THE  LIBRARY 

OF 

THE  UNIVERSITY 

OF  CALIFORNIA 

RIVERSIDE 

IN  MEMORY  OF 

Professor  Hairy  J.  Quqyle 


PRESENTED  BY 

'"Mrs  Fannie  Q.  Paul 
Mrs  Annie  Q.  Hadley 
Mrs  Elizabeth  Q.  Flowers 


J]  CO)  S  E  tPM  D  ft  E 


HISTOEY 


OF  THE 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE 


OP 


FRANCE  UNDER  NAPOLEON. 


BY 

M.   ADOLPHE    THIEES, 

LATE  PRIME  MINISTER  OF  FBANCE; 

MEMBER  OF  TEE  FRENCH  ACADEMY,  AND  OF  THE  INSTITUTE,  ETC.  ETC.  ETC.,  AUTHOB  OF  "TEE  HISTORY  OF  TEE 

FRINGE  REVOLUTION." 


TRANSLATED  BY 

D.  FORBES  CAMPBELL  AND  H.  W.  HERBERT. 


WITH  NOTES  AND  ADDITIONS. 


VOL.  II. 


PHILADELPHIA: 
J.    B,    LIPPING OTT   &    CO. 

1861. 


in  i 

^ 


Entered,  according  to  Act  of  Congress,  in  the  year  1861,  by 

J.  B.   LIPPINCOTT   4   CO., 
in  the  Clerk's  Office  of  the  District  Court  of  the  United  States  for  the  Eastern  District  of  Pennsylvania. 


HISTORY 

or 

THE  CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE 

or 

FRANCE 

UNDER 

NAPOLEON. 


BOOK  XXII. 

ULM    AND    TRAFALGAR. 

Consequences  of  the  Union  of  Genoa  with  the  Empire— That  Union,  though  a  Fault,  is  attended  with  beneficia. 
Results — A  vast  Field  opened  to  the  Military  Combinations  of  Napoleon — Four  Attacks  directed  against  France 
• — Napoleon  directs  his  serious  Attention  to  one  only,  and  by  the  Manner  in  •which  he  intends  to  repel  it,  he 
purposes  to  defeat  the  other  three — Explanation  of  his  Plan — Movement  of  the  six  Corps  d'Armee  from  the 
Shores  of  the  Ocean  to  the  Sources  of  the  Danube — Napoleon  keeps  his  Dispositions  a  profound  Secret,  and 
communicates  them  to  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  alone,  in  order  to  attach  that  Prince  by  relieving  him  from 
Apprehension — Precautions  taken  by  him  for  the  Preservation  of  the  Flotilla — His  return  to  Paris — Change  in 
the  Public  Opinion  in  regard  to  him — Censures  passed  upon  him— State  of  the  Finances — Commencement  of 
Arrears — Difficult  Situation  of  the  principal  commercial  Towns — Scarcity  of  Specie — Efforts  of  Commerce  to 
procure  the  Precious  Metals — Association  of  the  Company  of  the  United  Merchants  with  the  Court  of  Spain — 
Speculation  with  Dollars — Danger  of  that  Speculation — The  Company  of  United  Merchants,  having  blended  in 
their  Hands  the  Affairs  of  France  and  Spain,  extend  the  Embarrassment  of  one  to  the  other — Consequences  of 
this  Situation  for  the  Bank  of  France — Irritation  of  Napoleon  against  the  Men  of  Business — Important  Sums  in 
Silver  and  Gold  sent  to  Strasburg  and  Italy — Levy  of  the  Conscription  by  a  Decree  of  the  Senate — Organization 
of  the  Reserves — Employment  of  the  National  Guard — Meeting  of  the  Senate — Coldness  shown  towards  Napo- 
leon by  the  People  of  Paris — Napoleon  is  somewhat  vexed  at  it,  but  sets  out  for  the  Army,  certain  of  soon 
changing  that  Coldness  into  Transports  of  Enthusiasm — Dispositions  of  the  Coalition — March  of  two  Russian 
Armies,  one  into  Gallicia  to  assist  the  Austrians,  the  other  into  Poland  to  threaten  Prussia — The  Emperor 
Alexander  at  Pulawi — His  Negotiations  with  the  Court  of  Berlin — March  of  the  Austrians  into  Lombardy  and 
Bavaria — Passage  of  the  Inn  by  General  Mack — The  Elector  of  Bavaria,  after  great  Perplexities,  throws 
himself  into  the  Arms  of  France,  and  retires  to  Wurzburg  with  his  Court  and  Army — General  Mack  takes 
Position  at  Ulm — Conduct  of  the  Court  of  Naples — Commencement  of  Military  Operations  on  the  Part  of  the 
French — Organization  of  the  Grand  Army — Passage  of  the  Rhine — March  of  Napoleon  with  Six  Corps  along 
the  Suabian  Alps  to  turn  General  Mack — Napoleon  reaches  the  Danube  near  Donauwerth  before  General  Mack 
has  any  Suspicion  of  the  Presence  of  the  French — General  Passage  of  the  Danube — General  Mack  is  enve- 
loped— Battles  of  Wertingen  and  Giinsburg — Napoleon,  at  Augsburg,  makes  his  Dispositions  whh  the  two^fold 
Object  of  investing  Ulm  and  occupying  Munich,  for  the  Purpose  of  separating  the  Russians  from  Ihe  Austrians 
— Error  committed  by  Murat — Danger  of  Dupont's  Division — Battle  of  Haslach — Napoleon  hastens  beneath  the 
Walls  of  Ulm.  and  repairs  the  Faults  committed — Battle  of  Elchingen  on  the  14th  of  October — Investment  of 
Ulm — Despair  of  General  Mack  and  Retreat  of  the  Archduke  Ferdinand — The  Austrian  Army  is  obliged  to 
capitulate — Unexampled  Triumph  of  Napoleon — He  destroys  in  twenty  Days  an  army  of  Eighty  Thousand  Men 
without  a  general  Engagement — Naval  Operations  after  the  Return  of  AdmiralVilleneuve  to  Cadiz — Severity 
of  Napoleon  towards  that  Admiral — Admiral  Rosilly  is  sent  to  supersede  him,  and  Orders  are  given  to  the 
Fleet  to  leave  Cadiz  and  proceed  into  the  Mediterranean — Vexation  of  Admiral  Villeneuve,  who  resolves  to 
fight  a  desperate  Battle — The  two  Fleets  meet  off  Cape  Trafalgar — Attack  of  the  English  in  Two  Columns — 
They  break  the  French  line  of  Battle — Heroic  Conflicts  of  the  Rerloutable.  Bueentaure,  Fauguevx.  Algesiras,  Pluton, 
AchiUe.  and  Prince  of  Asturias — Death  of  Nelson,  Captivity  of  Villeneuve — Defeat  of  our  Fleet  after  a  memorable 
Struggle — Tremendous  Storm  after  the  Engagement — Shipwrecks  succeed  Fights — Conduct  of  the  Imperial 
Government  towards  the  French  Navy — Silence  ordered  respecting  the  late  Events — Ulm  causes  Trafalgar  to> 
be  forgotten. 


IT  was  an  egregious  fault  to  unite  Genoa 
with  France,  on  the  very  eve  of  the  expedition 
against  England,  and  thus  to  furnish  Austria 
with  the  last  reason  that  must  decide  her  to 
war.  It  was  provoking  and  drawing  upon  one's 
self  a  formidable  coalition  at  a  moment  when 
one  had  need  of  absolute  peace  upon  the  Con- 
tinent, in  order  to  have  the  utmost  freedom  of 
action  ajrainst  England.  Napoleon,  it  is  true, 
had  not  foreseen  the  consequences  of  the  union 
of  Genoa ;  his  error  consisted  in  despising 
Austria  too  much,  and  in  believing  her  to  be 
incapable  of  acting,  whatever  liberty  he  might 

Vol.  II.— 2 


take  with  her.  Though  he  has  been  justly 
censured  for  this  union,  effected  under  such 
circumstances,  still  it  was  in  reality  a  fortu 
nate  event.  No  doubt,  had  Admiral  Villeneuve 
been  able  to  sail  up  the  Channel,  and  to  appear 
off  Boulogne,  there  would  be  reason  to  regret 
for  ever  the  derangement  of  the  execution'of 
the  most  gigantic  plan ;  but  as  that  admiral* 
did  not  arrive,  Napoleon,  reduced  once  more- 
to  inaction,  unless  he  had  been  rash  enough  to 
cross  the  Strait  without  the  protection  of  a 
fleet,  Napoleon  would  have  found  himself  in 
extreme  embarrassment.  This  expedition,  so 

9 


10 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Aug.  1805. 


frequently  announced,  and  which  had  miscar- 
ried thrice  successively,  would  at  last  have 
exposed  him  to  a  sort  of  ridicule,  and  would 
have  exhibited  him  to  the  eyes  of  Europe  as 
in  a  real  state  of  impotence  in  opposition  to 
England.  The  continental  coalition,  furnish- 
ing him  with  a  field  of  battle  which  he  needed, 
repaired  the  fault  that  he  had  committed  by 
coming  itself  to  commit  one,  and  drew  him 
most  seasonably  from  an  indecisive  and  un- 
pleasant situation.  The  chain  which  links  to- 
gether the  affairs  of  this  world  is  sometimes 
a  very  strange  one.  Frequently,  the  judicious 
combination  fails,  and  that  which  is  faulty 
succeeds  This,  however,  is  not  an  absolute 
motive  for  declaring  all  prudence  vain,  and  for 
preferring  to  it  the  impulsions  of  caprice  in 
the  government  of  empires.  No,  we  ought 
always  to  prefer  calculation  to  impulse  in  the 
conduct  of  affairs;  but  we  cannot  help  ac- 
knowledging that  the  designs  of  man  are  over- 
ruled by  the  designs  of  Providence,  more  sure, 
more  profound,  than  his.  It  is  a  reason  for 
modesty,  not  for  abdication,  to  human  wisdom. 
One  must  have  had  a  close  view  of  the  dif- 
ficulties of  government,  one  must  have  felt 
how  difficult  it  is  to  form  great  determinations, 
to  prepare  them,  to  accomplish  them,  to  move 
men  and  things,  in  order  to  appreciate  the  re- 
solution which  Napoleon  took  on  this  occasion. 
The  mortification  of  witnessing  the  miscar- 
riage of  the  Boulogne  expedition  having  once 
passed  off,  he  turned  his  whole  attention  to  his 
new  plan  of  continental  war.  Never  had  he 
greater  resources  at  his  disposal;  never  had  a 
wider  lield  of  operations  opened  to  his  view. 
When  he  commanded  the  army  of  Italy,  he 
found  his  movements  bounded  by  the  plain  of 
Lombardy  and  the  circle  of  the  Alps;  and  if 
he  thought  of  extending  his  views  beyond  that 
circle,  the  alarmed  prudence  of  Carnot,  the 
director,  stepped  forward  to  check  him  in  his 
combinations.  When,  as  First  Consul,  he  con- 
ceived the  plan  of  the  campaign  of  1800,  he 
was  obliged  to  humour  lieutenants  who  were 
still  his  equals ;  and  if,  for  example,  he  de- 
vised for  Moreau  a  plan  which  would  proba- 
bly have  been  attended  with  the  most  fortunate 
consequi  nces,  he  was  stopped  by  the  timid 
spirit  of  that  general ;  he  was  forced  to  allow 
him  to  act  in  his  own  sure  but  limited  manner, 
and  to  confine  himself  within  the  sequestered 
field  of  Piedmont.  It  is  true  that  he  signalized 
his  presence  there  by  an  operation  which  will 
for  ever  remain  a  prodigy  of  the  art  of  war, 
but  still  his  genius,  in  striving  to  expand  itself, 
had  met  with  obstacles.  For  the  first  time  he 
was  free,  free  as  Caesar  and  Alexander  had 
been.  Such  of  his  companions  in  arms,  whose 
jealousy  or  whose  reputation  rendered  them 
troublesome,  had  excluded  themselves  from  the 
lists  by  their  imprudent  and  guilty  conduct. 
He  had  left  him  none  but  lieutenants  submis- 
sive to  his  will,  and  combining  in  the  highest 
degree  all  the  qualities  necessary  for  the  ex- 
ecution of  his  designs.  His  army,  weary  of 
long  inaction,  eager  for  glory  and  battle,  trained 
by  ten  years  of  war  and  three  of  encampment, 
was  prepared  for  the  most  difficult  enterprises, 
for  liie  most  daring  marches.  All  Europe  was 
•>pen  to  his  combinations.  He  was  in  the 


West,  on  the  shores  of  the  North  Sea  and  the 
Channel;  and  Austria,  assisted  by  Russian, 
Swedish,  Italian,  and  English  forces,  was  in  the 
East,  pushing  upon  France  masses  which  a  sort 
of  European  conspiracy  had  placed  at  her  dis- 
posal. The  situation,  the  means,  every  thing, 
were  grand.  But  if  France  had  never  been  better 
able  to  cope  with  sudden  and  serious  dangers, 
so  never  had  the  difficulty  been  equally  great 
That  army,  so  prepared  that  we  may  affirm  such 
another  never  existed,  that  army  was  on  the 
shores  of  the  Ocean,  far  from  the  Rhine,  the 
Danube,  the  Alps,  which  explains  why  the  con- 
tinental powers  had  suffered  it  to  assemble 
without  remonstrating,  and  it  was  necessary  to 
transport  it  all  at  once  to  the  centre  of  the  con- 
tinent. There  was  the  problem  to  be  resolved. 
We  shall  see  how  Napoleon  managed  to  tra- 
verse the  space  that  separated  him  from  his 
enemies,  and  to  throw  himself  among  them  at 
the  most  suitable  point  for  dissolving  their  for- 
midable coalition. 

Although  he  had  persisted  in  believing  that 
the  war  was  not  so  near  at  hand  as  it  really 
was,  he  had  completely  settled  the  preparations 
and  the  plan.  Sweden  was  making  arma- 
ments at  Stralsund  in  Swedish  Pomcrania; 
Russia,  at  Revel,  in  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  Two 
strong  Russian  armies  were  alleged  to  be  con- 
centrating themselves,  one  in  Poland,  in  order 
to  hurry  away  Prussia,  the  other  in  Gallicia, 
to  assist  Austria.  It  was  not  merely  suspected 
but  known  with  certainty  that  two  Austrian 
armies  were  forming,  one  of  80,000  men  in 
Bavaria,  the  other  of  100,000  men  in  Italy, 
both  connected  by  a  corps  of  25  or  30  thou- 
sand in  Tyrol.  Lastly,  Russians,  assembled  at 
Corfu,  English  at  Malta,  and  symptoms  of 
agitation  in  the  court  of  Naples,  left  no  room 
to  doubt  that  some  attempt  would  be  made  to- 
wards the  south  of  Italy. 

Four  attacks  then  were  preparing:  the  first, 
in  the  North,  from  Pomerania,  on  Hanover  and 
Holland,  was  to  be  executed  by  Swedes,  Rus- 
sians, and  English  ;  the  second,  in  the  East,  by 
the  valley  of  the  Danube,  assigned  to  Austrians 
and  Russians  united;  the  third  in  Lombardy, 
reserved  for  Austrians  alone;  the  fourth  on  the 
south  of  Italy,  was  to  be  undertaken,  rather 
later,  by  a  force  composed  of  Russians,  Eng- 
lish, and  Neapolitans. 

Napoleon  had  as  complete  a  comprehension 
of  this  plan  as  if  he  had  been  present  at  the 
military  conferences  of  M.  de  Winzingerode  at 
Vienna,  to  which  we  have  already  adverted. 
There  was  but  one  more  circumstance  yet  un- 
known to  him,  likewise  to  his  enemies — should 
they  gain  Prussia?  Napoleon  did  not  think  so. 
The  coalesced  powers  hoped  to  effect  this  by 
intimidating  King  Frederick  William.  In  this 
case,  the  attack  in  the  North,  instead  of  being 
an  accessory  attempt,  greatly  cramped  by  ihe 
neutrality  of  Prussia,  would  become  a  threat- 
ening enterprise  against  the  empire,  from  Co- 
logne to  the  mouths  of  the  Rhine.  This,  how- 
ever, was  not  at  all  probable,  and  Napoleon 
considered  only  the  two  grand  attacks  from 
Bavaria  and  Lombardy  as  serious,  and  re- 
garded those  preparing  in  Pomerania  and  to- 
wards the  kingdom  of  Naples  as  at  most 
deserving  of  some  precautions. 


Aug.  1805.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


II 


He  resolved  to  direct  the  bulk  of  his  forces 
into  the  valley  of  t.ie  Danube,  and  to  frustrate 
all  the  secondary  attacks  by  the  manner  in 
which  he  should  repulse  the  principal.  His 
profound  conception  was  based  on  a  very  sim- 
ple fact,  the  distance  of  the  Russians,  which 
would  be  likely  to  make  them  arrive  late  to 
the  assistance  of  the  Austrians.  He  thought 
that  the  Austrians,  impatient  to  fall  upon  Ba- 
varia, and  to  occupy,  according  to  their  cus- 
tom, the  favourite  position  of  Ulm,  would,  by 
acting  in  that  manner,  add  to  the  distance 
which  naturally  separated  them  from  the  Rus- 
sians ;  that  the  latter  would  consequently  ap- 
pear late  in  line,  ascending  the  Danube  with 
their  principal  army  united  to  the  Austrian 
reserves.  Crushing  the  Austrians  before  the 
arrival  of  the  Russians,  Napoleon  then  pur- 
posed to  fall  upon  the  latter,  deprived  of  the 
aid  of  the  principal  Austrian  army,  and  in- 
tended to  employ  the  expedient,  extremely  easy 
in  theory,  extremely  difficult  in  practice,  to 
beat  his  enemies  one  after  the  other. 

In  order  to  its  success,  this  plan  required  a 
particular  mode  of  moving  his  army  to  the 
theatre  of  operations,  that  is  to  say,  to  the 
valley  of  the  Danube.  If,  after  the  example 
of  Moreau,  Napoleon  should  ascend  the  Rhine, 
for  the  purpose  of  crossing  it  at  Strasburg  and 
Schaffhausen,  and  were  then  to  debouch  by 
the  defiles  of  the  Black  Forest  between  the 
Suabian  Alps  and  the  Lake  of  Constance,  and 
thus  attack  in  front  the  Austrians  posted  be- 
hind the  Iller,  from  Ulm  to  Memmingen,  he 
should  not  completely  fulfil  his  object.  Even 
in  beating  the  Austrians,  as  he  was  more  cer- 
tain than  ever  of  doing  with  the  army  trained 
in  the  camp  of  Boulogne,  he  should  drive  them 
before  him  upon  the  Russians,  and  should 
cause  them,  weakened  merely,  to  form  a  junc- 
tion with  their  northern  allies.  It  behoved 
him,  therefore,  as  at  Marengo,  and  still  more 
than  at  Marengo,  to  turn  the  Austrians,  and 
not  to  be  satisfied  with  beating  them,  but  to 
surround  them,  so  as  to  send  them  all  prison- 
ers into  France.  Then  Napoleon  could  throw 
himself  upon  the  Russians,  who  would  have 
no  other  support  but  the  Austrian  reserves. 

To  this  end,  a  perfectly  simple  march  oc- 
curred to  his  mind.  One  of  his  corps  d'armee, 
that  of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  was  in  Hanover, 
a  second,  General  Marmont's,  in  Holland,  the 
others  at  Boulogne.  He  conceived  the  idea  of 
making  the  first  descend  through  Hesse,  into 
Franconia,  upon  Wurzburg  and  the  Danube; 
of  making  the  second  advance  along  the  Rhine, 
taking  advantage  of  the  facilities  afforded  by 
thru  river,  and  of  uniting  it  at  Mayence  and 
Wurzburg  with  the  corps  coming  from  Hano- 
ver. While  these  two  great  detachments  were 
to  descend  from  north  to  south,  Napoleon  re- 
solved to  transport,  by  a  movement  from  west 
to  east,  from  Boulogne  to  Strasburg,  the  corps 
encamped  on  the  shores  of  the  Channel,  to 
feign  with  these  latter  a  direct  attack  by  the 
Black  Forest,  but  in  reality  to  leave  that  forest 
on  the  right,  to  pass  to  the  leA  through  Wur- 
temburg,  in  order  to  join  in  Franconia  the 
corps  of  Bernadolte  and  Marmont,  to  cross  the 
Danube  below  Ulm,  in  the  environs  of  Donau- 
werth,  to  get  thus  into  the  rear  of  the  Aus- 


trians, to  surround  them,  to  take  them,  and, 
after  getting  rid  of  them,  march  upon  Vienna 
to  meet  the  Russians. 

The  position  of  Marshal  Bernadotte  coming 
from  Hanover,  of  General  Marmont  coming 
from  Holland,  was  an  advantage,  for  it  took 
one  of  them  but  seventeen  days,  the  other  only 
fourteen  or  fifteen,  to  reach  Wurzburg,  on  the 
flank  of  the  hostile  army  encamped  at  Ulm. 
The  movement  of  the  troops  starting  from 
Boulognefor  Strasburg  required  about  twenty- 
four  days,  and  this  was  to  fix  the  attention  of 
the  Austrians  on  the  ordinary  debouche  of  the 
Black  Forest.  In  the  space  of  twenty-four 
days,  that  is  to  say  about  the  25th  of  Septem- 
ber, Napoleon  might  therefore  have  arrived  at 
the  decisive  point.  By  adopting  an  immediate 
resolution,  by  concealing  his  movements  as 
long  as  possible,  by  his  further  stay  at  Bou- 
logne, by  circulating  false  reports,  by  disguis- 
ing his  intentions  with  that  art  for  deceiving 
an  enemy  which  he  possessed  in  a  supreme 
degree,  he  could  have  passed  the  Danube  in 
the  rear  of  the  Austrians  before  they  had  any 
suspicion  of  his  presence.  If  he  succeeded, 
he  should  rid  himself  in  the  month  of  October 
of  the  first  hostile  army;  he  would  employ 
that  of  November  in  marching  upon  Vienna, 
and  in  the  environs  of  that  capital  he  should 
meet  with  the  Russians,  whom  he  had  never 
seen,  whom  he  knew  to  be  steady  foot-soldiers, 
but  not  invincible,  for  Moreau  and  Massena 
had  already  beaten  them,  and  he  promised 
himself  to  beat  them  still  more  severely. 
Having  reached  Vienna,  he  should  have  got 
far  beyond  the  Austrian  army  of  Italy,  which 
would  become  an  urgent  motive  for  that  army 
to  retreat. 

The  plan  of  Napoleon  was  to  give  Massena, 
the  most  energetic  of  his  lieutenants,  and  the 
one  who  was  best  acquainted  with  Italy,  the 
command  of  the  French  army  on  the  Adige. 
It  was  to  consist  of  no  more  than  50,000  men, 
but  choice  troops,  for  they  had  made  all  the 
campaigns  beyond  the  Alps  from  Montenotte 
to  Marengo.  Provided  that  Massena  could 
detain  the  Archduke  Charles  on  the  Adige  for 
a  month,  which  seemed  beyond  doubt,  with 
soldiers  accustomed  to  conquer  the  Austrians, 
whatever  might  be  their  number,  and  under  a 
general  who  never  fell  back,  Napoleon,  having 
arrived  at  Vienna,  would  relieve  Lombardy  as 
he  had  relieved  Bavaria.  He  would  draw  the 
archduke  upon  himself,  but  at  the  same  time 
he  would  draw  Massena;  and  then,  uniting 
the  50,000  men  from  the  banks  of  the  Adige 
with  the  150,000  with  whom  he  had  marched 
along  the  Danube,  he  should  find  himself  at 
Vienna  at  the  head  of  200,000  victorious 
French.  Disposing  directly  of  such  a  mass 
of  forces,  having  thwarted  the  two  principal 
attacks,  those  of  Bavaria  and  Lombardy,  what 
need  he  care  about  the  two  others  prepared  in 
the  north  and  south,  towards  Hanover  and 
towards  Naples  1  Were  all  Europe  in  arms, 
he  would  have  nothing  to  fear  from  the  whole 
of  its  forces. 

Still  he  omitted  not  to  take  certain  preca? 
tions  in  regard  to  Lower  Italy.  General  St 
Cyr  occupied  Calabria  with  20,000  men.  Na- 
poleon gave  him  instructions  to  march  upon 


12 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Aug.  1805. 


Naples  and  make  himself  master  of  that  capi- 
tal on  the  first  symptom  of  hostility.  It  would, 
no  doubt,  have  been  more  consistent  with  his 
principles  not  to  cut  the  army  of  Italy  in  two, 
not  to  place  50,000  men  under  Massena  on  the 
banks  of  the  Adige,  and  520,000  under  General 
St.  Cyr  in  Calabria;  to  unite  the  whole,  on  the 
contrary,  into  one  mass  of  70,000  men,  which, 
certain  to  conquer  in  the  north  of  Italy,  would 
have  little  to  fear  from  the  south.  But  he  con- 
ceived that  Massena,  with  50,000  men  and  his 
character,  would  be  sufficient  to  detain  the 
Archduke  Charles  for  a  month,  and  he  deemed 
it  dangerous  to  permit  the  Russians  and  the 
English  to  gain  a  footing  at  Naples,  and  to 
foment  in  Calabria  a  war  of  insurrection, 
which  it  would  be  difficult  to  extinguish.  For 
this  reason  he  left  General  St.  Cyr  and  20,000 
men  in  the  gulf  of  Tarento,  with  orders  to 
march  on  the  first  signal  to  Naples,  and  to 
throw  the  Russians  and  the  English  into  the 
sea,  before  they  had  time  to  establish  them- 
selves on  the  continent  of  Italy.  As  for  the 
attack  prepared  in  the  north  of  Europe,  at  such 
a  distance  from  the  frontiers  of  the  Empire, 
Napoleon  was  content  to  provide  against  it  by 
merely  continuing  the  negotiation  begun  at 
Berlin  relative  to  the  kingdom  of  Hanover. 
He  had  offered  that  kingdom  to  Prussia  as  the 
price  of  her  alliance ;  but,  having  scarcely 
any  hope  of  a  formal  alliance  on  the  part  of 
so  timid  a  court,  he  proposed  to  place  Hano- 
ver in  its  hands  in  pledge,  if  it  would  not 
receive  it  as  a  definitive  gift.  In  either  case,  it 
would  be  obliged  to  keep  the  belligerent  troops 
out  of  the  country,  and  its  neutrality  would 
consequently  suffice  to  cover  the  north  of 
Europe. 

Such  was  the  plan  conceived  by  Napoleon. 
Moving  his  corps  d'armee  by  rapid  and  unex- 
pected marches  from  Hanover,  Holland,  and 
Flanders,  into  the  heart  of  Germany,  passing 
the  Danube,  below  Ulm,  separating  the  Aus- 
trians  from  the  Russians,  enveloping  the 
former,  overthrowing  the  latter,  then  pushing 
on  through  the  valley  of  the  Danube  to  Vienna, 
and  by  this  movement  relieving  Massena  in 
Italy,  he  should  soon  have  repulsed  the  two 
principal  attacks  directed  against  his  Empire. 
His  victorious  armies  being  thus  united  under 
the  walls  of  Vienna,  he  should  no  longer  need 
o  give  himself  any  concern  about  an  attempt 
m  the  south  of  Italy,  which,  besides,  General 
St.  Cyr  would  frustrate,  and  another  in  the 
north  of  Germany,  which  would  be  cramped 
on  all  sides  by  the  Prussian  neutrality. 

Never  had  captain  either  in  ancient  or  mo- 
dern times  conceived  and  executed  plans  on 
such  a  scale.  Never,  indeed,  had  a  more 
mighty  mind,  possessing  greater  freedom  of 
will,  commanding  means  more  prodigious, 
had  to  operate  on  such  an  extent  of  country. 
What  is  it,  in  fact,  that  we  see  on  most  occa- 
sions 1  Irresolute  governments,  deliberating 
when  they  ought  to  act,  improvident  govern- 
ments, which  think  of  organizing  their  forces 
when  they  ought  to  be  on  the  field  of  battle, 
and  under  them  subordinate  generals,  scarcely 
capable  of  stirring  on  the  circumscribed  theatre 
assigned  to  their  operations.  Here,  on  the 
contrary,  genius,  decision,  foresight,  absolute 


freedom  of  action,  all  concurred  in  the  same 
man  and  to  the  same  end.  It  is  rarely  that 
such  circumstances  are  combined,  but  when 
they  do  meet  together,  the  world  has  a  master. 
In  the  last  days  of  the  month  of  August,  the 
Austrians  were  already  on  the  banks  of  the 
Adige  and  the  Inn,  the  Russians  on  the  fron- 
tiers of  Gallicia.  It  seemed  as  if  they  should 
surprise  Napoleon  ;  but  that  was  not  the  case* 
He  gave  all  his  orders  at  Boulogne  on  the  26th 
of  August,  but  with  the  recommendation  not  to 
issue  them  till  ten  at  night  on  the  27th.  His 
object  in  this  was  to  reserve  for  himself  the 
whole  of  the  27th  before  he  definitively  re- 
nounced his  grand  maritime  expedition.  The 
courier  despatched  on  the  27th  would  not 
reach  Hanover  before  the  1st  of  September. 
Marshal  Bernadotte,  already  forewarned,  was 
to  commence  his  movement  on  the  2d  of  Sep- 
tember, to  have  collected  his  corps  on  the  6th 
at  Gottingen,  and  to  reach  Wiirzburg  by  the 
20th.  He  had  orders  to  collect  in  the  fortress 
of  Hameln  the  artillery  taken  from  the  Hano- 
verians, the  military  stores  of  all  kinds,  the 
sick,  the  depots  of  his  corps  d'armee,  and  a 
garrison  of  6000  men,  commanded  by  an  ener- 
getic officer,  who  could  be  relied  upon.  This 
garrison  was  to  be  provisioned  for  a  year.  If 
an  arrangement  were  concluded  with  Prussia 
for  Hanover,  the  troops  left  at  Hameln  were 
immediately  to  rejoin  Bernadotte's  corps ;  if 
not,  they  were  to  remain  in  that  fortress,  and 
to  defend  it  to  the  death,  in  case  the  English 
should  send  an  expedition  to  the  Weser,  which 
the  Prussian  neutrality  could  not  prevent.  "I 
shall  be,"  wrote  Napoleon,  "  as  prompt  as 
Frederick,  when  he  went  from  Prague  to 
Dresden  and  Berlin.  I  will  run  fast  enough 
to  the  relief  of  the  French  defending  my  eagles 
in  Hanover,  and  fling  into  the  Weser  the  ene- 
mies who  shall  have  come  from  that  quarter." 
Bernadotte  had  orders  to  traverse  the  two 
Hesses,  to  tell  the  governments  of  those  two 
principalities  that  he  was  returning  to  France 
by  Mayence,  to  force  a  passage  if  it  were  re- 
fused, but  to  march  with  money  in  his  hand, 
to  pay  for  every  thing,  and  to  observe  rigid 
discipline. 

On  the  same  evening  of  the  27th  of  August, 
a  courier  set  off  with  orders  for  General  Mar- 
mont  to  march  with  20,000  men  and  40  pieces 
of  cannon  well  horsed,  to  follow  the  banks  of 
the  Rhine  to  Mayence,  and  to  proceed  by 
Mayence  and  Frankfort  to  Wiirzburg.  This 
order  was  to  reach  Utrecht  on  the  30th  of  Au- 
gust. General  Marmont,  having  received  a 
previous  intimation,  was  to  set  himself  in  mo- 
tion on  the  1st  of  September,  to  arrive  at  Ma- 
yence on  the  15th  or  16th,  and  at  Wiirzburg 
on  the  18th  or  19th.  Thus  these  two  corps 
from  Hanover  and  Holland  were  to  be  amidst 
the  Franconian  principalities  of  the  elector  of 
Bavaria  from  the  18th  to  the  20th  of  Septem- 
ber, and  to  form  there  a  force  of  40,000  men. 
As  the  elector  had  been  recommended  to  retire 
to  Wiirzburg,  if  the  Austrians  should  attempt 
to  do  him  violence,  he  was  sure  of  finding 
there  a  succour  ready  prepared  for  his  person 
and  for  his  army. 

Lastly,  on  the  evening  of  the  27th  were  is- 
sued the  orders  for  the  camps  of  Ambleteuse, 


Aug.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


13 


Boulogne,  and  Montreuil.  These  orders  were 
to  begin  to  be  executed  on  the  morning  of  the 
29th.  On  the  first  day,  the  first  divisions  of 
each  corps  were  to  march  by  three  different 
romes,  on  the  second  day  the  second  divisions, 
on  the  third  day  the  last;  consequently,  they 
followed  each  other  at  twenty-four  hours'  dis- 
tance. The  three  routes  specified  were — for 
ihe  camp  of  Ambleteuse,  Cassel,  Lille,  Namur, 
Luxemburg,  Deux-Ponts,  Manheim ;  for  the 
tamp  of  Boulogne,  St.  Omer,  Douai,  Cambrai, 
Mezieres,  Verdun,  Metz,  Spire ;  for  the  camp 
if  Montreuil,  Arras,  La  Fere,  Reims,  Nancy, 
Saverne,  Strasburg.  As  it  would  require 
twenty-four  marches,  the  whole  army  might 
be  upon  the  Rhine  between  the  21st  and  the 
24th  of  September.  That  would  be  timely 
enoush  to  be  of  use  (here;  for  the  Austrians, 
unwilling  to  make  any  stir  in  order  to  be  the 
more  sure  of  surprising  the  French,  had  con- 
tinued in  the  camp  of  Wels  near  Linz,  and 
consequently  could  not  be  in  line  before  Na- 
poleon. Besides,  the  further  they  advanced 
upon  the  Upper  Danube,  the  nearer  they  ap- 
proached to  the  frontier  of  France  between  the 
lake  of  Constance  and  Schaffhausen,  the  more 
chances  Napoleon  had  of  enveloping  them. 
Officers,  despatched  with  funds  to  all  the  roads 
which  the  troops  were  to  travel,  were  directed 
to  get  provisions  prepared  for  them  at  every 
station.  Formal  and  several  times  repeated 
orders,  like  all  those  given  by  Napoleon,  en- 
joined that  each  soldier  should  be  furnished 
with  a  great  coat  and  two  pair  of  shoes. 

Napoleon,  closely  keeping  his  secret,  which 
was  intrusted  to  none  but  Berthier  and  M. 
Daru,  said  to  those  about  him  that  he  was 
sending  30,000  men  to  the  Rhine.  He  wrote 
to  the  same  effect  to  most  of  his  ministers. 
He  communicated  nothing  more  to  M.  de  Mar- 
bois,  and  merely  directed  him  to  collect  as 
much  money  as  possible  in  the  chests  at  Stras- 
burg, which  the  avowed  mission  of  30,000  men 
to  Alsace  was  sufficient  to  account  for.  He 
ordered  M.  Daru  to  set  out  immediately  for  Pa- 
ris, to  go  to  M.  Dejean,  minister  of  the  materiel 
of  war,  to  write  with  his  own  hand  all  the  ac- 
ce>sory  orders  required  by  the  displacing  of 
the  army,  and  not  to  let  a  sing'e  clerk  into  the 
secret.  Napoleon  resolved  to  stay  himself  six 
or  seven  days  longer  at  Boulogne,  ihe  better  to 
deceive  ihe  public  in  regard  to  his  plans. 

As  all  these  corps  were  to  traverse  France, 
excepting  that  of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  which 
was  to  give  itself  out  in  Germany  for  a  corps 
destined  to  recross  the  frontiers,  it  was  certain 
that  they  must  be  in  full  march  before  they 
gave  any  signs  of  their  presence,  before  these 
signs  were  transmuted  lo  Paris,  sent  from  Pa- 
ris abroad,  and  that  many  davs  must  elapse 
before  the  enemy  could  be  acquainted  with  the 


breaking  up  of  the  camp  of  Boulogne.  Be- 
sides, as  the  tidings  of  these  movements  could 
be  accounted  for  by  the  mission  of  30,000  men 
to  the  Rhine,  of  which  no  secret  was  made, 
they  left  the  most  perspicacious  minds  in  doubt ; 
and  there  was  a  great  chance  of  being  upon 
the  Rhine,  the  Neckar,  or  the  Mayn,  while  the 
army  was  supposed  to  be  still  on  the  shores 
of  the  Channel.  Napoleon  at  the  same  time 
sent  away  Murat  and  his  aides-de-camp,  Sa- 
vary  and  Bertrand,'  to  Franconia,  Suabia,  and 
Bavaria.  They  had  orders  to  explore  all  the 
roads  leading  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Danube, 
to  observe  the  nature  of  each  of  these  roads, 
the  military  positions  to  be  found  upon  them, 
the  means  of  subsistence  which  they  afforded; 
lastly,  all  the  suitable  points  for  crossing  the 
Danube.  Murat  was  to  travel  under  a  fic- 
titious name,  and,  having  finished  his  survey, 
to  return  to  Strasburg,  and  there  take  the  com- 
mand of  the  first  columns  that  should  reach 
the  Rhine. 

To  leave  the  Russians  in  ignorance  of  his 
resolutions  as  long  as  possible.  Napoleon 
moreover  recommended  to  M.  de  Talleyrand 
to  delay  the  manifesto  destined  for  the  cabinet 
of  Vienna,  and  the  purport  of  which  was  to 
summon  that  cabinet  to  explain  itself  defini- 
tively. In  reply  to  this  summons  he  expected 
from  it  nothing  but  falsehoods,  and,  as  for  con- 
victing it  of  duplicity  before  the  face  of  Eu- 
rope, it  would  be  time  enough  to  do  that  at  the 
moment  of  the  first  hostilities.  He  despatched 
General  Thiard,  who  had  entered  into  the  ser- 
vice of  France  on  the  return  of  the  emigrants, 
to  Carlsruhe,  and  charged  him  to  negotiate  an 
alliance  with  the  grand  duchy  of  Baden.  He 
addressed  offers  of  the  like  nature  to  Wurtem- 
berg,  alleging  that  he  foresaw  war,  judging 
from  the  preparations  of  Austria,  but  never 
hinting  how  far  he  was  ready  to  commence  it. 
In  short,  it  was  to  the  elector  of  Bavaria  alone 
that  he  communicated  the  whole  secret  of  his 
plans.  That  unfortunate  prince,  hesitating 
between  Austria,  which  was  his  enemy,  and 
France,  which  was  his  friend,  but  the  one 
near,  the  other  distant;  recollecting  too  that  in 
preceding  wars,  invariably  trampled  upon  by 
both,  he  had  always  been  forgotten  at  the 
peace,  this  unfortunate  prince  knew  not  to 
which  to  attach  himself.  He  was  aware  that, 
if  he  gave  himself  up  to  France,  he  might  ex- 
pect accessions  of  territory;  but,  still  ignorant 
of  the  breaking  up  of  the  camp  of  Boulogne, 
he  beheld  her,  at  the  period  of  which  we  are 
treating,  wholly  occupied  by  her  struggle  with 
England,  importuned  by  her  German  allies, 
and  unable  to  assist  them.  Accordingly,  he 
was  incessantly  talking  of  an  alliance  to  our 
minister,  M.  Otto,  without  ever  daring  to  con- 
clude one.  This  state  of  things  was  soon 


1  BERTRAXD.  HENRI  GRATIEN,  COUNT— General  of  di- 
vision, aid-de-rnmp  to  Napuleon,  grand-marshal  of  the 
palare.  &c.  He  was  born  of  parents  in  the  mi<tdle  ranks, 
entered  the  military  service  as  An  engineer  and  rose  to 
the  rank  of  general  of  brigade.  In  the  camp  at  Boulogne, 
in  1801,  Napoleon  became  acquainted  with  his  merit,  and 
from  that  time  Bertrand  was  constantly  wilh  him.  He 
was  his  aid-de-camp  at  Atisterlitz.  In  1806,  took  Span- 
dau  after  an.  attack  of  a  few  days.  In  1607,  contributed 
largely  to  the  victory  at  Friedland.  In  1809,  bridged 


the  Danube  in  a  most  masterly  manner  after  Aspern. 
Oi-itingnished  himself  at  I.ut/en,  Bautzen,  and  Leipsic, 
in  1812  and  1S13;  after  Leipsic,  defended  Lindennu  against 
Grulay,  and  covered  Mentz  after  the  battle  of  Hanau,  till 
Ihe  army  had  passed  the  Rhine.  He  took  part  in  the 
campaign  of  1814,  accompanied  Napoleon  to  Elba,  sHared 
the  100  days  wilh  him,  and  going  with  him  to  St.  Helena, 
remained  with  him  until  his  death,  after  which  be  re- 
turned to  France. — Encyclopaedia  Americana.  u 

B 


14 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Aug.  1--5. 


changed,  in  consequence  of  the  letters  of  Napo- 
leon. The  latter  wrote  directly  to  the  elector, 
informing  him  (as  a  secret  of  state  intrusted 
to  his  honour)  that  he  had  deferred  his  plans 
against  England,  and  should  march  immedi- 
ately with  200,000  men  into  the  heart  of  Ger- 
many. "  You  shall  be  succoured  in  time,"  he 
sent  him  word,  "and  the  vanquished  house  of 
Austria  shall  be  forced  to  compose  for  you  a 
considerable  state  with  the  wrecks  of  its  patri- 
mony."— Napoleon  made  a  point  of  gaining 
that  elector,  who  had  25,000  well  organized 
soldiers,  and  magazines,  abundantly  supplied, 
in  Bavaria.  It  would  be  an  important  advan- 
tage to  snatch  these  25,000  soldiers  from  the 
coalition,  and  to  secure  them  for  himself.  For 
the  rest,  the  secret  was  not  in  danger,  for  that 
prince  felt  a  real  hatred  for  the  Austrians; 
and,  when  once  set  at  ease,  he  desired  no  bet- 
ter than  to  ally  himself  with  France. 

Napoleon  then  turned  his  attention  to  the 
army  of  Italy.  He  ordered  the  troops  dispersed 
in  Parma,  Genoa,  Piedmont,  and  Lombardy,  to 
be  assembled  under  the  walls  of  Verona.  He 
withdrew  the  command  of  those  troops  from 
Marshal  Jourdan,  observing  the  greatest  deli- 
cacy towards  that  personage,  whom  he  es- 
teemed, but  whose  character  he  deemed  un- 
equal to  the  circumstances,  and  who  moreover 
was  wholly  unacquainted  with  the  country 
situated  between  the  Po  and  the  Alps.  He 
promised  to  employ  him  on  the  Rhine,  where 
he  had  always  fought,  and  directed  Massena 
to  set  off  without  delay.  The  distance  at 
which  Italy  was,  caused  the  divulging  of  these 
orders  to  be  attended  with  little  danger,  for  it 
could  not  but  be  late. 

These  dispositions  arranged,  he  devoted  the 
remaining  time  that  he  had  to  pass  at  Bou- 
logne in  prescribing  himself  the  most  minute 
precautions  for  securing  the  flotilla  from  all 
attacks  on  the  part  of  the  English.  It  was  na- 
tural to  suppose  that  they  would  take  advan- 
tage of  the  departure  of  the  army  to  attempt  a 
landing,  and  to  burn  the  stores  accumulated 
in  the  basins.  Napoleon,  who  had  not  re- 
nounced the  intention  of  returning  soon  to  the 
coasts  of  the  ocean,  after  a  successful  war, 
and  who  moreover  was  most  unwilling  to  ex- 
pose himself  to  so  mortifying  an  insult  as  the 
burning  of  the  flotilla,  enjoined  the  following 
precautions  to  the  ministers  Decres  and  Ber- 
thier.  The  divisions  of  Etaples  and  Vimereux 
were  to  be  united  with  those  of  Boulogne  and 
all  placed  at  the  extremity  of  the  basin  of  the 
Liane,  out  of  reach  of  the  enemy's  projectiles. 
The  same  precaution  could  not  be  taken  for 
the  Dutch  flotilla  which  was  at  Ambleteuse, 
but  every  thing  was  so  arranged  that  the  troops 
stationed  at  Boulogne  could  hasten  to  that 
point  in  two  or  three  hours.  Netting  of  a  par- 
ticular kind,  attached  to  a  heavy  anchor,  pre- 
vented the  introduction  of  the  incendiary  ma- 
chines which  might  be  launched  under  the 
form  of  floating  bodies. 

Three  entire  regiments,  including  their  third 
battalion,  were  left  at  Boulogne.  To  these 
were  added  twelve  third  battalions  of  the  regi- 
ments which  set  out  for  Germany.  The  sail- 
ors belonging  to  the  flotilla  were  formed  into 
fifteen  battalions  of  a  thousand  men  each. 


They  were  armed  with  muskets,  and  officers 
of  infantry  appointed  to  train  them.  They 
were  to  do  duty  alternately  either  on  board 
the  vessels  continuing  afloat,  or  about  those 
aground  in  the  port  This  assemblage  of  land 
troops  and  seamen  formed  a  force  of  thirty-six 
battalions,  commanded  by  generals  and  a 
marshal,  Marshal  Brune,  the  same  who,  in 
1799,  had  thrown  the  Russians  and  the  Eng- 
lish into  the  sea.  Napoleon  gave  orders  for 
the  construction  of  entrenchments  on  land  all 
round  Boulogne,  to  cover  the  flotilla  and  the 
immense  magazines  which  he  had  formed. 
He  desired  that  picked  officers  should  be  at- 
tached to  each  entrenched  position,  and  that 
they  should  remain  constantly  at  the  same 
post,  in  order  that,  answering  for  its  safety, 
they  might  study  incessantly  to  improve  its 
defences. 

He  then  charged  M.  Decres  to  assemble  the 
naval  officers,  Marshal  Berthier  to  assemble 
the  military  officers,  to  explain  to  both  the  im- 
portance of  the  post  confided  to  their  honour, 
to  console  them  for  being  left  inactive  while 
their  comrades  were  gone  to  fight,  to  promise 
that  they  should  be  employed  in  their  turn, 
that  they  should  even  have  before  long  the 
glory  of  concurring  in  the  expedition  to  Eng 
land  ;  for,  after  punishing  the  continent  for  its 
aggression,  Napoleon  would  come  back  to 
the  shores  of  the  Channel,  perhaps  the  next 
spring. 

Napoleon  was  personally  present  at  the  de- 
parture of  all  the  divisions  of  the  army.  It 
would  be  difficult  to  form  any  conception  of 
their  joy,  of  their  ardour,  when  they  learned 
that  they  were  going  to  be  employed  in  a  great 
war.  It  was  five  years  since  they  had  been 
in  battle ;  and  for  two  and  a  half  they  had 
been  waiting  in  vain  for  an  opportunity  to 
cross  over  to  England.  Old  and  young  sol- 
diers, become  equals  from  living  several  years 
together,  confident  in  their  officers,  enthusiasts 
for  the  chief  who  was  to  lead  them  to  victory, 
hoping  for  the  highest  rewards  from  a  system 
which  had  raised  a  fortunate  soldier  to  the 
throne,  full,  in  short,  of  the  sentiment  which 
at  that  period  had  superseded  every  other,  the 
love  of  glory — all,  old  and  young,  ardently 
longed  for  war,  battles,  dangers,  and  distant 
expeditions.  They  had. conquered  the  Austri- 
ans, the  Prussians,  the  Russians;  they  de- 
spised all  the  soldiers  of  Europe,  and  did  not 
imagine  that  there  was  an  army  in  the 
world  capable  of  resisting  them.  Broken  to 
fatigue,  like  real  Roman  legions,  they  felt  no 
horror  of  long  marches  which  were  to  lead  to 
the  conquest  of  the  continent.  They  set  off 
singing  and  shouting  "  Vive  VEmpereur!"  beg- 
ging for  as  speedy  a  meeting  as  possible  with 
the  enemy.  It  is  true  that,  in  those  hearts, 
boiling  over  with  courage,  there  was  less  pure 
patriotism  than  in  the  soldiers  of  '92 ;  there 
was  more  ambition,  but  a  noble  ambition,  that 
of  glory,  of  rewards  legitimately  acquired, 
and  a  confidence,  a  contempt  of  dangers  and 
difficulties,  which  constitute  the  soldier  des- 
tined for  great  things.  The  volunteers  of  '92 
were  eager  to  defend  their  country  against  an, 
unjust  invasion  ;  the  veteran  soldiers  of  1805, 
to  render  it  the  first  power  in  'he  world.  Lei 


Sept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


15 


us  not  make  a  distinction  between  such  senti- 
ments :  it  is  praiseworthy  to  hasten  to  the  de- 
v.nce  of  one's  country  when  in  danger;  it  is 
equally  praiseworthy  to  devote  one's  self  that 

may  be  great  and  glorious. 

After  seeing,  with  his  own  eyes,  his  army 
commence  its  march,  Napoleon  set  out  from 
Boulogne,  on  the  2d  of  September,  and  arrived 
on  the  3d  at  Malmaison.  Nobody  was  in- 
formed of  his  resolutions ;  he  was  supposed 
to  be  still  engaged  with  his  plans  against 
England:  people  merely  felt  uneasy  respect- 
ing the  intentions  of  Austria,  and  they  ac- 
counted for  the  march  of  troops  which  began 
to  be  talked  of  by  the  mission  already  pub- 
lished of  a  corps  of  30,000  men,  which  was  to 
watch  the  Austrians  on  the  upper  Rhine. 

The  public,  not  correctly  acquainted  with 
facts,  ignorant  to  what  a  point  a  profound 
English  intrigue  had  knitted  the  bonds  of  a 
new  coalition,  censured  Napoleon  for  having 
pushed  Austria  to  extremity  by  placing  the 
crown  of  Italy  on  his  head,  uniting  Genoa  to 
the  Empire,  and  giving  Lucca  to  the  Princess 
Elisa.  They  ceased  not  to  admire  him;  they 
deemed  themselves  extremely  fortunate  in  liv- 
ing under  a  government  so  firm,  so  just,  as  his  ; 
but  they  found  fault  with  his  excessive  fondness 
for  that  in  which  he  so  highly  excelled,  his  fond- 
ness for  war.  No  one  could  believe  that  he  was 
unfortunate  under  such  a  captain  ;  but  people 
heard  talk  of  Austria,  of  Russia,  of  part  of 
Germany  being  in  the  pay  of  England:  they 
knew  not  whether  this  new  struggle  would  be 
of  short  or  long  duration,  and  they  recollected 
involuntarily  the  distresses  of  the  first  wars 
of  the  Revolution.  Confidence,  however,  pre- 
dominated far  overall  other  sentiments  ;  but 
a  slight  murmur  of  disapprobation,  extremely 
perceptible  to  the  sensitive  ears  of  Napoleon, 
was  nevertheless  heard. 

What  contributed  more  particularly  to  ren- 
der the  sensations  experienced  by  the  public 
the  more  painful,  was  the  extreme  financial 
embarrassment.  It  was  produced  by  different 
causes.  Napoleon  had  persisted  in  his  plan  of 
never  borrowing.  "  While  I  live,"  he  wrote  to 
M.  de  Marbois,  "  I  will  not  issue  any  paper." 
(Milan,  May  18,  1805.)  In  fact,  the  discredit 
produced  by  the  assignats,  the  mandats,  and 
ail  ihe  issues  of  paper,  still  continued,  and  all- 
powerful,  all-dreaded  as  the  Emperor  of  the 
French  then  was,  he  could  not  have  forced  an 
annuity  of  5  francs  to  be  accepted  for  a  capi- 
tal of  more  than  50  francs,  which  would  have 
constituted  a  loan  at  10  per  cent.  Serious 
embarrassments,  however,  resulted  from  this 
situation,  for  the  wealthiest  country  could  not 
defray  the  expenses  of  war  without  throwing 
part  of  them  upon  the  future. 

We  have  already  explained  the  state  of  the 
budgets.  That  of  the  year  XII.  (September, 
1803  to  September,  1804,)  estimated  at  700 
millions,  exclusive  of  the  costs  of  collection, 
had  amounted  to  762.  Fortunately,  the  taxes 
had  received  from  the  public  prosperity,  which 
war  did  not  interrupt  under  this  powerful  go- 
vernment, an  increase  of  about  40  millions. 
The  produce  of  the  registration  amounted  to 
18  millions,  that  of  the  customs  to  16;  in  this 
increase  of  the  revenue,  there  was  still  a  defi- 


cit of  20  and  odd  millions  to  be  provided 
for. 

The  ways  and  means  of  the  year  XIII.  (Sep- 
tember, 1804  to  September,  1805,)  which  ended 
at  this  moment,  exhibited  a  still  greater  defi- 
ciency. The  naval  works  were  partly  finished : 
it  had  been  at  first  thought  that  the  expenses 
of  this  year  might  be  considerably  reduced. 
Though  those  of  the  year  XII.  amounted  to 
762  millions,  it  was  hoped  that  the  year  XIII. 
would  not  require  more  than  684  millions. 
But  the  past  months  exhibited  thus  far  a 
monthly  expenditure  of  about  60  millions, 
which  supposed  a  yearly  expenditure  of  720. 
To  meet  this  there  were  the  taxes  and  the  ex- 
traordinary resources.  The  taxes,  which  pro- 
duced 500  millions  in  1801,  had  risen,  by  the 
mere  effect  of  the  general  wealth  and  without 
any  change  in  the  tariffs,  to  a  produce  of  560 
millions.  The  indirect  contributions  recently 
established  having  yielded  this  year  very 
nearly  25  millions,  the  voluntary  donations  of 
the  communes  and  departments,  converted 
into  additional  centimes,  furnishing  very  little 
short  of  20  millions  more,  the  permanent  re- 
venue had  reached  600  millions.  It  was  ne- 
cessary, therefore,  to  find  120  millions  to 
complete  the  budget  of  the  year  XIII.  The 
Italian  subsidy  of  22  millions  would  supply  a 
part;  but  then  the  Spanish  subsidy  of  48  mil- 
lions had  ceased  in  December,  1804,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  brutal  declaration  of  war  which 
England  had  issued  against  Spain.  The  lat- 
ter, thenceforward  serving  the  common  cause 
by  her  fleets,  had  no  longer  to  serve  it  by  her 
finances.  The  American  fund,  the  price  of 
Louisiana,  was  consumed.  To  supply  the 
place  of  these  resources,  there  had  been  added 
to  the  Italian  subsidy  of  22  millions  a  sum  of 
36  millions  in  new  securities,  a  species  of  loan, 
the  mechanism  of  which  we  have  explained 
elsewhere;  then,  an  alienation  of  national 
domains  to  the  amount  of  20  millions;  and 
lastly,  some  reimbursements  due  from  Pied- 
mont and  amounting  to  6  millions.  The 
whole  made,  with  the  ordinary  imposts,  684 
millions.  From  36  to  40  millions  more  were 
therefore  wanting  to  reach  720. 

Thus  there  was  an  arrear  of  20  millions  for 
the  year  XII.  and  of  40  for  the  year  XIII.  But 
this  was  not  all.  The  accounts,  being  still  in 
a  crude  state,  did  not  exhibit,  as  they  now  do, 
all  the  facts  at  a  glance:  there  had  just  been 
discovered  some  balances  of  expenses  not 
discharged,  and  some  deficiencies  in  the  re- 
ceipts belonging  to  the  service  of  preceding 
years,  which  constituted  a  further  charge  of 
about  20  millions.  On  adding  all  these  defi- 
cits, 20  millions  for  the  year  XII.,  40  for  the 
year  XIII.,  20  recently  discovered,  one  mighr 
estimate  at  about  80  millions  the  arrear  that 
began  to  accrue  since  the  renewal  of  the  war 

Various  means  had  been  employed  to  pro- 
vide for  it.  In  the  first  place,  a  debt  had  been 
incurred  with  the  Sinking  Fund.  The  securi- 
ties, of  which  a  resource  had  been  made,  ought 
to  have  been  repaid  to  that  fund  at  the  rate  of 
5  millions  per  annum.  It  ought  to  have  been 
paid  at  the  rate  of  10  millions  per  annum,  for 
the  70  millions'  worth  of  national  domains 
which  the  law  of  the  year  IX.  had  assigned  to 


16 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Sept.  1805 


it,  to  compensate  the  augtnenta:ion  of  the 
public  debt.  It  had  not  been  paid  either  of 
these  two  sums.  It  is  true  that  security  had 
been  given  for  them  in  national  domains,  and 
that  it  was  not  a  very  importunate  creditor. 
The  Treasury  owed  it  about  30  millions  at  the 
end  of  the  year  XIII.  (September,  1805.) 

Some  other  resources  had  been  found  in 
various  improvements  introduced  into  the  ser- 
vice of  the  Treasury.  If  the  state  did  not  in- 
spire in  general  any  great  confidence  in  finan- 
cial matters,  certain  agents  of  the  finances 
inspired  much  within  the  sphere  of  their  offi- 
cial duties.  Thus  the  central  cashier  of  the 
Treasury,  established  in  Paris,  superintending 
all  the  remittances  of  funds  between  Paris  and 
the  provinces,  issued  bills  upon  himself  or 
upon  accountable  persons,  his  correspondents, 
which  were  always  paid  in  the  open  office ; 
because  the  payments  were  made,  even  amidst 
those  interruptions,  with  perfect  punctuality. 
This  species  of  bank  had  been  able  to  put  into 
circulation  not  less  than  15  millions  in  bills 
taken  as  ready  money. 

Lastly,  a  real  melioration  in  the  service  of 
the  receivers-general  had  procured  a  resource 
of  nearly  the  like  amount.  For  the  direct 
contributions  imposed  upon  land  and  build- 
ings, the  value  of  which  was  known  before- 
hand, and  the  payment  fixed  like  a  rent,  the 
persons  accountable  were  required  to  subscribe 
bills  payable  month  by  month  into  their  chest, 
by  the  oft-mentioned  title  of  Obligations  of  the 
receivers-general.  But,  for  the  indirect  contribu- 
tions, discharged  irregularly,  in  proportion  to 
the  consumption  or  the  transactions  upon 
which  they  were  imposed,  it  was  necessary  to 
wait  till  the  produce  was  realized,  before  draw- 
ing upon  the  receivers-general  what  were  called 
Bills  at  sight.  Thus  they  enjoyed  this  part  of 
the  funds  of  the  state  for  about  fifty  days.  It 
was  settled  that,  in  future,  the  Treasury  should 
draw  upon  them  in  advance,  and  every  month, 
orders  for  two-thirds  of  the  known  amount  of 
the  indirect  contributions  (that  amount  was 
190  millions;)  that  the  last  third  should  re- 
main in  their  hands  to  meet  the  variations  of 
ther  eturns,  and  should  be  remitted  to  the 
Treasury  only  in  the  old  accustomed  form  of 
Bills  at  sight.  This  more  prompt  payment  of 
part  of  the  funds  of  the  state  was  equivalent 
to  an  aid  of  about  15  millions. 

Thus  by  running  into  debt  with  the  Sinking 
Fund,  by  creating  the  bills  of  the  central 
cashier  of  the  Treasury,  by  accelerating  cer- 
tain returns,  there  had  been  found  resources 
for  about  GO  millions.  Taking  the  deficit  at 
80  or  90,  there  would  still  be  wanting  about 
30  millions.  This  had  been  supplied  either 
by  means  uf  arrears  with  the  contractors,  that 
is  to  say  with  the  famous  company  of  the 
United  Merchants,  whose  supplies  were  not 
punctually  paid  for,  or  by  discounting  a  larger 
amount  in  obligations  of  the  receivers-general  than 
ougm  to  have  been  done. 

Napoleon,  who  was  unwilling  to  enter  too 
far  into  this  system  of  arrear,  had  devised, 
while  in  Italy,  an  operation,  which,  according 
to  him,  had  nothing  of  the  nature  of  a  paper 
currency.  Of  the  300  or  400  millions'  worth 
of  national  domains  remainir^  in  1800,  no- 


thing was  left  in  1805;  not  that  the  whole  of 
that  valuable  resource  had  been  expended, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  because,  with  the  view  to 
its  preservation,  it  had  been  applied  to  the  en- 
dowment of  the  Sinking  Fund,  the  Senate,  the 
Legion  of  Honour,  the  Invalides,  and  the  Pub- 
lic Instruction.  The  few  portions  which  were 
still  seen  figuring  in  the  budgets  composed  a 
last  remnant  which  was  assigned  to  the  Sink- 
ing Fund,  in  discharge  of  what  was  owing  and 
of  what  was  not  paid  to  it.  Napoleon  had  an 
idea  to  take  back  from  the  Legion  of  Honour 
and  the  Senate  the  national  domains  which  he 
lad  assigned  to  them,  to  give  them  rentes  in- 
stead, and  to  dispose  of  those  domains  for  an 
operation  with  the  contractors.  Accordingly, 
•entes  were  actually  delivered  to  the  Senate 
and  the  Legion  of  Honour  in  exchange  for 
their  immovables.  For  an  income  of  1000 
francs  in  land  there  was  granted  them  a  reve- 
nue of  1720  francs  in  rentes;  in  order  to  com- 
pensate the  difference  between  the  price  of 
the  one  and  the  other.  The  Senate  and  the 
Legion  of  Honour  thus  gained  a  considerable 
increase  of  their  annual  income.  Possession 
was  again  taken  of  the  national  domains,  and 
they  began  to  be  disposed  of  to  the  contractors 
at  a  price  agreed  upon.  The  latter,  obliged  to 
borrow  of  capitalists,  who  lent  them  funds  for 
which  they  had  no  occasion,  found  in  the  im- 
movables a  pledge  by  the  aid  of  which  they 
obtaided  credit  and  procured  the  means  of 
continuing  their  service.  It  was  the  Sinking 
Fund  to  which  this  whole  operation  was  com- 
mitted, and  which  took  from  the  redeemed 
rentes  the  sum  necessary  for  indemnifying  the 
Senate  and  the  Legion  of  Honour.  The 
state,  in  its  turn,  was  obliged  to  indemnify  it 
by  creating  for  its  profit  a  sum  in  rentes  cor- 
responding to  that  of  which  it  had  deprived 
itself.  It  was  with  these  various  expedients, 
some  of  them  legitimate,  as  the  improvements 
of  service,  others  injurious,  as  the  delays  of 
payment  to  the  contractors,  and  the  resump- 
tion of  the  domains  given  to  different  esta- 
blishments— it  was  with  these  expedients,  we 
say,  that  means  were  found  to  supply  the  de- 
ficit produced  during  the  last  two  years.  At 
the  present  day,  the  floating  debt  which  is 
provided  for  with  Ports  royaux  would  permit  a 
charge  four  or  five  times  as  considerable  to  be 
contracted. 

All  this  w.ould  have  produced  but  a  mode- 
rate embarrassment,  if  the  state  of  commerce 
had  been  good;  but  that  was  not  the  case. 
The  French  merchants,  in  1802,  reckoning 
upon  the  duration  of  the  maritime  peace,  had 
embarked  in  considerable  speculations,  and 
sent  out  goods  to  all  countries.  The  violent 
conduct  of  England,  rushing  upon  our  flag 
before  the  declaration  of  war,  had  caused  them 
immense  losses.  Many  houses  had  concealed 
their  distress,  and,  making  up  their  minds  to 
great  sacrifices,  assisting  each  other  wilh  their 
credit,  had  got  over  the  first  blow.  But  the 
new  shock  resulting  from  the  continental  war 
could  not  fail  to  complete  their  ruin.  Bank- 
ruptcies began  already  to  take  place  in  the 
principal  commercial  towns,  and  produced 
there  general  distress.  This  was  not  the  sole 
cause  of  the  stagnation  of  business.  Ever 


Sept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


17 


since  the  fall  <  f  the  assignats,  specie,  though 
it  soon  made  its  appearance  again,  had  always 
been  insufficient,  owing  to  a  cause  easy  of  com- 
prehension. Paper  money,  though  discredited 
from  the  very  first  day  of  its  issue,  had  never- 
theless performed  the  service  of  specie  for 
some  part  of  the  exchanges,  and  had  driven 
part  of  the  metallic  currencies  out  of  France. 
The  public  prosperity,  suddenly  restored  under 
the  Consulate,  had  not  lasted  long  enough  to 
bring  hack  the  gold  and  silver  which  had  been 
carried  out  of  the  country.  The  want  of  it 
was  felt  in  all  sorts  of  transactions.  To  pro- 
cure it  was  at  this  period  one  of  the  incessant 
cares  of  commerce.  The  bank  of  France, 
which  had  acquired  rapid  prosperity,  because 
it  furnished  by  means  of  its  perfectly  ac- 
credited notes  a  supplementary  currency — 
the  bank  of  France  had  the  greatest  difficulty 
to  keep  in  its  coffers  a  metallic  reserve  pro- 
portioned to  the  issue  of  its  notes.  For  this 
purpose,  it  had  made  praiseworthy  efforts  and 
drawn  from  Spain  a  prodigious  sum  in  dollars. 
Unluckily,  a  drain,  then  opened  for  specie, 
carried  it  away  as  fast  as  it  was  brought  in  : 
this  was  the  payment  for  colonial  produce. 
Formerly,  that  is  to  say  in  1788  and  1789, 
when  we  possessed  St.  Domingo,  France 
drew  from  her  colonies  sugar,  coffee,  and 
other  colonial  productions  to  the  amount  of 
220  million  francs,  of  which  she  consumed 
70  or  80  millions'  worth  and  exported  as 
much  as  150,  particularly  in  the  form  of  re- 
fined sugar.  If  we  consider  the  difference  in 
the  value  of  all  things,  a  difference  not  less 
than  double,  between  that  time  and  the  pre- 
sent, we  shall  conceive  what  an  immense 
source  of  prosperity  was  dried  up.  It  was 
necessary  to  go  abroad  for  what  we  wanted, 
and  to  receive  from  our  very  enemies  the 
colonial  commodities  which,  twenty  years 
before,  we  sold  to  all  Europe.  A  considerable 
portion  of  our  specie  was  carried  to  Ham- 
burg, Amsterdam,  Genoa,  Leghorn,  Venice, 
Trieste,  to  pay  for  the  sugar  and  coffee  which 
the  English  introduced  there  by  means  of  the  | 
free  trade  or  by  smuggling.  To  Italy  was  i 
sent  much  more  than  the  22  millions  paid  us 
by  that  country.  All  the  mercantile  men  of 
the  time  complained  of  this  state  of  things,  i 
and  this  subject  was  daily  discussed  at  the 
bank  by  the  most  enlightened  men  of  business 
in  France. 

It  was  to  Spain  that  all  Europe  was  accus-  j 
tomed  to  apply  for  the   metals.    That  cele-  j 
brated  nation,  for  which  Columbus  had  pro- 
cured ages  of  wealthy  and  fatal  sloth  by  open- 
ing to  it  the  mines  of  America,  had  suffered 
itself  to  run  in  debt  through  ignorance  and 
negligence.      The    calamities    of    war   were 
added   to   a  vicious   administration ;    it   was 
then   the  most  distressed  of  powers,  and  ex- 
hibited that  so   melancholy  spectacle  in  all 
cases,  of  opulence  reduced  to  poverty.    The 
loss  of  the  galleons,  intercepted  by  the  English 
cruisers,  was  felt  not  only  by  Spain  hut  by  all 
Europe.     Though  the  export  of  dollars  was  j 
prohibited  in  the  Peninsula,  yet  France  con-  j 
trived  to  extract  them  by  smuggling,  thanks  ' 
to  a  long  contiguity  of  territory,  and  neigh-  : 
touring  countries  frequently  car  ied  them  out  i 

VOL.  II.— 3 


of  France  by  the  same  means.  This  contra- 
band trade  was  as  solidly  established  and  as 
widely  extended  as  a  lawful  traffic.  But  at 
this  period  it  was  much  obstructed  by  the  in- 
terruption of  the  arrivals  from  America,  and 
it  is  a  singular  fact  that  England  herself  suf- 
fered from  that  cause.  The  money  hoarded  in 
the  cellars  of  the  Spanish  governors  of  Mexico 
and  Peru,  ceased  to  come  either  to  Cadiz  or 
Bayonne,  to  London  or  Paris.  England  was  in 
want  of  the  metals  for  all  purposes,  but  par- 
ticularly for  the  payment  of  the  European 
coalition;  for  the  colonial  produce  and  other 
merchandise  with  which  she  supplied  either 
Russia  or  Austria  no  longer  sufficed  to  dis- 
charge the  subsidies  which  she  had  engaged 
to  pay  them.  Pitt  had  himself  alleged  this 
reason  for  contesting  with  the  coalesced  pow- 
ers part  of  the  sums  which  they  demanded. 
After  giving  for  next  to  nothing  enormous 
quantities  of  sugar  and  coffee  to  the  allies, 
the  British  cabinet  sent  them  notes  of  the 
bank  of  England.  Some  were  actually  found 
in  the  hands  of  Austrian  officers. 

Such  were  the  principal  causes  of  the  com- 
mercial and  financial  distress.  If  the  compa- 
ny of  United  Merchants,  which  then  transacted 
all  the  business  of  the  Treasury,  supply  of 
provisions,  discount  of  obligations,  discount  of 
Spanish  subsidy,  had  confined  itself  to  the  ser- 
vice which  it  had  undertaken,  it  might,  though 
not  without  difficulty,  have  supported  the  bur- 
den. It  could  no  longer  get  the  obligations  of 
the  receivers-general  discounted  at  one  half  per 
cent,  per  month  (6  per  cent,  per  annum) ;  it 
was  as  much  as  it  could  do  to  find  capitalists 
who  discounted  them  for  itself  at  three  quar- 
ters per  cent,  per  month  (9  per  cent,  per  an- 
num,) which  exposed  it  to  an  enormous  loss. 
The  Treasury,  it  is  true,  entered  into  an  agree- 
ment with  it,  and,  by  indemnifying  it  for  the 
usury  practised  by  the  capitalists,  would  have 
had  means  to  facilitate  the  countinuance  of  its 
service.  But  its  chief  director,  M.  Ouvrard, 
had  based  on  this  situation  an  immense  plan, 
certainly  very  ingenious,  and  which  would 
have  been  very  advantageous  too,  if  this  plan 
had  combined  with  the  merit  of  invention  the 
still  more  necessary  merit  of  accurate  calcula- 
tion. As  we  have  seen,  the  three  contractors 
forming  the  company  of  United  Merchants  had 
divided  the  parts  among  them.  M.  Desprez, 
formerly  a  cashier  to  a  banker,  enriched  by 
his  extraordinary  skill  in  the  traffic  in  paper, 
was  charged  with  the  discount  of  the  paper  of 
the  Treasury.  To  M.  Vanlerberghe,  whc  was 
thoroughly  acquainted  with  the  corn  trade, 
was  assigned  the  supply  of  provisions.  M. 
Ouvrard,  the  boldest  of  the  three,  the  most  fer- 
tile in  resources,  had  reserved  the  grand  spe- 
culations for  himself.  Having  accepted  from 
France  the  paper  with  which  Spain  paid  her  sub- 
sidy, and  promised  to  discount  it,  which  had  se- 
duced M.  de  Marbois,  he  conceived  the  idea 
of  forming  a  great  connection  with  Spain,  the 
mistress  of  Mexico  and  Peru,  from  whos" 
hands  issued  the  metals,  the  object  of  univer- 
sal ambition.  He  had  gone  to  Madrid,  where 
he  found  a  court  saddened  by  the  war,  by  the 
yellow  fever,  by  a  frightfifl  dearth,  and  by  the 
importunate  demands  of  Napoleon,  whos; 
B  2 


18 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept.  1805. 


debtor  it  was.  Nothing  of  all  this  appeared  to 
surprise  or  to  embarrass  M.  Ouvrard.  He  had 
charmed  by  his  ease,  by  his  assurance,  the  old 
people  who  reigned  at  theEscurial,  as  he  had 
charmed  M.  de  Marbois  by  procuring  for  him  the 
resources  that  he  could  not  procure  for  himself. 
He  had  at  first  offered  to  pay  the  subsidy  due 
to  France  for  the  end  of  1803  and  for  the 
whole  of  the  year  1804,  which  was  a  first  re- 
lief that  came  very  seasonably.  He  had  then 
furnished  several  immediate  aids  in  money, 
of  which  the  court  was  in  urgent  need.  He 
had  undertaken,  moreover,  to  ship  corn  for  the 
Spanish  ports,  and  to  procure  for  the  Spanish 
squadrons  provisions  which  they  were  in  want 
of.  All  these  services  had  been  accepted  with 
cordial  acknowledgments.  M.  Ouvrard  wrote 
immediately  to  Paris,  and  through  M.  de  Mar- 
bois, whose  favour  he  possessed,  he  had  ob- 
tained the  permission  usually  refused  to  export 
from  France  some  cargoes  of  wheat  to  Spain. 
These  sudden  arrivals  had  stopped  the  mo- 
nopolizing of  corn  in  the  ports  of  the  Peninsula, 
and,  by  putting  an  end  to  the  dearth,  which 
consisted  rather  in  a  fictitious  elevation  of 
prices  than  in  the  scarcity  of  grain,  M.  Ouv- 
rard had  relieved,  as  by  enchantment,  the  se- 
verest distresses  of  the  Spanish  people.  This 
was  more  than  enough  to  seduce  and  to  capti- 
vate the  not  very  clear-sighted  administrators 
of  Spain. 

It  will  naturally  be  asked  with  what  resources 
could  the  court  of  Madrid  pay  M.  Ouvrard  for 
all  the  services  which  it  received  from  him. 
The  means  were  simple.  M.  Ouvrard  desired 
that  the  privilege  of  bringing  over  dollars  from 
Mexico  should  be  granted  to  him.  He  actually 
obtained  the  privilege  of  shipping  them  from 
the  Spanish  colonies,  at  the  rate  of  3  francs 
%75  centimes,  while  in  France,  in  Holland,  in 
Spain,  they  were  worth  5  francs  at  least.  This 
was  an  extraordinary  profit,  but  assuredly  well 
deserved,  if  M.  Ouvrard  could  contrive  to 
elude  the  British  cruisers,  and  to  transport 
from  the  new  world  to  the  old  those  metals 
which  had  become  so  precious.  Spain,  which 
was  sinking  under  her  distresses,  was  ex- 
tremely happy  to  realize  three-fourths  of  her 
treasures  with  the  sacrifice  of  the  other  fourth. 
It  is  not  always  that  the  sons  of  indolent  and 
prodigal  families  make  such  advantageous 
bargains  with  the  stewards  who  pay  ransom 
for  their  prodigality. 

•But  how  bring  over  these  dollars  in  spite  of 
Pitt  and  the  English  fleets  ?  M.  Ouvrard  was 
not  more  embarrassed  by  this  difficulty  than  by 
the  others.  He  conceived  the  idea  of  making 
use  of  Pitt  himself  by  means  of  the  most  sin- 
gular of  combinations.  There  were  Dutch 
houses,  particularly  that  of  Hope  &  Co.,  which 
had  establishments  both  in  Holland  and  Eng- 
land. He  devised  the  scheme  of  selling  them 
r.he  Spanish  dollars  at  a  price  which  still  en- 
sured a  considerable  profit  to  his  company.  It 
w?s  for  these  houses  to  persuade  Mr.  Pitt  to 
allow  them  to  come  from  Mexico.  As  Pitt 
was  in  want  of  them  for  his  own  purposes, 
it  was  possible  that  he  would  permit  a  certain 
sum  to  pass,  although  he  knew  that  he  was  to 
share  it  with  his  enemies.  It  was  a  kind  of 
tacit  contract,  which  the  Dutch  houses  in  part- 


nership with  English  houses  were  to  nego- 
tiate. Experience  subsequently  proved  that 
this  contract  was  practicable  for  part,  if  not 
for  the  whole.  M.  Ouvrard  had  also  an  idea 
of  employing  American  houses,  which,  with 
his  delegation,  and  thanks  to  the  neutral  flag, 
could  go  and  ship  the  dollars  in  the  Spanish 
colonies  and  carry  them  to  Europe.  But  the 
question  was  to  ascertain  how  many  of  these 
dollars  Pitt  would  suffer  to  be  brought,  and  how 
many  the  Americans  could  bring  by  favour  of 
their  neutrality.  If  there  had  been  time,  such 
a  speculation  might  have  succeeded,  have  ren- 
dered important  services  to  France  and  Spain, 
and  afforded  the  company  abundant  and  legiti- 
mate profits.  Unfortunately,  the  necessities 
were  extremely  urgent.  Out  of  an  arrear  of 
80  or  90  millions,  which  the  French  Treasury 
was  obliged  to  meet  with  expedients,  there 
were  about  30  millions  which  it  owed  to  the 
company  of  United  Merchants,  and  which  it  paid 
with  immovables.  It  had,  therefore  to  bear 
this  first  charge.  It  had,  moreover,  to  furnish 
this  same  French  Treasury  with  the  amount 
for  a  year  at  least  of  the  Spanish  subsidy ;  that 
is  to  say  from  40  to  50  millions;  it  had  to  dis- 
count for  it  the  obligations  of  the  receivers-gene- 
ral ;  it  had,  lastly,  to  pay  for  the  corn  sent  to 
the  ports  of  the  Peninsula  and  the  provisions 
procured  for  the  Spanish  fleets.  This  was  a 
situation  which  would  not  permit  the  compa- 
ny to  await  the  success  of  hazardous  and  dis- 
tant speculations.  Until  that  success  it  was 
obliged  to  live  by  expedients.  It  had  pawned 
to  lenders  the  immovables  received  in  pay- 
ment. Having  contrived,  thanks  to  the  com- 
plaisance of  M.  de  Marbois,  to  gain  almost 
complete  possession  of  the  portfolio  of  the 
Treasury,  it  extracted  from  it  handfuls  of  obli- 
gations of  the  receivers-general,  which  it  placed  in 
the  hands  of  capitalists,  lending  their  money 
on  pledge  at  usurious  interest.  It  got  part 
of  these  same  obligations  discounted  by  the 
Bank  of  France,  which,  induced  by  its  inti- 
mate connection  with  the  government,  refused 
nothing  that  was  applied  for  in  behalf  of  the 
public  service.  The  company  received  the 
amount  of  these  discounts  in  bank  notes, 
and  the  situation  then  resolved  itself  into  an 
issue,  more  considerable  from  day  to  day,  of 
these  bank  notes.  But,  the  metallic  reserve 
not  increasing  in  proportion  to  the  mass  of 
notes  issued,,  the  consequence  was  a  positive 
danger;  and  it  was  the  bank,  in  reality,  which 
had  to  sustain  the  weight  of  everybody's  em- 
barrassments. Hence  voices  were  raised  in 
the  bosom  of  the  council  of  regency,  requiring 
that  a  stop  should  be  put  to  the  assistance 
granted  to  M.  Desprez,  representing  the  com- 
pany of  the  United  Merchants.  But  other  voices, 
less  prudent  and  more  patriotic,  that  of  M. 
Peregaux  in  particular,  declared  against  such 
a  proposal,  and  caused  the  assistance  applied 
for  by  M.  Desprez  to  be  granted. 

The  French  Treasury,  the  Spanish  Treasury, 
the  company  of  United  Merchants,  which  served 
to  link  them  together,  were  like  embarrassed 
houses,  which  lend  each  other  their  signature 
and  assist  one  another  with  a  credit  which 
they  do  not  possess.  But,  it  must  be  confessed 
the  French  Treasury  was  the  least  cramped 


Sept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


19 


of  these  three  associated  houses,  and  it  was 
least  liable  to  suffer  much  from  such  a  part- 
nership ;  for,  in  reality,  it  was  with  its  sole 
resources,  that  is  to  say,  with  the  obligations  of 
the  receivers-general  discounted  by  the  bank,  that 
all  demands  were  met,  and  that  the  Spanish 
armies  as  well  as  the  French  armies  were  fed. 
For  the  rest,  the  secret  of  this  extraordinary 
situation  was  not  known.  The  partners  of  M. 
Ouvrard,  whose  engagements  with  him  have 
never  been  clearly  denned,  though  those  en- 
gagements have  been  the  subject  of  long  legal 
proceedings,  knew  not  themselves  the  full  ex- 
tent of  the  burden  that  was  about  to  crush 
them.  Finding  themselves  already  much 
cramped,  they  called  loudly  for  M.  Ouvrard, ; 
and  induced  M.  Marbois  to  order  his  imme- ; 
diate  return  to  Paris.  M.  de  Marbois,  not  very 
capable  of  judging  with  his  eyes  of  all  the  ! 
details  of  a  vast  management  of  funds,  de- 
ceived moreover  by  a  dishonest  clerk,  had  no 
suspicion  to  what  an  extent  the  resources  of  | 
the  Treasury  were  abandoned  to  the  company. 
Napoleon  himself,  though  he  extended  his  in-1 
defatigable  vigilance  to  every  thing,  perceiving  j 
in  the  services  a  real  deficit  of  no  more  than 
about  60  millions,  which  .could  be  supplied  ' 
with  national  domains  and  different  expe- 
dients, ignorant  of  the  confusion  which  had 
crept  in  between  the  operations  of  the  Trea- 
sury and  those  of  the  United  Merchants,  was  not 
aware  of  the  real  cause  of  the  embarrassments 
and  uneasiness  that  began  to  be  felt.  He 
attributed  the  pressure  prevailing  everywhere 
to  the  false  speculations  of  French  commerce, 
to  the  usury  which  the  possessors  of  capital 
strove  to  practise,  and  railed  against  men  of 
business  nearly  in  the  same  manner  as  he 
railed  against  ideologues,  when  he  met  with 
ideas  that  displeased  him.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
he  would  not  suffer  objections  to  the  execution 
of  his  orders  to  be  drawn  from  this  state  of 
things.  He  had  demanded  12  millions  in  specie 
at  Strasburg,  and  demanded  them  so  impera- 
tively that  recourse  was  had  to  extreme  means 
to  procure  them.  He  had  required  10  more 
millions  in  Italy,  and  the  company,  obliged 
to  buy  them  at  Hamburg,  transmitted  them 
to  Milan  either  in  specie  or  in  gold,  across 
the  Rhine  and  the  Alps.  Besides,  Napoleon 
reckoned  upon  having  struck  such  blows  in 
fifteen  or  twenty  days,  as  to  put  an  end  to  all 
embarrassments. 

These  resources  obtained  rightly  or  wrongly 
from  the  Treasury,  he  turned  his  attention  to  • 
the  conscription  and  the  organization  of  the! 
reserve.     The   annual   contingent   was   then 
divided  into  two  halves  of  30,000  men  each, 
the  first  called  into  active  service,  the  second  j 
left  in  the  bosom  of  the  population,  but  liable  ! 
to  be  called  to  join  the  army  on  the  mere  sum-  j 
rnons  of  the  government.    There  was  still  left 
a  great  part  of  the  contingent  of  the  years, 
IX.,  X.,  XL,  XII.,  and  XIII. 

These  were  grown  men,  whom  the  govern- 
ment could  dispose  of  by  decree.  Napoleon 
called  them  all,  but  he  determined  also  to 
anticipate  the  levy  of  the  year  XIV.,  compre- 
hending the  individuals  who  would  attain  the 
required  age  between  the  23d  of  September, 
1805,  and  the  23d  of  September,  1806;  and  as 


the  use  of  the  Gregorian  calendar  was  to  be 
resumed  on  the  1st  of  the  following  January, 
he  directed  the  young  men  who  would  attain 
the  legal  age  between  the  23d  of  September 
and  the  31st  of  December,  1806,  to  be  included 
in  this  levy.  He  resolved  therefore  to  comprise 
in  a  single  levy  of  fifteen  months  all  the  con- 
scripts to  whom  the  law  should  be  applicable 
from  the  month  of  September,  1805,  to  the 
month  of  December,  1806.  This  measure 
would  furnish  him  with  80,000  men,  the  last 
of  whom  would  not  have  completely  attained 
the  age  of  twenty  years.  But  he  had  no  inten- 
tion of  employing  them  immediately  in  mili- 
tary service.  He  purposed  to  prepare  them 
for  the  profession  of  arms  by  placing  them  in 
the  third  battalions,  which  composed  the  depot 
of  each  regiment.  These  men  would  thus 
have  a  year  or  two  as  well  to  acquire  instruc- 
tion as  to  gain  their  full  strength,  and  would 
form,  in  fifteen  or  eighteen  months,  excellent 
soldiers,  almost  as  well  trained  as  those  of  the 
camp  of  Boulogne.  This  was  a  combination 
beneficial  at  once  for  the  health  of  the  men 
and  for  their  military  instruction  ;  for  the  con- 
script of  twenty,  if  sent  immediately  into  the 
field,  is  soon  in  the  hospital.  But  this  combi- 
nation was  practicable  only  for  a  government 
which,  having  an  army  completely  organized 
to  meet  the  enemy  with,  had  no  need  of  the 
annual  contingent  but  by  way  of  a  reserve. 

The  Legislative  Body  not  being  assembled, 
time  must  have  been  lost  in  calling  it  together. 
Napoleon  would  not  consent  to  such  a  delay, 
and  conceived  the  idea  of  addressing  himself 
to  the  Senate,  on  the  ground  of  two  motives: 
the  first,  the  irregularity  of  a  contingent  which 
comprised  more  than  twelve  months  and  some 
conscripts  under  twenty  years  of  age;  the 
second,  the  urgency  of  the  circumstances.  It 
was  overstepping  the  bounds  of  legality  to  act 
in  this  manner,  for  the  Senate  could  not  vote 
either  any  contribution  in  money  or  any  con- 
tribution in  men.  It  was  invested  with  func- 
tions of  a  different  order,  such  as  to  prevent 
the  adoption  of  unconstitutional  laws,  to  fill  up 
gaps  in  the  Constitution,  and  to  watch  the  acts 
of  the  government  having  an  arbitrary  taint. 
To  the  Legislative  Body  belonged  exclusively 
the  voting  of  imposts  and  levies  of  men.  It 
was  a  fault  to  violate  that  Constitution  already 
too  flexible,  and  to  render  it  a  great  deal  too 
illusory,  by  neglecting  so  easily  to  observe  its 
forms.  It  was  another  fault,  not  to  be  more 
sparing  of  the  employment  of  the  Senate,  which 
had  been  made  the  ordinary  resource  in  all 
difficult  cases,  and  to  indicate  but  too  clearly 
that  more  dependence  was  placed  on  its  doci- 
lity than  on  that  of  the  Legislative  Body.  The 
Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres,  who  disliked  ex 
cesses  of  power  that  were  not  indispensable, 
made  these  remarks,  and  maintained  that  it 
was  necessary,  at  least  for  the  observance  of 
forms,  to  attribute  by  an  organic  measure  the 
vote  of  the  contingents  to  the  Senate.  Napo- 
leon, who,  without  despising  the  views  of  pru- 
dence, deferred  them  to  another  time  when  he 
was  in  a  hurry,  would  neither  lay  down  a 
general  rule  nor  postpone  the  levy  of  the  con 
tingent.  In  consequence,  he  ordered  a  senatus 
consultum  grounded  on  two  extraordinary 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Sept  1805 


considerations  to  be  prepared:  those  consi- 
derations were  the  irregularity  of  the  con- 
tingent, embracing  more  than  an  entire  year, 
and  the  urgency  of  the  circumstances,  which 
would  not  admit  of  the  delay  required  for  as- 
sembling the  Legislative  Body. 

He  thought,  also,  of  having  recourse  to  the 
national  guards,  instituted  by  virtue  of  the 
laws  of  1790,  1791,  and  1795.  This  third 
coalition  having  all  the  characteristics  of  the 
two  former,  though  times  were  changed,  though 
Europe  was  less  adverse  to  the  principles  of 
France,  but  much  more  to  her  greatness,  he 
conceived  that  the  nation  owed  its  government 
a  concurrence  as  energetic,  as  unanimous,  as 
formerly.  He  could  not  expect  ardour,  for  the 
revolutionary  enthusiasm  no  longer  existed; 
but  he  could  reckon  upon  perfect  submission 
to  the  law  on  the  part  of  the  citizens,  and  on  a 
deep  sense  of  honour  in  such  of  them  as  the 
law  should  summon.  He  therefore  ordered 
the  reorganization  of  the  national  guards,  but 
aimed  at  the  same  time  to  render  them  more 
obedient  and  more  soldier-like.  To  this  end, 
he  caused  a  senatus  consultum  to  be  prepared, 
authorizing  their  reorganization  by  imperial 
decrees.  He  resolved  to  reserve  for  himself 
the  nomination  of  the  officers,  and  to  collect  in 
the  chasseur  and  grenadier  companies  the 
youngest  and  most  warlike  portion  of  the  popu- 
lation. This  he  destined  for  the  defence  of 
fortresses,  and  for  occasional  assemblages  at 
threatened  points,  such  as  Boulogne,  Antwerp, 
La  Vendee. 

These  different  elements  were  disposed  of 
in  the  following  manner.  Nearly  200,000 
soldiers  were  marching  to  Germany ;  70,000 
defended  Italy;  twenty-one  battalions  of  in- 
fantry, and  more  than  fifteen  battalions  of  sea- 
men guarded  Boulogne.  We  have  already 
Feen  that  the  regiments  were  composed  of 
three  battalions,  two  for  war,  one  for  the  depot, 
the  latter  charged  to  receive  sick  and  con- 
valescent soldiers,  and  to  train  the  conscripts. 
A  certain  number  of  these  third  battalions  had 
already  been  stationed  at  Boulogne.  All  the 
others  were  distributed  from  Mayence  to  Stras- 
burg.  Towards  these  three  points  were  di- 
rected the  men  remaining  to  be  levied  for  the 
years  IX.,X.,XL,  XII.,  and  XIII.,  and  the  80,000 
conscripts  for  1806.  They  were  to  be  incor- 
porated with  the  third  battalions,  in  order  to  be 
trained  and  to  acquire  their  full  strength.  The 
oldest,  when  they  should  be  formed,  were  after- 
wards to  be  organized  into  marching  corps, 
for  filling  the  gaps  which  war  should  have  j 
made  in  the  ranks  of  the  army.  This  would  , 
be  a  reserve  of  150,000  men,  at  least,  guarding 
the  frontier,  and  serving  to  recruit  the  corps. 
The  national  guards,  supporting  this  reserve, 
were  to  be  organized  in  the  North  and  the 

1  KEM.ERMANN.  The  elder,  Duke  of  Valmy,  Marshal 
and  I'eer  of  France.  Born  at  Strasburg.  in  1735,  entered 
the  Conflans  legion  ag  a  hussar  in  1752,  and  performed  in 
it  the  first  campaigns  of  the  Seven  Years'  war.  He  went 
through  all  ihe  grades  of  service  up  to  the  rank  of  mar- 
shal de  camp.  At  the  breaking  out  of  the  Revolution,  he 
look  the  patriotic  side,  arid  distinguished  himself  so  much 
that  he  received  a  civic  crown  from  the  citizens  of  Lan- 
dau. Al  the  commencement  of  the  war  he  received  the 
ommaml  of  the  army  of  the  Moselle,  formed  a  junction 


West,  to  be  in  readiness  to  hasten  to  the 
coasts,  and  in  particular  to  repair  to  Boulogne 
and  Antwerp,  if  the  English  should  attempt  to 
burn  the  flotilla,  or  to  destroy  the  docks  con- 
structed on  the  Scheldt.  Marshal  Brune  had 
already  been  appointed  to  command  at  Bou- 
logne. Marshal  Lefebvre  was  to  command  at 
Mayence,  Marshal  Kellermann1  at  Strasburg. 
These  nominations  attested  the  admirable  tact 
of  Napoleon.  Marshal  Brune  had  a  reputa- 
tion acquired  in  1799,  by  having  repulsed  a 
descent  of  the  Russians  and  English.  Marshals 
Lefebvre  and  Kellermann,  old  soldiers,  who 
had  been  rewarded  for  their  services  by  a 
place  in  the  Senate  and  the  honorary  baton  of 
marshal,  were  capable  of  superintending  the 
organization  of  the  reserve,  while  their  younger 
companions  in  arms  were  engaged  in  active 
warfare.  .  They  gave  occasion,  at  the  same 
time,  to  an  infringement  of  the  law  which  for- 
bade senators  to  hold  public  appointments 
This  law  was  extremely  displeasing  to  the 
Senate,  and  it  was  very  ingeniously  evaded 
by  calling  some  of  its  members  to  train  the 
rear-guard  of  the  national  defence. 

These  arrangements  completed,  Napoleon 
directed  the  measures  just  enumerated  to  be 
carried  to  the  Senate,  and  presented  them  him- 
self in  an  imperial  sitting  held  at  the  Luxem- 
bourg on  the  23d  of  September.  He  there 
spoke,  in  firm  and  precise  terms,  of  the  conti- 
nental war,  which  had  come  upon  him  una- 
wares, while  he  was  engaged  with  the  expedition 
against  England,  of  the  explanations  demanded 
from  Austria,  of  the  ambiguous  answers  of 
that  court,  of  its  now  demonstrated  falsehoods, 
since  its  armies  had  passed  the  Inn  on  the  8th 
of  September,  at  the  moment  when  it  was 
most  strongly  protesting  its  love  of  peace.  He 
appealed  to  the  attachment  of  France,  and 
promised  to  have  soon  annihilated  the  new  co- 
alition. The  senators  gave  him  strong  tokens 
of  assent,  though,  in  the  bottom  of  their  hearts, 
they  attributed  the  new  continental  war  to  the 
incorporations  of  states  which  had  been  ef- 
fected in  Italy.  In  the  streets  through  which 
the  imperial  train  had  to  pass,  from  the  Lux- 
embourg to  the  Tuileries,  the  popular  enthu- 
siasm, damped  by  distress,  was  less  expressive 
than  usual.  Napoleon  perceived  and  was 
piqued  at  it,  and  expressed  some  vexation  to 
the  Arch-Chancellor  Cambaceres.  He  regarded 
it  as  an  injustice  done  him  by  the  people  of 
Paris;  hut  ft  seemed  to  inspire  him  with  a  de- 
termination to  excite,  before  long,  shouts  of 
enthusiasm  louder  and  more  vehement  than 
had  yet  rung  so  frequently  in  his  ears;  and  he 
turned  his  thoughts,  which  had  not  time  to 
dwell  upon  any  subject,  to  the  events  that 
were  preparing  on  the  banks  of  the  Danube. 
In  haste  to  depart,  he  made  a  regulation  for  the 

in  September  with  the  main  army  of  Diimouriez,  and 
sustained,  September  20, 1793,  the  celebrated  attack  of  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick.  The  cannonade  of  Valmy  caused 
the  allies  to  retreat,  and  decided  the  fate  of  Europe  till 
1813.  After  the  18ih  Brumaire,  he  was  made  a  senator 
of  France  by  Napoleon,  and  a  marshal  of  France  on  the 
first  creation  of  that  dignity.  He  must  not  be  confounded 
with  his  son,  the  younger  Kellermann,  who  won  the 
battle  of  Marengo  by  a  brilliant  but  unrewarded  charge 
of  cavalry. — Encyclopedia  dincricavi.  H. 


Sept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


organization  of  the  government  in  his  absence. 
His  brother  Joseph  was  appointed  president 
of  the  Senate;  his  brother  Louis,  in  quality  of 
constable,  was  to  attend  to  the  levies  of  men 
and  the  formation  of  the  national  guards.  The 
Arch-Chancellor  Cambaceres  was  intrusted 
with  the  presidency  of  the  Council  of  State. 
All  matters  of  business  were  to  be  discussed 
in  a  council  composed  of  the  ministers  and  j 
the  grand  dignitaries,  under  the  presidency  of 
the  Grand-Elector  Joseph.  It  was  setiled  thai  | 
couriers,  despatched  every  day,  should  carry  ! 
to  Napoleon  a  report  on  every  affair,  with  the 
personal  opinion  of  the  Arch-Chancellor  Cam- 
baceres. The  latter,  apprehensive  lest  Joseph 
Bonaparte,  presiding  over  the  council  of  the 
government,  might  be  hurt  at  this  allotment 
of  the  part  of  supreme  critic  to  one  of  the 
members  of  that  council,  made  an  observation 
on  the  subject  to  Napoleon ;  but  Napoleon 
suddenly  interrupted  him,  declaring  that  he 
would  not  deprive  himself  of  the  aid  of  most 
valuable  abilities  to  humour  any  man's  vanity. 
He  persisted.  His  decisions  were  to  be  trans- 
mitted to  Paris  after  he  had  received  the  report 
sent  by  the  arch-chancellor.  It  was  only  in 
urgent  cases  that  the  council  was  authorized 
not  to  wait  for  the  decision  of  the  Emperor, 
and  to  issue  orders  which  each  minister  was 
to  execute  on  his  personal  responsibility.  Thus 
Napoleon  reserved  to  himself  the  decision  of 
all  matters  even  during  his  absence,  and  made 
the  Arch-Chancellor  Cambaceres  the  eye  of  his 
government,  while  he  was  far  away  from  the 
centre  of  the  empire. 

All  about  him  witnessed  his  departure  with 
sorrow.  They  knew  not  yet  the  secret  of  his 
genius ;  they  were  not  aware  how  much  he 
would  shorten  the  war.  They  feared  that  it 
might  be  long,  and  they  were  sure  that  it  would 
be  bloody.  They  asked  themselves  what  would 
be  the  lot  of  France,  if  that  head  should 
chance  to  be  struck  by  the  bullet  that  pierced 
the  breast  of  Turenne,  or  the  ball  that  fractured 
the  skull  of  Charles  XII.  1  Besides,  all  who 
approached  him,  abrupt  and  absolute  as  he 
was,  could  not  help  loving  him.  It  was,  there- 
fore, with  deep  regret  that  they  saw  him  de- 
part. He  consented  to  be  accompanied  as  far 
as  Strasburg  by  the  empress,  who  was  the 
more  strongly  attached  to  him  the  more  fear 
she  felt  about  the  duration  of  her  union  with 
him.  He  took  with  him  Marshal  Berthier, 
leaving  orders  for  M.  de  Talleyrand,  with  a 
few  clerks,  to  follow  the  head-quarters  at  a 
certain  distance.  Setting  out  from  Paris  on 
the  24th,  Napoleon  arrived  at  Strasburg  on  the 
26th. 

To  the  great  astonishment  of  Europe,  the 
army,  which  twenty  days  before  was  on  the 


1  TOLSTOY,  COUNT.    A  Russian  general  of  some  ability. 
He  served  throughout  all  the  wars  of  this  period,  and  was 
severely  defeated  by  St.  Cyr  before  Dresden,  in  1813. — Ali- 
ton's  Hutory  of  Europe.  H. 

2  KUTUSOF,     GOLENISCHITSCHOFF,    PRINCE    SMOLEN8- 

KY.  A  Russian  field-marshal,  born  1745;  entered  the 
army  in  1759;  served  in  Poland  from  1764  to  1769,  and 
afterwards  against  the  Turks  under  RomanzofT.  In  1788, 
he  was  wounded  near  the  right  eye  at  the  siege  of  Ocza- 
kov,  having  been  appointed  governor  of  the  Crimea  the 
year  before.  He  assisted  the  Prince  of  Coburg  to  gain 


shores  of  the  Ocean,  was  already  in  the  heart 
of  Germany,  on  the  banks  of  the  Mayn,  the 
Neckar,  and  the  Rhine.  Never  had  march 
more  secret,  more  rapid,  been  performed  in 
any  age.  The  heads  of  columns  got  sight  of 
each  other  everywhere,  at  Wiirzburg,  at  May- 
ence,  at  Strasburg.  The  joy  of  the  soldiers 
was  at  its  height,  and  when  they  beheld  Na- 
poleon, they  greeted  him  with  shouts  a  thou- 
sand times  repeated  of  "  Vive  L'Empereur!" 
That  innumerable  multitude  of  troops,  in- 
fantry, artillery,  cavalry,  suddenly  collected; 
those  convoys  of  provisions,  of  ammunition, 
formed  in  haste ;  those  long  files  of  horses 
bought  in  Switzerland  and  in  Suabia;  in  short, 
all  these  movements  of  an  army  that  was  not 
expected  a  few  days  before,  and  which  had 
suddenly  made  its  appearance,  presented  an 
unparalleled  spectacle,  heightened  by  a  mili- 
tary court,  at  once  stern  and  brilliant,  and  by 
an  immense  concourse  of  persons  curious  to 
see  the  Emperor  of  the  French  setting  out  for 
war. 

The  coalition  had  hastened  on  its  parts,  but 
it  was  not  so  well  prepared  as  Napoleon,  nor 
above  all  so  active,  though  animated  by  the 
most  ardent  passions.  It  had  been  agreed  be- 
tween the  coalesced  powers  that  they  should 
march  their  principal  forces  towards  the  Dan- 
ube before  winter,  that  Napoleon  might  not  be 
able  to  take  advantage  of  the  difficulty  of  the 
communications  during  the  bad  season  for 
crushing  Austria  separated  from  her  allies. 
All  the  orders  of  the  movement  had,  therefore, 
been  given  for  the  end  of  August  and  the 
beginning  of  September.  In  acting  thus,  the 
allies  expected  to  be  far  in  the  advance  of 
Napoleon,  and  flattered  themselves  that  they 
should  have  it  in  their  power  to  commence 
hostilities  at  any  moment  which  they  should 
deem  most  seasonable.  They  had  no  concep- 
tion that  they  should  find  the  French  trans- 
ported so  suddenly  to  the  theatre  of  war. 

A  Russian  force  was  collecting  at  Revel, 
and  embarked  in  the  first  days  of  September 
for  Stralsund.  It  was  composed  of  16,000 
men  under  the  command  of  General  Tolstoy.' 
Twelve  thousand  Swedes  had  preceded  them  to 
Stralsund.  They  were  to  march  together 
through  Mecklenburg  into  Hanover,  and  to  be 
there  joined  by  15,000  English;  who  were  to 
come  up  the  Elbe  and  land  at  Cuxhaven. 
This  would  form  an  army  of  43,000  men,  des- 
tined to  make  an  attack  from  the  north.  This 
attack  was  to  be  either  principal  or  accessory, 
according  as  Prussia  joined  or  did  not  join 
in  it. 

Two  large  Russian  armies,  of  60,000  men 
each,  were  advancing,  the  one  through  Galli 
cia,  under  General  Kutusof,2  the  other  through 

the  victories  of  Focksi  h  mi  and  of  Rimnik,  in  1789.  II* 
was  present  wilh  Suwaroff  at  the  storming  of  Ismail 
In  1793,  he  was  ambassador  at  Constantinople,  and  served 
in  the  subsequent  Polish  war  under  Suwaroff.  After  the 
restoration  of  peace,  he  was  first  appointed  commander- 
in-chief  of  Finland,  and  afterwards  governor-gene's"  of 
Lithuania,  by  Paul.  He  resided  several  years  at  ttliua, 
,  endeavouring  by  constant  study  to  remedy  the  deficiencies 
of  his  early  education.  In  1801,  he  was  appointed  gover- 
nor-general of  St.  Petersburg.  In  1S08,  at  the  age  of  sixty, 
Alexander  gave  him  the  command  of  the  first  Russia* 


22 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Sept.  1805 


Poland,  under  General  Buxhb'vden.1  The 
Russian  guard,  12,000  strong,  picked  men, 
under  the  Grand-duke  Constantine,2  followed 
the  first.  An  army  of  reserve,  under  General 
Michelson,  was  forming  at  Wilna.  The  young 
Emperor  Alexander,3  hurried  by  levity  into 
war,  clear-sighted  enough  to  perceive  his 
error,  but  not  possessing  resolution  enough  to 
abandon  or  correct  it  by  energy  of  execution —  j 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  haunted,  though  he  | 
would  not  avow  it,  by  a  secret  dread,  had  not 
decided  till  very  late  upon  making  the  last 
preparations.  The  corps  of  Gallicia,  which, 
under  General  Kutusof,  was  to  come  to  the 
assistance  of  the  Austrians,  had  not  reached 
the  frontier  of  Austria  till  towards  the  end  of 
August.  It  had  traversed  Gallicia  from  Brody 
to  Olmutz,  Moravia  from  Olmiitz  to  Vienna, 
and  Bavaria  from  Vienna  to  Ulm.  This  was 
a  much  greater  distance  than  the  French  had 
to  travel  from  Boulogne  to  Ulm,  and  the  Rus- 
sians were  not  such  adepts  at  distant  marches 
as  the  French.  Europe,  which  has  seen  our 
soldiers  march,  well  knows  that  never  were 
any  so  expeditious.  The  presage  of  Napo- 
leon, therefore,  was  accomplished,  and  already 
the  Russians  were  behindhand. 

The  second  Russian  army,  placed  between 
Warsaw  and  Cracow,  in  the  environs  of 
Pulawi,  amounting,  with  the  Russian  guards, 
to  70,000  men,  awaited  the  arrival  of  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  to  receive  his  directions  in 
regard  to  Prussia.  That  monarch  had  gone 
to  Revel  to  see  the  embarkation  of  his  troops 
before  he  set  out  for  the  army  in  Poland,  and 
had  proceeded  to  Pulawi,  a  beautiful  residence 
of  the  illustrious  family  of  Czartoryski,  at 
some  distance  from  Warsaw.  He  was  there 
with  his  young  minister  for  foreign  affairs, 
Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  to  communicate  the 
'more  readily  with  the  court  of  Berlin. 

In  company  with  Alexander  was  Prince 
Peter  Dolgorouki,  an  officer  just  starting  in 
the  career  of  arms,  full,  of  presumption  and 

corps  against  the  French.  He  is  most  celebrated  for  the 
masterly  ability,  coolness,  and  conduct  with  which  he 
pressed  the  retreat  of  Napoleon  from  Moscow;  and  was 
perhaps  the  ablest  of  the  Russian  generals  o'that  day. — 
Encyclopaedia  Americana,  Alison.  H. 

1  BUXHOVDEN,  FREDERIC  WILLIAM.  COUNT  OF.    Born 
of  an  ancient  Livonian  family  on  the  isle  of  Moen  near 
Osel ;  was  educated  at  St.  Petersburg,  and  engaged  in 
the  war  against  the  Turks  in  1769.    In  1790,  he  defeated 
the  Swedish  generals  Hamilton  and  Meyerfeld,  and  res- 
cued Frederickshaven  and  Viborg.     In  Poland  he  com- 
manded a  Russian  division  in  1792  and  1791.     While  mi- 
litary governor  of  St.  Petersburg,  he  was  disgraced  by 
the  Emperor  Paul ;  but  was  made  governor-general  of 
Livonia,  Esthonia,  and  Courland,  by  Alexander.    In  1805, 
he  commanded  the  left  wing  at  Austerlitz,  which  advanced 
while  the  centre  and  right  were  beaten,  Sec.,  &c. — Ency- 
clopedia Americana.  H. 

2  CONSTANTINE,  C^ESAROVITCH  PAULOVITCH.     Grand- 
prince  of  Russia,  second  son  of  Paul  I.    Was  born  May  9, 
1799.    His  great  characterises  were  energy,  activity, 
daring  courage,  and  rudeness  approaching  almost  to  bar- 
barism.   In  1799,  he  distinguished  himself  so  much  under 
Suwaroff  that   Paul  I.  bestowed  on   him  the  honorary 
title  of  Ciegnrovitch.     At  Ansterlitz,  in  1808,  he  distin- 
guished himself  greatly  for  his  courage.    In  1812,  1813, 
1814,  he  attended  his  brother,  the  Emperor  Alexander,  in 
all  his  campaigns.     After  the  war  he  was  made  military 
governor  of  Poland,  and  resided  at   Warsaw  in  great 
•plendoirr.    During  the  life  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  he 


ambition,  an  enemy  of  that  coterie  of  young 
wits  who  governed  the  empire,  striving  to 
persuade  the  emperor  that  those  young  inep 
were  faithless  Russians,  who  betrayed  Russia 
to  benefit  Poland.  The  fickleness  of  Alexan 
der  gave  Prince  Dolgorouki  more  than  one 
chance  of  success.  It  was  false  that  Prince 
Adam,  the  most  honourable  of  men,  was  capa- 
ble of  betraying  Alexander.  But  he  hated  the 
court  of  Prussia,  the  weakness  of  which  he 
took  for  duplicity ;  he  wished,  from  a  senti- 
ment entirely  Polish,  that  the  design  of  using 
force  with  that  court,  if  it  did  not  adhere  to 
the  views  of  the  coalition,  should  be  rigorously 
executed,  that  Russia  should  break  with  it, 
and  that,  trampling  down  its  scarcely  formed 
armies,  the  Russians  should  take  from  >*• 
Warsaw  and  Posen,  and  proclaim  Alexander 
king  of  reconstituted  Poland.  This  was  a 
perfectly  natural  wish  for  a  Pole,  but  an  in- 
considerate one  for  a  Russian  statesman.  Na- 
poleon alone  was  sufficient  to  beat  the  coali- 
tion ;  how  would  it  be  if  the  forced  alliance  of 
Prussia  were  given  to  him] 

Besides,  it  was  requiring  too  much  from  the 
irresolute  character  of  Alexander.  He  had 
sent  his  ambassador,  M.  d'Alopeus,  to  Berlin, 
to  make  an  appeal  to  the  friendship  of  Fred- 
erick William,  to  demand  of  him  in  the  first 
place  a  passage  through  Silesia  for  the  Rus- 
sian army,  and  then  to  insinuate  that  no  doubt 
was  entertained  of  the  concurrence  of  Prussia 
in  the  meritorious  work  of  European  deliver- 
ance. The  negotiator  was  even  authorized  to 
declare  to  the  Prussian  cabinet  that  there 
must  be  no  hesitation,  that  neutrality  was  im- 
possible, that  if  a  passage  were  not  granted 
with  a  good  grace  it  would  be  taken  by  force. 
M.  d'Alopeus  was  to  be  seconded  by  Prince 
Dolgorouki,  aide-de-camp  of  Alexander.  The 
latter  was  instructed  to  let  it  be  clearly  per- 
ceived at  Berlin  that  there  was  a  fixed  deter- 
mination to  win  Prussia  by  caresses  or  to 
decide  her  by  violence.  Things  had  even 


had  renounced  all  pretensions  to  the  throne  by  a  secret 
instrument,  dated  January  14,  1822;  but  on  the  death  of 
Alexander  he  was  notwithstanding  proclaimed  emperor. 
He  preferred,  however,  to  abide  by  his  renunciation,  and 
Nicholas,  his  younger  brother,  the  present  Emperor  of 
Russia,  succeeded  Alexander. — Encyc.  Americana.  H. 
3  ALEXANDER  I.  PAULOVITCH.  Son  of  Paul  I..  Auto- 
crat of  all  the  Russias,  and  King  of  Poland.  He  was 
born  December  23,  1777,  ascended  the  throne  March  24, 
1801,  was  crowned  27th  of  September,  1801,  in  Moscow, 
and  die''  December  1,  1825.  He  was  one  of  the  most  im- 
portant men  of  modern  time,  and  a  great  benefactor  of 
his  native  land.  He  had  great  natural  talents,  which  had 
been  judiciously  cultivated  by  his  mother  and  instructors. 
He  recognised  the  spirit  of  the  age,  and  frequently  acted 
with  very  liberal  views.  The  history  of  his  government 
may  be  divided  into  three  periods,  the  first  from  1801  lo 
1805,  which  was  peaceful  and  devoted  to  the  execution 
of  the  schemes  of  Peter  the  Great  and  Catharine  respect- 
ing the  internal  administration.  The  second  from  1805 
to  1814,  which  was  a  time  of  war  with  France,  Sweden, 
Turkey,  and  Persia,  by  which  the  resources  and  national 
feelings  of  his  people  were  wonderfully  developed.  The 
third  from  1814  to  1825,  devoted  to  the  constant  and  un- 
interrupted aggrandizement  of  Russia.  He  was,  as  a 
man,  amiable,  peaceful,  kind,  generous,  frank,  open,  chi- 
valric,  and  firm  ;  as  a  ruler,  resolute,  able,  and  enlight- 
ened; and  as  a  military  leader,  far  above  mediocrity.— 
Encyclopaedia  Americana.  a. 


Sept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


been  carried  to  such  a  length  at  Pulawi,  that 
the  manifesto  which  was  to  precede  hostilities 
was  drawn  up. 

While  these  strong  representations  were 
addressed  to  Prussia  by  the  Russian  agents, 
she  found  herself  face  to  face  with  the  French 
negotiators,  Messrs.  Duroc  and  Laforest,  com- 
missioned by  Napoleon  to  offer  her  Hanover. 
It  will  be  recollected  that  the  grand-marshal  of 
the  palace,  Duroc,  had  left  Boulogne  to  carry 
this  offer  to  Berlin.  The  integrity  of  the  young 
kinsr  had  not  been  proof  against  it;  neither 
had  the  sentiments  of  M.  de  Hardenberg,  who 
was  called  in  Europe  the  right-thinking  minis- 
ter. M.  de  Hardenberg  perceived  but  one  diffi- 
culty in  this  affair,  that  was,  to  find  a  form 
which  should  save  the  honour  of  his  master 
in  the  eyes  of  Europe.  Two  months,  July  and 
Au?ust,  had  been  spent  in  seeking  this  form. 
One  had  been  devised  which  was  ingenious 
enough.  It  was  the  same  that  the  coalition 
had  contrived  on  its  part  for  commencing  the 
war  against  Napoleon,  that  is  to  say,  an  armed 
mediation.  The  King  of  Prussia  was,  for  the 
sake  of  peace,  which,  it  was  alleged,  was 
needed  by  all  the  powers,  to  declare  on  what 
conditions  the  balance  of  Europe  would  ap- 
pear to  him  sufficiently  guarantied,  to  state 
those  conditions,  and  then  give  it  to  be  under- 
stood that  he  should  pronounce  in  favour  of 
those  who  should  admit  them,  against  those 
who  should  refuse  to  admit  them,  which  signi- 
fied that  he  would  make  half-war  along  with 
France  in  order  to  gain  Hanover.  He  was,  in 
fact,  to  adopt  in  his  declaration  most  of  Napo- 
leon's conditions,  such  as  the  creation  of  the 
kingdom  of  Italy,  with  separation  of  the  two 
crowns  at  the  period  of  the  general  peace,  the 
annexation  of  Piedmont  and  Genoa  to  the  Em- 
pire, the  free  disposal  of  Parma  and  Placentia 
left  to  France,  the  independence  of  Switzer- 
land and  Holland,  lastly,  the  evacuation  of 
Tarento  and  Hanover  at  the  peace.  There 
was  no  difficulty  but  as  to  the  construction  to 
be  put  upon  the  independence  of  Switzerland 
and  Holland.  Napoleon,  who  had  then  no 
view  upon  those  two  countries,  would  never- 
theless not  guaranty  their  independence  in 
terms  which  would  allow  the  enemies  of 
France  to  effect  a  counter-revolution  there. 
The  discussions  on  this  subject  were  prolonged 
till  the  end  of  the  month  of  September,  and  the 
young  King  of  Prussia  was  about  to  make  up 
his  mind  to  the  violence  with  which  he  was 
threatened,  when  he  clearly  perceived  from 
the  march  of  the  Russian,  Austrian,  and 
French  armies  that  war  was  inevitable  and 
near  at  hand.  Terrified  at  this  prospect,  he 
fell  back,  and  talked  no  more  either  about 
armed  mediation  or  the  acquisition  of  Hano- 

1  BRUNSWICK,  CIIAHLES  WILLIAM  FERDINAND,  DUKE 
OF.  He  commanded  the  allied  army  of  70,000  Prussians 
and  68,000  Austrian-),  which  invaded  France  in  1792,  in 
the  hope  of  conquering  the  release  of  Louis  XVI.  from 
prison,  and  re-establishing  the  monarchy ;  hut  was 
checked  at  Valiny  by  Kellermann  anil  Diiinoiiriez,  and 
forced  to  retreat  after  a  few  unimportant  successes.  He 
commanded  the  Prussian  army  during  the  movements 
previous  to  the  battle  of  Jena,  in  1806,  and  by  his  false 
manoeuvres  did  much  towards  their  fatal  defeat.  A  few 
days  later,  at  Auersladt,  he  was  killed  by  a  ball  in 
the  breast  while  leading  a  charge  gallantly  against  the 


ver,  as  the  price  of  that  mediation.  He  re- 
turned to  his  ordinary  system  of  neutrality  of 
the  north  of  Germany.  Then  Messrs.  Duroc 
and  Laforest  offered  him,  agreeably  to  the  or- 
ders of  Napoleon,  what  the  cabinet  of  Berlin 
had  itself  so  often  demanded,  the  delivery  of 
Hanover  to  Prussia,  by  way  of  deposit,  on  con- 
dition that  the  latter  should  insure  the  posses- 
sion of  it  to  France.  But,  gratified  as  King 
Frederick  William  would  have  been  by  the 
retreat  of  the  French  and  the  delivery  to  him 
of  so  valuable  a  deposit,  he  saw  that  he  should 
be  obliged  to  oppose  the  northern  expedition, 
and  he  still  refused.  He  made  a  thousand 
protestations  of  attachment  to  Napoleon,  to  his 
dynasty,  to  his  government,  adding  that,  if  he 
did  viole'nce  to  his  sympathies,  it  was  because 
he  was  defenceless  against  Russia  on  the  side 
of  Poland.  To  this  Messrs.  Duroc  and  La- 
forest  replied  by  the  offer  of  an  army  of  80,000 
French,  ready  to  join  the  Prussians.  But  this 
would  still  be  war,  and  Frederick  William  re- 
jected it  under  this  new  form.  It  was  at  this 
moment  that  M.  d'Alopeus  and  Prince  Dolgo- 
rouki  arrived  at  Berlin  to  require  Prussia  to 
declare  herself  for  the  coalition.  The  king 
was  not  less  frightened  at  the  demands  of  the 
one  than  at  the  proposals  of  the  others.  He 
replied  by  protestations  exactly  like  those 
which  he  had  addressed  to  the  French  negotia- 
tors. He  was,  he  said,  full  of  attachment  for 
the  young  friend  whose  acquaintance  he  had 
made  at  Memel,  but  he  should  be  the  first  to  in- 
cur the  vengeance  of  Napoleon,  and  he  could 
not  expose  his  subjects  to  such  great  dangers, 
without  making  himself  culpable  towards 
them.  The  Russian  envoys,  insisting,  told 
him  that  the  army  collected  between  Warsaw 
and  Cracow,  was  placed  there  expressly  to 
succour  him ;  and  that  it  was  a  friendly  fore- 
thought of  the  Ernperor  Alexander;  that  the 
70,000  Russians  composing  that  army  were 
about  to  cross  Silesia  and  Saxony,  on  their 
way  to  the  Rhine,  to  receive  the  first  shock  of 
the  French  armies.  Frederick  William  was 
not  to  be  persuaded  by  these  reasons.  The 
envoys  then  proceeded  still  further,  and  gave 
him  to  understand  that  it  was  too  late ;  that, 
not  doubting  his  adhesion,  the  Russian  troops 
had  been  already  ordered  to  pass  through  the 
Prussian  territory.  At  this  kind  'of  violence, 
Frederick  William  could  no  longer  contain 
himself.  People  were  mistaken  respecting 
his  character.  He  wa^  irtesolute,  which  fre- 
quently gave  him  the  appearance  ot  weakness 
and  duplicity  ;  but,  when  driven  to  extremity, 
he  became  obstinate  and  choleric.  Filled  with 
indignation,  he  convoked  a  council,  to  which 
were  summoned  the  old  Duke  of  Brunswick1 
and  Marshal  de  Mollendorf,2  and,  notwithstand- 

French  infantry.  He  was  a  noble-minded,  chivalric,  and 
gallant  man,  but  lacked  the  decision  of  character  and  ra- 
pidity  of  conception  and  action  necessary  to  make  a  great 
commander.  He  left  to  his  son  the  duty  of  vengeance  on 
Hi  •  French,  and  he,  /ike  his  father,  met  his  death  on  the 
field,  though  not  like  him  of  defeat.— Encyclopedia  Ame- 
ricana. H. 
»  MOLLENDORF,  RICHARD  JOACHIM  HENRY,  COUNT 
VON.  A  Prussian  general,  born  in  1724,  educated  at 
Brandenburg,  and  in  1740  admitted  among  the  pages  of 
|  Frederic  II.,  whom  he  accompanied  in  the  first  Silesian 
war.  and  with  whom  he  was  present  at  the  battles  of 


24 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Sept.  1805. 


ing  his  parsimony,  decided  on  putting  the 
Prussian  army  upon  the  war  footing.  Seeing 
that  he  was  on  the  point  of  suffering  violence 
from  both,  he  resolved  to  take  his  precautions, 
and  ordered  the  assembling  of  80,000  men, 
which  would  cost  him  16  million  Prussian 
dollars  (64  million  francs)  to  be  taken  partly 
from  the  revenues  of  the  state,  partly  from  the 
treasury  of  the  greaf  Frederick,  a  treasury 
drained  during  the  preceding  year,  but  reple- 
nished during  the  present  by  dint  of  savings. 

M.  d'Alopeus,  alarmed  at  these  dispositions, 
hastened  to  write  to  Pulawi,  to  advise  his  em- 
peror, with  the  most  earnest  entreaties,  to  hu- 
mour the  King  of  Prussia,  if  he  wished  not  to 
have  all  the  forces  of  the  Prussian  monarchy 
upon  his  hands. 

When  these  tidings  reached  Pulawi,  they 
shook  the  resolution  of  Alexander.  Prince 
Adam  Czartoryski  had  warmly  urged  him  to 
decide  not  to  give  Prussia  time  to  defend  her- 
self, and  to  take  a  passage  instead  of  soliciting 
it  for  such  a  length  of  time.  If  Prussia  turns 
to  war,  said  Prince  Adam,  let  us  declare  Alex- 
ander king  of  Poland  and  organize  that  king- 
dom, in  the  rear  of  the  Russian  armies.  If, 
on  the  contrary,  she  complies,  we  shall  have 
realized  the  plan  of  the  coalesced  powers  and 
gained  one  more  ally.  But  Alexander,  en- 
lightened by  the  correspondence  of  M.  d'Alo- 
peus, withstood  the  counsels  of  his  young 
minister,  sent  his  aide-de-camp  Dolgorouki  to 
Berlin  to  affirm  to  his  royal  friend  that  it  had 
never  been  his  intention  to  coerce  his  will, 
that,  on  the  contrary,  he  had  just  given  orders 
for  his  army  to  halt  on  the  Prussian  frontiers, 
that  this  was  done  in  deference  to  him,  but 
that  affairs  of  such  importance  could  not  be 
settled  by  means  of  agents,  and  that  therefore 
he  requested  an  interview.  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, fearing  lest  he  should  suffer  as  much 
compulsion  from  the  caresses  of  Alexander  as 
he  could  have  done  from  his  armies,  would 
rather  have  declined  this  interview.  His 
court,  however,  which  leaned  to  the  coalition 
and  to  war,  and  the  queen,  whose  sentiments 
corresponded  with  those  of  the  young  empe- 
ror, persuaded  him  that  he  could  not  refuse  it. 
The  interview  was  fixed  for  the  first  days  of 
October.  Meanwhile  Messrs.  Duroc  and  La- 
forest  were  in  Berlin,  receiving  all  sorts  of 
assurances  of  neutrality. 

While  the  Russians  were  thus  employing 
the  month  of  September,  Austria  was  making 
better  use  of  that  valuable  time.  She  commis. 


Molwitz  and  Chotusitz.  In  1746,  he  obtained  a  company 
in  the  guards,  and  rose  regularly  in  the  service,  until  in 
1783  tin  was  made  governor  of  Berlin.  In  the  reign  of 
Frederic  William  II.  he  was  made  general  of  infantry, 
and  commanded  the  Russian  troops  employed  in  1793,  in 
the  dismemberment  of  Poland.  On  his  return  home,  he 
was  created  a  field-marshal,  and  soon  afterwards  gover- 
nor of  South  Russia.  He  subsequently  succeeded  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick  in  the  command  of  the  Prussian  army 
on  the  Rhine,  in  1794,  when  he  gained  the  victory  of  Kai- 
SHrslauten.  In  1799,  he  was  one  of  the  principal  advisers 
of  the  treaty  Of  Bach,  after  which  he  was  made  grand- 
marshal.  In  1806,  though  very  old,  he  accepted  a  com- 
mand under  the  l)uke  of  Brunswick,  and  was  present  at 
'.i-iia  and  Auerstadt;  at  the  last  of  which  actions  he  was 
Bounded.  After  this  he  retired  from  service  and  died  in 
January  28,  1816. — Encyclopedia  Americana. 


ioned  M.  de  Cobentzel  to  repeat  incessantly  in 
Paris  that  her  sole  desire  was  to  negotiate  and 
to  obtain  guarantees  for  the  future  state  of 
Italy,  and  was  meanwhile  availing  herself  of 
the  English  subsidies  with  the  utmost  activity. 
She  had,  in  the  first  place,  assembled  100,000 
men  in  Italy,  under  the  Archduke  Charles.  It 
was  there  that  she  placed  her  best  general  and 
her  strongest  army,  to  recover  her  most  re- 
gretted provinces.  Twenty-five  thousand  men, 
under  the  Archduke  John,  who  had  command- 
ed at  Hohenlinden,  guarded  the  Tyrol ;  80  or 
90,000  men  were  destined  to  enter  Bavaria, 
proceed  to  Suabia,  and  take  the  famous  posi- 
tion of  Ulm,  where,  in  1800,  M.  de  Kray1  had 
so  long  detained  General  Moreau.  The  50  or 
60  thousand  Russians  under  General  Kutusof, 
coming  to  join  the  Austrian  army,  would  form 
a  mass  of  140  or  150  thousand  fighting  men, 
which,  it  was  hoped,  would  give  the  French 
occupation  enough  to  afford  the  other  Russian 
armies  time  to  arrive,  the  Archduke  Charles 
time  to  reconquer  Italy,  and  the  troops  sent  to 
Hanover  and  Naples  time  to  produce  a  useful 
diversion.  It  was  the  famous  General  Mack, 
the  same  who  had  formed  all  the  plans  of  cam- 
paign against  France,  and  who  came,  with 
great  activity,  and  a  certain  skill  in  military 
details,  to  replace  the  Austrian  army  on  a  war 
footing — it  was  this  same  general  who  had 
been  appointed  to  the  command  of  the  army 
of  Suabia,  in  conjunction  with  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand. 

Advantage  had  been  taken  of  the  towns  be- 
longing to  Austria  in  that  country  to  prepare 
magazines  between  the  lake  of  Constance  and 
the  Upper  Danube.  The  city  of  Memmingen, 
situated  on  the  Iller,  and  forming  the  left  of  the 
position  of  which  Ulm  forms  the  right,  was 
one  of  these  places.  Immense  stores  of  pro- 
visions had  been  collected  there  and  some  en- 
trenchments thrown  up,  which  could  not  have 
been  done  at  Ulm,  because  it  belonged  to  Ba- 
varia. 

All  this  had  been  accomplished  by  the  last 
days  of  August.  But  Austria  had,  by  a  preci- 
pitation not  usual  with  her,  committed  here  an 
egregious  blunder.  The  position  of  Ulm  could 
not  be  occupied  without  crossing  the  Bavarian 
frontier.  Besides,  Bavaria  possessed  an  army 
of  25,000  men,  large  magazines,  the  line  of  the 
Inn,  and  thus  there  were  all  sorts  of  reasons 
for  being  the  first  to  seize  such  a  valuable 
prey.  Aus-tria  conceived  the  idea  of  acting 
towards  her  as  Russia  was  doing  towards 
Prussia,  that  is  to  say  to  surprise  and  hurry 
her  away.  It  was  easier,  it  is  true,  but  the 


1  KRAY,  General.  A  Hungarian  by  birth,  and  one  of 
the  most  distinguished  officers  of  the  empire.  Active, 
intrepid,  and  indefatigable;  gifted  with  cool  head  and  an 
admirable  coup  d'oeil,  in  danger  he  was  one  of  the  most 
illustrious  generals  of  the  imperial  army,  and,  after  the 
Archduke  Charles,  has  left  the  most  brilliant  reputation 
in  its  military  archives  of  the  last  century.  In  1799,  he 
gained  the  decisive  victory  of  Magnano  over  the  French 
under  Scherer.  In  the  same  year  he  besieged  and  took 
the  strong  fortress  of  Mantua;  and  afterwards  greatly 
distinguished  himself  at  the  battle  of  Novi.  In  1800,  he 
commanded  against  Moreau  in  the  celebrated  Rhine  cam* 
paign,  and  though  unsuccessful  displayed  great  ability 
and  conduct. — Alison' a  Europe.  H-, 


bept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


25 


consequences,  in  case  of  failure,  would  be  dis- 
astrous. 

On  the  arrival  of  General  Mack1  upon  the 
banks  of  the  Inn,  Prince  de  Schwarzenberg 
was  sent  to  Munich  to  make  the  strongest  so- 
licitations to  the  elecior  on  the  part  of  the  em- 
peror of  Germany.  He  was  commissioned  to 
urge  him  to  pronounce  in  favour  of  the  coali- 
tion, to  unite  his  troops  with  those  of  Austria, 
to  consent  to  their  being  incorporated  into  the 
imperial  army,  dispersed  regiment  by  regiment 
in  the  Austrian  divisions,  to  give  up  his  terri- 
tory, his  magazines,  to  the  allies,  to  join,  in 
short,  in  the  new  crusade  against  the  common 
enemy  of  Germany  and  Europe.  The  Prince 
of  Schwarzenberg  was  even  authorized,  in 
case  of  necessity,  to  offer  to  Bavaria,  in  Salz- 
burg, in  the  Tyrol  itself,  the  fairest  aggran- 
dizements, provided  that,  on  the  reconquest  of 
Italy  by  their  joint  arms,  the  collateral  branches 
of  the  imperial  house,  which  had  been  ex- 
pelled from  that  country,  could  be  re-esta- 
blished there. 

When  Prince  de  Schwarzenberg  arrived  at 
Munich,  the  elector  was  in  much  the  same 
situation  as  Prussia  herself.  M.  Otto,  the 
same  who,  in  1801,  had  so  ably  negotiated  the 
peace  of  London,  was  our  minister  at  Munich. 
Affecting,  amidst  that  capital,  to  be  neglected 
by  the  court,  he  had,  nevertheless,  secret  in- 
terviews with  the  elector,  and  strove  to  prove 
to  him  that  Bavaria  existed  solely  through  the 
protection  of  Napoleon.  It  is  certain  that,  on 
this,  as  on  many  other  occasions,  she  could 
not  save  herself  from  Austrian  rapacity  with- 
out the  support  of  France.  If,  even  in  1803, 
she  had  obtained  a  reasonable  share  of  the 
Germanic  indemnities,  she  owed  it  entirely  to 
French  intervention.  M.  Otto,  by  insisting  on 
these  considerations,  had  put  an  end  to  the 
hesitation  of  the  elector,  and  had  induced  him 
to  bind  himself,  on  the  24th  of  August,  by  a 
treaty  of  alliance.  It  was  a  few  days  after- 
wards, on  the  7th  of  September,  that  Prince  de 
Schwarzenberg  made  his  appearance  at  Mu- 
nich. The  elector,  who  was  very  feeble,  had 
about  him  a* fresh  cause  for  feebleness,  in  the 
electress  his  wife,  one  of  those  three  beautiful 
princesses  of  Baden  who  had  ascended  the 
thrones  of  Russia,  of  Sweden,  and  of  Bavaria, 
and  who  all  three  were  distinguished  for  their 
animosity  against  France.  Of  the  three,  the 
electress  of  Bavaria  was  the  most  vehement. 
She  fretted,  she  wept,  she  manifested  extreme 
vexation,  at  seeing  her  husband  chained  to 
Napoleon,  and  rendered  him  more  miserable 
than  he  would  naturally  have  been  from  his 
own  agitation.  M.  de  Schwarzenberg,  fol- 
lowed at  the  distance  of  two  days'  march  by 
the  Austrian  army,  and  seconded  by  the  tears 
of  the  electress,  succeeded  in  shaking  the 

1  MACK,  CHARLES,  BARON  VON.  An  Austrian  general, 
born  in  Franconia  in  1752.  He  enlisted  as  a  private  dra- 
goon, but  soon  rose  to  be  a  petty  officer,  and  in  the  war 
with  Turkey  obtained  a  captain's  commission.  When 
(he  war  with  France  broke  out  he  was  appointed  quarter- 
master-general in  the  Prince  of  Coburg's  army,  and  di- 
rected its  operations  in  the  campaign  of  1793.  In  1797, 
ne  succeeded  the  Archduke  Charles  in  the  command  of 
the  army  of  the  Rhine.  The  next  year  he  was  sent  to 
Naples,  then  invaded  by  the  French,  was  beaten  in  the 
VOL.  II.— 4 


!  elector,  and  extorting  from  him  a  promise  to 
|  give  himself  up  to  Austria.     This  prince,  how- 
ever, dreading  the  consequences  of  this  sudden 
change,  fearing  General  Mack,  who  was  near 
at  hand,  and  Napoleon  too,  though  he  was  at  a 
distance,  thought  it  right  to  inform  M.  Otto  of 
the  circumstance,  to  excuse  his  conduct  by 
I  alleging  his  unfortunate  position,  and  to  solicit 
the  indulgence  of  France. 

M.  Otto,  being  thus  apprized  of  the  fact, 
hastened  to  the  elector,  represented  to  him  the 
danger  of  such  a  defection  and  the  certainty 
of  soon  having  Napoleon  as  conqueror  at 
Munich,  making  peace  by  the  sacrifice  of 
Bavaria  to  Austria.  Certain  circumstances 
seconded  the  arguments  of  M.  Otto.  The  re- 
quisition to  dislocate  the  army  and  to  disperse 
it  among  the  Austrian  divisions  had  roused 
indignation  in  the  Bavarian  generals  and  offi- 
cers. News  arrived,  at  the  same  time,  that 
the  Austrians,  without  waiting  for  the  consent 
solicited  at  Munich,  had  passed  the  Inn,  and 
public  opinion  was  revolted  by  such  a  viola- 
tion of  the  territory.  People  remarked  pub- 
licly that,  if  Napoleon  was  ambitious,  Pitt 
was  not  less  so  ;  that  the  latter  had  bought  the 
cabinet  of  Vienna,  and  that,  thanks  to  the 
gold  of  England,  Germany  was  to  be  again 
trampled  under  foot  by  the  soldiers  of  all  Eu- 
rope. Independently  of  these  circumstances 
favourable  to  M.  Otto,  the  elector  had  an  able 
minister,  M.  de  Monlgelas,  fired  with  ambition 
for  his  country,  dreaming  of  securing  for  Ba- 
varia in  the  nineteenth  century  those  aggran- 
dizements which  Prussia  had  acquired  in  the 
eighteenth,  seeking  incessantly  whether  it  was 
in  Vienna  or  in  Paris  that  there  was  most 
chance  of  obtaining  them,  and  having  finally 
concluded  that  it  would  be  from  the  most  in- 
novating power,  that  is  to  say  from  France. 
He  had,  therefore,  been  in  favour  of  the  treaty 
of  alliance  signed  with  M.  Otto.  Touched, 
however  by  the  offers  of  Prince  Schwarzen- 
berg, he  was  shaken  for  a  moment  under  the 
influence  of  ambition,  as  his  master  had  been 
under  that  of  weakness.  But  he  was  soon 
brought  back,  and  the  solicitations  of  M.  Otto, 
seconded  by  the  public  opinion,  by  the  irrita- 
tion of  the  Bavarian  army,  by  the  counsels  of 
M.  de  Montgelas,  once  more  gained  the  as- 
cendency. The  elector  was  again  won  for 
France.  In  the  agitated  state  of  mind  in 
which  that  prince  was,  he  did  every  thing  that 
he  was  advised  to  do.  It  was  proposed  that 
he  should  retire  to  Wurzburg,  a  bishopric 
secularized  for  Bavaria  in  1803,  and  that  his 
army  should  follow  him.  He  approved  this 
proposal.  In  order  to  gain  time,  he  informed 
M.  de  Schwarzenberg,  that  he  was  going  to 
send  to  Vienna  a  Bavarian  general,  M.  de  No- 
garola,  a  known  partisan  of  Austria,  commis- 


fleld,  fell  intosuspicion  with  the  Neapolitans,  fled  into  the 
French  lines,  and  was  sent  as  a  prisoner  to  Dijon.  la 
1801,  he  was  appointed  by  the  emperor  commander-in 
chief  in  the  Tyrol,  Dalmatia,  and  Italy.  In  1805,  he  wan 
driven  beyond  the  Danube  by  Napoleon  and  submitted  to 
the  capitulation  of  Ulm,  by  which  28,000  Austrians  laid 
down  their  arms,  for  which  he  was  subsequently  sen- 
tenced  to  death  as  a  traitor.  His  sentence  was,  however, 
commuted  to  imprisonment,  and  he  died  in  obscurity  in 
1828. — Encyclopedia  Americana. 

c 


36 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


[Sept   1805. 


sioned  to  treat  there.  This  done,  the  elector 
set  out  with  his  whole  court,  in  the  night  be- 
tween the  8th  and  the  9th  of  September,  and 
proceeded  first  to  Ratisbon,  and  from  Ratisbon 
to  Wurzburg,  where  he  arrived  on  the  12th 
of  September.  The  Bavarian  troops  collected 
at  Amberg  and  at  Ulm  received  orders  to  con- 
centrate themselves  at  Wurzburg.  The  elec- 
tor, on  leaving  Wurzburg,  published  a  mani- 
festo, denouncing  to  Bavaria  and  Germany  the 
violence  of  which  he  was  the  victim. 

M.  de  Schwarzenberg  and  General  Mack, 
who  had  passed  the  Inn,  thus  saw  the  elector, 
his  court,  and  his  army,  slip  out  of  their  hands, 
and  found  themselves  objects  of  ridicule  as 
•well  as  of  indignation.  The  Austrians  ad- 
vanced by  forced  marches,  without  being  able 
to  overtake  the  Bavarians,  and  everywhere 
found  the  opinion  of  the  country  exasperated 
against  them.  One  circumstance  contributed 
more  particularly  to  irritate  the  people  in  Ba- 
varia. The  Austrians  had  their  hands  full  of 
paper  money,  not  current  at  Vienna  without  a 
great  loss.  They  obliged  the  inhabitants  to 
take  this  discredited  paper  as  money.  Thus 
a  serious  pecuniary  injury  was  added  to  the 
galled  national  feelings  to  incense  the  Bava- 
rians. 

General  Mack,  after  this  pitiful  expedition, 
for  which,  however,  he  was  less  responsible 
than  the  Austrian  negotiator,  marched  for  the 
upper  Danube,  and  took  the  position  which 
had  long  been  assigned  him,  the  right  at  Ulm, 
the  left  on  Memmingen,  the  front  covered  by 
the  Iller,  which  runs  to  Memmingen  and  falls 
into  the  Danube  at  Ulm.  The  officers  of  the 
Austrian  staff  had  been  for  some  years  past 
incessantly  extolling  this  position  as  the  best 
that  could  be  occupied  for  making  head 
against  the  French  debouching  from  the  Black 
Forest.  Here  they  had  one  of  their  wings 
supported  on  the  Tyrol,  the  other  on  the  Da- 
nube. They  thought  themselves,  therefore, 
quite  secure  on  both  sides,  and,  as  for  their 
rear,  they  never  gave  it  a  thought,  not  imagin- 
ing that  the  French  could  ever  come  by  any 
other  than  the  ordinary  route.  General  Mack 
had  drawn  to  him  General  Jellachich,1  with 
the  division  of  the  Vorarlberg.  He  had 
65,000  men,  immediately  at  hand,  and,  on  his 
rear,  to  connect  him  with  the  Russians,  Gene- 
ral Kienmayer  at  the  head  of  20,000.  This 
formed  a  total  of  85,000  combatants. 

General  Mack  then  was  just  where  Napo- 
leon had  supposed  and  wished,  that  is  to  say 
on  the  upper  Danube,  separated  from  the  Rus- 
sians by  the  distance  from  Vienna  to  Ulm. 
The  elector  of  Bavaria  was  at  Wurzburg, 
with  his  tearful  court,  with  his  army  indig- 
nant against  the  Austrians,  and  in  expectation 
of  the  speedy  arrival  of  the  French. 

In  order  to  form  a  complete  idea  of  ~the 
state  of  Europe  during  this  great  crisis,  all  we 
have  to  do  now  is  to  cast  our  eyes  on  what 
was  passing  in  the  south  of  Italy.  The  su- 
preme counsellors  of  the  coalition,  unwill- 
ing that  the  court  of  Naples,  watched  by  the 


20,000  French  under  General  St.  Cyr,  should 
compromise  itself  too  early,  had  suggested  to 
it  a  real  treachery,  which  that  court,  blinded 
and  demoralized  by  hatred,  was  not  likely  to 
be  very  scrupulous  about.  It  had  been  ad- 
vised to  sign  a  treaty  of  neutrality  with 
France,  in  order  to  obtain  the  withdrawal  of 
the  corps  which  was  at  Tarento.  When  this 
corps  should  have  retired,  the  court  of  Naples, 
less  closely  watched,  would  have,  it  was  told, 
time  to  declare  itself,  and  to  receive  the  Rus- 
sians and  the  English.  The  Russian  general, 
Lascy,  a  prudent  and  considerate  man,  was 
at  Naples,  commissioned  to  make  secret  pre- 
parations, and  to  bring  in  the  allies  when  the 
moment  should  be  deemed  seasonable.  There 
were  12,000  Russians  at  Corfu,  besides  a  re- 
serve at  Odessa,  and  6000  English  at  Malta. 
They  reckoned  further  upon  36,000  Neapoli- 
tans, somewhat  less  wretchedly  organized 
than  usual,  and  on  the  levy  en  masse  of  the 
banditti  of  Calabria. 

This  treaty,  proposed  to  Napoleon  just  be- 
fore his  departure  from  Paris,  had  appeared 
acceptable  to  him,  for  he  did  not  conceive  that 
so  weak  a  court  would  risk  with  him  the  con- 
sequences of  such  a  treachery.  He  imagined 
that  the  terrible  example  which  he  had  made 
of  Venice  in  1797  would  have  cured  the 
Italian  governments  of  their  propensity  to 
knavery.  In  a  treaty  of  neutrality,  excluding 
the  Russians  and  the  English  from  the  south 
of  Italy,  he  found  the  advantage  of  being  en- 
abled to  give  Massena  20,000  more  men,  if 
the  50,000  under  his  command  were  not  suffi- 
cient to  defend  the  Adige. 

He  accepted,  therefore,  this  proposal,  ant* 
by  a  treaty  signed  at  Paris  on  the  21st  of  Sep 
tember,  he  consented  to  withdraw  his  troops 
from  Tarento,  on  the  promise  made  him  by 
the  court  of  Naples  not  to  suffer  any  landing 
of  the  Russians  and  the  English.  On  this 
condition,  General  St.  Cyr  had  orders  to  march 
towards  Lombardy,  and  Queen  Caroline  and 
her  weak  husband  were  left  at  liberty  to  pre- 
pare a  sudden  levy  of  troops  on  the  rear  of  the 
French. 

Such  was  the  situation  of  the  allied  powers 
from  the  20th  to  the  25th  of  September.  The 
Russians  and  the  Swedes,  charged  with  the 
attack  on  the  north,  joined  at  Stralsund,  to 
combine  with  a  landing  of  the  English  at  the 
mouth  of  the  Elbe ;  a  Russian  army  was  or- 
ganizing at  Wilna,  under  General  Michelson  ; 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  with  his  corps  of 
guards  and  Buxhu'vden's  army,  was  at  Pulawi, 
on  the  Vistula,  soliciting  an  interview  with 
the  King  of  Prussia ;  another  Russian  army, 
under  General  Kutusof,  had  penetrated  through 
Gallicia  into  Moravia,  to  join  the  Austrians. 
This  latter  was  parallel  to  Vienna,  and  was 
about  to  ascend  the  Danube.  General  Mack, 
a  hundred  leagues  in  advance,  had  taken  po- 
sition, at  Ulm,  at  the  head  of  85,000  men, 
awaiting  the  French  at  the  outlet  of  the  Black 
Forest.  The  Archduke  Charles  was  on  the 
Adige  with  100,000  men.  The  court  of  Na- 


1  JELLACHICH.  An  Austrian  general  of  more  ability 
than  good  fortune.  He  was  defeated  and  forced  to  sur- 
render with  the  Prince  de  Rohan  in  the  Tyrol  in  1805, 


and  was  again  totally  defeated  in  the  valley  of  the  Mnhr 
by  the  Viceroy  Eugene  Beauharnais  in  1603.— .Iliton't 
Europe  H. 


Sept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


27 


pies  was  meditating  a  surprise,  which  was  to 
be  executed  with  the  Russians  from  Corfu  and 
the  English  from  Malta. 

Napoleon,  as  we  have  already  seen,  had 
arrived  at  Strasburg  on  the  26th  of  September. 
His  columns  had  strictly  followed  his  orders 
and  pursued  the  routes  which  he  had  pre- 
scribed them.  Marshal  Bernadotte,  having 
furnished  Hameln  with  stores,  provisions,  and 
a  strong  garrison,  and  left  there  the  men  least 
capable  of  taking  the  field,  had  set  out  from 
Giittingen  with  17,000  soldiers,  all  fit  to  en- 
counter any  hardship.  He  had  forewarned 
the  elector  of  Hesse  of  his  passage,  with  the 
formalities  enjoined  by  Napoleon.  He  had  at 
first  met  with  a  consent,  afterwards  with  a 
refusal,  to  which  he  had  paid  no  heed,  and 
had  crossed  Hesse  without  experiencing  any 
resistance.  Officers  of  administration,  pre- 
ceding his  corps,  ordered  provisions  at  every 
station,  and,  paying  for  every  thing  in  ready 
money,  found  speculators  eager  to  supply  the 
wants  of  our  troops.  An  army  that  carries 
its  travelling  expenses  along  with  it,  can  live 
without  magazines,  without  loss  of  time,  with- 
out annoyance  to  the  country  through  which 
it  is  passing,  if  that  country  is  but  moderately 
stocked  with  articles  of  consumption.  With 
this  auxiliary,  Bernadotte  traversed  without 
difficulty  the  two  Hesses,  the  principality  of 
Fulda,  the  territories  of  the  prince  arch-chan- 
cellor, to  Bavaria.  He  marched  perpendicu- 
larly from  north  to  south.  He  arrived  on  the 
17th  of  September  near  Cassel,  on  the  20th 
at  Giessen,  on  the  27th  at  Wurzburg,  to  the 
great  joy  of  the  elector  of  Bavaria,  who  was 
dying  of  fright  amidst  the  contradictory 
tidings  of  the  Austrians  and  the  French.  A 
minister  of  the  Emperor  of  Germany  had 
hastened  to  that  prince,  to  make  excuses  for 
what  had  happened,  and  to  endeavour  to  con- 
ciliate him.  The  Austrian  minister  knew 
nothing  of  the  march  of  Bernadotte's  corps, 
till  the  French  cavalry  appeared  on  the  heights 
of  Wiirzburg.  He  set  out  immediately,  leav- 
ing the  elector  for  ever,  that  is  for  the  whole 
time  that  our  prosperity  lasted. 

M.  de  Montgelas,  the  better  to  colour  the 
conduct  of  his  master,  solicited  from  us  a  pre- 
caution far  from  honourable  for  Bavaria; 
which  was  to  alter  the  date  of  the  treaty  of 
alliance  concluded  with  France.  That  treaty 
was  signed  in  reality  on  the  24th  of  August. 
M.  de  Montgelas  expressed  a  wish  to  give  it 
another  date,  that  of  the  23d  of  September. 
This  was  assented  to,  and  he  was  enabled  to 
assert  to  his  confederates  at  Ratisbon,  that  he 
had  not  given  himself  up  to  France  till  the 
day  after  the  violences  done  him  by  Austria. 

General  Marmont,  ascending  the  Rhine, 
and  availing  himself  of  it  for  the  conveyance 
of  his  materiel,  had  marched  along  the  fine 
road  which  Napoleon  had  opened  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  river,  and  which  is  one  of  the  me- 
morable works  of  his  reign.  On  the  12th  of 
September  he  was  at  Nimeguen,  on  the  18th 
at  Cologne,  on  the  25th  at  Mayence,  on  the 
26th  at  Frankfurt,  on  the  29th  in  the  environs 
of  Wurzburg.  He  brought  a  corps  of  20,000 
men,  a  park  of  40  pieces  of  cannon  well 
horsed,  and  a  considerable  supply  of  ammu- 


nition.   These  20,000  men  included  a  division 

of  Dutch  troops  commanded  by  General  Du- 

monceau.     As   for   the    15,000    French   who 

composed  this  corps,  a  fact  unexampled  in  the 

history  of  the  war  will  afford  a  correct  idea 

of  their  quality.    They  had  just  traversed  part 

of  France  and  Germany,  and  marched  twenty 

successive  days  without  halting :  and  on  their 

!  arrival  at  Wurzburg  nine  men  only  were  miss- 

,  ing.     There  was   not  a   general  who  would 

not  have  deemed  himself  fortunate  if  he  had 

1  lost  no  more  than  two  or  three  hundred,  for  it 

|  is  the  entering  upon    a   campaign,  and   the 

effects  of  the  first  marches,  that  try  weakly 

constitutions,  and  cause  men  to  lag  behind. 

Towards  the  end  of  September,  then,  Napo- 
leon had,  in  the  heart  of  Franconia,  six  days' 
march  from  the  Danube,  and  threatening  the 
flank  of  the  Austrians,  Marshal  Bernadotte 
with  17,000  men,  General  Marmont,  with 
20,000.  To  these  forces  must  be  added  25,000 
Bavarians,  collected  at  Wurzburg,  and  ani- 
mated with  real  enthusiasm  for  the  cause  of 
the  French,  which,  for  the  moment,  had  be- 
come their  own.  They  clapped  their  hands  on 
seeing  our  regiments  appear  in  sight. 

Marshal  Davout,  with  the  corps  that  had 
marched  from  Ambleteuse,  Marshal  Soult,  with 
that  from  Boulogne,  Marshal  Ney,  with  that 
from  Montreuil,  traversing  Flanders,  Picardy, 
Champagne,  and  Lorraine,  were  on  the  Rhine 
on  the  23d  and  24th  of  September,  preceded 
by  the  cavalry,  which  Napoleon  had  set  in  mo- 
tion four  days  before  the  infantry.  All  marched 
with  unparalleled  ardour.  Dupont's  division, 
in  passing  through  the  department  of  the 
Aisne,  had  left  behind  about  fifty  men  belong- 
ing to  that  department.  They  had  gone  to  see 
their  families,  and  by  the  day  after  the  next 
they  had  all  of  them  rejoined.  After  travel- 
ling 150  leagues,  in  the  middle  of  autumn, 
without  resting  for  a  single  day,  this  army  had 
neither  sick,  nor  stragglers,  an  unexampled 
circumstance,  owing  to  the  spirit  of  the  troops 
and  to  a  long  encampment. 

Marshal  Augereau  had  formed  his  division 
in  Bretagne.  Setting  out  from  Brest,  passing 
through  Alencon,  Sens,  Langres,  Befort,  he 
had  to  cross  France  in  its  greatest  breadth, 
and  was  to  be  on  the  Rhine  a  fortnight  after 
the  other  corps.  Thus,  he  was  destined  to  act 
as  a  reserve. 

Never  was  astonishment  equal  to  that  whicn 
filled  all  Europe  on  the  unexpected  arrival  of 
this  army.  It  was  supposed  to  be  on  the 
shores  of  the  ocean,  and  in  twenty  days,  that 
is  to  say,  in  the  time  required  for  the  report 
of  its  march  to  begin  to  spread,  it  appeared  on 
the  Rhine,  and  inundated  South  Germany.  It 
was  the  effect  of  extreme  promptness  in  de~ 
ciding,  and  of  profound  art  in  concealing,  the 
determinations  that  were  taken. 

The  news  of  the  appearance  of  the  French 
spread  immediately,  and  produced  in  the  Aus- 
trian generals  no  other  idea  than  this,  that  the 
principal  theatre  of  the  war  would  be  in  Ba- 
varia and  not  in  Italy,  since  Napoleon  and  the 
army  of  the  Ocean  were  proceeding  thither. 
The  only  consequences  were  an  application  to 
augment  the  Austrian  forces  in  Suabia,  and 
an  order,  highly  displeasing  to  the  Archduke 


28 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Sept.  1805 


Charles,  to  send  a  detachment  from  Italy  into 
the  Tyrol,  which  was  then  to  proceed  through 
the  Vorarlberg  to  the  assistance  of  General 
Mack.  But  the  real  design  of  Napoleon  con- 
tinued to  be  a  profound  secret.  The  troops 
which  had  joined  at  Wiirzburg  seemed  to  have 
no  other  errand  but  to  pick  up  the  Bavarians 
and  to  protect  the  elector.  The  principal  force, 
placed  at  the  upper  Rhine,  at  the  entrance  of 
the  defiles  of  the  Black  Forest,  seemed  des- 
tined to  enter  there.  General  Mack,  there- 
fore, was  more  and  more  confirmed  everyday 
in  his  idea  of  keeping  the  position  of  Ulm, 
which  had  been  assigned  to  him. 

Napoleon,  having  collected  his  whole  army, 
gave  it  an  organization  which  it  has  ever  since 
retained,  and  a  name  which  it  will  for  ever  re- 
tain in  history,  that  of  the  GRAND  ARMY. 

He  divided  it  into  seven  corps.  Marshal 
Bernadotte,  with  the  troops  brought  from  Han- 
over, formed  the  first  corps,  17,000  strong. 
General  Marmont,  with  the  troops  from  Hol- 
land, formed  the  second,  which  numbered 
20,000  men  present  under  arms.  The  troops 
of  Marshal  Davout,  encamped  at  Ambleteuse, 
and  occupying  the  third  place  along  the  coast 
of  the  Ocean,  had  received  the  designation  of 
third  corps,  and  amounted  to  an  effective  force 
of  26,000  fighting  men.  Marshal  Soult,  with 
the  centre  of  the  grand  army  of  the  Ocean, 
encamped  at  Boulogne,  and  composed  of  40,000 
infantry  and  artillery,  formed  the  fourth  corps. 
Suchet's  division  was  destined  to  be  soon  de- 
tached from  it,  in  order  to  form  part  of  the 
fifth  corps,  with  Gazan's  division  and  the 
grenadiers  of  Arras,  which  were  henceforward 
known  by  the  appellation  of  Oudinot's  grena- 
diers, after  the  name  of  their  gallant  leader. 
This  fifth  corps  was  to  consist  of  18,000  men 
besides  Suchet's  division.  It  was  assigned  to 
the  faithful  and  heroic  friend  of  Napoleon, 
Marshal  Lannes,  who  had  been  recalled  from 
Portugal  to  take  part  in  the  perilous  expedition 
of  Boulogne,  and  was  now  summoned  to  fol- 
low the  Emperor  to  the  banks  of  the  Morawa, 
the  Vistula,  and  the  Niemen.  Under  the  in- 
trepid Ney,  the  camp  of  Montreuil  composed 
the  sixth  corps,  and  amounted  to  24,000  sol- 
diers. Augereau,  with  two  divisions,  14,000 
strong  at  most,  placed  last  on  the  line  of  coast 
— he  was  at  Brest — composed  the  seventh 
corps.  The  name  of  eighth  corps  was  subse- 
quently given  to  the  Italian  troops,  when  they 
came  to  act  in  Germany.  This  organization 
was  that  of  the  army  of  the  Rhine,  but  with 
important  modifications,  adapted  to  the  genius 
of  Napoleon,  and  necessary  for  the  execution 
of  the  great  things  which  he  meditated. 

In  the  army  of  the  Rhine,  each  corps,  com- 
plete in  all  arms,  formed  of  itself  a  little 
army,  having  every  thing  within  itself,  and 
capable  of  giving  battle.  Hence  these  corps 
had  a  tendency  to  separate,  especially  under  a 
general  like  Moreau,  who  commanded  only  in 
proportion  to  his  genius  and  character.  Na- 
poleon had  organized  his  army  in  such  a  man- 
ner that  it  was  entirely  in  his  hand.  Each 
corps  was  complete  in  infantry  only;  it  had 
the  necessary  artillery,  and  of  cavalry  just 
what  was  requisite  to  guard  itself  well,  that  is 
to  say,  some  squadrons  of  hussars  or  chas- 


seurs. Napoleon  reserved  to  himself  to  com- 
plete them  afterwards  by  the  aid  of  a  reserve 
of  those  two  arms,  which  he  alone  disposed  of. 
According  to  the  ground  and  circumstances, 
he  withdrew  from  one  to  give  to  another,  either 
a  reinforcement  of  artillery  or  a  mass  of 
cuirassiers. 

Above  all,  he  made  a  point  of  keeping 
together  under  one  chief,  and  in  immediate 
dependence  on  his  will,  the  principal  mass  of 
his  cavalry.  As  it  is  with  this  that  one  ob- 
serves the  enemy  by  running  incessantly 
around  him,  that  one  completes  his  defeat 
when  he  is  staggered,  that  one  pursues  and 
envelopes  him  when  in  flight,  Napoleon  re- 
solved to  reserve  to  himself  exclusively  this 
means  of  preparing  victory,  of  deciding  it, 
and  of  reaping  its  fruits.  He  had  therefore 
collected  into  a  single  corps  the  heavy  caval- 
ry, composed  of  cuirassiers  and  carabineers, 
commanded  by  Generals  Nansouty  and  d'Haur- 
poul ;  to  these  he  had  added  dragoons  on  foot 
as  well  as  mounted,  under  Generals  Klein, 
Walther,  Beaumont,  Bourcier,  and  Baraguay 
d'Hilliers,  and  had  given  the  command  of  the 
whole  to  his  brother-in-law,  Murat,  who  was 
the  most  dashing  cavalry  officer  of  that  day, 
and  who,  under  his  orders,  represented  the 
magister  equitum  of  the  Roman  armies.  Bat- 
teries of  flying  artillery  followed  this  cavalry, 
and  procured  for  him,  in  addition  to  the  might 
of  swords,  that  of  fires.  We  shall  soon  see 
it  spreading  over  the  valley  of  the  Danube, 
upsetting  the  Austrians  and  the  Russians, 
entering  astonished  Vienna  pell-mell  with 
them  ;  presently,  hastening  back  to  the  plains 
of  Saxony  and  Prussia,  pursuing  to  the  shores 
of  the  Baltic  and  carrying  off  the  entire  Prus- 
sian army,  or  rushing  at  Eylau  upon  the  Rus- 
sian infantry,  saving  the  fortune  of  Napoleon 
by  one  of  the  most  impetuous  shocks  that 
ever  armed  masses  have  given  or  received. 
This  reserve  numbered  22,000  horsemen,  of 
whom  6000  were  cuirassiers,  9  to  10  thousand 
mounted  dragoons,  6000  dragoons  on  foot, 
and  a  thousand  horse  artillery. 

Lastly,  the  general  reserve  of  the  grand 
army  was  the  imperial  guard,  the  finest  corps 
d'clite  in  the  world,  serving  at  once  for  a  means 
of  emulation  and  a  means  of  reward  for  such 
soldiers  as  distinguished  themselves  ;  for  they 
were  not  introduced  into  the  ranks  of  this 
guard  till  they  had  proved  their  prowess.  The 
imperial  guard  was  composed,  like  the  consu- 
lar guard,  of  mounted  grenadiers  and  chas-- 
seurs,  much  the  same  as  a  regiment,  where 
the  companies  of  elite  only  have  been  retained. 
It  comprised,  moreover,  a  fine  Italian  battalion, 
representing  the  royal  guard  of  the  king  of 
Italy,  a  superior  squadron  of  Mamelukes,  the 
last  memorial  of  Egypt,  and  two  squadrons  of 
gendarmerie  d'elite,  to  perform  the  police  duty 
of  the  head-quarters,  in  all  7000  men.  Napo- 
leon had  added  to  it,  in  large  proportion,  the 
arm  to  which  he  was  partial,  because,  on  cer- 
tain occasions,  it  made  amends  for  all  the 
others — artillery.  He  had  formed  a  park  of 
24  pieces  of  cannon,  manned  and  horsed  with 
particular  care,  which  made  nearly  four  pieces 
to  every  thousand  men. 

The  guard  scarcely  ever  quitted  the  head' 


Sept.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


29 


quarters ;  it  riarched  almost  always  beside  the 
Emperor,  with  Lannes'  and  Oudinot's  grena- 
diers. 

Such  was  the  grand  army.  It  presented  a 
mass  of  186,000  combatants  really  present 
under  the  colours.  It  numbered  38,000  horse- 
men, and  340  pieces  of  cannon.  If  we  add 
to  these  Massena's  50,000  men,  and  General 
St.  Cyr's  20,000,  we  shall  have  a  total  of 
256,000  French  spread  from  the  gulf  of  Ta- 
rento  to  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe,  with  a  reserve 
of  150,000  young  soldiers  in  the  interior.  If 
we  further  add  25,000  Bavarians,  7  or  8  thou- 
sand subjects  of  the  sovereigns  of  Baden  and 
Wurtemberg  ready  to  fall  into  line,  we  may  say 
that  Napoleon  was  going,  with  250,000  French, 
30  and  odd  thousand  Germans,  to  fight  about 
500,000  men  belonging  to  the  coalition, 
250,000  of  whom  were  Austrians,  200,000 
Russians,  50,000  English,  Swedes,  Neapoli- 
tans, having  also  their  reserve  in  the  interior 
of  Austria,  of  Russia,  and  in  the  English 
fleets.  The  coalition  hoped  to  join  to  them 
200,000  Prussians.  This  would  not  be  im- 
possible, if  Napoleon  did  not  make  haste  to 
conquer. 

It  was,  in  fact,  urgent  for  him  to  commence 
operations,  and  he  gave  orders  for  passing  the 
Rhine  on  the  25th  and  26th  of  September, 
after  sacrificing  two  or  three  days  to  rest  the 
men,  to  repair  some  damages  to  the  harness 
of  the  cavalry,  to  exchange  some  wounded 
and  jaded  horses  for  fresh  horses,  a  great 
number  of  which  had  been  collected  in  Alsace, 
and  lastly  to  prepare  a  large  park  and  a  con- 
siderable quantity  of  biscuit.  His  disposi- 
tions for  turning  the  Black  Forest,  behind 
which  General  Mack,  encamped  at  Ulm,  was 
waiting  for  the  French,  were  these. 

If  we  fix  our  eyes  upon  that  country  so 
often  traversed  by  our  armies,  and  for  that 
reason  so  frequently  described  in  this  history, 
we  see  the  Rhine  issuing  from  the  Lake  of 
Constance,  running  westward  as  far  as  Basle, 
then  suddenly  turning  and  running  almost 
direct  north.  We  see  the  Danube,  on  the  con- 
trary, rising  from  some  petty  springs  very  near 
the  point  where  the  Rhine  issues  from  the 
Lake  of  Constance,  taking  its  course  to  the 
east,  and  following  that  direction  with  very 
few  deviations  to  the  Black  Sea.  It  is  a  chain 
of  mountains  of  very  moderate  height,  most 
improperly  called  the  Suabian  Alps,  that  thus 
separates  the  two  rivers,  and  sends  the  Rhine 
to  the  seas  of  the  North,  the  Danube  to  the 
seas  of  the  East.  These  mountains  turn  their 
steepest  declivities  towards  France,  and  sub- 
side by  a  gradual  slope,  in  the  plains  of  Fran- 
conia,  between  Nordlingen  and  Donauwerth. 
From  their  riven  flank,  clothed  with  woods, 
called  by  the  general  name  of  Black  Forest, 
run  to  the  left,  .that  is  to  say,  towards  the 
Rhine,  the  Neckar  and  the  Mayn  ;  to  the  right, 
the  Danube,  which  runs  along  the  back  of  them, 
nearly  bare  of  wood  and  formed  into  terraces. 
Through  them  run  narrow  defiles  which  you 
must  necessarily  traverse  in  going  from  the 
Rhine  to  the  Danube,  unless  you  choose  to 
avoid  those  mountains,  either  by  ascending 
the  Rhine,  to  above  Schaffhausen,  or  by  travel- 
ling along  the  foot  of  them  from  Strasburg  to 


Nordlingen  and  into  the  plains  of  Franconia, 
where  they  disappear.  In  the  preceding  war, 
the  French  had  alternately  taken  two  routes. 
Sometimes  debouching  from  the  Rhine,  be- 
tween Strasburg,  and  Huningen,  they  had 
traversed  the  defiles  of  the  Black  Forest; 
sometimes  ascending  the  Rhine  to  Schaffhau- 
sen, they  had  crossed  that  river  near  the  Lake 
of  Constance,  and  found  themselves  at  the 
sources  of  the  Danube,  without  passing 
through  the  defiles. 

Napoleon,  purposing  to  place  himself  be- 
tween the  Austrians  who  were  posted  at  Ulm, 
and  the  Russians  who  were  coming  to  their 
assistance,  was  obliged  to  take  another  route. 
Studying  in  the  first  place  to  fix  the  attention 
of  the  Austrians  on  the  defiles  of  the  Black 
Forest  by  the  appearance  of  his  columns 
ready  to  enter  it,  he  meant  then  to  proceed 
along  the  foot  of  the  Suabian  Alps,  without 
crossing  them,  as  far  as  Nordlingen,  to  turn, 
with  all  his  united  columns,  their  lowered  ex- 
tremity, and  to  pass  the  Danube  at  Donau- 
wenh.  By  this  "novement  he  should  form  a 
junction  on  the  way  with  the  corps  of  Berna- 
dotte  and  Marmont,  which  would  have  already 
reached  Wiirzburg,  he  should  turn  the  posi- 
tion of  Ulm,  debouch  on  the  rear  of  General 
Mack,  and  execute  the  plan  long  settled  in  his 
mind,  and  from  which  he  expected  immense 
results. 

On  the  25th  of  September,  he  ordered  Mural 
and  Lannes  to  pass  the  Rhine  at  Strasburg, 
with  the  reserve  of  cavalry,  Oudinot's  grena- 
diers, and  Gazan's  division.  Murat  was  to 
proceed  with  his  dragoons  from  Oberkirch  to 
Freudenstadt,  from  Offenburg  to  Rothweil, 
from  Freiburg  to  Neustadt,  and  thus  appear 
at  the  head  of  the  principal  defiles,  so  as  to 
induce  a  supposition  that  the  army  itself  was 
to  pass  through  them.  Provisions  were  be- 
spoken along  this  route,  to  complete  the  delu- 
sion of  the  enemy.  Lannes  was  to  support 
these  reconnaissances  by  a  few  battalions  of 
grenadiers,  but,  in  reality,  placed  with  the 
bulk  of  his  corps  in  advance  of  Strasburg,  on 
the  Stuttgard  road,  he  had  orders  to  cover  the 
movement  of  Marshals  Ney,  Soult,  and  Da- 
vout,  who  were  directed  to  cross  the  Rhine 
lower  down.  General  Songis,  who  command- 
ed the  artillery,  had  thrown  two  bridges  of 
boats,  the  first  between  Lauterburg  and  Carls- 
ruhe  for  the  corps  of  Marshal  Ney,  the  second 
in  the  environs  of  Spire  for  the  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Soult.  Marshal  D;ivout  had  at  his  dis- 
posal the  bridge  of  Manheim.  These  mar- 
shals were  to  cross  the  valleys  which  descend 
from  the  chain  of  the  Suabian  Alps  and  to 
skirt  that  chain,  supporting  themselves  one 
upon  the  other,  so  as  to  be  able  to  assist  each 
other  in  case  of  the  sudden  appearance  of  the, 
enemy.  All  of  them  had  orders  to  be  pro- 
vided with  four  days'  bread  in  the  soldiers' 
knapsacks,  and  four  days'  biscuit  in  the  bag- 
gage-wagons, in  case  they  should  be  obliged 
to  make  forced  marches.  Napoleon  did  not 
leave  Strasburg  till  he  saw  his  parks  and  his 
reserves  move  off  under  the  escort  of  a  divi- 
sion of  infantry.  He  passed  the  Rhine  on  the 
1st  of  October,  accompanied  by  his  guard, 
after  taking  leave  of  the  empress  who  re- 
r.  2 


30 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1805, 


mained  at  Strasburg,  with  the  imperial  court, 
aiid  the  chancellery  of  M.  de  Talleyrand. 

On  reaching  the  territory  of  the  Grand-duke 
of  Baden,  Napoleon  found  the  reigning  family, 
which  had  come  to  meet  and  pay  him  homage. 
The  old  elector  presented  himself  surrounded 
by  three  generations  of  princes.  Like  all  the 
second  and  third-rate  sovereigns  of  Germany, 
he  had  been  desirous  to  obtain  the  boon  of 
neutrality,  an  absolute  chimera  under  such 
circumstances;  for  when  the  petty  German 
powers  are  not  able  to  prevent  war  by  resist- 
ing the  great  powers  which  are  intent  on  it, 
they  must  not  flatter  themselves  that  they  can 
obviate  its  calamities  by  a  neutrality  which  is 
impossible,  because  they  are  almost  all  in  the 
obligatory  track  of  tfie  belligerent  armies. 
Napoleon  had  offered  them  his  alliance  in- 
stead of  neutrality,  promising  to  settle  to  their 
advantage  the  questions  of  territory  or  of 
sovereignty  which  separated  them  from  Aus- 
tria ever  since  the  unfinished  arrangements 
of  1803.  The  Grand-duke  of  Baden  concluded 
to. accept  that  alliance,  and  promised  to  fur- 
nish 3000  men,  besides  provisions  and  means 
of  conveyance,  to  be  paid  for  in  the  country 
itself.  Napoleon,  after  sleeping  at  Ettlingen, 
set  out  on  the  2d  of  October  for  Stuttgard. 
Before  his  arrival,  a  collision  had  wellnigh 
taken  place  between  the  Elector  of  Wurtem- 
berg  and  Marshal  Ney.  That  elector,  known 
throughout  Europe  for  the  extreme  warmth  of 
his  temper  and  disposition,  was  at  that  mo- 
ment discussing  with  the  minister  of  France 
the  conditions  of  an  alliance  which  he  greatly 
disliked.  But  he  insisted  that,  till  the  conclu- 
sion of  this  business,  no  French  troops  should 
enter  either  Louisburg,  which  was  his  country 
residence,  or  Stuttgard,  which  was  his  capital. 
Marshal  Ney  did  consent  not  to  enter  Louis- 
burg,  but  he  ordered  his  artillery  to  be  pointed 
against  the  gates  of  Stuttgard,  and  by  these 
means  obtained  admission.  Napoleon  arrived 
opportunely  to  appease  the  anger  of  the  elec- 
tor. He  was  received  by  him  with  great 
magnificence,  and  stipulated  with  him  an 
alliance,  which  has  founded  the  greatness  of 
that  house,  as  similar  alliances  have  founded 
that  of  all  the  princes  of  the  south  of  Ger- 
many. The  treaty  was  signed  on  the  5th  of 
October,  and  contains  an  engagement  on  the 
part  of  France  to  aggrandize  the  house  of 
Wurtemberg,  and,  on  the  part  of  that  house, 
to  furnish  10,000  men,  besides  provisions, 
horses,  and  carriages,  which  were  to  be  paid 
for  when  taken. 

Napoleon  stayed  three  or  four  days  at  Louis- 
burg,  to  allow  his  corps  on  the  left  time  to  get 
into  line.  It  was  a  most  delicate  position  to 
brush,  for  forty  leagues,  the  skirts  of  an  enemy 
80  or  90  thousand  strong,  without  rousing 
him  too  much,  and  at  the  risk  of  seeing  him 
debouch  on  a  sudden  upon  one  of  his  wings. 
Napoleon  provided  against  this  with  admirable 
art  and  foresight.  Three  routes  ran  across 
Wurtemberg  and  terminated  at  those  lowered 
extremities  of  the  Suabian  Alps,  which  it  was 
necessary  10  reach  in  order  to  arrive  at  the 
Danube  between  Donauwerth  and  Ingolstadt. 
The  principal  was  that  of  Pforzheim,  Stutt- 
aard,  Heidenheim,  which  skirted  the  very 


flanks  of  the  mountains,  and  which  was  ir? 
communication,  by  a  great  number  of  defiles, 
with  the  position  of  the  Austrians  at  Ulm.  Il 
was  this  that  required  to  be  traversed  with  the 
greatest  precaution,  on  account  of  the  proxi- 
mity of  the  enemy.  Napoleon  occupied  it 
with  Mural's  cavalry,  the  corps  of  Marshal 
Lannes,  that  of  Marshal  Ney,  and  the  guard. 
The  second,  which,  running  from  Spire,  passed 
through  Heilbronn,  Hall,  Ellwangen,  and  ter- 
minated in  the  plain  of  Nordlingen,  was  occu- 
pied by  the  corps  of  Marshal  Soult.  The 
third,  running  from  Manheim,  passing  through 
Heidelberg,  Neckar-Elz,  and  Ingelfingen,  ter- 
minated at  Oettingen.  It  was  by  this  that 
Marshal  Davout  marched.  It  approached 
towards  the  direction  which  the  corps  of  Ber- 
nadotte  and  Marmont  were  to  follow,  in  pro- 
ceeding from  Wurzburg  to  the  Danube.  Na- 
poleon arranged  the  march  of  these  different 
columns  so  as  that  they  should  all  arrive 
from  the  6th  and  7th  of  October  in  the  plain 
extending  along  the  Danube,  between  Nordlin- 
gen, Donauwerlh,  and  Ingolstadt.  But  in  this 
revolving  movement,  his  left  wheeling  upon 
his  right,  the  latter  had  to  describe  a  less  ex- 
tensive circle  than  the  former.  He  was  there- 
fore obliged  to  make  his  right  slacken  its  pace, 
in  order  to  give  the  corps  of  Marmont  and  Ber- 
nadotte,  which  formed  the  extreme  left,  Marshal 
Davout's  which  came  next  to  them,  lastly,  Mar- 
shal Souk's, which  came  after  MarshalDavout's, 
and  connected  them  all  with  the  head-quarters, 
time  to  finish  their  revolving  movement. 

After  waiting  sufficiently,  Napoleon  set  him- 
self in  march  on  the  4th  of  October,  with  the 
whole  of  his  right.  Murat,  galloping  inces- 
santly at  the  head  of  his  cavalry,  appeared  by 
turns  at  the  entrance  of  each  of  the  defiles 
which  run  through  the  mountains,  merely 
showing  himself  there  and  then  withdrawing 
his  squadrons  as  soon  as  the  artillery  and 
baggage  had  made  so  much  way  as  to  have 
nothing  to  fear.  Napoleon,  with  the  corps  of 
Lannes,  Ney,  and  the  guards,  followed  the 
Stuttgard  route,  ready  to  hasten  with  50,000 
men  to  the  assistance  of  Murat,  if  the  enemy 
should  appear  in  force  in  one  of  the  defiles. 
As  for  the  corps  of  Soult,  Davout,  Marmont, 
and  Bernadotte,  forming  the  centre  and  the 
left  of  the  army,  their  danger  did  not  begin  till 
the  movement  that  was  executing,  by  march- 
ing along  the  foot  of  the  Suabian  Alps,  was 
finished,  and  they  should  debouch  in  the  plain 
of  Nordlingen.  It  was  possible,  in  fact,  that 
General  Mack  being  timely  apprized,  might 
fall  back  from  Ulm  upon  Donauwerth,  cross  the 
Danube,  and  come  to  this  plain  of  Nordlingen 
to  fight,  for  the  purpose  of  stopping  the  French. 
Napoleon  had  so  arranged  things  that  Murat. 
Ney,  Lannes,  and  with  them  the  corps  of  Mar- 
shals Soult  and  Devout,  at  least,  should  con- 
verge together  on  the  6th  of  October  between 
Heidenheim,  Oettingen,  and  Nordlingen,  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  present  an  imposing  mass  to 
the  enemy.  But  till  then  his  incessant  study 
was  to  deceive  General  Mack  so  long  that  he 
should  not  think  of  decamping,  and  that  Ihe 
French  might  reach  the  Danube  at  Donau- 
werth before  he  had  quitted  his  position  at 
Ulm.  On  the  4th  and  ou  the  6th  of  October, 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE 


every  thing  continued  to  wear  the  best  aspect. 
The  weather  was  splendid;  the  soldiers,  well 
provided  with  shoes  and  great-coats,  marched 
merrily.  One  hundred  and  twenty-four  thou- 
sand French  advanced  thus  on  a  line  of  battle 
of  26  leagues,  the  right  touching  upon  the 
mountains,  the  left  converging  towards  the 
plains  of  the  Upper  Palatinate,  capable  of  be- 
ing collected  in  a  few  hours  to  the  number  of 
90  or  100  thousand  men  on  one  or  the  other 
of  their  wings,  and,  what  is  more  extraordi- 
nary, without  the  Austrians  having  the  least 
idea  of  this  vast  operation. 

"  The  Austrians,"  wrote  Napoleon  to  M.  de 
Talleyrand  and  to  Marshal  Augereau,  "  are 
on  the  debouches  of  the  Black  Forest.  God  j 
grant  that  they  may  remain  there  !  My  only 
fear  is  that  we  shall  frighten  them  too  much  j 
....  If  they  allow  me  to  gain  a  few  more 
marches,  I  hope  to  have  turned  them  and  to  find 
myself,  with  my  whole  army,  between  the  Lech  j 
and  the  Isar." — He  wrote  to  the  minister  of  the 
police:  "Forbid  the  newspapers  of  the  Rhine 
to  make  any  more  mention  of  the  army  than 
if  it  did  not  exist."  To  reach  the  points  indi- 
cated to  them,  the  corps  of  Bernadotte  and 
Marmont  were  to  cross  one  of  the  provinces 
which  Prussia  possessed  in  Franconia,  that 
of  Anspach.  By  drawing  them  nearer  to  the 
corps  of  Marshal  Davout,  Napoleon  could  in 
fact  have  brought  them  closer  to  him,  and  thus 
avoided  entering  the  Prussian  territory.  But 
the  roads  were  already  encumbered;  to  have 
accumulated  more  troops  in  them  would  have 
occasioned  inconvenience  for  the  order  of  the 
movement  and  for  the  supply  of  provisions. 
Besides,  by  contracting  the  circle  described 
by  the  army,  he  would  have  diminished  the 
chances,  of  enveloping  the  enemy.  Napoleon 
purposed  to  embrace  in  his  movement  the 
course  of  the  Danube  as  far  as  Ingolstadt,  in 
order  to  debouch  as  far  as  possible  in  the  rear 
of  the  Austrians,  and  to  be  able  to  stop  them, 
in  case  they  should  fall  back  from  the  Iller  to 
the  Lech.  Not  imagining,  from  the  state  of 
his  relations  with  Prussia,  that  she  could  make 
any  difficulty  towards  him,  reckoning  upon 
the  custom  established  in  the  late  wars  of  tra- 
versing the  Prussian  provinces  in  Franconia, 
because  they  were  out  of  the  line  of  neutrality, 
having  received  no  intimation  that  a  different 
course  would  be  adopted  in  this,  Napoleon 
made  no  scruple  to  borrow  the  territory  of  An- 
spach, and  gave  orders  to  Marmont's  and  Ber- 
nadotte's  corps  accordingly.  The  Prussian 
magistrates  appeared  on  the  frontier,  to  protest 
in  the  name  of  their  sovereign  against  the  vio- 
lence that  was  done  them.  In  reply,  the  orders 
of  Napoleon  were  produced,  and  the  troops 
passed  on,  paying  in  specie  lor  all  that  was 
taken,  and  observing  the  strictest  discipline. 
The  Prussian  subjects,  well  paid  for  the  bread 
and  the  meat  with  which  they  supplied  our 
soldiers,  did  not  appear  to  be  much  irritated 
at  the  alleged  violation  of  their  territory. 

On  the  6th  of  October,  our  six  corps  d'armee 
had  arrived  without  accident  beyond  the  Sua- 
bian  Alps,  Marshal  Ney  at  Heidenheim,  Mar- 
shal Lannes  at  Neresheim,  Marshal  Davout 
at  Oettingen,  General  Marmont  and  Marshal 
Bernadotte  on  the  Aichstadt  road,  all  in  sight 


of  the  Danube,  considerably  beyond  the  posi- 
tion of  Ulm. 

What,  meanwhile,  were  General  Mack,  the 
Archduke  Ferdinand,  and  all  the  officers  of  the 
Austrian  staff,  about?  Most  fortunately,  the 
intention  of  Napoleon  was  not  revealed  to 
them.  Forty  thousand  men,  who  had  passed 
the  Rhine  at  Strasburg,  and  who  had  plunged 
at  once  into  the  defiles  of  the  Black  Forest, 
had  confirmed  them  in  the  idea  that  the  French 
would  pursue  the  accustomed  track.  False 
reports  of  spies,  artfully  despatched  by  Napo- 
leon, had  confirmed  them  still  more  in  this 
opinion.  They  had  heard,  indeed,  of  some 
French  troops  spread  in  Wurtemberg,  but  they 
supposed  that  they  were  coming  to  occupy  the 
petty  states  of  Germany,  and  perhaps  to  assist 
the  Bavarians.  Besides,  nothing  is  more  con- 
tradictory, more  perplexing,  than  that  multi- 
tude of  reports  of  spies  or  of  officers  sent  on 
reconnaissance.  Some  of  them  place  corps 
d'armee  where  they  have  met  with  detach- 
ments only,  others  mere  detachments  where 
they  ought  to  have  found  corps  d'armee. 
Frequently  they  have  not  seen  with  their  own 
eyes  what  they  report,  and  they  have  merely 
picked  up  the  hearsays  of  terrified,  surprised, 
or  astonished  persons.  The  military,  like  the 
civil  police,  lies,  exaggerates,  contradicts  itself. 
In  the  chaos  of  its  reports  the  superior  mind 
discerns  the  truth,  while  the  weak  mind  is  lost. 
And,  above  all,  if  any  anterior  prepossession 
exists,  if  one  is  disposed  to  believe  that  the 
enemy  will  come  by  one  point  rather  than  by 
another,  the  facts  collected  are  all  interpreted 
in  a  single  sense,  how  far  soever  they  may  be 
from  admitting  of  it.  In  this  manner  are  pro- 
duced great  errors,  which  sometimes  ruin 
armies  and  even  empires. 

Such  was  at  this  moment  General  Mack's 
state  of  mind.  The  Austrian  officers  had  long 
extolled  the  position  which,  supporting  its 
right  at  Ulm,  its  left  at  Memmingen,  faced  the 
French  debouching  from  the  Black  Forest. 
Authorized  by  an  opinion  which  was  general, 
and  in  obedience,  moreover,  to  positive  in- 
structions. General  Mack  had  established  him- 
self in  this  position.  He  had  there  his  provi- 
sions, his  military  stores,  and  nothing  would 
have  persuaded  him  that  he  was  n.ot  most  con- 
veniently placed  there.  The  only  precaution 
which  he  had  taken  upon  his  rear  consisted  in 
sending  General  Kienmayer,  with  a  few  thou- 
sand men,  to  Ingolstadt,  to  observe  the  Bava 
rians  who  had  fled  to  the  Upper  Palatinate, 
and  to  connect  himself  with  the  Russians, 
whom  he  expected  by  the  high  road  from 
Munich. 

While  General  Mack,  with  a  mind  prepos 
sessed  with  an  opinion  formed  beforehand,  re 
mained  motionless  at  Ulm,  the  six  corps  of 
the  French  army  debouched  on  the  6lh  of  Oc- 
tober in  the  plain  of  Nordlingen,  beyond  the 
mountains  of  Suabia,  which  they  had  turned, 
and  on  the  banks  of  the  Danube,  which  they 
were  about  to  cross.  On  the  evening  of~th« 
6th,  Vandamme's  division,  belonging  to  Mar- 
shal Soult's  corps,  outstripping  all  the  others, 
reached  the  Danube,  and  surprised  the  bridgt 
of  Miinster,  a  league  above  Donauwerth.  On 
the  7th  of  October,  the  corps  of  Marshal  Soult 


82 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


took  the  bridge  of  Donauwerth  itself,  faintly 
disputed  by  a  battalion  of  Colloredo's,1  which, 
unable  to  defend,  endeavoured  in  vain,  to  de- 
stroy it.  The  troops  of  Marshal  Soult  speed- 
ily repaired  it,  and  passed  over  in  the  greatest 
haste.  Murat,  with  his  division  of  dragoons, 
preceding  the  right  wing,  formed  of  the  corps 
of  Marshals  Lannes  and  Ney,  had  proceeded 
to  the  bridge  of  Miinster,  already  surprised  by 
Vandamme.  He  claimed  that  bridge  for  his 
troops  and  those  which  were  following  him, 
left  that  of  Donauwerth  to  Marshal  Soult's 
troops,  passed  instantly  with  a  division  of  dra- 
goons, and  dashed  off  on  the  other  side  of  the 
Danube,  in  pursuit  of  an  object  of  great  inte- 
rest, the  occupation  of  the  bridge  of  Rain  on  the 
Lech.  The  Lech,  which  runs  behind  the  Iller, 
nearly  parallel  to  the  latter,  and  falls  into  the 
Danube  near  Donauwerth,  forms  a  position 
situated  beyond  that  of  Ulm,  and,  by  occupy- 
ing the  bridge  of  Rain,  the  French  would  have 
turned  both  the  Iller  and  the  Lech,  and  left 
General  Mack  few  chances  of  falling  back  to 
good  purpose.  It  took  but  the  time  required 
for  Murat's  dragoons  to  gallop  the  distance,  to 
make  themselves  masters  of  Rain  and  the 
bridge  over  the  Lech.  Two  hundred  horse 
overturned  all  the  patroles  of  Kienmayer's 
corps,  while  Marshal  Soult  established  him- 
self in  force  at  Donauwerth,  and  Marshal  Da- 
vout  came  in  sight  of  the  bridge  of  Neuburg. 

Napoleon  repaired  the  same  day  to  Donau- 
werth. His  hopes  were  now  realized,  but  he 
did  not  consider  himself  completely  sure  of 
success  till  he  had  won  the  very  last  result  of 
his  admirable  manoeuvre.  Some  hundreds  of 
prisoners  had  been  already  taken,  and  their 
reports  were  unanimous.  General  Mack  was 
at  Ulm  on  the  Iller:  it  was  his  rear-guard, 
commanded  by  General  Kienmayer,  and  in- 
tended to  connect  him  with  the  Russians, 
which  the  French  had  just  fallen  in  with  and 
driven  across  the  Danube.  Napoleon  imme- 
diately determined  to  take  a  position  between 
the  Austrians  and  the  Russians,  so  as  to  pre- 
vent their  junction.  The  first  movement  of 
General  Mack's,  had  he  been  capable  of  a 
timely  resolve,  ought  to  have  been  to  quit  the 
banks  of  the  Iller,  to  fall  back  upon  the  Lech, 
to  pass  through  Augsburg,  in  order  to  join 
General  Kienmayer  on  the  Munich  road.  Na- 
poleon, without  losing  a  moment,  ordered  the 
following  dispositions:  He  would  not  throw 
Ney's  corps  beyond  the  Danube,  but  left  it  on 
the  roads  running  from  Wurtemberg  to  Ulm, 
to  guard  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  by  which 
we  arrived.  He  directed  Murat  and  Lannes 
to  pass  to  the  right  bank  by  the  two  bridges 
which  the  French  were  masters  of,  those  of 
Miinster  and  Donauwerth,  to  ascend  the  river, 
and  to  place  themselves  between  Ulm  and 
Augsburg,  to  prevent  General  Mack  from  re- 
treating by  the  high  road  from  Augsburg  to 
Munich.  The  intermediate  point  which  they 
had  to  occupy  was  Burgau.  Napoleon  or- 
dered Marshal  Soult  to  leave  the  mouth  of  the 
Lech,  where  he  was  in  position,  to  ascend  that 


tributary  of  the  Danube  to  Augsburg,  with  the 
three  divisions  of  St.  Hilaire,  Vandamme,  and 
Legrand.  Suchet's  division,  the  fourth  of 
Marshal  Soult's,  was  already  placed  under  the 
command  of  Lannes.  Thus  Marshal  Ney, 
with  20,000  men  on  the  left  bank  of  the  Da- 
nube, which  had  been  abandoned,  Murat  and 
Lannes,  with  40,000  on  the  right,  which  had 
just  been  taken  possession  of,  Marshal  Soult, 
with  30,000  on  the  Lech,  surrounded  General 
Mack,  by  whatever  outlet  he  might  attempt  to 
escape. 

Turning  his  immediate  attention  from  this 
point  to  others,  Napoleon  ordered  Marshal 
Davout  to  hasten  and  cross  the  Danube  at 
Neuburg,  and  to  clear  Ingolstadt,  towards 
which  Marmont  and  Bernadotte  were  proceed- 
ing. The  route  followed  by  these  latter  was 
longer;  they  were  two  marches  behindhand. 
Marshal  Davout  was  then  to  proceed  to  Aich- 
ach  on  the  Munich  road,  to  push  General  Kien- 
mayer before  him,  and  to  form  the  rear-guard 
of  the  masses  which  were  accumulating 
around  Ulm.  The  corps  of  Marmont  and  Ber- 
nadotle  had  orders  to  quicken  their  pace,  to 
cross  the  Danube  at  Ingolstadt,  and  to  march 
for  Munich,  in  order  to  replace  the  elector  in 
his  capital,  barely  a  month  after  he  had  quitted 
it.  It  was  for  Marshal  Bernadotte,  at  this  mo- 
ment the  companion  of  the  Bavarians,  that 
Napoleon  reserved  the  honour  of  reinstating 
them  in  their  country.  By  this  disposition, 
Napoleon  would  present  to  the  Russians  com- 
ing from  Munich,  Bernadotte  and  the  Bava- 
rians, then,  in  case  of  emergency,  Marmont  and 
Davout,  who  were  to  march,  according  to  cir- 
cumstances, either  upon  Munich  or  Ulm,  to 
assist  in  the  complete  investment  of  General 
Mack. 

On  the  following  day,  the  8th  of  October, 
Marshal  Soult  ascended  the  Lech,  on  his  way 
to  Augsburg.  He  found  no  enemies  before 
him.  Murat  and  Lannes,  destined  to  occupy 
the  space  comprised  between  the  Lech  and 
the  Iller,  ascended  from  Donauwerth  to  Bur- 
gau, through  a  country  presenting  some  slight" 
obstructions,  covered  here  and  there  with 
woods,  and  traversed  by  several  small  rivers, 
tributaries  of  the  Danube.  The  dragoons  were 
marching  at  the  head,  when  they  met  with  a 
hostile  corps,  more  numerous  than  any  which 
they  had  yet  seen,  posted  around  and  in  ad- 
vance of  a  large  village  called  Wertingen. 
This  hostile  corps  was  composed  of  six  bat- 
talions of  grenadiers  and  three  of  fusileers, 
commanded  by  Baron  d'Auffenberg,  of  two 
squadrons  of  Duke  Albert's  cuirassiers,  and 
two  squadrons  of  Latour's  light  horse.  They 
had  been  sent  on  reconnaissance  by  General 
Mack,  on  the  circulation  of  a  vague  rumour 
of  the  appearance  of  Frenchmen  on  the  banks 
of  the  Danube.  He  still  conceived  that  these 
French  must  belong  to  Bernadotte's  corps, 
posted,  it  was  said,  at  Wilrzburg,  to  assist  the 
Bavarians.  The  Austrian  officers  were  at 
dinner  when  they  were  informed  that  the 
French  were  in  sight.  They  were  extremely 


'  COLLOREDO,  JEROME,  COUKT.  A  member  of  one  of 
the  most  distinguished  families  of  Austria,  born  in  1775. 
He  was  master-general  of  the  ordnance  in  1813,  com- 


manded the  first  division  of  the  army  at  Him,  and  died  in 
1822  while  commander-in-chief  in  Bohemia. — Kncyelopa- 
dia  Americana.  H. 


Oct.  1805.1 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


surprised,  refused  at  first  to  believe  the  report, 
but  could  not  long  doubt  its  accuracy,  and 
they  mounted  their  horses  precipitately,  to  put 
themselves  at  the  head  of  their  troops.  In  ad- 
/ance  of  Wertingen,  there  was  a  hamlet  named 
Hohenreichen,  guarded  by  a  few  hundred  Aus- 
trians,  foot  and  horse.  Sheltered  by  the  houses 
of  this  hamlet,  they  kept  up  a  galling  fire,  and 
held  in  check  a  regiment  of  dragoons  which 
first  arrived  on  the  spot.  The  chef  d'cscadron 
Excellmans,  the  same  who  has  since  signalized 
his  name  by  so  many  brilliant  acts,  then  no 
more  than  aide-de-camp  to  Murat,  had  hastened 
up  at  the  sound  of  the  firing.  He  induced  two 
hundred  dragoons  to  dismount  cheerfully, 
when,  musket  in  hand,  they  rushed  into  the 
hamlet,  and  dislodged  those  who  occupied  it. 
Fresh  detachments  of  dragoons  had  mean- 
while come  up;  the  Austrians  were  pressed 
more  warmly;  the  assailants  penetrated  in 
pursuit  of  them  into  Wertingen,  passed  that 
village,  and  found,  on  a  sort  of  plateau,  the  : 
nine  battalions  formed  into  a  single  square,  • 
of  small  extent,  but  close  and  deep,  hav-  ! 
ing  cannon  and  cavalry  on  its  wings.  The 
brave  chef  d'escadron  Excellmans  immediately 
charged  this  square  with  extraordinary  bold- 
ness, and  had  a  horse  killed  under  him.  At 
his  side  Colonel  Meaupetit  was  upset  by  the 
thrust  of  a  bayonet.  But,  vigorous  as  was  the 
attack,  there  was  no  breaking  this  compact 
mass.  Some  time  was  thus  spent,  the  French 
dragoons  endeavouring  to  cut  down  the  Aus- 
trian grenadiers,  who  returned  their  efforts 
with  thrusts  of  the  bayonet  and  the  fire  of  their 
pieces.  Murat  at  length  came  up  with  the 
bulk  of  his  cavalry,  and  Lannes  with  Oudi- 
not's  grenadiers,  both  drawn  in  haste  by  the 
reports-  of  the  cannon.  Murat  immediately 
ordered  his  squadrons  to  charge  the  enemy's 
square,  and  Lannes  directed  his  grenadiers 
upon  the  margin  of  a  wood  which  was  seen 
in  the  background,  so  as  to  cut  off  the  retreat 
of  the  Austrians.  The  latter,  charged  in  front, 
threatened  in  rear,  fell  back  at  first  in  a  close 
mass,  but  presently  in  disorder.  If  Oudinot's 
grenadiers  could  have  reached  the  ground  a 
few  moments  earlier,  the  whole  of  the  nine 
battalions  would  have  been  made  captive. 
Two  thousand  prisoners,  several  pieces  of 
cannon,  and  several  colours,  were  nevertheless 
taken. 

Lannes  and  Murat,  who  had  seen  the  chef 
fescadron  Excellmans  at  the  point  of  the  hos- 
tile bayonets,  determined  to  send  him  to  Na- 
poleon with  the  news  of  the  first  success  ob- 
tained, and  the  colours  taken  from  the  enemy. 
The  Emperor  received  the  young  and  dashing 
officer  at  Donauwerth,  granted  him  rank  in  the 
Legion  of  Honour,  and  delivered  the  insignia 
to  him  in  the  presence  of  his  staff,  to  give  the 
greater  eclat  to  the  first  rewards  earned  in  this 
war. 

On  this  same  day,  October  the  8th,  Marshal 
Soult  entered  Augsburg,  without  striking  a 
blow.  Marshal  Davout  had  crossed  the  Danube 
at  Neuburg,  and  proceeded  to  Aichach  to  take 
the  intermediate  position  assigned  to  him,  be- 
tween the  French  corps  going  to  invest  Ulm, 
and  those  going  to  Munich  to  make  head 
against  the  Russians.  Marshal  Bernadotte 
VOL.  II.— 5  « 


and  General  Marmont  made  preparations  for 
passing  the  Danube  towards  Ingolstadt,  with 
the  intention  of  repairing  to  Munich. 

Napoleon  ordered  the  position  of  Ulm  to  be 
straitened.  He  enjoined  Marshal  Ney  to  as- 
cend the  left  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  to  make 
himself  master  of  all  the  bridges  over  the 
river,  in  order  to  be  enabled  to  act  on  both 
banks.  He  directed  Murat  and  Lannes,  on 
their  side,  to  ascend  the  right  bank,  and  to 
contribute  with  Ney  to  the  closer  investment 
of  the  Austrians.  Next  day,  Marshal  Ney, 
prompt  at  executing  the  orders  which  he  re- 
ceived, especially  when  those  orders  brought 
him  nearer  to  the  enemy,  reached  the  bank  of 
the  Danube,  and  ascended  it  till  he  was  oppo- 
site to  Ulm.  The  first  bridges  that  he  met 
with  were  those  of  Ganzburg.  He  charged 
Malher's  division  to  take  them. 

These  bridges  were  three  in  number.  The 
principal  was  before  the  small  town  of  Gilnz- 
burg;  the  second  above,  at  the  village  of 
Leipheim ;  the  third  below,  at  the  small  ham- 
let of  Reisensburg.  General  Malher  ordered 
them  all  to  be  attacked  at  once.  He  charged 
the  staff-officer  Lefol  to  attack  that  of  Leip- 
heim with  a  detachment,  and  General  Labassee 
to  attack  that  of  Reisensburg  with  the  59th  of 
the  line.  He  reserved  for  himself,  at  the  head 
of  Marcognet's  brigade,  the  attack  of  the  prin- 
cipal bridge,  that  of  Giinzburg.  The  bed  of 
the  Danube  not  being  regularly  formed  in  this 
part  of  its  course,  it  was  necessary  to  cross  a 
multitude  of  islands  and  petty  channels,  bor- 
dered with  willows  and  poplars.  The  ad- 
vanced guards  fushed  resolutely  forward, 
forded  all  the  waters  that  impeded  their  pro- 
gress, and  took  two  or  three  hundred  Tyrolese, 
with  major-general  Baron  d'Aspre,  who  com- 
manded at  this  point.  Our  troops  soon  ar- 
rived at  the  principal  arm,  over  which  was 
erected  the  bridge  of  Giinzburg.  The  Aus- 
trians, on  retiring,  had  destroyed  part  of  the 
flooring  of  the  bridge.  General  Malher  would 
have  had  it  repaired ;  but  on  the  other  bank 
were  posted  several  Austrian  regiments,  a 
numerous  artillery,  and  the  Archduke  Ferdi- 
nand himself,  who  had  hastened  thither  with 
considerable  reinforcements.  The  Austrians 
began  to  comprehend  how  serious  was  the 
operation  undertaken  on  their  rear,  and  they 
resolved  to  make  a  strong  effort  to  save  at 
least  the  bridges  nearest  to  Ulm.  They  pour- 
ed a  murderous  fire  of  musketry  and  artillery 
upon  the  French.  These,  being  no  longer 
screened  by  woody  islands,  and  remaining  un- 
covered on  the  strand,  endured  this  fire  with 
extraordinary  firmness.  To  ford  the  river  was 
impossible.  They  clambered  up  the  piles  of 
the  bridge  for  the  purpose  of  repairing  it  with 
planks.  But  the  workmen,  picked  off  one  by 
one  by  the  balls  of  the  enemy,  could  not  ac- 
complish it,  and  the  French  lines,  exposed 
meanwhile  to  the  fire  of  the  Austrians,  sus- 
tained a  heavy  loss.  General  Malher  made 
them  fall  back  to  the  wooded  islands,  in  order 
not  to  prolong  a  useless  temerity. 

This  fruitless  attempt  had  cost  some  hun- 
dreds of  men.  The  two  other  attacks  were 
made  simultaneously.  Impassable  marshes 
had  rendered  that  of  Leipheim  impracticably 


34 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


That  of  Reisensburg  had  been  more  successful. 
General  Labassee,  having  at  his  side  Colonel 
Lacuee,  commandant  of  the  59th,  had  ad- 
vanced with  this  regiment  to  the  margin  of  the 
great  arm  of  the  Danube.  Here  also  the 
Austrians  had  destroyed  part  of  the  planks  of 
the  bridge,  but  not  so  completely  as  to  pre- 
vent our  soldiers  from  repairing  and  passing 
it.  The  59th  crossed  the  bridge,  took  Reisens- 
burg and  the  surrounding  heights,  in  spite  of 
at  least  treble  their  force.  Its  colonel,  La- 
cuee, was  killed  there,  fighting  at  the  head  of 
his  soldierts.  On  seeing  a  French  regiment 
thrown  unsupported  across  the  Danube,  the 
Austrian  cavalry  hastened  up  to  the  assistance 
of  the  infantry,  and  most  furiously  charged  the 
39th,  formed  into  a  square.  Thrice  did  it  rush 
upon  the  bayonets  of  that  brave  regiment,  and 
thrice  was  it  stopped  by  the  fire  close  to  the 
muzzles  of  the  guns.  The  59th  remained 
master  of  the  field  of  battle  after  efforts  the 
memory  of  which  deserves  to  be  perpetuated. 

One  of  the  three  bridges  being  crossed, 
General  Malher  moved  his  whole  division 
upon  Reisensburg  towards  evening.  The 
Austrians  then  did  not  care  to  persist  in  dis- 
puting Giinzburg.  They  fell  back  upon  Ulm 
in  the  night,  leaving  the  French  1000  prison- 
ers and  300  wounded.  Great  honours  were 
paid  to  Colonel  Lacuee.  The  divisions  of 
Ney's  corps,  assembled  at  Giinzburg,  attended 
his  funeral  on  the  8th,  and  paid  unanimous 
regrets  to  his  memory.  Marshal  Ney  placed 
Dupont's  division  on  the  left  bank  of  the  river, 
and  sent  Malher's  and  Loison's  divisions  to 
the  right  bank,  to  keep  up  Ae  communication 
with  Lannes. 

Napoleon  remained  till  the  evening  of  the 
9th  at  Donauwerth.  He  then  set  out  for  Augs- 
burg, because  that  was  the  centre  for  collect- 
ing intelligence  and  for  issuing  directions.  At 
Augsburg  he  was  between  Ulm  on  one  side 
and  Munich  on  the  other,  between  the  army 
of  Suabia  which  he  was  about  to  envelop,  and 
the  Russians  whose  approach  general  rumour 
was  proclaiming.  His  object  in  staying  away 
from  Ulm  for  a  day  or  two  was  to  concentrate 
the  command  there ;  and,  from  a  reason  of 
relationship  much  more  than  from  a  reason 
of  superiority,  he  placed  Marshals  Ney  and 
Lannes  under  the  orders  of  Murat,  which 
highly  displeased  them,  and  produced  sad 
bickering.  These  were  embarrassments  inse- 
parable from  the  new  system  established  in 
France.  A  republic  has  its  inconveniences, 
which  are  sanguinary  rivalships;  and  mo- 
narchy has  its  inconveniences,  which  are  fa- 
mily compliances.  Thus  Murat  had  at  his 
disposal  about  60,000  men,  to  keep  General 
Mack  in  check  under  the  walls  of  Ulm. 

On  his  arrival  at  Augsburg,  Napoleon 
found  Marshal  Soult  there  with  the  fourth 
corps.  Marshal  Davoul  had  established  him- 
self at  Aichach ;  General  Marmont  followed 
him ;  Bernadotte  was  on  the  road  to  Munich. 
The  French  army  was  in  nearly  the  same 
situation  as  it  had  been  at  Milan,  when,  after 
miraculously  crossing  the  St.  Bernard  it  was 
in  the  rear  of  General  Melas.  seeking  to  en- 
vlop  him,  but  ignorant  of  the  route  by  which 
it  might  catch  him.  The  same  uncertainty 


prevailed  in  regard  to  the  plans  of  General 
Mack.  Napoleon  set  about  studying  what  he 
might  be  templed  to  do  in  so  urgent  a  danger, 
and  was  puzzled  to  guess ;  in  fact,  General 
Mack  himself  did  noi  know  it.  You  have 
greater  difficulty  to  guess  the  intentions  of  an 
irresolute  than  of  a  resolute  adversary,  and  if 
the  uncertainty  were  not  likely  to  ruin  you 
to-morrow,  it  might  serve  you  to  deceive  the 
enemy  to-night.  In  this  state  of  doubt,  Napo- 
leon attributed  to  General  Mack  the  most  rea- 
sonable design,  that  of  retreating  through  the 
Tyrol.  That  general,  in  fact,  if  he  directed 
his  course  to  Memmingen,  on  the  left  of  the 
position  of  Ulm,  would  have  but  two  or  three 
marches  to  make  in  order  to  reach  the  Tyrol 
by  way  of  Kempten.  He  would  thus  connect 
himself  with  the  army  which  was  guarding 
the  chain  of  the  Alps,  and  with  that  which 
occupied  Italy.  He  would  save  himself  and 
contribute  to  form  a  mass  of  200,000  men,  a 
mass  always  formidable,  what  position  soever 
it  occupies  on  the  genera)  theatre  of  opera- 
tions. He  would,  at  any  rate,  escape  a  catas- 
trophe for  ever  celebrated  in  the  annals  of 
war. 

Napoleon,  therefore,  attributed  to  him  this 
design,  without  dwelling  upon  another  idea 
which  General  Mack  might  have  conceived, 
and  which  he  did  conceive  for  a  moment,  that 
of  fleeing  by  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube, 
guarded  by  only  one  of  the  divisions  of  Mar- 
shal Ney,  Dupont's  division.  This  desperate 
step  was  the  least  supposable,  for  it  required 
extraordinary  boldness.  It  could  not  be  taken 
without  crossing  the  route  which  the  French 
had  followed,  and  which  was  still  covered 
with  their  equipages  and  their  depots;  and  it 
would  perhaps  expose  those  who  had  to  exe- 
cute it  to  the  danger  of  meeting  with  them 
en  masse,  and  fighting  their  way  through  them 
in  order  to  retreat  into  Bohemia.  Napoleon 
did  not  admit  such  a  probability,  and  con- 
cerned himself  only  about  barring  the  routes 
to  the  Tyrol.  Accordingly,  he  ordered  Mar- 
shal Soult  to  ascend  the  Lech  to  Landsberg, 
for  the  purpose  of  occupying  Memmingen, 
and  intercepting  the  road  from  Memmingen  to 
Kempten.  He  sent  General  Marmont's  corps 
to  Augsburg,  to  take  the  place  of  Marshal 
Soult's.  In  that  city  he  likewise  established 
his  guard,  which  habitually  accompanied  the 
head-quarters.  There  he  awaited  the  move- 
ments of  his  different  corps-d'armee,  rectify- 
ing their  march  whenever  that  was  needed. 

Bernadolte,  pushing  the  rear-guard  of  Kien- 
mayer,  entered  Munich  on  the  morning  of  the 
12th,  precisely  a  month  after  the  invasion  of 
the  Austrians  and  the  retreat  of  the  Bavari- 
ans. He  took  about  a  thousand  prisoners 
from  the  enemy's  detachment,  which  he 
pushed  before  him.  The  Bavarians,  trans- 
ported with  joy,  received  the  French  with  ve- 
hement applause.  It  was  impossible  to  come 
either  more  expeditiously  or  more  surely  to 
the  aid  of  their  allies,  especially  when  they 
had  been  a  few  days  before  at  the  extremity 
of  the  continent,  on  the  shores  of  the  Chan- 
nel. Napoleon  wrote  immediately  to  the  elec- 
tor, to  induce  him  to  return  to  his  capital. 
He  invited  him  to  come  back  with  the  whole 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


Bavarian  army,  which  would  have  been  use- 
less a*  Wurzburg,  and  which  was  destined  to 
occupy  the  line  of  the  Inn  conjointly  with  Ber- 
nadotte's  corps.  Napoleon  recommended  that 
it  should  be  employed  in  making  reconnais- 
sances, because  the  country  was  familiar  to  it, 
and  it  could  give  the  best  intelligence  respect- 
ing the  march  of  the  Russians,  who  were  com- 
ing by  the  road  from  Vienna  to  Munich. 

Marshal  Soult,  sent  towards  Landsberg,  met 
with  nothing  there  but  Prince  Ferdinand's 
cuirassiers,  who  fell  back  upon  UJm  by  forced 
marches.  So  great  was  the  ardour  of  our 
troops,  that  the  26th  chasseurs  were  not  afraid 
to  measure  their  strength  with  the  Austrian 
heavy  cavalry,  and  took  from  it  an  entire 
squadron,  with  two  pieces  of  cannon.  This 
rencounter  evidently  proved  that  the  Austri- 
ans,  instead  of  running  away  towards  the 
Tyrol,  were  concentrating  themselves  behind 
the  I-ller,  between  the  Memmingen  and  Ulm, 
and  that  they  would  there  find  a  new  bat- 
tle of  Marengo.  Napoleon  prepared  to  fight 
it  with  the  greatest  possible  mass  of  his 
forces.  He  supposed  that  it  might  take  place 
on  the  13th  or  14th  of  October,  but  not  being 
hurried,  as  the  Austrians  did  not  take  the 
initiative,  he  preferred  the  14th,  that  he  might 
have  more  time  for  collecting  his  troops. 
He  first  modified  the  position  of  Marshal  Da- 
vout,  whom  he  moved  from  Aichach  to  Da- 
chau, so  that  this  marshal,  in  an  advantageous 
post  between  Augsburg  and  Munich,  could,  in 
three  or  four  hours,  either  advance  to  Munich,  to 
oppose,  with  Bernadotte  and  the  Bavarians, 
60,000  combatants  to  the  Russians,  or  fall  back 
towards  Augsburg,  to  second  Napoleon  in  his 
operations  against  the  army  of  General  Mack. 
Having  taken  these  precautions  on  his  rear, 
Napoleon  made  the  following  dispositions  on 
his  front,  with  a  view  to  that  supposed  battle 
of  the  14th.  He  ordered  Marshal  Soult  to  be 
established  on  the  13th  at  Memmingen,  press- 
ing that  position  with  his  left,  and  connecting 
himself  by  his  right  with  the  corps  which 
were  about  to  be  moved  upon  the  Iller.  He 
sent  his  guard  to  Weissenhorn,  whither  he 
resolved  to  proceed  himself.  He  hoped  in 
this  manner  to  assemble  100,000  men  in  a 
space  of  ten  leagues,  from  Memmingen  to 
Ulm.  The  troops,  in  fact,  being  able  in  one 
day  to  make  a  march  of  five  leagues  and  to 
fight,  it  was  easy  for  him  to  collect  on  one  and 
the  same  field  of  battle,  the  corps  of  Ney, 
Lannes,  Murat,  Marmont,  Soult,  and  the  guard. 
Fate,  however,  reserved  for  him  a  totally  dif- 
ferent triumph,  from  that  which  he  anticipated, 
a  newer  triumph,  and  not  less  astonishing  for 
its  vast  consequences. 

Napoleon  left  Augsburg  on  the  12th,  at  11 
o'clock  at  night,  for  Weissenhorn.  On  the 
road  he  fell  in  with  Marmont's  troops,  com- 
posed of  French  and  Dutch,  overwhelmed 
with  fatigue,  laden  at  once  with  their  arms, 
and  their  rations  of  provisions  for  several 


UIJPONT.  A  French  general  of  division  of  some  abi- 
lity and  high  renown,  which  at  a  later  period  he  lost  in 
Spain, by  the  surrender  of  Baylen,  in  180S,  in  which  twen- 
ty thousand  of  the  b«st  troops  of  France  laid  down  their 
arms  to  the  Spaniards  under  Reding  and  Castanos.  On 
his  return  to  France  thereafter,  he,  with  all  the  other  uiii- 


days.  The  weather,  which  had  been  fine  till 
the  passage  of  the  Danube,  had  become  fright- 
ful. Thick  snow,  melting  as  it  fell,  was  con- 
verted into  mud,  and  rendered  the  roads  im- 
passable. All  the  little  streams  which  run 
into  the  Danube  were  overflowed.  The  sol- 
diers proceeded  through  absolute  bogs,  fre- 
quently impeded  in  their  march  by  convoys 
of  artillery.  Nevertheless,  not  a  murmur 
was  heard.  Napoleon  stopped  to  harangue 
them :  he  made  them  form  a  circle  around 
him,  explained  to  them  the  situation  of  the 
enemy,  and  the  manoeuvre  by  which  he  had 
surrounded  them,  and  promised  them  a  tri- 
umph as  glorious  as  that  of  Marengo.  The 
soldiers,  intoxicated  by  his  speech,  proud  of 
seeing  the  greatest  captain  of  the  age  explain 
his  plans  to  them,  burst  forth  into  the  most 
vehement  transports  of  enthusiasm,  and  re- 
plied by  unanimous  shouts  of  "  Vive  CEmpe- 
reur .'"  They  resumed  their  march,  impatient 
to  assist  in  the  great  battle.  Those  who  had 
heard  the  words  of  the  Emperor  repeated 
them  to  those  who  had  not  heard  them,  and 
they  cried,  with  joy,  that  it  was  all  over  with 
the  Austrians,  and  that  they  would  be  taken 
to  the  last  man. 

It  was  high  time  for  Napoleon  to  return  to 
the  Danube,  for  his  orders,  misunderstood  by 
Murat,  would  have  led  to  disasters  if  the  Aus- 
trians had  been  more  enterprising. 

While  Lannes  and  Murat  were  investing 
Ulm  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  Ney, 
continuing  a  cheval  on  the  river,  had  two  divi- 
sions on  the  right  bank,  and  one  only,  that  of 
General  Dupont,'  on  the  left  bank.  On  ap- 
proaching Ulm,  to  invest  it,  Ney  had  perceived 
the  defect  of  such  a  situation.  Enlightened 
by  incidents  of  which  he  had  a  closer  view, 
guided  by  a  happy  instinct  for  war,  confirmed 
in  his  opinion  by  Colonel  Jomini,  a  staff-offi- 
cer of  the  highest  merit,  Ney  had  discovered 
the  danger  of  leaving  but  one  division  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  river.  Why,  said  he,  should 
not  the  Austrians  seize  the  opportunity  for 
flight  on  the  left  bank,  trampling  under  foot 
our  equipages  and  our  parks,  which  would 
certainly  not  oppose  any  great  resistance  to 
them  1  Murat  would  not  admit  that  such  a 
thing  could  happen,  and,  appealing  to  the  mis- 
construed letters  of  the  Emperor,  who,  expect- 
ing a  serious  affair  on  the  Iller,  ordered  all  the 
troops  to  be  concentrated  there,  he  was  even 
on  the  point  of  concluding  that  it  was  wrong 
to  leave  Dupont's  division  on  the  left  bank, 
since  that  division  must  be  away  from  the 
place  of  action  on  the  day  of  the  great  battle. 
This  difference  of  opinion  gave  rise  to  a  warm 
altercation  between  Ney  and  Murat.  Ney  was 
mortified  to  have  to  obey  a  superior,  whom  he 
thought  below  himself  by  his  talents,  if  he 
was  above  him  by  the  imperial  relationship. 
Murat,  filled  with  pride  at  his  new  rank,  proud 
above  all  of  being  admitted  to  a  more  particu- 
lar acquaintance  with  the  intentions  of  Napo- 

cers,  was  cast  into  prison,  where  he  lingered  many  years, 
without  trial  or  investigation,  until  1812,  when  a  court  of 
inquiry  sat  on  the  generals,  and  condemned  them  all.  It 
is,  perhaps,  but  just  here  to  add  that  public  opinion  did 
not  support  their  decision.— Alison's  Europe.  H. 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


leon,  made  Marshal  Ney  feel  his  official  supe- 
riority, and  at  last  went  so  far  as  to  give  him 
absolute  orders.     But  for  mutual  friends,  these 
two  lieutenants  of  the  Emperor  would  have 
decided  their  quarrel  in  a  manner  not  at  all 
consistent  with  their  position.     This  alterca- 
tion led  to  the  issue  of  contradictory  orders  to. ' 
Dupont's  division,  and  to  a  situation  that  was  ! 
perilous   for   it.     But,  fortunately,  while  the 
dispute  respecting  the  post  fittest  for  it  to  oc- 
cupy was   going   forward,  it  was   extricated 
from  the  danger  into  which  an  error  of  Murat's  { 
had  thrown  it  by  an  ever  memorable  battle. 

General   Mack,    who   could    not    entertain 
further  doubt  of  his  fate,  had  made  a  change 
of  front.     Instead  of  having  his  right  at  Ulm, 
he  had  his  left  there ;  instead  of  having  his  I 
left  at  Memmingen,  he  had   his  right  there. 
Still  supported  on  the  Iller,  he  turned  his  back 
to  France,  as  if  he  had  come  from  it,  while  . 
Napoleon  turned  his  on  Austria,  as  if  that  had  ' 
been  the  point  from  which  he  started.     This  ! 
would  be  the  natural  position  of  the  two  gene- 
rals, one  of  whom  has  turned  the  other.  Gene- 
ral Mack,  after  drawing  to  him  the  troops  dis- 
persed in  Suabia,  as  well  as  those  which  had 
returned  beaten  from  Wertingen  and  Giinzburg, 
had  left  some  detachments  on  the  Iller  from 
Memmingen  to  Ulm,  and  had  assembled  the 
greater  part  of  his  forces  at  Ulm  itself,  in  the 
entrenched  camp  which  overlooks  that  city. 

The  reader  is  acquainted  with  the  situation 
and  the  form»of  this  camp,  which  has  been 
already  described  in  this  history.  At  this 
point  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube  is  much 
higher  than  the  right  bank.  While  the  right 
bank  presents  a  marshy  plain,  slightly  inclined 
towards  the  river,  the  left  bank,  on  the  con- 
trary, presents  a  series  of  heights  laid  out 
terrace-fashion,  and  washed  by  the  Danube, 
nearly  in  the  same  manner  as  the  terrace  of 
St.  Germain  is  washed  by  the  Seine.  The 
Michaelsberg  is  the  principal  of  these  heights. 
The  Austrians  were  encamped  there  to  the 
number  of  about  60,000,  having  the  city  of 
Ulm  at  their  feet. 

General  Dupont,  who  was  left  alone  on  the 
left  bank,  and  who,  agreeably  to  the  orders  of 
Marshal  Ney,  was  to  approach  nearer  to  Ulm 
on  the  morning  of  the  1 1th  of  October,  had 
advanced  within  sight  of  that  place  by  the 
Albeck  road.  It  was  the  very  moment  which 
Murat  and  Ney,  meeting  at  Giinzburg,  were 
spending  in  contention,  and  which  Napoleon, 
hastening  to  Augsburg,  was  employing  in 
making  his  general  dispositions.  General  Du- 
pont, on  reaching  the  village  of  Haslach,  from 
which  the  Michaelsberg  is  seen  in  its  full 
extent,  discovered  there  60,000  Austrians  in  an 
imposing  attitude.  The  last  marches,  per- 
formed in  the  worst  weather  and  with  extreme 
rapidity,  had  reduced  his  division  to  6000 
men.  There  had,  however,  been  left  him  Ba- 
raguay  d'Hillier's  dismounted  dragoons,  who, 
during  the  journey  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Danube,  had  been  assigned  not  to  Murat,  but 
to  Marshal  Ney.  This  was  a  reinforcement 
of  5000  men,  which  might  have  been  of  great 
service,  if  it  had  not  remained  at  Languenau, 
three  leagues  in  the  rear. 
General  Dupont,  having  come  in  sight  of  the 


Michaelsberg  and  the  60,000  Austrians  who 
occupied  it,  found  himself  before  them,  with 
three  regiments  of  infantry,  two  of  cavalry, 
and  a  few  pieces  of  cannon.  That  officer, 
since  so  unfortunate,  was  seized  at  this  sight 
by  an  inspiration,  which  would  do  honour  to 
the  greatest  generals.  He  judged  that,  if  he 
fell  back,  he  should  betray  his  weakness,  and 
be  soon  surrounded  by  10,000  horse,  despatched 
in  pursuit  of  him  ;  that  if,  on  the  contrary,  he 
performed  an  act  of  daring,  he  might  deceive 
the  Austrians,  persuade  them  that  he  was  the 
advanced-guard  of  the  French  army,  oblige 
them  to  be  circumspect,  and  thus  gain  time 
to  retrieve  the  wrong  step  into  which  he  had 
been  led. 

In  consequence,  he  immediately  made  his 
dispositions  for  fighting.  On  his  left  he  had 
the  village  of  Haslach,  surrounded  by  a  small 
wood.  There  he  placed  the  32d,  which  had 
become  celebrated  in  Italy,  and  commanded, 
at  this  period,  by  Colonel  Darricau,  the  1st 
hussars,  and  part  of  his  artillery.  On  his 
right,  backed  in  like  manner  upon  a  wood,  he 
placed  the  96th  of  the  line,  commanded  by 
Colonel  Meunier,  and  the  17th  dragoons.  A 
little  in  advance  of  his  right,  he  had  the  village 
of  Jungingen,  surrounded  also  by  a  few  clumps 
of  wood,  and  he  ordered  it  to  be  occupied  by  a 
detachment. 

In  this  position  General  Dupont  received 
the  Austrians,  detached  to  the  number  of 
25,000,  under  the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  to  fight 
a  division  of  6000  French.  General  Dupont, 
still  under  the  influence  of  a  happy  inspiration 
on  this  occasion,  soon  perceived  that  his  divi- 
sion would  be  destroyed  by  the  musketry  alone, 
if  he  suffered  the  Austrians  to  deploy  their  line 
and  to  extend  their  fire.  Then,  combining  the 
daring  of  a  vigorous  execution  with  the  daring 
of  a  great  resolution,  he  ordered  the  two  regi- 
ments of  his  right,  the  96th  of  the  line  and  the 
9th  light,  to  charge  with  the  bayonet.  At  the 
signal  given  by  him,  these  two  brave  regiments 
moved  off",  and  marched  with  bayonet  lowered, 
upon  the  first  Austrian  line.  They  overturned 
it,  threw  it  into  disorder,  and  took  1500  pri- 
soners, who  were  sent  to  the  left,  to  be  shut  up 
in  the  village  of  Haslach.  General  Dupont, 
after  this  feat,  placed  himself  again  in  position 
with  his  two  regiments,  and  awaited  immov- 
ably the  sequel  of  this  extraordinary  combat. 
But  the  Aastrians,  not  choosing  to  admit  them- 
selves to  be  beaten,  returned  to  the  attack  with 
fresh  troops.  Our  soldiers  advanced  a  second 
time  with  the  bayonet,  repulsed  the  assailants, 
and  again  took  numerous  prisoners.  Dis- 
gusted with  these  useless  attacks  in  front,  the 
Austrians  directed  all  their  efforts  against  our 
wings.  They  marched  upon  the  village  of 
Haslach,  which  covered. the  left  of  Dupont's 
division,  and  which  contained  their  prisoners. 
The  32d,  whose  turn  was  come  to  fight,  vigor- 
ously disputed  that  village  with  them,  and 
drove  them  from  it,  while  the  1st  hussars, 
vying  with  the  infantry,  made  impetuous 
charges  on  the  repulsed  columns.  The  Aus- 
trians  did  not  confine  themselves  to  the  attack 
of  Haslach ;  they  made  an  attempt  on  the  other 
wing,  and  endeavoured  to  take  the  village  of 
Jungingen,  situated  on  the  right  of  General 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


37 


Dnpont.  Favoured  by  numbers,  they  pene- 
trated into  it  and  made  themselves  masters  of 
the  place  for  a  moment.  General  Dupont, 
appreciating  the  danger,  caused  Jungingen  to 
be  attacked  by  the  9th,  by  which  it  was  re- 
taken. Again  it  was  wrested  from  him,  and 
again  he  retook  it.  This  village  was  thus 
carried  by  main  force  five  times  consecutively, 
and  in  the  confusion  of  these  repeated  attacks, 
the  French  made  each  time  some  prisoners. 
Buf  while  the  Austrians  were  exhausting 
themselves  in  impotent  efforts  against  this 
handful  of  soldiers,  their  immense  cavalry, 
dashing  away  in  all  directions,  fell  upon  the 
7th  dragoons,  charged  it  several  times,  killed 
its  colonel,  the  gallant  St.  Dizier,  and  obliged 
it  to  retire  into  the  wood  against  which  it  was 
backed.  A  host  of  Austrian  horse  then  spread 
itself  over  the  surrounding  plateaux,  galloped 
to  the  village  of  Albeck,  from  which  Dupont's 
division  had  started,  took  its  baggage,  which 
Baraguay  d'Hilliers'  dragoons  ought  to  have 
defended,  and  thus  picked  up  some  vulgar 
trophies,  a  sad  consolation  for  a  defeat  sus- 
tained by  25,000  men  against  6000. 

It  became  urgent  to  put  an  end  to  so  perilous 
an  engagement.  General  Dupont,  having  fa- 
tigued the  Austrians  by  an  obstinate  fight  of 
five  hours,  hastened  to  take  advantage  of  the 
night  to  retire  upon  Albeck.  Thither  he 
inarched  in  good  order,  preceded  by  4000  pri- 
soners. 

If  General  Dupont,  in  fighting  this  extra- 
ordinary battle,  had  not  stopped  the  Austrians, 
they  would  have  fled  into  Bohemia,  and  one 
of  Napoleon's  most  splendid  combinations 
would  have  been  completely  frustrated.  It  is 
a  proof  that  great  generals  ought  to  have  great 
soldiers  ;  for  the  most  illustrious  captains 
often  need  their  troops  to  repair  by  their 
heroism  either  the  hazards  of  war  or  the  errors 
which  genius  itself  is  liable  to  commit. 

This  rencounter  with  a  part  of  the  French 
army  produced  stormy  deliberations  at  the 
head-quarters  of  the  Austrians.  They  were 
informed  of  the  presence  of  Marshal  Soult  at 
Landsberg;  they  supposed  that  General  Du- 
pont was  not  alone  at  Albeck,  and  they  began 
to  believe  that  they  were  surrounded  on  all 
sides.  General  Mack,  on  whom  the  Austrians 
have  endeavoured  to  throw  all  the  shame  of 
their  disaster,  had  fallen  into  a  perturbation  of 
mind  easily  to  be  conceived.  Whatever  judges 
who  have  reasoned  after  the  event  may  say,  it 
would  have  required  nothing  less  to  save  him 
than  an  inspiration  from  Heaven,  to  reveal  to 
him  all  at  once  the  weakness  of  the  corps 
v/hich  was  before  him,  and  the  possibility,  by 
crushing  it,  of  retiring  to  Bohemia.  The  un- 
fortunate general,  who  knew  not  what  has 
since  become  known,  and  who  had  no  reason 
to  think  that  the  French  were  so  weak  on  the 
left  bank,  fell  to  deliberating  with  the  illustri- 
ous companion  of  his  melancholy  fate,  the 
Archduke  Ferdinand.  He  wasted  precious 
time  in  agitations  of  mind,  and  could  not  re- 
solve either  to  flee  towards  Bohemia  by  cutting 
his  way  through  Dupont's  division,  or  to  re- 
treat towards  the  Tyrol  by  forcing  a  passage 
at  Memmingen.  The  measure  which  to  him 
appeared  the  safest  was  to  establish  himself 


still  more  solidly  in  the  position  of  Ulm,  to 
concentrate  his  army  there,  and  there  await, 
in  a  large  mass  difficult  to  be  carried  by  as- 
sault, the  arrival  of  the  Russians  by  Munich, 
or  of  the  Archduke  Charles  by  the  Tyrol.  He 
said  to  himself  that  General  Kienmayer  with 
20,000  Austrians,  General  Kutusof  with  60,000 
Russians,  would  soon  appear  on  the  road  from 
Munich ;  that  the  Archduke  John,  with  the 
corps  of  the  Tyrol,  and  even  the  Archduke 
Charles,  with  the  army  of  Italy,  could  not  fail 
to  hasten  to  his  succour  by  way  of  Kempten, 
and  that  then  it  would  be  Napoleon  who  would 
be  in  danger,  for  he  would  be  pressed  between 
80,000  Austro-Russians,  coming  from  Austria, 
25,000  Austrians  descending  from  the  Tyrol, 
and  70,000  Austrians  encamped  below  Ulm, 
which  would  make  175,000  men.  But  it  would 
have  been  necessary  that  all  these  different 
junctions  should  be  effected  in  spite  of  Napo- 
leon, placed  in  the  centre,  with  160,000  French 
accustomed  to  conquer.  In  misfortune,  one 
catches  eagerly  at  the  slightest  glimmer  of 
hope ;  and  General  Mack  believed  even  the 
false  reports  made  to  him  by  the  spies  sent  by 
Napoleon.  These  spies  told  him  sometimes 
that  a  landing  of  English  at  Boulogne  would 
recall  the  French  immediately  to  the  Rhine, 
sometimes  that  the  Russians  and  the  Archduke 
Charles  were  debouching  by  the  Munich  roacL 

In  difficult  situations,  subordinate  persons 
become  bold  and  talkative ;  they  censure  their 
superiors  and  form  opinions  of  their  own. 
General  Mack  had  about  him  subordinates, 
who  were  nobles  of  high  distinction,  and  who 
were  not  afraid  to  raise  their  voices.  Some 
were  for  making  off  into  Tyrol,  others  into 
Wurtemberg,  and  others  into  Bohemia.  These 
last,  who  were  right  by  accident,  adduced  the 
battle  of  Haslach  to  prove  that  the  route  to 
Bohemia  was  open.  The  usual  effect  of  con- 
tradiction on  an  agitated  mind  is  to  weaken  it 
still  more,  and  to  produce  half-measures,  always 
the  most  fatal  of  any.  General  Mack,  in  order 
to  grant  something  to  the  opinions  which 
he  combated,  took  two  very  singular  resolu- 
tions for  a  man  who  had  decided  to  remain  at 
Ulm.  He  sent  Jellachich's  division  to  Mem- 
mingen,  to  reinforce  that  post  which  General 
Spangen  w&s  guarding  with  5000  men,  with 
the  intention  of  thus  keeping  himself  in  com- 
munication with  the  Tyrol.  He  despatched 
General  Riesc  to  occupy  the  heights  of  Elch- 
ingen,  with  an  entire  division,  in  order  to  ex- 
tend himself  on  the  left  bank,  and  to  attempt 
a  strong  reconnaissance  on  the  communica- 
tions of  the  French. 

To  remain  at  Ulm  and  wait  for  succours, 
and  to  fight  a  defensive  battle  there  in  case 
of  emergency,  he  ought  to  have  remained 
there  en  masse,  and  not  to  have  sent  corps  to 
the  two  extremities  of  the  line  which  he  oc- 
cupied, for  that  was  the  way  to  expose  them 
to  be  destroyed  one  after  another.  Be  this  as 
it  may,  General  Mack  directed  General  Riesc 
to  occupy  the  convent  of  Elchingen,  which  is 
situated  on  the  heights  of  the  left  bank,  quite 
close  to  Haslach,  where  the  fight  of  the  llth 
had  taken  place.  At  the  foot  of  these  heights, 
and  below  the  convent,  was  a  bridge  whjch 
Murat  had  sent  a  French  detachment  to  occu- 
1) 


38 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


py.  The  Austrians  had  previously  attempted  ' 
to  destroy  it.  Murat's  detachment,  in  order  to  ' 
cover  itself  on  the  approach  of  the  troops  of 
General  Riesc,  completed  its  destruction  by 
burning  it.  There  were  still  left,  however,  the 
piles  driven  into  the  river,  and  which  the  wa- 
ter had  saved  from  the  conflagration.  Thus 
the  French  army  was  without  communication 
with  the  left  bank  otherwise  than  by  the 
bridges  of  Giinzburg,  situated  far  below 
Elchingen.  Dupont's  division  had  retired  to 
Langenau.  Retreat  was,  therefore,  open  to 
the  Austrians.  Luckily  they  were  ignorant 
of  that. 

It  was  during  these  transactions  that  Napo- 
leon, leaving  Augsburg  in  the  night  of  the 
12th  of  October,  reached  Ulm  on  the  13th. 
No  sooner  had  he  arrived  than  he  visited  on 
horseback,  in  terrible  weather,  all  the  posi- 
tions occupied  by  his  lieutenants.  He  found 
them  extremely  irritated  against  one  another, 
and  maintaining  totally  different  opinions. 
Lannes,  whose  judgment  was  sound  and  per- 
spicacious in  war,  had  concluded,  like  Mar- 
shal Ney,  that,  instead  of  intending  to  accept 
battle  on  the  Iller,  the  Austrians  were  rather 
meditating  an  escape  into  Bohemia,  on  the 
left  bank,  by  fighting  their  way  through  Du- 
pont's division.  If  Napoleon  could  entertain 
any  doubts  when  at  a  distance  from  the  spot, 
he  had  none  whatever  when  on  the  spot  itself. 
Besides,  in  ordering  the  left  bank  to  be 
watched,  and  Dupont's  division  to  be  placed 
there,  he  went  away  without  saying  that  One 
ought  not  to  leave  this  division  there  without 
support,  without  securing,  above  all  things, 
the  means  of  passing  from  one  bank  to  the 
other,  for  the  purpose  of  succouring  it  if  it 
were  attacked.  Thus  the  instructions  of  Na- 
poleon had  not  been  better  understood  than 
the  situation  itself.  He  coincided,  therefore, 
entirely  with  Marshals  Ney  and  Lannes 
against  Murat,  and  gave  instructions  for  re- 
pairing immediately  the  egregious  blunders 
committed  during  the  preceding  days.  He 
resolved  to  re-establish  the  communications 
of  the  right  bank  with  the  left  bank  by  the 
bridge  nearest  to  Ulm,  that  of  Elchingen. 
One  might  have  descended  as  far  as  Giinz- 
burg, which  belonged  to  us,  repassed  the  Da- 
nube there,  and  ascended  again,  with  Dupont's 
division  reinforced,  to  Ulm.  But  this  would 
have  been  a  very  lengthened  movement, 
which  would  have  left  the  Austrians  abun- 
dant time  to  escape.  It  was  far  preferable,  at 
break  of  day  on  the  14th,  to  re-establish  by 
main  force  the  bridge  of  Elchingen,  which 
was  close  at  hand,  and  to  cross  in  sufficient 

1  LOISON,  OLIVER.  A  native  of  Domvilliers,  the  son  of 
an  attorney.  He  entered  the  French  guards  and  was  one 
of  the  first  in  that  regiment  who  deserted  the  king.  On 
the  formation  of  the  National  Guard,  he  desired  to  be 
nominated  an  officer,  but  being  refused  by  Lafayette,  in 
consequence  of  his  inability  to  read  or  write,  he  accused 
him  at  the  Jacobins.  On  the  10th  of  Augnst,  1792,  he  led 
the  mob  which  attacked  tlu  Tuileries.  In  1795,  he  was 
general  of  brigade,  and  served  Napoleon  in  the  affair  of 
the  Sections.  He  subsequently  joined  Massena's  army  in 
Switzerland  and  was  made  general  of  division.  In  the 
campaign  of  1805,  he  distinguished  himself  so  much  that 
he  was  made  governor  of  Munster  and  Osnabruck,  in 
A  liirh  office  he  greatly  enriched  himself.  In  1808,  he 


number  to  the  left  bank,  while  General  Du- 
pont,  instructed  to  that  effect,  should  ascend 
from  Langenau  towards  Albeck  and  Ulm. 

Napoleon  gave  his  orders  in  consequence 
for  the  next  day,  the  14th.  Marshal  Soulthad 
been  moved  to  the  extremity  of  the  line  of  the 
Iller  towards  Memmingen ;  General  Marmont 
advanced  intermediately  on  the  Iller.  Lannes, 
Ney,  and  Murat,  united  below  Ulm,  were  to 
place  themselves  a  cheval  on  both  banks  of  the 
Danube,  in  order  to  give  a  hand  to  Dupont's 
division,  alone  on  the  left  bank.  But  for  this 
purpose  it  was  requisite  to  re-establish  the 
bridge  of  Elchingen.  For  Ney  was  reserved 
the  honour  of  executing,  in  the  morning  of 
the  14th,  the  vigorous  operation  which  was  to 
put  us  again  in  possession  of  both  banks  of 
the  river. 

This  intrepid  marshal  was  deeply  mortified 
by  some  indiscreet  expressions  used  by  Murat 
in  the  recent  altercation  which  he  had  with 
him.  Murat,  as  if  impatient  of  too  long  argu- 
ments, had  told  him  that  he  understood  nothing 
of  all  the  plans  that  were  explained  to  him, 
and  that  it  was  his  own  custom  not  to  make 
his  till  he  was  facing  the  enemy.  This  was  the 
proud  answer  which  a  man  of  action  might 
have  addressed  to  an  empty  babbler.  Marshal 
Ney,  on  horseback  early  in  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  in  full  uniform,  and  wearing  his  decora- 
tions, laid  hold  of  Murat's  arm,  and  shaking 
him  violently  before  the  whole  staff,  and  be- 
fore the  Emperor  himself,  said  haughtily, 
"Come,  prince,  come  along  with  me  and  make 
your  plans  in  face  of  the  enemy."  Then,  gal- 
loping to  the  Danube,  he  went,  amidst  a  shower 
of  balls  and  grape,  having  the  water  up  to  his 
horse's  bdly,  to  direct  the  perilous  operation 
!  assigned  to  him. 

This  operation  consisted  in  repairing  the 
bridge,  of^vhich  nothing  was  left  but  the  piles 
without  flooring,  passing  it,  crossing  a  small 
meadow  that  lay  between  the  Danube  and  the) 
foot  of  the  eminence,  then  making  himself 
master  of  the  village  with  the  convent  of  El- 
chingen, which  rose  amphitheatrically,  and 
was  guarded  by  20,000  men  and  a  formidable 
artillery. 

Marshal  Ney,  undaunted  by  all  these  ob- 
stacles, ordered  an  aide-de-camp  of  General 
Loison's,1  Captain  Coisel,  and  a  sapper  to  lay 
hold  of  the  first  plank  and  carry  it  to  the  piles 
of  the  bridge,  for  the  purpose  of  re-establish- 
ing the  pas'sage,  under  the  fire  of  the  Aus- 
trians. The  brave  sapper  had  a  leg  carried 
away  by  a  grape-shot,  but  his  place  was  im- 
mediately supplied.  One  plank  was  first  thrown 
in  the  form  of  flooring,  then  a  second  and  a 


served  under  Junot  in  his  invasion  of  Portugal,  in  which 
he  distinguished  himself  equally  by  his  ability  and  by  his 
atrocious  barbarity  and  shameful  rapacity.  The  massa- 
cre of  Evora,  in  which  8000  Portuguese  men,  women, 
and  children,  and  thirty-eight  priests  were  butchered  in 
cold  blood,  will  never  be  forgotten.  In  1813,  he  was  em- 
ployed under  Davout  in  Hamburg,  where  his  cruelty  and 
his  skill  were  equally  apparent.  In  1814,  he  was  serving 
under  Soult,  and  with  that  marshal  gave  in  his  adhesion 
to  Louis.  He  served  Napoleon  zealously  during  the  hun- 
dred days,  and  after  Waterloo  fled  to  Liege,  near  which 
town  he  had  a  valuable  estate  on  which  he  died  in  1816. — 
Court  and  Camp  of  JVajioleon.  B. 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


30 


third.  Having  finished  one  length,  they  pro- 
ceeded to  the  next,  till  they  had  covered  the 
last  piles  under  a  murderous  fire  of  small 
arms,  poured  upon  our  labourers  by  skilful 
marksmen  on  the  opposite  bank.  Immediately 
the  voltigeurs  of  the  6th  light,  the  grenadiers 
of  the  30th,  and  a  company  of  carabineers, 
without  waiting  for  the  bridge  to  be  made  com- 
pletely firm,  threw  themselves  to  the  other  side 
of  the  Danube,  dispersed  the  Austrians  who 
guarded  the  left  bank,  and  cleared  a  sufficient 
space  for  Loison's  division  to  come  to  their 
assistance. 

Marshal  Ney  then  ordered  the  39th  and  the 
6lh  light  to  cross  to  the  other  bank  of  the  river. 
He  directed  General  Villatte  to  put  himself  at 
the  head  of  the  39th,  and  to  extend  himself  on 
the  right  in  the  meadow,  in  order  to  make  the 
Austrians  evacuate  it,  while  he  himself,  with 
the  6th  light,  would  take  the  convent.  The 
39th  stopped  while  passing  the  bridge  by  the 
French  cavalry,  which  rushed  across  it  with 
ardour,  was  prevented  from  getting  over  entire. 
The  1st  battalion  alone  of  that  regiment  was 
able  to  execute  the  order  which  it  had  received. 
It  had  to  sustain  the  charges  of  the  Austrian 
cavalry  and  the  attack  of  three  hostile  bat- 
talions; it  was  even  forced  back  for  a  mo- 
ment, after  an  obstinate  resistance,  to  the  head 
of  the  bridge.  But,  being  soon  succoured  by 
its  second  battalion,  joined  by  the  69th  and 
the  76th  of  the  line,  it  recovered  the  lost 
ground,  remained  master  of  the  whole  of  the 
meadow  on  the  right,  and  obliged  the  Aus- ! 
trians  to  regain  the  heights.  Meanwhile  Ney, ; 
at  the  head  of  the  6th  light,  was  pushing  on 
through  the  steep  and  crooked  streets  of  the  ! 
village  of  Elchingen,  under  a  downward  fire 
from  the  houses,  which  were  full  of  infantry. , 
He  wrested  the  village,  house  by  house,  from 
the  hands  of  the  Austrians,  and  stormed  the 
convent,  which  is  on  the  summit  of  the  height. 
Arrived  at  this  place,  he  had  before  him  the 
undulateu  plateaux,  interspersed  with  wood,  on 
which  Dupont's  division  had  fought  on  the 
1 1th.  These  plateaux  extend  to  the  Michaels- 
berg,  above  the  very  city  of  Ulna.  Ney  re- 
solved to  establish  himself  there,  lest  he  might 
he  tumbled  into  the  Danube  by  an  offensive 
return  of  the  enemy.  A  large  patch  of  wood 
came  10  the  margin  of  the  height,  close  'up  to 
the  convent  and  the  village  of  Elchingen. 
Ney  determined  to  make  himself  master  of  it, 
in  oider  to  appuy  his  left  there.  He  purposed, 
his  left  being  well  secured,  to  revolve  upon  it 
and  to  move  forward  his  right.  He  threw 
into  the  wood  the  69th  of  the  line,  which 
plunged  into  it  in  spite  of  a  brisk  fire  of 
musketry.  While  a  furious  fight  was  kept  up 
in  that  quarter,  the  rest  of  the  Austrian  corps 
was  formed  into  several  squares  of  two  or 
three  thousand  men  each.  Ney  ordered  them 
to  be  attacked  by  the  dragoons,  followed  by 
the  infantry  in  column.  The  18th  dragoons 
made  so  vigorous  a  charge  upon  one  of  them 
as  to  break  it  and  to  compel  it  to  lay  down  its 
arms.  At  this  sight,  the  Austrians  retired  in 
great  haste,  and  fled  at  first  towards  Haslach, 
and  then  proceeded  to  rally  on  the  Michaels- 
berg. 

Meanwhile,  General  Duo<  nt.  marching  from 


Langenau  towards  Albeck,  had  fallen  in  with 
the  corps  of  Werneck,  one  of  those  which  had 
left  Ulm  on  the  preceding  day,  with  the  inten- 
tion of  pushing  reconnaissances  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Danube,  and  seeking  means  of 
retreat  for  the  Austrian  army.  On  hearing 
the  cannon  on  his  rear,  General  Werneck  had 
turned  back  and  proceeded  to  the  Michaels- 
berg  by  the  road  from  Albeck  to  Ulm.  He  ar- 
rived there  at  the  very  moment  when  Dupout's 
division  was  repairing  thither  on  its  side,  and 
when  Marshal  Ney  was  taking  the  heights  of 
Elchingen.  A  new  combat  ensued  at  this 
point  between  General  Werneck,  who  wished 
to  get  back  to  Ulm,  and  General  Dupont,  who 
wished,  on  the  contrary,  to  prevent  him.  The 
32d  and  the  9th  light  rushed  in  close  column 
upon  the  infantry  of  the  Austrians  and  re- 
pulsed it,  while  the  96th  received  in  square 
the  charges  of  their  cavalry.  The  day  closed 
amidst  this  fray,  Marshal  Nay  having  glori- 
ously reconquered  the  left  bank,  and  General 
Dupont  having  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Wer- 
neck's  corps  to  Ulm.  Three  thousand  pri- 
soners and  a  great  quantity  of  artillery  had 
been  taken.  But  what  was  still  more  import- 
ant, the  Austrians  were  definitively  shut  up  in 
Ulm,  and  this  time  without  any  chance  of 
escape,  should  even  the  happiest  inspiration 
visit  them  at  this  last  moment. 

During  these  occurrences  on  the  left  bank, 
Lannes  had  approached  Ulm  on  the  right  bank, 
General  Marmont  had  advanced  towards  the 
Iller,  and  Marshal  Soult,  pressing  the  extremity 
of  the  position  of  the  Austrians,  had  taken 
Memmingen.  The  enemy  was  still  engaged  in 
palisading  that  city  when  Marshal  Soult  arrived 
there.  He  had  rapidly  invested  it,  and  obliged 
General  Spangen  to  lay  down  his  arms  with 
5000  men,  the  whole  of  his  artillery,  and  a 
great  number  of  horses.  General  Jellachich, 
hastening  up,  but  loo  late,  to  the  relief  of  Mem- 
mingen with  his  division,  finding  himself  in 
face  of  a  corps-d'armee  of  30,000  men,  retired, 
not  upon  Ulm,  fearing  that  he  should  not  be 
able  to  regain  it,  but  upon  Kempten  and  the 
Tyrol.  Marshal  Soult  immediately  proceeded 
towards  Ochsenhausen,  to  complete  on  all  sides 
the  investment  of  the  fortress  and  the  en- 
trenched camp  of  Ulm. 

Such  was  the  situation  at  the  close  of  day 
on  the  14th  of  October.  After  the  departure 
of  General  Jellachich  and  the  different  actions 
which  had  been  fought,  General  Mack  was  re- 
duced to  50,000  men.  From  this  must  be  de- 
ducted Werneck's  corps,  separated  from  him  by 
Dupont's  division.  That  unfortunate  general 
found  himself,  therefore,  in  a  desperate  posi- 
tion. There  was  no  elegible  course  for  him 
to  pursue.  His  only  resource  was  to  rush 
sword  in  hand  upon  one  of  the  points  of  the 
circle  of  iron  in  which  he  had  been  enclosed, 
and  to  perish  or  to  open  an  outlet  for  himself. 
To  throw  himself  upon  Ney  and  Dupont  would 
still  have  b«-en  the  least  disastrous  step  to  take. 
To  a  certainty  he  would  have  been  beaten,  for 
Lannes  and  Murat  would  have  hastened  by 
the  bridge  of  Elchingen  to  the  assistance  of 
Ney  and  Dupont,  and  there  needed  not  such 
an  assemblage  of  forces  to  conquer  disheart- 
ened soldiers.  Still  the  honour  of  the  arms 


40 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


would  have  been  saved,  and,  next  to  victory, 
that  is  the  most  important  result  that  one  can 
obtain.  But  General  Mack  persisted  in  his 
resolution  of  concentrating  himself  in  Ulm, 
and  waiting  there  for  the  succour  of  the  Rus- 
sians. He  had  to  endure  violent  attacks  from 
Prince  Schwarzenberg  and  the  Archduke  Fer- 
dinand. The  latter,  in  particular,  was  deter- 
mined to  escape  at  any  risk  the  misfortune  of 
being  made  prisoner.  General  Mack  produced 
the  powers  of  the  Emperor,  which,  in  case  of 
difference  of  opinion,  conferred  on  him  the  su- 
preme authority.  This  was  enough  to  render 
him  responsible,  not  to  make  him  be  obeyed. 
The  Archduke  Ferdinand  resolved,  thanks  to 
his  less  dependent  position,  to  withdraw  him- 
self from  the  authority  of  the  general-in-chief. 
When  night  came  on,  he  chose  that  gate  of 
Ulm  which  exposed  him  to  the  least  risk  of 
encountering  the  French,  and  started  with  six 
or  seven  thousand  horse  and  a  corps  of  infan- 
try, with  the  intention  of  joining  General  Wer- 
neck  and  escaping  through  the  Upper  Palati- 
nate to  Bohemia.  By  uniting  General  Wer- 
neck's  corps  to  the  detachment  which  accom- 
panied him  he  took  from  General  Mack  about 
20,000  men,  and  left  him  in  Ulm  with  30,000 
only,  blockaded  on  all  sides  and  forced  to  lay 
down  his  arms  in  the  most  ignominious  man- 
ner. 

It  has  been  falsely  alleged  that  the  depar- 
ture of  the  prince  proved  the  possibility  of  es- 
caping from  Ulm.  In  the  first  place,  it  is 
most  improbable  that  the  whole  army,  with  its 
artillery  and  its  matdriel,  could  slip  away  like 
a  mere  detachment,  composed  for  the  greater 
part  of  horse  soldiers.  But  what  happened  a 
few  days  afterwards  to  the  Archduke  Ferdi- 
nand proves  that  the  army  itself  would  have 
plunged  into  ruin  in  this  flight.  The  grand 
fault  lay  in  dividing  itself.  It  ought  to  have 
remained  or  gone  forth  altogether — remained 
to  fight  an  obstinate  battle  with  70,000  men ; 
gone  forth  to  rush  with  these  70,000  men 
upon  one  of  the  points  of  the  investment,  and 
there  to  find  either  death  or  the  success  which 
fortune  sometimes  grants  to  despair.  But  to 
divide,  some  to  flee  with  Jellachich  to  the  Ty- 
rol, others  to  escort  the  flight  of  a  prince  into 
Bohemia,  others  again  to  sign  a  capitulation  at 
Ulm,  was  of  all  modes  of  proceeding  the  most 
deplorable.  For  the  rest,  experience  teaches 
that,  in  these  situations,  the  dejected  human 
mind,  when  it  has  begun  to  descend,  descends 
so  low  that  among  all  courses  it  takes  the 
worst.  It  is  right  to  add  that  General  Mack 
has  since  invariably  asserted  that  he  disap- 


proved of  this  division  of  the  Austrian  forces 
and  of  these  separate  retreats.' 

Napoleon  passed  the  night  between  the  14th 
and  15th  in  the  convent  of  Elchingen.  On 
the  morning  of  the  15th,  he  resolved  to  bring 
the  affair  to  a  close,  and  gave  orders  to  Mar- 
shal Ney  to  storm  the  heights  of  Michaelsberg. 
These  heights,  situated  in  advance  of  Ulm 
when  you  go  along  the  left  bank,  overlook 
that  city,  which,  as  we  have  said,  is  seated  at 
their  foot,  on  the  very  margin  of  the  Danube. 
Lannes  had  passed  with  his  corps  by  the 
bridge  of  Elchingen,  and  flanked  the  attack 
of  Ney.  He  was  to  take  the  Frauenberg,  a 
neighbouring  height  to  the  Michaelsberg.  Na- 
poleon was  on  the  ground,  having  Lannes 
near  him,  observing,  on  the  one  hand,  the 
positions  which  Ney  was  going  to  attack  at 
the  head  of  his  regiments,  and  on  the  other, 
casting  his  eyes  down  on  the  city  of  Ulm, 
situated  in  the  bottom.  All  at  once,  a  battery 
!  unmasked  by  the  Austrians  poured  its  grape- 
shot  upon  the  imperial  group.  Lannes  abruptly 
seized  the  reins  of  Napoleon's  horse,  to  lead 
him  out  of  the  galling  fire.  Napoleon,  who 
did  not  seek  the  fire,  neither  did  he  shun  it, 
who  approached  it  no  nearer  than  was  neces- 
sary in  order  to  judge  of  things  by  his  own 
eyes,  placed  himself  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
see  the  action  with  less  danger.  Ney  set  his 
columns  in  motion,  climbed  the  entrench- 
ments raised  on  the  Michaelsberg,  and  carried 
them  with  the  bayonet.  Napoleon,  fearing 
that  Ney's  attack  would  be  too  prompt,  wished 
to  slacken  it,  in  order  to  give  Lannes  time  to 
assault  the  Frauenberg,  and  thus  to  divide  the 
enemy's  attention.  "  Glory  is  not  to  be  divided," 
was  Ney's  answer  to  General  Dumas,  who 
brought  him  the  order  to  wait  for  the  assist- 
ance of  Lannes,  and  he  continued  his  march, 
surmounted  all  obstacles,  and  reached  with 
his  corps  the  back  of  the  heights  just  above 
the  city  of  Ulm.  Lannes,  on  his  part,  carried 
the  Frauenberg,  and,  joining,  they  descended 
together  to  approach  the  walls  of  the  place. 
In  the  ardour  which  hurried  away  the  attack- 
ing columns,  the  17th  light,  under  the  com- 
mand of  Colonel  Vedel,  of  Suchet's  division, 
scaled  the  bastion  of  the  place  nearest  to  the 
river,  and  established  itself  there.  But  the 
Austrians,  perceiving  the  hazardous  position 
of  that  regiment,  fell  upon  it,  repulsed  it,  and 
took  from  it  some  prisoners. 

Napoleon  thought  it  right  to  suspend  the 
combat,  and  to  defer  till  the  morrow  the  busi- 
ness of  summoning  the  place,  and,  if  it  re- 
sisted, to  take  it  by  assault.  In  the  course  of 


1  The  Austrians  have  never  published  any  account  of 
their  operations  in  this  first  part  of  the  compaign  of  1805. 
Many  works,  however,  have  appeared  in  Germany,  the 
writers  of  which  have  made  a  point  of  abusing  General 
Mack  and  extolling  the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  in  order  to 
account  by  the  silliness  of  a  single  individual  for  the 
disaster  of  the  Austrian  army,  and  to  diminish  at  the 
same  time  the  glory  of  the  French.  These  works  are  all 
inaccurate  and  unjust,  a,nd  are  grounded  for  the  most  part 
on  false  circumstances,  the  impossibility  of  which  even  is 
demonstrated.  I  procured  with  great  difficulty  one  of  the 
scarce  copies  of  the  defence  presented  by  General  Mack 
to  the  council  of  war,  before  which  he  was  summoned  to 
appear.  This  defence,  of  a  singular  form,  in  a  tone  of 


constraint,  especially  in  what  relates  to  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand,  fuller  of  declamatory  reflections  than  facts, 
has  nevertheless  furnished  me  with  the  meane  of  ascer- 
taining what  were  the  intentions  of  the  Austrian  general, 
and  rectifying  a  great  number  of  absurd  conjectures.  I 
think,  therefore,  that  I  have  arrived  in  this  narrative  at 
the  truth,  at  least  as  nearly  as  one  can  reasonably  hope 
to  do  in  regard  to  occurrences  which  have  not  been  veri- 
fied in  writing,  even  in  Austria,  and  of  which  there  are 
now  scarcely  any  living  witnesses.  The  principal  per- 
sonages arc  actually  dead,  and  in  Germany  there  has  been 
a  very  natural,  very  excusable,  motive  for  disfiguring  the 
truth,  that  of  sparing  the  national  self-love  by  sacrificing 
a  single  man. 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


41 


this  day,  General  Dupont,  who  had  been  ever 
since  the  preceding  day  in  face  of  Werneck's 
corps,  had  again  engaged  him,  to  prevent  his 
gelling  back  to  Ulm.  Napoleon  had  sent 
Mural  to  see  what  was  passing  in  that  quarter, 
for  he  was  extremely  puzzled  to  conjecture, 
ignorant  of  the  departure  of  a  portion  of  the 
Austrian  army.  It  soon  became  evident  to 
him  that  several  detachments  had  succeeded 
in  stealing  off  by  one  of  the  gates  of  Ulm,  the 
one  that  was  the  least  exposed  to  the  view 
and  the  action  of  the  French.  He  immediately 
directed  Murat,  wilh  the  reserve  cavalry,  Du- 
pont's.  division,  and  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  to 
pursue  to  the  utmost  that  part  of  the  enemy's 
army  which  had  escaped  from  the  place. 

Next  day,  the  16th,  he  ordered  a  few  shells 
to  be  thrown  into  Ulm,  and  in  the  evening  he 
enjoined  M.  de  Segur,  one  of  the  officers  of 
his  staff,  to  go  to  General  Mack  and  summon 
him  to  lay  down  his  arms.  Obliged  to  pro- 
ceed in  the  dark,  and  in  very  bad  weather,  he 
had  the  greatest  difficulty  to  get  into  the  place. 
He  was  led,  blindfold,  before  General  Mack, 
who,  striving  to  conceal  his  profound  anxiety, 
was  nevertheless  unable  to  dissemble  his  sur- 
prise and  his  grief  on  learning  the  whole  ex- 
tent of  his  disaster.  He  was  not  fully  ac- 
quainted with  it,  for  he  knew  not  yet  that  he 
was  encompassed  by  100,000  French,  that 
60,000  more  occupied  the  line  of  the  Inn,  that 
the  Russians,  on  the  contrary,  were  at  a  great 
distance,  and  that  the  Archduke  Charles,-de- 
tained  on  the  Adige  by  Marshal  Massena, 
could  not  come.  Each  of  these  pieces  of  in- 
telligence, which  at  first  he  would  not  believe, 
but  which  he  was  soon  obliged  to  admit  on  the 
repeated  and  solemn  assertion  of  M.  de  Segur, 
cut  him  to  the  heart.  After  much  exclamation 
against  the  proposal  to  capitulate,  General 
Mack  began  by  degrees  to  endure  the  idea,  on 
condition  of  waiting  a  few  days  for  the  suc- 
cour of  the  Russians.  He  would  be  ready,  he 
said,  to  surrender  in  eight  days,  if  the  Rus- 
sians should  not  make  their  appearance  be- 
fore Ulm.  M.  de  Segur  had  orders  to  grant 
him  no  more  than  five,  or,  at  the  utmost,  six. 
In  case  of  refusal,  he  was  to  threaten  him 
with  an  assault,  and  the  most  rigorous  treat- 
ment for  the  troops  under  his  command. 

This  unfortunate  general  thought  that  it 
concerned  his  honour,  already  lost,  to  obtain 
eight  days  instead  of  six.  M.  de  Segur  retired 
to  carry  his  answer  to  the  Emperor.  The  par- 
leys continued,  and  at  length  Berlhier,  having 
introduced  himself  into  the  place,  agreed  with 
General  Mack  to  the  following  conditions.  If, 
on  the  25th  of  October,  before  midnight,  an 
Austro-Russian  corps  capable  of  raising  the 
blockade  of  Ulm  did  not  make  its  appearance, 
the  Austrian  army  was  to  lay  down  its  arms, 
the  men  to  be  prisoners  of  war  and  to  be  con- 
ducted to  France.  The  Austrian  officers  were 
to  be  at  liberty  to  return  to  Austria,  on  condi- 
tion of  never  again  serving  against  France. 
Horses,  arms,  ammunition,  colours,  were  all 
to  belong  to  the  French  army. 

This  agreement  was  concluded  on  the  19th 
of  October,  but  the  convention  was  to  be  dated 
the  17th,  which  gave  in  appearance  to  General 

VOL.  II.— 6 


Mack  the  eight  days  demanded.  That  un- 
fortunate man,  having  arrived  at  the  Emperor's 
head-quarters  and  been  received  with  the  at- 
tentions due  to  adversity,  affirmed  repeatedly 
that  he  was  not  to  blame  for  the  disasters  of 
his  army,  that  he  had  established  himself  at 
Ulm  by  order  of  the  Aulic  Council,  and  that 
since  the  investment  his  force  had  been  divided 
contrary  to  his  express  desire. 

This,  it  will  be  seen,  was  a  new  convention 
of  Alexandria,  without  the  dreadful  bloodshed 
of  Marengo. 

Meanwhile  Murat,  at  the  head  of  Dupont's 
division,  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  and  the  cavalry 
reserve,  atoned  for  his  recent  fault  by  pursu- 
ing the  Austrians  with  truly  prodigious  rapidity. 
He  followed  General  Werneck  and  Prince  Fer- 
dinand unremittingly,  swearing  not  to  let  a 
single  man  escape.  Setting  out  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  16th  of  October,  he  had  a  rear- 
guard action  with  General  Werneck  in  the 
evening  and  took  from  him  2000  prisoners. 
Next  day,  the  17th,  he  took  the  road  to  Heiden- 
heim,  striving  to  harass  the  enemy's  flanks  by 
the  rapid  march  of  his  cavalry.  General 
Werneck  and  the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  having 
joined,  made  their  retreat  together.  In  the 
course  of  the  day,  the  French  passed  Heiden- 
heim  and  arrived  at  Neresheim  at  night,  at  the 
same  time  as  the  rear-guard  of  Werneck's 
corps.  It  was  thrown  into  disorder  and  ob- 
liged to  disperse  in  the  woods.  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  the  18th,  Murat,  marching  without 
intermission,  followed  the  enemy  towards 
Nordlingen.  The  regiment  of  Stuart,  being 
enveloped,  surrendered  entire.  General  Wer- 
neck, finding  himself  surrounded  on  all  sides, 
and  unable  to  advance  further  with  a  harassed 
infantry,  having  no  longer  any  hope,  or  even 
any  wish,  to  escape,  offered  to  capitulate.  The 
capitulation  was  accepted,  and  this  general 
laid  down  his  arms  with  8000  men.  Three 
Austrian  generals,  taking  with  them  part  of 
the  cavalry,  resolved  to  escape,  in  spite  of  the 
capitulation.  Murat  sent  an  officer  to  them  to 
summon  them  to  execute  their  engagement. 
They  would  not  listen  to  him,  and  went  off  to 
rejoin  Prince  Ferdinand.  Murat,  intent  on 
punishing  such  a  breach  of  faith,  pursued 
them  with  still  greater  activity  on-  the  follow- 
ing day.  In  the  night,  the  great  park,  com- 
posed of  500  carriages,  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  pursuers. 

This  route  presented  a  scene  of  unparalleled 
confusion.  The  Austrians  had  thrown  them- 
selves upon  our  communications;  they  had 
taken  a  great  number  of  our  carriages,  of  OUT 
stragglers,  and  part  of  Napoleon's  treasure. 
All  that  they  had  conquered  for  a  moment  was 
retaken  from  them,  besides  their  artillery,  their 
equipages,  and  their  own  treasure.  There  were 
to  be  seen  soldiers  and  employes  of  both  armies, 
running  away  in  disorder,  without  knowing 
whither  they  were  going,  ignorant  which  was 
the  victor  and  which  the  vanquished.  The 
peasants  of  the  Upper  Palatinate  ran  after  the 
fugitives,  stripped  them,  and  cut  the  traces  of 
the  Austrian  artillery,  to  possess  themselves 
of  the  horses.  Murat,  continuing  his  pursuit, 
arrived  on  the  19th  at  Gunzenhauscn,  the 
D  2 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


Prussian  frontier  of  Anspach.  A  Prussian 
officer  had  the  boldness  to  come  and  insist 
upon  the  neutrality,  though  the  Austrian  fugi- 
tives had  obtained  permission  to  pass  through 
the  country.  Murat's  only  answer  was  to 
enter  Gunzenhausen  by  main  force,  and  to  fol- 
low the  archduke  beyond  it.  Next  day,  the 
20th,  he  passed  through  Nuremberg.  The 
enemy,  finding  his  strength  exhausted,  at 
length  halted.  An  action  ensued  between  the 
two  cavalries.  After  numerous  charges  re- 
ceived and  returned,  the  squadrons  of  the 
archduke  dispersed,  and  the  greater  part  of 
them  laid  down  their  arms.  Some  infantry 
that  was  left  also  surrendered.  Prince  Ferdi- 
nand was  indebted  for  the  advantage  of  saving 
his  person  to  the  attachment  of  a  subaltern, 
•who  gave  him  his  horse.  He  gained,  with 
two  or  three  thousand  horse,  the  road  to  Bo- 
hemia. 

Murat  thought  that  he  ought  not  to  push  on 
any  further.  He  had  marched  four  days  with- 
out resting,  at  the  rate  of  more  than  ten 
leagues  a  day.  His  troops  were  harassed  with 
fatigue.  This  pursuit,  prolonged  beyond  Nu- 
remberg, would  have  carried  him  beyond  the 
circle  of  the  operations  of  the  army.  Besides, 
all  that  Prince  Ferdinand  had  left  was  not 
worth  an  additional  march.  In  this  memora- 
ble expedition,  Murat  had  taken  12,000  pri- 
soners, 120  pieces  of  cannon,  500  carriages, 
11  colours,  200  officers,  7  generals,  besides  the 
treasure  of  the  Austrian  army.  He  had, 
therefore,  his  ample  share  in  this  glorious 
campaign. 

The  plan  of  Napoleon  was  completely  re- 
alized. It  was  the  20th  of  October,  and  in 
twenty  days,  without  giving  battle,  by  a  series 
of  marches  and  some  combats,  an  army  of 
80,000  men  was  destroyed.  None  had  escaped 
but  General  Kienmayer.  with  about  a  dozen 
thousand  men,  General  Jellachich,  with  five 
or  six  thousand,  Prince  Ferdinand,  with  two 
or  three  thousand  horse.  At  Wertingen, 
Gunzburg,  Haslach,  Munich,  Elchingen,  in 
the  pursuit  conducted  by  Murat,  about  30,000 
prisoners  had  been  picked  up.'  There  were 
left  30,000,  who  would  soon  be  found  in  Ulm. 
These  made  a  total  of  60,000  men  taken,  with 
their  artillery,  consisting  of  200  pieces  of 
cannon,  with  four  or  five  thousand  horses, 
well  adapted  for  remounting  our  cavalry, 
together  with  all  the  materiel  of  the  Austrian 
army,  and  80  colours. 

The  French  army  had  a  few  thousand  lame, 
in  consequence  of  forced  marches,  and  it 
numbered  at  most  2000  men  bars  de  combat. 

Napoleon,  satisfied  respecting  the  Russians, 
had  not  been  displeased  to  halt  four  or  five 
days  before  Ulm,  to  give  his  soldiers  time  to 
rest  themselves,  and  particularly  to  rejoin  their 
colours;  for  the  last  operations  had  been  so 
rapid  that  a  certain  number  of  them  had  been 
left  behind.  Our  Emperor,  said  they,  has 
found  out  a  new  way  of  making  war;  he  no 
longer  makes  it  with  our  arms  but  with  our 
legs. 


1  Here  is  an  approximated  enumeration,  but  rather  re 
duced  than  exaggerated,  of  these  prisoners  : — Taken  at 
Wertingen,  2000;  at  GUnsburg,  2000;  at  Haslach,  4000 ; 


Napoleon,  however,  would  not  wait  any 
longer,  and  he  was  desirous  to  gain  the  three 
or  four  days  which  were  yet  to  run,  in  virtue 
of  the  capitulation  signed  with  General  Mack. 
He  sent  for  him,  and  pouring  some  consola- 
tions into  his  heart,  obtained  from  him  a  new 
concession,  which  was  to  deliver  the  place  on 
the  20th,  on  condition  that  Ney  should  remain 
below  Ulm  till  the  25th  of  October.  General 
Mack  conceived  that  he  had  performed  his  last 
duties  by  paralyzing  a  French  corps  till  the 
eighth  day.  In  truth,  in  the  situation  to  which 
he  was  reduced,  all  that  he  could  do  was 
very  little.  He  consented,  therefore,  to  leave 
the  place  on  the  following  day. 

Accordingly,  on  the  next  day,  October  the 
20th,  1805,  an  ever-memorable  day,  Napoleon, 
placed  at  the  foot  of  the  Michaelsberg,  facing 
Ulm,  saw  the  Austrian  army  file  away  before 
him.  He  occupied  an  elevated  slope,  having 
behind  him  his  infantry,  drawn  up  in  semicir- 
cle on  the  hill  side,  and,  opposite,  his  cavalry 
deployed  in  a  right  line.  The  Austrians  filed 
ofF  between  the  two,  laying  down  their  arms  at 
the  entrance  of  this  sort  of  amphitheatre.  A 
large  watch-fire  had  been  made,  near  which 
Bonaparte  posted  himself  to  witness  the  cere- 
mony. General  Mack  first  came  forward  and 
delivered  his  sword  to  him,  exclaiming  with 
grief,  "Here  is  the  unfortunate  Mack!"  Napo- 
leon received  him,  himself  and  his  officers,  with 
the  greatest  courtesy,  and  directed  them  to  be 
ranged  on  either  side  of  him.  The  Austrian 
soldiers,  before  they  came  into  his  presence, 
flung  down  their  arms  with  a  vexation  honour- 
able to  them,  and  that  feeling  gave  way  only  to 
the  curiosity  which  seized  them  on  approach- 
ing Napoleon.  All  devoured  with  their  eyes 
that  terrible  conqueror,  from  whom  their  co- 
lours had  received,  for  the  last  two  years,  such 
cruel  affronts. 

Napoleon,  conversing  with  the  Austrian  offi- 
cers, said  to  them  loud  enough  to  be  heard  by 
all,  "I  know  not  why  we  are  at  war.  It  was 
not  my  wish.  I  thought  only  of  warring  with 
the  English,  when  your  master  came  to  pro- 
voke me.  You  see  my  army:  I  have  200,000 
men  in  Germany;  your  soldiers  who  are  pri- 
soners will  see  200,000  more,  traversing  France 
to  come  in  aid  of  the  first  I  need  not,  you  well 
know,  have  so  many  to  conquer.  Your  master 
ought  to  think  of  peace,  otherwise  the  fall  of 
the  house  of  Lorraine  may  possibly  arrive.  It 
is  not  new  territories  on  the  continent  that  I 
desire,  it  is  ships,  colonies,  and  commerce  that 
I  wish  to  possess,  and  this  ambition  is  as  pro- 
fitable to  you  as  to  myself." 

These  words,  delivered  with  some  haughti- 
ness, were  met  by  silence  only  from  those  offi- 
cers, and  sorrow  to  think  that  they  were  de- 
served. Napoleon  afterwards  conversed  with 
the  most  noted  of  the  Austrian  generals,  and 
watched  for  five  hours  this  extraordinary  sight. 
Twenty-seven  thousand  men  filed  away  before 
him.  From  three  to  four  thousand  wounded 
were  left  in  the  place. 

On  the  following  day,  according  to  his  cus- 


at  Munich,  1000;  at  Elchingen,  3000  ;  at  Memminpen, 
5000  ;  in  the  pursuit  by  Murat,  12  to  13,000.  Total,  29  or 
30,000. 


0;*  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


43 


torn,  he  addressed  a  proclamation  to  his  sol- 
diers. I>  tfas  couched  in  the  following 
terms. 

"Imperial  head-quarters,  Elehingen, 
"  29  Vendemiaire,  year  XIV  (21  October,  1805). 

"  Soldiers  of  the  Grand  Army. 

"In  a  fortnight  we  have  made  a  campaign: 
we  have  accomplished  what  we  intended.  We 
have  driven  the  troops  of  the  house  of  Austria 
out  of  Bavaria,  and  reinstated  our  ally  in  the 
sovereignty  of  his  dominions.  That  army, 
which,  with  equal  ostentation  and  imprudence, 
came  and  placed  itself  on  our  frontiers,  is  an- 
nihilated. But  what  cares  England  1  her  object 
is  attained ;  we  are  no  longer  at  Boulogne ! . . . 
*  "  Out  of  the  hundred  thousand  men  who  com- 
posed that  army,  sixty  thousand  are  prisoners  ; 
they  shall  go  and  replace  our  conscripts  in  the 
labours  of  our  fields.  Two  hundred  pieces  of 
cannon,  ninety  colours,  all  the  generals,  are  in 
our  power;  not  fifteen  thousand  men  of  that 
army  have  escaped.  Soldiers,  I  had  announced 
to  you  a  great  battle;  but,  thanks  to  the  vi- 
cious combinations  of  the  enemy,  I  have  been 
enabled  to  obtain  the  same  success  without 
running  any  risk;  and,  what  is  unexampled  in 
the  history  of  nations,  so  great  a  result  has 
diminished  our  force  by  no  more  than  fifteen 
hundred  men  hors  de  combat. 

"  Soldiers,  this  success  is  owing  to  your  un- 
bounded confidence  in  your  Emperor,  to  your 
patience  in  enduring  fatigues  and  privations  of 
every  kind,  and  to  your  extraordinary  intre- 
pidity. 

"  But  we  shall  not  stop  there ;  you  are  im- 
patient to  commence  a  second  campaign.  That 
Russian  army,  which  the  gold  of  England  has 
brought  from  the  extremities  of  the  earth,  shall 
share  the  same  fate. 

"  In  this  new  struggle  the  honour  of  the  in- 
fantry is  more  especially  concerned.  Here  is 
to  be  decided,  for  the  second  time,  that  ques- 
tion which  has  already  been  decided  in  Swit- 
zerland and  Holland,  whether  the  French  infan- 
try is  the  second  or  the  first  in  Europe.  There 
are  no  generals  here  against  whom  I  can  have 
any  glory  to  acquire :  all  my  care  will  be  to 
obtain  victory  with  the  least  possible  effusion 
of  your  blood.  My  soldiers  are  my  children." 

The  day  after  the  surrender  of  Ulm,  Napo- 
leon set  out  for  Augsburg,  with  the  intention 
of  reaching  the  Inn  before  the  Russians,  march- 
ing to  Vienna,  and,  as  he  had  resolved,  frus- 
trating the  four  attacks  which  were  directed 
against  the  Empire  by  the  single  march  of  the 
grand  army  for  the  capital  of  Austria. 

Wherefore  are  we  obliged  to  follow  up  im- 
mediately this  glorious  recital  with  one  that  is 
so  afflicting!  In  the  very  same  days  of  the 
month  of  October,  1805,  for  ever  glorious  for 
France,  Providence  inflicted  on  our  fleets  a 
cruel  compensation  for  the  victories  of  our  ar- 
mies. History,  on  which  is  imposed  the  task 
of  recording  alternately  the  triumphs  and  the 
disasters  of  nations,  and  of  imparting  to  curi- 
ous posterity  those  same  emotions  of  joy  or 
grief  which  were  felt  in  their  time  by  the  gene- 
rations whose  vicissitudes  she  relates — History 


1  THE  SWIFTSURE,  "4,  commanded  by  Captain   (after- 
wards Sir  Benjamin)  Hallowell,  fell  in  on  the  24th  of  June, 


must  make  up  her  mind  to  describe,  after  the 
marvels  of  Ulm,  the  terrific  scene  of  destruction 
that  was  passing,  at  the  same  moment,  oflf  the 
coast  of  Spain,  in  sight  of  Cape  Trafalgar. 

The  unfortunate  Villeneuve,  in  leaving  Fer- 
rol,  was  agitated  by  the  desire  of  proceeding 
to  the  Channel,  in  conformity  with  the  grand 
schemes  of  Napoleon ;  but  he  was  urged  by  an 
irresistible  impulse  towards  Cadiz.  The  news 
of  the  junction  of  Nelson  with  Admirals  Cal- 
der  and  Cornwallis  had  filled  him  with  a  sort 
of  terror.  This  intelligence,  true  in  some  re- 
spects,— for  Nelson,  on  his  return  to  England, 
had  visited  Admiral  Cornwallis  ofTBrest, — was 
false  in  the  most  important  point,  for  Nelson 
had  not  stopped  off  Brest  but  had  sailed  for 
Portsmouth.  Admiral  Calder  had  been  sent 
alone  to  Ferrol,  and  had  not  appeared  there  till 
after  the  departure  of  Villeneuve.  They  were, 
therefore,  running  after  one  another  in  vain,  as 
is  often  the  case  on  the  wide  expanse  of  the 
ocean;  and  Villeneuve,  if  he  had  persisted, 
would  have  found  Cornwallis,  separate  both 
from  Nelson  and  Calder,  off  Brest.  He  thus 
lost  the  grandest  of  opportunities,  and  caused 
France  to  lose  it ;  though,  indeed,  it  is  impos- 
sible to  say  what  would  have  been  the  result 
of  that  extraordinary  expedition,  if  Napoleon 
had  been  at  the  gates  of  London,  while  the  Aus- 
trian armies  would  have  been  on  the  frontiers 
of  the  Rhine.  The  rapidity  of  his  blows,  usually 
swift  as  lightning,  would  alone  have  decided 
whether  forty  days,  from  the  20th  of  August 
to  the  30th  of  September,  were  sufficient  for 
subjugating  England,  and  for  giving  to  France 
the  conjoined  sceptres  of  earth  and  ocean. 

On  leaving  Ferrol,  Villeneuve  had  not 
dared  to  tell  Lauriston  that  he  was  going  to 
Cadiz;  but,  when  once  at  sea,  he  no  longer 
concealed  from  him  the  apprehensions  by 
which  he  was  tormented,  and  which  urged 
him  to  get  away  from  the  Channel,  and  to 
steer  for  the  furthest  point  of  the  Peninsula. 
On  the  earnest  remonstrances  of  General 
Lauriston,  who  endeavoured  to  represent  to 
him  the  full  magnitude  of  the  designs,  of  the 
miscarriage  of  which  he  would  be  the  cause, 
he  resumed  for  a  moment  the  intention  of 
steering  for  the  Channel,  and  put  the  head  of 
the  ship  to  the  north-east.  But  the  wind,  being 
right  in  his  teeth,  blowing  precisely  from  the 
north-east,  forbade  this  route,  and  he  resolved 
definitively  to  steer  for  Cadiz,  his  heart  ha- 
rassed by  a  new  apprehension,  that  of  incur- 
ring the  anger  of  Napoleon.  He  came  in 
sight  of  Cadiz  about  the  20th  of  August.  An 
English  squadron  of  moderate  force  usually 
blockaded  that  port.  Arriving  at  the  head  of 
the  combined  fleet,  he  might  have  taken  this 
squadron,  had  he  come  rapidly  upon  it  with 
his  united  strength.  But,  still  haunted  by  the 
same  terrors,  he  despatched  an  advanced 
guard,  to  ascertain  whether  there  was  not  oft' 
Cadiz  a  naval  force  capable  of  giving  battle; 
the  English  ships,  taking  the  alarm,  had  time 
to  sheer  off.  Admiral  Ganteaume,  in  1801, 
having  failed  in  the  object  of  his  expedition 
to  Egypt,  at  least  took  the  Swiftsure.1  Ville- 

1801,  between  the  coast  of  Africa  and  the  Isle  of  Candia, 
with  Ganteaume's  squadron,  consisting  of  L'Indomptable, 


44 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Oct  180& 


neuve  had  not  even  the  slight  consolation  to 
enter  Cadiz  bringing  with  him  two  or  three 
English  ships,  as  some  indemnification  for 
his  useless  campaign. 

He  naturally  expected  a  violent  explosion 
of  anger  on  the  part  of  Napoleon,  and  he 
passed  some  days  in  deep  despair.  Nor  was 
he  mistaken.  Napoleon,  on  receiving  from 
Lauriston,  his  aide-de-camp,  a  detailed  report 
of  all  that  had  taken  place,  regarding  as  an  act 
of  duplicity  the  double  language  held  on  leav- 
ing Ferrol,  and  as  a  sort  of  treason  the  igno- 
rance in  which  Lallemand  had  been  left  of 
the  return  of  the  fleet  to  Cadiz,  which  ex- 
posed the  latter  to  the  danger  of  presenting 
himself  singly  before  Brest,  above  all,  imput- 
ing to  Villeneuve  the  frustration  of  the  grand- 
est design  that  he  had  ever  conceived,  applied 
to  him,  in  the  presence  of  the  minister  De- 
cres, the  most  disparaging  expressions,  and 
even  called  him  a  coward  and  a  traitor.  He 
was  a  good  soldier  and  a  good  citizen ;  but 
too  much  discouraged  by  inexperience  of  the 
French  naval  service  and  by  the  imperfection 
of  his  materiel,  and  frightened  at  the  complete 
disorganization  of  the  Spanish  navy,  he  anti- 
cipated only  certain  defeat  in  any  rencounter 
with  the  enemy,  and  he  was  inexpressibly 
grieved  at  the  pan  of  the  vanquished  to  which 
he  was  necessarily  doomed  by  Napoleon. 
He  had  not  thoroughly  comprehended  that 
what  Napoleon  required  of  him  was  not  to 
conquer,  but  to  devote  himself  to  destruction, 
provided  that  the  Channel  was  opened.  Or, 
very  likely,  if  he  had  comprehended  this 
terrible  destination,  he  might  not  have  been 
able  to  make  up  his  mind  to  it.  We  shall 
presently  see  how  soon  he  was  to  be  led 
to  the  same  sacrifice,  and  this  time  without 
any  result  that  could  shed  lustre  on  his  de- 
feat. 

Napoleon,  in  the  torrent  of  great  things 
which  hurried  him  along,  soon  lost  sight  of 
Admiral  Villeneuve  and  his  conduct.  Never- 
theless, before  he  set  out  for  the  banks  of  the 
Danube,  he  cast  a  last  look  at  his  navy,  and 
on  the  way  in  which  he  should  think  fit  to 
employ  it.  He  gave  orders  for  the  separation 
of  the  Brest  fleet,  and  for  the  division  of  that 
fleet  into  several  squadrons,  agreeably  to  the 
plan  of  M.  Decres,  which  consisted  in  avoid- 
ing great  naval  engagements,  and  meanwhile 
undertaking  distant  expeditions  composed  of 
a  few  ships,  more  likely  to  escape  the  English, 
and  as  injurious  to  their  commerce  as  advan- 
tageous for  the  instruction  of  our  seamen. 
He  determined,  moreover,  to  give  General  St. 
Cyr,  who  occupied  Tarento,  the  support  of  the 
Cadiz  fleet  and  the  land-troops  which  it  had 
on  board.  He  calculated  that  this  fleet, 
amounting  to  forty  and  even  forty-six  ships, 
after  it  should  have  rallied  the  Carthagena 
division,  would  for  some  time  have  the  mas- 
tery of  the  Mediterranean,  as  that  of  Bruix 
had  formerly  had,  take  the  weak  English 


squadron  stationed  off  Naples,  and  furnish 
General  St.  Cyr  with  the  useful  aid  of  the 
4000  soldiers  whom  it  had  been  carrying 
about  over  all  the  seas.  He  ordered  it,  there- 
fore, to  leave  Cadiz,  to  enter  the  Mediterra- 
nean, to  call  for  the  Carthagena  division,  then 
to  proceed  to  Tarento,  and,  in  case  the  Eng- 
lish squadrons  should  have  united  off"  Cadiz, 
not  to  let  itself  be  shut  up  there,  but  to  get  out 
if  it  should  be  superior  in  number,  for  it  was 
better  to  be  beaten  than  disgraced  by  pusilla- 
nimous conduct. 

These  resolutions  being  taken  by  Napoleon, 
under  the  impression  produced  upon  him  by 
the  timidity  of  Villeneuve,  not  sufficiently 
matured,  and  above  all  not  sufficiently  con- 
tested by  the  minister  Decres,  who  durst  no 
longer  repeat  what  he  feared  he  had  gone  too 
far  in  saying,  were  immediately  transmitted 
to  Cadiz.  Admiral  Decres  did  not  report  to 
Villeneuve  all  the  expressions  of  Napoleon, 
but,  suppressing  only  the  contumelious  lan- 
guage, he  repeated  to  him  the  animadversions 
made  on  his  conduct  from  his  leaving  Toulon 
till  his  return  to  Spain,  intimating  that  he 
must  perform  great  things  before  he  could 
recover  the  esteem  of  the  Emperor.  Inform- 
ing him  of  his  new  destination,  he  ordered 
him  to  sail,  and  to  proceed  successively  to 
Carthagena,  Naples,  and  Tarento,  to  execute 
there  the  instructions  which  we  have  just  de- 
tailed. Without  enjoining  him  to  sail  at  all 
hazards,  he  told  him  that  the  Emperor  desired 
that  the  French  navy,  when  the  English 
were  inferior  in  force,  should  never  refuse  to 
fight.  There  he  stopped  short,  not  daring  to 
declare  the  whole  truth  to  Villeneuve,  or  to 
renew  his  remonstrances  with  the  Emperor  to 
prevent  a  great  naval  engagement,  which  then 
had  no  longer  the  excuse  of  necessity.  Thus 
all  parties  contributed  their  share  to  produce 
a  great  disaster,  Napoleon  by  his  anger,  the 
minister  Decres  by  his  concealment,  and  Vil- 
leneuve by  his  despair. 

When  on  the  point  of  setting  out  for  Stras- 
burg,  Napoleon  gave  M.  Decres  a  last  order 
relative  to  the  naval  operations — "Your  friend 
Villeneuve,"  said  he,  "  will  probably  be  too 
cowardly  to  venture  out  of  Cadiz.  Despatch 
Admiral  Rosilly  to  take  the  command  of  the 
squadron,  if  it  has  not  already  sailed,  and  or- 
der Admiral  Villeneuve  to  come  to  Paris  to 
account  to  me  for  his  conduct."  M.  Decres 
had  not  the  courage  to  acquaint  Villeneuve 
with  this  new  misfortune,  which  deprived  him 
of  all  means  of  redeeming  his  character,  and 
merely  informed  him  of  the  departure  of  Ro- 
silly, without  communicating  the  motive  for  it. 
He  did  not  advise  Villeneuve  to  sail  before 
Admiral  Rosilly  should  reach  Cadiz,  but  he 
hoped  that  this  would  be  the  case;  and,  in 
his  embarrassment  between  an  unfortunate 
friend,  whose  faults  he  was  aware  of,  and  the 
Emperor,  whose  resolutions  he  deemed  impru- 
dent, he  too  frequently  committed  the  error  of 


90;  Le  Formidable, 80;  I.' Indivisible,  80;  La  Constitution, 
74 ;  Le  Dix  Aofit,  74 ;  Le  Dessaix,  74 ;  Le  Jean  Bart,  74 ; 
La  Brivoure,  40;  La  Creole,  40;  Le  Vanteur  lugger.— 

rrecit  des  Kucncmcns  Militairt*. 


She  engaged  the  squadron  in  close  action  for  one  hour, 

when,  finding  further  resistance  vain,  he  surrendered. 

Ganteaume  received  his  prisoner  with  a  nobleness  that 

1  wa»  creditable  to  both  parties.— Brtnton't  Jfaval  Hut.  H. 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


leaving  things  to  themselves,  instead  of  tak- 
ing upon  him  the  responsibility  of  directing 
them.1 

Villeneuve,  on  receiving  the  letters  of  M. 
Decres,  guessed  all  that  was  not  told  him,  and 
was  as  miserable  as  he  had  reason  to  be  on 
account  of  the  reproaches  which  he  had  in- 
curred. What  touched  him  most  was  the  im- 
putation of  cowardice,  which  he  well  knew 
th°.t  he  had  never  deserved,  and  which  he  fan- 
cied that  he  could  perceive  in  the  very  reser- 
vations of  the  minister,  his  patron  arid  his 
friend.  He  wrote  in  answer  to  M.  Decres  : 
"The  seamen  of  Paris  and  the  departments 
will  be  very  unworthy  and  very  silly  if  they 
cast  a  stone  at  me.  Let  them  come  on  board 
our  squadrons,  and  then  they  will  see  with 
what  elements  they  are  liable  to  have  to  fight. 
For  the  rest,  if  the  French  navy  has  been  deficient 
in  •nothing  but  courage,  as  it  is  alleged,  the  Emperor 
skull  soon  be  satisfied,  and  he  may  reckon  upon  the 
most  splendid  success." 

These  bitter  words  contained  the  prognostic 
of  what  was  soon  to  happen.  Villeneuve 
made  preparations  for  sailing  again,  landed 
the  troops  that  they  might  rest  themselves, 
and  the  sick  that  they  might  get  well.  He 
availed  himself  of  the  very  reduced  means  of 
Spain  to  refit  his  ships,  which  had  suffered 
from  a  long  navigation ;  to  procure  at  least 
three  months'  provisions:  lastly,  to  re-organize 
the  various  departments  of  his  fleet.  Admiral 
Gravina,  by  his  advice,  got  rid  of  his  bad 
ships,  and  exchanged  them  for  the  best  in  the 
dockyard  of  Cadiz.  The  whole  month  of  Sep- 
tember was  devoted  to  these  duties.  The  fleet 
gained  much  in  materiel :  the  personnel  remained 
as  it  was.  The  French  crews  had  acquired 
some  experience  during  a  navigation  of  nearly 
eight  months.  They  were  full  of  ardour  and 
zeal.  Some  of  the  captains  were  excellent. 
But  among  the  officers  there  was  too  great  a 
number  borrowed  recently  from  commerce, 
and  having  neither  the  spirit  nor  skill  of  the  im- 
perial navy.  Instruction,  especially  in  regard 
to  the  artillery,  was  far  too  much  neglected. 
Our  seamen  were  not  then  such  skilful  gun- 
ners as  in  these  later  times,  thanks  to  the  spe- 
cial attention  bestowed  on  this  part  of  their 
military  education.  What  our  navy  also 
wanted  was  a  system  of  naval  tactics  adapted 
to  the  new  mode  of  fighting  the  English.  In- 
stead of  placing  themselves  in  order  of  battle 
in  two  opposite  lines,  as  formerly,  of  ad- 
vancing methodically,  each  ship  keeping  her 
rank,  and  taking  for  her  antagonist  the  ship 
facing  her  in  the  opposite  line,  the  English, 
directed  by  Rodney1  in  the  American  war,  and 
by  Nelson  in  the  war  of  the  Revolution,  had 
contracted  the  habit  of  advancing  boldly,  with- 

1  Abundance  of  conjectures  have  been  made  respecting 
the  causes  which  led  tn  the  sailing  en  masse  of  the  fleet 
from  Cadiz  and  the  battle  of  Traf  ilgar.     On  this  subject 
nothing  is  true  hut  what  is  here  stated.    Our  account  is 
taken  from  the  authentic  correspondence  of  Napoleon 
and  th.it  of  Admirals  Dei  res  and  Villeneuve.     All   lint 
can  be  said  concerning  that  melancholy  event  U  here 
given. 

2  UODNB-Y,  GEORGE  BKYDGES.     Born  in  171",  the  son  of 
a  captain  in  the  royal  navy.   He  had  his  first  ship  in  1M-.J. 
In  1749,  wag  governor  of  Newfoundland.    In  1759,  was 


out  observing  any  order  but  that  which  result- 
ed from  the  relative  swiftness  of  the  ships,  of 
dashing  upon  the  enemy's  fleet,  breaking  the 
line,  and  cutting  off  a  portion  to  place  it  be- 
tween two  fires;  in  short,  of  not  shrinking 
from  the  fray  at  the  risk  of  sending  their  shot 
into  one  another.  The  experience,  the  skill 
of  their  crews,  the  confidence  which  they 
owed  to  their  successes,  always  insured  to 
them  in  these  rash  enterprises  the  advantage 
over  their  adversaries,  less  agile,  less  confi- 
dent, though  having  as  much  bravery,  and 
often  more.  The  English,  then,  had  affected 
at  sea  a  revolution  very  much  like  that  which 
Napoleon  had  effected  on  land.  Nelson,  who 
had  contributed  to  this  revolution,  was  not  a 
superior  and  universal  genius  like  Napoleon; 
far  from  it:  he  was  even  narrow-minded  in 
things  foreign  to  his  art;  but  he  had  the  ge- 
nius of  his  profession;  he  was  intelligent, 
resolute,  and  possessed  in  a  high  degree  the 
qualities  suited  to  offensive  war,  activity, 
hardihood,  and  judgment. 

Villeneuve,  who  was  endowed  with  spirit 
and  courage,  but  not  that  firmness  ef  mind 
which  befits  a  military  chief,  was  perfectly 
acquainted  with  the  defects  of  our  mode  of 
fighting.  On  this  subject  he  had  written  let- 
ters, full  of  good  sense,  to  M.  Decres,  who 
agreed  with  him  in  opinion,  as  all  seamen 
did.  But  he  thought  it  impossible  to  prepare, 
while  on  active  service,  new  instructions,  and 
to  render  them  sufficiently  familiar  to  his  cap- 
tains for  them  to  be  able  to  apply  them  in  any 
speedy  encounter.  At  the  battle  of  Ferrol, 
however,  he  had  opposed  to  the  English,  as 
the  reader  will  no  doubt  remember,  an  unex- 
pected manoeuvre,  highly  approved  by  Napo- 
leon and  by  M.  Decres.  Admiral  Calder,  ad- 
vancing in  column  upon  the  end  of  his  line, 
with  the  intention  of  cutting  it  off,  he  had  had 
the  art  to  withdraw  it  with  great  promptness. 
But,  when  the  battle  had  once  begun,  he  had 
not  known  how  to  manoeuvre ;  he  had  left  part 
of  his  force  inactive,  and,  when  a  forward 
movement  of  his  whole  line  would  have  been 
sufficient  for  retaking  the  two  disabled  Spa- 
nish ships,  he  had  not  ventured  to  order  it. 
Villeneuve,  nevertheless,  displayed  in  that 
battle  real  talents,  in  the  judgment  of  Napo- 
leon, but  not  decision  equal  to  the  intelligence 
which  he  possessed.  Subsequently,  he  ad- 
dressed no  other  instructions  to  his  captains 
but  to  obey  the  signals  which  he  should  make 
in  the  moment  of  action,  if  the  state  of  the 
wind  admitted  of  manoeuvring,  and,  if  it  did  not, 
to  do  their  best  to  get  into  the  fire,  and  to  seek 
an  adversary.  "  You  must  not  wait,"  said  he, 
"  for  the  signals  of  the  admiral,  who,  in  the 
confusion  of  a  sea-fight,  frequently  cannot  see 

admiral,  and  commanded  the  expedition  which  success 
fully  bombarded  H.ivre.  In  1701,  he  reduced  Martinique 
and  was  made  a  baronet.  In  1780,  he  utterly  defeated  the 
Spanish  Admiral  L.iugare  in  the  famous  action  of  Cape 
St.  Vincent.  In  1782,  he  obtained  a  complete  victory  over 
al  IV  Grasse,  capturing  five  and  sinking 
vessels.  He  was  created  a  baron,  and 


the  French  Admi 
one  of  his  larges 
pensioned,  and  a 
said  by  some  wri 
practised  the  ma 


his  death  buried  in  St.  Paul's.  He  'a 
era  to  have  been  the  firM  admiral  wno 
ceuvre  of  breaking  :he  lire;  to  wuich 


M.  Ttiiers  here  makes  allusion. — Encyc. 


46 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct  180J. 


what  is  passing,  nor  give  his  orders,  nor, 
above  all,  find  means  to  transmit  them.  Each 
must  listen  only  to  the  voice  of  honour,  and 
press  on  into  the  hottest  of  the  fight  EVERY 

CAPTAIX  IS  AT  HIS  POST  IF  HE  IS  I3C  THE 
FIRE." 

Such  were  his  instructions,  and,  for  the  rest, 
Admiral  Bruir  himself,  so  superior  to  Ville- 
neuve,  had  not  addressed  any  others  to  the 
officers  whom  he  commanded.  If,  in  our 
great  sea-fights,  every  captain  had  followed 
these  simple  directions,  dictated  by  honour  as 
much  as  by  experience,  the  English  would 
have  numbered  fewer  triumphs,  or  paid  dearer 
for  them. 

What  particularly  alarmed  Admiral  Villne- 
neuve  was  the  state  of  the  Spanish  fleet  It 
was  composed  of  fine  large  ships,  one  of  them 
especially,  the  Santissima  Trinidad,  of  1 40  guns, 
the  largest  ever  built  in  Europe.  But  these 
vast  machines  of  war,  which  reminded  one 
of  the  ancient  splendour  of  the  Spanish  mo- 
narchy under  Charles  III.,  were,  like  the  Turk- 
ish ships,  superb  in  appearance,  useless  in 
danger.  The  penury  of  the  Spanish  arsenals 
had  not  allowed  them  to  be  properly  rigged, 
and  the  weakness  of  the  crews  was  distressing. 
They  were  manned  by  an  assemblage  of  peo- 
ple of  all  sorts,  picked  up  at  random  in  the 
maritime  towns  of  the  Peninsula,  untrained, 
unaccustomed  to  the  sea,  and  incapable  in  all 
respects  of  coping  with  the  old  sailors  of  Eng- 
land, though  the  generous  Spanish  blood 
flowed  in  their  veins.  The  officers,  for  the 
most  part,  were  no  better  than  the  seamen. 
Some  of  them,  however,  such  as  Admiral  Gra- 
vina,  Vice-admiral  Alava,  Captains  Valdez, 
Churruca,  and  Galiano,  were  worthy  of  the 
most  glorious  times  of  the  Spanish  navy. 

Villeneuve,  most  determined  to  prove  that 
he  was  not  a  coward,  employed  the  month  of 
September  and  the  first  days  of  October  in 
introducing  some  system  and  better  order  into 
this  compound  of  the  two  navies.  He  formed 
two  squadrons,  the  one  for  battle,  the  other  of 
reserve.  He  assumed  himself  the  command 
of  the  squadron  of  battle,  composed  of  twenty- 
one  ships,  and  formed  with  it  three  divisions 
of  seven  ships  each.  He  had  under  his  im- 
mediate command  the  centre  division ;  Ad- 
miral Dumanoir,  whose  flag  was  hoisted  in 
the  Formidable,  commanded  the  rear-division ; 
Vice-admiral  Alava,  who  had  his  flag  in  the 
Sjnta  Anna,  commanded  the  van.  The  reserve 
squadron  was  composed  of  twelve  ships,  and 
formed  into  two  divisions  of  six  ships  each. 
Admiral  Gravina  was  the  commander  of  this 
squadron,  and  had  under  him,  to  direct  the 
second  division,  Rear-admiral  Magon,  in  the 
dlgesiras.  It  was  with  this  squadron  of  re- 
serve, detached  from  the  line  of  battle  and 
acting  apart,  that  Villeneuve  intended  to  parry 
any  unforeseen  manoeuvres  of  the  enemy,  that 
is,  if  the  wind  permitted  himself  to  manoauvre. 
In  the  contrary  case,  he  trusted  to  the  duty  of 
honour  imposed  on  all  his  captains  to  press 
into  the  fire. 

The  combined  fleet,  therefore,  was  com- 
posed of  thirty-three  ships,  five  frigates,  and 
two  brigs.  In  his  impatience  to  sail,  Ville- 
neuve resolved,  on  the  8th  of  October,  (16 


Vendemiaire,)  10  take  advantage  of  an  east 
wind  to  get  out  of  the  road,  for,  to  work  out 
of  Cadiz,  you  require  winds  from  north-east  to 
south-east  But  three  of  the  Spanish  ships 
had  just  left  the  basin,  and  their  crews  had 
embarked  on  the  preceding  day :  these  were 
the  Santa  Anna,  the  Rayo,  and  the  San  Justo. 
Fit,  at  most,  to  sail  with  the  fleet,  they  were 
incapable  of  keeping  their  place  in  a  line  of 
battle.  This  remark  was  urged  by  the  Spa- 
nish officers.  Villeneuve,  to  cover  his  respon- 
sibility, resolved  to  assemble  a  council  of  war. 
The  bravest  officers  of  the  two  fleets  declared 
that  they  were  ready  to  go  wherever  it  was 
required,  to  second  the  views  of  the  Emperor 
Napoleon,  but  that  to  rush  into  the  immediate 
presence  of  the  enemy,  in  the  state  in  which 
most  of  the  ships  were,  would  be  a  most  peril- 
ous imprudence ;  that  the  fleet,  on  quitting  the 
road,  having  had  scarcely  time  to  manoauvre 
for  a  few  hours,  would  fall  in  with  the  Eng- 
lish fleet,  of  equal  or  superior  force,  and  would 
be  infallibly  destroyed ;  that  it  would  be  better 
to  wait  for  some  favourable  opportunity,  such 
as  a  separation  of  the  English  forces,  pro- 
duced by  any  cause  whatever,  and  till  then  to 
complete  the  organization  of  the  ships  which 
had  been  last  manned. 

Villeneuve  sent  the  result  of  this  delibera- 
tion to  Paris,  adding  to  the  opinion  of  the 
council  his  own,  which  was  contrary  to  any 
great  battle,  in  the  actual  state  of  the  two 
fleets.  But  he  sent  these  useless  documents, 
as  if  to  make  his  quiet  resignation  the  more 
conspicuous  ;  and  he  added  that  he  had  taken 
the  resolution  to  sail  with  the  first  east  wind 
that  should  allow  him  to  get  out  of  the  road 
with  the  fleet. 

He  waited  therefore  with  impatience  for  the 
propitious  moment  for  quitting  Cadiz  at  all 
risks.  He  had  at  length  before  him  that  formi- 
dable Nelson,  whose  image,  pursuing  him 
over  all  the  seas,  had  caused  him  to  fail 
of  fulfilling  the  most  important  of  missions 
through  fear  of  meeting  with  him.  And  now 
he  no  longer  feared  his  presence,  though  it 
was  more  to  be  dreaded  than  ever,  because  his 
mind,  worked  up  by  despair,  longed  for  dan- 
ger, almost  for  defeat,  in  order  to  prove  that 
he  was  right  in  avoiding  an  encounter  with 
the  British  fleet 

Nelson,  after  touching  for  a  moment  at  the 
British  shores,  which  he  was  never  to  behold 
again,  had  sailed  for  Cadiz.  He  took  with 
him  one  of  the  fleets  which  the  Admiralty,  pene- 
trating, after  the  lapse  of  two  years,  the  de- 
signs of  Napoleon,  had  collected  in  the  Chan- 
nel. He  was  naturally  conducted  to  Cadiz  by 
the  report  spread  over  the  ocean  of  the  return 
of  Villeneuve  to  the  extremity  of  the  Penin- 
sula. 

Nelson  had  at  his  disposal  a  naval  force  of 
about  the  same  strength  as  Villeneuve,  that  is 
to  say,  33  or  34  ships,  but  all  seasoned  by  long 
cruises,  and  having  that  superiority  over  the 
combined  fleet  of  France  and  Spain  which 
blockading  squadrons  always  have  over  block- 
aded squadrons.  Not  doubting,  from  the  pre- 
parations of  which  he  was  accurately  informed 
by  Spanish  spies,  that  he  should  soon  catch 
Villeneuve  on  the  passage,  he  observed  his 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


47 


movements  with  the  greatest  attention,  and  ad- 
dressed to  the  English  officers,  preparatory  to 
the  engagement  which  he  foresaw,  instructions 
made  public  since,  and  admired  by  all  sea- 
men. 

He  described  to  them  his  favourite  manoeu- 
vre, taking  care  to  explain  the  motives  for  it. 
To  form  in  line,  he  said,  occasioned  a  loss  of 
too  much  time,  for  all  the  ships  were  not  alike 
affected  by  the  wind,  and  then  a  squadron 
would  have  to  regulate  its  movements  by  those 
of  the  worst  sailers.  An  enemy  who  wished 
to  avoid  a  battle  would  thus  be  allowed  time 
to  slip  away.  On  this  occasion,  care  must  be 
taken  not  to  let  the  combined  French  and 
Spanish  fleet  escape. — Nelson  supposed  that 
Villeneuve  had  been  joined  by  Lallemand's 
division  and  perhaps  by  that  of  Carthagena 
also,  which  would  have  composed  a  squadron 
of  46  ships.  He  hoped  himself  to  have  40, 
including  those  whose  speedy  arrival  was  an- 
nounced; and  the  more  numerous  his  fleet 
should  be,  the  less  would  he  attempt  to  draw 
it  up  in  line.  He  therefore  ordered  two  co- 
lumns to  be  formed,  one  immediately  under  his 
own  command,  the  other  under  the  command 
of  Vice-admiral  Collingwood,1  to  bear  down 
briskly  on  the  enemy's  line,  without  observing 
any  order  but  that  of  swiftness,  and  to  cut 
through  that  line  in  two  places,  at  the  centre 
and  towards  the  rear,  and  then  to  envelop  the 
portions  so  cut  off  and  to  destroy  them.  That 
part  of  the  enemy's  fleet  which  you  will  have 
excluded  from  the  fight,  he  added,  grounding 
himself  on  the  numerous  experiences  of  the 
age,  will  scarcely  be  able  to  succour  the  part 
attacked,  and  you  will  have  conquered  before 
it  arrives. — It  was  impossible  to  foresee  with 
greater  sagacity  and  accuracy  the  conse- 
quences of  such  a  mano3uvre.  Nelson  had 
previously  impressed  the  idea  upon  the  mind 
of  each  of  his  officers,  and  he  expected  from 
one  moment  to  another  the  opportunity  for 
realizing  it.  That  he  might  not  intimidate  his 
adversary  too  much,  he  had  even  taken  care 
not  to  blockade  Cadiz  too  closely.  He  merely 
stationed  frigates  to  watch  the  road,  and,  for 
his  own  part,  cruised  with  ships  of-the  line  in 
the  wide  mouth  of  the  Strait,  tacking  from 
west  to  east  far  out  of  sight  of  the  coast. 

Being  informed  of  the  real  state  of  the  forces 
of  Villeneuve,  who  had  not  been  joined  either 
by  Salcedo  or  Lallemand,  he  had  not  scrupled 
to  leave  four  ships  of  the  line  at  Gibraltar,  to 
give  one  to  Admiral  Calder,  who  had  been  re- 
called to  England,  and  to  send  another  to  Gib- 
raltar to  take  in  water.  This  circumstance, 
known  at  Cadiz,  confirmed  Villeneuve  in  his 
resolution  to  sail.  He  conceived  the  English 
to  be  stronger,  for  he  supposed  them  to  have 
33  or  34  ships,  and  he  was  rejoiced  to  learn  that 
they  had  not  so  many.  He  even  believed  that 
they  numbered  fewer  than  they  really  had, 
that  is  to  say  23  or  24. 


1  COLLINGWOOD,  CUTHBERT.  He  was  a  native  of  New- 
castle-upon-Tyne,  and  was  educated  in  the  same  school 
with  Lord  Eldon.  Ho  entered  the  navy  in  1761,  and  in  the 
action  of  June  1,  1794,  was  flag-captain  of  the  Prince. 
To  enumerate  his  services  would  require  three  times  the 
•pace  that  can  be  spared  here.  Wherever  BritUh  squa- 


Meanwhile,  the  last  despatches  from  Paris, 
announcing  the  coming  of  Admiral  Ro>sily, 
arrived  at  Cadiz.  At  first  this  gave  Vilie- 
neuve  no  great  concern.  The  idea  of  serving 
honourably  under  an  officer,  his  superior  in 
age  and  rank,  and  behaving  like  a  valiant  lieu- 
tenant  at  his  side,  soothed  his  mind,  oppressed 
by  the  weight  of  too  great  a  responsibility. 
But  Admiral  Rosilly  was  already  at  Madrid, 
and  no  despatch  from  the  minister  had  ex- 
plained to  Villeneuve  the  lot  reserved  for  him 
under  the  new  admiral.  Villeneuve  soon  be- 
gan to  think  that  he  was  purely  and  simply  dis- 
placed from  the  command  of  the  fleet,  and  that 
he  should  not  have  the  consolation  of  redeem- 
ing his  character  by  fighting  in  the  second 
rank  in  a  conspicuous  manner.  Anxious  to 
escape  this  dishonour,  and  availing  himself 
of  his  instructions,  which  authorized  him, 
nay,  even  made  it  a  duty  for  him,  to  sail  when 
the  enemy  should  be  inferior  in  force,  he  con- 
sidered the  advices  recently  received  as  an 
authorization  to  weigh.  He  immediately  made 
the  signal  for  so  doing.  On  the  19th  of  Oc- 
tober (27  Vendemiaire),  a  slight  breeze  from 
the  south-east  having  sprung  up,  he  sent  Rear- 
admiral  Magon  out  of  the  road  with  a  division. 
Magon  gave  chase  to  a  ship  of  the  line  and 
some  frigates  of  the  enemy's,  and  came  to  an 
anchor  for  the  night  outside  the  road.  Next 
day,  the  20th  (28  Vendemiaire),  Villeneuve 
himself  weighed,  with  the  whole  fleet.  The 
light  and  variable  winds  came  from  the  east 
quarter.  He  put  the  ship's  head  to  the  south, 
having  the  reserve  squadron  under  Admiral 
Gravina  ahead  and  somewhat  to  larboard.  The 
combined  fleet  consisted,  as  we  have  said,  of 
33  sail  of  the  line,  5  frigates,  and  2  brigs.  It 
made  a  fine  appearance.  The  French  ships 
manoeuvred  well,  but  the  Spanish,  most  of 
them  at  least,  very  ill. 

Though  the  enemy  was  not  yet  in  sight,  the 
movement  of  his  frigates  gave  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  he  was  not  far  off.  One  ship,  the 
jlrhille,  at  length  perceived  him,  but  descried 
and  signalled  only  18  sail.  For  a  moment  the 
French  flattered  themselves  that  they  should 
meet  the  English  in  far  inferior  force.  A  spark 
of  hope  glimmered  in  the  mind  of  Villeneuve 
— the  last  that  was  to  cheer  his- life. 

He  gave  orders  in  the  evening  for  the  ships 
to  get  into  line  in  order  of  swiftness,  forming 
the  line  from  the  ship  most  to  leeward,  which 
signified  that  each  ship  was  to  take  her  place 
according  to  her  speed,  not  according  to  her 
accustomed  rank,  and  to  get  into  line  from 
that  which  had  given  way  most  to  the  wind. 
The  breeze  had  varied.  The  heads  of  the 
ships  were  to  the  south-east,  that  is,  towards 
the  entrance  of  (he  Strait.  The  signal  for 
battle  was  given  on  board  all  the  ships  of  the 
fleet. 

During  the  whole  night  there  were  seen  and 
heard  the  signals  of  the  English  frigates, 


drons  fought  or  ftVited,  here  he  served  with  indefatigable 
energy,  and  almost  unequalled  skill  and  courage.  After 
Nelson  onlv,  he  was  the  best  and  greatest  of  English  ad- 
mirals, and  was  distinguished  not  more  for  his  excellence 
as  a  commander  than  for  his  admirable  virtues  as  a  man. 
—Brenton't  JVaval  History. 


48, 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  180 


which,  by  rockets  and  cannon,  acquainted 
Nelson  with  the  direction  of  our.  course.  At 
daybreak  the  wind  was  west,  still  light  and 
variable,  with  a  rolling  sea,  high  waves  but 
no  breakers,  the  sun  bright;  the  enemy  was  at 
length  perceived  formed  into  several  groups, 
which  appeared  to  some  to  be  two  in  number, 
to  others  three.  He  was  steering  towards  the 
French  fleet,  and  still  five  or  six  leagues  dis- 
tant. 

Villeneuve  immediately  ordered  the  line  to 
be  regularly  formed,  each  vessel  retaining  the 
place  which  she  had  taken  in  the  night,  keep- 
ing as  close  as  possible  to  her  neighbour,  and 
being  on  the  starboard  tack,  a  disposition  in 
which  the  wind  was  received  on  the  right, 
which  was  natural,  since  they  had  west  winds 
to  sail  to  the  south-east  from  Cadiz  to  the 
Strait.  The  line  was  very  ill-formed.  The 
waves  ran  high,  the  breeze  light,  and  the  ships 
manoeuvred  with  difficulty,  a  circumstance 
which  rendered  the  inexperience  of  part  of  the 
crews  the  more  to  be  regretted. 

The  reserve  squadron,  composed  of  twelve 
ships,  sailed  apart  from  the  principal  squadron. 
It  had  kept  constantly  to  windward  before  the 
latter,  which  was  an  advantage,  for  by  going 
with  the  wind  it  could  always  rejoin  the  other, 
taking  such  a  position  as  was  suitable  for  it 
to  take,  as  for  instance  to  place  the  enemy 
between  two  fires,  when  he  should  be  occupied 
in  fighting  us.  If  ever  there  was  a  sufficient 
motive  for  the  creation  of  a  squadron  of  reserve, 
it  was  on  this  occasion.  Admiral  Gravina, 
whose  mind  was  prompt  and  clear  in  the  midst 
of  action,  made  a  signal  to  Villeneuve,  apply- 
ing for  leave  to  manoeuvre  in  an  independent 
manner.  Villeneuve  refused  it,  for  what  rea- 
sons it  is  difficult  to  conceive.  Perhaps  he 
feared  that  the  reserve  squadron  might  be 
compromised  by  its  advanced  position,  and 
despaired  of  being  able  to  succour  ii,  since  he 
was  to  leeward  of  it.  This  reason  itself  was 
not  sufficient,  for,  if  he  was  not  sure  that  he 
should  be  able  to  go  to  it,  he  was  at  least  sure 
that  he  could  bring  it  to  him;  and,  by  making 
it  return  immediately  into  line,  he  deprived 
himself  irretrievably  of  a  movable  detachment 
very  usefully  placed  for  manoeuvring ;  he 
lengthened  without  advantage  his  line  already 
too  long,  since  it  consisted  of  21  ships,  and 
was  about  to  be  increased  to  33.  He  never- 
theless ordered  Admiral  Gravina  to  rejoin  and 
range  himself  in  the  line  of  the  principal  fleet. 
These  signals  were  visible  to  the  whole  squa- 
dron. Real-admiral  Magon,  who  was  not  less 
happily  endowed  than  Admiral  Gravina,  des- 
crying the  question  and  the  answer  on  the 
masts  of  the  two  admirals,  exclaimed  that  it 
was  a  blunder,  and  warmly  expressed  his  vexa- 
tion in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  heard  by  all 
his  officers. 

About  half-past  eight  o'clock,  the  intention 
of  the  enemy  became  more  manifest.  The 
different  groups  of  the  English  squadron,  less 
difficult  to  distinguish  as  they  approached, 
now  appeared  to  form  but  two.  They  clearly 
revealed  Nelson's  intention  of  breaking  our 
line  at  two  points.  They  advanced,  with  all 
sail  hoisted,  before  the  wind,  peculiarly  fa- 
voured in  their  plan  of  throwing  themselves 


across  our  course,  since  they  came  with  a 
west  wind  upon  us,  who  formed  a  long  line 
from  north  to  south,  a  little  inclined  to  east. 
The  first  column,  placed  to  the  north  of  our 
position,  consisting  of  12  ships  commanded 
by  Nelson,  threatened  our  rear.  The  second, 
placed  to  the  southward  of  the  former,  compre- 
hending 15  ships  commanded  by  Admiral 
Collingwood,  threatened  our  centre.  Ville- 
neuve, by  that  instinctive  movement  which 
always  causes  us  to  screen  a  threatened  part, 
wished  to  go  to  the  succour  of  his  rear-guard, 
and  at  the  same  time  to  keep  himself  in  com- 
munication with  Cadiz,  which  was  behind  him 
to  the  north,  that  he  might  have  a  secure  re- 
fuge in  case  of  defeat.  He  therefore  made  the 
signal  to  wear  all  at  once,  each  vessel  by  this 
manoeuvre  revolving  upon  herself,  the  line 
remaining  as  it  was,  long  and  straight,  but 
ascending  to  the  north,  instead  of  descending 
to  the  south. 

This  manoeuvre  would  not  have  any  other 
advantage  than  that  of  bringing  him  nearer  to 
Cadiz.  Our  fleet,  ascending  in  a  column  to- 
wards the  north,  instead  of  descending  towards 
the  south,  was  to  be  assailed  at  two  different 
points,  but  still  assailed  by  two  hostile  columns, 
which  were  coming  to  break  through  it.  It  was 
a  case  to  excite  more  regret  than  ever  for  the 
loss  of  the  independent  position,  and  to  wind- 
ward, which  the  squadron  of  reserve  had 
shortly  before  occupied,  a  position  which,  at 
this  moment,  would  have  permitted  it  to  ma- 
noeuvre against  one  of  the  two  groups  of  the 
English  fleet.  In  this  state  of  things,  all  that 
could  be  done  was  to  close  the  line,  to  render 
it  regular,  and,  if  possible,  to  bring  back  to 
their  post  the  ships  which,  having  fallen  to  lee- 
ward, left  gaps  through  which  the  enemy  could 
pass. 

But  it  was  no  easy  matter  for  the  ships  that 
were  out  of  line  to  get  into  it  again,  especially 
in  the  state  of  the  wind,  and  with  the  inexpe- 
rience of  the  crews.  They  might  all  have  gone 
before  the  wind  together  for  the  purpose  of 
trying  to  get  into  line  with  the  leeward  ships, 
which  would  have  occasioned  a  general  change 
of  position  and  fresh  irregularities  greater  than 
those  which  it  was  designed  to  correct.  It  was 
not  deemed  right  to  make  it.  The  line,  there- 
fore, remained  ill-formed,  the  distance  not  be- 
ing equal  between  all  the  ships,  several  being 
either  on  the  right,  or  astern  of  their  post.  The 
variable  breeze,  having  acted  more  upon  the 
rear  and  the  centre,  had  produced  a  slight  cur- 
vature in  those  divisions.  Villeneuve  had  or- 
dered the  head-sails  to  be  crowded  with  a  view 
to  enable  the  curved  parts  to  straighten  them- 
selves. In  this  manner  he  multiplied  signals 
for  the  purpose  of  bringing  each  ship  into  her 
place,  and  could  scarcely  succeed,  notwith- 
standing the  universal  alacrity  and  obedience. 
The  frigates,  ranged  on  the  starboard  and  to 
leeward  of  the  squadron,  each  opposite  to  her 
admiral's  ship,  were  rather  too  distant  to  ren- 
der any  other  service  than  that  of  repeating 
signals. 

At  length,  about  eleven  o'clock  in  the  fore- 
noon, the  two  hostile  columns  advancing,  with 
the  wind  and  all  sail  crowded,  came  up  to  our 
fleet.  They  followed  each  other  in  the  order  of 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


49 


swiftness,  with  the  single  precaution  of  putting 
their  three-deckers  at  the  head.  They  had 
seven  and  we  four  only,  unfortunately  Spanish, 
that  is,  less  capable  of  rendering  their  superi- 
ority serviceable.  Thus,  though  the  English 
had  but  27  ships  and  we  33,  they  had  the  same 
number  of  guns  and  consequently  they  were 
nearly  equal  in  force.  They  had  on  their  side 
experience  of  the  sea,  the  habit  of  conquering, 
a  great  commander,  and  on  that  day  even  the 
favours  of  Fortune,  since  the  advantage  of  the 
wind  was  for  them.  We  lacked  all  these  con- 
ditions of  success,  but  we  had  a  virtue,  which 
can  sometimes  control  Fate,  the  resolution  to 
fight  to  the  death. 

The  fleets  were  within  cannon-shot.  Ville- 
neuve,  by  a  precaution  frequently  ordered  at 
sea,  but  far  from  desirable  on  this  occasion, 
had  given  directions  not  to  fire  till  the  enemy 
was  within  good  range.  The  English  columns 
presenting  a  great  accumulation  of  ships,  each 
shot  would  have  done  considerable  damage. 
Be  this  as  it  may,  about  noon,  the  southern 
column,  commanded  by  Admiral  Collingwood, 
outstripping  a  little  the  northern,  commanded 
by  Nelson,  reached  the  centre  of  our  line  at 
the  position  of  the  Santa  Anna*,  a  Spanish  three- 
decker.  The  French  ship  Fougueux  hastened  to 
fire  at  the  Royal  Sovereign,  the  leading  ship  of 
the  English  column,  carrying  120  guns,  and 
the  flag  of  Admiral  Collingwood.  The  whole 
French  line  followed  this  example,  and  opened 
a  heavy  fire  upon  the  enemy's  squadron.  The 
damage  done  to  it  afforded  reason  to  regret  that 
the  firing  had  not  commenced  before.  The 
Royal  Sovereign,  continuing  her  movement, 
attempted  to  get  between  the  S.inta  Anna  and 
the  Fougueux  in  order  to  pass  between  these 
two  vessels,  which  were  not  sufficiently  close 
to  each  other.  The  Fougueux  crowded  sail  to 
fill  the  gap,  but  did  not  arrive  in  time.  The 
Royal  Sovereign,  passing  astern  of  the  Santa 
Anna  and  ahead  of  the  Fougueiuc,  poured  into 
the  Santa  Anna  a  broadside  from  her  larboard 
guns,  double-shotted  with  ball  and  grape,  rak- 
ing her  fore  and  aft,  which  made  great  havoc 
in  the  Spanish  vessel.  At  the  same  moment 
she  sent  her  starboard  broadside  into  the  Fou- 
gueux, but  without  much  effect,  while  she  re- 
ceived considerable  damage  from  the  latter. 
The  other  English  ships  of  that  column,  which 
had  closely  followed  their  admiral,  fell  upon 
the  French  line  from  north  to  south,  sought  to 
cut  it,  by  penetrating  into  the  intervals,  and  to 
place  it  between  two  fires  by  proceeding  to- 
wards its  extremity.  They  were  fifteen,  and 
were  engaged  against  sixteen.  If  then  every 
one  had  done  his  duty,  these  16  French  and 
Spanish  ships  would  have  made  head  against 
the  15  English,  independently  of  any  succour 
from  the  van.  But  several  ships,  ill-managed, 
had  already  suffered  themselves  to  be  carried 
away  from  their  post.  The  Bahama,  the  Mon- 
tanez,  the  Argonauta,  all  of  them  Spanish,  were 
either  on  the  right,  or  astern  of  the  place  which 
they  should  have  occupied  in  the  line  of  battle. 
L'Argonau'e,  a  French  ship,  did  not  follow  a 
better  example.  On  the  contrary,  the  Fougueux, 
the  Plu'nn,  and  the  Algesiras  were  fighting  with 
extraordinary  vigour,  and  by  their  energy  had 
drawn  upon  themselves  the  greater  number  of 
VOL.  II.— 7 


the  enemy's  ships,  so  that  each  of  them  was 
engaged  with  several  at  once.  The  Algerirat  in 
particular,  in  which  was  Rear-admiral  Magon, 
was  engaged  hand  to  hand  wilh  the  Tonnant, 
which  he  cannonaded  with  extreme  violence, 
and  made  preparations  for  boarding.  The 
Prince  of  the  Asturias,  commanded  by  Admiral 
Gravina,  terminated  our  line,  and  surrounded 
by  enemies,  avenged  the  honour  of  the  Span- 
ish flag  for  the  misconduct  of  most  of  her  com- 
panions. 

Scarcely  half  an  hour  had  elapsed  from  the 
commencement  of  the  action,  and  the  smoke 
which  the  subsiding  breeze  ceased  to  carry 
away,  already  enveloped  the  two  fleets.  From 
this  dense  cloud  issued  tremendous  and  con- 
tinual thunders,  while  all  around  floated  wrecks 
of  masts  and  numbers  of  horribly  mangled 
corpses. 

The  north  column,  commanded  by  Nelson, 
came  up  twenty  or  thirty  minutes  after  that  of 
Collingwood,  to  our  centre,  athwart  the  Uucen- 
taure.  There  were  at  this  part  seven  ships 
ranged  in  the  following  order:  the  Santiuima 
\  Trinidad,  having  on  board  Vice-admiral  Cisne- 
1  ros,  next  to  the  Bucentaure,  bearing  the  flag  of 
I  Admiral  Villeneuve,  both  in  line,  and  so  close 
i  that  the  bowsprit  of  the  latter  touched  the  stern 
j  of  the  former;  the  Neptune,  a  French  ship,  the 
1  San  Leandro,  Spanish,  both  fallen  to  leeward, 
and  having  left  a  double  vacancy  in  the  line ; 
the  Redoutable,  precisely  at  her  post  and  in  the 
waters  of  the  Bucentaure,  but  placed  in  regard 
to  the  latter  at  the  distance  of  two  ships ;  lastly 
the  San  Juslo  and  the  Indomptalk,  fallen  to  lee- 
ward, and  leaving  two  more  posts  vacant  be- 
tween this  group  and  the  Santa  Anna,  which 
was  the  first  of  the  group  attacked  by  Colling- 
wood. Of  these  seven  ships,  then,  the  Santitst- 
ma  Trinidad  and  the  Bucentaure  alone  were  in 
line,  very  close  to  each  other,  and  the  Redouta- 
ble, having  two  vacant  posts  ahead  of  her  and 
two  astern.  Fortunately,  not  for  the  success 
of  the  battle  but  for  the  honour  of  our  arms, 
there  were  here  men  whose  courage  was  supe- 
rior to  all  dangers.  It  was  these  three  ships 
which  alone,  out  of  seven,  remained  at  their 
posts,  that  had  to  bear  the  brunt  of  Nelson's 
entire  column,  composed  of  twelve  ships,  seve- 
ral of  them  three-deckers. 

The  Victory,  in  which  Nelson  had  his  flag, 
|  was  to  have  been  preceded  by  the  Temeraire. 
The  English  officers,  expecting  to  see  their 
j  first  ship  furiously  attacked,  besought  Nelson 
!  to  permit  the  Temeraire  to  precede  the  Victo- 
'  ry,  that  so  invaluable  a  life  as  his  might  not 
be  too  much  exposed.    "  By  all  means,"  re- 
plied Nelson,  "  let  the  Temeraire  go  first  if 
she  can."     He  then  crowded  all  sail  in  the 
!  Victory,  and  thus  kept  at  the  head  of  the  co- 
1  lumn.     No   sooner  was   the   Victory   within 
cannon-shot  than  the  Santittima  Trinidad,  the 
Bucentaure,  and  the  Redoutable,  opened  a  tre- 
mendous fire  upon  her.   In  a  few  minutes  they 
carried  away  one  of  her  top-masts,  cut  up  her 
rigging,  and  killed  and  wounded  fifty  of  her 
crew.     Nelson,  who  was  seeking  the  French 
admiral's  ship,  imagined  that  he  had  discover- 
ed her,  not  in  the  gigantic  Spaniard,  the  Sun- 
tissima  Trinidad,  but  in  the  Bucentaure,  a  French 
,  80-gun  ship ;  and  he  endeavoured  f>  luru  her 
E 


00 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Ocl.  1805. 


by  passing  between  her  and  the  Redoutable. 
But  an  intrepid  officer  commanded  the  Re- 
doutable :  it  was  Captain  Lucas.  Compre- 
hending Nelson's  intention  from  the  manner 
of  his  ship,  he  had  bent  all  his  sails  to  catch 
the  least  breath  of  wind,  and  had  been  fortu- 
nate enough  to  come  up  in  time,  so  that  with 
his  bowsprit  he  dashed  against  and  shattered 
the  ornamental  work  which  crowned  the  stern 
of  the  Bucentaure.  Nelson,  therefore,  found 
the  space  closed.  He  was  not  a  man  to  draw 
back.  He  persisted,  and  unable  to  part  with 
his  prow,  the  two  ships  so  strongly  locked  to- 
gether, he  let  the  Victory  fall  with  her  side 
against  that  of  the  Redoutable.  From  the 
shock,  and  a  relic  of  the  breeze,  the  two  ships 
were  carried  out  of  the  line,  and  the  way  was 
again  clear  astern  of  the  Eucentaure.  Several 
English  ships  came  up  at  once  to  surround 
the  Bucentaure  and  the  Santissima  Trinidad. 
Others  ascended  along  the  French  line,  where 
ten  ships  were  left  without  antagonists,  fired  a 
few  broadsides  at  them,  and  immediately  fell 
upon  the  French  ships  of  the  centre,  three  of 
which  made  an  heroic  resistance  against  their 
assailants. 

The  ten  French  ships  of  the  van  became 
therefore  nearly  useless,  as  Nelson  had  fore- 
seen. Villeneuve  ordered  the  flags  signifying 
that  any  captain  was  not  at  his  post  if  he  was 
not  in  the  fire,  to  be  hoisted  on  his  fore  and 
mizen-mast.  The  frigates,  according  to  rule, 
repeated  the  signal,  which  was  more  visible 
Irom  their  masts  than  from  the  admiral's,  still 
shrouded  in  a  cloud  of  smoke ;  and,  agreeably 
to  the  same  rule,  they  added  to  the  signal  the 
numbers  of  the  vessels  which  had  remained 
out  of  fire,  till  those  which  were  thus  desig- 
nated responded  to  the  voice  of  honour. 

While  those  were  thus  called  to  danger 
whom  Nelson's  manoeuvre  had  separated  from 
it,  an  unexampled  contest  was  going  on  at  the 
centre.  The  Redoutable  had  to  fight  not  only 
the  Victory,  laid  along  her  larboard  side,  but 
also  the  Temeraire,  which  had  placed  herself 
a  little  astern  of  her  starboard  side,  and  kept 
up  a  furious  combat  with  these  two  foes. 
Captain  Lucas,  after  several  broadsides  from 
his  larboard  guns,  which  had  made  terrible 
havoc  on  board  the  Victory,  had  been  obliged 
to  give  up  firing  "his  lower  tier,  because  in  this 
part  the  protruding  sides  of  the  ships  meeting 
prevented  the  use  of  those  guns.  The  men 
who  had  thus  becpme  disposable  he  sent  up 
into  the  tops  and  shrouds,  to  pour  a  destruc- 
tive fire  of  grenadoes  and  musketry  upon  the 
deck  of  the  Victory.  At  the  same  time,  all 
his  starboard  guns  were  employed  against  the 
Temeraire,  placed  at  some  distance.  To  finish 
the  contest  with  the  Victory,  he  had  given  or- 
ders to  board ;  but,  his  ship  having  only  two 
decks  and  the  Victory  three,  there  was  the 
height  of  one  deck  to  climb,  and  a  sort  of 
ditch  to  cross  in  passing  from  one  to  the 
other ;  for  the  receding  form  of  the  ships  left 
a  vacancy  between  them,  though  they  touched 
at  the  water  line.  Captain  Lucas  immediately 
ordered  his  yards  to  be  brought  to  form  a 
bridge  for  passing  from  ship  to  ship.  JVIean- 
while  the  firing  was  continued  from  the  tops 
and  shrouds  of  the  Redoutable  upon  the  deck 


of  the  Victory.  Nelson,  dressed  in  an  old 
frock  coat  which  he  wore  on  days  of  battle, 
having  Captain  Hardy,  his  flag-captain  by  his 
side,  would  not  withdraw  himself  from  the 
danger  for  a  moment.  His  secretary  had 
already  been  killed  near  him;  Captain  Hardy 
had  had  a  shoe-buckle  carried  away:  and  a 
chain-shot  had  swept  off  eight  men  at  once. 
This  great  seaman,  a  just  object  of  our  hate 
and  of  our  admiration,  unmoved  upon  his 
quarter-deck,  was  observing  this  horrible 
scene,  when  a  ball  from  the  tops  of  the  Re- 
doutable struck  him  on  the  left  shoulder  and 
lodged  in  his  loins.  Sinking  upon  his  knees, 
he  fell  upon  the  deck,  making  an  effort  to 
support  himself  with  his  only  hand.  In  fall- 
ing, he  said  to  Captain  Hardy,  "  They  have 
done  for  me  at  last,  Hardy." — "  I  hope  not," 
replied  the  captain.  "  Yes,"  rejoined  Nelson, 
"I  have  but  a  short  time  to  live."  He  was 
conveyed  to  the  place  to  which  the  wounded 
are  carried,  but  he  was  almost  insensible:  he 
had,  indeed,  but  a  few  hours  to  live.  Rallying 
at  times,  he  inquired  how  the  battle  went,  and 
gave  a  piece  of  advice  which  soon  proved  his 
profound  foresight.  "  Anchor,"  said  he,  "  bring 
the  fleet  to  an  anchor." 

His  death  produced  extraordinary  agitation 
on  board  the  Victory.  The  moment  was  fa- 
vourable for  boarding.  The  gallant  Lucas,  at 
the  head  of  a  band  of  picked  men,  had  already 
mounted  upon  the  yards  laid  from  one  ship  to 
the  other,  when  the  Temeraire,  never  ceasing 
to  second  the  Victory,  fired  a  tremendous 
broadside  of  grape.  Nearly  two  hundred 
French  fell  dead  or  wounded.  These  were 
almost  all  that  were  about  to  make  the  attempt 
to  board.  There  were  not  hands  enough  left 
to  persist  in  it.  The  men  returned  to  the  star- 
board guns  and  renewed  an  avenging  fire 
against  the  Temeraire,  which  dismasted  and 
did  her  prodigious  damage.  But,  as  if  it  was 
not  enough  to  have  two  three-deckers  to  fight 
a  ship  of  two  decks,  a  new  enemy  came  to 
join  the  former  in  crushing  the  Redoutable. 
The  English  ship  Neptune,  attacking  her  at 
the  stern,  poured  into  her  broadsides  which 
soon  reduced  her  to  a  deplorable  condition. 
Two  masts  of  the  Redoutable  had  fallen  upon 
the  deck;  part  of  her  guns  were  dismounted; 
one  of  her  sides,  nearly  demolished,  formed 
but  one  vast  aperture;  the  helm  was  rendered 
unserviceable;  while  several  shot-holes,  just 
at  the  surface  of  the  water,  let  it  into  the  hold 
in  torrents.  The  whole  of  the  officers  were 
wounded;  ten  midshipmen  out  of  eleven  were 
killed.  Out  of  a  crew  of  640  men,  522  were 
hors  de  combat ;  300  killed,  222  wounded.  In 
such  a  state,  this  heroic  ship  could  no  longer 
defend  herself.  Her  flag  was  hauled  down, 
but,  before  she  struck,  she  avenged  on  the 
person  of  Nelson  the  disasters  of  the  French 
navy. 

The  Victory  and  the  Redoutable  having  been 
carried  out  of  the  line  in  meeting,  the  way 
was  clear  for  the  enemy's  ships,  which  came 
to  surround  the  Eucentaure  and  the  Santissima 
Trinidad.  These  two  ships  were  still  strongly 
linked  together,  for  the  Eucentaure  had  her 
bowsprit  jammed  in  the  stern  gallery  of  the 
Santissima  Trinidad.  Ahead  of  them, 


Oet  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


51 


which  was  the  nearest  of  the  ten  ships  that 
had  remained  inactive,  had  at  first  lent  them 
some  succour;  but,  after  receiving  a  violent 
cannonade,  she  suffered  herself  to  drive  before 
the  wind,  and  left  the  Santissima  Trinidad  and 
the  Bucentaure  to  their  deplorable  fate.  The 
Bucentaure,  at  the  commencement  of  the  action, 
had  received  from  the  Victory  some  broad- 
sides, which,  raking  her  from  the  stern,  had 
done  her  much  mischief.  Soon  afterwards 
she  was  surrounded  by  several  English  ships, 
which  took  the  place  of  the  Victory.  Some 
laid  themselves  abaft  the  stern,  others,  turning 
the  line,  on  her  starboard  side.  She  was  thus 
attacked  in  rear  and  on  the  right  by  four  ships, 
two  of  which  were  three-deckers.  Villeneuve, 
as  firm  amidst  the  fire  as  irresolute  under  the 
anxieties  of  command,  remained  on  his  quar- 
ter-deck, hoping  that,  among  so  many  French 
and  Spanish  ships  that  surrounded  him,  some 
one  would  come  forward  to  succour  their  ad- 
miral. He  fought  with  the  utmost  energy, 
and  not  without  some  hope.  Having  no  ene- 
mies on  the  left,  and  several  astern  and  on  the 
right,  in  consequence  of  the  movement  which 
the  English  had  made  in  passing  within  the 
line,  he  would  have  changed  his  position,  to 
withdraw  his  stern,  as  well  as  his  starboard 
tier  of  guns,  which  had  sustained  great  dam- 
age, and  turn  his  larboard  side  to  the  enemy. 
But,  his  bowsprit  being  fast  in  the  gallery  of 
the  Santissima  Trinidad,  he  could  not  stir.  He 
directed  the  Santissima  Trinidad  to  be  ordered, 
by  word  of  mouth,  to  let  herself  drive,  in 
order  to  produce  a  separation  of  the  two  ships. 
The  order  was  not  executed,  because  the 
Spanish  ship,  having  lost  her  masts,  lay  ab- 
solutely immovable  on  the  water. 

The  Bucentaure,  nailed  to  her  position,  was 
therefore  obliged  to  endure  a  raking  fire  astern 
and  on  the  right,  without  being  able  to  use  her 
starboard  guns.  However,  nobly  supporting 
the  honour  of  the  flag,  she  replied  by  a  fire 
quite  as  active  as  that  which  she  received. 
This  combat  had  lasted  an  hour,  when  the 
flag-captain  Magendie  was  wounded.  Lieu- 
tenant Daudignon,  taking  his  place,  was 
wounded  also,  and  succeeded  in  his  turn  by 
Lieutenant  Fournier.  Before  long  the  main- 
mast and  the  mizen-mast  went  by  the  board, 
and  produced  frightful  confusion  on  deck. 
The  flag  was  hoisted  upon  the  fore-mast. 
Buried  in  a  thick  cloud  of  smoke,  the  admiral 
could  not  distinguish  what  was  passing  in  the 
rest  of  the  fleet.  The  smoke  clearing  off  a 
little,  he  perceived  the  ships  of  the  van  still 
motionless,  and  ordered  them,  by  hoisting  his 
signals  on  his  oniy  remaining  mast,  to  wear 
all  at  once,  and  to  come  into  the  fire.  Enve- 
loped afresh  in  that  murderous  cloud,  which 
launched  forth  death  and  destruction,  he  con- 
tinued the  fight,  foreseeing  that  he  should  be 
obliged  in  a  few  moments  to  quit  his  flag-ship, 
ir«\l  to  prosecute  his  duties  in  another.  About 
three  o'clock  his  third  mast  went  by  the  board, 
and  the  deck  was  completely  encumbered  with 
wrecks. 

The  Bucentaure,  with  her  starboad  side  torn 
to  pieces,  her  stern  demolished,  her  masts  gone, 
was  reduced  to  a  sheT  hulk.  "  My  part  in  the 
Bucentaure  is  finished  I"  exclaimed  the  hapless 


Villeneuve ;  "  I  will  try  to  charm  fortune  on 
board  another  ship."  He  purposed  then  to 
get  into  a  boat  and  go  to  the  van  to  bring  it 
himself  to  the  fight.  But  the  boats,  placed  on 
the  deck  of  the  Bucentaure,  had  been  dashed 
to  pieces  by  the  successive  fall  of  all  the 
masts,  and  those  which  were  on  the  bows  had 
been  riddled  by  balls.  The  Santissima  Trinidad 
was  hailed,  and  a  boat  applied  for.  Vain 
efforts  !  no  human  voice  could  be  heard  amidst 
this  confusion.  The  French  admiral,  there- 
fore, found  himself  confined  to  the  hull  of  his 
ship,  which  was  ready  to  sink,  no  longer  able 
to  give  orders  or  to  make  any  attempt  to  save 
the  fleet  committed  to  his  charge.  His  frigate, 
F Hortense,  which  ought  to  have  come  to  his 
assistance,  never  stirred,  whether  prevented 
by  the  winds  or  terrified  by  this  appalling 
sight.  The  admiral  had  nothing  left  him  but 
death,  and  more  than  once  he  had  made  up 
his  mind  to  it.  The  chief  of  his  staff,  M.  de 
Prigny,  had  just  been  wounded  by  his  side. 
Nearly  the  whole  of  his  crew  were  hors  de  com- 
bat. The  Bucentaure,  completely  dismasted, 
riddled  with  balls,  unable  to  use  her  guns, 
which  were  dismounted  or  obstructed  by  the 
wrecks  of  the  rigging,  had  not  even  the  cruel 
satisfaction  of  returning  one  of  the  blows 
which  she  received.  It  was  a  quarter  past 
four;  no  assistance  arriving,  the  admiral  was 
obliged  to  strike  his  flag.  An  English  pin- 
nace came  to  fetch  him  and  to  carry  him  on 
board  the  Mars.  There  he  was  received  with 
the  attentions  due  to  his  rank,  his  misfortunes, 
and  his  bravery — a  slender  compensation  for 
so  severe  a  calamity.  He  had  at  length  found 
that  disastrous  fate  which  he  had  dreaded 
meeting,  sometimes  in  the  West  Indies,  some- 
times in  the  Channel.  He  found  it  at  the  very 
spot  where  he  expected  to  avoid  it,  at  Cadiz, 
and  he  submitted  to  it,  without  the  consolation 
of  perishing  for  the  accomplishment  of  a  great 
design. 

During  this  engagement,  the  Santissima.  Tri- 
nidad, surrounded  by  enemies,  had  been  taken. 
Thus,  of  the  seven  ships  of  the  centre  attacked 
by  Nelson's  column,  three,  the  Redoutable,  the 
Bucentaure,  the  Santissima  Trinidad,  had  been 
overpowered  without  receiving  assistance  from 
the  four  others,  the  Neptune,  the  San  Leandro, 
the  San  Justo,  and  the  Indomptable.  These  lat- 
ter, having  fallen  to  leeward  at  the  commence- 
ment of  the  action,  could  not  get  back  into  the 
fight.  They  had,  therefore,  no  other  means  of 
being  serviceable  than  to  descend  within  the 
line,  under  the  impulsion  of  a  slight  breeze, 
which  continued  to  blow  from  the  west,  and  to 
join  the  sixteen  ships  attacked  by  Colling- 
wood.  One  only,  the  French  ship,  the  Nep- 
tune, commanded  by  a  good  officer,  Captain 
Maistral,  executed  this  manosuvre,  keeping  al- 
ways close  to  danger.  He  gave  broadsides 
successively  to  the  Victory  and  to  the  Royai 
Sovereign,  and  endeavoured  to  afford  some  as- 
sistance to  the  rear,  engaged  with  Colling- 
wood's  column.  The  three  others,  the  San 
Leandro,  the  San  Jutto,  and  the  Indomptable, 
permitted  themselves  to  be  carried  by  the  ex- 
piring breeze  far  away  .Vom  the  field  of  battle. 

There  were,  however,  still  left  the  ten  ships 
of  the  van,  which,  after  exchanging  a  few  shoU 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


i 
[Oct.  1805. 


with  Nelson's  column,  had  remained  without 
antagonists.  The  signal  which  called  them 
to  the  post  of  honour  had  found  them  already 
drifted  to  leeward,  or  unable  to  stir  from  the 
lightness  of  the  breeze.  VHeros,  placed  near- 
est to  the  centre,  after  having  supported  for  a 
moment,  as  we  have  seen,  her  two  neighbours, 
the  Eurentaure  and  the  Santisnma  Trinidad,  had 
suffered  herself  to  drift  by  the  slight  breath  of 
air  which  still  prevailed,  and  the  impulsion  of 
which  unluckily  served  to  carry  her  only  out 
of  the  fight.  At  any  rate,  blood  had  flowed 
upon  the  deck  of  that  ship;  but  her  gallant 
captain,  Poulain,  killed  at  the  first  onset,  had 
taken  away  with  him  the  spirit  by  which  he 
was  animated.  The  San  Augustino,  placed 
above  the  Heros,  having  Isst  her  post  very 
early,  had  been  followed  and  taken  by  the 
English  conquerors  of  the  Bucentaure.  The 
San  Francisco  fared  no  better.  Ascending  this 
line  of  the  van,  there  came  successively  the 
Mont  Blanc,  the  Duguny-Trouin,  the  Formidable, 
the  Kayo,  the  Intrepirfe,  the  Scipion,  and  the 
Neptune.  Admiral  Dumanoir  had  repeated  to 
them  the  signal  to  wear  and  to  bear  down  upon 
the  centre.  Most  of  them  had  continued  mo- 
tionless, from  want  of  knowing  how  to  ma- 
noeuvre, or  for  want  of  the  ability  or  the  will 
to  comply.  At  length,  there  were  four  which 
obeyed  the  signal  of  the  commander  of  the  di- 
vision, by  hoisting  all  their  boats  and  employ- 
ing them  in  assisting  to  wear.  These  were 
the  Mont  Elanr,  the  Duguay-Trouin,  the  Formi- 
dable, and  the  Scipion.  Rear-admiral  Duma- 
noir had  prescribed  to  them  a  good  manoeuvre  ; 
this  was,  instead  of  wearing  before  the  wind, 
which  must  carry  them  within  the  line,  to 
wear  against  the  wind,  which,  on  the  contrary, 
must  carry  them  outside,  and  enable  them,  by 
letting  themselves  drift  before  it,  to  join  in  the 
fight  whenever  they  thought  proper. 

Rear-admiral  Dumanoir,  on  board  the  For- 
midable, which  had  won  so  much  glory  in  the 
battle  of  Algesiras,  with  the  Sripion,  the  Du- 
guay-Trouin, and  the  Mont  Blanc,  prepared 
therefore  to  descend  from  north  to  south, 
along  the  line  of  battle.  At  that  pajt  to  which 
he  was  proceeding,  he  should  have  it  in  his 
power  to  place  the  English  between  two  fires. 
But  it  was  late,  three  o'clock  at  least.  He 
perceived  almost  everywhere  disasters  con- 
summated, and  not  having  the  resolution  to 
share  the  general  fate  of  the  French  fleet,  he 
could  be  at  no  loss  for  good  reasons  for  not 
involving  himself  inextricably.  Having  ar- 
rived opposite  to  the  centre,  he  saw  the  Bu- 
centaure in  the  possession  of  the  enemy,  the 
Kantissima  Trinidad  taken,  the  Redoutable  con- 
quered long  before,  and  the  English,  though 
tney  had  themselves  suffered  severely,  run- 
ning after  the  ships  which  had  fallen  to  lee- 
ward. In  his  progress  he  sustained  a  very 
brisk  fire,  which  damaged  his  four  ships  and 
rendered  them  less  fit  for  action.  Warmly 
received  by  Nelson's  victorious  column,  and 
seeing  nothing  to  assist,  he  continued  his 
course,  and  came  to  the  rear,  where  the  six- 
.een  French  and  Spanish  ships  engaged  with 
Collingwood's  column  were  fighting.  There, 
by  devoting  himself,  he  might  have  saved 
some  ships  or  added  glorious  deaths  to  those 


which  were  to  console  us  for  a  great  defeat. 
Disheartened  by  the  fire  which  had  just  da- 
maged his  division,  consulting  prudence  ra- 
ther than  despair,  he  did  nothing  of  the  kind. 
Treated  by  Fortune  like  Villeneuve,  he  was 
soon  doomed,  for  having  endeavoured  to  avoid 
a  glorious  catastrophe,  to  be  overtaken  else- 
where by  a  useless  disaster. 

At  this  extremity  of  the  line,  which  had 
been  engaged  the  first  with  Collingwood's  co- 
lumn, the  French  ships,  the  Argonaute  alone 
excepted,  fought  with  a  courage  worthy  of  im- 
mortal glory.  And  as  for  the  Spanish  ships, 
two,  the  Santa  Anna  and  the  Prince  of  the  Aslu- 
n'as,  gallantly  seconded  the  conduct  of  the 
French. 

After  a  conflict  of  two  hours,  the  Santa  Anna, 
which  was  the  first  of  the  rear,  having  lost  all 
her  masts,  and  inflicted  on  the  Royal  Sovereign 
almost  as  much  damage  as  she  had  received, 
struck  her  flag.  Vice-admiral  Alava,  severely 
wounded,  had  behaved  nobly.  The  Fougueux, 
next  neighbour  to  the  Santa  Anna,  after  making 
great  efforts  to  assist  her  by  preventing  the 
Royal  Sovereign  from  forcing  the  line,  had 
been  deserted  by  the  Monarca,  the  ship  astern 
of  her.  Being  then  turned  and  attacked  by 
two  English  ships,  the  Fougueux  had  disabled 
both  of  them.  Engaged  afterwards,  side  by 
side  with  the  Temeraire,  she  had  had  to  repel 
several  attempts  at  boarding,  and  had  lost 
about  400  out  of  700  men.  Captain  Beau- 
doin,  who  commanded  her,  having  been  killed, 
Lieutenant  Bazin  had  immediately  taken  his 
place,  and  resisted  two  assaults  of  the  English 
as  valiantly  as  his  predecessor.  The  enemy, 
returning  to  the  charge,  and  having  gained 
possession  of  the  forecastle,  the  gallant  Bazin, 
wounded  and  covered  with  blood,  having  but 
a  few  men  left  about  him,  and  confined  to  the 
quarter-deck,  found  himself  compelled  to  sur- 
render the  Fougueux  after  the  most  glorious  re- 
sistance. 

Astern  of  the  Fougittux,  on  the  very  spot 
abandoned  by  the  Monarca,  the  French  ship, 
'  the  Pluton,  commanded  by  Captain  Cosmao, 
manoeuvred  with  equal  daring  and  dexterity. 
Hastening  to  fill  the  space  left  vacant  by  the 
Monarca,  she  had  stopped  short  an  enemy's 
ship,  the  Mars,  which  attempted  to  pass  there, 
riddled  hec  with  shot,  and  was  preparing  to 
carry  her  by  boarding,  when  a  three-decker 
came  up  astern  and  cannonaded  her.  She  had 
cleverly  slipped  away  from  this  new  adver- 
sary, and,  turning  her  bows  instead  of  her 
stern,  had  avoided  the  enemy's  fire  while- 
sending  into  her  several  furious  broadsides. 
Returning  to  her  first  antagonist,  and  contriving 
to  get  the  weathergage,  she  had  succeeded  in 
raking  her  astern,  carrying  away  two  of  her 
masts,  and  -putting  her  hors  de  combat.  Having 
got  rid  of  these  two  assailants,  the  Pluton 
I  sought  to  hasten  to  the  assistance  of  the  French, 
who  were  overwhelmed  by  numbers,  owing  to 
the  retreat  of  the  ships  unfaithful  to  their 
duty. 

Astern  of  the  Pluton,  the  Algesiras,  bearing 
the  flag  of  Rear-admiral  Magon,  was  engaged 
in  a  memorable  fight,  worthy  of  that  which 
the  Redoutable  had  sustained,  and  quite  as  san- 
guinary. Rear-admiral  Magon,  born  in  the 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


53 


Isle  of  France,  of  a  family  from  St.  Malo,  was 
still  young,  and  as  handsome  as  he  was  brave. 
At  the  commencement  of  the  action,  he  had 
called  together  his  crew,  and  promised  to  give 
the  man  who  should  be  first  to  head  the  board- 
ers, a  splendid  shoulder-belt,  presented  to  him 
by  the  Philippine  Company.     All  were  eager 
to  earn   such  a  reward  from  his  hand.     Be- 
having as  the  commanders  of  the  Redoutable, 
the  Fougutux, the  P/uto«,had  done, Rear-admiral 
Magon  first  carried  the  Jllgesiras  forward  to 
close  the  way  against  the  English,   who  in- 
tended to  cut  the  line.    In  this  movement,  he 
fell  in  with  the  Tonnant,  an  80-gun  ship,  for- 
merly French,  taken  by  the  English  at  Aboukir, 
and  commanded  by  a  courageous  officer,  Cap- 
tain Tyler.    He  approached  very  near  to  her, 
fired,  and  then,  wearing,  ran  his  bowsprit  to  a 
great  depth  into  the  shrouds  of  the  enemy's 
ship.    The  shrouls,  as  everybody  knows,  are 
those   ladders   of  ropes,   which,   binding  ihe 
masts  to  the  hull  of  the  ship,  serve  to  steady 
and  to  ascend  them.     Thus  locked  to  his  an- 
tagonist,  Magon   collected   around    him    the 
stoutest  of  his  crew,  to  lead  them   to  board. 
But  the  same  thing  happened  to  them  that  had 
befallen  the  crew  of  the  Redoutabk.     Already 
assembled  on  the  deck  and  on  the  bowsprit, 
they  were  about  to  rush  upon  the  Tonnant, 
when  another  English  ship,  lying  athwart  the 
dlgesiras,  poured  into  her  several  rounds  of 
grape,  which  mowed  down  a  great  number  of 
the  boarders.     It  was  then  necessary,  before 
prosecuting  the  attempt,  to  reply  to  the  new 
enemy  that  had  fallen  upon  her,  and  also  to  a 
third  which  had  just  joined  the  two  others  in 
cannonading  the  already  shattered  sides  of  the 
jllgesirat.  While  thus  defending  himself  against 
three  ships,  Magon  was  boarded  by  Captain 
Tyler,  who  resolved,  in  his  turn,  to  show  him- 
self on  the  deck  of  the  Jllgesiras.     He  received 
him  at  the  head  of  his  crew,  and  he  himself, 
with  a  boarding-axe  in  his  hand,  setting  the 
example  to  his  men,  they  repulsed  the  English. 
Thrice  they  returned  to  the  charge,  and  thrice 
were  they  driven  off  the  deck  of  the  dlgesiras. 
His  flag-captain,  Leiourneur,  was  killed  by  his 
side.    Lieutenant  Plassan,  who  took  the  com- 
mand, was  immediately  wounded  also.  Magon, 
whose  brilliant  uniform  rendered  him  a  con- 
spicuous mark  to  the  enemy,  received  a  ball 
in  the  arm,  which  bled  profusely.    He  took  no 
heed  of  this  wound,  and  continued  at  his  post. 
But  a  second  struck   him  on  the  thigh.    His 
strength  then  began  to  fail  him.     As  he  could 
scarcely  support  himself  on  the  deck  of  his 
ship,  covered  with  wrecks  and  corpses,  Jhe 
officer  who,  after  the  death  of  all  the  others, 
had  become  flag-captain,  M.  de  la  Bretonniere, 
begged  him  to  go  down  for  a  moment  to  the 
cockpit,  at  least  to  have  his  wounds  dressed, 
that  he  might  not  lose  his  strength  along  with 
his  blood.     The  hope  of  being  able  to  return 
to  the  combat  decided  Magon  to  listen  to  the 
solicitations  of  M.  de  la  Bretonniere.  He  went 
down   to  the  lower  deck,  supported  by  two 
sailors.    But  the  sides  of  the  ship  being  shat- 
tered, afforded  a  free  passage  to  the  grape-shot 
Magon  received  a  ball  from  a  musketoon  in 
his  chest,  and  dropped  dead  immediately.  This 
event  filled  his  crew  with  consternation.  They 


fought  with  fury,  to  avenge  a  commander  whom 
hey  had  alike  loved  and  admired.  But  the 
three  masts  of  the  Jllgesiras  were  gone,  and  the 
uns  dismounted  or  obstructed  by  the  wrecks 
of  the  masts.  Out  of  641  men,  150  were 
killed,  and  180  wounded.  The  crew,  cooped 
up  on  the  quarter-deck,  held  possession  of  only 
part  of  the  ship.  They  were  without  hope, 
without  resource:  they  poured  a  last  discharge 
into  the  enemy,  and  surrendered  that  rear- 
admiral's  flag  which  had  been  so  valiantly 
defended. 

Astern  of  the  jllzesiras,  others  were  still  en- 
gaged, though  the  day  was  far  advanced.  The 
Bahama  had  withdrawn,  but  the  Jligle  fought 
gallantly,  and  did  not  surrender  till  after  severe 
losses  and  the  death  of  her  commander,  Cap- 
tain Gourrege.  The  Stciftsure,  which  the  ene- 
my made  a  particular  point  of  retaking,  be- 
cause she  had  been  English,  behaved  with 
equal  bravery,  and  yielded  only  to  numbers, 
having  seven  feet  water  in  her  hold.  Beyond 
the  Swiftsurc,  the  French  ship  the  Jlrgonau'e, 
after  receiving  some  damage,  sheered  off.  The 
Berwirk  fought  honourably  in  her  place.  The 
Spanish  ships,  Jlrgonauta,  San  Nejtomureno,  and 
San  Ildefonso,  had  quitted  the  field  of  battle.  On, 
the  contrary,  Admiral  Gravina,  in  the  Prince  of 
the  Jlsturias,  surrounded  by  the  English  ships 
which  had  doubled  the  extremity  of  the  line, 
defended  himself  alone  against  them  with  ex- 
traordinary energy.  Encompassed  on  every 
side,  riddled  with  shot,  he  held  out  stoutly,  and 
must  have  been  overpowered,  had  he  not  been 
assisted  by  the  Neptune,  which  we  have  seen 
exerting  herself  to  get  to  windward  to  make 
herself  useful,  and  by  the  Pluton,  which,  hav- 
ing succeeded  in  getting  rid  of  her  adversaries, 
had  come  to  seek  fresh  dangers.  Unfortu- 
nately, at  the  end  of  this  fight,  Admiral  Gra- 
vina received  a  mortal  wound.  Lastly,  at  the 
extremity  of  this  long  line,  marked  by  flames, 
by  floating  wrecks  of  ships,  by  thousands  of 
mutilated  bodies,  a  last  scene  occurred  to  fill 
the  combatants  with  horror,  and  our  very  ene- 
mies with  admiration.  The  dchille,  attacked 
on  several  sides,  defended  herself  with  obsti- 
nacy. Amidst  the  cannonade,  a  fire  broke  out 
in  the  ship.  It  would  have  been  but  natural 
to  leave  the  guns  and  hasten  to  the  fire,  which 
already  began  to  spread  with  alarming  activity. 
But  the  sailors  of  the  dchtllc,  fearing  that  while 
they  were  extinguishing  it,  the  enemy  might 
profit  by  the  inaction  of  their  artillery  to  gain 
the  advantage,  chose  rather  to  be  invaded  by 
the  flames  than  to  forsake  their  guns.  Pre- 
sently, volumes  of  smoke,  issuing  from  the 
hull  of  the  ship,  frightened  the  English,  and 
decided  them  to  move  away  from  this  volcano, 
which  threatened  every  moment  to  explode  and 
to  engulph  alike  assailants  and  defenders. 
They  left  it,  therefore,  all  alone  amidst  the 
abyss,  and  began  to  contemplate  this  spectacle, 
which,  from  one  moment  to  another,  must  ter- 
minate in  a  horrible  catastrophe.  The  French 
crew,  already  much  thinned  by  the  grape-shot, 
finding  themselves  delivered  from  their  ene- 
mies, directed  all  their  efforts  to  the  extinction 
of  the  flames  which  were  consuming  theii 
ship.  But  it  was  too  lale:  they  were  forced  to 
think  of  saving  their  lives,  they  threw  into 
s  ? 


54 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Oct  1805. 


the  sea  every  thing  capable  of  floating,  casks, 
masts,  yards,  and  sought  upon  them  a  preca- 
rious refuge  from  the  explosion  expected 
every  minute.  Scarcely  had  a  few  of  the 
sailors  committed  themselves  to  the  sea,  when 
the  fire,  having  reached  the  powder,  caused  the 
Jlchille  to  blow  up  with  a  tremendous  crash, 
which  terrified  the  conquerors  themselves.  The 
English  hastened  to  send  off  their  boats  to 
pick  up  the  unfortunate  men  who  had  so  nobly 
defended  themselves.  A  very  small  number 
found  means  to  save  their  lives.  Most  of  them, 
remaining  on  board,  were  hurled  into  the  air 
along  with  the  wounded  who  encumbered  the 
ship. 

It  was  five  o'clock.  The  fighting  was  over 
almost  everywhere.  The  line,  broken  at  first 
in  two  places,  and  presently  in  three  or  four, 
from  the  absence  of  the  ships  which  had  not 
been  able  to  keep  in  their  positions,  was 
ravaged  from  one  extremity  to  the  other.  At 
the  sight  of  that  fleet,  either  destroyed  or  in 
flight,  Admiral  Gravina,  extricated  by  the 
Neptune  and  the  Pluton,  and  having  become 
commander-in-chief,  gave  the  signal  for  re- 
treat. Besides  the  two  French  ships  which 
came  to  his  assistance,  and  the  Prince  of  the 
Jlsturias,  which  he  was  on  board  of,  he  was 
able  to  rally  eight  more,  three  French;  the 
Hcros,  the  Indomptuble,  and  the  Jlrgonaute,  and 
five  Spanish,  the  Rayo,  the  San  Francisco  de 
dssisi,  the  San  Justo,  the  Montanez,  and  the 
Leandro.  These  latter,  we  must  confess,  had 
saved  themselves  much  rather  than  their 
honour.  These  were  eleven  which  escaped 
from  the  disaster,  besides  the  four  with  Rear- 
admiral  Dumanoir,  which  made  a  separate 
retreat — in  all,  fifteen.  To  this  number  must 
be  added  the  frigates,  which,  placed  to  leeward, 
had  not  done  what  might  have  been  expected 
of  them  to  assist  the  fleet.  Seventeen  French 
and  Spanish  ships  had  been  taken  by  the 
English;  one  had  blown  up.  The  combined 
fleet  had  lost  six  or  seven  thousand  men, 
killed,  wounded,  drowned,  or  prisoners.  Never 
had  so  vast  a  scene  of  horror  been  beheld 
upon  the  seas. 

The  English  had  obtained  a  complete  vic- 
tory, but  a  sanguinary,  a  dear-bought  victory. 
Of  the  twenty-seven  ships  composing  their 
fleet,  almost  all  had  lost  masts;  some  were 
unfitted  for  service,  either  for  ever,  or  till  they 
had  received  considerable  repairs.  They  had 
to  regret  the  loss  of  about  3000  men,  a  great 
number  of  their  officers,  and  the  illustrious 
Nelson,  more  to  be  regretted  by  them  than  an 
army.  They  took  in  low  seventeen  ships,  al- 
most all  dismasted  or  near  foundering,  and  an 
admiral  prisoner.  They  had  ihe  glory  of  skill, 
of  experience,  combined  with  incontestable 
bravery.  We  had  the  glory  of  a  heroic  de- 
feat, unequalled  perhaps  in  history  for  the 
devotedness  of  the  vanquished. 

At  nightfall  Gravina  stood  away  for  Cadiz 
with  eleven  ships  and  five  frigates.  Rear- 
admiral  Dumanoir,  fearful  of  finding  the  ene- 
my between  him  and  France,  steered  towards 
the  Sirait. 

Admiral  Collingwood  assumed  the  signs  of 
mourning  for  his  deceased  commander,  but  he 
did  not  think  proper  to  follow  the  injunction 


of  that  dying  officer,  and  resolved,  instead  of 
anchoring  the  fleet,  to  pass  the  night  under 
sail.  The  coast  and  the  disastrous  cape  of 
Trafalgar,  which  has  given  name  to  the  battle, 
were  in  sight.  A  dangerous  wind  began  to 
spring  up,  the  night  to  become  dark,  and  the 
English  ships,  manreuvring  with  difficulty,  on 
account  of  their  damages,  were  obliged  to  tow 
or  to  escort  seventeen  captured  ships.  The 
wind  soon  increased  in  violence,  and  the  hor- 
rors of  a  bloody  battle  were  succeeded  by  a 
tremendous  storm,  as  if  Heaven  had  designed 
to  punish  the  two  most  civilized  nations  of  the 
globe,  and  the  most  worthy  to  rule  it  bene- 
ficially by  their  union,  for  the  fury  in  which 
they  had  just  been  indulging.  Admiral  Gra- 
vina and  his  eleven  ships  had  a  secure  and 
speedy  retreat  in  Cadiz.  But  Admiral  Col- 
lingwood, too  far  distant  from  Gibraltar,  had 
but  the  bosom  of  the  ocean  whereon  to  rest 
from  the  fatigues  and  the  sufferings  of  victory. 
In  a  few  moments,  night,  more  cruel  than  the 
day  itself,  mingled  conquered  and  conquerors, 
and  made  them  all  tremble  beneath  a  hand 
mightier  than  that  of  victorious  man,  the  hand 
of  Nature  in  wrath.  The  English  were 
obliged  to  throw  off  the  ships  which  they  were 
towing,  and  to  give  up  watching  those  which 
they  had  under  their  escort.  Singular  vicissi- 
tudes of  naval  warfare !  Some  of  the  prison- 
ers, overjoyed  at  the  terrific  aspect  of  the 
tempest,  conceived  a  hope  of  reconquering 
their  ships  and  their  liberty.  The  English 
who  guarded  the  Bucentaure,  finding  themselves 
without  assistance,  gave  up  of  their  own  ac- 
cord our  admiral's  ship  to  the  remnant  of  the 
French  crew.  These,  delighted  at  being  de- 
livered by  an  appalling  danger,  set  up  jury- 
masts  in  their  dismasted  ship,  fastened  to  them 
fragments  of  sails,  and  steered  for  Cadiz,  pro- 
pelled by  the  hurricane.  The  Jilgesiras,  wor- 
thy of  the  unfortunate  Magon,  who^e  corpse 
she  carried,  resolved  also  tc  rwe  her  deliver 
ance  to  the  storm.  Seventy  English  officers 
and  seamen  guarded  this  noble  prize.  Shat- 
tered as  she  was,  the  jilgesiras,  recently  built, 
bore  herself  up  on  the  waves,  in  spite  of  her 
extensive  damages.  But  her  three  masts  were 
cut  down;  the  mainmast  fifteen  feet  from  the 
deck,  the  fore,  nine,  and  the  mizen,  five  feet. 
The  ship  which  towed  her,  flung  off  the  cable 
that  held  her  prisoner.  The  English  left  in 
charge  of  her  had  fired  guns  to  demand  assist- 
ance, but  obtained  no  answer.  Then,  address- 
ing themselves  to  M.  de  la  Bretonniere,  they 
begged  him  to  assist  them  with  his  crew  in 
saving  the  ship,  and  with  the  ship  the  lives  of 
all  on  board.  M.  de  la  Bretonniere,  struck  at 
this  application  by  a  gleam  of  hope,  desired 
to  confer  with  his  countrymen  shut  up  in  the 
1  hold.  He  went  to  the  French  officers,  and 
communicated  to  them  his  hope  of  wresting 
the  jilgesiras  from  her  conquerors.  They 
unanimously  agreed  to  comply  with  the  pro- 
posal that  was  made  to  them,  and,  when  once 
in  possession  of  the  ship,  to  fall  upon  the 
English,  to  disarm  them,  to  fight  them  to  the 
last  extremity  amidst  the  horrors  of  that  night, 
and  afterwards  to  provide  as  they  best  could 
for  their  own  safety.  There  were  left  270 
French,  disarmed,  but  ready  for  any  attempt 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


55 


to  recover  their  ship  from  the  hands  of  the 
enemy.  The  officers  went  about  among  them, 
and  imparted  their  plan,  which  was  received 
with  transport.  It  was  agreed  that  M.  de  la 
Bretonniere  should  first  summon  the  English, 
and  that,  if  they  refused  to  surrender,  the 
French,  at  a  given  signal,  should  fall  upon 
them.  The  terrors  of  the  tempest,  the  fears 
of  the  coast,  which  was  not  far  off,  were  all 
forgotten :  nothing  was  thought  of  but  this 
new  fight,  a  species  of  civil  war,  in  presence 
of  the  incensed  elements. 

M.  de  la  Bretonniere  went  back  to  the  Eng- 
lish, and  told  them  that  the  state  of  neglect  in 
which  the  ship  was  left  amidst  so  great  a  dan- 
ger had  dissolved  all  their  engagements;  that 
from  that  moment  the  French  looked  upon 
themselves  as  free  ;  and  that,  if  their  guards 
conceived  their  honour  interested  in  fighting, 
they  could  do  so;  that  the  French  crew, 
though  unarmed,  would  rush  upon  them  at  the 
first  signal.  Two  French  seamen,  in  their 
impatient  ardour,  actually  fell  upon  the  Eng- 
lish sentinels,  and  received  large  wounds 
from  them.  M.  de  la  Bretonniere  repressed 
the  tumult,  and  gave  the  English  officers  time 
for  reflection.  The  latter,  after  deliberating 
for  a  moment,  considering  their  small  number, 
the  cruelty  of  their  countrymen,  the  common 
danger  threatening  the  conquered  and  the 
conquerors,  surrendered  to  the  French,  on 
condition  that  they  should  be  again  free  as 
soon  as  they  should  reach  the  shore  of 
France.  M.  de  la  Bretonniere  promised  to 
demand  their  liberty  from  his  government,  if 
they  succeeded  in  getting  into  Cadiz.  Shouts 
of  joy  rang  through  the  ship  :  all  hands  fell 
to  work:  topmasts  were  sought  out  from 
among  the  spare  stores;  they  were  hoisted, 
fixed  upon  the  stumps  of  the  large  masts, 
sails  were  fitted  to  them,  and  in  this  state  the 
ship  stood  for  Cadiz. 

Daylight  appeared,  but,  instead  of  bringing 
any  improvement  in  the  weather,  it  was  worse 
than  before.  Admiral  Gravina  had  returned 
to  Cadiz  with  the  remnant  of  the  combined 
fleet.  The  English  fleet  was  in  sight  of  that 
port,  accompanied  by  some  of  its  prizes, 
which  it  kept  at  the  muzzle  of  its  guns. 
After  struggling  the  whole  day  against  the 
storm,  the  commanding  officer.  La  Breton- 
niere, though  without  a  pilot,  but  assisted  by 
a  seaman  who  was  familiar  with  the  waters 
of  Cadiz,  arrived  at  the  entrance  of  the  road. 
He  had  but  a  single  bower  anchor  left  and 
one  thick  cable,  to  resist  the  wind  which  blew 
with  violence  towards  the  coast.  He  threw 
out  that  anchor,  and  trusted  himself  to  it,  a 
prey  at  the  same  time  to  keen  anxiety ;  for, 
if  that  gave  way,  the  Algesirus  must  perish  on 
the  rocks.  Unacquainted  with  the  road,  he 
had  anchored  near  a  formidable  reef  called 
Diamond  Point.  The  night  was  passed  in  the 
most  painful  apprehension.  At  length  day 
returned  and  shed  a  fearful  light  on  that  deso- 
late beach.  The  Bucentavre,  always  unfortu- 
nate, had  gone  ashore  there.  Part  of  her 
crew  had,  indeed,  been  saved  by  the  Indompt- 
able,  anchored  not  far  off.  The  latter,  which 
had  sustained  little  damage,  because  she  had 
fought  but  little,  was  secured  by  good  anchors 


and  good  cable.*.  During  the  whole  day  the 
Mgesiras  fired  signals  of  distress,  to  claim  as- 
sistance. A  few  boats  perished  before  they 
could  reach  her.  One  only  succeeded  in 
bringing  to  her  a  very  small  grapnal.  The 
JHgesirax  remained  at  anchor  near  thelndompt- 
able,  applying  to  the  latter  to  tow  her,  which 
she  promised  to  do  as  soon  as  it  was  possible 
to  get  in.io  Cadiz.  Night  again  shrouded  the 
sea  and  the  two  ships  anchored  one  beside 
the  other :  it  was  the  second  since  the  fatal 
battle.  The  crew  of  the  dlgesiras  looked  with 
terror  on  the  two  weak  anchors  on  which 
their  salvation  depended,  and  with  envy  on 
those  of  the  Indomptablc.  The  violence  of  the 
tempest  increased,  and  all  at  once  a  thrilling 
shriek  was  heard.  The  Indomptable,  her 
strong  anchors  having  given  way,  came  on 
suddenly,  covered  with  her  lanterns,  having 
on  deck  her  crew  in  despair,  passed  within  a 
few  feet  of  the  Jllgesiras,  and  struck  with  a 
horrible  crash  upon  Diamond  Point.  The 
lanterns  which  lighted  her,  the  cries  which 
rang,  were  buried  in  the  billows.  Fifteen 
hundred  men  perished  at  once,  for  the  In- 
domptable had  on  board  her  own  crew  nearly 
entire,  that  of  the  Bucentaure,  sound  and 
wounded,  and  part  of  the  troops  embarked  in 
the  admiral's  ship. 

After  this  afflicting  sight  and  the  painful  re- 
flections which  it  occasioned,  the  Jllgcs-irus  saw 
day  return  and  the  storm  abate.  She  entered 
at  last  the  road  of  Cadiz,  and,  proceeding  at 
random,  grounded  in  a  bed  of  mud,  where  she 
was  thenceforward  out  of  danger.  Just  reward 
of  the  most  admirable  heroism! 

While  these  tragic  adventures  marked  the 
miraculous  return  of  the  Jilgesiras,  the  Redout' 
able,  the  ship  which  had  so  gloriously  fought 
the  Victory,  and  from  which  proceeded  the 
bullet  that  had  killed  Nelson,  foundered.  Her 
stern,  undermined  by  the  balls,  had  suddenly 
fallen  in,  and  there  had  been  scarcely  time  to 
take  out  of  her  119  Frenchmen.  The  Fougufux, 
disabled,  struck  on  the  coast  of  Spain  and  was 
lost. 

The  Monarca,  abandoned  in  like  manner, 
had  gone  to  pieces  off  the  rocks  of  San  Lucar. 

The  English  had  but  few  of  their  prizes  left, 
and  with  the  least  damaged  of  their  ships  they 
kept  at  sea,  within  sight  of  Cadiz,  constantly 
struggling  against  contrary  winds,  which  had 
prevented  them  from  regaining  Gibraltar.  At 
this  sight  the  brave  commander  of  the  Pluton, 
Captain  Cosmao,  could  not  repress  the  zeal 
with  which  he  was  animated.  His  ship  was 
riddled,  his  crew  reduced  to  half,  but  none  of 
these  reasons  could  stop  him.  Borrowing 
some  hands  from  the  Hermione  frigate,  he  re- 
paired his  rigging  in  haste,  and,  exercising  the 
command  which  belonged  to  him,  for  all  the 
admirals  and  rear-admirals  were  dead,  wound- 
ed, or  prisoners,  he  made  a  signal  to  the  ships 
capable  of  putting  to  sea  to  weigh,  in  order  to 
take  from  Collingwood's  fleet  the  French  whom 
it  was  dragging  away  with  it.  The  intrepid 
Cosmao  accordingly  sailed  in  company  with 
the  Neptune,  which  during  the  battle  had  done 
her  best  to  get  into  the  fire,  and  with  thre 
other  French  and  Spanish  ships,  which  ) 
not  had  the  honour  of  taking  parr  j  7  the 


56 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


of  Trafalgar.  They  were  five  in  all,  accom- 
panied by  five  frigates,  which  had  also  to  make 
amends  for  their  recent  conduct.  In  spite  of 
the  foul  weather,  these  ten  ships  approached 
the  English  fleet.  Collingwood,  taking  them 
for  so  many  ships  of  the  line,  immediately 
sent  ten  of  his  least  damaged  ships  to  meet 
them.  In  this  movement  some  of  the  prizes 
were  abandoned.  The  frigates  availed  them- 
selves of  the  opportunity  to  seize  and  take  in 
tow  the  Santa  Jlnna  and  the  Neptune.  Cosmao, 
who  had  not  sufficient  force,  and  had  against 
him  the  wind  blowing  towards  Cadiz,  returned, 
carrying  off  with  him  the  two  reconquered 
ships,  the  only  trophy  that  he  could  gain  after 
such  disasters.  That  was  not  the  only  result 
of  this  effort.  Admiral  Collingwood,  apprehen- 
sive that  he  should  not  be  able  to  keep  his 
prizes,  sunk  or  burned  the  Santissima  Trinidad, 
the  Jlrgonauta,  the  San  Augustine,  and  the  In- 
trepide. 

The  Mgle  escaped  from  the  English  ship, 
the  Defiance,  and  ran  aground  off  Port  St. 
Mary.  The  Eenrick  was  lost  by  an  act  of  de- 
votedness  similar  to  that  which  had  saved  the 
Mgcsiras.  Among  the  ships  which  accom- 
panied Captain  Cosmao,  there  was  one  which 
could  not  get  back:  that  was  the  Spanish  ship, 
the  Eayo,  which  perished  between  Rota  and 
San  Lucar. 

The  English  admiral  at  length  reached  Gib- 
raltar, carrying  with  him  but  four  prizes  out 
of  seventeen,  one  French,  the  Swiftsure,  and 
three  Spanish;  and  he  was  afterwards  obliged 
to  sink  the  Swiftsure  also. 

Such  was  that  fatal  battle  of  Trafalgar.  In- 
experienced seamen,  allies  still  more  inex- 
perienced, a  lax  discipline,  a  neglected  materiel, 
everywhere  precipitation,  with  its  conse- 
quences ;  a  commander  too  deeply  impressed 
with  these  disadvantages,  conceiving  from 
them  sinister  presentiments,  carrying  these 
with  him  over  all  the  seas,  suffering  their  in- 
fluence to  thwart  the  great  plans  of  his  sove- 
reign; that  irritated  sovereign  underrating 
material  obstacles,  less  difficult  to  surmount 
on  land  than  at  sea,  mortifying  by  the  bitter- 
ness of  his  reproaches  an  admiral  whom  he 
ought  rather  to  have  pitied  than  blamed;  this 
admiral  fighting  from  despair,  and  Fortune, 
cruel  to  adversity,  refusing  him  even  the  ad- 
vantage of  the  wind;  half  of  a  fleet  paralyzed 
by  ignorance  and  by  the  elements,  the  other 
half  fighting  with  fury;  on  one  side  a  bravery 
founded  on  calculation  and  skill,  on  the  other 
an  heroic  inexperience,  sublime  deaths,  a 
frightful  carnage,  an  unparalleled  destruction  ; 
after  the  ravages  of  men,  the  ravages  of  the 
tempest;  the  abyss  ingulphing  the  trophies  of 
the  conqueror;  lastly,  the  triumphant  chief 
buried  in  his  triumph,  and  the  vanquished 
chief  projecting  suicide  as  the  only  refuge 
from  his  affliction — such  was,  we  repeat  it,  that 
fatal  battle  of  Trafalgar,  with  its  causes,  its 
results,  its  tragic  aspects. 

From  this  great  disaster  there  could,  how- 
ever, be  drawn  useful  consequences  for  our 
navy  It  was  requisite  to  relate  to  the  world 
what  had  happened.  The  combats  of  the  Re- 
doubtable, the  Mgesiras,  the  jlchille,  deserve  to  be 
recorded  with  pride,  beside  the  triumphs  of 


Ulm.  Unsuccessful  courage  is  not  less  admi- 
rable than  successful  courage:  it  is  more 
touching.  Besides,  the  favours  of  Fortune  to 
us  were  great  enough  to  permit  us  to  avow 
publicly  some  of  her  severities.  Then  liberal 
rewards  ought  to  have  been  bestowed  on  the 
men  who  had  so  worthily  done  their  duty,  and 
those  to  have  been  brought  before  a  council 
of  war,  who,  daunted  by  the  horror  of  the 
scene,  had  kept  out  of  the  fire.  And,  had  they 
even  behaved  well  on  other  occasions,  it  would 
have  been  right  to  sacrifice  them  to  the  neces- 
sity of  establishing  discipline  by  terrible  ex- 
amples. Above  all,  government  ought  to  fin<? 
in  this  sanguinary  defeat  a  lesson  for  itself;  it 
ought  to  impress  it  with  the  conviction  that 
nothing  should  be  hurried,  particularly  where 
the  navy  is  concerned;  it  ought  to  make  it 
abstain  from  presenting  in  line  of  battle  squa- 
drons not  sufficiently  tried  at  sea,  and  to  apply 
itself  mean  while  to  train  them  by  frequent  and 
distant  cruises. 

The  excellent  King  of  Spain,  without  enter- 
ing into  all  these  calculations,  wrapped  up  in 
one  and  the  same  measure  rewards  for  the 
brave  and  for  the  cowards,  unwilling  to  bring 
to  light  any  thing  but  the  honour  done  to  his 
flag  by  the  conduct  of  some  of  his  seamen. 
It  was  a  weakness  natural  to  a  court  that  had 
grown  old,  but  a  weakness  arising  from  be- 
nignity. Our  sailors,  sonvwhat  recruited 
after  their  hardships,  had  mingled  with  the. 
Spanish  seamen  in  the  port  of  Cadiz,  when 
they  were  informed  that  the  King  of  Spain 
gave  a  step  in  rank  to  every  Spaniard  who 
had  been  present  at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar, 
besides  particular  distinctions  to  those  who 
had  behaved  best.  The  Spaniards,  almost 
ashamed  of  being  rewarded  when  the  French 
were  not,  said  to  the  latter  that  probably  they 
would  soon  receive  the  recompense  of  their 
courage.  This  was  not  the  case :  the  brave 
and  the  cowards  among  the  French  also 
shared  the  same  treatment,  and  that  treatment 
was  oblivion. 

When  the  news  of  the  disasters  of  Trafal- 
gar reached  Admiral  Decres,  he  was  intensely 
grieved.  That  minister,  notwithstanding  his 
intelligence,  notwithstanding  his  intimate  ac- 
quaintance with  naval  matters,  never  had  any 
thing  but  reverses  to  report  to  a  sovereign 
who,  in  every  other  line,  obtained  only  suc- 
cesses. He  transmitted  these  melancholy  de- 
tails to  Napoleon,  who  was  already  advancing 
with  eagle's  speed  upon  Vienna.  Though 
bad  tidings  had  scarcely  power  to  affect  a 
mind  intoxicated  with  triumphs,  the  news  of 
Trafalgar  mortified  Napoleon,  and  excited  his 
profound  displeasure.  On  this  occasion,  how- 
ever, he  was  less  severe  than  usual  toward 
Admiral  Villeneuve,  for  that  unfortunate  chief 
had  fought  bravely,  though  very  imprudently. 
Napoleon  acted  in  this  instance  as  men  of  the 
strongest  as  well  as  of  the  weakest  minds  fre- 
quently act ;  he  strove  to  forget  this  vexation, 
and  to  make  others  forget  it.  He  desired  that 
little  should  be  said  about  Trafalgar  in  the 
French  newspapers,  and  that  it  should  be 
mentioned  as  an  imprudent  fight,  in  which 
we  had  suffered  more  from  the  tempest  than 
from  the  enemy.  He  resolved  neither  to  re« 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


57 


ward  nor  to  punish,  which  was  a  cruel  injus- 
uoe,  unworthy  of  him  and  of  the  spirit  of  his 
government.  At  that  time  there  was  some- 
thing passing  in  his  mind  which  contributed 
powerfully  to  produce  this  so  niggardly  con- 
duct: he  began  to  despair  of  the  French  navy. 
He  was  devising  a  more  sure,  a  more  practi- 
cable way  of  fighting  England ;  this  was  to 
fight  her  in  the  allies  whom  she  paid;  to  take 
the  continent  from  her,  to  exclude  from  it  her 
commerce  and  her  influence.  It  was  natural 
for  him  to  prefer  this  method,  in  the  employ- 
ment of  which  he  excelled,  and  which,  well 
managed,  would  certainly  have  conducted  him 
to  the  aim  of  his  efforts.  From  that  day,  Na- 
poleon thought  less  of  the  navy,  and  wished 
everybody  else  to  think  less  of  it  too. 


With  respect  to  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  Eu- 
rope itself  was  willing  enough  to  observe 
that  silence  which  he  desired.  The  mighty 
resonance  of  his  steps  on  the  continent 
drowned  the  echoes  of  the  cannon  of  Trafal- 
gar. The  powers  who  had  the  sword  of  Na- 
poleon at  their  breast  were  but  little  cheered 
by  a  naval  victory,  profitable  to  England  alone, 
without  any  other  result  than  a  new  extension 
of  her  commercial  domination,  a  domination 
which  they  disliked  and  tolerated  only  from 
jealousy  of  France.  Besides,  British  glory 
did  not  console  them  for  their  own  humilia- 
tion. Trafalgar,  then,  eclipsed  not  the  splen- 
dour of  Ulm,  and,  as  we  shall  presently  see, 
lessened  none  of  its  consequences. 


BOOK  XXIII. 

ADSTERLITZ. 


THE  tidings  from  the  banks  of  the  Danube 
had  filled  France  with  satisfaction ;  those  from 
Cadiz  grieved  her,  but  neither  gave  her  any 
surprise.  Every  thing  was  hoped  for  from  our 
land  forces,  constantly  victorious  ever  since 
the  commencement  of  the  Revolution,  and 
scarcely  any  thing  from  our  fleets,  so  unfor- 
tunate for  the  last  fifteen  years.  But  conse- 
quences of  minor  importance  only  were 
attached  to  naval  events;  on  the  contrary, 
our  prodigious  successes  on  the  continent 
were  regarded  as  completely  decisive.  There 
people  beheld  hostilities  kept  at  a  great  dis- 
tance from  our  frontiers,  the  coalition  discon- 
certed at  its  outset,  the  duration  of  the  war 
greatly  abridged,  and  the  continental  peace 
rendered  speedy,  bringing  with  it  the  hope  of 
a  maritime  peace.  Meanwhile,  the  army, 

Vox..  II.— 8 


pushing  on  towards  Austria  to  meet  the  Rus- 
sians, afforded  a  presage  of  new  and  great 
events,  which  were  awaited  with  keen  impa- 
tience. For  the  rest,  confidence  in  the  genius 
of  Napoleon  tempered  all  anxieties. 

This  confidence  was  needed  to  support  cre- 
dit, which  was  violently  shaken.  We  have 
already  described  the  embarrassing  situation 
of  our  finances.  An  arrear,  owing  to  the  re- 
solution of  Napoleon  to  provide  without  loan 
for  the  expenses  of  the  war;  the  embarrass- 
ments of  the  Spanish  Treasury,  extended  to 
the  French  Treasury  by  the  speculations  of 
the  company  of  the  United  Merchants  ;  the  port 
folio  of  the  Treasury  given  up  entirely  to  thac 
company,  by  the  fault  of  an  honest  but  de 
luded  minister — such  were  the  causes  of  thai 
situation.  They  had  finally  produced  iue  cri- 


58 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


'"is  which  had  long  been  foreseen.  An  inci- 
tent  had  contributed  to  hasten  it.  The  court 
f  Madrid,  which  was  debtor  to  the  company  of 
:he  United  Merchants  for  the  subsidy,  the  amount 
«>f  which  the  latter  had  undertaken  to  dis- 
charge, for  the  cargoes  of  corn  sent  to  the  dif- 
erent  ports  of  the  Peninsula,  for  the  supplies 
furnished  for  the  Spanish  fleets  and  armies — 
the  court  of  Madrid  had  just  had  recourse  in 
its  distress  to  a  disastrous  measure.  Being 
obliged  to  suspend  the  payments  of  the  Chest 
f  Consolidation,  a  species  of  bank  dedicated  to 
rhe  service  of  the  public  debt,  it  had  given  a 
:brced  currency  as  money  to  the  notes  of  that 
chest.  Such  a  measure  must  necessarily  cause 
all  the  specie  to  disappear.  M.  Ouvrard,  who, 
till  he  could  bring  over  the  piastres  of  Mexico, 
assigned  to  him  by  the  court  of  Madrid,  had 
no  other  means  of  supplying  the  wants  of  his 
partners  but  the  cash  which  he  was  to  draw 
t'rom  the  Chest  of  Consolidation,  found  him- 
self suddenly  stopped  short  in  his  operations. 
There  had  been  promised  in  particular  to  M. 
Desprez  four  millions  of  piastres,  which  he 
had  promised  in  his  turn  to  the  bank  of 
France,  in  order  to  obtain  from  it  the  assist- 
ance that  he  needed.  These  four  millions 
were  no  longer  to  be  depended  upon.  On  the 
sums  to  be  drawn  from  Mexico,  a  loan  of  ten 
millions  had  been  negotiated  with  the  house 
of  Hope,  of  which  two  at  most  could  be  hoped 
for,  in  time  to  be  useful.  These  unfortunate 
circumstances  had  increased  beyond  measure 
the  embarrassments  of  M.  Desprez,  who  was 
charged  with  the  operations  of  the  Treasury, 
-inr3  of  M.  Vanlerberghe,  who  was  charged 
with  the  supply  of  provisions,  and  the  embar- 
rassments of  both  had  fallen  back  upon  the 
bank.  We  have  already  explained  how  they 
induced  the  bank  to  discount  either  their  own 
paper  or  the  obligations  of  the  receivers-general. 
The  bank  gave  them  the  amount  in  notes,  the 
issue  of  which  was  thus  increased  in  an  im- 
moderate manner.  This  would  have  been 
only  an  evil  very  speedily  reparable  if  the 
promised  piastres  had  arrived  to  bring  back 
the  metallic  reserve  of  the  bank  to  a  suitable 
rate.  But  things  had  come  to  such  a  point 
that  the  bank  had  not  more  than  fifteen  mil- 
.  lion  francs  in  its  coffers,  against  seventy-two 
millions  in  notes  issued,  and  twenty  millions 
in  running  accounts,  that  is  to  say  against 
ninety-two  millions  demandable  immediately. 
A  strange  circumstance,  which  had  recently 
come  to  light,  greatly  aggravated  this  situa- 
tion. M.  de  Marbois,  in  his  unlimited  confi- 
dence in  the  company,  had  granted  a  faculty 
entirely  unexceptionable,  which  he  had  at  first 
viewed  only  as  a  facility  of  service,  and  which 
had  become  the  cause  of  a  great  abuse.  The 
company  having  in  its  possession  the  greater 
part  of  the  obligations  of  the  receivers-general, 
since  it  discounted  them  to  the  bank,  having 
to  pay  itself  for  services  of  all  kinds  which  it 
executed  in  different  parts  of  the  territory, 
found  itself  obliged  to  draw  incessantly  upon 
the  chests  of  the  Treasury ;  and,  for  the  great- 
er convenience,  M.  de  Marbois  had  ordered 
the  receivers-general  to  pay  the  funds  which 
came  into  their  hands  to  the  mere  receipt  of 
M.  Desprez.  The  company  had  immediately 


made  use  of  this  faculty.  While,  on  the  one 
hand,  it  endeavoured  to  procure  cash  at  Paris 
by  discounting  with  the  bank  the  obligations  of 
the  receivers-general  of  which  it  was  possessed, 
on  the  other,  it  took  from  the  chest  of  the  re- 
ceivers-general the  money  destined  for  the 
discharge  of  those  same  obligations,  and  the 
bank,  when  they  became  due,  on  sending  them 
to  the  receivers-general,  found  in  payment 
nothing  but  receipts  of  Desprez's.  Thus  the 
bank  received  paper  in  payment  of  other  pa- 
per. In  this  manner  it  was  led  to  so  great  an 
issue  of  notes  with  so  small  a  reserve.  A 
treacherous  clerk,  betraying  the  confidence  of 
M.  de  Marbois,  was  the  principal  cause  of  the 
compliances  of  which  such  a  deplorable  use 
was  made. 

This  situation,  unknown  to  the  minister, 
not  duly  appreciated  even  by  the  company, 
which,  in  its  embarrassment,  not  measuring 
either  the  extent  of  the  operations  in  which  it 
had  been  induced  to  engage,  or  the  gravity  of 
the  acts  which  it  committed — this  situation  re- 
vealed itself  gradually  by  a  universal  scarcity 
of  money.  The  public,  in  particular,  eager 
after  metallic  specie,  apprised  of  its  rarity  at 
the  Bank,  thronged  to  its  offices  to  convert 
notes  into  cash.  Malevolent  persons  joining 
those  who  were  alarmed,  the  crisis  soon  be- 
came general. 

Circumstances  so  aggravated  produced 
avowals  long  delayed  and  distressing  elucida- 
tions. M.  Vanlerberghe,  to  whom  any  thing 
that  there  was  blamable  in  the  conduct  of  the 
company  could  not  be  imputed,  for  he  was 
solely  occupied  with  the  corn-trade,  without 
knowing  to  what  embarrassments  he  was  ex- 
posed by  his  partners — M.  Vanlerberghe  went 
to  M.  de  Marbois,  and  declared  to  him  that  it 
was  impossible  for  him  to  provide  both  for  the 
service  of  the  Treasury  and  for  the  victualling 
service,  and  that  it  was  quite  as  much  as  he 
could  do  to  continue  the  latter.  He  did  not 
disguise  from  him  that  the  supplies  furnished 
for  Spain,  and  still  unpaid  for,  were  the  prin- 
cipal cause  of  his  straitened  situation.  M.  de 
Marbois,  dreading  lest  the  victualling  service 
should  be  at  a  stand,  encouraged,  moreover, 
by  some  expressions  of  the  Emperor,  who, 
satisfied  with  M.  Vanlerberghe,  had  intimated 
an  intention  of  supporting  him,  granted  to  that 
contractor  an  aid  of  20  millions.  He  placed 
them  to  the  account  of  former  supplies  which 
the  administrations  of  war  and  the  navy  had 
not  yet  paid  for,  and  he  gave  them  by  return- 
ing to  M.  Vanlerberghe  personal  engage- 
ments of  his  to  the  amount  of  20  millions, 
contracted  on  account  of  the  service  of  the 
Treasury.  But  no  sooner  was  this  aid  granted 
than  M.  Vanlerberghe  came  to  apply  for  a 
second.  This  contractor  had  at  his  back  a 
multitude  of  sub-contractors,  who  usually  gave 
him  credit,  but  who,  no  longer  obtaining  the 
confidence  of  the  capitalists,  could  not  make 
any  further  advances.  He  was,  therefore,  re- 
duced to  the  last  extremity.  M.  de  Marbois, 
alarmed  at  these  communications,  soon  re- 
ceived others  still  more  serious.  The  bank 
sent  to  him  a  deputation  to  acquaint  the  go- 
vernment with  its  situation.  The  piastres 
promised  by  M.  Desprez  were  not  forthcoming, 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


and  yet  he  applied  for  further  discounts  ;  the 
Treasury,  on  its  part,  -wanted  discounts,  and 
the  bank  had  not  two  millions  of  crowns  in 
its  coffers  against  an  amount  of  92  millions 
demandable.  What  was  it  to  do  in  such  a 
predicament?  M.  Desprez  declared,  on  his 
part,  that  he  was  at  the  end  of  his  resources, 
especially  if  the  bank  refused  its  assistance. 
He,  too,  confessed  that  it  was  the  counter- 
check given  by  the  affairs  of  Spain  which 
threw  him  into  these  distressing  embarrass- 
ments. It  became  unfortunately  evident  to  the 
minister  that  M.  Vanlerberghe,  supported  on 
M.  Desprez,  M.  Desprez  upon  the  Treasury, 
and  the  bank  bore  the  burden  of  the  affairs 
of  Spain,  which  was  thus  transferred  to  France 
herself  by  the  rash  combinations  of  M.  Ouv- 
rard. 

It  was  too  late  to  recede,  and  quite  useless 
to  complain.  It  was  requisite  for  the  govern- 
ment to  extricate  itself  from  this  peril,  and 
to  that  end  to  extricate  those  who  had  impru- 
dently involved  themselves  in  it ;  for  to  leave 
them  to  perish  would  be  to  run  the  risk  of 
perishing  with  them.  M.  de  Marbois  did  not 
hesitate  in  deciding  to  support  Messieurs  Van- 
lerberghe and  Desprez;  and  he  did  right.  But 
he  could  no  longer  venture  to  act  on  his  sole 
responsibility,  and  a  council  of  government, 
summoned  at  his  instigation,  met  under  the 
presidency  of  Prince  Joseph.  Prince  Louis, 
the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres,  and  all  the 
ministers  attended.  Some  of  the  superior 
employes  in  the  finances  were  sent  for,  and 
among  others  M.  Mollien,  director  of  the 
Sinking  Fund.  The  council  deliberated  long 
on  the  subject.  After  much  general  and  idle 
discussion,  it  was  necessary  to  come  to  a  con- 
clusion, and  each  hesitated,  in  presence  of  a 
responsibility  equally  great,  whatever  course 
should  be  adopted,  for  it  was  as  serious  a 
matter  to  let  the  contractors  sink  as  to  support 
them.  The  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres,  who 
had  sense  enough  to  comprehend  the  exigen- 
cies of  this  situation,  and  influence  enough  to 
induce  the  Emperor  to  admit  them,  led  a 
majority  to  decide  in  favour  of  an  immediate 
aid  to  M.  Vanlerberghe,  to  the  amount  of  ten 
millions  at  first,  and  afterwards  of  ten  more, 
when  an  approving  answer  should  be  received 
from  head-quarters.  As  for  M.  Desprez,  it  was 
a  question  to  be  settled  with  the  bank,  for  that 
alone  could  assist  the  latter,  by  continuing  to 
discount  for  him.  But  the  means  proposed  by 
it  to  parry  the  exhaustion  of  its  coffers  and  to 
keep  up  the  credit  of  its  notes,  without  which 
the  establishment  must  fall,  were  taken  into  con- 
sideration. Nobody  was  of  opinion  that  it  was 
possible  to  give  them  a  forced  cash  currency, 
both  on  account  of  the  impossibility  of  esta- 
blishing a  paper  money  in  France,  and  on  ac- 
count of  the  impossibility  of  prevailing  upon 
the  Emperor  to  consent  to  such  a  resolution. 
But  certain  measures,  designed  to  render  pay- 
ments slower  and  the  drain  of  specie  less 
rapid,  were  adopted.  The  ministry  of  the 
Treasury  and  the  prefect  of  the  police  were 
left  to  arrange  the  detail  of  these  measures 
with  the  bank. 

M.  de  Marbois  had  some  very  warm  discus- 
sions with  the  council  of  the  bank.  He  com- 


plained of  the  manner  in  which  it  had  managed 
its  affairs — a  very  unjust  reproach ;  for  if  it 
had  been  embarrassed,  it  was  solely  through 
the  fault  of  the  Treasury.  Its  portfolio  con- 
tained nothing  but  excellent  commercial  paper, 

'  the  regular  payment  of  which  became  for  the 
moment  its  only  effective  resource.  It  had 

.  even  diminished  its  discounts  to  individuals 

I  so  far  as  to  reduce  its  portfolio  below  the  ordi- 
nary proportions.  It  had  nothing  in  dispro- 

1  portionate  quantity,  but  M.  Desprez's  paper  and 
obligations  of  the  receivers-general,  which  brought 
back  no  money.  It  was  suffering,  therefore, 
for  the  sake  of  the  government  itself.  But 
the  bankers  who  directed  it  were  in  general  so 

'  devoted  ro  the  Emperor,  in  whom  they  loved, 
if  not  the  glorious  warrior,  at  least  the  restorer 

i  of  order,  that  they  allowed  themselves  to  be 
treated  by  the  agents  of  power  with  a  harsh- 
ness which  at  this  day  the  most  vulgar  com- 
panies cf  speculators  would  not  endure.  On 
their  part,  it  is  true,  this  was  the  effect  of 
patriotism  rather  than  of  servility.  To  sup- 

\  port  the  government  of  the  Emperor  was  in 
their  eyes  an  imperative  duty  to  France,  whom 

i  he  alone  preserved  from  anarchy.  They  would 
not  feel  irritated  at  very  undeserved  reproaches, 
and  they  showed  a  devotedness  to  the  cause 

1  of  the  Treasury  worthy  of  serving  for  an  ex- 
ample under  similar  circumstances.  The  fol- 
lowing measures  were  adopted  as  most  capable 
of  alleviating  the  crisis. 

M.  de  Marbois  was  to  send  off  post,  into  the 
departments  nearest  to  the  capital,  clerks  with 
orders  to  the  paymasters  to  give  up  all  the 
funds  which  were  not  indispensably  required 
for  the  seryice  of  the  rentes,  of  the  pay  of  the 
salaries  of  the  functionaries,  and  to  transmit 
these  funds  to  the  bank.  It  was  hoped  that  ia 

|  this   manner  five   or   six  millions  in  specie 

I  would  be  brought  in.  Orders  were  given  to 
the  receivers-general  who  had  not  delivered  to 
M.  Desprez  all  the  sums  in  their  chests,  to  pay 
them  immediately  into  the  bank.  The  clerks 
sent  out  were  likewise  directed  to  ascertain 
whether  some  of  these  accountable  persons 
were  not  employing  the  funds  of  the  Treasury 
for  their  private  interest.  To  these  means  of 
bringing  in  cash  were  added  others  for  pro 
venting  the  drain  of  it.  Notes  beginning  to 
fall  in  value,  the  public  hurried  to  the  bank, 
impatient  to  convert  them  into  money.  Had 
not  stock-jobbers  and  ill-disposed  persons  in 
terfered,  a  loss  of  1  or  2  per  cent.,  which  notes 
were  sustaining,  would  have  been  sufficient  to 
induce  the  mass  of  holders  to  demand  their 
conversion  into  specie.  The  bank  was  author- 
ized not  to  convert  into  money  more  than  five 
or  six  hundred  thousand  francs'  worth  of  notes 
per  day.  This  was  all  the  specie  that  was 
needed  when  confidence  existed.  Another  pre- 
caution was  taken  in  order  to  retard  pay- 
ments: this  was  to  count  the  money.  The 
applicants  for  payment  would  gladly  have 
dispensed  with  this  formality,  for  they  were 
not  afraid  that  the  bank  would  cheat  the  public 
by  putting  a  piece  short  in  a  bag  of  a  thousand 
francs.  The  cashiers,  with  an  affectation  ol 
accuracy,  nevertheless  took  the  trouble  tr 
count  them.  It  was  decided,  moreover,  that 
cash  should  be  given  for  a  single  note  only  to 


60 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


one  and  the  same  person,  and  that  each  should 
be  admitted  in  turn.  At  length,  the  concourse 
increasing  every  day,  a  last  expedient  was  de- 
vised, that  of  distributing  numbers  to  the 
holders  of  notes,  in  the  proportion  of  five  or 
six  hundred  thousand  francs,  which  were  in- 
tended to  be  paid  per  day.  These  numbers, 
deposited  at  the  mairies  of  Paris,  were  to  be 
distributed  by  the  maires  among  persons  no- 
toriously unconnected  with  the  commerce  in 
money,  and  having  recourse  to  the  payment 
of  their  notes  merely  for  the  purpose  of  satis- 
fying real  wants. 

These  measures  put  an  end  at  least  to  the 
material  disturbance  about  the  offices  of  the 
bank,  and  reduced  the  issue  of  specie  to  the 
most  urgent  wants  of  the  population.  Jobbers, 
who  sought  to  extract  specie  from  the  bank, 
to  make  the  public  pay  6  or  7  per  cent,  for  it, 
were  thwarted  in  their  manoeuvres.  It  was 
nevertheless  a  real  suspension  of  payment, 
under  the  guise  of  a  more  cautious  system.  It 
was  unfortunately  inevitable.  Under  these 
circumstances,  it  is  not  the  measure  itself 
which  is  to  be  blamed,  but  the  anterior  con- 
duct which  rendered  it  necessary. 

The  clerks  sent  out  procured  the  remittance 
of  two  millions  at  most.  The  daily  expiry  of 
commercial  effects  brought  more  notes  than 
crowns,  for  traders  paid  in  specie  only  when 
they  had  sums  of  less  than  500  francs  to  pay. 
The  bank  resolved  therefore  to  buy  piastres  at 
any  price  in  Holland,  and  thus  take  to  its  own 
account  part  of  the  costs  of  the  crisis.  Thanks 
to  these  conjoint  means,  the  embarrassment 
would  soon  have  been  surmounted,  had  not 
M.  Desprez  suddenly  come  to  plead  still  greater 
necessities,  and  to  solicit  further  aid. 

This  banker,  charged  by  the  company  to 
furnish  the  Treasury  with  the  funds  necessary 
for  the  service,  and  for  this  purpose  to  discount 
the  obligations  of  the  receivers-general,  the  bills  at 
sight,  &c.,  had  engaged  to  do  this  discount  at  a 
half  per  cent,  per  month,  that  is  to  say,  at  6 
per  cent,  per  annum.  The  capitalists  having 
refused  to  discount  them  for  him  at  less  than 
1  per  cent,  per  month,  that  is  at  12  per  cent, 
per  annum,  he  was  exposed  to  ruinous  losses. 
He  had  devised  a  scheme  for  sparing  himself 
these  losses,  which  was  to  pledge  the  obliga- 
tions and  the  bills  at  sight  to  lenders,  and  to 
borrow  on  these  securities  instead  of  getting 
them  sub-discounted.  The  speculators,  de- 
sirous to  make  an  advantage  of  the  circum- 
stance, had  at  last  refused  to  renew  this  species 
of  operations,  in  order  to  oblige  him  to  give 
up  the  securities  of  the  Treasury,  and  thus  to 
obtain  them  at  a  low  price.  "  The  embarrass- 
ments of  the  place,"  wrote  M.  de  Marbois  to 
the  Emperor,  "  afford  many  people  a  pretext 
for  employing  them  like  corsairs  towards  the 
United  Merchants,  and  I  know  great  patriots  who 
have  withdrawn  12  or  14  hundred  thousand 
francs  from  the  agent  of  the  Treasury,  in  order 
to  make  a  better  bargain."  (Letter  of  the  28th 
of  September — Depot  of  the  Secretary  of 
State's  office.) 

M.  Desprez,  who  had  already  received  an  aid 
of  14  millions  from  the  bank,  wished  to  obtain 
30  immediately,  and  70  in  the  month  of  Bru- 
maire:  consequently,  he  wanted  a  sum  of  100 


millions.  This  situation,  avowed  at  the  bank 
caused  an  absolute  consternation  there,  and 
produced  an  explosion  of  complaints  on  the 
part  of  men  who  were  not  disposed  to  espouse 
the  fortune  of  the  government,  be  it  what  it 
might.  They  asked  what  M.  Desprez  was,  and 
by  what  title  such  great  sacrifices  were  claimed 
for  him.  The  commercial  world  was  ignoram 
of  the  partnership  subsisting  between  him  ann 
the  company  of  contractors,  which  was  la 
bouring  at  once  for  Spain  and  for  France.  Bur 
the  directors  of  the  bank,  though  ignorant  o, 
his  real  situation,  proposed  to  oblige  the  minis 
ter  to  avow  him  as  tha  agent  of  the  Treasury 
were  it  only  to  have  one  security  the  more 
The  minister,  apprized  of  their  intention,  hac 
sent  a  note  in  hi?  O-^R  handwriting  to  the  pre- 
sident of  the  regency  to  say  that  M.  Despre- 
was  acting  oiJy  on  benalf  of  the  Treasury 
From  an  over.ight,  M.  de  Marbois  had  neglected 
to  sign  this  rclt.  He  wa.',  required  to  sign  it 
He  complieJ  and  it  was  impossible  to  denj 
that  they  v<r;  in  presence  of  the  Emperoi 
himself,  the  creator  of  the  oanV,  the  saviou. 
and  master  j,C  France,  b^f  gir.g  th?m  not  to  re 
duce  his  gov  :rnment  to  txtreraity  by  refusing 
the  resources  which  i.  had  urgent  need  of. 

The  voice  of  patriotism  prevailed,  and  this 
result  was  chiefly  'iwing  to  M.  Per/egaux,  thr 
celebrated  banker  whose  influence  v/as  alwayv 
exerted  for  the  bfnefit  of  the  State.  It  was  de 
cided  that  all  necessary  aid  should  be  affordeo 
to  M.  Dusprez;  that  the  obligations  whicK 
served  for  borrow  ing  upon  pledge,  and  which 
he  had  avoided  discounting  to  spare  himseH 
too  great  lo&sej,  should  be  discounted,  no  ma< 
ter  at  what  rate,  whether  they  belonged  to  M 
Desprez  or  to  the  bank;  that  he  should  tak«.- 
upon  himself  this  operation,  as  more  capabk. 
than  any  other  to  execute  it ;  that  the  losses 
should  be  borne,  half  by  the  company  and  half 
by  the  bank;  that  metals  should  be  bought  at 
Amsterdam  and  Hamburg,  at  joint  cost;  and 
that  M.  Desprez  should  be  requested  not  to  ve 
new  his  engagements,  in  order  to  put  an  end 
to  such  a  situation.  It  was  lastly  resolved  to 
diminish  the  discounts  to  commerce,  to  devote 
all  the  existing  resources  to  the  Treasury,  and 
to  issue  no  notes  but  for  it.  The  daily  pay- 
ment of  commercial  paper  had  brought  back  a 
considerable  quantity  of  notes,  which  it  was  at 
first  proposed  to  destroy,  but  M  hich  were  soon 
put  into  circulation  again,  to  satisfy  the  wants 
of  M.  Desprez.  The  first  issue  was  even  far 
surpassed,  and  it  was  raised  to  80  millions,  be- 
sides the  20  millions  of  current  accounts.  But 
the  extraordinary  purchases  of  piastres,  and 
the  effective  discount  of  the  obligations,  procured 
the  five  or  six  hundred  thousand  francs  per 
day,  which  were  indispensable  for  satisfying 
the  public;  and  there  appeared  a  flattering 
prospect  of  getting  over  this  crisis  without 
compromising  the  services,  and  without  bring- 
ing bankruptcy  upon  the  contractors,  which 
would  have  led  to  that  of  the  Treasury  itself. 

There  was,  however,  no  preventing  indivi- 
dual bankruptcies,  which,  following  one  an- 
other in  rapid  succession,  added  greatly  to  the 
national  dejection.  The  failure  of  M.  Reca- 
mier,  a  banker  renowned  for  his  integrity,  his 
extensive  business,  and  the  high  style  in  which 


Oct  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


fil 


he  lived,  and  who  fell  a  victim  to  circumstan- 
ces, much  more  than  to  his  financial  conduct, 
produced  the  most  painful  sensation.  Malevo- 
lent persons  attributed  it  to  business  transac- 
tions with  the  Treasury,  which  had  no  exist- 
ence. Many  failures  of  less  importance  fol- 
lowed that  of  M.  Recamier,  both  in  Paris  and 
in  the  provinces,  and  produced  a  sort  of  panic 
terror.  Under  a  government  less  firm  and  less 
powerful  than  that  of  Napoleon,  this  crisis 
might  have  been  attended  with  the  most  seri- 
ous consequences.  But  people  relied  upon  his 
fortune  and  upon  his  genius ;  nobody  felt  any 
uneasiness  about  the  maintenance  of  public 
order;  they  looked  every  moment  for  some 
grand  stroke  which  should  raise  sinking  cre- 
dit ;  and  that  detestable  species  of  speculators 
who  aggravate  all  situations  by  founding  their 
calculations  on  the  depreciation  of  assets, 
durst  not  venture  upon  the  game  of  lowering, 
for  fear  of  the  victories  of  Napoleon. 

AH  eyes  were  fixed  upon  the  Danube,  where 
the  destinies  of  Europe  were  about  to  be  de- 
cided. Thence  were  to  proceed  the  events 
that  could  put  an  end  to  that  financial  and  po- 
litical crisis.  People  hoped  for  them  with  full 
confidence,  especially  after  seeing  in  a  few 
days  a  whole  army  taken,  almost  without  strik- 
ing a  blow,  by  the  sole  effect  of  a  manoeuvre. 
One  circumstance  of  this  very  manoeuvre, 
however,  had  just  produced  an  unfortunate 
complication  with  Prussia,  and  given  us  rea- 
son to  fear  an  additional  foe.  This  circum- 
stance was  the  march  of  Marshal  Bernadotte's 
corps  through  the  Prussian  province  of  Ans- 
pach. 

Napoleon,  in  directing  the  movement  of  his 
columns  upon  the  flank  of  the  Austrian  army, 
had  not  considered  for  a  moment  that  any  ob- 
jection would  be  made  to  passing  through  the 
provinces  which  Prussia  possessed  in  Franco- 
nia.  In  fact,  according  to  the  convention  of 
neutrality  stipulated  by  Prussia  with  the  belli- 
gerent powers,  during  the  last  war,  the  pro- 
vinces of  Anspach  and  Bayreuth  had  not  been 
comprehended  in  the  neutrality  of  the  north  of 
Germany.  The  reason  was  simple,  namely, 
that  these  provinces,  lying  in  the  obligatory 
route  of  the  French  and  Austrian  armies,  it  was 
almost  impossible  to  withdraw  them  from  their 
passage.  All  that  could  be  required  was  that 
they  should  not  become  a  theatre  of  hostilities, 
that  they  should  be  traversed  rapidly,  and  that 
both  parties  should  pay  for  what  they  took 
there.  If  Prussia  had  desired  that  a  different 
system  should  be  adopted  on  this  occasion,  she 
ought  to  have  said  so.  Besides,  when  quite 
recently,  she  had  entered  into  negotiations  of 
alliance  with  France,  when  she  had  proceeded 
in  this  track  so  far  as  to  listen  to  and  assent  to 
the  offer  of  Hanover,  she  scarcely  had  a  right 
to  change  the  old  rules  of  her  neutrality,  in  or- 
der to  render  them  more  stringent  for  France 
than  in  1796.  This  would  have  been  incon- 
ceivable :  on  this  point,  therefore,  she  had  kept 
a  silence,  which,  decently,  she  would  not  have 
ventured  to  break,  especially  to  declare  that,  in 
full  negotiation  of  an  alliance,  she  was  deter- 
mined to  be  less  condescending  to  us  than  in 
times  of  extreme  coldness.  Be  this  as  it  may, 
Napoleon,  grounding  himself  on  the  old  conven- 


'  tion  and  on  an  appearance  of  friendship  which 
he  could  not  but  believe,  had  not  considered  the 
passage  through  the  province  of  Anspach  as  a 
violation  of  territory.  What  proves  his  sin- 
cerity in  regard  to  this  point  is  that  strictly  he 
might  have  made  shift  without  borrowing  the 
roads  of  that  province;  and  that,  by  keeping 
his  columns  closer  to  one  another,  it  would 
have  been  very  easy  for  him  to  avoid  the  Prus- 
sian territory,  without  losing  many  chances  of 
enveloping  General  Mack. 

But  the  situation  of  Prussia  was  daily  be- 
coming more  embarrassing,  between  the  Em- 
peror Napoleon  and  the  Emperor  Alexander. 
The  first  offered  him  Hanover  and  his  alli- 
ance ;  the  second  solicited  of  him  a  passage 
through  Silesia  for  one  of  his  armies,  and 
seemed  to  declare  to  him  that  he  must  join  in 
the  coalition,  either  willingly  or  by  force.  As 
soon  as  he  comprehended  the  true  state  of  the 
case,  Frederick  William  was  seized  with  an 
extraordinary  agitation.  That  prince,  some- 

I  times  swayed  by  the  avidity  natural  to  the 
Prussian  power,  which  impelled  him  towards 
Napoleon,  sometimes  by  court  influences, 
which  drew  him  towards  the  coalition,  had 
made  promises  to  everybody,  and  had  thus 
involved  himself  in  an  embarrassing  position 
from  which  he  saw  no  outlet  but  war  with 
Russia  or  with  France.  He  was  exasperated 
in  the  highest  degree  at  this,  for  he  was  dissa- 
tisfied both  with  others  and  with  himself,  and 
he  could  not  contemplate  war  without  appre- 
hension. Indignant,  however,  at  the  violence 
with  which  Russia  threatened  him,  he  had  or- 
dered 80,000  men  to  be  placed  on  the  war 
footing.  In  this  state  of  things,  news  of  the 
alleged  violation  of  the  Prussian  territory 
reached  Berlin.  This  was  a  new  subject  of 
vexation  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  because  it 
diminished  the  force  of  the  arguments  which 
he  was  opposing  to  the  urgent  representations 
of  Alexander.  It  is  true  that  there  were  rea- 
sons for  opening  the  province  of  Anspach  to 
the  French,  which  did  not  exist  for  opening 
Silesia  to  the  Russians.  But  in  moments  of 
effervescence,  it  is  not  justice  of  argument 
that  prevails;  and,  on  learning  at  Berlin  the 
passage  of  the  French  through  the  territory 
of  Anspach,  the  court  cried  oufthat  Napoleon 
had  offered  an  unworthy  insult  to  Prussia  in 
treating  her  as  he  was  accustomed  to  treat 
Naples  or  Baden  ;  that  she  could  not  possibly 
submit  to  it  without  dishonouring  herself; 
that,  for  the  rest,  if  they  were  not  to  have 
war  with  Napoleon,  they  should  be  obliged  to 
have  it  with  Alexander,  for  that  prince  would 
not  suffer  them  to  act  in  so  partial  a  manner 
towards  him,  to  refuse  him  what  had  been 
granted  to  his  adversary  :  and,  finally,  that,  if 
they  were  forced  to  choose,  it  would  be  ex- 
tremely strange,  most  unworthy  of  the  senti- 
ments of  the  king,  to  espouse  the  cause  of 
the  oppressors  of  Europe  against  its  defenders. 
Frederick  William,  it  was  added,  had  always 
professed  other  sentiments  at  Memel  in  his 
confidential  intercourse  with  his  youns  friend 
Alexander.  Such  was  the  way  in  which  peo- 
ple talked  openly  at  Berlin,  and  particularly 
in  the  royal  family,  swayed  by  a  queen,  affec- 
tionate, beautiful,  and  stirring. 


G2 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Oct.  1805. 


Frederick  William,  though  sincerely  irritated 
at  the  violation  of  the  territory  of  Anspach, 
•which  deprived  him  of  his  best  argument 
against  the  urgent  solicitations  of  Russia,  be- 
haved as  men  false  through  weakness  are  ac- 
customed to  do :  he  made  a  resource  of  his 
anger,  and  pretended  to  be  more  irritated  than 
he  was.  His  conduct  towards  the  two  repre- 
sentatives of  France  was  ridiculously  af- 
fected. Not  only  did  he  refuse  to  receive  them, 
but  M.  de  Hardenberg  would  not  admit  them 
into  his  cabinet  to  hear  their  explanations. 
Messieurs  de  Laforest  and  Duroc  were  laid 
under  a  sort  of  interdict,  and  cut  off  from  all 
communication  even  with  the  private  secre- 
tary, M.  Lombard,  through  whom  passed  the 
confidential  communications  when  the  ques- 
tion either  of  German  indemnities  or  of  Han- 
over was  under  discussion.  The  secret  inter- 
mediate agents  usually  employed  declared 
that,  in  the  state  of  the  king's  mind  in  regard 
to  the  French,  they  durst  not  see  any  of  them. 
All  this  anger  was  evidently  assumed.  The 
intention  was  to  draw  from  it  a  solution  of  the 
embarrassments  in  which  Prussia  had  in- 
volved herself;  to  be  able  to  tell  France  that 
the  engagements  made  with  her  were  broken 
through  her  own  fault.  These  engagements, 
renewed  so  often  and  substituted  for  various 
plans  of  alliance  which  had  failed,  consisted 
in  promising  formally  that  the  Prussian  terri- 
tory should  never  subserve  any  aggression 
against  France,  that  Hanover  itself  should  be 
secured  against  all  invasion.  The  French 
having  forcibly  passed  through  the  Prussian 
territory,  it  was  proposed  thence  to  conclude 
that  they  had  given  Prussia  a  right  to  open  it 
to  whomsoever  she  pleased.  Here  was  an 
outlet  miraculously  discovered  to  escape  from 
the  difficulties  of  all  kinds  accumulated 
around  her.  In  consequence,  it  was  resolved 
to  declare  that  Prussia  was,  by  the  violation 
of  her  territory,  released  from  every  engage- 
ment, and  that  she  granted  a  passage  to  the 
Russians  through  Silesia,  in  compensation  of 
the  passage  taken  through  Anspach  by  the 
French.  The  intention  was  to  do  much  bet- 
ter than  to  get  out  of  a  great  embarrassment; 
it  was  hoped  to  obtain  a  profit  from  all  this. 
It  was  decided  to  seize  Hanover,  where  no 
more  than  6000  French  were  left  shut  up  in 
the  fortress  of  Hameln,  and  to  colour  that,  in- 
vasion by  a  spurious  pretext,  that  of  provid- 
ing against  fresh  violations  of  territory,  for  an 
Anglo-Russian  army  was  marching  for  Han- 
over, and  by  occupying  it  Prussia  prevented 
the  theatre  of  hostilities  from  being  transferred 
to  her  provinces,  by  which  Hanover  was  en- 
closed on  all  sides. 

The  king  summoned  an  extraordinary  coun- 
cil, to  which  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and 
Marshal  Mollendorf  were  called.  M.  de  Haug- 
witz,  drawn  from  his  retirement  for  these 
momentous  circumstances,  attended  it  also. 
There  the  resolutions  which  we  have  just  re- 
capitulated were  agreed  upon,  but  they  were 
left  for  a  few  days  enveloped  in  a  sort  of  cloud, 
to  terrify  still  more  the  two  representatives  of 
France.  Though  neither  they  nor  their  mas- 
ter were  thought  to  be  easily  frightened,  it 
was  imagined  that,  at  a  moment  when  Napo- 


leon had  so  many  enemies  on  his  hands,  the 
fear  of  adding  Prussia  to  them,  which  would 
have  rendered  the  coalition  universal,  as  in 
1792,  would  act  powerfully  upon  their  minds. 

Messieurs  de  Laforest  and  Duroc  had  long 
applied  in  vain  for  an  interview  with  M 
de  Hardenberg.  At  length  they  saw  hire 
found  in  him  the  studied  attitude  of  a  man 
who  is  making  an  effort  to  repress  his  indig- 
nation, and  obtained  from  him,  amidst  manj 
bitter  complaints,  nothing  but  the  declaration, 
that  the  engagements  of  Prussia  were  broken, 
and  that  she  should  thenceforth  be  guided 
solely  by  the  interest  of  her  own  safety.  The 
cabinet  suffered  the  resolution  of  opening  Si- 
lesia to  the  Russians,  and  of  occupying  Hano- 
ver with  a  Russian  army,  upon  pretext  of 
preventing  the  flames  of  war  from  spreading 
to  the  very  heart  of  the  kingdom,  to  reach  by 
degrees  the  ears  of  the  two  French  negotiators. 
It  seemed  to  intimate  that  France  ought  to 
deem  herself  fortunate  to  get  off  so  easily. 

All  this  was  very  unworthy  of  the  upright- 
ness of  the  king  and  the  power  of  Prussia. 
However,  after  this  first  explosion,  forms  began 
to  improve,  not  only  because  it  was  part  of  the 
Prussian  plan  to  soften  down,  but  also  because 
the  astonishing  successes  of  Napoleon  had 
suggested  serious  reflections  to  all  courts. 

What  was  passing  in  Berlin  had  been  car- 
ried to  Pulawi  with  the  speed  of  lightening. 
Alexander,  who  had  desired  to  see  Frederick 
William  before  France  had  given  Prussia 
causes  of  complaint,  could  not  but  be  still  more 
desirous  to  do  so  afterwards.  He  hoped  to  find 
that  prince  disposed  to  receive  all  kinds  of  in- 
fluences. Instead,  therefore,  of  fixing  upon 
such  a  place  of  meeting  that  the  distance  to 
be  travelled  should  be  equally  divided,  Alexan- 
der performed  the  entire  journey  himself,  and 
proceeded  immediately  to  Berlin. 

Frederick  William,  on  hearing  of  the  arrival 
of  the  tzar,  was  sorry  that  he  had  made  so 
much  fuss,  and  thus  drawn  upon  himself  a  flat- 
tering but  compromising  visit.  Napoleon  com- 
menced the  war  in  a  manner  so  rapid  and  de- 
cisive as  to  hold  out  little  encouragement  to  a 
connection  with  his  enemies.  However,  it 
was  not  possible  to  refuse  the  attentions  of  a 
prince  for  whom  one  professed  such  a  warm 
affection.  The  necessary  orders  were,  there- 
fore, given  for  receiving  him  with  all  befitting 
ceremony.  On  the  25th  of  October,  Alexan- 
der made  his  entry  into  the  Prussian  capital, 
amidst  the  thunder  of  the  cannon,  and  between 
Hies  of  the  royal  Prussian  guard.  The  young 
King  hastening  to  meet  him,  embraced  him 
ordially  amidst  the  applause  of  the  people, 
who,  having  at  first  been  favourable  to  the 
French,  began  to  allow  themselves  to  be  hur- 
ried away  by  the  impulsion  of  the  court,  and 

the  assertion,  a  thousand  times  repeated, 
that  Napoleon  had  violated  the  territory  of 
Anspach  out  of  contempt  for  Prussia.  Alex- 
ander had  promised  himself  to  employ  on  this 
occasion  all  the  means  of  seduction  that  he 
Dossessed  to  bring  the  court  of  Berlin  into  his 
nterests.  He  did  not  fail  to  do  so,  and  began 
with  the  beautiful  queen  of  Prussia,  who  was 
easy  to  gain,  for,  sprung  from  the  house  of  ' 
VIecklenburg,  she  snared  all  the  passions  of 


Oct.  1805.] 


CONSU1  ATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


63 


the  German  nobility  against  the  French  Re- 
volution. Alexander  paid  her  a  sort  of  chival- 
rous worship,  which  might  be  taken  at  plea- 
sure for  a  mere  homage  rendered  to  her  merit, 
or  for  a  much  warmer  sentiment.  Though  at 
that  time  very  attentive  to  a  distinguished  lady 
of  the  Russian  nobility,  Alexander  was  a  man 
and  a  prince  to  feign  on  a  seasonable  occasion 
a  sentiment  useful  to  his  views.  There  was 
nothing,  however,  in  these  demonstrations  that 
was  capable  of  offending  either  decorum  or 
the  jealous  susceptibility  of  Frederick  Wil- 
liam. He  had  not  been  two  days  in  Berlin  be- 
fore the  whole  court  was  full  of  him,  and  ex- 
tolled his  gracefulness,  his  intelligence,  his 
generous  ardour  for  the  cause  of  Europe.  He 
had  paid  particular  attentions  to  all  the  rela- 
tions of  the  great  Frederick :  he  had  visited 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  Marshal  Mullen- 
dorf,  and  honoured  in  them  the  chiefs  of  the 
Prussian  army.  The  young  prince,  Louis,1 
who  was  remarkable  for  his  violent  hatred  of 
the  French  and  an  ardent  passion  for  glory — 
Prince  Louis,  gained  over  beforehand  to  the 
cause  of  Russia,  manifested  more  vehemence 
than  usual.  A  sort  of  general  fascination  gave 
up  the  court  of  Prussia  to  Alexander.  Fred- 
erick William  perceived  the  effect  produced 
around  him,  and  began  to  be  alarmed  at  it. 
He  waited  with  painful  anxiety  for  the  propo- 
sals that  were  to  spring  from  all  this  enthu- 
siasm, and  he  kept  silence  for  fear  of  hasten- 
ing the  moment  of  the  explanations.  We  have 
already  said  that,  in  his  extreme  embarrass- 
ment, he  had  summoned  to  him  his  old  coun- 
sellor de  Haugwitz,  whose  mind,  too  acute  for 
his  own,  sometimes  annoyed  him  by  his  very 
superiority,  but  whose  shrewd,  evasive  policy, 
always  inclined  to  a  neutrality,  perfectly 
suited  him.  They  both  deplored  the  fatal  con- 
catenation of  things,  which,  under  the  im- 
passioned and  unequal  direction  of  M.  de  Har- 
denberg,  had  brought  Prussia  to  a  point  from 
which  there  was  absolutely  no  outlet.  M.  de 
Hardenberg,  at  first  the  friend  and  creature  of 
M.  de  Haugwitz,  soon  the  jealous  rival  of  that 
statesman,  had  begun  by  following  his  policy, 
which  consisted  in  keeping  himself  neuter  be- 
tween the  two  European  parties,  and  in  making 
the  most  of  that  neutrality;  but  he  had  done 
so  with  his  impassioned  character,  sometimes 
overturning  on  one  side,  sometimes  on  the 
other,  favourable  to  the  French  when  the  ques- 
tion concerned  Hanover,  to  such  a  degree  as 
to  be  disposed  to  give  himself  wholly  up  to 
them,  and,  since  the  affair  of  Anspach,  so  hur- 
ried away  by  the  general  movement,  that  he 
was  ready  to  go  halves  with  Russia  making 
war  upon  them.  M.  de  Haugwitz,  censuring, 
but  with  delicacy,  an  ungrateful  disciple, 
said  that  Prussia  had  been  too  French  a  few 
months  before  and  that  now  she  was  too  Rus- 
sian. But  how  was  she  to  extricate  herself 
from  the  dilemma  7  how  escape  from  the  grasp 
of  the  young  Emperor  1  The  difficulty  in- 
creased hourly,  and  it  was  not  to  be  resolved 


1  PRINCE  f.oois  OF  PRUSSIA,  brother  of  Frederick  Wil- 
liam II.  of  Prussia,  and  a  resolute  supporter  of  his  realm 
against  Napoleon.  He  was  one  of  the  most  gallant  princes 
of  the  day ;  enthusiastic,  high-spirited,  and  noble-minded, 


by  incessantly  eluding  it.  Time  was  precious 
for  Alexander,  for  every  day  that  elapsed 
brought  tidings  of  a  new  success  of  Napoleon's 
on  the  Danube,  and  a  new  peril  for  Austria,  as 
well  as  for  the  Russian  armies,  which  had 
reached  the  Inn.  He  therefore  addressed  him- 
self to  the  King  of  Prussia,  and  induced  his 
minister  for  foreign  affairs,  the  able  and  astute 
Count  de  Haugwitz,  to  address  him  also.  The 
theme  which  both  of  them  developed  may 
easily  be  inferred  from  what  precedes.  Prus- 
sia, said  they,  could  not  separate  herself  from 
the  cause  of  Europe;  she  could  not  contribute 
by  her  inaction  to  render  the  common  enemy 
triumphant;  she  had  some  respect  paid  her 
by  him  for  the  moment,  and  not  a  great  deal, 
to  judge  from  what  had  recently  happened  at 
Anspach,  but  she  would  soon  be  crushed  when, 
delivered  from  Austria  and  Russia,  he  should 
have  nobody  else  to  settle  with.  Prussia,  it  is 
true,  was  a  much  nearer  object  for  the  attacks 
of  Napoleon;  but  then  an  army  of  80,000  men 
was  marching  to  her  assistance,  and  it  had  ap- 
proached so  near  to  her  solely  for  that  purpose. 
This  army,  assembled  at  Pulawi,  on  the  fron- 
tier of  Silesia,  was  not  a  threat  but  a  generous 
attention  on  the  part  of  Alexander,  who  had  not 
desired  to  urge  his  friend  into  a  serious  war 
without  offering  him  the  means  of  defying  its 
perils.  Besides,  Napoleon  had  many  enemies 
on  his  hands ;  he  would  be  in  great  danger  on 
the  Danube,  if,  while  the  united  Austrians  and 
Russians  should  oppose  a  solid  barrier  to 
him,  Prussia  were  to  throw  herself  upon  his 
rear  by  Franconia ;  he  would  then  find  him- 
self between  two  fires,  and  be  infallibly  over- 
come. In  this  very  probable  case,  the  com- 
mon deliverance  would  be  due  to  Prussia,  and 
then  there  should  be  done  for  her  all  that  Napo- 
leon promised,  all  that  he  meant  not  to  perform  ; 
then  there  should  be  given  to  her  that  comple- 
ment of  territory  with  which  he  had  flattered 
the  just  ambition  of  the  house  of  Brandenburg 
— Hanover.  (Letters  had  actually  been  des- 
patched to  London  to  decide  England  to  thi> 
sacrifice.)  And  it  would  be  much  better  to 
receive  so  valuable  a  gift  from  the  legitimate 
owner,  as  the  price  of  the  salvation  of  all,  thav. 
from  a  usurper  giving  away  the  property  of 
another  as  a  reward  for  treachery. 

To  these  representations  was  added  a  new 
influence;  this  was  the  presence  of  the  Arch- 
duke Anthony,  who  had  travelled  in  the  utmost 
haste  from  Vienna  to  Berlin.  That  prince 
came  to  report  the  disasters  of  Ulin,  the  rapid 
progress  of  the  French,  the  perils  of  the  Aus- 
trian monarchy,  too  great  not  to  be  common 
to  all  Germany,  and  he  earnestly  solicited  the 
reconciliation  at  any  price  of  the  two  principal 
German  powers. 

This  diplomatic  machination  was  too  well 
planned  for  the  unfortunate  King  of  Prussia  to 
esca-pe  from  it.  Nevertheless,  he  and  M.  de 
Haugwitz  made  an  obstinate  resistance,  as  if 
they  had  had  a  presentiment  of  the  disasters 
that  were  soon  to  befall  the  Prussian  mo- 


Ihough  he  somewhat  sullied  these  high  characteristics  by 
debauchery  and  dissipation.  He  died  fighting  gallantly 
at  Jena,  in  defence  of  his  native  kingdom,  on  the  lOtu  ol 
October,  1806.— million's  Europe.  B 


64 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


narchy.  There  were  many  interviews,  many 
controversies,  many  bitter  complaints.  The 
king  and  his  minister  declared  that  the  two 
emperors  were  bent  on  the  ruin  of  Prussia, 
that  they  would  ruin  her  to  a  certainty,  for 
all  Europe,  were  it  united,  would  be  incapable 
of  withstanding  Napoleon  ;  that,  if  they  did 
yield,  it  was  because  violence  was  done  to 
their  reason,  their  prudence,  their  patriotism, 
and  they  should  not  fail  to  recriminate  against 
the  plan  which  had  been  laid  to  hurry  them 
away,  either  with  their  good  will  or  by  force,  a 
plan  of  which  the  Russian  army  collected  on 
the  frontier  of  Silesia  was  to  be  the  instru- 
ment. To  this  the  Emperor  Alexander  replied, 
by  giving  up  his  minister  Prince  Czartoryski. 
Swayed  by  his  natural  inconstancy,  he  began 
already  to  listen  much  to  the  Dolgoroulds, 
who  went  about  asserting  everywhere  that 
Prince  Czartoryski  was  a  perfidious  minister, 
betraying  his  Emperor  for  the  sake  of  Poland, 
of  which  he  intended  to  make  himself  king, 
and  striving,  with  this  object,  to  set  Russia 
upon  Prussia.  Alexander,  who  had  not  suffi- 
cient firmness  for  the  plan  that  had  been  pro- 
posed to  him,  was  alarmed,  even  at  Pulawi,  at 
the  idea  of  marching  against  France,  by  pass- 
ing over  the  body  of  Prussia,  were  even  the 
crown  of  Poland  to  be  the  reward  of  that  te- 
merity. Enlightened  by  M.  de  Alopeus,  ex- 
cited by  the  Dolgoroukis,  he  said  that  an  at- 
tempt had  been  made  to  lead  him  to  commit  a 
great  fault,  and  he  even  keenly  reproached 
Prince  Czartoryski,  whose  grave  and  austere 
character  began  to  be  annoying  to  him,  be- 
cause, with  the  freedom  of  a  friend  and  an 
independent  minister,  he  sometimes  blamed 
his  sovereign  for  his  foibles  and  his  fickleness. 

By  dint  of  application,  of  disavowals,  and 
above  all  of  accessory  influences,  such  as  the 
solicitations  of  the  queen,  the  language  of 
Prince  Louis,  the  cries  of  the  young  Prussian 
staff,  the  king  was  at  length  appeased,  M.  de 
Haugwitz  overcome,  and  both  led  to  enter  into 
the  views  of  the  coalition.  But,  swayed  as 
Frederick  William  was,  he  determined  to  re- 
serve for  himself  a  last  resource  for  escaping 
from  these  new  engagements ;  and,  by  the  ad- 
vice of  M.  de  Haugwiiz,  he  adopted  a  plan 
which  could  still  hold  forth  some  illusion  to 
his  vanquished  integrity,  and  which  consisted 
in  a  project  of  mediation,  a  grand  hypocrisy 
employed  at  that  time  by  all  the  powers  to  dis- 
guise the  plan  of  coalition  against  France.  It 
was  the  form  which  Prussia  had  thought  of 
employing  three  months  before,  when  the  ques- 
tion of  allying  herself  with  France  at  the  price 
of  Hanover  was  under  discussion;  it  was  the 
form  which  she  employed  now  when  discuss- 
ing the  question  of  allying  herself  with  Alex- 
ander; and,  unluckily  for  her  honour,  again  at 
the  price  of  Hanover. 

It  was  agreed  that  Prussia,  alleging  the  im- 
possibility of  living  at  peace  between  impla- 
cable adversaries,  who  did  not  even  respect 
her  territory,  should  decide  to  intervene  for 
the  purpose  of  forcing  them  to  peace.  So  far, 
so  good;  but  what  were  to  be  the  conditions 
of  this  peace  1  Therein  lay  the  whole  ques- 
tion. If  Prussia  conformed  to  the  treaties 
signed  with  Napoleon,  and  by  which  she  had 


guarantied  the  present  state  of  the  French  em- 
pire, in  exchange  for  what  she  had  received  in 
Germany,  there  was  nothing  to  be  said.  But 
she  was  not  firm  enough  to  stop  at  this  limit, 
which  was  that  of  honour.  She  agreed  to  pro- 
pose as  conditions  of  peace  anew  demarcation 
of  the  Austrian  possessions  in  Lombardy, 
which  would  extend  the  latter  from  the  Adige 
to  the  Mincio,  (which  must  lead  to  a  dismem- 
berment of  the  kingdom  of  Italy,)  an  indemnity 
for  the  King  of  Sardinia,  and,  besides  these, 
the  conditions  usually  admitted  by  Napoleon 
himself,  in  case  of  a  general  pacification,  that 
is  to  say  the  independence  of  Naples,  of  Swit- 
zerland, of  Holland.  This  was  a  formal  viola- 
tion of  the  reciprocal  guarantees  which  Prussia 
had  stipulated  with  France,  not  in  plans  of  al- 
liance which  had  miscarried,  but  in  authentic 
conventions  signed  on  occasion  of  the  German 
indemnities. 

The  Russians  and  the  Austrians  would  have 
desired  more,  but,  as  they  knew  that  Napoleon 
would  never  consent  to  these  conditions,  they 
were  certain,  even  with  what  they  had  obtained, 
to  drag  Prussia  into  the  war. 

There  was  another  difficulty,  which  also 
they  passed  over,  in  order  to  remove  all  ob- 
stacles. Frederick  William  would  not  pre- 
sent himself  to  Napoleon  in  the  name  of  all 
his  enemies,  especially  England,  after  so  much 
confidential  communication  with  him  against 
that  power.  He  expressed,  therefore,  a  desire 
to  say  not  a  single  word  relative  to  Great  Bri- 
tain in  the  declaration  of  mediation,  intending, 
he  said,  to  interfere  only  in  regard  to  the  peace 
of  the  continent.  This  again  was  assented  to, 
as  it  was  still  thought  that  there  was  sufficient 
in  what  had  been  agreed  upon  to  plunge  him 
into  the  war.  Further,  he  required  a  last  pre- 
caution, the  most  captious  and  the  most  im- 
portant of  all,  the  postponement  for  a  month 
of  the  term  at  which  Prussia  should  be  obliged 
to  act  On  the  other  hand,  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick, always  consulted,  always  heard  without 
appeal,  when  the  matter  in  hand  related  to 
military  affairs,  declared  that  the  Prussian 
army  would  not  be  ready  till  the  first  days  in 
December,  and  on  the  other  M.  de  Haugwitz 
recommended  delay,  to  see  how  things  went 
on  the  Danube  between  the  French  and  the 
Russians.  With  a  captain  such  as  Napoleon, 
events  could  not  lag,  and,  in  gaining  a  month 
only,  there  was  a  chance  of  being  extricated 
from  embarrassment  by  some  unforeseen  and 
decisive  solution.  It  was  settled,  therefore, 
that,  at  the  expiration  of  a  month,  reckon- 
ing from  the  day  on  which  M.  de  Haugwitz, 
commissioned  to  propose  the  mediation,  should 
have  left  Berlin,  Prussia  should  be  required 
to  take  the  field,  if  Napoleon  had  not  returned 
a  satisfactory  answer.  It  would  be  easy  to 
add  a  few  days  to  that  month,  by  retarding  the 
departure  of  M.  de  Haugwitz  upon  various  pre- 
texts, and,  besides,  Frederick  William  trusted 
to  that  negotiator,  to  his  prudence  and  his  ad- 
dress, that  the  first  words  exchanged  with  Na- 
poleon should  not  render  the  rupture  inevitable 
and  immediate. 

These  conditions,  unworthy  of  Prussian 
honour,  for  they  were  contrary,  we  repeat  it, 
to  formal  stipulations,  the  price  of  which  Prus 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


65 


sia  had  received  in  fine  territories,  contrary 
especially  to  an  intimacy  which  Napoleon 
must  have  believed  to  be  sincere — these  con- 
ditions were  inserted  in  a  double  declaration, 
signed  at  Potsdam  on  the  3d  of  November. 
The  text  of  it  has  never  been  published,  but 
Napoleon  found  means  subsequently  to  learn 
its  purport.  This  declaration  has  retained  the 
title  of  treaty  to  Potsdam.  No  doubt  Napo- 
leon had  committed  faults  in  regard  to  Prus- 
sia: while  caressing  her  and  benefiting  her 
much,  he  had  let  slip  more  than  one  occasion 
to  bind  her  irrevocably.  But  he  had  loaded 
her  with  solid  favours,  and  he  had  always  be- 
haved honourably  in  his  transactions  with  her. 

Alexander  and  Frederick  William  were  re- 
siding at  Potsdam.  It  was  in  this  beautiful 
retreat  of  the  great  Frederick,  that  they  recipro- 
cally heightened  each  other's  enthusiasm,  and 
concluded  that  treaty  so  contrary  to  the  policy 
and  the  interests  of  Prussia.  The  able  Count 
de  Haugwitz  was  deeply  grieved  at  it,  and  ex- 
cused himself  in  his  own  eyes  for  having 
signed  it,  solely  in  the  'hope  of  eluding  its  con- 
sequences. The  king,  bewildered,  confounded, 
knew  not  whither  he  was  going.  To  complete 
his  perturbation  of  mind,  Alexander,  in  con- 
cert it  is  said  with  the  queen,  and  probably  in 
consequence  of  her  fondness  for  studied  scenes, 
desired  to  see  the  little  vault  which  contains 
the  remains  of  the  great  Frederick  in  the  Pro- 
testant church  of  Potsdam.  There,  at  the  bot- 
tom of  this  vault,  hollowed  out  of  a  pillar  of 
the  church,  narrow,  simple  even  to  negligence, 
lay  two  wooden  coffins,  the  one  that  of  Frede- 
rick William  I.,  the  other  the  great  Frederick's. 
Alexander  went  thither  with  the  young  king, 
shed  tears,  and,  clasping  his  friend  in  his  arms, 
swore  to  him  and  begged  him  to  swear  an  oath 
of  everlasting  friendship  on  the  coffin  of  the 
great  Frederick.  Never  were  they  to  separate 
either  their  cause  or  their  fortunes.  Tilsit 
was  destined  ere  long  to  show  the  solidity  of 
such  an  oath,  probably  sincere  at  the  moment 
when  it  was  taken. 

This  scene,  related  in  Berlin,  published 
throughout  all  Europe,  confirmed  the  opinion 
that  there  existed  a  close  alliance  between  the 
two  young  monarchs. 

England,  apprised  of  the  change  of  things 
in  Prussia,  and  of  the  negotiations  so  happily 
conducted  with  that  court,  regarded  it  as  a 
capital  event,  which  might  decide  the  fate  of 
Europe.  She  despatched  immediately  Lord 
Harrowby  himself,  the  minister  for  foreign 
affairs,  to  negotiate.  The  cabinet  of  London 
was  not  difficult  with  the  court  of  Berlin;  it 
accepted  its  accession,  no  matter  at  what  price. 
It  consented  that  England  should  not  even  be 
mentioned  in  the  negotiation  which  Count  de 
Haugwitz  was  about  to  undertake  in  the  camp 
of  Napoleon,  and  it  kept  subsidies  ready  for 
the  Prussian  army,  not  doubting  that  she 
would  take  part  in  the  war  at  the  end  of  a 
month.  With  respect  to  the  aggrandizements 
of  territory  promised  to  the  house  of  Branden- 
burg, it  was  disposed  to  concede  much,  but  it 
did  not  depend  on  the  English  cabinet  to  give 
up  Hanover,  the  highly-prized  patrimony  of 
George  III.  Mr.  Pitt  would  cheerfully  have 
sacrificed  it,  for  the  British  ministers  have  al- 

VOL.  II.— 9 


ways  taken  it  into  their  heads  to  regard  Han- 
over as  a  burden  to  England.  But  they  would 
sooner  have  persuaded  King  George  to  re- 
nounce the  three  kingdoms  than  Hanover. 
To  make  amends,  an  offer  was  made  of  some- 
thing not  so  contiguous,  it  is  true,  to  the  Prus- 
sian monarch,  but  more  considerable — Holland 
itself."  That  Holland,  which  all  the  courts 
declared  to  be  the  slave  of  France,  and  whose 
independence  they  claimed  with  such  energy, 
was  flung  at  the  feet  of  Prussia  to  attach  her 
to  the  coalition  and  to  release  Hanover.  It  is 
for  the  illustrious  Dutch  nation  to  judge  what 
value  it  ought  to  set  on  the  sincerity  of  Euro- 
pean affections  in  regard  to  it. 

These  were  so  many  points  to  be  settled 
afterwards  between  the  courts  of  Prussia  and 
England.  In  the  interim  it  was  requisite  to 
draw  from  the  treaty  of  Potsdam  its  essential 
consequence,  that  is  to  say,  the  accession  of 
Prussia  to  the  coalition.  The  Austrians  and 
the  Russians  urged  the  departure  of  M.  de 
Haugwitz,  and,  while  he  was  making  his  pre- 
parations, the  Emperor  Alexander  set  out  on 
the  5th  of  November,  after  a  stay  of  ten  days 
at  Berlin,  for  Weimar,  to  see  his  sister,  the 
grand-duchess,  a  princess  of  high  merit,  who 
lived  in  that  city  surrounded  by  the  greatest 
geniuses  of  Germany,  happy  in  that  noble 
intercourse  which  she  was  worthy  to  enjoy. 
The  parting  of  the  two  monarchs  was,  like 
their  first  meeting  at  the  gales  of  Berlin,  mark- 
ed by  embraces  and  demonstrations  of  friend- 
ship; which  one  of  the  parties  at  least  seemed 
to  wish  to  render  conspicuous.  Alexander 
set  out  for  the  army  surrounded  by  the  inte- 
rest which  usually  attaches  to  such  a  depar- 
ture. People  saluted  in  him  a  young  hero, 
ready  to  confront  the  greatest  dangers,  for  the 
triumph  of  the  common  cause  of  kings. 

Meanwhile,  M.  de  Laforest,  minister  of 
France,  Duroc,  grand-marshal  of  the  imperial 
palace,  were  totally  forsaken.  The  court  con- 
tinued to  treat  them  with  affronting  coldness. 
Though  the  most  profound  secrecy  had  been 
promised  between  the  Russians  and  the  Prus- 
sians relative  to  the  stipulations  of  Potsdam, 
the  Russians,  unable  to  conceal' their  satisfac- 
tion, had  told  everybody  that  Prussia  was 
irrevocably  bound  to  them.  Their  joy,  indeed, 
revealed  this  plainly  enough,  and,  joined  to 
the  military  preparations  which  were  making, 
to  the  bustle,  rather  unsuited  to  his  age  into 
which  the  old  Duke  of  Brunswick  put  himself, 
it  attested  the  success  which  Alexander's  pre- 
sence at  Potsdam  had  obtained.  M.  de  Har- 
den berg,  who  shared  with  M.  de  Haugwitz  the 
direction  of  the  foreign  affairs,  scarcely  show- 
ed himself  to  the  French  negotiators,  but  M. 
de  Haugwitz  had  more  frequent  interviews 
with  them.  Being  asked  by  them  what  im- 
portance ought  to  be  attached  to  the  Russian 
indiscretions,  he  defended  himself  against  all 
the  suppositions  that  were  publicly  circulated. 
He  avowed  a  project,  which,  he  said,  could 
have  nothing  new  for  them,  that  of  a  media- 
tion. When  they  wished  to  learn  whether  that 
mediation  was  to  be  an  armed  one,  which  sig- 


1  It  is  on  authentic  documents  that  I  found  this  aswr 
tioo. 

r  2 


C6 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


nified  imposed,  he  evaded  the  question,  saying 
that  the  representations  of  his  court  to  Napo- 
leon would  be  proportioned  to  the  urgency  of 
the  moment.  When,  at  last,  they  asked  what 
were  to  be  the  conditions  of  this  mediation,  he 
replied  that  they  would  be  just,  discreet,  con- 
formable to  the  glory  of  France,  and  of  this 
he  had  given  the  best  proof  by  undertaking 
himself  to  carry  them  to  Napoleon.  He  could 
not,  the  first  time  of  his  visiting  that  great 
man,  expose  himself  to  the  hazard  of  being 
roughly  repulsed. 

Such  were  the  explanations  obtained  from 
the  cabinet  of  Berlin.  The  only  thing  which 
was  evident  was  that  Silesia  was  open  to  the 
Russians,  as  a  punishment  for  the  passage  of 
our  troops  through  the  territory  of  Anspach, 
and  that  Hanover  was  about  to  be  occupied 
by  a  Prussian  army.  As  France  had  a  garri- 
son of  6000  men  in  the  fortress  of  Hameln, 
M.  de  Haugwitz,  without  saying  whether  or- 
ders would  be  given  for  besieging  that  place, 
promised  the  greatest  civility  to  the  French, 
adding  that  he  hoped  for  the  same  from  them. 

The  Grand-marshal  Duroc,  seeing  nothing 
further  to  do  in  Berlin,  set  out  for  Napoleon's 
head-quarters.  At  this  period,  the  end  of  Oc- 
tober, and  the  beginning  of  November,  Napo- 
leon, having  finished  with  the  first  Austrian  ar- 
my, was  preparing  to  fall  upon  the  Russians, 
according  to  the  plan  which  he  had  conceived. 

When  he  learned  what  was  passing  in  Ber- 
lin, he  was  confounded  with  amazement,  for  it 
was  in  perfect  good  faith,  and  believing  in  the 
maintenance  of  the  former  custom,  that  he 
had  ordered  troops  to  pass  through  the  pro- 
vinces of  Anspach.  He  could  not  think  that 
the  irritation  of  Prussia  was  sincere,  and  he 
was  convinced  that  it  was  assumed  to  cover 
the  weaknesses  of  that  court  towards  the  coali- 
tion. But  nothing  that  he  could  conjecture  on 
that  subject  was  capable  of  shaking  him,  and 
on  this  occasion  he  displayed  all  the  greatness 
of  his  character. 

The  reader  is  already  acquainted  with  the 
general  plan  of  his  operations.  In  presence 
of  four  attacks  directed  against  the  French 
Empire,  one  in  the  north,  by  Hanover,  the 
second  in  the  south,  by  Lower  Italy,  the  two 
others  from  the  east,  by  Lombardy  and  Bava- 
ria, he  had  taken  account  of  the  last  two  only. 
Leaving  to  Massena  the  task  of  parrying  that 
from  Lombardy,  and  detaining  the  archdukes 
for  a  few  weeks,  he  had  reserved  for  himself 
the  most  important,  that  which  threatened 
Bavaria.  Taking  advantage,  as  we  have  seen, 
of  the  distance  which  separated  the  Austrians 
from  the  Russians,  he  had  by  an  unexampled 
march  enclosed  the  former,  and  sent  them 
prisoners  to  France.  Now  he  was  about  to 
march  upon  the  second,  and'  to  hurl  them 
back  upon  Vienna.  By  this  movement  Italy 
would  be  released,  and  the  attacks  prepared 
in  the  north  and  south  of  Europe  would  be- 
come insignificant  diversions. 

It  was,  however,  in  the  power  of  Prussia  to 
give  serious  obstructions  to  this  plan  by  throw- 
ing herself,  by  way  of  Franconia  or  Bohemia, 
upon  the  rear  of  Napoleon,  while  he  was 
marching  upon  Vienna.  An  ordinary  general, 
on  the  news  of  what  was  passing  in  Berlin, 


would  have  stopped  short  and  fallen  back,  to 
take  a  position  nearer  to  the  Rhine,  so  as  not 
to  be  turned,  and  would  have  awaited  in  this 
position,  at  the  head  of  his  collected  forces, 
the  consequences  of  the  treaty  of  Potsdam. 
But,  in  acting  thus,  he  would  have  rendered 
certain  the  dangers  that  were  only  probable; 
he  would  have  given  the  two  Russian  armies 
of  Kutusof  and  Alexander  time  to  effect  their 
junction,  the  Archduke  Charles  time  to  pass 
from  Lombardy  into  Bavaria,  to  join  the  Rus 
sians,  the  Prussians  time  and  the  courage  to 
make  unacceptable  proposals  and  to  enter  the 
lists.  He  might  in  a  month  have  had  upon 
his  hands  120,000  Austrians,  100,000  Rus- 
sians, 150,000  Prussians,  assembled  in  the 
Upper  Palatinate  or  Bavaria,  and  been  over- 
whelmed by  a  mass  of  forces  double  his  own. 
To  persist  more  than  ever  in  his  ideas,  that  is 
to  say  to  march  forward,  to  fling  back  to  one 
extremity  of  Germany  the  principal  armies 
of  the  coalition,  to  listen  in  Vienna  to  the 
complaints  of  Prussia,  and  to  give  her  his 
triumphs  for  an  answer — such  was  the  wisest, 
though  apparently  the  rashest,  determination. 
Let  us  add  that  these  great  resolutions  are 
made  for  great  men,  that  ordinary  men  would 
sink  under  them;  that,  moreover,  they  require 
not  only  a  superior  genius  but  an  absolute 
authority;  for,  to  have  the  power  of  advancing 
or  falling  back  according  to  circumstances,  it 
is  requisite  to  be  the  centre  of  all  movements, 
of  all  intelligence,  of  all  wills  ;  it  is  requisite 
to  be  general  and  head  of  the  empire;  it  is 
requisite  to  be  Napoleon  and  Emperor. 

The  language  of  Napoleon  to  Prussia  was 
conformable  to  the  resolution  which  he  had 
just  taken.  So  far  from  offering  excuses  for 
the  violation  of  the  territory  of  Anspach,  he 
merely  referred  to  anterior  conventions,  saying 
that,  if  these  conventions  had  been  set  aside, 
he  should  have  been  informed  of  it;  that,  for 
the  rest,  these  were  mere  pretexts;  that  his 
enemies,  he  clearly  perceived,  had  the  ascend- 
ency in  Berlin:  that  it  no  longer  became  him 
to  enter  thenceforward  into  friendly  explana- 
tions with  a  prince  for  whom  his  friendship 
seemed  to  be  of  no  value;  that  he  should  leave 
to  time  and  events  the  business  of  answering 
for  him,  but  that  on  a  single  point  he  should 
be  inflexible,  that  of  honour;  that  never  had 
his  eagles  put  up  with  an  affront;  that  they 
were  in  one  of  the  fortresses  of  Hanover,  that 
of  Hameln :  that  if  any  attempt  should  be 
made  to  drag  them  out  of  it,  General  Barbou 
would  defend  them  to  the  last  extremity,  and 
should  be  succoured  before  he  would  yield; 
that  it  was  no  new  or  alarming  thing  for  France 
to  have  all  Europe  upon  her  hands;  that  he, 
Napoleon,  would  soon  come,  if  he  was  called 
thither,  from  the  banks  of  the  Danube  to  the 
banks  of  the  Elbe,  and  force  his  new  enemies 
to  repent,  like  the  old  ones,  of  having  insulted 
the  dignity  of  his  empire.  The  order  given  to 
General  Barbou,  and  communicated  to  the 
Prussian  government,  was  as  follows: 

"  To  THE  GEXERAL  OF  DIVISION,  BARBOU. 

"  Augsburg,  October  21. 

"  I  know  not  what  is  preparing,  but  whatever 
may  be  the  power  whose  armies  should  attempt 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


87 


to  enter  Hanover,  were  it  even  a  power  that 
has  not  declared  war  against  me,  you  must  op- 
pose it.  Not  having  forces  sufficient  to  with- 
stand an  army,  shut  yourself  up  in  the  for- 
tresses, and  let  nobody  approach  within  gun- 
shot of  those  fortresses.  I  shall  come  to  the 
relief  of  the  troops  shut  up  in  Hameln.  My 
eagles  have  never  yet  put  up  with  an  affront. 
I  hope  that  the  soldiers  whom  you  command 
will  be  worthy  of  their  comrades,  and  that 
they  will  know  how  to  preserve  honour,  the 
best  and  most  valuable  property  of  nations. 

"You  must  not  surrender  the  place  without 
an  order  from  me,  which  shall  be  brought  to 
you  by  one  of  my  aides-de-camp. 

"  NAPOLEON." 

Napoleon  had  gone  from  Ulm  to  Augsburg, 
and  from  Augsburg  to  Munich,  to  make  there 
his  dispositions  for  the  march.  Before  we 
follow  him  into  that  long  and  immense  valley 
of  the  Danube,  surmounting  all  the  obstacles 
thrown  in  his  way  by  winter  and  the  enemy, 
let  us  cast  our  eyes  for  a  moment  on  Lom- 
bardy,  where  Massena  was  charged  to  make 
head  against  the  Austrians  till  Napoleon  had 
nullified  their  position  oh  the  Adige  by  ad- 
vancing upon  Vienna. 

Napoleon  and  Massena  were  both  thoroughly 
acquainted  with  Italy,  since  both  had  acquired 
glory  there.  The  instructions  given  for  this 
campaign  were  worthy  of  both.  Napoleon  had 
first  laid  it  down  as  a  principle  that  50,000 
French,  appuyed  on  a  river,  had  nothing  to 
fear  from  80,000  enemies  whoever  they  might 
be;  that,  at  any  rate,  he  should  only  ask  them 
to  guard  the  Adige  till,  penetratinginto  Bavaria, 
(which  forms  the  northern  slope  of  the  Alps, 
as  Lombardy  forms  the  southern)  he  had  turned 
the  position  of  the  Austrians  and  obliged  them 
to  fall  back ;  that  for  this  it  was  necessary  to 
keep  together  on  the  upper  part  of  the  river, 
the  left  wing  to  the  Alps,  according  to  the  ex- 
ample which  he  had  always  given,  to  hurl 
back  the  Austrians  into  the  mountains,  if  they 
should  come  by  the  gorges  of  the  Tyrol;  or, 
if  they  should  pass  the  lower  Adige,  to  let  them 
do  so,  and  only  to  keep  themselves  concen- 
trated, and  when  they  should  have  entered  the 
marshy  country  of  the  lower  Adige  and  of  the 
Po,  from  Legnago  to  Venice,  to  rush  upon  their 
flank  and  drown  them  in  the  lagoons ;  that,  by 
remaining  thus  in  a  mass  at  the  foot  of  the 
Alps,  they  would  have  nothing  to  fear  either 
from  above  or  below;  but  that,  if  the  enemy 
appeared  to  renounce  the  offensive,  they  must 
take  it  against  him,  carry  by  night  the  bridge 
of  Verona  over  the  Adige,  and  then  proceed 
to  the  attack  of  the  heights  of  Caldiero.  The 
campaigns  of  Napoleon  would  furnish  models 
for  every  mode  of  acting  on  this  part  of  the 
theatre  of  war. 

Massena  was  not  a  man  to  hesitate  between 
the  offensive  and  the  defensive.  The  first  sys- 
tem of  war  was  alone  suited  to  his  character 
and  genius.  He  had  arrived  at  such  a  degree 
of  confidence  that  he  did  not  conceive  himself 
to  be  doomed  to  keep  the  defensive  before 
80,000  Austrians,  even  though  commanded  by 
the  Archduke  Charles.  In  consequence,  in  the 
tiight  between  the  17th  and  the  18th  of  October, 
after  bavin?  received  news  of  the  first  move- 


ments of  the  grand  army,  he  had  advanced  in. 
silence  towards  the  bridge  of  ChSteau-Vieur, 
situated  in  the  interior  of  Verona.  That  city, 
as  the  reader  knows,  is  divided  by  the  Adige 
into  two  parts.  One  belonged  to  the  French, 
the  other  to  the  Austrians.  The  bridges  were 
cut,  and  the  approaches  defended  by  palisades 
and  walls.  Having  blown  up  the  wall  which 
barred  the  approach  to  the  bridge  of  Chateau- 
Vieux,  Massena,  on  reaching  the  bank  of  the 
river,  had  despatched  a  party  of  brave  volti- 
geurs  in  boats,  some  to  ascertain  whether  the 
piles  of  the  bridge  were  undermined,  the 
others  to  throw  themselves  on  the  opposite 
bank.  Certain  that  the  piles  were  not  under- 
mined, he  had  caused  a  sort  of  passage  to  be 
made  with  thick  planks,  and  then,  crossing  the 
Adige,  had  fought,  the  whole  of  the  18th,  with 
the  Austrians.  The  secrecy,  the  vigour,  the 
promptness  of  this  attack,  had  been  worthy  of 
Napoleon's  first  lieutenant  in  the  campaigns 
of  Italy.  Massena  found  himself,  by  this  ope- 
ration, master  of  the  course  of  the  Adige,  able, 
in  case  of  need,  to  operate  on  both  banks,  and 
having  scarcely  any  fear  of  being  surprised 
by  a  passage  by  main  force,  for  he  was  strong 
enough  to  interrupt  such  an  operation  at  what- 
ever point  it  might  have  been  attempted.  Be- 
fore he  took  a  determined  offensive  and  ad- 
vanced definitively  into  the  Austrian  territory, 
he  wished  to  receive  decisive  tidings  from  the 
banks  of  the  Danube. 

These  tidings  arrived  on  the  28th  of  Octo- 
ber, and  filled  the  army  of  Italy  with  joy  and 
emulation.  Massena  caused  them  to  be  com- 
municated to  his  troops,  accompanied  with  the 
discharge  of  the  artillery,  and  resolved  to 
march  forward  immediately.  On  the  follow- 
ing day,  the  29th  of  October,  he  took  three  of 
his  divisions,  Gardanne's,  Duhesme's,  and 
Molitor's,1  beyond  the  Adige,  beat  back  the 
Austrians,  and  extended  himself  in  the  plain 
called  St.  Michael's,  between  the  citadel  of 
Verona  and  the  entrenched  camp  of  Caldiero. 
His  design  was  to  attack  that  formidable  camp, 
though  he  had  before  him  an  army  far  supe- 
rior in  number,  and  appuyed  on  posiiions 
which  nature  and  art  had  rendered  extremely 
strong.  The  archduke,  on  his 'part,  informed 
of  the  extraordinary  successes  of  the  French 
grand  army,  presuming  that  he  should  soon 
be  obliged  to  retreat  and  march  to  the  relief 
of  Vienna,  thought  that  he  ought  not  to  give 
up  the  ground  as  if  vanquished.  He  purposed 
to  gain  a  decisive  advantage,  which  should 
enable  him  to  retire  quietly,  and  to  take  that 
route  which  was  best  suited  to  the  general 
situation  of  the  allies. 

The  two  adversaries,  then,  were  about  to 
fall  upon  each  other  with  the  greater  violence, 
since  they  met* both  with  the  same  resolution 
to  fight  to  extremity. 

Massena  had  before  him  the  last  steegs  of 
the  Tyrolese  Alps,  subsiding  gradually  into 
the  plain  of  Verona,  near  the  village  of  Cal- 
diero. On  his  left  the  heights,  called  the 


I  GARDAMNE— MOLITOR— DUHESME  ;  all  three  French 
generals  of  division  of  ability.  Their  names  will  occur 
continually  hereafter  in  the  accounts  of  the  various  war« 
of  the  empire.  H- 


68 


[Nov.  1805. 


heights  of  Colognola,  were  covered  with  en- 
trenchments, regularly  constructed,  and  armed 
with  a  numerous  artillery.  In  the  centre,  and 
in  the  plain,  was  the  village  of  Caldiero, 
through  which  ran  the  high  road  of  Lombardy, 
leading  through  the  Friule  into  Austria.  At 
this  point  an  obstacle  presented  itself,  in 
grounds  enclosed  and  built  on,  occupied  by  a 
great  part  of  the  Austrian  infantry.  Lastly,  on 
his  right,  Massena  saw  spread  out  before  him 
the  flat  and  marshy  banks  of  the  Adige,  tra- 
versed in  all  directions  by  ditches  and  dykes 
bristling  with  cannon.  Thus,  on  the  left,  en- 
trenched mountains;  in  the  centre,  a  high-road 
bordered  with  buildings,  marshes,  and  the 
Adige ;  everywhere  works  adapted  to  the 
ground,  covered  with  artillery,  and  80,000  men 
to  defend  them — such  was  the  entrenched 
camp  which  Massena  was  to  attack  with 
50,000  men.  Nothing  was  capable  of  intimi- 
dating the  hero  of  Rivoli,  of  Zurich,  and  of 
Genoa.  On  the  morning  of  the  30th,  he  ad- 
vanced in  column  on  the  high-road.  On  his 
left,  he  directed  General  Molitor  to  take  the 
formidable  heights  of  Colognola;  with  Du- 
hesme's  and  Gardanne's  divisions,  he  under- 
took himself  the  attack  of  the  centre,  along 
the  high-road;  and,  as  he  judged  that,  to  dis- 
lodge an  enemy  superior  in  number  and  posi- 
tion, it  was  necessary  to  threaten  him  with  a 
serious  danger  on  one  of  his  wings,  he  directed 
General  Verdier  to  proceed  to  the  extreme 
right  of  the  French  army,  there  to  cross  the 
Adige  with  10,000  men,  to  turn  the  left  wing 
of  the  archduke,  and  then  fall  upon  his  rear. 
If  this  operation  was  well  executed,  it  would 
be  worth  such  a  detachment,  but  it  was  hazard- 
ous to  commit  the  passage  of  a  river  to  a 
lieutenant;  and  those  10,000  men,  if  they  were 
not  well  employed  on  the  right,  would  be  sorely 
missed  at  the  centre. 

At  break  of  day,  Massena,  marching  vigo- 
rously upon  the  enemy,  ovenhrew  him  at  all 
points.  General  Molitor,  one  of  the  ablest  and 
firmest  officers  of  the  army,  advanced  coolly 
to  the  foot  of  the  heights  of  Colognola,  and 
ascended  the  first  steeps  in  spite  of  a  tremend- 
ous fire.  While  Colonel  Teste,  advancing  at 
the  head  of  the  5th  of  the  line,  was  ready  to 
climb  them,  Count  de  Bellegarde,  sallying  from 
the  redoubts  with  all  his  forces,  came  forward 
to  overwhelm  that  regiment.  General  Molitor, 
instantly  aware  of  the  seriousness  of  the  dan- 
ger, without  stopping  to  count  the  enemy, 
rushed  upon  General  Bellegarde's  column 
with  the  6th  of  the  line,  the  only  regiment  that 
he  had  at  hand.  He  attacked  that  column  with 
such  violence,  that  he  surprised  it,  and  obliged 
it  to  halt.  Meanwhile,  Colonel  Teste  had  en- 
tered one  of  the  redoubts  and  hoisted  there  the 
colours  of  the  5th,  the  eagle  *of  which  was 
carried  away  by  a  ball.  But  the  Austrians, 
nshamed  to  see  their  positions  wrested  from 
tihem  by  so  small  a  number  of  men,  returned 
to  the  charge  and  retook  the  redoubt.  The 
French,  at  this  point,  remained  opposite  to  the 
enemy's  entrenchments,  without  being  able  to 
take  them.  It  was  miraculous  to  have  dared 
so  much  with  so  few  men,  and  without  sus- 
taining a  defeat. 

At  the  centre,  Prince  Charles  had  placed  the 


bulk  of  his  forces.  He  had  pul  at  the  head  a 
reserve  of  grenadiers,  in  whose  ranks  fought 
three  archdukes.  General  Duhesme  and  Gard- 
anne,  sweeping  the  high-road,  and  carrying, 
one  after  another,  the  enclosures  that  bordered 
it,  had  already  arrived  near  Caldiero.  The 
Archduke  Charles  chose  this  moment  for  tak- 
ing the  offensive.  He  repulsed  the  assailants, 
and  marched  along  the  road  in  close  column, 
at  the  head  of  the  best  Austrian  infantry.  This 
column  continuing  to  advance,  as  did  of  old 
that  of  Fontenoy,  had  already  passed  the  de- 
tachments of  French  troops  spread  on  the 
right  and  left  in  the  enclosures,  came  on  to 
possess  itself  of  Vago,  which  was  to  the 
French  what  Caldiero  was  to  the  Austrians, 
the  appui  of  their  centre.  But  Massena 
hastened  to  the  spot.  He  rallied  his  divisions, 
placed  all  his  disposable  artillery  in  the  road, 
and,  facing  the  enemy,  poured  the  grape-shot 
at  point-blank  range,  upon  the  brave  Austrian 
grenadiers,  then  ordered  them  to  be  charged 
with  the  bayonet  and  attacked  on  the  flank, 
and,  after  an  obstinate  fight,  in  which  he  was 
continually  in  the  midst  of  the  fire,  like  a 
common  soldier,  he  forced  the  column  to  re- 
treat. He  pushed  it  beyond  Caldiero,  and 
gained  so  much  ground  as  to  penetrate  into 
the  first  Austrian  entrenchments.  If,  at  this 
moment,  General  Verdier,  accomplishing  his 
mission,  had  crossed  the  Adige,  or  even  had 
Massena  had  the  10,000  men  uselessly  em- 
ployed at  his  extreme  right,  he  would  have 
taken  the  formidable  camp  of  Caldiero.  But 
General  Verdier,  mismanaging  his  operation, 
had  thrown  one  of  his  regiments  beyond  the 
river,  without  having  it  in  his  power  to  sup- 
port it,  and  had  completely  failed  in  his  de- 
sign of  passing.  Night  alone  parted  the  com- 
batants, and  covered  with  its  shades  one  of  the 
bloodiest  fields  of  battle  of  the  age. 

It  required  the  character  of  Massena  to 
undertake  and  to  come  off  from  such  a  conflict 
without  check.  The  Austrians  had  lost  3000 
men,  killed  and  wounded,  and  4000  of  them 
had  been  taken  prisoners.  The  French  had 
not  lost  more  than  3000,  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners.  They  bivouacked  on  the  field  of 
battle,  mingled  the  one  with  the  other,  amidst 
terrible  confusion.  But,  in  the  night,  the 
archduke  sent  off  his  baggage  and  his  artil- 
lery, and  next  morning,  occupying  the  French 
by  means  of  a  rear-guard,  he  commenced  his 
retrograde  movement.  A  corps  of  5000  men, 
commanded  by  General  Hillinger,  was  sacri- 
ficed to  the  interest  of  this  retreat.  It  had  been 
ordered  down  from  the  heights  to  alarm  Ve- 
rona, on  the  rear  of  our  army,  while  the  arch- 
duke was  setting  himself  in  march.  General 
Hillinger  had  not  time  to  return  from  this  de- 
monstration, perhaps  pushed  too  far,  and  was 
taken  with  his  whole  corps.  Thus,  in  these 
three  days,  Massena  had  deprived  the  enemy  of 
eleven  or  twelve  thousand  men,  8000  of  whom 
were  prisoners,  and  3000  left  hors  de  combat. 

He  immediately  set  out  in  close  pursuit  of 
the  archduke.  But  the  Austrian  prince  had  in 
his  favour  the  best  soldiers  of  Austria,  to  the 
number  of  70,000,  his  experience,  his  talents, 
winter,  over-flowed  rivers,  the  bridges  over 
which  he  broke  down,  in  retiring.  Massena 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


69 


could  not  flatter  himself  with  the  hope  of  in- 
volving him  in  a  catastrophe ;  nevertheless, 
he  occupied  him  sufficiently  by  pursuing  him, 
not  to  leave  him  the  facility  of  manoeuvring 
at  pleasure  against  the  grand  army. 

This  other  part  of  Napoleon's  plan  was 
therefore  accomplished  as  punctually  as  the 
preceding;  the  Archduke  Charles,  falling  back 
upon  Austria,  was  obliged  to  maintain  a  run- 
ning fight  while  going  to  the  succour  of  the 
threatened  capital. 

Napoleon  had  not  lost  a  moment  at  Munich 
in  making  his  dispositions.  He  was  anxious 
to  cross  the  Inn,  to  fight  the  Russians,  and  to 
disconcert  the  underhand  manoeuvres  of  Ber- 
lin by  fresh  successes  as  prompt  as  those  of 
Ulm.  The  corps  of  General  Kutusof,  which 
he  had  before  him,  numbered  scarcely  50,000 
men  on  taking  the  field,  though  it  was  to  have 
been  far  more  numerous  according  to  the  pro- 
mises of  Russia.  From  Moravia  to  Bavaria 
this  corps  had  left  behind  five  or  six  thousand 
stragglers  and  sick,  but  it  had  been  joined  by 
the  Austrian  detachment  of  Kienmayer,  which 
had  escaped  from  the  disaster  of  Ulm,  before 
the  investment  of  that  place.  M.  de  Meerfeld1 
had  added  some  troops  to  this  detachment,  and 
taken  the  command  of  it.  The  whole  together 
might  amount  to  about  65,000  soldiers,  Rus- 
sian and  Austrian.  This  was  but  little  for 
saving  the  monarchy  against  150,000  French, 
100,000  of  whom  at  least  were  marching  in  a 
single  mass.  General  Kutusof  commanded  this 
army.  He  was  an  elderly  man,  had  lost  the 
sight  of  one  eye  in  consequence  of  a  wound 
on  the  head,  very  corpulent,  indolent,  dissolute, 
greedy,  but  intelligent ;  as  active  in  mind  as 
he  was  heavy  in  body,  lucky  in  war,  a  clever 
courtier,  and  capable  enough  of  commanding 
in  a  situation  that  required  prudence  and  good 
fortune.  His  lieutenants  were  men  of  mode- 
rate talents,  excepting  three,  Prince  Bagration2 
and  Generals  Doctorow  and  Miloradovich.3 
Prince  Bagration  was  a  Georgian,  of  heroic 
courage,  making  amends  by  experience  for  the  j 
lack  of  early  instruction,  and  always  charged,  j 
whether  at  the  advanced-guard  or  at  the  rear- 
guard, with  the  most  difficult  duty.  General 
Doctorow  was  a  discreet,  modest,  firm,  and 
well-informed  officer.  General  Miloradovich 
was  a  Servian,  of  brilliant  valour,  but  absolu- 
tely destitute  of  military  knowledge,  dissolute 
in  manners,  uniting  all  the  vices  of  civiliza- 
tion with  all  the  vices  of  barbarism.  The 
character  of  the  Russian  soldiers  corresponded 
with  that  of  their  generals.  They  had  a  sa- 
vage, ill-directed  bravery.  Their  artillery  was 
clumsy,  their  cavalry  indifferent.  Altogether, 
generals,  officers,  and  soldiers,  composed  an 
ignorant  army,  but  singularly  formidable  from 
its  devotedness.  The  Russian  troops  have  since 
learned  the  art  of  war  by  waging  it  with  us,  and 
have  begun  to  add  knowledge  to  courage. 

General  Kutusof  had  been  ignorant  till  the 

1  MEERFELD.     An  Austrian  general  of  some  distinc- 
tion.   He  served  throughout  the  war,  and  distinguished 
himself,  although  repulsed  and  made  prisoner  at  Leipsic. 
— Alison's  History.  H. 

2  BAORATION,  PRINCE.    A  Russian  general  of  the  first 
class,  and  of  one  of  the  noblest  families  of  the  empire. 
In  point  of  ability  and  bravery  he  was  second  to  scarce 


last  moment  of  the  disaster  of  Ulm ;  for  the 
Archduke  Ferdinand  and  General  Mack,  the 
day  before  their  catastrophe,  announced  to  him 
nothing  but  successes.  The  truth  was  no: 
known  till  the  arrival  of  General  Mack,  who 
came  in  person  to  report  the  destruction  of 
the  principal  Austrian  army.  Kutusof,  then 
despairing  with  reason  of  saving  Vienna,  did 
not  disguise  from  the  Emperor  Francis,  who 
had  hastened  to  the  Russian  head-quarters, 
that  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  sacrifice  of 
that  capital.  He  would  fain  have  withdrawn 
as  speedily  as  possible  from  the  danger  wnich 
threatened  himself,  by  passing  to  the  left  bank 
of  the  Danube,  in  order  to  join  the  Russian 
reserves  coming  through  Bohemia  and  Mo- 
ravia. The  Emperor  Francis  and  his  council, 
however,  made  a  point  of  not  sacrificing 
Vienna  till  at  the  last  extremity,  and  nattered 
themselves  that,  by  retarding  the  march  of 
Napoleon  by  all  the  means  which  defensive 
war  was  capable  of  furnishing,  time  might  be 
given  to  the  Archduke  Charles  to  reach  Aus- 
tria, to  the  Russian  reserves  to  arrive  on  the 
Danube,  and  to  effect  a  general  junction  of 
the  allied  forces,  for  the  purpose  of  fighting  a 
battle,  which  might  perhaps  prove  the  salva- 
tion of  the  capital  and  of  the  monarchy. 
General  Kutusof,  in  compliance  with  the  de- 
sires of  the  principal  ally  of  his  master,  pro- 
mised to  oppose  to  the  French  every  resist- 
ance that  did  not  go  so  far  as  to  involve  a 
general  action ;  and,  to  slacken  their  move- 
ment, he  determined  to  avail  himself  of  all  the 
tributaries  of  the  Danube  coming  from  the 
Alps  and  throwing  themselves  into  that  great 
river.  For  this  purpose,  it  was  sufficient  to 
break  down  the  bridges,  and  to  obstruct  by 
strong  rear-guards  the  passages  by  main  force 
which  the  French  should  attempt,  passages 
difficult  in  a  season  when  all  the  waters  were 
high,  and  laden  with  flakes  of  ice. 

Napoleon  had  made  the  following  disposi- 
tions for  his  march  :  He  was  obliged  to  direct 
his  course  between  the  Danube  and  the  chain 
of  the  Alps,  by  a  route  cramped  between  the 
river  and  the  mountains.  To  advance  with  a 
numerous  army  by  this  narrow  route  would 
have  been  attended  with  difficulty  of  subsist- 
ing and  danger  for  marching,  for,  besides  the 
Archduke  Charles,  who  might  pass  from  Lom- 
bardy  into  Bavaria,  and  throw  himself  upon 
our  flank,  there  were  in  Tyrol  about  25,000 
men  under  the  Archduke  John.  Napoleon, 
therefore,  took  the  wise  precaution  to  commit 
to  Ney's  corps  the  conquest  of  the  Tyrol. 
He  directed  the  marshal  to  leave  Ulm,  to 
ascend  by  Kempten,  and  to  penetrate  into  the 
Tyrol,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  cut  in  two  the 
troops  scattered  through  that  long  country. 
Those  which -were  to  the  right  of  Marshal 
Ney  were  to  be  flung  back  upon  the  Vorarl- 
berg  and  the  Lake  of  Constance,  where  Auge- 
reau's  corps  would  arrive,  after  traversing  the 

any  in  the  service  of  Alexander.  He  died  fighting  nobly 
at  Borodino  on  the  7th  of  September,  1812.— JUiton't  En- 
rope.  a- 
3  DocTOBOMr—MiLOBADovicH— Russian  general*  of 
distinction.  Both  acquired  great  renown  for  their  con- 
duct at  Borodino,  and  subsequently  during  the  disastrous 
retreat  of  the  French  to  the  Beresina.—  Ibid.  » 


70 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


whole  extent  of  France  from  Brest  to  Huningen. '  quiring  the  speedy  execution  of  them,  and 
Ney,  deprived  of  Dupont's  division,  which  had  :  paying  for  the  articles,  of  which  those  made 
concurred  with  Murat  in  the  pursuit  of  the  up  were  to  be  collected  at  Augsburg.  As  that 
Archduke  Ferdinand,  was  reduced  to  about !  city  became  the  principal  point  of  the  route 
10,000  men.  But  Napoleon,  trusting  to  his  of  the  army,  all  the  detachments  were  to  pass 
vigour  and  to  the  14,000  men,  whom  Augereau  !  through  it  in  order  to  supply  themselves  with 
was  bringing,  believed  that  he  would  have  j  what  they  needed.  These  precautions  taken, 


force  enough  for  the  task  which  he  had  to 
perform.  The  Tyrol  thus  occupied,  he  des- 
tined Bernadotte  to  penetrate  into  the  country 
of  Salzburg.  He  directed  the  latter  to  proceed 
from  Munich  towards  the  Inn,  and  to  cross  it 
either  at  Wasserburg  or  Rosenheim.  General 
Marmont  was  to  support  Bernadotte.  In  this 
manner  Napoleon  ensured  two  advantages, 


Napoleon  set  out  to  follow  his  corps,  which 
preceded  him  by  one  or  two  marches. 

The  movementsof  his  army  were  executed  as 
prescribed  by  him.  On  the  26th  of  October,  the 
whole  of  it  was  advancing  towards  the  Inn.  The 
Austro-Russians  had  not  left  a  single  bridge 
standing.  But  the  soldiers,  throwing  themselves 
everywhere  into  boats,  and  crossing  in  large  de- 


that  of  covering  himself  completely  towards  j  tachments,  under  musketry  and  grape,  forced  the 
the  Alps,  and  that  of  gaining  possession  of  the  j  enemy  to  evacuate  the  opposite  bank,  and  set 
upper  course  of  the  Inn,  which  would  prevent  j  about  repairing  the  bridges,  seldom  totally  de- 
the  Austro-Russians  from  defending  its  lower  |  stroyed,  owing  to  the  precipitation  of  his  retreat, 
course  against  the  main  body  of  our  army.  Bernadotte,  meeting  with  but  few  obstacles, 
As  for  himself,  with  the  corps  of  Marshals  passed  the  Inn  on  the  28th  of  October,  at  Was- 
Davout,  Soult,  and  Lannes,  with  the  reserve  serburg.  Marshals  Soult,  Murat,  and  Davout 
cavalry  and  the  guard,  he  should  take  in  front .  passed  it  at  Muhldorf  and  Neu-Oettingen. 
the  great  barrier  of  the  Inn,  with  the  intention  i  Lannes  proceeded  towards  Braunau,  and,  find- 
of  crossing  from  Muhldorf  to  Braunau.  Mu-  ing  the  bridge  broken  down,  sent  a  detachment 


rat  had  orders  to  set  off  on  the  26th  of  October, 
with  the  dragoons  of  Generals  Walther  and 
Beaumont,  General  d'Hautpoul's  heavy  ca- 
valry, and  a  bridge  equipage,  to  proceed  direct 
to  Muhldorf,  following  the  high  road  from  Mu- 


to  the  other  bank  by  means  of  some  craft  which 
had  been  seized.  This  detachment  crossed  the 
river  and  appeared  at  the  gates  of  Braunau. 
What  was  the  astonishment  of  our  soldiers  to 
find  that  place  open,  though  in  a  perfect  state 


nich  through  Hohenlinden,  and  thus  travers-   of  defence,  completely  armed,  and  provided  with 
ing  the  scenes  of  Moreati's  glory.     Marshal   considerable  resources!  Immediate  possession 
Soult  was  to  support  him  at  the  distance  of 
one  march  in  rear.     Marshal  Davout  took  the 


route  on  the  left,  through  Freisingen,  Dorfen, 
and  Neu-Oettingen.  Lannes,  who  had  con- 
tributed with  Murat  to  the  pursuit  of  the  Arch- 
»duke  Ferdinand,  was  to  march  still  more  to 


wastaken,  and  from  a  fact  so  extraordinary  it 
was   inferred   that   the  enemy  was  retreating 


with  a  precipitation  bordering  on  disorder. 

Napoleon,  delighted  with  such  an  acquisi- 
tion, hastened  in  person  to  Braunau,  to  ascer- 
tain the  strength  of  the  place  and  what  bene- 


the  left  than  Davout,  through  Landshut,  Wils-  fit  he  might  derive  from  it.  Having  inspected 
burg,  and  Braunau.  Lastly,  Dupont's  divi-  it,  he  ordered  a  great  portion  of  the  resources 
sion,  which  had  proceeded  far  in  the  same  '  which  he  meant  at  first  to  collect  at  Augs- 


direction,  descended  the  Danube,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  going  to  take  Passau.  Napoleon, 
with  the  guard,  followed  Murat  and  Soult  on 
the  high-road  from  Munich. 

Before    he   left   Augsburg,   Napoleon    pre- 


scribed  there    a    system    of    precautions   to 
which  we  shall  find  him   paying   more   and 


burg,  to  be  removed  thither ;  judging  it  to  be 
preferable  for  the  use  to  which  he  destined  it 
He  left  a  garrison  there,  and  gave  the  com- 
mand of  it  to  his  aide-de-camp  Lauriston,  who 
had  returned  from  the  naval  campaign  which 


he  had  made  with  Admiral  Villeneuve.    It  was 
not  the  mere  command  of  a  fortress  that  he 

more  attention,  in  proportion  as  the  sphere  I  committed  to  him  ;  it  was  a  government,  com- 
of  his  operations  increased,  and  in  which  he  j  prising  all  the  rear  of  the  army.  The  wounded, 
has  never  been  equalled  for  the  extent  of  his  !  the  ammunition,  the  prisoners,  the  recruits, 
foresight  and  the  activity  of  his  care.  The  '  coming  from  France,  the  prisoners  who  were 
object  of  this  system  of  precautions  was  to  going  thither,  were  all  to  pass  through  Brau- 
create  upon  his  line  of  operation  points  of  i  nau,  under  the  superintendence  of  General 
support,  which  should  serve  him  alike  to  ad- '  Lauriston. 

vance  or  to  fall  back,  if  he  should  be  com-  I  From  the  29th  to  the  30th  of  October,  the 
pelled  to  the  latter  course.  These  points  of  j  army  had  crossed  the  Inn,  left  Bavaria  behind, 
support,  besides  the  advantage  of  presenting  and  invaded  Upper  Austria.  It  was  no  longer 
a  certain  force,  were  to  have  that  of  contain-  i  a  burden  to  allies,  but  to  the.  hereditary  States 
ing  immense  stores  of  all  kinds,  very  useful  of  the  imperial  house.  It  was  marching  for- 
to  an  army  marching  forward,  indispensable  j  ward,  covered  against  any  movement  of  the 
lor  a  retreating  army.  He  chose  in  Bavaria,  archdukes  by  Bernadotte  and  Marmont  at 
on  the  Lech,  Augsburg,  which  afforded  some  Salzburg,  by  Ney  in  the  Tyrol.  Napoleon, 
means  of  defence  and  the  resources  suited  to  j  not  losing  a  moment,  resolved  to  proceed  from 
a  great  population.  He  gave  directions  for  ;  the  line  of  the  Ion  to  that  of  the  Traun. 


the  works  necessary  to  secure  it  against  a  coup 
de  main,  and  desired  that  corn,  cattle,  cloth, 
shoes,  ammunition,  and,  above  all,  hospitals, 
should  be  found  there.  He  ordered  commis- 
sion'? for  cloth  and  shoes  to  be  given  at 
Nuremberg,  at  Ratisbon,  and  at  Munich,  re- 


From  the  Inn  to  the  Traun,  you  have,  as 
everywhere  in  this  country,  the  Danube  on 
the  left,  the  Alps  on  the  right  It  is  a  magni- 
ficent country,  resembling  Lombard}',  only 
more  stern,  because  it  is  to  the  north  instead 
of  to  the  south  of  the  Alps,  and  would  be  as 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


level  as  a  plain,  but  for  a  large  mountain 
called  the  Hausriick  which  rises  abruptly  in 
the  midst  of  it.  This  mountain  is  peaked, 
totally  detached  from  the  Alps,  and  would 
form  an  island,  if  the  country  were  covered 
with  water.  But  having  passed  the  Haus- 
rJlck,  you  have  nothing  before  you  but  an  un- 
dulating and  wooded  plain,  extendin^-to  the 
bank  of  the  Traun  and  called  the  plain  of 
Wels.  The  Traun  runs  over  gravel  and 
among  fine  trees,  and  throws  itself  into  the 
Danube  near  Linz,  the  capital  of  the  province, 
militarily  as  important  as  the  city  of  Ulm, 
and  for  that  reason,  bristling,  since  our  great 
wars,  with  fortifications  on  a  new  system. 

Napoleon  directed  Lannes  by  Efferding, 
upon  Linz,  Marshals  Davout  and  Soult,  by  the 
road  to  Ried  and  Lambach,  upon  Wels,  along 
the  foot  of  the  Hausriick.  Murat  always  pre- 
ceding them  with  his  cavalry.  The  guard  fol- 
lowed with  the  head-quarters.  Apprehending, 
however,  that  the  plain  of  Wels  might  be 
chosen  by  the  enemy  for  a  field  of  battle,  he 
directed  Marmont  to  leave  Bernadotte  at  Salz- 
burg, and  to  rejoin  the  main  body  of  the  army, 
by  passing  behind  the  Hausriick,  along  the  road 
through  Strasswalchen  and  Wocklabriick  to 
Wels,  so  as  to  take  the  Austro-Russians  in 
flank,  if  they  should  be  disposed  to  halt  with 
the  intention  of  fighting. 

The  1st  chasseurs  came  up  with  them  in 
advance  of  Ried,  charged  them  gallantly,  and 
put  them  to  the  rout.  The  French  marched 
upon  Lembach,  which  the  enemy  made  a  show 
of  defending,  solely  to  gain  time  to  save  their 
baggage.  Davout  overtook  them  and  had  a 
brilliant  rear-guard  action  with  them,  but  pre- 
parations for  a  battle  were  nowhere  perceived. 
The  enemy  covered  himself  with  the  Traun 
in  passing  it  at  Wels.  We  entered  Linz 
without  striking  a  blow.  Though  the  Austri- 
ans  had  made  use  of  the  Danube  for  evacuat- 
ing their  principal  magazines,  they  neverthe- 
less left  us  valuable  resources.  Napoleon 
arrived  and  established  his  head-quarters  at 
Linz  on  the  15th  of  November. 

Being  established  in  this  town,  Napoleon 
moved  forward  his  corps-d'armee  from  the 
Traun  to  the  Ens,  which  is  easy,  for  the  coun- 
try between  these  two  tributaries  of  the  Da- 
nube offered  no  position  of  which  the  enemy 
could  be  tempted  to  avail  himself.  This 
country  presents  a  slightly  elevated  plain,  in- 
tersected by  ravines,  covered  with  wood,  hav- 
ing two  steep  slopes,  one  forward,  which  you 
must  ascend  when  you  have  passed  the  Traun, 
the  other  at  the  further  extremity,  which  you 
must  descend,  if  you  mean  to  pass  the  Ens. 
Not  having  defended  it  on  the  side  next  to  the 
Traun,  the  Austro-Russians  could  not  think 
of  defending  it  on  the  side  next  to  the  Ens, 
since  they  would  have  been  everywhere  com- 
manded. The  Ens  was  therefore  passed  with- 
out obstacle. 

Having  his  head-quarters  at  Linz  and  his 
advanced  guards  on  the  Ens,  Napoleon  made 
new  dispositions  for  the  continuation  of  this 
offensive  march,  performed,  as  we  have  said, 
upon  a  narrow  road  between  the  Danube  and 
the  Alps.  The  difficulty  of  advancing  thus  in 
a  long  column,  the  tail  of  which  could  never 


come  to  the  assistance  of  the  head,  if  it  were 
surprised  by  the  enemy,  with  the  dangers 
always  to  be  apprehended  of  an  attack  in  flank, 
if  the  archdukes  should  suddenly  leave  Italy 
and  march  into  Austria — this  difficulty,  further 
increased  by  the  scarcity  of  provisions,  already 
consumed  or  destroyed  by  the  Russians,  re- 
quired great  precautions  before  reaching  Vi- 
enna. 

The  most  serious  inconvenience  of  this 
march  was  certainly  the  possibility  of  a  sud- 
den appearance  of  the  archdukes.  The  two 
belligerent  masses,  acting  in  Austria  and  in 
Lombardy,  were  moving  from  west  to  east,  the 
one  under  Napoleon  and  Kutusof  to  the  north 
of  the  Alps,  the  other  to  the  south  of  them  un- 
der Massena  and  the  Archduke  Charles.  Was 
it  possible  that  the  Archduke  Charles,  suddenly 
stealing  away  from  Massena,  and  leaving  be- 
fore him  a  mere  rear-guard  to  delude  him, 
should  cross  the  Alps,  pick  up  by  the  way  his 
brother  John  with  the  corps  in  the  Tyrol,  and 
penetrate  into  Bavaria,  either  to  join  the  Aus- 
tro-Russians behind  one  of  the  defensive  posi- 
tions which  are  met  with  on  the  Danube,  or 
merely  to  throw  himself  on  the  flank  of  the 
French  grand  army?  Though  possible,  this 
was  scarcely  probable.  The  Archduke  Charles 
had  two  routes :  the  first,  by  the  Tyrol,  Verona, 
Trent,  Inspruck,  would  have  led  him  behind 
the  Inn ;  the  second,  more  circuitous,  through 
Carinthia  and  Styria,  by  Tarvis,  Leoben,  and 
Lilienfeld,  would  have  led  him  to  the  well- 
known  position  of  St.  PGlten,  in  advance  of 
Vienna.  With  respect  to  the  first,  supposing 
that  the  archduke  had  decided  at  the  very  mo- 
ment of  Mack's  capitulation,  which  took  place 
on  the  20th,  which  was  not  known  at  Verona 
by  the  French  till  the  28th,  which  could  not  be 
known  by  the  Austrians  before  the  25th  or  the 
26th — supposing  that,  before  leaving  Italy,  the 
archduke  had  not  chosen  to  fight  a  battle  for 
the  purpose  of  restraining  the  French  army,  he 
would  have  had  from  the  25th  to  the  28th  to 
traverse  the  Tyrol  and  arrive  upon  the  Inn, 
which  Napoleon  passed  on  the  28th  and  29th. 
He  would  evidently  not  have  time  enough  for 
such  a  march.  As  for  the  route  through  Sty- 
ria, which  he  would  have  had  it  in  his  power 
to  take  after  the  battle  of  Caldiero.  he  would 
have  had  to  traverse  the  Friule,  Carinthia,  and 
Styria,  and  to  march  a  hundred  leagues  in  the 
Alps,  between  the  30th  of  October,  the  day  of 
the  battle  of  Caldiero  and  the  6th  or'«th  of 
November,  the  day  on  which  Napoleon  crossed 
the  Ens  to  move  forward.  He  would  not  have 
had  time  for  such  an  operation  either.  If  the 
Archduke  Charles  could  not  anticipate  Napo- 
leon, upon  one  of  the  defensive  positions  of 
the  Danube,  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  to  him 
150,000  united  Austrians  and  Russians,  he 
might,  without  anticipating  him,  suffer  himself 
to  be  outstripped,  on  the  contrary,  and  cross 
the  chain  of  the  Alps,  to  attempt  a  flank  attack 
upon  the  grand  army.  No  doubt,  with  soldiers 
accustomed  to  conquer,  prepared  for  daring 
enterprises,  capable  of  clearing  their  way  any- 
where, he  would  have  had  it  in  his  power  to 
make  such  an  attempt,  and  to  produce  a  sud- 
den and  serious  derangement  in  the  march  of 
Napoleon,  perhaps  even  to  change  the  face  of 


72 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


events,  but  running  the  risk  himself  of  being! 
enclosed  between  two  armies,  that  of  Massena 
and  that  of  Napoleon,  as  had  formerly  happen- 
ed to  Suwarow  in  the  St.  Gothard.  This  would 
have  been  one  of  the  most  hazardous  of  reso- 
lutions, and  one  does  not  take  such  resolutions 
when  one  has  in  one's  hands  an  army,  which 
is  the  last  resource  of  a  monarchy. 

Napoleon,  nevertheless,  conducted  himself 
as  if  such  a  resolution  had  been  probable.  The 
only  position  which  the  enemy  could  occupy 
for  covering  Vienna,  whether  the  army  of  Ku- 
tusof  was  there  alone,  or  whether  the  arch- 
dukes were  there  with  it,  was  that  of  St.  Polten. 
This  position  is  well  known.  The  Alps  of 
Styria,  pushing  the  Danube  to  the  north,  from 
Mulk  to  Krems,  throw  out  a  spur  which  is 
called  the  Kahlenberg,  and  which  subsides  only 
at  the  very  brink  of  the  river,  where  it  leaves 
scarcely  room  for  a  road.  As  the  Kahlenberg 
covers  with  its  mass  the  city  of  Vienna,  you 
must  cross  it  breadthwise  to  reach  that  capital. 
In  advance  of  this  spur,  half-way  up,  is  a  very 
spacious  position,  which  has  received  its  name 
from  a  large  village  situated  near  it,  that  of  St. 
Polten,  and  upon  which  a  retreating  Austrian 
army  might  fight  a  defensive  battle  with  ad- 
vantage. A  branch  of  the  high  road  from  Italy 
to  Vienna,  running  through  Lilienfeld,  termi- 
nates near  St.  Polten  and  might  bring  the  arch- 
dukes thither.  A  vast  wooden  bridge  over  the 
Danube,  that  of  Krems,  placed  this  position  in 
communication  with  the  two  banks  of  the  river, 
and  would  have  permitted  the  Prussian  and 
Austrian  reserves  to  hasten  thither  through 
Bohemia.  It  was  there  consequently  that  Na- 
poleon must  have  met  with  the  conjoined  forces 
of  the  allies,  if  such  a  junction  of  forces  had 
been  possible  in  advance  of  Vienna.  He  there- 
fore took,  in  approaching  this  point,  the  pre- 
cautions which  might  be  expected  of  a  general 
who  has  combined  calculation  and  daring  in 
a  superior  degree  to  any  celebrated  captains. 
Having  General  Marmont's  corps  on  his  right, 
he  resolved  to  send  him  to  Leoben  by  a  road 
passable  for  carriages,  which  runs  from  Lintz 
to  Leoben,  through  Styria.  General  Marmont, 
if  he  received  intelligence  of  the  approach  of 
the  archdukes,  was  to  fall  back  upon  the  grand 
army  and  to  become  the  extreme  right,  or,  if  the 
archdukes  proceeded  directly  from  the  Friule 
into  Hungary,  to  establish  himself  in  Leoben 
in  order  to  give  a  hand  to  Massena.  Between 
this  road,  which  Marmont  was  to  take,  and  the 
high  road  along  the  Danube,  which  the  bulk 
of  the  army  was  following,  there  was  a  moun- 
tain road,  which,  running  through  Waidhofen 
and  St.  Gaming,  descended  to  Lilienfeld,  be- 
yond the  position  of  St.  Polten,  and  thus  fur- 
nished the  means  of  turning  it.  This  Napo- 
leon directed  Marshal  Davout's  corps  to  pursue. 
The  corps  of  Bernadotte  was  no  longer  neces- 
sary at  Salzburg,  since  Ney  occupied  the  Ty- 
rol. Napoleon  enjoined  him  to  draw  nearer 
to  the  army,  detaching  the  Bavarians  towards 
Ney's  corps,  which  could  not  fail  to  be  par- 
ticularly gratifying  to  these  latter,  always  ex- 
tremely ambitious  to  possess  the  Tyrol.  He 
reserved  for  himself,  for  the  direct  attack  of 
the  position  of  St.  Polten,  the  corps  of  Marshals 
8oult,  Lannes,  and  Bernadotte,  besides  Murat's 


cavalry  and  the  guaM;  these  were  sufficient, 
the  corps  of  Davout  being  sent  to  turn  that  po- 
sition. 

Napoleon  did  not  stop  there,  but  resolved  to 
take  some  precautions  on  the  left  bank  of  the 
Danube.  So  far  he  had  marched  on  the  right 
bank  only,  taking  no  heed  of  the  left  bank. 
There  »as  talk,  however,  of  an  assemblage  of 
troops  in  Bohemia,  formed  by  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand,  who  escaped  from  Ulm  with  some 
thousand  horse.  There  was  also  a  rumour  of 
the  approach  of  the  second  Russian  army, 
conducted  into  Moravia  by  Alexander.  It 
was  necessary,  therefore,  to  guard  himself  on 
this  side  also.  Napoleon,  who  had  detached 
the  division  of  Dupont  to  Passau,  ordered  him 
to  advance  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Danube, 
keeping  up  with  the  army,  and  sending  out 
reconnaissances  upon  the  roads  from  Bohe- 
mia to  learn  what  was  passing  there.  The 
Dutch,  who  had  left  Marmont,  were  to  join 
Dupont's  division.  Judging  th-is  not  to  be 
sufficient,  Napoleon  detached  Gazan's  division 
from  the  corps  of  Lannes,  and  made  it  march 
with  Dupont's  division  on  the  left  bank.  He 
placed  both  under  the  command  of  Marshal 
Mortier,  and,  not  to  leave  them  cut  off  from 
the  grand  army,  which  continued  to  occupy 
the  right  bank,  he  conceived  the  idea  of  form- 
ing, with  the  craft  collected  on  the  Inn,  the 
Traun,  the  Enns,  and  the  Danube,  a  numerous 
flotilla,  into  which  he  put  provisions,  ammu- 
nition, all  the  fatigued  men,  and  which,  de- 
scending the  Danube  with  the  army,  could  in 
an  hour  throw  ten  thousand  men  on  the  right 
or  on  the  left,  connected  the  two  banks,  and 
served  at  once  for  a  medium  of  communica- 
tion and  of  conveyance.  At  the  head  of  this 
flotilla  he  put  Captain  Lostanges,  an  officer  of 
the  seamen  of  the  guard. 

It  was  by  such  a  combination  of  precautions 
that  Napoleon  provided  against  the  inconve- 
nience of  that  offensive  march,  performed  up- 
on a  long  and  narrow  road  between  the  Alps 
and  the  Danube.  He  had  thus  on  the  summit 
of  the  Alps  Marmont's  corps,  half-way  up  Da- 
vout's corps,  at  their  foot,  along  the  Danube, 
the  corps  of  Soult,  Lannes,  and  Bernadotte, 
and  the  cavalry  of  Murat;  on  the  other  side  of 
the  Danube  Mortier's  corps,  and,  lastly,  a  flo- 
tilla to  connect  all  the  forces  marching  on  both 
banks  of  the  river,  and  to  carry  whatever  it 
was  difficult  to  drag  along  with  them.  It  was 
with  this  imposing  train  that  he  approached 
Vienna. 

At  the  moment  when  he  was  about  to  leave 
Linz,  an  emissary  from  the  Emperor  of  Ger- 
many arrived  at  the  head-quarters.  This  was 
General  Giulay,  one  of  the  officers  taken  at 
Ulm,  since,  released,  and  who,  having  heard 
Napoleon  speak  of  his  pacific  dispositions, 
had  so  represented  the  matter  to  his  master  as 
to  make  some  impression  upon  him.  In  con- 
sequence, the  Emperor  Francis  sent  him  to 
propose  an  armistice.  General  Giulay  did  not 
explain  himself  clearly,  but  it  was  evident  that 
he  wished  Napoleon  to  halt  before  entering 
Vienna;  yet  he  offered  in  return  no  guarantee 
of  a  speedy  and  acceptable  peace.  Napoleon 
consented,  indeed,  to  treat  of  peace  imme- 
diately with  a  plenipotentiary  sufficiently  ac- 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


credited,  and  authorized  to  consent  to  the  ne- 
cessary sacrifices;  but  to  grant  an  armistice 
without  guarantee  to  obtain  what  was  due  to 
him  as  an  indemnification  for  the  war,  was 
giving  the  second  Russian  army  time  to  join 
the  first,  and  the  archduke  time  to  join  the 
Russians  under  the  walls  of  Vienna.  Napo- 
leon was  not  the  man  to  commit  such  a  fault. 
He  declared,  therefore,  that  he  would  stop  at 
the  very  gates  of  Vienna,  and  not  pass  them, 
if  an  envoy  should  come  to  him  with  sincere 
proposals  of  peace,  but  that  otherwise  he 
should  proceed  direct  to  his  goal,  which  was 
the  capital  of  the  empire.  M.deGiulay  alleged 
the  necessity  of  consulting  with  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  before  conditions  acceptable  by  all 
the  belligerent  powers  could  be  fixed.  Napo- 
leon replied,  that  the  Emperor  Francis,  who 
was  in  danger,  would  be  wrong  to  make  his 
resolutions  dependent  on  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander, who  was  not  there ;  that  he  ought  to 
think  of  saving  his  monarchy,  and  to  that  end 
to  arrange  with  France,  leaving  it  to  the  French 
army  to  send  the  Russians  home.  Napoleon 
had  not  entered  into  any  explanation  respect- 
ing the  conditions  capable  of  satisfying  him  ; 
still  everybody  knew  that  he  wanted  the  Ve- 
netian states.  Those  states  formed  the  com- 
plement of  Italy ;  he  would  not  have  provoked 
a  war  to  acquire  them  ;  but,  war  having  been 
raised  by  Austria,  it  was  natural  that  he 
should  claim  this  the  legitimate  price  of  his 
victories.  He  delivered,  moreover,  to  M.  de 
Giulay  a  mild  and  polite  letter  for  the  Empe- 
ror Francis,  at  the  same  time  sufficiently  ex- 
plicit, relative  to  the  conditions  of  peace. 

Before  he  set  off",  Napoleon  received  also  a 
visit  from  the  Elector  of  Bavaria,  who,  unable 
to  join  him  at  Munich,  came  to  Linz  to  express 
his  gratitude,  his  admiration,  his  joy,  and, 
above  all,  his  hopes  of  aggrandizement. 

Napoleon  had  stayed  at  Linz  but  three  days, 
that  is  to  say,  precisely  the  time  necessary  for 
giving  his  orders.  But  his  corps  had  never 
ceased  marching;  for,  after  passing  the  Inn  on 
the  28th  and  29th  of  October,  the  Traun  on  the 
3lst,  the  Ens  on  the  4th  and  5ih  of  November, 
they  advanced  the  same  day  upon  Amstetten 
and  St.  Pollen.  At  Atnsletten,  the  Russians 
determined  to  have  a  rear-guard  action  in  or- 
der to  gain  time  to  save  their  baggage.  The 
high  road  to  Vienna  ran  through  a  forest  of 
firs.  The  Russians  took  position  on  a  clear- 
ing in  the  forest,  which  left  a  certain  space 
open  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  road.  In  the 
centre  of  this  space,  and  in  front  of  it,  was 
drawn  up  the  artillery  of  the  Russians,  sup- 
ported by  their  cavalry ;  in  rear,  and  backed 
upon  the  wood,  their  best  infantry.  Murat 
and  Lannes,  debouching  with  the  dragoons 
and  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  perceived  these  dis- 
positions. It  was  the  first  time  that  they  had 
met  the  Russians,  and  they  were  desirous  to 
teach  them  how  the  French  fought.  They 
despatched  the  dragoons  and  the  chasseurs  at 
a  gallop  along  the  high  road,  to  take  the  ene- 
my's artillery  and  cavalry.  Our  brave  horse, 
in  spite  of  the  grape-shot,  had  soon  taken  the 
guns,  cut  in  pieces  the  Russian  cavalry,  and 
cleared  the  ground.  But  it  was  necessary  to 
break  the  infantry  backed  upon  the  fir  wood. 

Voi.  II— 10 


Oudinot's  grenadiers  undertook  that  task.  Af- 
ter an  extremely  brisk  fire  of  musketry,  they 
advanced  with  bayonets  fixed  upon  the  Rus- 
sians. The  latter,  displaying  extraordinary 
bravery,  fought  hand  to  hand,  and  took  advan- 
tage for  a  long  time  of  the  thickness  of  the 
wood  to  resist.  At  last  our  grenadiers  forced 
them  in  this  position  and  put  them  to  flight, 
after  killing,  wounding,  or  taking  about  a  thou- 
sand men. 

Murat  and  Lannes,  proceeding  together,  the 
first  with  his  cavalry,  always  going,  though 
overwhelmed  with  fatigue,  the  second  with  his 
formidable  grenadiers,  continued  the  pursuit 
of  the  enemy  on  the  6th,  7th,  and  8th  of  No- 
vember, without  being  able  to  overtake  him 
anywhere.  "The  Russians,"  wrote  Lannes  to 
Napoleon,  "  run  away  faster  than  we  follow 
them;  those  wretches  will  not  even  stop  to 
fight."  Arriving  on  the  8th  before  St.  Pollen, 
Lannes  and  Murat  found  them  in  order  of  bat- 
tle, putting  on  a  bold  look,  as  if  they  meant  to 
make  a  serious  affair  of  it.  The  two  leaders 
of  our  advanced-guard,  notwithstanding  their 
ardour,  durst  not  hazard  a  battle  without  the 
Emperor.  Besides,  they  had  not  sufficient 
means  for  fighting  one.  The  hostile  troops 
remained  in  presence  of  each  other  the  whole 
of  the  8th.  They  were  near  the  beautiful  ab- 
bey of  Molk.  That  wealthy  abbey,  situated  on 
the  steep  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  overlooking 
the  broad  bed  of  the  river,  with  its  magnificent 
domes,  presents  one  of  the  finest  views  in  the 
world.  It  was  reserved  for  the  head-quarters 
of  the  Emperor.  It  contained  abundant  re- 
sources, especially  for  the  sick  and  the 
wounded. 

Murat  was  lodged  at  the  chateau  of  Mittran, 
with  a  Count  de  Montecuculli.  There  he 
learned  from  various  reports,  that  the  Russians 
had  no  intention  to  make  a  stand  at  St.  Pollen. 
They  had  actually  taken  a  very  important  re- 
solution. After  having  delayed  the  march  of 
the  French,  either  by  breaking  down  the 
bridges  or  by  rear-guard  fights,  and  complied 
with  the  wishes  of  the  Emperor  of  Austria, 
who  was  desirous  that  the  high  road  lo  Vienna 
should  be  disputed  as  long  as  possible,  the 
Russians  conceived  that  ihey  had  done  enough, 
and  thought  of  their  own  safety.  They  re- 
passed  the  Danube  at  Krems,  the  point  where 
that  river,  terminaling  its  bend  to  the  north, 
resumes  its  eastern  direction.  The  motive 
which  especially  instigated  this  determination 
was  the  intelligence  that  part  of  the  French 
army  had  passed  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Dan- 
ube. They  had  reason  to  apprehend,  in  fact, 
that  Napoleon,  throwing,  by  some  unforeseen 
manoeuvre,  the  bulk  of  his  forces  on  the  left 
bank,  might  cut  them  off  from  Bohemia  and 
Moravia.  In  consequence,  they  crossed  the 
Danube  at  Krems,  and  burned  the  bridge  after 
they  had  passed  it.  The  works  which  would 
have  enabled  them  to  defend  it,  and  to  insure 
its  exclusive  possession,  being  scarcely  begun, 
they  had  no  other  resource  but  to  destroy  it 
They  effected  their  passage  on  the  9lh,  leav- 
ing, throughout  the  whole  archduchy  of  Aus- 
tria, frightful  traces  of  their  presence.  They 
plundered,  ravaged,  and  even  murdered,  be- 
having like  downright  barbarians,  so  that  the 
6 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


French  were  almost  regarded  as  deliverers  by  : 
the  people  of  the  country.     Their  conduct  in  j 
particular   towards   the  Austrian  troops  was  I 
any  thing   but  friendly.     They  treated  them  I 
with  extreme  arrogance,  affecting  to  impute  to 
them  the  disasters  of  this  campaign.     The  lan- 
guage of  the  Russian  officers  and  generals  on 
this  subject  was  insultingly  offensive,  and  by 
no   means    deserved;   for,   if    the   Austrians 
showed  less  firmness  than  the  Russian  infant- 
ry, in  all  other  respects  they  were  far  superior. 

The  Austrians,  living  on  very  bad  terms 
with  the  Russians,  separated  from  them,  to  go 
and  concur  in  the  defence  of  the  bridges  of 
Vienna;  and  M.  de  Meerfeld,  with  his  corps, 
retired  by  the  road  from  Steyer  to  Leoben. 
He  marched,  followed  by  Marshal  Marmont, 
on  the  road  from  Waidhofen  to  Leoben,  and 
by  Marshal  Davout  on  that  from  St.  Gaming 
to  Lilienfeld.  The  direct  road  to  Vienna  was, 
therefore,  open  to  the  French,  and  they  had 
but  two  marches  to  make  in  order  to  be  at  the 
gates  of  that  capital,  and  no  enemy  before 
them  who  could  dispute  their  entry. 

The  temptation  could  not  but  be  great  for 
Murat.  It  was  difficult  for  him  to  withstand 
the  desire  to  dash  forward  and  to  show  the 
Austrian  capital  his  person,  always  the  most 
conspicuous  at  reviews  as  in  dangers.  Never 
had  an  army  from  the  West  penetrated  into 
this  metropolis  of  the  Germanic  empire.  Mo- 
reau  in  1800,  General  Bonaparte  in  1797,  had 
signed  armistices  when  nearly  arrived  there. 
The  Turks  alone  had  reached  its  walls  with- 
out passing  them.  Murat  could  not  resist  this 
temptation,  and  marched  on  the  10th  and  llth 
for  Vienna,  urging  Marshals  Soult  and  Lannes 
to  accompany  him.  He  took  care,  it  is  true, 
not  to  enter,  and  halted  at  Burkersdorf,  in  the 
mountainous  defile  of  the  Kahlenberg,  two 
leagues  from  Vienna. 

This  was  a  useless  and  even  a  dangerous 
haste.  A  change  so  unforeseen  as  that  which 
had  just  manifested  itself  in  the  march  of  the 
enemy,  made  it  worth  while  to  halt  and  wait 
for  the  Emperor's  orders.  Besides,  it  was  pre- 
ceding too  far  the  corps  of  Marshal  Marmont, 
as  well  as  the  flotilla  destined  to  keep  that 
corps  in  communication  with  the  army,  and 
running  blindly  between  the  Russians,  who 
had  passed  to  the  other  side  of  the  Danube, 
and  the  Austrians  who  were  beaten  back  into 
the  mountains. 

At  this  instant,  in  fact,  peril  threatened 
Marshal  Mortier,1  placed  on  the  left  bank  of 
the  Danube,  and  coming  near  Stein,  into  the 
presence  of  the  Russians,  who  had  crossed 
the  river  at  Krems.  The  danger  of  Marshal 
Mortier  was  not  precisely  imputable  to  Murat, 
though  the  latter  had  contributed  to  produce 
and  to  aggravate  it  by  his  precipitate  move- 
ment upon  Vienna,  but  to  a  negligence  scarce- 
ly ever  to  be  met  with  in  the  operations  di- 

1  MORTIER,  ADOLPHE  CASIMIR  JOSEPH.  Born  at  Cam- 
bray  in  1768.  His  father,  a  wealthy  farmer,  gave  him  a 
good  education.  He  entered  a  cavalry  regiment  in  1791, 
and  soon  fought  his  way  to  the  rank  of  adjutant-general. 
Under  Pichegru,  Moreau,  and  Massena,  on  the  Rhine  and 
in  Switzerland,  he  fought  his  way  to  the  command  of  a 
division.  In  1804,  he  was  rewarded  for  his  capture  of 
Hanover  by  a  marshal's  baton.  In  1808,  he  wai  made 


reeled  by  Napoleon,  and  which,  nevertheless 
did  occur  in  this  instance,  for  there  are  inter- 
vals even  in  the  most  unremitting  and  most 
indefatigable  vigilance. 

Distracted  by  a  thousand  things,  Napoleon 
had  omitted  to  follow  one  of  his  most  inva- 
riable habits,  which  consisted  in  always  as- 
suring himself  of  the  execution  of  his  orders, 
after  he  had  given  them.  He  had  prescribed, 
in  a  general  manner,  the  union  of  Gazan's, 
Dupont's  and  Dumonceau's  divisions  into  a 
single  corps,  the  formation  of  a  flotilla  under 
Captain  Lostanges,  to  connect  the  columns 
marching  on  the  left  bank  with  those  march- 
ing on  the  right  bank,  and  he  had  depended 
too  much  upon  his  lieutenants  to  make  all 
these  things  harmonize.  Murat  had  advanced 
too  rapidly :  Mortier,  whether  drawn  along  by 
Murat's  movement,  or  whether  he  had  not 
given  General  Dupont  instructions  sufficiently 
precise,  had  left  the  interval  of  a  march  be- 
tween Gazan's  division,  which  he  had  with 
him,  and  Dupont's  and  Dumonceau's  divisions, 
which  were  to  join  him.  The  flotilla,  difficult 
to  collect,  was  left  far  behind. 

Meanwhile,  Napoleon,  quick  at  discovering 
negligences,  hastened  to  Molk,  and,  guessing 
the  danger  of  Marshal  Mortier,  though  not  yet 
apprized  of  it,  he  stopped  Marshal  Soult's 
corps,  which  Murat  had  wanted  to  take  with 
him,  and  sent  aides-de-camp  to  Murat  and 
Lannes  to  slacken  their  movement.  He  was 
fearful  not  only  of  what  might  happen  to  the 
corps  thrown  upon  the  left  bank  of  the  Da- 
nube, but  what  might  befall  the  advanced- 
guard  itself,  imprudently  carried  into  the  de- 
files of  the  Kahlenberg. 

Nowhere  are  faults  so  speedily  punished  as 
in  war,  for  nowhere  do  causes  and  effects  so 
speedily  follow  each  other.  The  Russians, 
guided,  upon  the  Austrian  territory,  by  an 
officer  of  the  Austrian  staff  of  the  highest 
merit,  Colonel  Schmidt,  soon  perceived  the 
existence  of  a  solitary  French  division  on  the 
left  bank  of  the  Danube,  and  resolved  to  cut  it 
off.  Feeling  secure,  from  the  destruction  of 
the  bridge  of  Krems,  which  prevented  the 
French  army  from  coming  to  the  assistance 
of  the  compromised  division,  not  perceiving  a 
mass  of  boats  which  might  make  amends  for 
the  want' of  a  bridge,  they  halted  to  procure 
for  themselves  an  apparently  easy  triumph. 
Gazan's  division  numbered  scarcely  5000 
men;  the  Russians,  since  their  separation 
from  the  Austrians,  were  still  nearly  40,000. 
The  ground  was  favourable  to  their  designs. 
The  Danube,  at  this  point,  runs  between 
steep  banks,  contracted  by  the  mountains  of 
Bohemia  on  the  one  hand,  and  by  the  Alps  of 
Styria  on  the  other.  From  Dirnstein  to  Stein 
and  to  Krems,  the  road  on  the  left  bank,  nar- 
row, frequently  hewn  out  of  the  rock,  is  bor- 
dered by  the  Danube  and  the  mountains,  which 


Duke  of  Treviso,  and  served  in  Spain,  where  he  took  Ba- 
dajos.  He  fought  well  at  Dresden  and  Lutzen  in  the 
campaign  of  1813,  and  in  1814  at  Monlmirail,  Troyes,  and 
under  the  walls  of  Paris.  Illness  prevented  his  serving 
at  Waterloo.  He  was  killed  by  the  discharge  of  the  in- 
fernal machine  prepared  for  the  destruction  of  Louil 
Philippe  in  1836.— Court  and  Camp  of  Napoleon  H 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


75 


overlook  the  river.  It  is  difficult  for  carriages,  eyes,  not  one,  either  officer  or  soldier,  ever 
Marshal  Mortier,  who  was  marching  upon  it  thought  of  capitulating.  To  die  to  the  last 
with  Gazan's  division,  had,  therefore,  put  into  j  man  rather  than  surrender  was  the  only  alter- 
boats  the  only  battery  that  he  had  at  his  dis-  I  native  which  presented  itself  to  these  brave 
posal.  The  horses,  led  by  hand,  followed  the  |  fellows,  so  heroic  was  the  spirit  which  an- 

'  imated  this  army !  Marshal  Mortier  thought 
like  his  soldiers,  and  like  them  he  was  resolved 
to  perish  rather  than  surrender  his  marshal's 
sword  to  the  Russians.  He  therefore  ordered 


division. 

On  the  llth  of  November,  while  Murat,  on 
the  right  bank,  was  running  to  the  gates  of 
Vienna,  Mortier,  on  the  left  bank,  had  passed 
Dirnstein,  where  are  the  ruins  of  a  castle  in 
which  Richard  Cceur  de  Lion  was  kept  pri- 
soner. At  this  point  of  Dirnstein,  the  moun- 


tains recede  a  little,  and  leave  a  space  be- 
tween their  foot  and  the  river.    The  road  runs 


them  to  march  in  close  column  and  to  force 
their  way  with  the  bayonet,  while  retreating  to 
Dirnstein,  where  they  should  be  rejoined  by 


Dupont's  division.  It  was  dark.  The  battle 
which  they  had  fought  with  the  Russians  in 
through  this  space,  sometimes  imbedded  in  the  '  the  morning  was  renewed  in  the  obscurity  of 
ground,  sometimes  raised  above  it  by  a  cause-  '  night,  but  in  an  opposite  direction.  Again 
way.  The  French  division,  having  entered  '  they  were  engaged  hand  to  hand  in  this  nar- 


upon  this  road,  perceived  the  smoke  of  the 
bridge  of  Krems,  which  was  still  burning. 
Presently  it  descried  the  Russians,  and  con- 
jectured that  they  had  passed  the  Danube  over 
this  bridge.  Without  considering  what  there 
might  be  before  it,  impelled  by  the  ardour 
common  to  the  whole  army,  it  thought  only  of 
pushing  forward  and  of  fighting.  Mortier 
gave  the  order  for  it,  which  was  instantly  ex- 
ecuted. An  officer  of  artillery,  since  General 
Fabvier,  who  commanded  the  battery  attached 
to  Gazan's  division,  had  his  pieces  landed  and 
placed  them  in  position.  The  Russians  ad- 
vanced in  a  close  mass  towards  the  French 
division.  The  fire  of  the  artillery  made  dread- 
ful havoc  in  their  ranks.  They  rushed  upon 
the  guns  to  take  them.  The  infantry  of  the 
100th  and  103d  regiments  of  the  line  defended 
them  with  extreme  vigour.  A  most  obstinate 
fight,  hand  to  hand,  ensued  in  this  narrow 
road.  The  cannon  were  taken,  but  immedi- 
ately retaken.  No  sooner  were  they  wrested 
from  the  Russians,  than  they  were  fired  at 
them,  almost  close  to  the  muzzles,  with  terri- 
bly destructive  effect.  The  French,  posted  on 
the  slightest  rising  grounds,  kept  up  a  fire  of 
musketry,  which  did  not  less  execution  than 
their  artillery.  The  fight  was  kept  up  at  this 
point  for  half  a  day,  and,  to  judge  from  the 
wounded  found  on  the  morrow,  the  enemy 
must  have  sustained  great  loss.  Fifteen  hun- 
dred prisoners  were  taken.  The  French  were 
at  last  left  masters  of  the  ground,  and  thought 
that  they  might  rest  themselves  there. 

They  had  advanced  while  fighting  as  far  as 
Stein.  The  4th  light,  spread  over  the  heights 
which  overlook  the  river,  kept  up  a  well-sus- 
tained tirailleur  fire,  which  became  every  mo- 
ment more  and  more  brisk.  The  cause  of  it, 
which  it  had  been  at  first  difficult  to  account 
for,  was  soon  explained.  The  Russians  had 
turned  the  heights.  With  two  columns,  form- 
ing a  mass  of  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  men, 
they  had  descended  on  the  rear  of  Gazan's 
division  and  entered  Dirnstein,  through  which 
this  division  had  passed  in  the  morning.  It 
was,  therefore,  enveloped  and  separated  from 
Dupont's  division,  which  had  been  left  a  march 
behind.  No  part  of  the  flotilla  was  to  be  seen 
on  the  Danube,  and  consequently  they  had 
very  little,  hope  of  escape  left  them.  Night 
was  approaching ;  the  situation  was  frightful, 
and  no  doubt  they  should  have  a  whole  army 
upon  them.  In  this  extremity,  evident  to  all 


row  road,  the  men  being  so  close  that  they 
frequently  seized  each  other  by  the  throat. 
While  fighting  in  this  manner,  the  French 
gained  ground  towards  Dirnstein.  However, 
after  penetrating  through  several  masses  of 
enemies,  they  began  to  despair  of  accomplish- 
ing their  object,  or  of  opening  themselves  a 
passage  that  was  incessantly  closed  again. 
Some  of  Mortier's  officers,  perceiving  no  fur- 
ther chance  of  saving  themselves,  proposed  to 
him  to  embark  alone,  and  to  withdraw  his 
person  at  least  from  the  Russians,  that  such  a 
trophy  as  a  marshal  of  France  might  not  be 
left  in  their  hands. 

"  No,"  replied  the  illustrious  marshal,  "  we 
must  not  forsake  such  brave  fellows.  We 
must  be  saved  or  perish  with  them." 

There  he  was  sword  in  hand,  fighting  at  the 
head  of  his  grenadiers,  and  making  repeated 
assaults  to  get  back  to  Dirnstein,  when,  all  at 
once,  a  most  violent  firing  was  heard  in  the 
rear  of  Dirnstein.  Hope  instantly  revived,  for, 
according  to  all  probabilities,  this  must  be  Du- 
pont's division  arriving.  In  fact,  that  brave 
division,  which  had  marched  all  day,  had 
learned  in  advancing,  the  dangerous  situation 
of  Marshal  Mortier,  and  was  hastening  to  his 
assistance.  General  Marchand,  with  the  9th 
light,  supported  by  the  96th  and  32d  regiments 
of  the  line,  the  same  that  had  distinguished 
themselves  at  Haslach,  plunged  into  that 
gorge.  Some  pushed  on  direct  for  Dirnstein, 
others  entered  the  ravines  which  descend  from 
the  mountains,  to  drive  back  the  Russians.  A 
battle,  quite  as  obstinate  as  that  which  the  sol- 
diers of  Gazan's  division  were  at  this  moment 
fighting,  ensued  in  these  defiles.  At  length, 
the  9th  light  penetrated  to  Dirnstein,  while 
Marshal  Mortier  was  entering  on  the  opposite 
side.  The  two  columns  rejoined  and  recog- 
nised each  other,  by  the  fire-light.  The  sol- 
diers embraced  one  another,  overjoyed  at  hav- 
ing escaped  such  a  disaster. 

The  losses  were  cruel  on  both  sides,  but  the 
glory  was  not  equal,  for  5000  French  had  re- 
sisted more  than  30,000  Russians,  and  had 
saved  their  colours  by  fighting  their  way 
through.  These  are  examples  which  ought 
for  ever  to  be  recommended  to  a  nation.  Sol 
diers  who  have  resolved  to  die  can  always 
save  their  honour,  and  frequently  succeed  in 
saving  their  liberty  and  their  lives. 

Marshal  Mortier  found  in  Dirnstein  the  1500 
prisoners  whom  he  had  taken  in  the  morning. 


76 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


The  Russians  lost,  in  killed,  wounded,  and 
prisoners,  about  4000  men.  In  that  number 
was  Colonel  Schmidt.  The  enemy  could  not 
sustain  a  more  severe  loss,  and  they  soon  had 
reason  to  regret  it  bitterly.  The  French  num- 
bered 3000  men  hors  de  combat,  either  killed  or 
wounded.  Half  of  the  effective  force  of  Ga- 
zan's  division  had  fallen. 

When  Napoleon,  who  was  at  Molk,  learned 
the  issue  of  this  rencounter,  he  was  relieved 
from  the  apprehensions  which  he  had  enter- 
tained of  the  entire  destruction  of  Gazan's  di- 
vision. He  was  delighted  with  the  conduct  of 
Marshal  Mortier  and  his  soldiers,  and  he  sent 
the  most  signal  rewards  to  the  two  divisions 
of  Gazan  and  Dupont  He  recalled  them  to 
the  right  bank  of  the  Danube,  to  give  time  for 
their  wounds  to  heal,  and  destined  Bernadotte 
to  succeed  them  on  the  left  bank.  He  cen- 
sured Murat  for  the  un connectedness  which 
had  prevailed  in  the  different  columns  of  the 
army.  The  character  of  Napoleon  was  indul- 
gent, his  mind  stern.  He  preferred  simple, 
solid,  sedate  bravery  to  brilliant  bravery, 
though  he  employed  all  sorts,  such  as  nature 
presented  them  to  him,  in  his  armies.  He 
was  in  general  severe  towards  Murat,  whose 
levity,  ostentation,  and  restless  ambition,  he 
disliked,  though  at  the  same  time  he  did  jus- 
tice to  his  excellent  heart  and  his  transcen- 
dent courage.  "My  cousin,"  he  wrote  to  him, 
"I  cannot  approve  of  your  manner  of  marching. 
You  go  like  a  hare-brained  fellow,  without 
weighing  the  orders  that  I  send  you.  The  Rus- 
sians, instead  of  covering  Vienna,  have  re- 
crossed  the  Danube  at  Krems.  This  extraordi- 
nary circumstance  ought  to  have  suggested  to 
you  that  you  could  not  act  without  fresh  instruc- 
tions. Without  knowing  what  plans  the  ene- 
my may  have,  or  inquiring  what  was  my  plea- 
sure in  this  new  order  of  things,  you  go  and 
draw  away  my  army  towards  Vienna.  You 
have  consulted  only  the  petty  vanity  of  enter- 
ing Vienna.  There  is  no  glory  but  where 
there  is  danger.  There  is  none  in  entering  a 
defenceless  capital."  (Molk,the  llth  of  Novem- 
ber.) 

Murat,  on  this  occasion,  expiated  the  faults 
of  everybody.  He  had,  it  is  true,  marched 
too  rapidly ;  but,  had  he  remained  before 
Krems,  without  bridges  and  without  boats,  he 
would  have  been  of  no  great  assistance  to 
Mortier,  who  had  been  compromised  chiefly 
by  the  distance  left  between  Dupont' s  and  Ga- 
zan's divisions,  by  the  absence  of  the  flotilla. 
Murat  was  deeply  grieved.  Napoleon,  ap- 
prized by  his  aide-de-camp,  Bertrand,  of  his 
brother-in-law's  affliction,  corrected  by  a  few 
soothing  expressions  the  effect  of  this  harsh 
reprimand. 

Napoleon,  desirous  at  the  moment  of  deriv- 
ing advantage  from  the  very  fault  of  Murat, 
enjoined  him,  since  he  was  in  sight  of  Vienna, 
not  to  enter  it,  but  to  go  along  the  walls  and 
seize  the  great  bridge  of  the  Danube,  which  is 
thrown  across  that  river,  outside  the  suburbs 
This  bridge  occupied,  Napoleon  further  directed 
him  to  advance  with  all  expedition  upon  the 
road  to  Moravia,  in  order  to  arrive  before  the 
Russians  at  the  point  where  the  road  from 
Krems  joins  the  high  road  to  Olmutz.  If  he 


secured  the  bridge  and  marched  rapidly,  it 
might  be  possible  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  Ge- 
neral Kutusof  towards  Moravia,  and  to  subject 
lira  to  a  disaster  nearly  equal  to  that  of  Ge- 
neral Mack.  Murat  had  now  an  opportunity 
to  repair  his  faults,  and  he  seized  it  eagerly. 

Still  it  was  scarcely  to  be  supposed  that  the 
Austrians  had  committed  such  a  blunder  as  to 
leave  standing  the  bridges  of  Vienna,  which 
must  render  the  French  masters  of  both  banks 
of  the  river,  or  that,  if  they  had  left  them 
standing,  they  had  not  made  every  preparation 
for  destroying  them  at  the  first  signal.  No- 
thing, therefore,  was  more  doubtful  than  the 
operation  wished  for  rather  than  ordered  by 
Napoleon. 

The  Austrians  had  no  intention  to  defend 
Vienna.  That  fine  and  large  capital  has  a 
regular  enclosure,  that  which  resisted  the 
Turks  in  1683,  and  as,  in  time,  the  city  in- 
creased too  much  to  remain  shut  up  in  that 
space,  and  extensive  suburbs  arose  all  round 
it,  the  whole  was  encompassed  with  a  wall  of 
no  great  height,  in  the  form  of  redans,  sur- 
rounding the  whole  of  the  ground  built  upon. 
All  this  was  but  a  slight  defence,  for  the  wall 
which  covers  the  suburbs  was  easy  to  force; 
and,  once  master  of  the  suburbs,  one  might, 
with  a  few  shells,  oblige  the  body  of  the  place 
to  surrender.  The  Emperor  Francis  had 
charged  Count  Wurbna,  a  discreet  and  con- 
ciliatory man,  to  receive  the  French,  and  to 
concert  with  them  for  the  peaceable  posses- 
sion of  the  capital.  But  it  was  decided  that 
the  passage  of  the  river  should  be  disputed. 

Vienna  is  situated  at  a  certain  distance  from 
the  Danube,  which  runs  to  the  left  of  that  city, 
between  wooded  islands.  The  great  bridge, 
of  wood,  crossing  several  arms  of  the  river, 
forms  a  communication  from  one  bank  to  the 
other.  The  Austrians  had  placed  combustibles 
under  the  flooring  of  the  bridge,  and  were 
ready  to  blow  it  up  the  moment  that  the  French 
should  make  their  appearance.  They  were 
posted  on  the  left  bank,  with  their  artillery 
pointed,  and  a  corps  of  seven  or  eight  thou- 
sand men,  commanded  by  Count  Auersper?. 

Murat  had  approached  near  to  the  bridge, 
without  entering  the  city,  which,  owing  to  the 
localities,  it  was  easy  to  do.  At  this  moment 
the  rumour,  of  an  armistice  was  universally 
circulated.  Napoleon,  having  arrived  at  the 
palace  of  Schiinbrunn,  situated  on  the  high 
road,  before  you  come  to  Vienna,  had  been 
wailed  upon  by  a  deputation  of  the  inhabitants 
of  that  capital,  who  had  hastened  thither  to 
implore  his  clemency.  He  received  them 
with  all  the  attentions  due  to  an  excellent 
people,  and  from  civilized  nations  towards 
each  other.  He  had  also  received  and  ap- 
peared to  listen  to  M.  Giulay,  who  came  to 
repeat  the  overtures  previously  made  at  Linz. 
The  idea  of  an  armistice,  appearing  likely  to 
lead  to  peace,  had,  therefore,  spread  rapidly. 
Napoleon  had,  at  the  same  time,  sent  General 
Bertrand  to  renew  the  order  to  Murat  and 
Lannes  to  get  possession  of  the  bridges  if  pos- 
sible. Murat  and  Lannes  needed  no  spurring. 
They  had  placed  Oudinot's  grenadiers  behind 
the  umbrageous  plantations  that  border  the 
Danube,  and  advanced  themselves  with  some 


NOT.  1805.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


77 


aides-de-camp  to  the  tcte  de  pont.  General 
Bertrand  and  an  officer  of  the  engineers,  Co- 
lonel Dode  de  la  Brunerie,  had  repaired  thither 
also. 

A  wooden  barrier  closed  this  tele  de  pont. 
Orders  were  given  to  throw  it  down.     Behind,] 
at  some  distance,  was  posted  an  hussar,  as  I 
vidette,  who  fired   his  carbine,  and  galloped 
off.     He  was  followed  over  the  long  and  sinu- 
ous line  of  the  small  bridges    thrown  across 
the  several  arms  of  the  river,  till  his  pursuers 
came  to  the  great  bridge  over  the  principal 
arm.     Instead  of  planks,  nothing  was  to  be  j 
seen  but  a  bed  of  fascines  spread  on  the  floor- 
ing.    At  that  very  moment  an  Austrian  sub- ; 
officer  of  artillery  appeared  with  a  match  in  I 
his  hand.     Colonel  Dode  seized  and  slopped 
him  just  as  he  was  about  to  fire  the  train  com- ' 
municating  with  the  fire-works  placed  under 
the  arches.    In  this  manner  the  French  officers 
reached  the  other  bank :  they  addressed  the 
Austrian  artillerymen,  told  them  that  an  armis- 
tice  was   signed,  or   on   the   point  of   being 
signed,  that  peace  was  negotiating,  and  desired 
to  speak  with   the  general,  commanding  the 
troops. 

The  Austrians,  taken  by  surprise,  hesitated, 
and    conducted    General  Bertrand    to    Count 
Auersperg.  Meanwhile,  a  column  of  grenadiers 
advanced  by  Murat's  order.  It  could  not  be  seen, ; 
owing  to  the  large  trees  by  the  river,  and  the  ; 
windings  of  that  route,  which  alternately  cross-  , 
ed  bridges  and  wooded  islands.  While  awaiting 
their  arrival,  the  French  chiefs  continued  to 
converse  with  the  Austrians  under  the  mouths 
of  their  cannon.    All   at  once  the  long-con- 
cealed column   of  grenadiers  came  in  sight. ! 
The  Austrians,  beginning  to  perceive  that  they 
had  been    tricked,  prepared  to  fire.     Lannes 
and  Murat,  with  the  officers  who  accompanied 
them,  rushed  upon  the  gunners,  talked  to  them, 
made  them  hesitate  afresh,  and  thus  gave  the 
column  time  to  come  up.     The  grenadiers  at 
length  fell  upon  the  cannon,  seized  them,  and 
disarmed  the  Austrians. 

Meanwhile,  Count  Auersperg  came  up  ac- 
companied by  General  Bertrand  and  Colonel 
Dode.     He  was  painfully  surprised  to  see  the 
bridge  in   the  hands  of  the  French,  and  these 
collected  in  considerable  number  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Danube.     He  had  some  thousands 
of  infantry  left  to  dispute  the  possession  of: 
what  they  had  wrested   from    him.      But  the  | 
French  officers  repeated  to  him  all  the  stories  j 
by  which  they  had  already  lulled  the  guard  of, 
the  bridge,  and  persuaded  him  that  he  ought' 
to  retire  with  his  soldiers  to  a  certain  distance 
from  the  river.     Besides,  fresh  French  troops 
were  every  moment  arriving,  and  it  was  too 
late  to  resort  to  force.    M.  Auersperg  therefore 
withdrew,    agitated,    confounded,     appearing 
scarcely  to  comprehend  what  had  just  occurred. 

It  was  by  means  of  this  audacious  trick, 
seconded  by  the  unparalleled  courage  of  those 
who  played  it,  and  with  complete  success, 
that  the  bridges  of  Vienna  fell  into  our  hands. 
Four  years  later,  for  want  of  these  bridges, 
the  passage  of  the  Danube  cost  us  sanguinary 
battles,  which  had  wellnigh  proved  fatal  to 
us. 

The  joy  of  Napoleon,  on  hearing  of  this 


success,  was  extreme.  He  thought  no  longer 
of  snubbing  Murat,  but  sent  him  off  immedi- 
ately, with  the  reserve  cavalry,  the  corps  of 
Lannes,  and  that  of  Marshal  Soult,  to  proceed 
by  the  road  of  Stockerau  and  Hollabrunn,  to 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  General  Kutusof. 

Having  despatched  these  orders,  he  directed 
all  his  attention  to  the  police  of  Vienna  and 
the  military  occupation  of  that  capital.  It 
was  a  glorious  triumph  to  enter  that  ancient 
metropolis  of  the  Germanic  empire,  in  the 
bosom  of  which  the  enemy  had  never  ap- 
peared but  as  master.  During  the  last  two 
centuries  considerable  wars  had  been  waged, 
memorable  battles  won  and  lost,  but  never 
had  a  great  general  been  yet  seen  planting 
his  standard  in  the  capitals  of  mighty  States. 
Men  were  obliged  to  go  back  to  the  times  of 
the  conquerors  to  find  examples  of  such  vast 
results. 

Napoleon,  for  his  part,  took  up  his  abode  at 
the  imperial  palace  of  Schonbrunn.  He  gave 
the  command  of  the  city  of  Vienna  to  Gene- 
ral Clarke,  and  left  the  police  to  the  city  mili- 
tia. He  ordered  and  enforced  the  observance 
of  the  strictest  military  discipline,  and  suf- 
fered no  property  to  be  touched  but  the  public 
property,  such  as  the  chests  of  the  govern- 
ment and  the  arsenals.  The  great  arsenal  of 
Vienna  contained  immense  stores — 100,000 
muskets,  2000  pieces  of  cannon,  ammunition 
of  every  kind.  It  was  surprising  that  the 
Emperor  Francis  bad  not  caused  it  to  be  eva- 
cuated by  means  of  the  Danube.  Possession 
was  taken  of  all  that  it  contained  for  the  ac- 
count of  the  army. 

Napoleon  then  distributed  his  forces  in  such 
a  manner  as  to  guard  the  capital  duly,  and  to 
observe  the  road  from  the  Alps  by  which  the 
archdukes  might  soon  arrive,  that  of  Hungary, 
by  which  they  might  come  somewhat  later, 
lastly,  that  of  Moravia,  on  which  the  Russians 
were  in  force. 

We  have  seen  that  he  had  despatched  General 
Marmont  by  the  Leoben  road,  to  occupy  the 
pass  of  the  Alps,  and  Marshal  Davout  by  the 
road  of  St.  Gaming,  to  turn  the  position  of 
St.  Pollen.  The  latter  laboriously  climbed  the 
steepest  mountains  amidst  the  snow  and  ice 
of  a  precocious  winter,  and,  thanks  to  the  de- 
votedness  of  the  soldiers  and  the  energy  of 
the  officers,  he  had  surmounted  all  obstacles, 
when,  near  Mariazell,  on  the  high  road  from 
Leoben  to  St.  Piilten,  he  fell  in  with  the  corps 
of  General  Meerfeld  in  flight  from  General 
Marmont.  An  action  of  the  same  kind  that 
Massena  had  formerly  fought  in  the  Alps,  im- 
mediately ensued  between  the  French  and  the 
Austrians.  Marshal  Davout  overthrew  the 
latter,  took  from  them  4000  men,  and  drove 
the  rest  in  disorder  into  the  mountains.  He 
then  descended  upon  Vienna.  General  Mar- 
mont,  on  reaching  Leoben,  almost  without 
striking  a  blow,  halted  there  and  waited  for 
new  instructions  from  the  Emperor. 

Events  were  not  less  favourable  in  the  Ty- 
rol and  Italy.  Marshal  Ney,  sent,  after  the 
occupation  of  Ulm,  to  take  possession  of  the 
Tyrol,  had  luckily  chosen  the  debtnu-M  of 
Scharnits,  the  Por/a  Clawiin  of  the  ancients, 
for  penetrating  into  it.  This  was  one  of  the 

G  2 


78 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


most  difficult  passes  of  that  country,  but  it 
had  the  advantage  of  leading  straight  to  Ins- 
pruck,  amidst  the  dispersed  troops  of  the  Aus- 
trians,  which,  not  expecting  this  attack,  were 
scattered  from  the  Lake  of  Constance  to  the 
sources  of  the  Drave.  Marshal  Ney  had  not 
more  than  nine  or  ten  thousand  men,  intrepid 
soldiers  like  their  commander,  and  with  whom 
any  thing  might  be  undertaken.  He  made 
them  scale  in  the  month  of  November  the 
highest  peaks  of  the  Alps,  in  spite  of  the  rocks, 
which  the  inhabitants  tumbled  upon  their 
heads ;  for  the  Tyrolese,  strongly  attached  to 
the  House  of  Austria,  would  not  be  subjects 
of  Bavaria,  to  which  they  were  threatened  to 
be  transferred.  He  stormed  the  entrench- 
ments of  Scharnitz,  entered  Inspruck,  dis- 
persed the  surprised  Austrians,  and  drove 
some  of  them  into  the  Vorarlberg,  the  others 
into  Italian  Tyrol.  General  Jellachich  and 
Prince  de  Rohan  were  beaten  back  towards 
the  Vorarlberg,  and  from  the  Vorarlberg 
towards  the  Lake  of  Constance,  along  the 
very  route  by  which  Augereau  was  coming. 
As  though  Fate  had  decreed  that  none  of  the 
wrecks  of  the  army  of  Ulm  should  escape 
the  French,  General  Jellachich,  the  same  who 
at  the  surrender  of  Memmingen  had  evaded 
the  pursuit  of  Marshal  Soult,  came  full  butt 
upon  Augereau's  corps.  Seeing  no  chance 
of  escape,  he  laid  down  his  arms  with  a  de- 
tachment of  6000  men.  The  Prince  de  Ro- 
han, less  advanced  towards  the  Vorarlberg, 
had  time  to  fall  back.  He  made  an  audacious 
march  through  the  cantonments  of  our  troops, 
which,  after  the  taking  of  Inspruck,  were  neg- 
ligently guarding  the  Brenner,  beguiled  the 
vigilance  of  Loison,  one  of  Marshal  Ney's 
divisionary  generals,  passed  close  to  Botzen, 
almost  before  his  eyes,  and  then  fell  upon  Ve- 
rona and  Venice,  while  Massena  was  pursu- 
ing the  rear  of  the  Archduke  Charles.  Mas- 
sena had  charged  General  St.  Cyr,  with  the 
troops  brought  back  from  Naples,  to  blockade 
Venice,  in  which  the  Archduke  Charles  had 
left  a  strong  garrison.  General  St.  Cyr,  asto- 
nished at  the  presence  of  a  hostile  corps  on 
the  rear  of  Massena,  when  the  latter  was  al- 
ready at  the  foot  of  the  Julian  Alps,  marched 
with  the  utmost  expedition,  and  enveloped  the 
Prince  de  Rohan,  who  was  obliged,  like  Gene- 
ral Jellachich,  to  lay  down  his  arms.  On  this 
occasion  General  St.  Cyr  took  about  5000 
men. 

Meanwhile,  the  Archduke  Charles  was  con- 
tinuing his  arduous  retreat  through  the  Friule 
and  beyond  the  Julian  Alps.  His  brother,  the 
Archduke  John,  passing  from  the  Italian  Tyrol 
into  Carinthia,  followed  in  the  interior  of  the 
Alps  a  line  exactly  parallel  to  his.  The  two 
archdukes,  despairing  with  reason  of  arriving 
in  useful  time  atone  of  the  defensive  positions 
of  the  Danube,  and  judging  it  too  rash  to  fall 
upon  the  flank  of  Napoleon,  had  decided  to 
meet  at  Layback,  the  one  by  Villach,  the  other 
by  Udine,  and  then  to  proceed  to  Hungary. 
There  they  might  with  the  utmost  safety  join 
the  Russians  who  occupied  Moravia,  and, 
having  effected  their  junction  with  these  latter, 
they  might  resume  the  offensive,  if  the  allied 
armies  had  not  been  compromised  by  any 


fault,  and  if  the  two  sovereigns  of  Austria  and 
Russia  had  still  the  courage  to  prolong  the 
contest. 

General  Marmont,  placed  in  advance  of 
Leoben,  on  the  crests  which  separate  the  val- 
ley of  the  Danube  from  that  of  the  Drave, 
almost  saw  with  mortification  the  troops  of  the 
Archduke  John  filing  away  before  him,  and 
burned  with  impatience  to  fight  them.  But  a 
precise  order  chained  his  ardour,  and  enjoined 
him  to  confine  himself  to  guarding  the  defiles 
of  the  Alps. 

Massena,  after  pursuing  the  Archduke 
Charles  as  far  as  the  Julian  Alps,  had  halted 
at  the  foot  of  them,  and  conceived  that  he 
ought  not  to  venture  into  Hungary  in  pursuit 
of  the  archdukes.  He  gave  a  hand  to  General 
Marmont,  and  waited  for  orders  from  the  Em- 
peror. 

All  these  movements  were  finished  by  the 
middle  of  November,  nearly  at  the  same  time 
that  the  grand  army  was  performing  its  march 
upon  Vienna.  Assuredly,  if  one  had  devised 
a  plan  in  the  tranquillity  qf  the  closet,  with 
the  facilities  which  abound  for  tracing  projects 
on  the  map,  one  would  not  have  arranged  mat- 
ters with  greater  ease.  In  six  weeks  that 
army,  passing  the  Rhine  and  the  Danube,  in- 
terposing between  the  Austrian  posts  in  Suabia 
and  the  Russians  arriving  upon  the  Inn,  had 
enveloped  the  one,  beaten  back  the  other,  sur- 
prised the  Tyrol  by  a  detachment,  then  oc- 
cupied Vienna,  and  turned  the  position  of  the 
archdukes  in  Italy,  which  had  obliged  the  lat- 
ter to  seek  refuge  in  Hungary.  History  no- 
where presents  such  another  spectacle :  in 
twenty  days  from  the  Ocean  to  the  Rhine,  in. 
forty  from  the  Rhine  to  Vienna!  And  though 
separations  of  forces,  so  dangerous  in  war,  are 
most  frequently  attended  with  reverses  only; 
here  corps  had  been  seen  detached  to  a  dis- 
tance, which,  without  running  any  risk,  had 
accomplished  their  object,  because  at  the  cen- 
tre a  mighty  mass,  striking  opportunely  deci- 
sive blows  at  the  principal  bodies  assembled 
by  the  enemy,  had  imparted  an  impulsion  to 
which  every  thing  gave  way,  and  had  not  left, 
either  upon  its  rear  or  upon  its  wings,  any 
consequences  which  might  not  easily  be  ga- 
thered:  so  that  this  dispersion  was,  in  reality, 
nothing  but  a  skilful  distribution  of  accesso- 
ries beside  the  principal  action,  regulated  with 
wonderful  precision.  But,  after  admiring  that 
profound,  that  incomparable  art,  which  aston- 
ishes by  its  very  simplicity,  we  must  admire 
also  in  this  manner  of  operating  another  con- 
dition, without  which  every  combination,  how- 
ever judicious,  may  become  a  peril — that  is, 
such  a  vigour  in  the  soldiers  and  lieutenants 
that,  when  they  were  overtaken  by  an  unfore- 
seen accident,  they  knew  how,  by  their  energy, 
as  the  soldiers  of  General  Dupont  at  Haslach, 
of  Marshal  Mortier  at  Dirnstein,  of  Marshal 
Ney  at  Elchingen,  to  give  the  supreme  intelli- 
gence which  directed  them  time  to  come  to 
their  assistance,  and  to  repair  the  inevitable 
errors  in  even  the  best  conducted  operations. 
Let  us  repeat  what  we  have  already  remarked 
— a  great  captain  wants  valiant  soldiers,  and 
valiant  soldiers  want  in  like  manner  a  great 
captain.  The  glory  ought  to  be  theirs  in  com. 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


79 


mon,  as  well  as  the  merit  of  the  great  things 
which  they  accomplish. 

Napoleon,  at  Vienna,  would  not  feast  him- 
self there  with  the  vain-glory  of  occupying 
the  capital  of  the  Germanic  empire.  He 
wanted  to  put  an  end  to  the  war.  If  he  can 
be  reproached  with  having  in  his  career 
abused  fortune,  he  will  never  be  reproached, 
like  Hannibal,  with  not  having  known  how  to 
take  advantage  of  it,  and  with  having  fallen 
asleep  amidst  the  delights  of  Capua.  He  pre- 
pared, therefore,  to  speed  his  march  against 
the  Russians,  in  order  to  beat  them  in  Moravia, 
before  they  had  time  to  effect  their  junction 
with  the  archdukes.  These,  however,  on  the 
15th  of  November,  had  proceeded  no  further 
than  Laybach.  They  would  have  to  make  a 
very  great  circuit  to  reach  Hungary,  then  to 
traverse  it,  and  to  enter  Moravia  towards  01- 
miltz.  This  was  a  long  march  of  more  than 
150  leagues  to  make.  Twenty  days  would  not 
have  sufficed  for  it.  Napoleon,  at  this  period, 
was  at  Vienna,  and  had  only  40  leagues  to 
travel  to  reach  Briinn,  ihe  capital  of  Moravia. 

He  drew  nearer  to  him  General  Marmont, 
who  was  too  far  off,  and  assigned  to  him  a 
position  a  little  in  rear,  on  the  very  summit 
of  the  Alps  of  Styria,  in  order  to  guard  the 
high  road  from  Italy  to  Vienna.  He  enjoined 
him,  in  case  the  archdukes  should  attempt  to 
take  that  way  back,  to  destroy  the  bridges,  and 
to  break  up  the  roads,  which,  in  the  moun- 
tains, enables  a  corps  that  is  not  numerous  to 
stop  a  superior  enemy  for  some  time.  He 
forbade  him  to  give  way  to  the  desire  to  fight, 
unless  he  was  forced  to  do  so.  He  drew  Mas- 
sena  towards  General  Marmont,  and  put  them 
into  immediate  communication  with  each 
other.  The  troops  commanded  by  Massena 
thenceforward  assumed  the  title  of  the  eighth 
corps  of  the  grand  army.  Napoleon  placed 
the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout  all  round  Vienna ; 
one  division,  that  of  General  Gudiu,  in  rear 
of  Vienna,  towards  Neustadt,  where  it  could 
in  a  short  time  give  a  hand  to  Marmont;  an- 
other, that  of  General  Friant,  in  the  direction 
of  Presburg,  observing  the  debouches  of  Hun- 
gary;  the  third  that  of  General  Bisson  (which 
had  become  Caffarelli's  division)  in  advance 
of  Vienna,  on  the  road  to  Moravia.  Dupont's 
and  Gazan's  division  were  established  in 
Vienna  itself,  to  recover  from  their  fatigues 
and  their  wounds.  Lastly,  Marshals  Soult, 
Lannes,  and  Murat  marched  towards  Moravia, 
while  Marshal  Bernadotte,  having  passed  the 
Danube  at  Krems,  followed  the  track  of  Gene- 
ral Kutusof,  and  was  preparing  to  rejoin,  by 
the  same  route  which  that  general  had  taken, 
the  three  French  corps  that  were  going  to  fight 
the  Russians. 

Thus  Napoleon  at  Vienna,  in  the  centre  of 
a  web  skilfully  spread  around  him,  could  give 
assistance  wherever  the  slightest  agitation 
might  indicate  the  presence  of  the  enemy.  If 
the  archdukes  attempted  any  thing  towards 
Italy,  Massena  and  Marmont,  in  connection 
with  one  another,  were  backed  upon  the  Alps 
of  Styria,  and  Napoleon,  marching  Davout's 
corps  towards  Neustadt,  was  in  force  to  sup- 
port them.  If  the  archdukes  advanced  by  way 
of  Presburg  and  Hungary,  Napoleon,  could  de- 


spatch thither  Davout's  entire  corps,  a  little 
after  Marmont,  who,  at  Neustadt,  was  not  far 
off,  and,  in  case  of  need,  hasten  thither  him- 
self, with  the  bulk  of  the  army.  Lastly,  if  it 
were  necessary  to  make  head  against  the  Rus- 
sians in  Moravia,  he  could  in  three  days  unite 
with  the  corps  of  Soult,  Lannes,  and  Murat, 
which  were  already  there,  that  of  Davout, 
easily  withdrawn  from  Vienna,  and  that  of 
Bernadotte,  quite  as  easily  brought  back  from 
Bohemia.  He  was,  therefore,  duly  prepared 
on  every  side,  and  fulfilled  in  the  highest  de- 
gree the  conditions  of  that  art  of  war  which, 
in  conversation  with  his  lieutenants,  he  defined 
in  these  terms:  THE  ART  OF  DIVIDING  ONE'S 

SELF  TO   SUBSIST,  AND  OF  CONCENTRATING  ONE'S 

SELF  TO  FIGHT.  Never  have  the  precepts  of 
that  formidable  art  which  destroys  or  founds 
empires  been  better  defined  or  better  practised. 

Napoleon  had  hastened  to  avail  himself  of 
the  conquest  of  the  bridges  of  Vienna,  to  send 
Marshals  Soult,  Lannes,  and  Murat  beyond  the 
Danube,  in  the  hope  of  cutting  off  the  retreat 
of  General  Kutusof,  and  arriving  before  him 
at  Hollabriinn,  where  that  general,  who  had 
passed  the  Danube  at  Krems,  would  strike  off 
into  the  road  to  Moravia.  General  Kutusof 
directed  his  inarch  towards  Moravia,  and  not 
towards  Bohemia,  because  it  was  upon  Ol- 
miitz,  the  frontier  of  Moravia  and  Gallicia, 
that  the  second  Russian  army  was  directing 
its  course.  While  he  was  advancing  upon 
Hollabriin,  having  Prince  Bagration  at  the 
head,  he  was  astonished  and  dismayed  on 
learning  the  presence  of  the  French  on  the 
high  road  which  he  designed  to  follow,  and 
thus  acquiring  the  certainty  of  being  cut  off. 
He  then  laid  the  same  snare  for  Murat  which 
Murat  had  laid  for  the  Austrians,  in  order  to 
take  from  them  the  bridges  of  the  Danube. 
He  had  with  him  General  Winzingerode,  the 
same  who  had  negotiated  all  the  conditions  of 
the  plan  of  the  campaign.  He  despatched 
him  to  Murat  to  retail  to  him  the  inventions 
by  which  Count  Auersperg  had  been  deceived, 
and  which  consisted  in  saying  that  there  were 
no  negotiators  at  Schonbrunn  on  the  point  of 
signing  a  peace.  In  consequence,  he  directed 
an  armistice  to  be  proposed  to. him,  the  prin 
cipal  condition  of  which  was  to  halt  both  of 
them  on  the  ground  which  they  occupied,  so 
that  nothing  whatever  should  be  changed  by 
the  suspension  of  the  operations.  If  they 
were  to  be  resumed,  six  hours'  notice  was  to 
be  given.  Murat,  artfully  flattered  by  M.  de 
Winzingerode,  proud,  moreover,  of  the  honour 
of  being  the  first  intermediate  agent  of  the 
peace,  accepted  the  armistice,  saving  the  ap- 
probation of  the  Emperor.  We  mast  add,  in 
order  to  be  just,  that  a  consideration,  which 
was  not  without  weight,  contributed  greatly  to 
lead  him  into  this  false  step.  The  corps  of 
Marshal  Soult  was  not  yet  on  the  ground,  and 
he  was  fearful  that,  with  his  cavalry  and  Ou- 
dinot's  grenadiers,  he  should  not  have  a  suffi- 
cient force  to  bar  the  way  against  the  Rus- 
sians. He  despatched,  therefore,  an  aide-de- 
camp to  the  head-quarters  with  the  draft  of 
the  armistice. 

Next  day  the  commanders  on  both  sides 
visited  one  another.    Prince  Bagration  went 


80 


HISTORY    OH     1HE 


[Nov.  1805 


to  see  Murat,  and  manifested  great  interest 
and  curiosity  respecting  the  French  generals, 
and  especially  respecting  the  illustrious  Mar- 
shal Lannes.  The  latter,  simple  in  his  man- 
ners, without  being  on  that  account  deficient 
in  military  courtesy,  told  Prince  Bagration 
that  if  he  had  been  alone  they  should  have 
been  at  that  moment  fighting  instead  of  ex- 
changing compliments.  At  this  moment,  in 
fact,  the  Russian  army,  covering  itself  with 
Bagration's  rear-guard,  which  affected  to  keep 
motionless,  marched  rapidly  behind  this  cur- 
tain and  regained  the  road  to  Moravia.  Thus 
Murat,  duped  in  his  turn,  gave  the  enemy  oc- 
casion to  revenge  himself  for  the  bridge  of 
Vienna. 

Presently  there  arrived  an  aide-de-camp  of 
the  Emperor's,  Gen eral  Lemarrois,  who  brought 
a  severe  reprimand  to  Murat  for  the  fault  that  he 
had  committed,'  and  which  gave  an  order,  as 
well  to  him  as  to  Marshal  Lannes,  to  attack 
immediately,  whatever  the  hour  might  be  at 
which  this  communication  reached  them. 
Lannes,  however,  took  care  to  send  an  officer 
to  Prince  Bagration  to  acquaint  him  with  the 
orders  which  he  had  just  received.  Disposi- 
tions for  attack  were  instantly  made.  Prince 
Bagration  had  seven  or  eight  thousand  men. 
Determined  to  cover  completely  the  movement 
of  Kutusof,  he  took  the  noble  resolution  to  pe- 
rish rather  than  stir  from  the  spot.  Lannes 
pushed  his  grenadiers  upon  him.  The  only 
disposition  that  was  possible  was  that  of  two 
lines  of  infantry,  deployed  facing  one  another, 
and  attacking  on  nearly  level  ground.  For 
some  time  they  exchanged  a  very  brisk  and 
very  destructive  fire  of  musketry,  then  charged 
*  with  the  bayonet,  and,  what  is  rare  in  war,  the 
two  masses  of  infantry  marched  resolutely  to- 
wards each  other,  without  either  giving  way 
before  they  met.  They  closed,  and  then,  after 
a  fight,  man  to  man,  Oudinot's  grenadiers 
broke  Bagration's  foot-soldiers  and  cut  them 
in  pieces.  They  then  disputed,  till  after  night- 
fall, by  the  light  of  the  flames,  the  burning 
village  of  Schiingraben,  which  was  finally  left 
in  the  hands  of  the  French.  The  Russians 
behaved  valiantly.  They  lost  on  this  occasion 
nearly  half  their  rear-guard,  about  3000  men, 
more  than  1500  of  whom  strewed  the  field  of 
battle.  Prince  Bagration  had  proved  himself 
by  his  resolution  the  worthy  rival  of  Marshal 
Mortier  at  Dirnstein.  This  sanguinary  action 
was  fought  on  the  16th  of  November. 

The  French  advanced  on  the  following  days, 
taking  prisoners  at  every  step,  and  at  length 
entered,  on  the  19th,  the  town  of  Briinn,  the 
capital  of  Moravia.  The  place  was  found 
armed  and  provided  with  abundant  resources. 
The  enemy  had  not  even  thought  of  defending 


it.  They  thus  abandoned  to  Napoleon  an  im- 
portant position,  where  he  commanded  Mo- 
ravia, and  could  at  his  ease  observe  and  await 
the  movements  of  the  Russians. 

Napoleon,  on  receiving  intelligence  of  this 
last  combat,  resolved  to  proceed  to  Briinn,  for, 
the  news  from  Italy  announcing  the  protracted 
retreat  which  the  archdukes  were  making  into 
Hungary,  he  concluded  that  it  would  be  with 
the  Russians  that  he  should  chiefly  have  to  do. 
He  made  some  slight  changes  in  the  distribu- 
tion of  Marshal  Davout's  corps  around  Vienna. 
He  despatched  towards  Presburg  Gudin's  divi- 
sion, which  seemed  to  be  no  longer  necessary 
on  the  road  to  Styria,  since  the  retreat  of  the 
archdukes.  He  established  Friant's  division, 
belonging  to  the  same  corps,  in  advance  of 
Vienna,  on  the  road  to  Moravia.  Bisson's  divi- 
sion (which  had  for  a  moment  become  CafFa- 
relli's)  was  detached  from  Davout's  corps  and 
marched  to  Briinn,  to  supply  in  Lannes'  corps 
the  place  of  Gazan's  division,  left  at  Vienna. 

Napoleon,  on  his  arrival  at  Briinn,  fixed  his 
head-quarters  there  on  the  20th  of  November. 
General  Giulay,  accompanied  this  time  by  M. 
de  Stadion,  came  to  visit  him  again,  and  to 
talk  of  peace  more  seriously  than  in  his  pre- 
ceding missions.  Napoleon  expressed  to  both 
of  them  a  desire  to  lay  aside  arms  and  return 
to  France,  but  did  not  leave  them  in  ignorance 
of  the  conditions  on  which  he  should  consent 
to  do  so.  He  would  no  longer,  he  said,  allow 
Italy,  divided  between  France  and  Austria,  to 
continue  to  be  a  subject  of  jealousy  and  war 
between  them.  He  was  resolved  to  have  the 
whole  of  it  as  far  as  the  Isonzo,  that  is  to  say, 
he  required  the  Venetian  States,  the  only  part 
of  Italy  which  remained  for  him  to  conquer. 
He  entered  into  no  explanations  respecting 
what  he  should  have  to  demand  for  his  allies, 
the  Electors  of  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,  and 
Baden ;  but  he  declared  in  general  terms  that 
he  must  secure  their  situation  in  Germany, 
and  put  an  end  to  all  the  questions  left  pend- 
ing between  them  and  the  emperor,  since  the 
new  Germanic  constitution  of  1803.  Mes- 
sieurs de  Stadion  and  De  Giulay  cried  out 
vehemently  against  the  hardness  of  these  con- 
ditions. But  Napoleon  showed  no  disposition 
to  depart  from  them,  and  he  gave  them  to 
understand  that,  wholly  engrossed  by  the  du- 
ties of  war,  he  had  no  desire  to  keep  about 
him  negotiators,  who  were  in  reality  nothing 
but  military  spies,  directed  to  watch  his  move- 
ments. He  therefore  recommended  to  them 
to  go  to  Vienna,  to  M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  had 
just  arrived  there.  Napoleon,  caring  little 
about  the  tastes  of  his  minister,  who  was  not 
fond  either  of  business  or  of  the  fatigues  of 
head-quarters,  had  first  summoned  him  to 


'u  To  PRINCB  MURAT. 

"  SchSnbrunn,  25  Brumaire,  year  XIV., 
"November  16, 1805,  eight  in  the  morning. 
"It  is  impossible  to  find  terms  to  express  my  displeasure. 
You  command  only  my  advanced-guard,  and  yon  have  no 
right  to  make  an  armistice  without  my  order.    You  cause 
me  to  lose  the  fruit  of  a  campaign.     Break  the  armistice 
immediately  and  march  against  the  enemy.     Send  and 
declare  to  him  that  the  general  who  signed  that  capitula- 


tion had  no  right  to  do  it;  that  none  but  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  has  that  right. 

"  If,  however,  the  Emperor  of  Russia  would  ratify  the 
snid  convention,  I  would  ratify  it;  but  it  is  only  a  strata- 
gem. March;  destroy  the  Russian  army;  you  are  in  a 
position  to  take  the  baggage  and  its  artillery.  The  aide- 
de-camp  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  is  a Officer! 

are  nothing  when  they  have  not  powers :  this  had  none. 
The  Austrians  let  themselves  be  duped  for  the  passage 
of  the  bridge  of  Vienna,  you  let  yourself  be  duped  by  an 
aide-de-camp  of  the  emperor." 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


81 


Strasburg,  then  to  Munich,  and  now  to  Vienna. 
He  shifted  to  him  those  interminable  parleys, 
which  in  negotiations  always  precede  serious 
results. 

During  the  conferences  which  Napoleon  had 
held  with  the  two  Austrian  negotiators,  one  of 
them,  unable  to  contain  himself,  had  dropped 
an  imprudent  word,  from  which  it  might  evi- 
dently be  inferred  that  Prussia  was  bound  by 
a  treaty  with  Russia  and  Austria.  Something 
of  that  kind  had  been  intimated  to  him  from 
Berlin,  but  nothing  so  precise  as  what  he  had 
just  learned.  This  discovery  suggested  new 
reflections,  and  rendered  him  more  disposed 
to  peace,  without,  however,  inducing  him  to 
desist  from  his  essential  pretensions.  It  could 
not  suit  him  to  follow  the  Russians  beyond 
Moravia,  that  is  to  say  into  Poland,  for  that 
would  be  running  the  risk  of  seeing  the  arch- 
dukes cut  off  his  communications  with  Vi- 
enna. In  consequence,  he  resolved  to  await 
the  arrival  of  M.  de  Haugwitz  and  the  further 
development  of  the  military  projects  of  the 
Russians.  He  was  equally  ready  either  to 
treat,  if  the  proposed  conditions  seems  accept- 
able to  him,  or  to  cut  in  a  great  battle  the 
Gordian  knot  of  the  coalition,  if  his  enemies 
afforded  a  favourable  occasion  for  it  He 
therefore  suffered  a  few  days  to  elapse,  employ- 
ing himself  in  studying  with  extreme  care, 
and  in  making  his  generals  study,  the  ground 
upon  which  he  was,  and  upon  which  a  secret 
presentiment  told  him  that  he  might  be  fated  to 
fight  a  decisive  battle.  At  the  same  time,  he 
rested  his  troops,  worn  out  with  fatigue,  suffer- 
ing from  cold,  sometimes  from  hunger,  and 
having  traversed  in  three  months  nearly  500 
leagues.  Hence  the  ranks  of  his  soldiers  were 
much  thinned,  though  fewer  stragglers  were 
seen  among  them  than  in  the  train  of  any 
army.  The  effectives  had  lost  nearly  one- 
fifth,  since  taking  the  field.  All  military  men 
will  acknowledge  that  this  was  very  little  after 
such  fatigues.  For  the  rest,  whenever  the 
army  halted  anywhere,  the  ranks  were  soon 
completed,  owing  to  the  anxiety  of  the  men 
who  remained  behind  to  rejoin  their  corps. 

The  two  emperors  of  Russia  and  Germany, 
on  their  part,  meeting  at  Olmutz,  employed 
their  time  in  deliberating  upon  the  course 
which  they  ought  to  pursue.  General  Kutu- 
sof,  after  a  retreat,  in  which  he  had  sustained 
only  rear-guard  defeats,  nevertheless  brought 
back  no  more  than  thirty  andodd  thousand  men, 
already  inured  to  fighting,  but  exhausted  with 
fatigue.  He  had,  therefore,  lost  twelve  or  fifteen 
thousand  killed,  wounded,  prisoners,  or  lame. 
Alexander,  with  Buxhovden's  corps  and  the 
imgerial  Russian  guard,  brought  40,000,  which 
made  about  75,000  Russians.  Fifteen  thou- 
sand Austrians,  comprising  the  wrecks  of 
Kienmayer's  and  Meerfeld's  corps,  and  a  fine 
division  of  cavalry,  completed  the  Austro- 
Russian  army  beneath  Olmutz,  and  made  it 
amount  to  a  total  force  of  90,000  men.1 

This  is  a  fit  place  for  remarking  how  exag- 

1  The  R;is>i  ins  made  it  amount  to  much  less  the  day 
after  their  defeat,  Napoleon  to  much  more  in  his  bulle- 
tin*. After  comparing  a  great  number  of  testimonies 
and  authentic  accounts,  we  think  that  we  here  give  the 
most  accurate  statement. 
VOL.  II.— 11 


gerated  were  at  that  time  the  pretensions  of 
Russia  in  Europe,  on  comparing  them  with 
the  real  state  of  her  forces.  She  affected  to 
hold  the  balance  between  the  powers,  and  the 
real  number  of  soldiers  brought  by  her  upon 
the  fields  of  battle  where  the  destinies  of  the 
world  were  decided,  was  as  follows :  She  had 
sent  from  45  to  50  thousand  men,  under  Kutu- 
sof,  she  brought  40,000  under  Buxhovden  and 
the  Grand-duke  Constantine,  and  10,000  under 
General  Essen.  If  we  set  down  those  acting 
in  the  north  with  the  Swedes  and  the  English 
at  15,000,  and  those  preparing  to  act  towards 
Naples  at  10,000,  we  shall  have  a  total  of 
125,000  men,  figuring  in  reality  in  this  war, 
and  100,000  at  most,  if  we  are  to  believe  the 
accounts  of  the  Russians  after  their  defeat. 
Austria  had  assembled  more  than  200,000, 
Prussia  could  bring  into  line  150,000,  France, 
by  herself,  300,000.  We  do  not  speak  of 
soldiers  rated  on  the  effectives,  (which  makes 
a  difference  of  nearly  half,)  but  of  soldiers 
present  in  the  fire  on  the  day  of  battle.  Though 
the  Russians  were  steady  infantry,  yet  it  was 
not  with  100,000  men,  brave  and  ignorant, 
that  one  could  then  pretend  to  control  Europe. 

The  Russians,  always  extremely  contemptu- 
ous towards  their  allies  the  Austrians,  whom 
they  accused  of  being  cowardly  soldiers,  in- 
capable officers,  continued  to  commit  horrible 
ravages  in  the  country.  The  eastern  provinces 
of  the  Austrian  monarchy  were  afflicted  with 
dearth.  Necessaries  ran  short  at  Olmiitz,  and 
the  Russians  procured  themselves  provisions, 
not  with  the  dexterity  of  the  French  soldier, 
an  intelligent,  rarely  cruel,  marauder,  but  with 
the  brutality  of  a  savage  horde.  They  ex- 
tended their  pillage  to  the  distance  of  several 
leagues  round,  and  completely  laid  waste  the 
country  which  they  occupied.  Discipline, 
usually  so  strict  among  them,  was  visibly 
affected  by  it,  and  they  appeared  much  dissat- 
isfied with  their  emperor. 

In  the  Austro-Russian  camp,  therefore,  peo- 
ple were  not  disposed  to  take  wise  determina- 
tions. The  levity  of  youth  concurred  with  a 
feeling  of  great  discomfort  to  impel  them  to 
act,  no  matter  how,  to  change  their  place, 
were  it  merely  for  the  sake  of  change.  We 
have  said  that  the  Emperor  Alexander  began 
to  fall  under  new  influences.  He  was  not 
satisfied  with  the  direction  given  to  his  affairs; 
for  this  war,  notwithstanding  the  flatteries  with 
which  a  coterie  had  surrounded  him  at  Berlin, 
did  not  seem  to  turn  out  well,  and,  according 
to  the  custom  of  princes,  he  was  glad  to  throw 
upon  his  ministers  the  results  of  a  policy 
which  he  had  himself  decreed,  but  which  he 
could  not  uphold  with  the  perseverance  that 
could  alone  correct  its  faultiness.  What  had 
occurred  at  Berlin  had  confirmed  him  stili 
more  in  his  dispositions.  He  should  have 
committed  very  different  faults,  he  said,  if  he 
had  listened  to  his  friends.  By  persisting  tc 
do  violence  to  Prussia,  he  should  hav  'hrcwc 
her  into  the  arms  of  Napoleon,  whereas  by 
his  personal  address  he  had  induced  that 
court  to  enter,  on  the  contrary,  into  engage- 
ments which  were  equivalent  to  a  declaration 
of  war  against  France.  Hence  the  young 
emoeror  would  no  longer  listen  to  advice,  lor 


82 


HISTORY    OF  'THE 


[Nov.  1805. 


he  fancied  himself  more  clever  than  his  ad- 
visers. Prince  Adam  Czartoryski,  honest, 
grave,  having  warm  passions  under  a  cold 
exterior,  become,  as  we  Lave  seen,  the  trouble- 
some censor  of  the  weaknesses  and  the  fickle- 
ness of  his  master,  supported  an  opinion  which 
could  not  fail  to  alienate  him  completely.  Ac- 
cording to  this  minister,  the  emperor  had  no 
business  with  the  army.  That  was  not  his 
place.  He  had  never  served;  he  could  not 
know  how  to  command.  His  presence  at  the 
head-quarters,  surrounded  by  young,  giddy, 
ignorant,  presumptuous  men,  would  annul  the 
authority  of  the  generals,  and  at  the  same  time 
their  responsibility.  In  a  war,  into  which  they 
all  entered  with  a  certain  apprehension,  they 
desired  nothing  more  than  to  have  no  opinion, 
to  take  nothing  upon  themselves,  and  to  let 
hot-headed  youth  command,  that  they  might 
no  longer  be  responsible  for  the  defeats  which 
they  expected.  In  this  manner  there  would 
be  nothing  but  the  worst  of  commands  for  an 
army — that  of  a  court.  This  war,  moreover, 
would  be  fertile  in  lost  battles,  and  to  main- 
tain it  there  was  required  perseverance,  and 
perseverance  depended  on  the  magnitude  of 
the  means  which  should  be  provided.  It  was 
requisite,  therefore,  to  leave  the  generals  to 
act  the  part  which  belonged  to  them  at  the 
head  of  the  troops,  and  for  the  emperor  to  per- 
form his  at  the  centre  of  the  government,  by 
upholding  the  public  spirit,  by  administering 
with  energy  and  application,  so  as  to  furnish 
the  armies  with  the  necessary  resources  for 
prolonging  the  struggle,  the  only  means,  if  not 
to  conquer,  at  least  to  balance  fortune. 
,  It  was  impossible  to  express  a  sentiment 
either  more  sensible  or  more  disagreeable  to 
the  Emperor  Alexander.  He  had  tried  to  play 
a  political  part  in  Europe,  but  had  not  yet  suc- 
ceeded according  to  his  wish.  He  found  him- 
self hurried  into  a  contest  which  would  have 
filled  him  with  dismay,  if  the  remoteness  of  his 
empire  had  not  cheered  him.  He  had  need  to 
drown  his  thoughts  in  the  tumult  of  camps ;  he 
had  need  to  silence  the  murmurs  of  his  reason, 
by  hearing  himself  called  at  Berlin,  at  Dres- 
den, at  Weimar,  at  Vienna,  the  saviour  of  kings. 
This  monarch,  moreover,  asked  himself  whe- 
ther he  could  not,  in  his  turn,  shine  on  fields 
of  battle ;  whether,  with  his  intelligence,  he 
might  not  have  higher  inspirations  there  than 
those  old  generals,  whose  experience  impru- 
dent youth  encouraged  him  too  much  to  de- 
spise; lastly,  whether  he  could  not  have  his 
share  in  that  glory  of  arms  so  dear  to  princes, 
and  at  that  time  exclusively  decreed  by  fortune 
to  a  single  individual  and  to  a  single  nation. 

In  these  ideas  he  was  confirmed  by  the  mili- 
tary coterie  which  already  surrounded  him,  and 
at  the  head  of  which  was  Prince  Dolgorouki. 
This  latter,  in  order  to  gain  the  better  an  as- 
cendency over  the  emperor,  was  desirous  to 
draw  him  to  the  army.  He  strove  to  persuade 
him  that  he  had  the  qualities  for  command,  and 
that  he  had  but  to  show  himself  in  order  to 
change  the  fortune  of  the  war ;  that  his  pre- 
sence would  double  the  valour  of  the  soldiers, 
by  filling  them  with  enthusiasm ;  that  his  gene- 
rals were  common-place  men  without  abilities ; 
'Jiat  Napoleon  had  triumphed  over  their  timi- 


dity and  their  antiquated  science,  but  that  he 
would  not  triumph  so  easily  over  a  young  no- 
bility, intelligent  and  devoted,  led  by  an  adored 
emperor.  These  warriors,  such  novices  in  the 
profession  of  arms,  dared  to  maintain  that  at 
Dirnstein,  at  Hollabrunn,  the  Russians  had  con- 
quered the  French,  that  the  Austrians  were 
cowards,  that  there  were  no  brave  men  but  the 
Russians,  and  that  if  Alexander  would  but 
come  and  animate  them  with  his  presence, 
they  should  soon  put  a  stop  to  the  arrogant 
and  undeserved  prosperity  of  Napoleon. 

The  wily  Kutusof  ventured  timidly  to  say 
that  this  was  not  absolutely  the  case ;  but,  too 
servile  to  maintain  courageously  his  own  opi- 
nion, he  took  care  not  to  contradict  the  new 
possessors  of  the  imperial  favour,  and  had  the 
meanness  to  permit  his  old  experience  to  be 
insulted.  The  intrepid  Bagration,  the  vicious 
but  brave  Miloradovich,  the  discreet  Doctorow, 
were  officers  whose  opinion  deserved  some 
attention.  None  of  these  men  was  heeded. 
A  German  adviser  of  the  Archduke  John  at 
Hohenlinden,  General  Weirother,  had  alone  a 
real  authority  over  the  military  youth  who  sur- 
rounded Alexander.  Since  Frederick  the  Great, 
in  the  last  century,  had  beaten  the  Austrian 
army  by  attacking  it  on  one  of  its  wings,  the 
theory  of  oblique  order,  which  Frederick  had 
never  thought  of,  had  been  invented,  and  to 
this  theory  had  been  attributed  all  the  successes 
of  that  great  man.  Since  General  Bonaparte 
had  shown  himself  so  superior  in  the  high  com- 
binations of  war,  since  he  had  been  seen  so 
often  surprising,  enveloping  the  generals  op- 
posed to  him,  other  commentators  made  the 
whole  art  of  war  consist  in  a  certain  manoau- 
vre,  and  talked  about  nothing  but  turning  the 
enemy.  They  had  invented,  so  they  asserted, 
a  naw  science,  and  for  this  science  a  word 
then  new,  that  of  strategy,  and  they  hastened  to 
offer  it  to  the  princes  who  would  submit  to  be 
directed  by  them.  The  German  Weirother  had 
persuaded  the  friends  of  Alexander  that  he  had 
a  plan,  one  of  the  most  excellent  and  most  sure, 
for  destroying  Napoleon.  It  consisted  in  a 
grand  manoeuvre,  by  which  they  were  to  turn 
the  Emperor  of  the  French,  cut  him  off  from 
the  road  to  Vienna,  and  throw  him  into  Bohe- 
mia, beaten  and  separated  for  ever  from  the 
forces  which  he  had  in  Austria  and  in  Italy. 

The  susceptible  mind  of  Alexander  was 
wholly  won  by  these  ideas,  wholly  under  the 
influence  of  the  Dolgoroukis,  and  showed  no 
inclination  to  listen  to  Prince  Czartoryski 
when  the  latter  advised  him  to  return  to  Pe- 
tersburg, and  to  govern  there,  instead  of  com- 
ing to  fight  battles  in  Moravia. 

Amidst  this  mutual  agitation  of  the  young 

court  of  Russia,  the  Emperor  of  Germany  was 

scarcely  thought  of.   Neither  his  army  nor  his 

person  seemed  to  be  held  in  any  estimation. 

His  army,  it  was  said,  had  compromised  at 

Ulm  the  issue  of  that  war.     As  for  himself, 

they  were  coming  to  his  aid ;  he  ought  to  deem 

himself  fortunate  in  being  assisted,  and  not  to 

!  interfere  in  any  thing.   It  is  true  that  he  did  not 

!  interfere  in  many  things,  and  made  no  effort 

to  stem  this  torrent  of  presumption.  He  looked 

\  for  more  lost  battles,  reckoned  only  upon  time, 

i  if  he  then  reckoned  upon  any  thing,  and  weighed, 


Nov.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


83 


without  saying  so,  what  the  silly  pride  of  his 
allies  was  worth.  This  prince,  simple  and 
unostentatious,  possessed  the  two  great  quali- 
ties of  his  government,  shrewdness  and  con- 
stancy. 

It  may  easily  be  conceived  in  what  manner 
the  grave  question  which  was  to  be  resolved, 
that  is,  whether  it  was  right  to  give  battle  to 
Napoleon  or  not,  would  be  treated  by  so  many 
vain  minds.  Those  admirable  pictures  which 
antiquity  has  bequeathed  to  us,  and  which  re- 
present the  young  Roman  aristocracy  doing 
violence  by  its  silly  presumption  to  the  wisdom 
of  Pompey,  and  obliging  him  to  fight  the  battle 
of  Pharsalia  —  those  pictures  have  nothing 
more  grand,  nothing  more  instructive,  than 
what  was  passing  at  Olmiitz  in  1805,  about 
the  Emperor  Alexander.  Everybody  had  an 
opinion  on  the  question,  whether  a  battle  was 
to  be  sought  or  shunned,  and  everybody  ex- 
pressed it.  The  coterie,  at  the  head  of  which 
were  the  Dolgoroukis,  had  no  hesitation.  Ac- 
cording to  it,  not  to  fight  would  be  a  cowardice, 
and  an  egregious  blunder.  In  the  first  place, 
there  was  no  living  any  longer  at  Olmiitz ;  the 
army  was  perishing  there  of  want;  it  was  be- 
coming demoralized.  By  remaining  at  Olmiitz, 
they  relinquished  to  Napoleon  not  only  the 
honour  of  the  arms,  but  also  three-fourths  of 
the  Austrian  monarchy,  and  all  the  resources 
in  which  it  abounded.  By  advancing,  on  the 
contrary,  they  should  recover  at  one  blow  the 
means  of  subsistence,  confidence,  and  the  as- 
cendency, always  so  powerful,  of  the  offensive. 
And  then,  was  it  not  plain  that  the  moment  for 
changing  parts  had  arrived;  that  Napoleon, 
usually  so  prompt,  so  pressing  when  pursuing 
his  enemies,  had  suddenly  stopped  short,  that 
he  hesitated,  that  he  was  intimidated,  for,  fixed 
at  Brunn,  he  durst  not  come  to  Olmiitz  to  meet 
the  Russian  army  1  It  was  what  he  thought  at 
Dirnstein,  at  Hollabrunn  ;  it  was  because  his 
army  was  shaken  like  himself.  It  was  known, 
beyond  the  possibility  of  doubt,  that  it  was 
worn  out  with  fatigue,  reduced  one  half,  a  prey 
to  discontent  and  ever  murmuring. 

Such  was  the  language  held  by  the  young 
courtiers  with  incredible  assurance.  Some 
wise  men,  Prince  Czartoryski,  in  particu- 
lar, quite  as  young,  but  far  more  conside- 
rate than  the  Dolgoroukis,  opposed  to  them 
a  small  number  of  simple  reasons  that  must 
have  been  decisive  with  minds  which  the 
strangest  blindness  had  not  completely  be- 
wildered. In  taking  no  account  of  those  sol- 
diers who,  after  all,  had  remained  masters  of 
the  ground  at  Dirnstein  as  well  as  at  Holla- 
brunn, before  whom  the  Russians  had  inces- 
santly fallen  back  from  Munich  to  Olmiitz;  by 
taking  no  account  of  that  general  who  had 
conquered  all  the  generals  in  Europe,  the  most 
experienced  at  least  of  all  living  captains,  if 
he  was  not  the  greatest,  for  he  had  command- 
ed in  a  hundred  battles,  and  his  present  adver- 
saries had  never  commanded  in  one ;  in  tak- 
ing no  account  either  of  these  soldiers  or  of 
this  general,  there  were  two  peremptory  rea- 
sons for  not  being  in  haste.  The  first  and  the 
most  striking  was  that,  by  waiting  a  few  days 
longer,  the  month  stipulated  with  Prussia 
would  have  elapsed,  and  that  she  would  be 


obliged  to  declare  herself.  Who  knows,  iu 
fact,  if  in  previously  losing  a  great  battle  one 
may  not  furnish  her  with  occasion  to  release 
herself!  By  allowing,  on  the  contrary,  the 
term  of  a  month  to  expire,  150,000  Prussians 
would  enter  Bohemia,  Napoleon  would  be 
obliged  to  fall  back  without  our  having  to  run 
j  the  risk  of  a  battle  with  him.  The  second 
•  reason  for  delay  is  that,  by  giving  a  little  time 
'  to  the  archdukes,  they  would  arrive  with 
80,000  Austrians  from  Hungary,  and  one 
|  might  then  fight  Napoleon  in  the  proportion 
1  of  two,  perhaps  three,  to  one.  It  was  certainly 
difficult  to  live  without  provisions  at  Olmiitz, 
j  but  if  it  was  true  that  they  could  not  stay 
there  a  few  days  longer,  the  only  thing  that 
could  be  done  was  to  march  into  Hungary  to 
meet  the  archdukes.  There  they  should  find 
bread  and  a  reinforcement  of  80,000  men.  By 
adding  thus  to  the  distances  which  Napoleon 
would  have  to  traverse,  they  should  oppose  to 
him  the  most  formidable  of  all  obstacles. 
They  had  a  proof  of  this  truth  in  his  inaction 
ever  since  he  occupied  Briinn.  If  he  did  not 
advance  it  was  not  because  he  was  afraid  to 
do  so.  Inexperienced  soldiers  only  could  pre- 
tend that  such  a  man  was  afraid.  If  he  did 
not  advance,  it  was  because  he  found  the  dis- 
tance already  very  great.  He  was,  in  fact, 
forty  leagues  beyond,  not  his  capital,  but  that 
which  he  had  conquered,  and,  in  removing  to 
a  distance  from  it,  he  felt  it  tremble  under  his 
hand. 

What  reply  could  be  made  to  such  reasons? 
Assuredly  none.  But  with  prejudiced  minds 
the  quality  of  reasons  is  of  no  effect.  Evi- 
dence irritates  instead  of  persuading  them. 
It  was  decided,  therefore,  about  Alexander  that 
a  battle  must  be  fought.  The  Emperor  Fran- 
cis assented  to  it  on  his  part  He  had  every 
thing  to  gain  from  a  speedy  decision  of  the 
question,  for  his  country  was  suffering  cruelly 
by  the  war,  and  he  was  not  sorry  to  see  the 
Russians  pitted  against  the  French  and  afford- 
ing occasion  for  an  opinion  to  be  formed  of 
them  in  their  turn.  It  was  decided  to  leave 
the  position  of  Olmiitz,  which  was  very  good, 
on  which  it  would  have  been  easy  to  repulse 
an  assailing  army,  how  superior  soever  in 
number,  for  the  purpose  of  going  to  attack 
Napoleon  in  the  position  of  Briinn,  which  he 
had  been  carefully  studying  for  several  days. 
The  Russians  marched  in  five  columns  by 
road  from  Olmiitz  to  Briinn  in  order  to  approach 
the  French  army.  On  arriving  on  the  18th  of 
November  at  Wischau,  one  march  from 
Briinn,  they  surprised  an  advanced-guard  of 
cavalry  and  a  small  detachment  of  infantry, 
placed  in  that  village  by  Marshal  Soult. 
Three  thousand  horse  were  employed  to  sur- 
round them,  and  then,  with  a  battalion  of  in- 
fantry the  Russians  penetrated  into  Wischau 
itself.  About  a  hundred  French  prisoners 
I  were  picked  up  there.  The  aide-de-camp 
i  Dolgorouki  had  the  chief  hand  in  this  exploiu 
I  The  Emperor  Alexander  had  been  persuaded 
to  be  present,  and  was  made  to  believe  that 
j  this  skirmish  was  war,  and  that  his  presence 
j  had  doubled  the  valour  of  his  soldiers.  This 
slight  advantage  completely  turned  all  the 
young  heads  of  the  Russian  staff,  and  the  r^ 


84 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Dec.  1805. 


solution  to  fight  was  thenceforward  irrevoca- 
ble. Fresh  observations  of  Prince  Czar- 
toryski's  were  very  unfavourably  received. 
General  Kutusof,  under  whose  name  the  battle 
•was  to  be  fought,  no  longer  commanded,  and 
had  the  culpable  weakness  to  adopt  resolu- 
tions which  he  disapproved.  It  was  agreed, 
then,  to  attack  Napoleon  in  his  position  at 
Briinn,  according  to  the  plan  which  should  be 
formed  by  General  Weirother.  Another  march 
was  made,  and  the  Russians  established  them- 
selves in  advance  of  the  mansion  of  Aus- 
terlitz. 

Napoleon,  who  possessed  extraordinary  sa- 
gacity in  guessing  the  designs  of  an  enemy, 
was  well  aware  that  the  allies  were  seeking  a 
decisive  engagement  with  him,  and  was  highly 
pleased  at  it.  His  attention  was  nevertheless 
occupied  with  the  projects  of  Prussia,  which 
recent  accounts  from  Berlin  represented  as 
definitively  hostile,  and  with  the  movements 
of  the  Prussian  army,  which  was  advancing 
towards  Bohemia.  He  had  no  time  to  lose : 
he  wanted  either  an  overwhelming  battle  or 
peace.  He  had  no  doubt  of  the  result  of  a 
battle  ;  still  peace  would  be  the  safer  of  the 
two.  The  Austrians  proposed  it  with  a  certain 
appearance  of  sincerity,  but  always  referring, 
on  the  subject  of  the  conditions  to  the  approval 
of  Russia.  Napoleon  would  fain  have  dis- 
covered what  was  passing  in  the  head  of 
Alexander,  and  sent  his  aide-de-camp,  Savary, 
to  the  Russian  head-quarters,  to  compliment 
that  prince,  to  get  into  conversation  with  him, 
and  to  ascertain  precisely  what  he  desired. 

General  Savary  set  out  immediately,  pre- 
sented himself  with  a  flag  of  truce  at  the  ad- 
vanced posts,  and  had  some  difficulty  to  gain 
access  to  the  Emperor  Alexander.  While  he 
was  waiting  to  be  introduced,  he  had  oppor- 
tunities to  judge  of  the  dispositions  of  the 
young  Muscovite  nobles,  of  their  silly  infa- 
tuation, and  of  their  desire  to  be  present  at  a 
great  battle.  They  counted  upon  nothing  less 
than  beating  the  French  and  driving  their 
vanquished  army  to  the  frontiers  of  France. 
General  Savary  listened  calmly  to  this  lan- 
guage, was  at  length  admitted  to  the  Emperor, 
delivered  his  master's  message,  found  him 
mild  and  polite,  but  evasive,  and  far  from 
capable  of  appreciating  the  chances  of  the 
present  war.  On  the  repeated  assurance  that 
Napoleon  was  animated  with  very  pacific  dis- 
positions, Alexander  inquired  on  what  condi- 
tions peace  would  be  possible.  General  Sa- 
vary was  not  prepared  to  answer,  and  advised 
the  Emperor  Alexander  to  send  one  of  his 
aides-de-camp  to  the  French  head-quarters  to 
confer  with  Napoleon.  He  affirmed  that  the 
result  of  this  step  would  be  most  satisfactory. 
After  much  parleying,  in  which  General  Sa- 
vary, in  the  warmth  of  zeal,  said  more  than 
he  was  commissioned  to  do,  Alexander  sent 
with  him  Prince  Dolgorouki  himself,  the  prin- 
cipal personage  of  the  new  coterie,  which  dis- 
puted the  favour  of  the  czar  with  Messieurs 
de  Czartoryski,  de  Strogonoff,  and  de  Novo- 
siltzoff.  This  Prince  Dolgorouki,  though  one 
of  the  most  vehement  declaim ers  of  the  Rus- 
sian staff,  was  nevertheless  extraordinarily 
flattered  to  be  charged  with  a  commission  to 


the  Emperor  of  the  French.  He  accompani^] 
General  Savary,  and  was  presented  to  Napo- 
leon at  a  moment  when  the  latter,  having  just 
finished  the  inspection  of  his  advanced  posts, 
had  about  him  nothing  to  strike  a  vulgar 
mind.  Napoleon  listened  to  this  young  man, 
destitute  of  tact  and  discretion,  who  had  pick- 
ed up  here  and  there  some  of  the  ideas  with 
which  the  Russian  cabinet  feasted  itself,  and 
which  we  have  recapitulated  in  explaining  the 
plan  of  the  new  European  balance  of  power, 
expressed  them  awkwardly,  and  lugged  them 
in  unseasonably.  France,  he  declared,  must, 
if  she  desired  to  have  an  immediate  peace, 
and  if  she  continued  the  war  and  was  not 
successful,  would  be  required  to  restore  Bel- 
gium. Savoy,  and  Piedmont,  to  form  defensive 
barriers  around  and  against  her.  These  ideas, 
clumsily  expressed,  appeared  to  Napoleon  a 
formal  demand  of  the  immediate  restitution  of 
Belgium,  ceded  to  France  by  so  many  treaties, 
and  excited  in  him  a  violent  irritation,  which, 
however,  he  repressed,  conceiving  that  his 
dignity  did  not  permit  him  to  give  vent  to  it 
before  such  a  negotiator.  He  dismissed  him 
drily,  observing  that  they  should  settle  else- 
where than  in  diplomatic  conferences  the 
quarrel  which  divided  the  policy  of  the  two 
empires.  Napoleon  was  exasperated,  and 
could  think  of  nothing  but  fighting  to  the  last 
extremity. 

Ever  since  the  surprise  at  Wischau,  he  had 
drawn  back  his  army  into  a  position  wonder- 
fully well  chosen  for  fighting.  He  manifested 
in  his  movements  a  certain  hesitation  which 
contrasted  with  the  accustomed  boldness  of 
his  proceedings.  This  circumstance,  coupled 
with  the  mission  of  Savary,  contributed  still 
further  to  work  upon  the  weak  understandings 
which  swayed  the  Russian  staff.  There  was 
soon  but  one  cry  for  war  around  Alexander. 
Napoleon  is  falling  back,  said  they;  he  is  in 
full  retreat ;  we  must  rush  upon  him  and  over- 
whelm him. 

The  French  soldiers,  who  were  not  deficient 
in  intelligence,  perceived,  on  their  part,  clearly 
enough  that  they  should  have  to  do  with  the 
Russians,  and  their  joy  was  extreme.  Prepa- 
rations were  made  on  both  sides  for  a  decisive 
engagement.  - 

Napoleon,  with  that  milita'ry  tact  which  he 
had  received  from  nature,  and  which  he  had 
so  greatly  improved  by  experience,  had  adopt- 
ed among  other  positions  which  he  might 
have  taken  about  Briinn,  one  which  could  not 
fail  to  insure  to  him  the  most  important  re- 
sults, under  the  supposition  that  he  should  be 
attacked — a  supposition  which  had  become  a 
certainty. 

The  mountains  of  Moravia,  which  eonnect 
the  mountains  of  Bohemia  with  those  of  Hun- 
gary, subside  successively  towards  the  Danube, 
so  completely  that  near  that  river  Moravia 
presents  but  one  wide  plain.  In  the  environs 
of  Briinn,  the  capital  of  the  province,  they  are 
not  of  greater  altitude  than  high  hills,  and  are 
covered  with  dark  firs.  Their  waters,  retained 
for  want  of  drains,  form  numerous  ponds,  and 
throw  themselves  by  various  streams  into  me 
Morawa,  or  March,  and  by  the  Morawa  int 
the  Danube. 


Dec.  1805.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


85 


All  these  characters  are  found  together  in 
the  position  between  Brunn  and  Austerlitz, 
•which  Napoleon  has  rendered  for  ever  cele- 
brated. The  high  road  of  Moravia,  running 
from  Vienna  to  Briinn,  rises  in  a  direct  line  to 
the  northward,  then,  in  passing  from  Brunn  to 
Olmiitz,  descends  abruptly  to  the  right,  that  is 
to  the  east,  thus  forming  a  right  angle  with 
its  first  direction.  In  the  angle  is  situated  the 
position  in  question.  It  commences  on  the 
left  towards  the  Olmiitz  road,  with  heights 
studded  with  firs;  it  then  runs  off  to  the 
right  in  an  oblique  direction  towards  the 
Vienna  road,  and  after  subsiding  gradually, 
terminates  in  ponds  full  of  deep  water  in 
winter.  Along  this  position,  and  in  front  of 
it,  runs  a  rivulet,  which  has  no  name  known 
in  geography,  but  which,  in  part  of  its  course, 
is  called  Goldbach  by  the  people  of  the  coun- 
try. It  runs  through  the  little  villages  of 
Girzikowitz,  Puntowitz,  Kobelnitz,  Sokolnitz, 
and  Telnitz,  and,  sometimes  forming  marshes, 
sometimes  confined  in  channels,  terminates  in 
the  ponds  above-mentioned,  which  are  called 
the  ponds  of  Satschau  and  Menitz. 

Concentrated  with  all  his  forces  on  this 
ground,  appuyed  on  the  one  hand  upon  the 
wooded  hills  of  Moravia,  and  particularly  upon 
a  rounded  knoll  to  which  the  soldiers  of  Egypt 
gave  the  name  of  the  Santon,  appuyed,  on  the 
other,  upon  the  ponds  of  Satschau  and  Menitz 
— thus  covering  by  his  left  the  Olmiitz  road, 
by  his  right  the  Vienna  road — Napoleon  was  in 
a  condition  to  accept  with  advantage  a  decisive 
battle.  He  meant  not,  however,  to  confine  his 
operations  to  self-defence,  for  he  was  accus- 
tomed to  reckon  upon  greater  results ;  he  had 
divined,  as  though  he  had  read  them,  the  plans 
framed  at  great  length  by  General  Weirother. 
The  Auslro-Russians,  having  no  chance  of 
wresting  from  him  the  point  cCappui  which  he 
found  for  his  left  in  the  high  wooded  hills, 
would  be  tempted  to  turn  his  right,  which  was 
not  close  to  the  ponds,  and  to  take  the  Vienna 
road  from  him.  There  was  sufficient  induce- 
ment for  this  step;  for  Napoleon,  if  he  lost 
that  road,  would  have  no  other  resource  but  to 
retire  into  Bohemia.  The  rest  of  his  forces, 
hazarded  towards  Vienna,  would  be  obliged  to 
ascend  separately  the  valley  of  the  Danube. 
The  French  army,  thus  divided,  would  find  it- 
self doomed  to  a  retreat,  eccentric,  perilous, 
nay,  even  disastrous,  if  it  should  fall  in  with 
the  Prussians  by  the  way. 

Napoleon  was  perfectly  aware  that  such 
must  be  the  plan  of  the  enemy.  Accordingly, 
after  concentrating  his  army  towards  his  left 
and  the  heights,  he  left  towards  his  right,  that 
is  towards  Sokolnitz,  Telnitz,  and  the  ponds,  a 
space  almost  unguarded.  He  thus  invited  the 


Russians  to  persevere  in  their  plans.  But  it 
was  not  precisely  there  that  he  prepared  the 
mortal  stroke  for  them.  The  ground  facing 
him  presented  a  feature  from  which  he  hoped 
to  derive  a  decisive  result. 

Beyond  the  stream  lhat  ran  in  front  of  our 
position,  the  ground  spread  at  first,  opposite  to 
our  left,  into  a  slightly  undulated  plain,  through 
which  passed  the  Olmiitz  road  ;  then,  opposite 
to  our  centre,  it  rose  successively,  and  at  last 
formed  facing  our  right  a  plateau,  called  the 
plateau  of  Pratzen,  after  the  name  of  a  village 
situated  half-way  up,  in  the  hollow  of  a  ravine. 
This  plateau  terminated  on  the  right  in  rapid 
declivities  towards  the  ponds,  and  at  the  back 
in  a  gentle  slope  towards  Austerlitz,  the  cha- 
teau of  which  appeared  at  some  distance. 

There  were  to  be  seen  considerable  forces ; 
there  a  multitude  of  fires  blazed  at  night,  and 
a  great  movement  of  men  and  horses  was  ob- 
servable by  day.  On  these  appearances,  Na- 
poleon had  no  longer  any  doubt  of  the  designs 
of  the  Austro-Russians.1  They  intended  evi- 
dently to  descend  from  the  position  which  they 
occupied,  and,  crossing  the  Goldbach  rivulet, 
between  the  ponds  and  our  right,  to  cut  us  off 
from  the  Vienna  road.  But,  for  this  reason,  it 
was  resolved  to  take  the  offensive  in  our  turn, 
to  cross  the  rivulet  at  the  villages  of  Girziko- 
witz and  Puntowitz,  to  ascend  to  the  plateau 
of  Pratzen  while  the  Russians  were  leaving  it, 
and  to  take  possession  of  it  ourselves.  In 
case  we  succeeded,  the  enemy's  army  would 
be  cut  in  two;  one  part  would  be  thrown  to 
the  left  into  the  plain  crossed  by  the  Olmiitz 
road;  the  other  to  the  right  into  the  ponds. 
Thenceforward  the  battle  could  not  fail  to  be 
disastrous  for  the  Austro-Russians.  But,  for 
this  effect,  it  was  requisite  that  they  should 
not  blunder  by  halves.  The  prudent,  nay  even 
timid  attitude  of  Napoleon,  exciting  their  silly 
confidence,  would  induce  them  to  commit  the 
entire  blunder. 

Agreeably  to  these  ideas,  Napoleon  made  his 
dispositions.  Expecting  for  two  days  past  to 
be  attacked,  he  had  ordered  Bernadotte  to  quit 
Iglau  on  the  frontier  of  Bohemia,  to  leave 
there  the  Bavarian  division  which  he  had 
brought  with  him,  and  to  hasten  by  forced 
marches  to  Brunn.  He  had  ordered  Marshal 
Davout  to  march  Friant's  and  if  possible  Gu- 
din's  division  towards  the  abbey  of  Gross  Rai- 
gern,  situated  on  the  road  from  Vienna  to 
Brunn,  opposite  to  the  ponds.  In  consequence 
of  these  orders  Bernadotte  marched,  and  had 
arrived  on  the  1st  of  December.  General  Fri- 
ant,  being  alone  apprized  ;n  time,  because  Ge- 
neral Gudin  was  at  a  greater  distance  towards 
Presburg,  had  set  out  immediately,  and  tra- 
velled in  forty-eight  hours  the  thirty-six  leagues 


'  There  has  been  recently  published  a  work  translated 
from  the  Russian  by  M.  Leon  de  Narischkine,  which  con- 
tains a  great  number  of  inaccurate  assertions,  though 
proceeding  from  an  author  in  a  situation  to  be  correctly 
informed.  In  this  work  it  is  alleged  that,  before  the 
battle  of. Austerlitz,  the  plan  of  General  Weirother  was 
.  communicated  to  Napoleon.  This  assertion  Is  totally 
erroneous.  Such  a  communication  would  imply  that  the 
plan,  communicated  long  beforehand  to  the  commanders 
of  the  different  corps,  could  have  been  liable  to  be  di- 
vulged. We  shall  see  presently,  from  the  report  of  an 


eye-witness,  that  it  was  not  till  the  night  preceding  the 
battle  that  the  plan  was  communicated  to  the  command- 
ers of  corps.  Besides,  all  the  details  of  the  orders  and 
correspondence  proved  that  Napoleon  foresaw  and  was 
not  apprized  of  the  enemy's  plan.  Our  resolution  being 
to  avoid  all  controversy  with  contemporary  writers,  we 
shall  confine  o.  rselves  to  the  correction  of  this  er.or, 
without  noticing  many  others  contained  in  the  work  in 
question,  the  real  merit,  and  to  a  certain  point  the  impar- 
tiality, of  which  we  are  ready  to  acknowledge. 

H 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


>-~  1805 


which  separate  Vienna  from  Gross  Raigern. 
The  soldiers  sometimes  dropped  on  the  road, 
exhausted  with  fatigue;  but  at  the  least  sound, 
imagining  that  they  heard  the  cannon,  they 
rose  with  ardour  to  hasten  to  the  assistance 
of  their  comrades,  engaged,  they  said,  in  a 
bloody  battle.  On  the  night  of  the  1st  of  De- 
cember, which  was  extremely  cold,  they  bi- 
vouacked at  Gross  Raigern,  a  league  and  a  half 
from  the  field  of  battle.  Never  did  troops  on 
foot  perform  so  astonishing  a  march ;  for  it  is 
a  march  of  eighteen  leagues  a  day  for  two  suc- 
cessive days. 

On  the  1st  of  December,  Napoleon,  rein- 
forced by  Bernadotte's  corps  and  Friant's  divi- 
sion, could  number  65  or  70  thousand  men, 
present  under  arms,  against  90,000  men,  Rus- 
sians and  Austrians,  likewise  present  under 
arms. 

At  his  left  he  placed  Lannes,  in  whose  corps 
Caffarelli's  division  supplied  the  place  of  Ga- 
zan's.  Lannes,  with  the  two  divisions  of 
Suchet  and  Caffarelli,  was  to  occupy  the  Ol- 
miitz  road,  and  to  fight  in  the  undulated  plain 
outspread  on  either  side  of  that  road.  Napo- 
leon gave  him,  moreover,  Murat's  cavalry, 
comprising  the  cuirassiers  of  Generals  d'Haut- 
poul  and  Nansouty,  the  dragoons  of  Generals 
Walther  and  Beaumont,  and  the  chasseurs  of 
Generals  Milhaud  and  Kellermann.  The  level 
surface  of  the  ground  led  him  to  expect  a  pro- 
digious engagement  of  cavalry  on  this  spot. 
On  the  knoll  of  the  Santon,  which  commands 
this  part  of  the  ground,  and  is  topped  by  a 
chapel  called  the  chapel  of  Bosenitz,  he  placed 
the  17th  light,  commanded  by  General  Clapa- 
rede,  with  eighteen  pieces  of  cannon,  and  made 
him  take  an  oath  to  defend  this  position  to  the 
death.  This  knoll  was,  in  fact,  the  point 
d'appui  of  the  left. 

At  the  centre,  behind  the  Goldbach  rivulet, 
he  ranged  Vandamme's  and  St.  Hilaire's  divi- 
sions, which  belong  to  the  corps  of  Marshal 
Soult.  He  destined  them  to  cross  that  stream 
at  the  villages  of  Girzikowitz  and  Puntowitz, 
and  to  gain  possession  of  the  plateau  of  Prat- 
zen,  when  the  proper  moment  should  arrive. 
A  little  further  behind  the  marsh  of  Kobelnitz 
and  the  chateau  of  Kobelnitz,  he  placed  Mar- 
shal Soult's  third  division,  that  of  General  Le- 
grand.  He  reinforced  it  with  two  battalions 
of  tirailleurs,  known  by  the  names  of  chas- 
seurs of  the  Po  and  Corsican  chasseurs,  and 
by  a  detachment  of  light  cavalry,  under  Gene- 
ral Margaron.  This  division  was  to  have  only 
the  3d  of  the  line  and  the  Corsican  chasseurs 
at  Telnitz,  the  nearest  point  to  the  ponds,  and 
to  which  Napoleon  was  desirous  of  drawing 
the  Russians.  Far  in  rear,  at  the  distance  of 
a  league  and  a  half,  was  posted  Friant's  divi- 
sion at  Gross  Raigern. 

Having  ten  divisions  of  infantry,  Napoleon, 
therefore  presented  but  six  of  them  in  line. 
Behind  Marshals  Lannes  and  Soult,  he  kept  in 
reserve  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  separated  on  this 
occasion  from  Lannes'  corps,  the  corps  of 
Bernadotte,  composed  of  Drouet's  and  Riv- 
aud's  divisions,  and,  lastly,  the  imperial  guard. 
He  thus  kept  at  hand  a  mass  of  25,000  men,  to 
move  to  any  point  where  they  might  be  needed, 
ai'd  particularly  to  the  heights  of  Pratzen,  in 


order  to  take  those  heights  at  any  cost,  if  the 
Russians  should  not  have  cleared  them  suffi 
ciently.  He  bivouacked  himself  amidst  this 
reserve. 

These  dispositions  completed,  he  carried  his 
confidence  so  far  as  to  make  them  known  tc 
his  army  in  a  proclamation  imbued  with  the 
grandeur  of  the  events  that  were  preparing 
It  is  subjoined,  just  as  it  was  read  to  the  troops 
on  the  evening  before  the  battle. 

"  SOLDIEHS, 

"The  Russian  army  appears  before  you 
to  avenge  the  Austrian  army  of  Ulm.  They 
are  the  same  battalions  that  you  beat  at  Holla- 
briinn,  and  that  you  have  since  been  constantly 
pursuing  to  this  spot. 

"  The  positions  which  we  occupy  are  formi- 
dable ;  and  while  they  are  marching  to  turn 
my  right,  they  will  present  their  flank  to  me. 

"  Soldiers,  I  shall  myself  direct  your  batta- 
lions. I  shall  keep  out  of  the  fire,  if,  with  your 
usual  bravery,  you  throw  disorder  and  confu- 
sion into  the  enemy's  ranks.  But,  if  the  victory 
should  be  for  a  moment  uncertain,  you  will  see 
your  Emperor  the  foremost  to  expose  himself 
to  danger.  For  victory  must  not  hang  doubt- 
ful on  this  day,  most  particularly,  when  the 
honour  of  the  French  infantry,  which  so  deeply 
concerns  the  honour  of  the  whole  nation,  is  at 
stake. 

"  Let  not  the  ranks  be  thinned  upon  pretext 
of  carrying  away  the  wounded,  and  let  every 
one  be  thoroughly  impressed  with  this  thought, 
that  it  behoves  us  to  conquer  these  hirelings 
of  England,  who  are  animated  with  such  bitter 
hatred  against  our  nation. 

"  This  victory  will  put  an  end  to  the  cam- 
paign, and  we  shall  then  be  able  to  return  to 
our  winter-quarters,  where  we  shall  be  joined 
by  the  new  armies  which  are  forming  in 
France,  and  then  the  peace  which  I  shall  make 
will  be  worthy  of  my  people,  of  you,  and  of 
myself.  "  NAPOLEON." 

On  this  same  day  he  received  M.  de  Haug- 
witz,  who  had  at  length  reached  the  French 
head-quarters,  discerned  in  his  wheedling  con- 
versation all  the  falseness  of  Prussia,  and  felt 
more  convinced  than  ever  of  the  necessity  of 
gaining  a  signal  victory.  He  received  the 
Prussian  envoy  most  graciously,  told  him  that 
he  was  going  to  fight  on  the  morrow,  and  that 
he  would  see  him  again  afterwards,  if  he  was 
not  swept  ofF  by  some  cannon-ball,  and  that 
then  it  would  be  time  to  arrange  matters  with 
the  cabinet  of  Berlin.  He  advised  him  to  set  out 
that  very  night  for  Vienna,  and  he  gave  him  a 
letter  to  M.  de  Talleyrand,  taking  care  to  let 
him  be  conducted  through  the  field  of  battle 
of  Hollabriinn,  which  presented  a  horrible 
sight.  It  is  right,  he  wrote  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
that  this  Prussian  should  learn  by  his  own 
eyes  in  what  manner  we  make  war. 

Having  passed  the  evening  at  the  bivouac 
with  his  marshals,  he  resolved  to  visit  the  sol- 
diers and  to  judge  for  himself  of  their  moral 
disposition.  It  was  the  evening  of  the  1st  of 
December,  the  eve  of  the  anniversary  of  his 
coronation.  The  coincidence  of  these  dates 
was  singular,  and  Napoleon  had  not  contrived 
it,  for  he  accepted  battle,  but  did  not  offer  it. 
The  night  was  cold  and  dark. 


Dec.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


The  first  soldiers  who  perceived  him,  eager  ' 
to  light  him  on  his  way,  picked  up  the  straw 
of  their  bivouac  and  made  it  into  torches 
which  they  placed  blazing  on  the  top  of  their 
muskets.  In  a  few  minutes  this  example  was 
followed  by  the  whole  army,  and  along  the 
vast  front  of  our  position  was  displayed  this 
singular  illumination.  The  soldiers  accom- 
panied the  steps  of  Napoleon  with  shouts  of 
"  Vive  VEmpereur  '."  promising  to  prove  on  the 
morrow  that  they  were  worthy  of  him  and  of 
themselves.  Enthusiasm  pervaded  all  the  ; 
ranks.  They  went  as  men  ought  to  go  into 
danger,  with  hearts  full  of  content  and  confi- 
dence. 

Napoleon  retired  to  oblige  his  soldiers  to 
take  some  rest,  and  awaited  in  his  tent  the 
dawn  of  that  day  which  was  to  be  one  of  the 
most  glorious  of  his  life,  one  of  the  most  glo- 
rious in  history. 

Those  lights,  those  shouts,  had  been  early 
distinguished  from  the  heights  occupied  by  the 
Russian  army,  and  in  a  small  number  of  dis- 
creet officers  they  had  produced  a  sinister  pre- 
sentment. They  asked  one  another  if  these 
were  signs  of  an  army  disheartened  and  in 
retreat. 

Meanwhile,  ihe  commanders  of  the  Russian 
corps,  assembled  at  the  quarters  of  General 
Kutusof,  in   the  village  of  Kreznowitz,  were 
receiving  their  instructions  for  the  following 
day.     Old  Kutusof  was  fast  asleep,  and  Gene- 
ral Weirother,  having  spread  out  a  map  of  the 
country  before  those  who  did  listen  to  him, 
read  with  emphasis  a  memorial  containing  the  . 
whole  plan  of  the  battle.1     We  have  nearly  i 
explained  it  already  in  describing  the  disposi-  i 
lions  of  Napoleon.     The  right  of  the  Russians,  J 
under  Prince  Bagration,  faced  our  left,  as  it  j 
was  destined  to  advance  against  Lannes,  on  ! 
both   sides   of  the  Olmiitz   road,  to   take   the  ; 
Santon  from  us,  and  to  march  direct  for  Bruun. 
The  cavalry,  collected  into  a  single  mass  be- 
tween the  corps  of  Bagration  and  the  centre 
of  the  Russian  army,  was  to  occupy  the  same  ( 
plain  in  which  Napoleon  had  placed  Murat,  \ 
and  to  connect  the  left  of  the  Russians  with 


1  We  think  it  useful  to  quote  here  a  fragment  of  the 
manuscript  memoirs  of  General  Langeron,  an  eye-wit- 
ness, since  he  commanded  one  of  the  corps  of  the  Russian 
army.  Here  follows  the  account  of  that  officer. 

"  We  havH  seen  that  on  the  19th  of  November  (De- 
eember  the  1st)  our  columns  did  not  reach  their  destina- 
tion till  about  ten  o'clock  at  night. 

"  About  eleven,  all  the  commanders  of  those  columns, 
excepting  Prince  Bagrntion,  who  was  too  far  off,  received 
orders  to  repair  to  General  Kutusof 's  quarters  at  Krez- 
nowitz, to  have  the  dispositions  for  the  battle  of  the  fol- 
lowing day  read  to  them. 

"At  one  in  the  morning,  when  we  had  all  assembled, 
General  Weirother  arrived,  unfolded  upon  a  large  table 
an  immense  and  most  accurate  map  of  the  environs  of 
Briinn  and  Austerlitz,  and  read  the  dispositions  to  us  in 
a  loud  tone,  and  with  a  self-sufficient  air,  which  indicated 
a  thorough  persuasion  of  his  own  merit  and  that  of  our 
incapacity.  He  was  like  a  college  teacher  reading  a 
lesson  to  young  scholars.  Perhaps  we  really  were  scho- 
lars ;  but  he  was  far  from  being  a  clever  schoolmaster. 
Kutusof,  seated  and  half  asleep  when  we  arrived,  at 
length  fell  into  a  sound  nap  before  our  departure.  Buz- 
hSvden,  standing,  listened  but  most  assuredly  compre- 
hended not  a  word  ;  Miloradovich  held  his  tongue  ;  I'ri- 
hyicbewski  kept  in  the  background,  and  Doctorow  alone 


their  centre.  The  main  body  of  the  army, 
composed  of  four  columns,  commanded  by 
Generals  Doctorow,  Langeron,  Pribyschewski, 
and  Kollowrath,  established  at  the  moment  on 
the  heights  of  Pratzen,  was  to  descend  from 
them,  to  cross  the  swampy  stream  which  has 
been  previously  mentioned,  to  take  Telnitz, 
Sokolnitz,  and  Kobelnitz,  to  turn  the  right  of 
the  French,  and  to  advance  upon  their  rear,  to 
wrest  the  Vienna  road  from  them.  The  ren- 
de?vous  of  all  the  corps  was  fixed  under  the 
walls  of  Brunn.  The  Archduke  Constantine, 
with  the  Russian  guard,  nine  or  ten  thousand 
strong,  was  to  start  from  Austerlitz  at  day- 
break, and  to  place  himself  in  reserve  behind 
the  centre  of  the  combined  army. 

When  General  Weirother  had  finished  his 
lecture  to  the  commanders  of  the  Russian 
corps,  only  one  of  whom,  General  Doctorow, 
was  attentive,  and  only  one,  General  Langeron, 
inclined  to  contradict,  the  latter  ventured  to 
make  some  objections.  General  Langeron,  a 
French  emigrant,  who  served  against  his  coun- 
try, who  was  a  grumbler  but  a  good  officer, 
asked  General  Weirother,  if  he  imagined  that 
circumstances  would  turn  out  precisely  as  he 
had  written,  and  showed  himself  strongly  dis- 
posed to  doubt  it.  General  Weirother  would 
never  admit  any  other  idea  than  that  current 
in  the  Russian  staff,  namely  that  Napoleon 
was  retreating,  and  that  the  instructions  for 
this  case  were  excellent.  But  General  Kutu- 
sof put  an  end  to  all  discussion  by  sending  the 
commanders  of  the  corps  to  their  quarters,  and 
ordering  a  copy  of  the  instructions  to  be  for- 
warded to  each.  That  experienced  chief  knew 
in  what  estimation  plans  of  battles  conceived 
and  arranged  in  that  manner  ought  to  be  held, 
and  yet  he  suffered  the  thing  to  be  done,  though 
it  was  in  his  name  that  the  transaction  took 
place. 

By  four  in  the  morning  Napoleon  had  left 
his  tent,  to  judge  with  his  own  eyes  if  the 
Russians  were  committing  the  blunder  into 
which  he  had  been  so  dexterously  leading 
them.  He  descended  to  the  village  of  Punto- 
witz,  situated  on  the  bank  of  the  brook  which 


examined  the  map  attentively.  When  Weirother  had 
finished  his  lecture,  I  was  the  only  one  who  spoke. 
'General,'  I  said  to  him,  'this  is  all  very  well,  but  if  the 
enemy  should  anticipate  us  and  attack  us  at  Pratzen, 
what  are  we  to  do  then  V — 'The  case  is  not  foreseen,'  he 
replied.  'You  know  how  daring  Bonaparte  is.  If  he 
could  have  attacked  us,  he  would  have  done  so  to-day.' — 
'Then  you  do  not  think  him  strong 7'  I  rejoined.  'It  is 
much  if  he  has  40,000  men.' — 'In  this  case,  he  is  plung- 
ing himself  into  ruin  by  awaiting  our  attack  :  hut  I  look 
upon  him  to  be  too  able  to  be  imprudent,  for  if,  as  you 
wish  and  believe,  we  cut  him  off  from  Vienna,  he  will 
have  no  other  retreat  but  the  mountains  of  Bohemia.  I 
conjecture,  however,  that  he  has  a  different  design.  He 
has  put  out  his  fires,  and  not  a  sound  is  heard  in  his 
camp.' — 'That  is  because  he  is  retiring  or  changing  posi- 
tion ;  and,  even  supposing  he  takes  that  of  Turas,  he  will 
spare  us  a  great  deal  of  trouble,  and  the  disposilions  will 
remain  the  same.' 

"Kutusof,  having  then  wakened  up,  dismissed  us,  or- 
dering us  to  leave  an  adjutant  to  copy  the  dispositions 
which  Lieutenant-Colonel  Toll,  of  the  staff,  was  going  to 
translate  out  of  German  into  Russian.  It  was  three  in 
the  morning,  and  we  did  not  receive  copies  of  these  fc- 

I  moug  dispositions  till  near  eight,  when  we  were  already 

I  on  march." 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Dec.  1805. 


separated  the  two  armies,  and  perceived  the 
fires  of  the  Russians  nearly  extinguished  on 
the  heights  of  Pratzen.  A  very  distinguish- 
able sound  of  cannon  and  horses  indicated  a 
march  from  left  to  right  towards  the  ponds, 
the  very  way  that  he  wished  the  Russians  to 
take.  Great  was  his  joy  on  finding  his  fore- 
sight so  fully  justified  ;  he  returned  and  placed 
himself  on  the  high  ground  where  he  had 
bivouacked,  and  where  the  eye  embraced  the 
whole  extent  of  that  field  of  battle.  His  mar- 
shals were  on  horseback  at  his  side.  Day 
began  to  dawn.  A  wintry  fog  covered  the 
country  to  a  distance,  the  most  prominent 
points  only  being  visible  and  rising  above  the 
mist  like  islands  out  of  the  sea.  The  differ- 
ent corps  of  the  French  army  were  in  motion, 
and  were  descending  from  the  position  which 
they  had  occupied  during  the  night  to  cross 
the  rivulet  which  separated  them  from  the 
Russians.  But  they  halted  in  the  bottom, 
where  they  were  concealed  by  the  fog  and 
kept  by  the  Emperor  till  the  opportune  mo- 
ment for  the  attack. 

A  very  brisk  fire  was  already  heard  at  the 
extremity  of  the  line  towards  the  ponds.  The 
movement  of  the  Russians  against  our  left 
was  evident.  Marshal  Davont  had  gone  in  all 
haste  to  direct  Friant's  division  from  Gross 
Raigern  upon  Telnitz,  and  to  support  the  3d 
of  the  line  and  the  Corsican  chasseurs,  who 
would  soon  have  upon  their  hands  a  consider- 
able portion  of  the  enemy's  army.  Marshals 
Lannes,  Murat,  and  Soult,  with  their  aides-de- 
camp surrounded  the  Emperor,  awaiting  his 
'order  to  commence  the  combat  at  the  centre 
and  on  the  left.  Napoleon  moderated  their 
ardour,  wishing  to  let  the  Russians  consum- 
mate the  fault  which  they  were  committing  on 
our  right,  so  completely  that  they  should  not 
have  it  in  their  power  to  get  back  out  of  those 
bottoms  which  they  were  seen  entering.  The 
sun  at  length  burst  forth,  and  dispelling  the 
fog,  poured  a  flood  of  radiance  upon  the  vast 
field  of  battle.  It  was  the  sun  of  Austerlitz, 
a  sun  the  recollections  of  which  have  been  so 
frequently  submitted  to  the  present  generation, 
that  assuredly  they  will  not  be  forgotten  by 
future  generations.  The  heights  of  Pratzen 
were  cleared  of  troops.  The  Russians,  in 
execution  of  the  plan  agreed  upon,  had  de- 
scended to  the  bed  of  the  Goldbach,  to  gain 
possession  of  thu  villages  of  Telnitz  and  So- 
kolnitz,  situated  along  that  rivulet.  Napoleon 
then  gave  the  signal  for  the  attack,  and  his 
marshals  gallopped  off"  to  put  themselves  at 
the  head  of  their  respective  corps  d'armee. 

The  three  Russian  columns  directed  to  at- 
tack Telnitz  and  Sokolnitz,  had  broken  up  at 
seven  o'clock  in  the  morning.  They  were 
under  the  immediate  command  of  Generals 
Poctorow,  Langeron,  and  Pribyschewski,  and 
under  the  superior  command  of  General  Bux- 
hovden.an  officer  of  inferior  abilities,  inactive, 
puffed  up  by  the  favour  which  he  owed  to  a 
court  marriage,  and  who  no  more  commanded 
the  left  of  the  Russian  army  than  General 
Kutusof  commanded  the  whole.  He  marched 
himself  along  with  General  Doctorow's  co- 
lumn, forming  the  extremity  of  the  Russian 
line,  and  which  would  have  to  engage  first. 


He  paid  no  attention  to  the  other  columns,  or 
to  the  harmony  which  ought  to  have  been  in- 
troduced into  their  different  movements;  which 
was  very  lucky  for  us;  for,  if  they  had  acted 
together,  and  attacked  Telnitz  and  Sokolnitz 
en  masse,  as  Friant's  division  had  not  yet  ar- 
rived at  that  point,  they  might  have  gained 
much  more  ground  upon  our  right  than  it 
would  have  suited  us  to  give  up  to  them. 

Doctorow's  column  had  bivouacked,  like 
the  others,  on  the  height  of  Pratzen.  At  the 
foot  of  this  height,  in  the  bottom  which  sepa- 
rated it  from  our  right,  there  was  a  village 
called  Augezd,  and  in  that  village  an  advanced 
guard  under  the  command  of  General  Kien- 
mayer,  composed  of  five  Austrian  battalions, 
and  fourteen  squadrons.  This  advanced 
guard  was  to  sweep  the  plain  between  Au- 
gezd and  Telnitz,  while  Doctorow's  column 
was  descending  from  the  heights.  The  Aus- 
trians,  eager  to  show  the  Russians  that  they 
could  fight  as  well  as  they,  attacked  "the  village 
of  Telnitz  with  great  resolution.  It  was  ne- 
cessary to  cross  at  once  the  rivulet  running 
here  in  channels,  and  then  a  height  covered 
with  vines  and  houses.  We  had  in  this 
place,  besides  the  3d  of  the  line,  the  battalion 
of  the  Corsican  chasseurs,  concealed  from 
view  by  the  nature  of  the  ground.  These 
skilful  marksmen,  coolly  taking  aim  at  the 
hussars  who  had  been  sent  forward,  picked 
off  a  great  number  of  them.  They  received 
in  the  same  manner  the  Szekler  regiment 
(infantry),  and  in  half  an  hour  strewed  the 
ground  with  part  of  that  regiment.  The  Aus- 
trians,  tired  of  a  destructive  combat,  and  one 
that  was  productive  of  no  result,  attacked  en 
masse  the  village  of  Telnitz,  with  their  five 
united  battalions,  but  were  not  able  to  pene- 
trate into  it,  thanks  to  the  firmness  of  the  3d 
of  the  line,  which  received  them  with  the 
vigour  of  a  tried  band.  While  Kienmayer's 
advanced  guard  was  thus  exhausting  itself  in 
impotent  efforts,  Doctorow's  column,  twenty- 
four  battalions  strong,  led  by  General  Bux- 
hovden,  made  its  appearance,  an  hour  later 
than  was  £xpected,  and  proceeded  to  assist 
the  Austrians  to  take  Telnitz,  which  the  3d 
of  the  line  was  no  longer  sufficient  to  defend. 
The  bed  of  the  stream  was  crossed,  aud  Gene- 
ral Kienmayer  threw  his  fourteen  squadrons 
into  the  plain  beyond  Telnitz,  against  the 
light  cavalry  of  General  Margaron.  The 
latter  bravely  stood  several  charges,  but  could 
not  maintain  its  ground  against  such  a  mass 
of  cavalry.  Friant's  division,  conducted  by 
Marshal  Davont,  having  not  yet  arrived  from 
Gross  Raigern,  our  right  was  greatly  over- 
matched. But  General  Buxhovdeu,  after 
being  long  waited  for,  was  obliged  in  his 
turn  to  wait  for  the  second  column,  com- 
manded by  General  Langeron.  This  latter 
had  been  delayed  by  a  singular  accident 
The  mass  of  the  cavalry,  destined  to  occupy 
the  plain  which  was  on  the  right  of  the  Rus- 
sians and  on  the  left  of  the  French,  had  mis- 
conceived the  order  prescribing  that  it  should 
take  that  position :  it  had  therefore  gone  and 
taken  post  at  Pratzen,  amidst  the  bivouacs  of 
Langeron's  column.  Having  discovered  its 
error,  this  cavalry,  in  repairing  to  its  proper 


D«  C.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


89 


place,  had  cut  and  long  retarded  Langeron's  ! 
and  Pribyschewski's  columns.    General  Lan- 
geron,  having  at  length  arrived  before  Sokol- 
nitz,  commenced  an  attack  on  it.     But  mean- . 
while  General  Friant  had  come  up  in  the  ut- 
most haste,  with  his  division,  composed  of  five 
regiments  of  infantry  and   six   regiments  of 
dragoons.     The   1st  regiment  of  dragoons,  at- 
tached for  this  occasion  toBourcier's  division, 
was  despatched  at  full  trot  upon  Telnitz.   The 
Austro-Russians,   already   victorious    at   this 
point,  began    to  cross  the  Goldbach,  and  to 
press  the  3d  of  the  light  as  well  as  Margaron's 
light  cavalry.     The  dragoons  of  the  first  regi- 
ment, on  approaching  the  enemy,  broke  into  a 
gallop,  and  drove  back  into  Telnitz  all  who 
had  attempted  to  debouch  from  it.     Generals 
Friant  and  Heudelet,  arriving   with   the    1st 
brigade,  composed  of  the   108th   of  the  line 
and  the  voltigeurs  of  the   15th  light,  entered , 
Telnitz  with  bayonets  fixed,  expelled  the  Aus- ', 
trians  and  Russians,  and  drove  them  pell-mell 
beyond  the  channels  which  form  the  bed  of 
the  Goldbach,  and  remained   masters  of  the 
ground,  after  they  had   strewed  it  with  dead 
and  wounded.     Unluckily,  the  fog,  dispersed 
nearly  everywhere,  prevailed  in  the  bottoms. 
It  enveloped  Telnitz  as  in  a  sort  of  cloud.  The 
26th  light,  of  Legrand's  division,  which  had  i 
come  to  the  assistance  of  the  3d  of  the  line,  | 
perceiving  indistinctly  masses  of  troops  on  the 
other  side  of  the  stream,  without  being  able  to  ' 
discern  the  colour  of  their  uniform,  fired  upon  ; 
the  108th,  under  the  impression  that  it  was  the 
enemy.     This  unexpected  attack  staggered  the 
108th,  which  fell  back,  for  fear  of  being  turned. 
Taking  advantage  of  this  circumstance,  the 
Russians  and  Austrian?,  having   twenty-nine  \ 
battalions  at  this  point,  resumed  the  offensive, 
and  dislodged  Heudelet's  brigade  from  Telnitz, ; 
while  General  Langeron,  attacking  with  twelve 
Russian   battalions    the   village  of  Sokolnitz, 
situated  on   the  Goldbach,  a  little  above  Tel-  j 
nitz,  had  penetrated  into  it.     The  two  hostile 
columns  of  Doctorow  and  Langeron  then  be- 
gan to  debouch,  the  one  from  Telnitz,  the  other  , 
from  Sokolnitz.     At  the  same  time   General  | 
Pribyschew^ki's    column   had   attacked    and  j 
taken  the  chateau  of  Sokolnitz,  situated  above 
the  village  of  that  name.  At  this  sight  General 
Friant,  who  on  that  day,  as  on  so  many  others, 
behaved  like  a  hero,  flung  General  Bourcier, 
with  his  six  regiments  of  dragoons,  upon  Doc- 
torow's  column,  at  the  moment  when  the  latter 
was  deploying  beyond  Telnilz.    The  Russians 
presented  their  bayonets  to  our  dragoons ;  but 
the  charges  of  our  horse,  repeated   with  the 
utmost  fury,  prevented  them  from  extending 
themselves,  and  supported  Heudelet's  brigade, 
which  was  opposed  to  them.     General  Friant 
afterwards  put  himself  at  the  head  of  Lochet's 
brigade,  composed  of  the  18th  and  the  lllth1 
of  the  line,  and  rushed   upon  Langeron's  co- 
lumn, which  was  already  beyond  the  village 
of  Sokolnitz,  drove  it  back  to  that  place,  en- 
tered  it  at  its  heels,  expelled  it  again,  and 

1  Prince  Czartoryski,  placed  between  the  two  empe-    At  this  sight  that  prince  lost  all  the  confidence  which  he 
rnrs,  remarked  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  the  nimble  and    had  till  then  felt,  and  conceived  a  sinister  presentiment 
decided  step  with  which  the  French  were  ascending  to  :  which  never  left  him  during  the  engagement, 
the  plate  i;,  without  returning  the  fire  of  the  Russians.  1     2  The  same  who  died  lately. 
VOL.  II.— 12  H  2 


hurled  it  to  the  other  side  of  the  Goldbach. 
Having  occupied  Sokolnitz,  General  Friant 
committed  it  to  the  guard  of  the  48th,  and 
marched  with  his  3d  brigade,  that  of  Kister, 
composed  of  the  33d  of  the  line  and  the  15th 
light,  to  recover  the  chdteau  of  Sokolnitz  from 
Pribyschewski's  column.  He  forced  it  to  fall 
back.  But  while  he  was  engaged  with  Priby- 
schewski's troops,  in  front  of  the  chateau  of 
Sokolnitz,  Langeron's  column,  attacking  anew 
the  village  dependent  on  this  chateau,  had 
wellnigh  overwhelmed  the  48th,  which,  retir- 
ing into  the  houses  of  the  village,  defended 
itself  with  admirable  gallantry.  General  Friant 
returned,  and  extricated  the  48th.  That  brave 
general  and  his  illustrious  chief,  Marshal  Da- 
vout,  hastened  incessantly  from  one  point  to 
another,  on  this  line  of  the  Goldbach,  so  warmly 
disputed,  and  with  seven  or  eight  thousand 
foot  and  2800  horse,  engaged  35,000  Russians. 
Indeed,  Friant's  division  was  reduced,  by  a 
march  of  thirty-six  hours  which  it  had  per- 
formed, to  6000  men  at  most,  and  with  the  3d 
of  the  line  formed  no  more  than  seven  or  eight 
thousand  combatants.  But  the  men  who  had 
lagged  behind,  arriving  every  moment  at  the 
report  of  the  cannon,  successively  filled  up 
the  gaps  made  by  the  enemy's  fire  in  its  ranks. 

During  this  obstinate  combat  towards  our 
right,  Marshal  Soult,  at  the  centre,  had  attacked 
the  position  on  which  depended  the  issue  of 
the  battle.  At  a  signal  given  by  Napoleon, 
the  two  divisions  of  Vandamme  and  St.  Hi- 
laire,  formed  into  close  column,  ascended  at  a 
rapid  pace  the  acclivities  .of  the  plateau  of 
Pratzen.  Vandamme's  division  had  proceeded 
to  the  left,  St.  Hilaire's  to  the  right  of  the  vil- 
lage of  Pratzen,  which  is  deeply  imbedded  in 
a  ravine  that  terminates  at  the  Goldbach 
rivulet,  near  Puntowitz.  While  the  French 
were  pushing  forward,  the  centre  of  the  ene- 
my's army,  composed  of  Kollowrath's  Austrian 
infantry  and  the  Russian  infantry  of  Milora- 
dovich,  twenty-seven  battalions  strong,  under 
the  immediate  command  of  General  Kutusof 
and  the  two  emperors,  had  come  and  deployed 
on  the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  to  take  the  place 
of  Buxhovden's  three  columns,  which  had  de- 
scended into  the  bottoms.  Our  soldiers,  with- 
out returning  the  fire  of  musketry  which  they 
sustained,  continued  to  climb  the  height,  sur- 
prising by  their  nimble  and  resolute  step  the 
enemy's  generals  who  expected  to  find  them 
retreating.1 

On  reaching  the  village  of  Pratzen  they 
passed  on  without  halting  there.  General 
Morand,  putting  himself  at  the  head  of  the  10th 
light,  went  and  drew  up  on  the  plateau.  Ge- 
neral Thiebault2  followed  him  with  his  brigade, 
composed  of  the  14th  and  36th  of  the  line, 
and,  while  he  was  advancing,  suddenly  re- 
ceived in  rear  a  volley  of  musketry,  which 
proceeded  from  two  Russian  battalions  con- 
cealed in  the  ravine,  at  the  bottom  of  which 
the  village  of  Pratzen  is  situated.  Genera) 
Thiebault  halted  for  a  moment,  returned  at 


90 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Dec.  1805 


point-blank  range  the  volley  which  he  had  re- 
ceived, and  entered  the  village  with  one  of  his 
battalions.  He  dispersed  and  took  the  Rus- 
sians who  occupied  it,  and  then  returned  to 
support  General  Morand,  deployed  on  the  pla- 
teau. Vare's  brigade,  the  second  of  St.  Hi- 
laire's  division,  passing  on  its  part  to  the  left 
of  the  village,  drew  up  facing  the  enemy,  while 
Vandamme,  with  his  whole  division,  took  a 
position  still  further  to  the  left,  near  a  small 
knoll,  called  Stari  Winobradi,  which  com- 
mands the  plateau  of  Pratzen.  Upon  this 
knoll  the  Russians  had  posted  five  battalions 
and  a  numerous  artillery. 

The  Austrian  infantry  of  Kollowrath  and 
the  Russian  infantry  of  Miloradovich  were 
drawn  up  in  two  lines.  Marshal  Soult,  with- 
out loss  of  time,  brought  forward  St.  Hilaire's 
and  Vandamme's  divisions.  General  Thie- 
bault,  forming  with  his  brigade  the  right  of  St. 
Hilaire's  division,  had  a  battery  of  twelve 
pieces.  He  ordered  them  to  be  charged  with 
balls  and  grape,  and  opened  a  destructive  fire 
upon  the  infantry  opposed  to  him.  This  fire, 
kept  up  briskly  and  directed  with  precision, 
soon  threw  the  Austrian  ranks  into  disorder, 
and  they  hurried  in  confusion  to  the  back  of 
the  plateau.  Vandamme  immediately  attacked 
the  enemy  drawn  up  opposite  to  him.  His 
brave  infantry  coolly  advanced,  halted,  fired 
several  murderous  volleys,  and  marched  upon 
the  Russians  with  the  bayonet.  It  flung  back 
their  first  line  upon  their  second,  put  both  to 
flight,  and  obliged  them  to  retreat  to  the  back 
of  the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  leaving  their  artillery 
behind  them.  In  this  movement,  Vandamme 
had  left  the  knoll  of  Stari  Winobradi,  defended 
by  several  Russian  battalions  and  bristling 
with  artillery,  on  his  left.  He  went  back  to  it, 
and,  directing  General  Schiner  to  turn  it  with 
the  24th  light,  he  ascended  it  himself  with  the 
4th  of  the  line.  In  spite  of  a  downward  fire, 
he  climbed  the  knoll,  overturned  the  Russians 
who  guarded  it,  and  took  their  cannon. 

Thus  in  less  than  an  hour  the  two  divisions 
of  Marshal  Soult's  corps  had  made  themselves 
masters  of  the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  and  were 
pursuing  the  Russians  and  Austrian?,  hurled 
pell-mell  down  the  declivities  of  that  plateau, 
which  inclines  towards  the  chateau  of  Auster- 
litz. 

The  two  Emperors  of  Austria  and  Russia, 
witnesses  of  this  rapid  action,  strove  in  vain 
to  rally  their  soldiers.  They  were  scarcely 
listened  to  amidst  that  confusion,  and  Alex- 
ander could  already  perceive  that  the  presence 
of  a  sovereign  is  not,  in  such  circumstances, 
worth  that  of  a  good  general.  Miloradovich, 
always  conspicuous  in  the  fire,  traversed  on 
horseback  that  field  of  battle,  ploughed  with 
balls,  and  strove  to  bring  back  the  fugitives. 
General  Kutusof,  wounded  on  the  cheek  by  a 
rnusket-ball,  beheld  the  realization  of  the  dis- 
aster which  he  had  foreseen,  and  which  he 
had  not  the  firmness  to  prevent.  He  had 
hastened  to  send  for  the  Russian  imperial 
guard,  which  had  bivouacked  in  advance  of 
Austerlitz,  in  order  to  rally  his  routed  centre 
behind  it.  If  this  commander  of  the  Austro- 
Russian  army,  whose  merit  was  limited  to 
great  astuteness  disguised  by  great  indolence, 


lad  been  capable  of  just  and  prompt  resolu- 
tions, he  would  have  hurried  at  this  moment 
:o  his  left,  engaged  with  our  right,  drawn 
Buxhovden's  three  columns  from  the  bottoms 
into  which  they  had  been  plunged,  brought 
them  back  to  the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  and  with 
a  collected  force  of  50,000  men  have  made  a 
decisive  effort  to  recover  a  position,  without 
which  the  Russian  army  must  be  cut  in  two 
[f  even  he  had  not  succeeded,  he  might  aJ 
least  have  retired  in  order  upon  Austerlitz  by 
a  safe  road,  and  not  have  left  his  left  backed 
upon  an  abyss.  But,  content  to  parry  the  evil 
of  which  he  was  an  eye-witness,  he  did  nothing 
more  than  rally  his  centre  upon  the  Russian 
imperial  guard,  nine  or  ten  thousand  strong, 
while  Napoleon,  on  the  contrary,  with  his 
eyes  riveted  on  the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  was 
bringing  forward  to  the  support  of  Marshal 
Soult,  already  victorious,  the  corps  of  Berna- 
dotte,  the  guard,  and  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  that 
is  to  say  25,000  choice  troops. 

While  our  right  was  thus  disputing  the  line 
of  the  Goldbach  with  the  Russians,  and  our 
centre  was  wresting  from  them  the  plateau  of 
Pratzen,  Lannes  and  Murat,  on  our  left,  were 
engaged  with  Prince  Bagration  and  all  the 
cavalry  of  the  Austro-Russians. 

Lannes,  with  Suchet's  and  Caffarelli's  divi- 
sions, deployed  on  both  sides  of  the  Olmiitz 
road,  was  to  march  straight  forward.  On  the 
left  of  the  road,  the  same  near  which  rose  the 
Santon,  the  ground,  on  approaching  the  wooded 
heights  of  Moravia,  was  very  uneven,  some- 
times hilly,  sometimes  intersected  by  deep 
ravines.  There  Suchet's  division  was  placed. 
On  the  right,  more  level  ground  was  connected 
by  very  gentle  rises  with  the  plateau  of  Prat- 
zen. Caffarelli  marched  on  that  side,  pro- 
tected by  Murat's  cavalry,  against  the  mass 
of  the  Austro-Russian  cavalry. 

At  this  point,  a  sort  of  Egyptian  battle  was 
anticipated,  for  here  were  seen  eighty-two 
Russian  and  Austrian  squadrons,  drawn  up  in 
two  lines,  commanded  by  Prince  John  of 
Lichtenstein.  For  this  reason,  Suchet's  and 
Caffarelli's  divisions  presented  several  bat- 
talions deployed,  and  behind  the  intervals  of 
these  battalions,  other  battalions  in  close  co- 
lumn, to  appuy  and  flank  the  former.  The 
artillery  was  spread  over  the  front  of  the  two 
divisions.  General  Kellermann's  light  cavalry, 
as  also  the  divisions  of  dragoons,  were  on  the 
right  in  the  plain,  Nansouty's  and  d'Haut- 
poul's  heavy  cavalry  in  reserve  in  rear. 

In  this  imposing  order,  Lasmes  moved  off  as 
soon  as  he  heard  the  cannon  at  Pratzen,  and 
traversed  at  a  foot  pace,  as  though  it  had  been 
a  parade  ground,  that  plain  illumined  by  a 
bright  winter's  sun. 

Prince  John  of  Lichtenstein  had  not  arrived 
upon  the  ground  till  late,  owing  to  a  mistake 
which  had  caused  the  Austro-Russian  cavalry 
to  run  from  the  right  to  the  left  of  the  field  of 
battle.  In  his  absence,  Alexander's  imperial 
guard  had  filled  the  gap  left  between  the  cen- 
tre and  the  right  of  the  combined  army.  When 
he  at  length  arrived,  perceiving  the  movement 
of  Lannes'  corps,  he  directed  the  Grand-duke 
Constantine's  Hulans  against  Caffarelli's  divi- 
sion. Those  bold  horse  rushed  upon  that  di- 


Dec.  1SU5.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


91 


vision,  before  which  Kellermann  was  placed 
•with  his  brigade  of  light  cavalry.  General 
Kellermann,  one  of  our  ablest  cavalry  officers, 
judging  that  he  should  be  flung  back  upon  the 
French  infantry,  and  perhaps  throw  it  into 
confusion,  if  he  awaited,  without  moving,  that 
formidable  charge,  drew  back  his  squadrons, 
and  making  them  pass  through  the  intervals 
of  Caffarelli's  battalions,  drew  them  up  again 
on  the  left,  in  order  to  seize  a  favourable  op- 
portunity for  charging.  The  Hulans,  coming 
up  at  a  gallop,  no  longer  found  our  light  ca- 
valry, but  encountered  in  its  stead  a  line  of 
infantry,  which  was  not  to  be  broken,  and 
which,  even  without  forming  into  square,  re- 
ceived it  with  a  murderous  fire  of  musketry. 
Four  hundred  of  these  assailants  were  soon 
stretched  on  the  ground  in  front  of  the  division. 
The  Russian  General  Essen  was  mortally 
wounded  fighting  at  their  head.  The  others 
dispersed  in  disorder  to  the  right  and  left. 
Kellermann,  who  had  reformed  his  squadrons 
on  the  left  of  CafTarelli,  seizing  the  opportune 
moment,  charged  the  Hulans,  and  cut  in  pieces 
a  considerable  number  of  them.  Prince  John 
of  Lichtenstein  sent  a  fresh  portion  of  his 
squadrons  to  the  assistance  of  the  Hulans. 
Our  division  of  dragoons  dashed  off  in  their 
turn  upon  the  enemy's  cavalry,  and  for  a  while 
nothing  was  to  be  seen  but  an  awful  fray,  in 
which  all  the  combatants  were  fighting  hand 
to  hand.  This  cloud  of  horsemen  at  length 
dispersed,  and  each  rejoined  his  line  of  battle, 
'caving  the  ground  covered  with  dead  and 
wounded,  mostly  Russians  and  Austrians. 
Our  two  masses  of  infantry  then  advanced 
with  firm  and  measured  step  upon  the  ground 
abandoned  by  the  cavalry.  The  Russians  op- 
posed to  them  forty  pieces  of  cannon,  which 
poured  forth  a  shower  of  projectiles.  One 
discharge  swept  away  the  whole  group  of 
drummers  of  Caffarelli's  first  regiment.  This 
fierce  cannonade  was  returned  by  the  fire  of  all 
our  artillery.  In  this  combat  with  great  guns, 
General  Valhabert  had  a  thigh  fractured  by  a 
ball.  Some  soldiers  would  have  carried  him 
away;  "Remain  at  your  post,"  said  he,  "I  shall 
know  how  to  die  all  alone;  six  men  must  not 
be  taken  away  for  the  sake  of  one."  The  French 
then  marched  for  the  village  of  Blaziowitz, 
situated  on  the  right  of  the  plain,  where  the 
ground  begins  to  rise  towards  Platzen.  Of 
this  village,  seated  like  all  those  of  the  coun- 
try, in  a  deep  ravine,  nothing  was  to  be  seen 
but  the  flames  that  were  consuming  it.  A  de- 
tachment of  the  Russian  imperial  guard  had 
occupied  it  in  the  morning,  till  Prince  Lichten- 
stein's  cavalry  should  arrive.  Lannes  ordered 
the  13th  light  to  take  it.  Colonel  Castex,  who 
commanded  the  13th,  advanced  with  the  first 
ba»"'  n  in  column  of  attack,  and  as  soon  as 
he  arrived  before  the  village,  he  was  struck  by 
a  ball  in  the  forehead.  The  battalion  rushed 
forward,  and  revenged  with  the  bayonet  the 
death  of  its  colonel.  Blaziowitz  was  carried, 
and  some  hundreds  of  prisoners,  picked  up 
there,  were  sent  to  the  rear. 

'At  the  other  wing  of  Lannes'  corps,  the 
Russians,  led  by  Prince  Bagration,  strove  to 
take  the  little  eminence,  called  by  our  soldiers 
ihe  Santon.  They  had  descended  into  a  valley 


which  skirts  the  foot  of  this  eminence,  taken 
the  village  of  Bosenitz,  and  exchanged  balls 
to  no  purpose  with  the  numerous  artillery 
planted  on  the  height.  But  the  Russians  did 
not  care  to  encounter  the  musketry  of  the  17th 
of  the  line,  too  advantageously  posted  for  them 
to  dare  to  approach  too  near. 

Prince  Bagration  had  drawn  up  the  rest  of 
his  infantry  on  the  Olmutz  road,  facing  Suchet's 
division.  Being  obliged  to  fall  back,  he  retired 
slowly  before  the  corps  of  Lannes,  which 
marched  without  precipitation,  but  with  im- 
posing compactness,  and  kept  constantly  gain- 
ing ground.  Blaziowitz  being  carried,  Lannes 
caused  the  villages  of  Holubitz  and  Kruch, 
situated  on  the  Olmutz  road,  to  be  taken  also, 
and  at  length  came  upon  Bagration's  infantry. 
At  this  moment  he  broke  the  line  formed  by 
his  two  divisions.  He  directed  Suchet's  divi- 
sion obliquely  to  the  left,  Caffarelli's  division 
obliquely  to  the  right.  By  this  diverging  move- 
ment, he  separated  Bagration's  infantry  from 
Prince  Lichtenstein's  cavalry,  and  threw  back 
the  first  to  the  left  of  the  Olmutz  road,  the  se- 
cond to  the  right,  towards  the  slopes  of  the 
plateau  of  Pratzen. 

That  cavalry  then  determined  to  make  a  last 
effort,  and  rushed  in  a  mass  upon  Caffarelli's 
I  division,  which  received  it  with  its  usual  firm- 
|  ness,  and  brought  it  to  a  stand  by  the  fire  of 
I  its  musketry.  Numerous  squadrons  of  Lich- 
tenstein's, at  first  dispersed,  then,  rallied  by 
their  officers,  were  led  back  against  our  batta- 
lions. By  order  of  Lannes,  the  cuirassiers  of 
Generals  d'Hautpoul  and  Nansouty,  who  fol- 
lowed Caffarelli's  infantry,  filed  away  at  full 
trot  behind  the  ranks  of  that  infantry,  formed 
upon  its  right,  deployed  there,  and  dashed  off 
at  a  gallop.  The  earth  quaked  under  those 
four  thousand  horsemen  cased  in  iron.  They 
rushed  sword  in  hand  upon  the  mass  of  the 
new-formed  Austro-Russian  squadrons,  over- 
threw them  by  the  shock,  dispersed,  and  obliged 
them  to  flee  towards  Austerlilz,  whither  they 
retired,  to  appear  no  more  during  the  engage- 
ment. 

Meanwhile,  Suchel's  division  -had  attacked 
Prince  Bagration's  infantry.  After  pouring 
upon  the  Russians  those  quiet  and  sure  vol- 
leys, which  our  troops,  not  less  intelligent  than 
inured  to  war,  executed  with  extreme  precision, 
Suchet's  division  had  advanced  upon  them 
with  the  bayonet.  The  Russians,  giving  way 
to  the  impetuosity  of  our  battalions,  had  re 
tired,  but  unbroken  and  without  surrendering. 
They  formed  a  confused  mass  bristling  with 
muskets,  which  the  French  could  only  drive 
before  them,  without  being  able  to  take  them 
prisoners.  Lannes,  having  got  rid  of  Prince 
Lichtenstein's  eighty-two  squadrons,  had  has- 
tened to  bring  back  General  d'Hautpoul's  heavy 
cavalry  from  the  right  to  the  left  of  that  plain, 
and  directed  it  upon  the  Russians  in  order  to 
decide  their  retreat.  The  cuirassiers,  charg- 
ing on  all  sides  those  obstinate  foot-soldiers 
who  were  retiring  in  large  bodies,  had  obliged 
some  thousands  of  them  to  lay  down  their 
arms. 

Thus,  on  our  left,  Lannes  had  fought  a  real 
battle  by  himself.     He  had  taken  4000  prison 
ers.    The   ground   around  him  was  strewed 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Dec.  1805. 


with  4000  Russians   and  Austrians  dead  or 
Bounded. 

But,  on  the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  the  conflict 
was  renewed  between  the  enemy  and  the  corps 
of  Marshal  Soult,  reinforced  by  all  the  re- 
serves, which  Napoleon  brought  up  in  person. 
General  Kutusof,  without  having  any  idea,  as 
we  have  observed,  of  calling  to  him  the  three 
columns  of  Doctorow,  Langeron,  and  Priby- 
schewski,  posted  in  the  bottoms,  thought  only 
of  rallying  his  centre  upon  the  imperial  Rus- 
sian guard.  The  single  brigade  of  Kamenski, 
belonging  to  Langeron's  corps,  hearing  a  very 
brisk  fire  on  its  rear,  had  halted,  and  then 
spontaneously  fallen  back,  in  order  to  return 
to  the  plateau  of  Platzen.  General  Langeron, 
apprized  of  the  circumstance,  had  come  up  to 
put  himself  at  the  head  of  this  brigade,  leaving 
the  rest  of  his  column  at  Sokolnitz. 

The  French,  in  this  renewed  combat  at  the 
centre,  were  about  to  find  themselves  engaged 
with  Kamenski's  brigade,  with  the  infantry  of 
Kollowrath  and  Miloradovich,  and  with  the 
imperial  Russian  guard.  Thiebault's  brigade, 
occupying  the  extreme  right  of  Marshal  Soult's 
corps,  and  separated  from  Vare's  brigade  by 
the  village  of  Pratzen,  found  itself  amidst  a 
square  of  fires,  for  it  had  in  front  the  reformed 
line  of  the  Austrians,  and  on  its  right  part  of 
Langeron's  troops.  This  brigade,  consisting 
of  the  10th  light,  and  of  the  14th  and  36th  of 
the  line,  was  soon  exposed  to  the  most  serious 
danger.  As  it  was  deploying  and  forming  it- 
self into  a  square  to  face  the  enemy,  Adjutant 
Labadie,  fearing  that  his  battalion,  under  a  fire 
of  musketry  and  grape,  discharged  at  the  dis- 
tance of  thirty  paces,  might  be  staggered  in  its 
movement,  seized  the  colours,  and,  planting 
himself  upon  the  ground,  cried,  "Soldiers, 
here  is  your  line  of  battle!"  The  battalion 
deployed  with  perfect  steadiness.  The  others 
imitated  it,  the  brigade  took  position,  and  for 
some  moments  exchanged  a  destructive  fire  of 
musketry  at  half-range.  These  three  regi- 
ments, however,  would  soon  have  sunk  under 
a  mass  of  cross-fires,  had  the  conflict  been  j 
prolonged.  General  St.  Hilaire,  admired  by  j 
the  army  for  his  chivalrous  valour,  was  con- 
versing with  Generals  Thiebault  and  Morand 
on  the  course  proper  to  be  pursued,  when  Co- 
lonel Pouzel  of  the  10th  said,  "  General,  let  us 
advance  with  the  bayonet,  or  we  are  undone." 
"Yes,  forward!"  replied  General  St.  Hilaire. 
The  bayonets  were  immediately  crossed,  and 
the  men,  falling  on  Kramenski's  Russians  on 
the  right  and  on  Kollowrath's  Austrians  in 
front,  precipitated  the  first  into  the  bottoms  of 
Sokolnitz  and  Telnitz,  and  the  second  down 
he  back  of  the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  towards  the 
Austerlitz  road. 

While  Thiebaull's  brigade,  left  for  some 
•  ime  unsupported,  extricated  itself  with  such 
valour  and  success,  Vare's  brigade  and  Van- 
damme's  division,  placed  on  the  other  side  of 
the  village  of  Pratzen,  had  not  near  so  much 
trouble  to  repulse  the  offensive  return  of  the 
Austro-Russians,  and  had  soon  flung  them  to 
the  foot  of  the  plateau,  which  they  strove  in  vain 
to  ascend.  In  the  ardour  that  hurried  away  our 
troops,  the  first  battalion  of  the  4th  of  the  line, 
belonging  to  Vandamme's  division,  had  yield- 


ed to  the  temptation  to  pursue  the  L  issians 
over  the  sloping  ground  covered  with  vines. 
The  Grand-duke  Constantine  had  immediately 
sent  a  detachment  of  the  cavalry  of  the  guard, 
which,  surprising  that  battalion  among  the 
vines,  had  overthrown  it  before  it  could  form 
into  square.  In  this  confusion  the  colour- 
bearer  of  the  regiment  had  been  killed.  A 
subaltern,  endeavouring  to  save  the  eagle,  had 
also  been  killed.  A  soldier  had  then  snatched 
it  out  of  the  hands  of  the  officer,  and,  being 
himself  put  hors  de  combat,  had  not  been  able  to 
prevent  Constantine's  horse  from  carrying  off" 
the  trophy. 

Napoleon,  who  had  come  to  reinforce  the 
centre  with  the  infantry  of  his  guard,  the 
whole  corps  of  Bernadotte,  and  Oudinot's  gre- 
nadiers, witnessed  the  rash  proceeding  of  this 
battalion  from  the  height  on  which  he  was 
posted.  "  They  are  in  disorder  yonder,"  said 
he  to  Rapp  ;  "  that  must  be  set  to  rights."  At 
the  head  of  the  Mamelukes  and  the  horse 
chasseurs  of  the  guard,  Rapp  instantly  flew  to 
the  succour  of  the  compromised  battalion. 
Marshal  Bessieres  followed  Rapp  with  the 
horse  grenadiers.  Drouet's  division  of  Berna- 
dotte's  corps,  formed  of  the  94th  and  95th  regi- 
ments and  of  the  '27th  light,  advanced  in  se- 
cond line,  headed  by  Colonel  Gerard,  Berna- 
dotte's  aid-de-carnp,  and  an  officer  of  great 
energy,  to  oppose  the  infantry  of  the  Russian 
guard. 

Rapp,  on  making  his  appearance,  drew  upon 
him  the  enemy's  cavalry,  who  were  slaughter- 
ing our  foot  soldiers  extended  on  the  ground. 
This  cavalry  turned  against  him  with  four  un- 
horsed pieces  of  cannon.  In  spite  of  a  dis- 
charge of  grape,  Rapp  rushed  forward,  and 
broke  through  the  imperial  cavalry.  He 
pushed  on,  and  passed  beyond  the  ground 
covered  by  the  wrecks  of  the  battalion  of  the 
4th.  The  soldiers  of  that  battalion  imme- 
diately rallied,  and  formed  anew  to  revenge 
the  check  which  they  had  received.  Rapp,  on 
reaching  the  lines  of  the  Russian  guard,  was 
assailed  with  a  second  charge  of  cavalry. 
These  were  Alexander's  horse-guards,  who, 
Headed  by  their  colonel,  Prince  Repnin,  fell 
upon  him.  The  brave  Morland,  colonel  of  the 
chasseurs  of  the  French  imperial  guard,  was 
killed;  the  chasseurs  were  driven  back.  But 
at  this  moment  the  horse-grenadiers,  led  by 
Marshal  Bessieres,  came  up  at  a  gallop  to  the 
assistance  of  Rapp.  This  splendid  body  of 
men,  mounted  on  powerful  horses,  was  eager 
to  measure  its  strength  with  the  horse-guards 
of  Alexander.  A  conflict  of  several  minutes 
ensued  between  them.  The  infantry  of  the 
Russian  guard,  witnessing  this  fierce  encoun- 
ter, durst  not  fire,  for  fear  of  slaughtering  its 
own  countrymen.  At  length  Napoleon's  horse- 
grenadiers,  veterans  tried  in  a  hundred  battles, 
triumphed  over  the  young  soldiers  of  Alexan- 
der, dispersed  them,  after  extending  a  number 
of  them  upon  the  ground,  and  returned  con- 
querors to  their  master. 

Napoleon,  who  was  present  at  this  engage- 
ment, was  delighted  to  see  the  Russian  youth 
punished  for  their  boasting.  Surrounded  by 
his  staff",  he  received  Rapp,who  returned  wound- 
ed, covered  with  blood,  followed  by  Prince 


Dec.  1801.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


Repnin  a  prisoner,  and  gave  him  signal  testi- 
monies ',?  satisfaction.  Meanwhile,  the  three 
regiments  of  Drouet's  division,  brought  by 
Colonel  Gerard,  pushed  the  infantry  of  the 
Russian  guard  upon  the  village  of  Kreznowitz, 
carried  that  village,  and  took  many  prisoners. 
It  was  one  o'clock ;  victory  appeared  no  longer 
doubtful,  for,  Lannes  and  Murat  being  masters 
of  the  plain  on  the  left,  Marshal  Soult,  supported 
by  the  whole  of  the  reserve,  being  master  of 
the  plateau  of  Pratzen,  there  was  nothing  left 
to  be  done  but  to  fall  upon  the  right,  and  fling 
Buxhovden's  three  Russian  columns,  which 
had  so  vainly  striven  to  cut  us  off  from  the 
road  to  Vienna,  into  the  ponds.  Napoleon, 
then  leaving  Bernadotte's  corps  on  the  plateau 
of  Pratzen,  and  turning  to  the  right  with  Mar- 
shal Soult's  corps,  the  guard,  and  Oudinot's 
grenadiers,  resolved  himself  to  seize  the  prize 
of  his  profound  combinations,  and  proceed  by 
the  route  which  Buxhoven's  three  columns 
had  taken  when  descending  from  the  plateau 
of  Pratzen,  to  attack  them  in  rear.  It  was 
high  time  for  him  to  arrive,  for  Marshal  Da- 
vout  and  his  Lieutenant-general  Friant,  hurry- 
ing incessantly  from  Kobelnitz  to  Telnitz  to 
prevent  the  Russians  from  crossing  the  Gold- 
bach,  were  almost  knocked  up.  The  brave 
Friant  had  had  four  horses  killed  under  him 
in  the  fight.  But,  while  he  was  making  the 
last  efforts,  Napoleon  suddenly  appeared  at 
the  head  of  an  overwhelming  mass  of  forces. 
Prodigious  confusion  then  took  place  among 
the  surprised  and  despairing  Russians.  Pri- 
byschewski's  entire  column,  and  half  of  Lan- 
geron's  left  before  Sokolnitz,  found  themselves 
surrounded  without  any  hope  of  escape,  for 
the  French  were  coming  upon  their  rear  by 
the  routes  which  they  had  themselves  pursued 
in  the  morning.  These  two  columns  dispersed; 
part  were  made  prisoners  in  Sokolnitz  ;  others 
fled  towards  Kobelnitz,  and  were  enveloped 
near  the  marshes  of  that  name.  Lastly,  a 
third  portion  made  off  towards  Briinn,  but 
was  obliged  to  lay  down  its  arms  near  the 
Vienna  road,  the  same  which  the  Russians  had 
appointed  for  rendezvous  in  the  hope  of  vic- 
tory. 

General  Langeron,  with  the  relics  of  Ka- 
menski's  brigade  and  some  battalions  which 
he  had  withdrawn  from  Sokolnitz  before  the 
disaster,  had  fled  towards  Telnitz  and  the 
ponds,  near  to  the  spot  where  Buxhovden  was 
with  Doctorow's  column.  The  silly  comman- 
der of  the  left  wing  of  the  Russians,  quite 
proud  of  having,  with  twenty-nine  battalions 
and  twenty-two  squadrons,  disputed  the  village 
of  Telnitz  against  five  or  six  French  batta- 
lions, continued  motionless,  awaiting  the  suc- 
cess of  Langeron's  and  Pribyschewski's 
column.  His  face,  according  to  an  eye-wit- 
ness, exhibited  evidence  of  the  excess  in 
which  he  was  accustomed  to  indulge.  Lange- 
ron, hastening  to  this  point,  related  to  him 
with  warmth  what  was  passing.  "  You  see 
nothing  but  enemies  everywhere,"  was  the 
brutal  answer  of  Buxh&vden.  "  And  you,"  re- 
plied Langeron, "  are  not  in  a  state  to  see  them 
anywhere."  At  this  instant  Marshal  Soult's 
column  appeared  on  the  slope  of  the  plateau 
towards  the  ponds,  advancing  towards  Doc- 


torow's column  to  drive  it  into  them.  It  was 
no  longer  possible  to  doubt  the  danger.  Bux- 
hovden, with  four  regiments,  which  he  had 
most  unskilfully  left  inactive  about  him,  en- 
deavoured to  regain  the  route  by  which  he  had 
come,  and  which  ran  through  the  village  of 
Augezd,  between  the  foot  of  the  plateau  of 
Pratzen  and  the  pond  of  Satschau.  Thither 
he  proceeded  precipitately,  ordering  General 
Doctorow  to  save  himself  as  he  best  could. 
Langeron  joined  him  with  the  remains  of  his 
column.  Buxhovden  was  passing  through 
Augezd,  at  the  very  moment  when  Vandam- 
me's  division,  descending  from  the  height, 
arrived  there  on  its  side.  He  sustained  in  his 
flight  the  fire  of  the  French,  and  succeeded  in 
gaining  a  place  of  safety  with  a  portion  of  his 
troops.  The  greater  part,  accompanied  by 
Langeron's  wrecks,  was  stopped  short  by 
Vandamme's  division,  which  was  in  posses- 
sion of  Augezd.  Then  all  together  rushed 
towards  the  frozen  ponds  and  strove  to  clear 
themselves  a  way  there.  The  ice  which  co- 
vered these  ponds,  weakened  by  the  warmth 
of  a  fine  day,  could  not  bear  the  weight  of 
men,  horses,  and  cannon.  It  gave  way  at 
some  points  beneath  the  Russians,  who  were 
ingulphed  ;  at  others  it  was  strong  enough  to 
afford  a  retreat  to  the  fugitives  who  thronged 
across  it 

Napoleon,  having  reached  the  slopes  of  the 
plateau  of  Pratzen,  towards  the  ponds,  per- 
ceived the  disaster,  which  he  had  so  skilfully 
prepared.  He  ordered  a  battery  of  the  guard 
to  fire  with  ball  upon  those  parts  of  the  ice 
which  still  held  firm,  and  completed  the  de- 
struction of  those  who  were  upon  it.  Nearly 
2000  perished  beneath  the  broken  ice. 

Between  the  French  army  and  these  inacces- 
sible ponds,  was  still  left  Doctorow's  unfortu- 
nate column,  one  detachment  of  which  had 
escaped  with  Buxhovden,  and  another  found  a 
grave  under  the  ice.  General  Doctorow,  left 
in  this  cruel  situation,  behaved  with  the  no- 
blest courage.  The  ground,  in  approaching  the 
lakes,  rose  so  as  to  offer  a  sort  of  appui. 
General  Doctorow,  backing  himself  against 
this  rising  ground,  formed  his  troops  into  three 
lines,  placing  the  cavalry  in  the  first  line,  the 
artillery  in  the  second,  and  the  infantry  in  the 
third.  Thus  deployed,  he  opposed  a  bold  face 
to  the  French,  while  he  sent  a  few  squadrons 
in  search  of  a  route  between  the  pond  of  Sats- 
chau and  that  of  Menitz. 

A  last  and  a  severe  combat  ensued  on  this 
ground.  The  dragoons  of  Beaumont's  divi- 
sion, borrowed  from  Murat,  and  brought  from 
the  left  to  the  right,  charged  Kienmayer's  Aus- 
trian cavalry,  which,  after  doing  its  duty, 
retired  under  the  protection  of  the  Russian 
artillery.  The  latter,  sticking  close  to  its 
guns,  poured  a  shower  of  grape  upon  the  dra- 
goons, who  endeavoured  in  vain  to  take  it 
Marshal  Soult's  infantry  marched  up,  in  its 
turn,  to  this  artillery,  in  spite  of  a  fire  at 
point-blank  range,  took  it  and  drove  the  Rus- 
sian infantry  towards  Telnitz.  Marshal  Da 
vout,  on  his  part,  with  Friant's  division,  was 
entering  Telnitz.  The  Russians,  therefore, 
had  no  other  retreat  but  a  narrow  pass  be- 
tween Telnitz  and  the  ?onds.  Some  rushed 


94 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Dec.  1805. 


upon  them  pell-mell,  and  shared  the  fate  of 
those  who  had  preceded  them.  Others  found 
means  to  escape  by  a  route  which  had  been 
discovered  between  the  ponds  of  Satschau  and 
Menitz.  The  French  cavalry  pursued  them 
along  this  track,  and  harassed  them  in  their 
retreat.  The  sun  in  the  daytime  had  converted 
the  clayey  soil  of  these  parts  from  ice  into 
thick  mud,  into  which  men  and  horses  sunk. 
The  artillery  of  the  Russians  stuck  fast  in  it. 
Their  horses,  fitted  rather  for  speed  than  for 
draught,  being  unable  to  extricate  the  guns, 
were  objiged  to  leave  them  there.  Amidst 
this  rout,  our  horses  picked  up  3000  prisoners 
and  a  great  number  of  cannon.  "I  had  pre- 
viously seen  some  lost  battles,"  says  an  eye- 
witness of  this  frightful  scene,  General  Lan- 
geron,  "  but  I  had  no  conception  of  such  a 
defeat." 

In  fact,  from  one  wing  to  the  other  of  the 
Russian  army,  no  part  of  it  was  in  order  but 
the  corps  of  Prince  Bagration,  which  Lannes 
had  not  ventured  to  pursue,  being  ignorant  of 
what  was  passing  on  the  right  of  the  army. 
All  the  rest  was  in  a  state  of  frightful  disorder, 
setting  up  wild  shouts,  and  plundering  the 
villages  scattered  upon  its  route,  to  procure 
provisions.  The  two  sovereigns  of  Russia 
and  Austria  fled  from  that  field  of  battle  upon 
which  they  heard  the  French  crying  "Vive 
I" Empereur !"  Alexander  was  deeply  dejected. 
The  Emperor  Francis,  more  tranquil,  bore  the 
disaster  with  great  composure.  Under  the 
common  misfortune,  he  had  at  least  one  con- 
solation :  the  Russians  could  no  longer  allege 
that  the  cowardice  of  the  Austrians  constituted 
all  the  glory  of  Napoleon.  The  two  princes 
retreated  precipitately  over  the  plains  of  Mo- 
ravia, amidst  profound  darkness,  separated 
from  their  household,  and  liable  to  be  insulted, 
through  the  barbarity  of  their  own  soldiers. 
The  Emperor  Francis  seeing  that  all  was  lost, 
took  it  upon  him  to  send  Prince  John  of  Lich- 
tenstein  to  Napoleon,  to  solicit  an  armistice, 
with  a  promise  to  sign  a  peace  in  a  few  days. 
He  commissioned  him,  moreover,  to  express 
to  Napoleon  his  wish  to  have  an  interview 
with  him  at  the  advanced  posts. 

Prince  John,  who  had  well  performed  his 
duty  in  the  engagement,  could  appear  with 
honour  before  the  conqueror.  He  repaired 
with  the  utmost  expedition  to  the  French  head- 
quarters. The  victorious  Napoleon  was  en- 
gaged in  going  over  the  field  of  battle,  to  have 
the  wounded  picked  up.  He  would  not  take 
rest  himself  till  he  had  paid  to  his  soldiers 
those  attentions  to  which  they  had  such  good 
right.  In  obedience  to  his  orders,  none  of 
them  had  quitted  the  ranks  to  carry  away  the 
wounded.  The  ground  was,  in  consequence, 
strewed  with  them  for  a  space  of  more  than 
three  leagues.  It  was  covered  more  especially 
with  Russian  corpses.  The  field  of  battle  was 
an  awful  spectacle.  But  this  sight  affected 
>ur  old  soldiers  of  the  Revolution  very  slightly. 
Accustomed  to  the  horrors  of  war,  they  re- 
garded wounds,  death,  as  a  natural  conse- 
quence of  battles,  and  as  trifles  in  the  bosom 
of  victory.  They  were  intoxicated  with  joy, 
and  raised  boisterous  acclamations,  when  they 
oerceivcJ  the  group  of  officers  which  marked 


the  presence  of  Napoleon.  His  return  to  the 
head-quarters,  which  had  been  established  at 
the  post-house  of  Posoritz,  had  the  appearance 
of  a  triumphal  procession. 

That  spirit,  in  which  such  bitter  pangs  were 
one  day  to  succeed  such  exquisite  joys,  tasted 
at  that  moment  the  delights  of  the  most  mag- 
nificent and  the  most  deserved  success;  for, 
if  victory  is  frequently  a  pure  favour  of  chance, 
it  was  in  this  instance  the  reward  of  admi- 
rable combinations.  Napoleon,  in  fact,  guess- 
ing with  the  penetration  of  genius,  that  the 
Russians  designed  to  wrest  the  Vienna  road 
from  him,  and  that  they  would  then  place 
themselves  between  him  and  the  ponds,  had, 
by  his  very  attitude,  encouraged  them  to  come 
thither;  since,  weakening  his  right,  reinforc- 
ing his  centre,  he  had  thrown  himself  upon 
the  heights  of  Pratzen,  abandoned  by  them, 
cut  them  thus  in  two,  and  flung  them  into  a 
gulf,  which  they  could  not  get  out  of.  The 
greater  part  of  his  troops,  kept  in  reserve,  had 
scarcely  been  brought  into  action,  so  strong 
did  a  just  conclusion  render  his  position,  and 
so  well  also  did  the  valour  of  his  soldiers  per- 
mit him  to  bring  them  forward  in  inferior 
number  before  the  enemy.  It  may  be  said 
that,  out  of  65,000  French,  40  or  45  thousand, 
at  most,  had  been  engaged;  for  Bernadotte's 
corps,  the  grenadiers,  and  the  infantry  of  the 
guard  had  exchanged  only  a  few  musket-shots. 
Thus  45,000  French  had  beaten  90,000  Austro- 
Russians. 

The  results  of  the  battle  were  immense : 
15,000  killed  or  wounded,  about  20,000  prison- 
ers, among  whom  were  10  colonels  and  8 
generals,  180  pieces  of  cannon,  an  immense 
quantity  of  artillery  and  baggage-wagons — 
such  were  the  losses  of  the  enemy  and  the 
trophies  of  the  French.  The  latter  had  to 
regret  about  7000  men  killed  and  wounded. 

Napoleon,  having  returned  to  his  head- 
quarters at  Posoritz,  there  received  Prince 
John  of  Lichtenstein.  He  treated  him  as  a 
conqueror  full  of  courtesy,  and  agreed  to  an 
interview  with  the  Emperor  of  Austria  on  the 
day  after  the  next,  at  the  advanced  posts  of  the 
two  armies;  but  an  armistice  was  not  to  be 
granted  till  the  two  Emperors  of  France  and 
Austria  had  met  and  explained  themselves. 

On  the  morrow,  Napoleon  transferred  his 
head-quarters  to  Austerlitz,  a  mansion  belong- 
ing to  the  family  of  Kaunitz.  There  he  esla- 
blished  himself,  and  determined  to  give  the 
name  of  that  mansion  to  the  battle  which  the 
soldiers  already  called  the  battle  of  the  three 
emperors.  It  has  borne  and  will  bear  for  ages 
the  name  which  it  received  from  the  immortal 
captain  who  won  it  He  addressed  to  his  sol 
diers  the  following  proclamation: 

"Aufterlitz,  12  Frimaire. 

"  Soldiers,  I  am  satisfied  with  you :  in  the 
battle  of  Austerlitz  you  have  justified  all  that 
I  expected  from  your  intrepidity.  You  have 
decorated  your  eagles  with  immortal  glory. 
An  army  of  one  hundred  thousand  men,  com- 
manded by  the  Emperors  of  Russia  and  Aus- 
tria, has  been  in  less  than  four  hours  either 
cut  in  pieces  or  dispersed.  Those  who  escaped 
your  weapons  are  drowned  in  the  lakes. 


Dec.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


95 


"Forty  colours,  the  standards  of  the  impe- 
rial guard  of  Russia,  one  hundred  and  twenty 
pieces  of  cannon,  more  than  thirty  thousand 
prisoners,1  are  the  result  of  this  ever-celebrated 
battle.  That  infantry,  so  highly  vaunted  and 
superior  in  number,  could  not  withstand  your 
shocks,  and  thenceforward  you  have  no  rivals 
to  fear.  Thus,  in  two  months,  this  third  coa- 
lition has  been  vanquished  and  dissolved. 
Peace  cannot  now  be  far  distant,  but,  as  I  pro- 
mised my  people  before  I  passed  the  Rhine,  I 
will  make  only  such  a  peace  as  gives  us  gua- 
rantees and  insures  rewards  to  our  allies. 

"  Soldiers,  when  all  that  is  necessary  to  se- 
cure the  welfare  and  the  prosperity  of  our 
country  is  accomplished,  I  will  lead  you  back 
to  France :  there  you  will  be  the  object  of  my 
tenderest  concern.  My  people  will  see  you 
again  with  joy,  and  it  will  be  sufficient  to  say, 
I  was  at  the  battle  of  Austerlitz,  for  them  to 
reply,  There  is  a  brave  man. 

"  NAPOLEOS." 

It  was  necessary  to  follow  the  enemy,  whom 
all  accounts  represented  as  being  in  disorderly 
retreat.  In  this  confusion,  Napoleon,  misled 
by  Murat,  conjectured  that  the  fugitive  army 
was  directing  its  course  towards  Olmutz,  and 
he  had  sent  off  the  cavalry  and  the  corps  of 
Lannes  to  that  point  But,  on  the  following 
day,  the  3d  of  December,  more  accurate  intel- 
ligence, collected  by  General  Thiard,  apprized 
him  that  the  enemy  was  proceeding  by  the 
road  to  Hungary  for  the  Morava.  Napoleon 
hastened  to  recall  his  columns  to  Nasiedlowitz 
and  Coding.  Marshal  Davout,  reinforced  by 
the  junction  of  Friant's  whole  division,  and  by 
the  arrival  in  line  of  Gudin's  division,  had  lost 
no  time,  thanks  to  his  nearer  position  to  the 
Hungary  road.  He  set  out  in  pursuit  of  the 
Russians  and  pressed  them  closely.  He  in- 
tended to  overtake  them  before  the  passage  of 
the  Morava,  and  to  cut  off  perhaps  a  part  of 
their  army.  After  marching  on  the  3d,  he  was, 
on  the  morning  of  the  4th,  in  sight  of  Goding 
and  nearly  up  with  them.  The  greatest  con- 
fusion prevailed  in  Goding.  Beyond  that 
place  there  was  a  mansion  belonging  to  the 
Emperor  of  Germany,  that  of  Holitsch,  where 
the  two  allied  sovereigns  had  taken  refuge. 
The  perturbation  there  was  as  great  as  at 
Goding.  The  Russian  officers  continued  to 
hold  the  most  unbecoming  language  respecting 
the  Austrians.  They  laid  the  blame  of  the 
common  defeat  on  them,  as  if  they  ought  not 
to  have  attributed  it  to  their  own  presumption, 
to  the  incapacity  of  their  generals,  and  to  the 
levity  of  their  government.  The  Austrians, 
moreover,  had  behaved  quite  as  well  as  the 
Russians  on  the  field  of  battle. 

The  two  vanquished  monarchs  were  very 
cool  towards  each  other.  The  Emperor  Fran- 
cis wished  to  confer  with  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander, before  he  went  to  the  interview  agreed 
upon  with  Napoleon.  Both  thought  that  they 
ought  to  solicit  an  armistice  and  peace,  for  it 
was  impossible  to  continue  the  struggle.  Alex- 
ander was  desirous,  though  he  did  not  acknow- 
ledge it,  that  himself  and  his  army  should  be 

'  The  exact  number  was  not  yet  known. 


saved  as  soon  as  possible  from  the  conse- 
quences of  an  impetuous  pursuit,  such  as 
might  be  apprehended  from  Napoleon.  As 
for  the  conditions,  he  left  his  ally  to  settle 
them  as  he  pleased.  The  Emperor  Francis 
alone  having  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the 
war,  the  conditions  on  which  peace  should  be 
signed  concerned  him  exclusively.  Some  time 
before,  the  Emperor  Alexander,  setting  himself 
up  for  the  arbiter  of  Europe,  would  have  in- 
sisted that  those  conditions  concerned  him 
also.  His  pride  was  less  exigent  since  the 
battle  of  the  2d  of  December. 

The  Emperor  Francis  accordingly  set  out 
for  Nasiedlowitz,  a  village  situated  midway  to 
the  mansion  of  Austerlitz,  and  there,  near  the 
mill  of  Paleny,  between  Nasiedlowitz  and  Ur- 
schitz,  amidst  the  French  and  the  Austrian 
advanced  posts,  he  found  Napoleon  waiting 
for  him  before  a  bivouac  fire  kindled  by  his 
soldiers.  Napoleon  had  had  the  politeness  to 
arrive  first.  He  went  to  meet  the  Emperor 
Francis,  received  him  as  he  alighted  from  his 
carriage  and  embraced  him.  The  Austrian 
monarch,  encouraged  by  the  welcome  of  his 
all-powerful  foe,  had  a  long  conversation  with 
him.  The  principal  officers  of  the  two  armies, 
standing  aside,  beheld  with  great  curiosity  the 
extraordinary  spectacle  of  the  successor  of  the 
Caesars  vanquished  and  soliciting  peace  of  the 
crowned  soldier,  whom  the  French  Revolution 
had  raised  to  the  pinnacle  of  human  greatness. 

Napoleon  apologized  to  the  Emperor  Francis 
for  receiving  him  in  such  a  place.  "  Such  are 
the  palaces,"  said  he,  "  which  your  majesty  has 
obliged  me  to  inhabit  for  these  three  months." 
— "  The  abode  in  them,"  replied  the  Austrian 
monarch,  "  makes  you  so  thriving,  that  you 
have  no  right  to  be  angry  with  me  for  it." — 
The  conversation  then  turned  upon  the  general 
state  of  affairs,  Napoleon  insisting  that  he  had 
been  forced  into  the  war  against  his  will  at  a 
moment  when  he  least  expected  it,  and  when 
he  was  exclusively  engaged  with  England,  the 
Emperor  of  Austria  affirming  that  he  had  been 
urged  to  take  arms  solely  by  the  designs  of 
France  in  regard  to  Italy.  Napoleon  declared 
that,  on  the  conditions  already  specified  to  M. 
de  Giulay,  and  which  he  had  no  need  to  re- 
peat, he  was  ready  to  sign  a  peace.  The  Em- 
peror Francis,  without  explaining  himself  on 
this  subject,  wished  to  know  how  Napoleon 
was  disposed  in  regard  to  the  Russian  army. 
Napoleon  first  required  that  the  Emperor  Fran- 
cis should  separate  his  cause  from  that  of  the 
Emperor  Alexander,  and  that  the  Russian  army 
should  retire  by  regulated  marches  from  the 
Austrian  territories,  and  promised  to  grant  him 
an  armistice  on  this  condition.  As  for  peace 
with  Russia,  he  added,  that  would  be  settled 
afterwards,  for  this  peace  concerned  him  alone. 
— "  Take  my  advice,"  said  Napoleon  to  the 
Emperor  Francis,  "do  not  mix  up  your  cause 
with  that  of  the  Emperor  Alexander.  Russia 
alone  can  now  wage  only  a  fancy  war  in  Eu- 
rope. Vanquished,  she  retires  to  her  deserts, 
and  you,  you  pay  with  your  provinces  thf 
costs  of  the  war."  The  forcible  language  of 
Napoleon  expressed  but  too. well  the  state  of 
!  things  in  Europe  between  that  great 
i  and  the  rest  of  the  continent.  The 


96 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Dec.  1805. 


Francis  pledged  his  word  as  a  man  and  a  sove- 
reign not  to  renew  the  war,  and  above  all  to 
listen  no  more  to  the  suggestions  of  powers 
which  had  nothing  to  lose  in  the  struggle.  He 
agreed  to  an  armistice  for  himself  and  for  the 
Emperor  Alexander,  an  armistice,  the  condition 
of  which  was  that  the  Russians  should  retire 
by  regulated  marches,  and  that  the  Austrian 
cabinet  should  immediately  send  negotiators 
empowered  to  sign  a  separate  peace  with 
France. 

The  two  emperors  parted  with  reiterated  de- 
monstrations of  cordiality.  Napoleon  handed 
into  his  carriage  that  monarch  whom  he  had 
just  called  his  brother,  and  remounted  his  horse 
to  return  to  Austerlitz. 

General  Savary  was  sent  to  suspend  the 
march  of  Davout's  corps.  He  first  proceeded 
to  Holitsch,  with  the  suite  of  the  Emperor 
Francis,  to  learn  whether  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander acceded  to  the  proposed  conditions.  He 
saw  the  latter,  around  whom  every  thing  was 
much  changed  since  the  mission  on  which  he 
was  sent  to  him  a  few  days  before.  "  Your 
master,"  said  Alexander  to  him,  "  has  shown 
himself  very  great.  I  acknowledge  all  the 
power  of  his  genius,  and,  as  for  myself,  I  shall 
retire,  since  my  ally  is  satisfied." — General 
Savary  conversed  for  some  time  with  the  young 
czar  on  the  late  battle,  explained  to  him  how 
the  French  army,  inferior  in  number  to  the 
Russian  army,  had  nevertheless  appeared  su- 
perior on  all  points,  owing  to  the  art  of  ma- 
noauvring  which  Napoleon  possessed  in  so 
eminent  a  degree.  He  courteously  added  that 
•with  experience  Alexander,  in  his  turn,  would 
ber  ime  a  warrior,  but  that  so  difficult  an  art 
v  AH  not  to  be  learned  in  a  day.  After  these 
flatteries  to  the  vanquished  monarch,  he  set 
out  for  Coding  to  stop  Marshal  Davout,  who 
had  rejected  all  the  proposals  fora  suspension 
of  arms,  and  was  ready  to  attack  the  relics  of 
the  Russian  army.  To  no  purpose  he  had  been 
assured  in  the  name  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia 
himself  that  an  armistice  was  negotiating  be- 
tween Napoleon  and  the  Emperor  of  Austria. 
He  would  not  on  any  account  abandon  his 
prey.  But  General  Savary  stopped  him  with 
a  formal  order  from  Napoleon.  These  were 
the  last  musket-shots  fired  during  that  unex- 
ampled campaign.  The  troops  of  the  several 
nations  separated  to  go  into  winter-quarters, 
awaiting  what  should  be  decided  by  the  nego- 
tiators of  the  belligerent  powers. 

Napoleon  proceeded  from  the  mansion  of 
Austerliiz  to  Briinn,  to  which  place  he  had  re- 
quired M.  de  Talleyrand  to  repair,  in  order  to 
•settle  the  conditions  of  the  peace,  which  could 
be  no  longer  doubtful,  since  the  resources  of 
Austria  were  exhausted;  and  Russia,  eager  to 
obtain  an  armistice,  was  drawing  off  her  army 
in  the  utmost  haste  into  Poland.  While  the 
war  of  the  first  coalition  had  lasted  five  years, 
that  of  the  second  coalition,  two,  the  war  raised 
by  the  third  had  lasted  three  months,  so  irre- 
sistible had  become  the  power  of  revolutionary 
Fiance,  concentrated  in  a  single  hand,  and  so 
able  and  prompt  was  that  hand  to  strike  those 
whom  it  purposed  to  reach.  The  course  of 
events  had  actually  been  such  as  Napoleon  had 
•Barked  »>u'  beforehand  in  his  cabinet  at  Bou- 


logne. He  had  taken  the  Austrians  at  Ulm 
almost  without  striking  a  blow ;  he  had  crushed 
the  Russians  at  Austerlitz,  and  extricated  Italy 
by  the  mere  effect  of  his  offensive  march  upon 
Vienna,  and  reduced  the  attacks  on  Hanover 
and  Naples  to  mere  acts  of  imprudence.  The 
latter,  in  particular,  after  the  battle  of  Auster- 
litz, was  but  a  disastrous  folly  for  ihe  house 
of  Bourbon.  Europe  was  at  the  feet  of  Napo- 
leon, and  Prussia,  hurried  away  for  a  moment 
by  the  coalition,  was  soon  destined  to  find  her- 
self at  the  mercy  of  the  captain  whom  she  had 
offended  and  betrayed. 

Still  it  required  great  skill  to  negotiate,  for, 
if  our  enemies,  recovering  from  their  terror, 
and  abusing  the  engagements  into  which  they 
had  obliged  Prussia  to  enter,  forced  her  to  in- 
tervene in  the  negotiations,  they  might  still, 
being  three  to  one,  dispute  the  conditions  of 
the  peace,  and  rob  the  conqueror  of  part  of  the 
advantages  of  the  victory.  Napoleon,  there- 
fore, determined  that  the  negotiations  should 
be  carried  on  at  Briinn,  far  from  M.  de  Haug- 
witz,  whom  he  had  sent  to  Vienna,  and  whom 
he  obliged  to  stay  there  by  promising  to  meet 
him  in  that  capital. 

While  the  armies  were  engaged  in  fighting, 
Messieurs  de  Giulay  and  De  Stadion  had  held 
conferences  at  Vienna  with  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
and  they  had  desired  to  negotiate  in  common 
for  Russia  and  Austria,  under  the  mediation  of 
Prussia.  Since  the  arrival  of  M.  de  Haugwitz, 
they  had  politely  but  earnestly  urged  him  to 
execute  the  convention  of  Potsdam,  judging 
that,  if  Prussia  were  comprehended  in  the 
negotiations,  she  would  be  obliged  either  to 
enforce  the  conditions  of  peace  settled  at  Pots- 
dam or  take  part  in  the  war.  M.  de  Haugwitz 
had  refused  to  treat  in  that  manner,  on  the 
ground  of  the  nature  of  his  mission,  which 
obliged  him  not  to  take  his  seat  in  a  congress, 
but  to  treat  directly  with  Napoleon,  in  order  to 
bring  him  into  the  ideas  adopted  by  the  Prus- 
sian cabinet.  Besides,  M.  de  Talleyrand  had 
cut  short  these  pretensions  by  declaring  that 
Austria  alone  would  be  admitted  to  the  nego- 
tiation. He  signified  this  resolution  at  Vienna 
on  the  2d  of  December,  the  very  day  on  which 
the  battle  of  Austerlitz  was  fought. 

That  battle  being  won,  and  the  armistice 
demanded  and  granted  at  the  bivouac  of  the 
conqueror,  the  separate  negotiation  was  a 
condition  accepted  beforehand.  Napoleon  re- 
quired, as  we  have  related,  that  it  should  be 
opened  immediately  at  Briinn  with  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand. He  caused  it  to  be  intimated  that  he 
consented  to  admit  M.  de  Giulay  to  treat,  but 
not  M.  de  Stadion,  formerly  ambassador  of 
Austria  in  Russia,  full  of  the  prejudices  of  the 
coalition,  and  raising,  from  the  very  nature 
of  his  genius,  incessantly  recurring  difficulties. 
He  pointed  out  for  negotiator  Prince  John  of 
Lichtenstein,  who  had  pleased  him  by  his 
frank  and  military  manners.  The  latter  was 
immediately  sent  to  Briinn  with  M.  de  Giulay. 
The  Emperor  Francis  being  at  Holitsch,  it 
was  possible  to  communicate  with  him  in  a 
few  hours,  and  to  settle  very  promptly  any 
contested  points.  The  negotiation  was,  there- 
fore, opened  at  Briinn,  between  Messieurs  de 
Talleyrand,  De  Giulay,  and  De  Lichtenstein 


Dec.  1805.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


97 


Napoleon,  after  he  had  fixed  the  basis,  pur- 
posed to  repair  immediately  to  Vienna,  to 
wring  from  M.  de  Haugwitz  a  confession  of 
the  weaknesses  and  the  falseness  of  Prussia, 
and  to  make  him  bear  the  punishment  for  them. 

But  what  were  to  be  the  bases  of  the  peace  ? 
This  was  what  Napoleon  and  M.  de  Talley- 
rand discussed  at  Brunn,  and  what  had  been 
the  subject  of  frequent  and  profound  conversa- 
tions between  them. 

The  moment  was  perilous  for  the  wisdom 
of  Napoleon.  Victorious  in  three  months 
over  a  powerful  coalition,  having  seen  the 
most  renowned  soldiers  of  the  continent  flee 
before  his  soldiers,  though  inferior  in  number, 
was  he  not  likely  to  acquire  from  his  power 
an  exaggerated  sentiment,  and  to  conceive  a 
contempt  for  all  European  resistances  ?  During 
the  Consulate,  when  he  wished  to  conciliate 
France  and  Europe,  he  had  been  seen  at  home 
indulging  parties,  abroad  overcoming  Austria 
by  victories,  Russia  by  delicate  caresses, 
Prussia  by  the  skilfully  employed  bait  of  Ger- 
manic indemnities,  England  by  the  state  of 
exclusion  to  which  he  had  reduced  her,  pacify- 
ing the  world  in  an  almost  miraculous  man- 
ner, and  displaying  the  most  admirable  of 
abilities,  that  of  the  force  which  knows  how 
to  restrain  itself.  But  he  had  soon  been  seen 
also  irritated  by  the  ingratitude  of  parties,  no 
longer  keeping  measures  with  them,  and 
striking  cruelly  in  the  person  of  the  Duke 
d'Enghien.  He  had  been  seen,  exasperated  at 
the  provoking  jealousy  of  England,  throwing 
down  the  gauntlet  which  she  had  picked  up, 
and  collecting  all  human  means  to  overwhelm 
her.  Now,  the  powers  of  the  continent,  having 
without  sufficient  motive  called  him  away  from 
his  struggle  with  England,  and  having  drawn 
upon  themselves  defeats  which  were  absolute 
disasters,  was  he  not  to  deal  with  them  as  with 
his  other  enemies,  and  set  aside  those  courte- 
sies indispensable  even  to  might,  and  which 
constitute  the  whole  art  of  politics]  Would 
a  man  who  could  always  draw  from  his  genius 
and  the  bravery  of  his  soldiers  such  an  event 
as  Marengo  or  Austerlitz  be  accountable  to 
any  one  on  earth  1 

M.  de  Talleyrand,  to  whose  character  and  to 
the  part  which  he  played  during  this  reign  we 
have  already  adverted,  again  made  on  this 
occasion  some  efforts  to  moderate  Napoleon, 
but  without  much  success.  Fonder  of  pleas- 
ing than  contradicting,  having,  in  regard  to 
European  politics,  inclinations  rather  than 
opinions,  incessantly  patronizing  Austria, 
doing  ill  offices  to  Prussia,  from  an  old  tradi- 
tion of  the  cabinet  of  Versailles,  he  had  ren- 
dered himself  suspected  of  complaisance  for 
the  one  and  aversion  for  the  other,  and  had 
not  that  credit  with  his  sovereign  which  a  firm 
and  convinced  mind  could  have  obtained. 
However,  on  this  as  on  other  occasions,  if  he 
had  not  the  merif  of  securing  the  ascendency 
for  moderation,  he  had  that  of  recommend- 
ing it. 

M.  de  Talleyrand,  on  the  day  after  the  battle 
of  Austerlitz,  gave  to  the  intoxicated  conqueror 
of  Europe  such  advice  as  this. 

It  was  requisite,  according  to  him,  to  treat 
Austria  with  moderation  and  generosity.  That 

VOL.  II.— 12 


power,  considerably  diminished  during  the 
last  two  centuries,  ought  to  be  much  less  an 
object  of  our  jealousy  than  formerly.  A  new 
power  ought  to  take  its  place  in  our  prepos- 
sessions— that  was  Russia,  and  against  this 
latter,  Austria,  so  far  from  being  a  danger,  was 
a  useful  barrier.  Austria,  a  vast  aggregation 
of  nations  foreign  to  each  other,  as  Austrians, 
Sclavonians,  Hungarians,  Bohemians,  Italians, 
might  easily  fall  to  pieces,  if  the  bond,  already 
feeble,  that  held  together  the  heterogeneous 
elements  of  which  it  was  composed,  were  to 
be  further  weakened;  and  its  wrecks  would 
have  more  tendency  to  attach  themselves  to 
Russia  than  to  France.  We  ought,  therefore, 
to  desist  from  inflicting  blows  upon  Austria, 
nay,  to  indemnify  her  for  the  new  losses  which 
she  was  about  to  sustain,  and  to  indemnify 
her  in  a  manner  beneficial  to  Europe,  which 
was  not  only  possible,  but  easy. 

M.  de  Talleyrand  proposed  an  ingenious 
combination,  but  premature,  indeed,  in  the 
then  state  of  Europe :  it  was  to  give  Austria 
the  banks  of  the  Danube,  that  is  to  say,  Wal- 
lachia  and  Moldavia.  These  provinces,  he 
said,  would  be  wijrth  more  than  Italy  itself; 
they  would  console  Austria  for  her  losses, 
alienate  her  from  Russia,  render  her,  in  regard 
to  the  latter,  the  bulwark  of  the  Ottoman  em- 
pire, as  she  already  was  that  of  Europe.  These 
provinces,  after  embroiling  her  with  Russia, 
would  embroil  her  with  England,  and  make 
her  thenceforward  the  obliged  ally  of  France. 

As  for  Prussia,  there  was  no  need  to  put 
one's  self  out  of  the  way  on  her  account:  we 
were  at  liberty  to  treat  her  as  we  pleased. 
It  was  decidedly  a  false,  faint-hearted  court, 
on  which  no  reliance  was  to  be  placed.  In 
order  to  please  it,  we  ought  not  again  to  es- 
trange Austria,  the  only  ally  whom  we  could 
think  of  in  future. 

Such  were  the  opinions  of  M.  de  Talley- 
rand on  this  occasion.  The  advice  to  spare 
Austria,  to  console  her,  nay  even  to  indemnify 
her  with  well  chosen  equivalents,  was  excel- 
lent; for  the  true  policy  of  Napoteon  ought  to 
have  been  to  conquer  and  to  spare  everybody 
on  the  morrow  of  the  victory.  But  the  coun- 
sel to  treat  Prussia  slightingly  was  pernicious, 
and  proceeded  from  a  false  policy,  to  which 
we  have  already  adverted.  Assuredly,  it 
would  have  been  desirable  to  have  it  in  our 
power  to  gain  the  provinces  of  the  Danube  to 
Austria,  and  above  all  to  make  her  consider 
them  as  a  sufficient  compensation  for  her 
losses  in  Italy  ;  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  she 
would  have  assented  to  such  a  combination  ; 
for  Wallachia  and  Moldavia,  by  alienating 
Russia  and  England  from  her,  would  have 
rendered  her  dependent  on  us.  It  is  doubtful, 
besides,  if  one  could,  at  this  period,  have  dis- 
tributed European  territories  so  freely  as  was 
done  two  years  'ater  at  Tilsit.  Be  this  as  it 
may,  in  determining  to  sway  Italy,  it  was  ne- 
cessary to  make  up  one's  mind  to  find  Aus- 
tria an  enemy,  whatever  consideration  might 
be  shown  for  her:  and  then  what  ally  would 
there  be  to  choose  1  We  have  already  ob- 
served more  than  once,  that,  embroiled  .vi'h, 
England  from  the  desire  of  equality  at  sea, 
with  Russia  from  the-  desire  of  supremacy  OP 


98 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Dec.  1805. 


the  continent,  unable  to  derive  any  benefit ! 
from  disorganized  Spain,  what  was  left  us  but 
Prussia — Prussia,  vacillating,  it  is  true,  but 
much  more  from  the  scruples  of  her  sove- 
reign than  from  the  natural  falseness  of  her 
cabinet — Prussia,  having  no  interest  contrary 
to  ours,  since  she  had  not  yet  the  Rhenish 
provinces,  already  compromised  in  our  sys- 
tem, having  her  hands  full  of  the  spoils  of  the 
church  received  from  us,  wishing  for  nothing 
better  than  to  receive  more  of  them,  and  1 
ready  to  accept  any  conquest  that  would  chain 
her  for  ever  to  our  policy  1 

It  was  an  egregious  mistake,  therefore, 
not  to  wish  to  spare  Austria,  but  to  believe 
that  we  could  attach  her  seriously  and  so 
strongly  that  there  was  no  longer  any  danger 
in  ill-treating  or  neglecting  Prussia. 

Napoleon  did  not  share  the  errors  of  Tal- 
leyrand, but  he  committed  others,  from  the 
passion  for  dominion,  which  the  hatred  of  his 
enemies,  and  the  prodigious  success  of  his 
armies  began  to  excite  in  him  beyond  all  rea- 
sonable bounds. 

He  had  not  sought  a  quarrel  on  the  conti- 
nent :  they  had  come,  on  the  contrary,  to  di- 
vert him  from  his  grand  enterprise  against 
England,  to  declare  war  against  him.  Those 
who  had  begun  that  war,  and  who  had  got 
beaten,  ought,  according  to  him,  to  bear  the 
consequences.  He  resolved,  therefore,  to  ob- 
tain, by  the  peace,  the  complement  of  Italy, 
that  is  to  say,  the  Venetian  States,  then  in  the 
possession  of  Austria,  and  likewise  the  defini- 
tive solution  of  the  Germanic  questions  in 
favour  of  his  allies,  Bavaria,  Baden,  Wurtem- 
berg. 

On  these  two  points  Napoleon  was  peremp- 
tory ;  it  was  not  wrong  of  him  to  be  so.  He 
wanted  Venice,  the  Friule,  Istria,  Dalmatia, 
in  short,  Italy  as  far  as  the  Julian  Alps,  and 
the  Adriatic  with  both  its  coasts,  which  would 
insure  him  an  action  upon  the  Ottoman  Em- 
pire. As  to  Germany,  he  purposed  first  to 
confine  Austria  with  her  natural  frontiers,  the 
Inn  and  the  Salza,  to  take  from  her  the  terri- 
tories which  she  possessed  in  Suabia,  and 
which  were  designated  by  the  title  of  Hither 
Austria,  territories  which  afforded  her  the 
means  of  annoying  the  German  States  in  alli- 
ance with  France,  and  of  making,  whenever 
she  pleased,  military  preparations  on  the 
Upper  Danube.  He  meant  to  deprive  her  of 
the  communications  of  the  Tyrol  with  the 
Lake  of  Constance  and  Switzerland,  that  is  to 
say,  off  the  Vorarlberg.  He  even  intended, 
if  possible,  to  wrest  from  her  the  Tyrol,  which 
gave  her  possession  of  the  Alps  and  an  ever 
sure  passage  into  Italy.  But  this  last  point 
was  difficult  to  be  obtained,  because  the  Ty- 
rol was  an  old  possession  of  Austria's,  as 
dear  to  her  affections  as  valuable  to  her  inte- 
rests. It  was  inflicting  on  Austria  a  loss  of 
about  four  millions  of  subjects  out  of  twenty- 
four,  and  of  fifteen  million  florins  out  a  reve- 
nue of  one  hundred  and  rnree.  These  were, 
therefore,  cruel  sacrifices  to  require  of  her. 

With  all  that  he  purposed  to  take  from  her 
in  Germany,  Napoleon  intended  to  complete 
the  patrimony  of  the  three  German  States 
which  had  been  his  auxiliaries — Bavaria, 


Baden,  and  Wurtemberg.  He  intended  also 
to  procure  for  himself  by  means  of  these  three 
States  an  action  on  the  Diet,  a  road  to  the 
Danube,  and  to  show  in  a  signal  manner  that 
his  alliance  was  beneficial  to  those  who  em- 
braced it. 

He  purposed  also  to  resolve  favourably  for 
those  allied  princes  the  question  of  the  im- 
mediate nobility,  and  to  abolish  that  nobility, 
which  created  them  enemies  in  their  domi- 
nions. He  meant  likewise  to  resolve  all 
questions  of  paramountship,  and  to  suppress 
by  that  means  a  great  number  of  rights  of  the 
feudal  kind,  very  slavish  and  onerous  to  the 
Germanic  States. 

Lastly,  Napoleon  proposed,  in  order  to  at- 
tach solidly  to  himself  the  three  princes  of 
South  Germany,  to  add  the  bond  of  matri- 
mony to  the  bond  of  benefit.  He  wanted 
princes  and  princesses  to  unite  with  members 
of  his  dynasty.  He  calculated  on  finding 
them  in  Germany,  and  on  thus  joining  to 
princely  establishments  the  influence  of  fa- 
mily alliances. 

Prince  Eugene  de  Beauharnais  was  dear  to 
his  heart.  He  had  made  him  viceroy  of  Italy : 
he  was  seeking  a  wife  for  him.  He  had  cast 
his  eyes  on  the  daughter  of  the  elector  of  Ba- 
varia, a  remarkable  princess,  and  worthy  of 
him  for  whom  she  was  destined.  As  he  re- 
served the  greater  part  of  the  spoils  of  Austria 
for  Bavaria,  which  the  situation  and  the  dan- 
gers of  that  electorate  sufficiently  justified,  he 
wished  that  part  of  those  spoils  should  be  the 
dowry  for  the  French  prince. 

But  the  Princess  Augusta  was  promised  to 
the  heir  of  Baden,  and  her  mother,  the  elec- 
tress  of  Bavaria,  a  violent  enemy  of  France, 
alleged  that  engagement  for  rejecting  an  al- 
liance which  she  disliked.  General  Thiard, 
having  contracted  intimacies  with  several  of 
the  minor  German  courts,  while  serving  in  the 
army  of  Conde,  had  been  sent  to  Munich  and 
Baden  to  remove  the  obstacles  which  opposed 
the  projected  unions.  That  officer,  a  clever 
negotiator,  had  made  use  of  the  Countess  of 
Hochberg,  who  was  united  by  a  left-handed 
marriage  with  the  reigning  Elector  of  Baden, 
and  who  had  need  of  France  to  obtain  the  ac- 
knowledgment of  her  children.  Through  the 
influence  of  this  lady,  he  had  induced  the 
court  of  Baden  to  a  very  delicate  step,  namely, 
to  desist  from  all  views  on  the  hand  of  the 
the  Princess  Augusta  of  Bavaria.  This  point 
gained,  the  elector  and  the  Electress  of  Bava- 
ria were  left  without  pretext  for  refusing  an 
•  alliance  which  brought  them  a  dowry  of  the 
Tyrol  and  part  of  Suabia. 

This  was  not  the  only  German  union  which 
i  Napoleon  thought  of.  The  heir  of  Baden,  from 
'  whom  the  Princess  Augusta  of  Bavaria  had 
just  been  taken,  was  yet  to  be  provided  for, 
Napoleon  destined  for  him  Mademoiselle  Ste- 
phanie de  Beauharnais,  a  person  endowed 
with  grace  and  a  superior  understanding,  and 
whom  he  intended  to  create  imperial  princess. 
He  charged  General  Thiard  to  conclude  this 
match  also.  Lastly,  the  old  Duke  of  Wurtera- 
berg  had  a  daughter,  the  Princess  Catharine, 
whose  noble  jualities  have  since  been  con« 
spicuously  called  forth  by  adversity.  Napo- 


Dec.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


99 


Icon  wished  to  obtain  her  for  his  brother  Je- 
rome. But  a  marriage  contracted  by  the  latter 
in  America,  without  the  authorization  of  his 
family,  was  an  obstacle  which  could  not  yet 
be  removed.  It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to 
defer  this  last  establishment.  To  all  the  ag- 
grandizements of  territory,  which  he  was  pre- 
paring for  the  houses  of  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg, 
and  Baden,  Napoleon  purposed  to  add  the  title 
of  king,  leaving  to  those  houses  the  place 
which  they  had  in  the  Germanic  confedera- 
tion. 

Such  were  the  advantages  which  Napoleon 
intended  to  derive  from  his  late  victories.  To 
require  the  whole  of  Italy  was,  on  his  part, 
natural  and  consistent.  To  seek  in  the  Aus- 
trian possessions  in  Saubia  means  of  aggran- 
dizing the  princes,  his  allies,  was  extremely  ju- 
dicious, for  Austria  was  thus  thrust  back  be- 
hind the  Inn,  and  the  alliance  of  France  was 
rendered  manifestly  beneficial.  To  take  the 
Vorarlberg  from  Austria,  in  order  to  give  it  to 
Bavaria,  was  also  wise,  for  she  was  then 
separated  from  Switzerland.  But  to  take  the 
Tyrol  from  her,  though  it  was  a  good  combi- 
nation in  reference  to  Italy,  was  filling  her 
heart  with  implacable  resentment ;  it  was  re- 
ducing her  to  a  despair,  which,  concealed  for 
the  moment,  would  break  forth  sooner  or  later ; 
it  was  condemning  one's  self  more  than  ever 
to  cautious  policy,  clever  at  finding  and  at 
keeping  alliances,  since  it  rendered  the  princi- 
pal of  the  powers  of  the  continent  an  irrecon- 
cilable foe.  To  resolve  the  question  of  the 
immediate  nobility,  and  several  other  feudal 
questions,  might  be  a  useful  simplification  in 
regard  to  the  internal  organization  of  Germany. 
But  to  aggrandize  in  an  extraordinary  degree 
the  Princes  of  Baden,  Bavaria,  and  Wurtem- 
berg, to  connect  them  with  France  so  closely 
as  to  render  them  suspected  to  Germany,  was 
to  create  for  them  a  false  position,  from  which 
they  would  some  day  be  tempted  to  extricate 
themselves  by  becoming  unfaithful  to  their 
protector;  it  was  making  enemies  of  all  the 
German  princes  who  were  not  favoured;  il 
was  wounding  in  a  new  fashion  Austria, 
already  wounded  in  so  many  ways,  and,  what 
was  still  worse,  disobliging  Prussia  herself; 
in  short,  it  was  interfering  further  than  was 
becoming  in  the  affairs  of  Germany,  and  rais- 
ing up  against  one's  self  jealous  spirits  and 
petty  in  grates.  Napoleon  ought  not  to  have 
forgotten  that  he  had  caused  cannon  to  be 
pointed  at  the  gates  of  Stuttgard  in  order  to 
break  them  open  ;  that  he  was  obilged  at  that 
moment  to  make  use  of  a  foreign  woman  to  ob- 
tain a  marriage  at  Baden,  and  almost  to  wring 
from  the  Elector  of  Bavaria  his  daughter,  who 
had  been  obtained  only  by  appearing  with  the 
keys  of  the  Tyrol  in  one  hand  and  the  sword 
of  France  in  the  other. 

Napoleon,  then,  overstepped  the  true  limit 
of  French  policy  in  Germany,  in  creating  for 
himself  allies  too  much  detached  from  the 
German  system,  and  by  no  means  sure,  be- 
cause their  position  would  be  false.  But  it  is 
difficult  to  observe  moderation  in  victory ;  be- 
sides, he  was  a  new  monarch  :  he  was  an  ex- 
cellent head  of  a  family ;  he  wanted  alliances 
and  marriages. 


Such  were  the  ideas  that  served  for  the 
foundation  of  the  instructions  left  with  M.  de 
Talleyrand  for  the  negotiation  commenced 
with  Messieurs  de  Giulay  and  Lichtenstein. 
He  added  one  condition  for  the  benefit  of  the 
army,  which  was  not  less  dear  to  him  than  his 
brothers  and  nieces;  he  demanded  100  mil- 
lions, for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  provision 
not  only  for  the  officers  of  all  ranks,  but  also 
for  the  widows  and  children  of  those  who  had 
fallen  in  battle  ;  without  losing  time,  he  signed 
three  treaties  of  alliance  with  Baden,  Wurtem- 
berg, and  Bavaria.  He  gave  to  Baden  the 
Ortenau  and  part  of  the  Brisgau,  several  towns 
on  the  shore  of  the  Lake  of  Constance,  that 
is  to  say  113,000  inhabitants,  which  was  an 
augmentation  of  about  one-fourth  to  the  terri- 
tories of  that  house.  He  gave  to  the  house  of 
Wurtemburg  the  rest  of  the  Brisgau,  and  con- 
siderable portions  of  Suabia,  that  is  to  say 
183,000  inhabitants,  which  formed  an  aug- 
mentation of  more  than  a  fourth,  and  raised  the 
population  of  that  principality  to  nearly  a  mil- 
lion. Lastly,  to  Bavaria  he  gave  the  Vorarl- 
berg, the  bishoprics  of  Eichstidt  and  Passau, 
recently  allotted  to  the  Elector  of  Salzburg,  all 
Austrian  Saubia,  the  city  and  bishopric  of 
Augsburg,  that  is  to  say  a  million  inhabitants, 
which  raised  Bavaria  from  two  millions  to 
three,  and  added  a  third  to  her  possessions. 
The  progress  of  the  negotiations  with  Austria 
did  not  admit  of  any  mention  being  yet  made 
of  the  Tyrol. 

To  these  princes  were,  moreover,  attributed 
all  the  rights  of  sovereignty  over  the  imme- 
diate nobility,  and  they  were  relieved  from  the 
feudal  services  claimed  by  the  Emperor  of 
Germany  on  account  of  certain  portions  of 
their  territories. 

The  Elector  of  Baden,  having  the  modesty 
to  refuse  the  title  of  king,  as  too  superior  to 
his  revenues,  the  title  of  elector  was  left  him ; 
but  that  of  king  was  immediately  conferred  on 
the  Electors  of  Bavaria  and  Wurtemberg. 

In  return  for  these  advantages,  those  three 
princes  engaged  to  assist  France  in  any  war 
which  she  might  have  to  wage  in  future  in 
support  of  her  state  at  this  time,  and  in  any 
which  might  result  from  the  treaty  about  to  be 
concluded  with  Austria.  France,  on  her  part, 
engaged,  whenever  it  should  be  necessary,  to 
take  up  arms  to  maintain  these  princes  in 
their  new  situation. 

These  treaties  were  signed  on  the  10th,  12th, 
and  20th  of  December.  They  were  delivered 
to  General  Thiard  when  he  set  off  to  negotiate 
the  projected  marriages. 

Thus  a  portion  of  the  territories  of  Austria 
had  been  disposed  of  beforehand,  and  without 
the  consent  of  that  power.  But  the  conqueror 
gave  himself  little  concern  about  the  conse- 
quences to  which  this  proceeding  exposed  him. 

Napoleon,  after  attending  to  his  wounded, 
after  sending  off  for  Vienna  those  at  least 
who  were  capable  of  being  removed,  after 
despatching  to  France  the  prisoners  and  the 
cannon  taken  from  the  enemy,  quitted  Brunr. 
leaving  M.  de  Talleyrand  to  discuss  the  pre- 
scribed conditions  with  Messieurs  de  Giulay 
and  De  Dichtenstein.  He  was  impatient  to 
have  a  long  conversation  at  Vienna  with  M. 


100 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Dec.  1805. 


le  Haugwitz  and  to  dive  to  the  bottom  of  the 
secret  of  Prussia. 

M.  de  Talleyrand  entered  immediately  into 
conference  with  the  two  Austrian  negotiators. 
They  strongly  remonstrated  when  they  were 
made  acquainted  with  the  pretensions  of  the 
French  minister,  and  as  yet  there  had  been 
no  explanation  respecting  the  Tyrol;  nothing 
had  been  said  but  about  the  desire  to  separate 
Austria  from  Italy  and  Switzerland,  to  cut 
short  all  causes  for  rivalry  and  war. 

Messieurs  de  Lichtenstein  and  De  Giulay 
communicated,  on  their  part,  the  conditions  to 
which  Austria  was  ready  to  consent  She 
saw  clearly  that  she  must  relinquish  the  Ve- 
netian States,  the  possessions  which  she  had 
in  Suabia,  and  litigious  pretensions  between 
the  Empire  and  the  German  princes.  She 
consented,  therefore,  to  cede  Venice  and  the 
terra  firma  as  far  as  the  Izonzo ;  but  she 
wished  to  keep  Istria  and  Albania  and  to  gain 
Ragusa,  as  debouches  necessary  for  Hungary. 
These  were,  besides,  the  last  remains  of  the 
acquisitions  obtained  by  the  reigning  emperor, 
and  he  made  it  a  point  of  honour  to  preserve 
them. 

As  for  the  Tyrol,  she  was  almost  disposed 
to  give  that  up,  but  by  transferring  it  to  the 
then  Elector  of  Salzburg,  the  Archduke  Fer- 
dinand, who  had  been  compensated  in  1803 
for  Tuscany  by  the  bishopric  Of  Salzburg  and 
the  provostship  of  Berchtolsgaden.  She  want- 
ed Salzburg  and  Berchtolsgaden  in  exchange, 
and  moreover  she  required  that  the  Vorarl- 
berg,  Lindau,  and  the  shores  of  the  Lake  of 
•Constance  should  be  given  to  the  same  arch- 
duke, as  dependencies  of  the  Tyrol. 

By  this  arrangement,  Austria  would  have 
acquired  Salzburg  and  kept  the  Tyrol  and  the 
Vorarlberg,  in  the  person  of  one  of  her  arch- 
dukes. 

For  the  rest,  she  consented  to  cede  the  Aus- 
trian possessions  in  Suabia,  likewise  the  Or- 
tenau,  the  Brisgau,  the  bishoprics  of  Eichstiidt 
and  Passau.  But  she  demanded  for  the 
princes  of  her  house  who  would  lose  those 
possessions  a  large  compensation,  which  will 
appear  singularly  devised,  and  show  with  what 
sentiments  the  members  of  the  European  coa- 
lition were  animated  towards  one  another — 
she  demanded  Hanover. 

Thus  this  patrimony  of  the  King  of  Eng- 
land, which  Napoleon  had  been  censured  for 
offering  to  Prussia,  and  Prussia  for  accepting 
from  Napoleon,  which  Russia  came  herself  to 
propose  to  Prussia  in  order  to  detach  her  from 
France,  Austria,  in  her  turn,  demanded  for  an 
archduke ! 

M.  de  Talleyrand,  delighted  to  find  such 
claims  brought  forward,  made  no  remonstrance 
on  hearing  them  expressed,  and  promised  to 
communicate  them  to  Napoleon. 

Lastly,  with  regard  to  the  contribution  of 
one  hundred  millions,  Austria  declared  it  im- 
possible for  her  to  pay  ten,  so  completely  was 
she  exhausted.  In  compensation  for  such  a 
sum,  she  offered  to  give  up  the  immense  ma- 
tirid  in  arms  and  ammunition  of  all  kinds, 
which  were  in  the  Venetian  States,  and  which 
she  would  have  had  a  right  to  carry  away,  if 
she  had  not  stipulated  to  leave  it. 


After  warm  debates,  which  lasted  but  three 
or  four  days,  since  both  parties  were  in  haste 
to  bring  matters  to  a  close,  it  was  agreed  that 
the  Prince  de  Lichtenstein  should  go  to  the 
Emperor  Francis  at  Holitsch,  to  obtain  fresh 
instructions,  as  those  with  which  he  was  fur- 
nished did  not  authorize  him  to  subscribe  to 
the  sacrifices  required  by  Napoleon. 

M.  de  Talleyrand  was  to  remain  at  Brunn 
till  his  return.  It  was  a  great  fault  of  the  A  us- 
trians  to  lose  time ;  for  what  was  passing  at 
Vienna  between  Napoleon  and  M.  de  Haug- 
witz  was  about  to  place  them  in  a  still  worse 
situation. 

M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  from  Briinn  corre- 
sponded daily  with  Vienna,  had  informed  Na- 
poleon that  he  was  not  near  settling  with  the 
Austrian  negotiators.  This  resistance,  which 
would  have  deserved  serious  attention  if  it  had 
been  combined  with  the  resistance  of  Prussia, 
annoyed  Napoleon.  The  archdukes  were  ap- 
proaching Presburg,  followed  by  100,000  men. 
The  Prussian  troops  were  assembling  in  Sax- 
ony and  in  Franconia;  the  Anglo-Russians 
were  advancing  in  Hanover.  These  conjoint 
circumstances  did  not  alarm  the  victor  of  Aus- 
terlitz.  He  was  ready,  if  need  were,  to  fight 
the  archdukes  under  the  walls  of  Presburg, 
and  then  to  fall  upon  Prussia  by  way  of  Bohe- 
mia. But  it  was  beginning  afresh  a  dangerous 
game  with  Europe,  coalesced  this  time  whole 
and  entire,  and  he  would  not  have  been  wise 
to  expose  himself  to  the  risk  for  a  few  square 
leagues  more  or  less.  Though  the  position  of 
Napoleon  was  that  of  an  all-powerful  conque- 
ror, it  did  not  dispense  him  from  the  duty  of 
behaving  like  an  able  politician.  It  was  Prus- 
sia that  it  particularly  behoved  his  skill  to  keep 
sight  of;  for,  profiting  by  the  terror  with  which 
the  recent  events  of  the  war  had  filled  her,  he 
might  take  her  away  from  the  coalition,  attach 
her  again  to  France,  and  add  to  the  victory  of 
Austerlitz  a  diplomatic  victory  not  less  deci- 
sive. He  was,  therefore,  extremely  impatient 
to  see  and  to  converse  with  M.  de  Haugwitz. 

M.  de  Haugwitz,  who  had  come  to  impose 
conditions  on  Napoleon,  under  the  false  ap- 
pearance of  an  officious  mediation,  found  him 
triumphant  and  almost  master  of  Europe.  No 
doubt,  with  firmness,  union,  perseverance,  it 
would  still  be  possible  to  make  head  againt- 
the  Emperor  of  the  French.  But  Russia  had 
passed  from  the  delirium  of  pride  to  the  de 
spondency  of  defeat.  And,  besides,  all  the 
allies,  distrusting  one  another,  communicated 
but  little  among  themselves.  M.  de  Haugwitz 
frequented  incessantly  and  exclusively  the 
French  legation,  and  carried  flattery  to  such  a 
length  as  to  wear  every  day  in  Vienna  the 
grand  cordon  of  the  Legion  of  Honour,1  never 
spoke  but  with  admiration  of  Austerlitz  and  of 
the  genius  of  Napoleon,  and  could  not  help 
feeling  a  strong  agitation  when  thinking  of  the 
reception  which  he  was  about  to  meet  with. 

Napoleon,  having  arrived  on  the  13th  of 
December  at  Vienna,  sent  the  same  evening  for 
M.  de  Haugwitz  to  Schonbrunn,  and  gave  au- 
dience to  him  in  the  cabinet  of  Maria  Theresa. 


1  It  is  M.  de  Talieyrand  who  relates  these  particulars  ii 
one  of  his  letters  to  Napoleon. 


Dec.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   TH.t]    EMPIRE. 


101 


He  knew  not  yet  all  that  had  taken  place  at 
Potsdam;  he  knew  more,  however,  than  when 
he  saw  M.  de  Haugwitz  at  Brunn,  the  day  be- 
fore the  battle.  He  was  informed  of  the  exist- 
ence of  a  treaty  signed  on  the  3d  of  November, 
by  which  Prussia  engaged  eventually  to  join 
the  coalition.  He  was  warm  and  easily  irri- 
tated, but  frequently  he  feigned  anger  rather 
than  felt  it.  Striving  on  this  occasion  to  inti- 
midate his  visitor,  he  reproached  M.  de  Haug- 
witz most  vehemently  for  having,  he,  the  minis- 
ter, who  was  the  friend  of  peace,  he  who  had 
placed  his  glory  in  the  system  of  neutrality, 
who  had  even  desired  to  convert  that  neutrali- 
ty into  a  plan  of  alliance  with  France — he  re- 
proached him  for  having  had  the  weakness  to 
unite  himself  at  Potsdam  with  Russia  and 
Austria,  for  having  contracted  with  those  two 
powers  engagements  which  could  lead  him  to 
nothing  but  war.  He  complained  bitterly  of 
the  duplicity  of  his  cabinet,  of  the  hesitations 
of  his  sovereign,  of  the  empire  of  women  over 
his  court,  and  gave  him  to  understand  that, 
being  now  rid  of  the  enemies  whom  he  had 
upon  his  hands,  he  was  at  liberty  to  do  what 
he  pleased  wilh  Prussia.  He  then  asked  with 
vehemence  what  the  Prussian  cabinet  wanted, 
what  system  it  calculated  on  pursuing,  and 
seemed  to  require  complete,  categorical,  im- 
mediate explanations  upon  all  these  points. 

M.  de  Haugwitz,  agitated  at  first,  soon  reco- 
vered himself,  for  he  had  not  less  presence  of 
mind  than  intelligence.  Amidst  all  this  bois- 
terous passion,  he  imagined  that  he  could  per- 
ceive that  Napoleon,  at  bottom,  was  desirous 
of  a  reconciliation,  and  that,  if  the  engage- 
ments entered  into  with  the  coalition  were  very 
speedily  broken,  this  conqueror,  apparently  so 
incensed,  would  consent  to  be  appeased. 

M.  de  Haugwitz  then  gave  his  artful,  spe- 
cious, fawning  explanations  of  the  circum- 
stances which  had  overpowered  and  hurried 
Prussia  away ;  mentioned,  not  indiscreetly, 
those  who  had  suffered  themselves  to  be  con- 
trolled by  pure  accident  to  such  a  degree  as  to 
depart  from  the  true  system  which  was  suita- 
ble for  their  country;  and  concluded  with  in- 
sinuating plainly  enough  that  all  would  be 
speedily  repaired,  and  even  that  the  alliance 
which  had  so  often  miscarried  might  become 
the  instantaneous  price  of  an  immediate  re- 
conciliation. 

Napoleon,  casting  a  piercing  look  into  the 
soul  of  M.  de  Haugwiiz,  perceived  that  the 
Prussians  desired  nothing  better  than  to  face 
about  and  come  back  to  him.  To  all  the  blows 
that  he  had  inflicted  on  Europe,  he  had  taken 
pleasure  in  adding  a  piece  of  arch-raillery ; 
and  he  took  it  into  his  head  to  offer  on  the  spot 
to  M.  de  Haugwitz  the  plan  which  Duroc  had 
been  ordered  to  present  at  Berlin,  that  is  to 
say,  the  formal  alliance  of  Prussia  with  France, 
on  the  so  oft-renewed  condition  of  Hanover. 
This  was  certainly  carrying  the  attempt  upon 
the  honour  of  the  Prussian  cabinet  to  a  great 
length ;  for  Napoleon  proposed  to  it,  for  the 
sake  of  money,  one  may  say,  to  dissolve  the 
ties  recently  contracted  over  the  coffin  of  the 
great  Frederick ;  and  he  proposed  to  it,  af  er 
deserting  France  at  Potsdam  for  the  benefit  of 
Europe,  to  desert  Europe  at  Vienna  for  the 


benefit  of  France.  Napoleon  did  not  hesitate, 
and,  while  uttering  this  proposal,  he  kept  his 
eyes  long  fixed  on  the  face  of  M.  de  Haug- 
witz. 

The  Prussian  minister  appeared  neither  an- 
gry nor  surprised.  He  seemed  delighted,  on 
the  contrary,  to  carry  back  from  Vienna,  in- 
stead of  a  declaration  of  war,  Hanover,  with 
the  alliance  of  France,  which  was  his  favour- 
ite system.  It  should  be  observed,  in  excuse 
for  M.  de  Haugwitz,  that,  having  left  Berlin  at 
a  moment  when  people  there  were  flattering 
themselves  that  Napoleon  would  not  reach 
Vienna,  he  had  seen,  even  in  this  supposition, 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  Marshal  Mollen- 
dorf  uneasy  about  the  consequences  of  a  war 
against  France,  and  insisting  that  no  declara- 
tion should  be  issued  before  the  end  of  Decem- 
ber. Now  Napoleon  had  taken  Vienna,  crushed 
all  the  allies  at  Austerlitz,  and  it  was  only  the 
13th  of  December.  M.  de  Haugwitz  had  rea- 
son to  apprehend  that  the  conqueror  might 
make  a  rapid  incursion  into  Bohemia  and  fall 
like  lightning  upon  Berlin.  He  thought  himself 
fortunate,  therefore,  in  terminating  with  a  con- 
quest a  situation  which  threatened  to  terminate 
in  a  disaster.  As  for  fidelity  towards  the  coa- 
lesced powers,  he  treated  them  as  they  treated 
each  other.  Besides,  for  the  line  of  conduct 
which  he  had  pursued  at  Vienna,  we  must  find 
fault  not  so  much  with  him  as  with  those  who, 
in  his  absence,  had  entangled  Prussia  in  a  de- 
file, having  no  outlet.  He  accepted,  therefore, 
the  offer  of  Napoleon  without  further  consider- 
ation. 

The  latter,  gratified  to  see  that  his  proposal 
was  successful,  said  to  M.  de  Haugwitz,  "  Well, 
then,  the  thing  is  decided,  you  shall  have  Han- 
over. You  will  give  me  in  return  some  patches 
of  territory  that  I  want,  and  sign  a  treaty  of 
alliance,  offensive  and  defensive,  with  France. 
But,  on  your  arrival  in  Berlin,  you  will  impose 
silence  on  the  coteries;  you  will  treat  them 
with  the  contempt  which  they  deserve;  you 
will  make  the  policy  of  the  ministry  predomi- 
nate over  that  of  the  court."— The  allusions 
of  Napoleon  pointed  to  the  queen,  to  Prince 
Louis,  and  to  those  about  them.  He  then  en- 
joined Duroc  to  confer  with  M.  de  Haugwitz, 
and  to  prepare  immediately  the  draft  of  the 
treaty. 

No  sooner  was  this  arrangement  concluded 
than  Napoleon,  delighted  with  his  work,  wote 
to  M.  de  Talleyrand,  desiring  him  not  to  bring 
matters  to  a  conclusion  at  Brunn,  to  protract 
the  negotiation  for  a  few  days  longer,  for  he 
was  certain  of  settling  with  Prussia,  which  he 
had  conquered  at  the  price  of  Hanover,  and 
thenceforward  he  had  no  need,  to  concern  him- 
self either  about  the  threats  of  the  Anglo-Rus- 
sians against  Holland,  or  the  movements  c-f 
the  archdukes  from  the  direction  of  Hungarv. 
He  added  that  he  would  now  peremptorily  in- 
sist on  the  Tyrol,  on  the  war  contribution 
more  resolutely  than  ever,  and  that,  for  the 
rest,  he  must  leave  Brunn  and  come  to  Vienna. 
The  negotiation  was  too  far  from  him  at  Briinn : 
he  wished  to  have  it  nearer,  af  Presburg  for 
instance. 

It,  was  on  the  13th  of  December  when  Na- 
poleon had  the  interview  with  M  de  Haugwitz. 
i  2 


103 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Dec.  1805 


The  treaty  was  drawn  up  on  the  14th,  and 
signed  on  the  15th  at  Schonbrunn.  The  prin- 
cipal conditions  were  the  following : 

France,  considering  Hanover  as  her  own 
conquest,  ceded  it  to  Prussia.  Prussia,  in  re- 
turn, ceded  to  Bavaria  the  margravate  of  An- 
spach,  that  province  which  it  was  so  difficult 
to_avoid  passing  through  when  at  war  with 
Austria.  She  ceded,  moreover,  to  France  the 
principality  of  Neufchatel,  and  the  duchy  of 
Cleves,  containing  the  fortress  of  Wesel.  The 
two  powers  guarantied  all  their  possessions ; 
that  is  to  say,  Prussia  guarantied  to  France 
her  present  limits,  with  the  new  acquisitions 
made  in  Italy  and  the  new  arrangements  con- 
cluded in  Germany;  and  France  guarantied  to 
Prussia  her  state  at  that  time,  including  the 
additions  of  1803  and  the  new  addition  of  Han- 
over. It  was  an  absolute  treaty  of  alliance, 
offensive  and  defensive,  which  moreover  bore 
that  formal  title,  a  title  repudiated  in  all  ante- 
rior treaties. 

Napoleon  had  demanded  Neufchatel,  Cleves. 
and  particularly  Anspach,  which  he  meant  to 
exchange  with  Bavaria  for  the  duchy  of  Berg, 
in  order  to  have  endowments  to  confer  on  his 
best  servants.  To  Prussia  these  were  very 
small  sacrifices,  and  to  him  valuable  means 
of  reward ;  for,  in  his  vast  designs,  he  would 
not  be  great  without  making  all  about  him 
great — his  ministers,  his  generals,  as  well  as 
his  relations. 

This  negotiation  was  a  master-stroke:  it 
covered  the  allies  with  confusion ;  it  placed 
Austria  at  the  discretion  of  Napoleon ;  and, 
above  all,  it  secured  to  the  latter  the  only  de- 
sirable and  possible  alliance,  the  alliance  of 
Prussia.  But  it  contained  a  serious  engage- 
ment, the  engagement  to  wring  Hanover  from 
England,  which  might  some  day  be  found  ex- 
tremely troublesome,  as  it  was  to  be  appre- 
hended that  it  might  prevent  a  maritime  peace, 
if  sooner  or  later  circumstances  rendered  such 
a  peace  possible. 

Napoleon  wrote  immediately  afterwards  to 
M.  de  Talleyrand  that  the  treaty  with  Prussia 
was  signed,  and  that  he  must  leave  Brtinn,  if 
the  Austrians  did  not  accept  the  conditions 
which  he  meant  to  impose  upon  them. 
»  M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  would  have  been 
glad  if  peace  had  been  already  concluded,  who 
disliked  above  all  to  maltreat  Austria,  was 
deeply  vexed.  As  for  the  Austrian  negotiators, 
they  were  thunderstruck.  They  brought  from 
Holitsch  fresh  concessions,  but  not  so  exten- 
sive as  those  which  had  been  required  of  them. 
They  knew  that  Prussia,  in  order  to  obtain 
Hanover,  exposed  them  to  the  loss  of  the  Ty- 
ro}, and,  notwithstanding  the  danger  of  further 
delay,  and  of  seeing  Napoleon  make  perhaps 
fresh  demands,  a  danger  of  which  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand took  pains  to  convince  them,  they 
were  obliged  to  refer  to  their  sovereign. 

They  parted,  therefore,  at  Briinn,  promising 
to  meet  again  at  Presburg.  The  abode  at 
Brunn  had  become  unwholesome  from  the 
effluvia  exhaled  by  a  soil  crowded  with  corpses 
and  a  town  filled  with  hospitals. 

M.  de  TalleyraTic  returned  to  Vienna  and 
found  Napoleon  ready  to  renew  the  war  if  his 
leroii  were  not  agreed  tu.  He  had  actually 


ordered  General  Songis  to  repair  the  materiel  of 
the  artillery,  and  to  augment  it  at  the  expense 
of  the  arsenal  of  Vienna.  He  had  even  ad- 
dressed a  severe  reprimand  to  Fouche,  the 
minister  of  police,  for  having  allowed  peace 
to  be  announced  too  soon  as  certain. 

One  very  recent  circumstance  had  contri- 
buted to  incense  him  more.  He  had  just  re 
ceived  intelligence  of  what  was  occurring  at 
Naples.  That  senseless  court,  after  stipulat- 
ing (by  the  advice  of  Russia,  it  is  true)  a 
treaty  of  neutrality,  had  all  at  once  thrown  oft 
the  mask  and  taken  up  arms.  When  informed 
of  the  battle  of  Trafalgar  and  the  engagements 
contracted  by  Prussia,  Queen  Caroline  had 
concluded  that  Napoleon  was  ruined,  and  had 
determined  to  send  for  the  Russians.  On  the 
19th  of  November,  a  naval  division  had  landed 
on  the  coast  of  Naples  12,000  Russians  and 
6,000  English.  The  court  of  Naples  had  en- 
gaged to  add  40,000  Neapolitans  to  the  Anglo- 
Russian  army.  The  plan  was  to  raise  Italy 
in  the  rear  of  the  French,  while  Massena  was 
at  the  foot  of  the  Julian  Alps  and  Napoleon 
almost  on  the  frontiers  of  ancient  Poland, 
That  court  of  emigrants  had  given  way  to  the 
habitual  weakness  of  emigrants,  which  is  to 
believe  always  what  they  wish  and  to  act  ac- 
cordingly. 

Napoleon,  when  apprized  of  this  scandalous 
violation  of  faith  pledged,  was  at  once  irritated 
and  pleased.  His  resolution  was  taken  ;  the 
Queen  of  Naples  should  pay  with  her  kingdom 
for  the  conduct  which  she  had  pursued,  and 
leave  vacant  a  crown  which  would  be  ex- 
tremely well  placed  in  the  Bonaparte  family. 
Nobody  in  Europe  could  tax  with  injustice  the 
sovereign  act  that  should  strike  this  branch 
of  the  house  of  Bourbon ;  and,  as  for  its 
natural  protectors,  Napoleon  had  no  need  to 
care  about  them. 

Meanwhile,  the  Austrian  negotiators  at 
Briinn  had  endeavoured  to  obtain  the  insertion 
in  the  treaty  of  peace  of  some  article  which 
should  cover  the  court  of  Naples,  of  whose 
secret,  though  yet  unknown  to  Napoleon,  they 
were  apprized.  But  the  latter,  when  once  in- 
formed, gave  a  positive  order  to  M.  de  Talley- 
rand not  to  listen  to  any  thing  on  that  subject 
— I  should  be  too  weak,  said  he,  were  I  to  put 
up  with  the  insults  of  that  wretched  court  of 
Naples.  You  know  with  what  generosity  I 
have  treated  it,  but  that  is  over  now,  Queen 
Caroline  shall  cease  to  reign  in  Italy.  Hap- 
pen what  will,  never  mention  it  in  the  treaty. 
That  is  my  absolute  will. 

The  negotiators  were  waiting  at  Presburg 
for  M.  de  Talleyrand,  He  repaired  thither 
The  negotiations  were  held  at  the  advanced 
posts  of  the  two  armies.  The  archdukes  had 
approached  Presburg:  they  were  within  two 
marches  of  Vienna.  Napoleon  had  collected 
there  the  greater  part  of  his  troops.  He  had 
brought  Massena  by  the  route  of  Styria.  Nearly 
200,000  French  were  concentrated  around  the 
capital  of  Austria.  Napoleon,  extremely  in- 
censed, had  determined  to  resume  hostilities 
But  it  would  have  been  too  great  a  folly  on 
the  part  of  the  court  of  Vienna  to  permit  that, 
especially  after  the  defection  of  Prussia,  and 
in  the  disheartened  state  of  the  Russian  caoi- 


Dec.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


103 


net.  Great  as  were  the  sacrifices  required  of 
the  Austrian  cabinet,  though  affecting  at  first 
to  repeal  the  idea,  it  had  made  up  its  mind  to 
submit  to  them.  It  was  therefore  agreed  that 
Austria  should  give  up  the  state  of  Venice, 
with  the  provinces  of  the  terra  firma,  such  as 
Friule,  Istria,  and  Dalmatia.  Trieste  and  the 
Bocca  di  Cattaro  were  also  to  be  ceded  to 
France.  These  territories  were  to  be  annexed 
to  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  The  separation  of 
the  crowns  of  France  and  Italy  was  anew 
stipulated,  but  with  a  vagueness  of  expression 
which  left  the  faculty  of  deferring  that  separa- 
tion till  the  general  peace,  or  till  the  death  of 
Napoleon. 

Bavaria  obtained  the  Tyrol,  the  object  of  her 
everlasting  longing,  the  German  Tyrol'as  well 
as  the  Italian  Tyrol.  Austria,  in  return,  ob- 
tained the  principalities  of  Salzburg  and 
Berchtolsgaden,  given  in  1803  to  the  Archduke 
Ferdinand,  previously  Grand-duke  of  Tuscany ; 
and  Bavaria  indemnified  the  archduke  by 
ceding  to  him  the  ecclesiastical  principality 
of  Wurzburg,  which  she  likewise  had  obtained 
in  1803,  in  consequence  of  the  secularizations. 

The  territory  of  Austria  was  thus  rendered 
more  compact ;  but,  with  the  Tyrol,  she  lost 
all  influence  over  Switzerland  and  Italy,  and 
the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  removed  into  the 
centre  of  Franconia,  ceased  to  be  under  her 
immediate  influence.  The  state  granted  to 
that  prince  was  not,  as  before,  a  mere  depen- 
dency of  the  Austrian  monarchy. 

To  this  indemnity,  found  in  the  country  of 
Salzburg,  was  added  for  Austria  the  secular- 
ization of  the  possessions  of  the  Teutonic 
Order,  and  their  conversion  to  hereditary 
property  in  favour  of  any  of  the  archdukes 
whom  she  should  point  out.  The  importance 
of  these  possessions  consisted  in  a  popula- 
tion of  120,000  inhabitants,  and  a  revenue  of 
150,000  florins. 

The  electoral  title  of  the  Archduke  Ferdi- 
nand was  upheld,  and  transferred  from  the 
principality  of  Salzburg  to  the  principality  of 
Wurzburg. 

Austria,  recognising  the  royalty  of  the  elec- 
tors of  Wurtemberg  and  Bavaria,  consented 
that  the  sovereigns  of  Baden,  Wurtemberg, 
and  Bavaria,  should  have  the  same  preroga- 
tives over  the  immediate  nobility  in  their  terri- 
tories as  the  emperor  had  over  the  immediate 
nobility  in  his.  This  was  equivalent  to  the 
suppression  of  that  nobility  in  the  three  states 
in  question,  for,  the  powers  of  the  emperor 
over  that  nobility  being  complete,  those  of  the 
three  princes  became  equally  so. 

Lastly,  the  imperial  chancellery  renounced 
all  rights  of  feudal  origin  in  the  three  states 
favoured  by  France. 

The  approbation  of  the  Diet  was,however,  for- 
mally reserved.  France  effected  in  this  manner 
a  social  revolution  in  a  considerable  part  of 
Germany ;  for  she  centralized  power  there  for 
the  benefit  of  the  territorial  sovereign,  and  put 
an  end  to  all  external  feudal  dependence.  She 
continued  also  the  system  of  secularizations, 
for  with  the  Teutonic  Order  disappeared  one 
of  the  last  two  ecclesiastical  principalities  re- 
maining, and  the  only  one  then  left  was  that 
of  the  prince  arch-chancellor,  ecclesiastical 


elector  of  Ratisbon.  Conformably  with  what 
had  previously  been  done,  this  secularization 
also  was  effected  for  the  benefit  of  one  of  the 
principal  courts  of  Germany. 

Austria,  definitively  excluded  from  Italy,  de- 
spoiled by  the  loss  of  the  Tyrol  of  the  com- 
manding positions  which  she  had  in  the  Alps, 
thrust  back  behind  the  Inn,  deprived  of  every 
advanced  post  in  Suabia,  and  of  the  feudal 
rights  which  subjected  the  states  of  South 
Germany  to  her,  had  sustained  immense  losses, 
material  and  political.  She  lost,  as  we  have 
already  observed,  four  millions  of  subjects  out 
of  twenty-four,  fifteen  millions  of  florins  out 
of  a  revenue  of  103. 

The  treaty  was  well  conceived  for  the  peace 
of  Italy  and  Germany.    There  was  only  one 
objection  to  be  made  to  it,  namely,  that  the 
;  vanquished,  too  ill-treated,  could   not  submit 
sincerely.     It  was  for  Napoleon,  by  great  dis- 
cretion, by  judicious  alliances,  to  leave  Aus- 
j  tria   without    hope   and    without    means    of 
|  revolting  against  the  decisions  of  victory. 

At  the  moment  of  signing  such  a  treaty,  the 
hands  of  the  plenipotentiaries  hesitated.  They 
stood  out  on  two  points,  the  war  contribution 
of  100  millions  and  Naples.  Napoleon  had 
reduced  the  contribution  demanded  to  50  mil- 
lions, on  account  of  the  sums  in  the  chests  of 
Austria,  to  which  he  had  already  helped  him- 
self. As  for  Naples,  he  would  not  hear  a  word 
about  her. 

In  order  to  overcome  him,  a  proceeding  of 
pure  courtesy  was  devised,  namely,  to  send  to 
him  the  Archduke  Charles,  a  prince  whose 
character  and  talents  he  honoured,  and  whom 
|  he  had  never  seen.  He  was  solicited  to  re- 
i  ceive  him  at  Vienna,  and  assented  very  cheer- 
fully, but  firmly  resolved  to  abate  nothing.  It 
was  expected  that  this  prince,  one  of  the  first 
generals  in  Europe,  explaining  to  him  the  re- 
sources which  the  Austrian  monarchy  still 
possessed,  expressing  the  sentiments  of  the 
army,  ready  to  sacrifice  itself  in  rejecting  a 
humiliating  peace,  joining  adroit  solicitations 
to  these  remonstrances,  might  perhaps  soften 
Napoleon.  Hence,  when  M.  de  Talleyrand 
urged  the  negotiators  to  bring  the  business  to 
a  conclusion,  they  replied  that  they  should  be 
accused  of  having  betrayed  their  country,  if 
they  gave  their  signatures  before  the  interview 
which  Napoleon  was  to  have  with  the  Arch- 
duke. 

However,  M.  de  Talleyrand  having  taken  it 
upon  himself  to  relinquish  10  millions  more 
of  the  war  contribution,  they  signed  on  the 
26th  of  December  the  treaty  of  Presburg,  one 
of  the  most  glorious  that  Napoleon  ever  con- 
cluded, and  certainly  the  best  conceived;  for, 
if  France  afterwards  obtained  more  extensive 
territories,  it  was  at  the  price  of  arrangements 
less  acceptable  to  Europe,  and  therefore  less 
durable.  The  Austrian  negotiators  confined 
themselves  to  the  recommendation  of  the 
reigning  house  of  Naples  to  the  generosity  of 
the  conqueror,  in  a  letter  signed  by  them  both. 
The  archduke  visited  Napoleon  on  the  27th, 
in  one  of  the  imperial  palaces,  was  received 
by  him  with  the  respect  due  to  his  rank  and 
his  renown,  conversed  with  him  on  the  mili- 
tary art,  which  was  perfectly  natural  betweeu 


104 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Dec.  1805 


two  captains  of  such  merit,  and  then  retired 
without  having  said  a  word  about  the  affairs 
of  the  two  empires. 

Napoleon  made  preparations  for  leaving 
Austria  immediately.  He  ordered  2000  pieces 
of  cannon  and  100,000  muskets,  found  in  the 
arsenal  of  Vienna,  to  be  shipped  on  the  Da- 
nube; he  despatched  150  pieces  to  Palma 
Nova,  to  arm  that  important  fortress,  which 
commanded  the  Venetian  states  of  the  terra 
firma.  He  regulated  the  return  of  his  soldiers 
in  such  a  manner  that  it  should  take  place  by 
short  marches,  for  he  would  not  have  them  go 
back  as  they  had  come,  on  the  run.  The  ne- 
cessary arrangements  were  made  on  the  route 
for  their  abundant  supply.  He  ordered  two 
millions  to  be  distributed  forthwith  among  the 
officers  of  all  ranks,  that  every  one  might  im- 
mediately enjoy  the  fruits  of  the  victory.  Ber- 
thier  was  appointed  to  superintend  the  return 
of  the  army  to  the  territory  of  France.  It  was 
to  evacuate  Vienna  in  five  days,  and  to  repass 
the  Inn  in  twenty.  It  was  stipulated  that  the 
fortress  of  Braunau  should  remain  in  the 
hands  of  the  French  till  the  complete  payment 
of  the  contribution  of  40  millions. 

This  done,  Napoleon  set  out  for  Munich, 
where  he  was  received  with  transport.  The 
Bavarians,  who  were  one  day  to  betray  him 
in  his  defeat,  and  to  oblige  the  French  army  to 
fight  its  way  through  them  at  Hanau,  covered 
with  their  applause,  pursued  with  ardent  cu- 
riosity, the  conqueror  who  had  saved  them 
from  in-vasion,  constituted  them  into  a  king- 
dom, enriched  them  with  the  spoils  of  van- 
quished Austria.  Napoleon,  after  attending 
the  wedding  of  Eugene  Beauharnais  and  the 
Princess  Augusta,  after  enjoying  the  happiness 


of  a  son  whom  he  loved,  the  admiration  of 
the  people,  eager  to  see  him,  the  flatteries  of 
an  enemy,  the  Electress  of  Bavaria,  set  out  for 
Paris,  where  the  enthusiasm  of  France  awaited 
him. 

A  campaign  of  three  months,  instead  of  a 
war  of  several  years,  as  it  had  at  first  been 
feared,  the  continent  disarmed,  the  French  em- 
pire extended  to  limits  which  it  ought  never 
to  have  passed,  a  dazzling  glory  added  to  our 
arms,  public  and  private  credit  miraculously 
restored,  new  prospects  of  peace  and  pros- 
perity opened  to  the  nation,  under  a  govern- 
ment powerful  and  respected  by  the  world — 
that  was  what  the  people  meant  to  thank  him 
for  by  a  thousand  times  repeated  shouts  of 
"  Vive  I'Empereur  /"  With  these  cries  he  was 
greeted  even  at  Strasburg  on  crossing  the 
Rhine,  and  they  accompanied  him  to  Paris, 
which  he  entered  on  the  26th  of  January,  1806. 
It  was  a  second  return  from  Marengo.  Aus- 
terlitz  was  in  fact  for  the  Empire  what  Ma- 
rengo had  been  for  the  Consulate.  Marengo 
had  confirmed  the  consular  power  in  the  hands 
of  Napoleon;  Austerlitz  secured  the  imperial 
crown  upon  his  head.  Marengo  had  caused 
France  to  pass  in  one  day  from  a  threatening 
situation  to  a  tranquil  and  grand  situation : 
Austerlitz,  by  crushing  in  a  day  a  formidable 
coalition,  produced  a  not  less  important  result. 
For  calm  and  reflecting  minds,  if  any  such 
were  left  in  presence  of  these  events,  there 
was  but  one  subject  for  fear — the  inconstancy 
of  Fortune,  and  what  is  still  more  to  be 
dreaded,  the  weakness  of  the  human  mind, 
which  sometimes  bears  adversity  without 
quailing,  rarely  prosperity  without  committing 
great  faults. 


Jan.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


105 


BOOK    XXIV. 


CONFEDERATION    OF    THE    RHINE. 

Return  of  Napoleon  to  Paris — Public  Joy — Distribution  of  the  Colours  taken  from  the  Enemy— Decree  of  the 
Senate  ordaining  the  Erection  of  a  triumphal  Monument — Napoleon  devotes  his  first  Attention  to  the  Finance* 
— The  Company  of  United  Merchants  is  ascertained  to  be  indebted  to  the  Treasury  the  Sum  of  141  Millions- 
Napoleon,  dissatisfied  with  M.  de  Marbois,  appoints  M.  Mollien  to  supersede  him — Re-establishment  of  Public 
Credit — A  fund  formed  with  the  Contributions  levied  in  conquered  Countries — Orders  relative  to  the  Returii  of  the 
Army,  to  the  Occupation  of  Dalmatia,  to  the  Conquest  of  Naples — Affairs  of  Prussia — Ratification  of  the  Treaty 
of  Schonbrunn  given  with  Reservations — New  Mission  of  M.  de  Haugwitz  to  Napoleon — The  Treaty  of Schon- 
brunn  remodelled  in  Paris,  but  with  more  Obligations  and  fewer  Advantages  for  Prussia — M.  de  Lucchesini  is 
»ent  to  Berlin  to  explain  these  new  Changes — The  Treaty  of  Schonbrunn,  transformed  into  the  Treaty  of  Paris, 
is  at  length  ratified,  and  M.  de  Haugwitz  returns  to  Prussia — Predominant  Ascendency  of  France — Entry  of 
Joseph  Bonaparte  into  Naples — Occupation  of  Venice— Delay  in  the  Delivery  of  Dalmatia — The  French  Army 
is  halted  on  the  Inn  till  the  Delivery  of  Dalmatia,  and  distributed  in  the  German  Provinces  most  capaole  of 
subsisting  it — Distress  of  the  occupied  Countries — Situation  of  the  Court  of  Prussia,  after  the  Return  of  M.  de 
Haugwitz  to  Berlin — Mission  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  to  St.  Petersburg,  to  explain  the  Conduct  of  the  Prus- 
sian Cabinet — State  of  the  Court  of  Russia — Dispositions  of  Alexander  since  Austerlitz — Reception  given  to  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick — Useless  Efforts  of  Prussia  to  induce  Russia  and  England  to  approve  the  Occupation  of 
Hanover— England  declares  War  against  Prussia — Death  of  Mr.  Pitt,  and  Accession  of  Mr.  Fox  to  the  Minis- 
try— Hopes  of  Peace — Correspondence  between  Mr.  Fox  and  M.  de  Talleyrand — Mission  of  Lord  Yarmouth 
to  Paris  in  Quality  of  confidential  Negotiator — Bases  of  a  Maritime  Peace — The  Agents  of  Austria,  instead  of 
giving  up  the  Bocca  di  Cattaro  to  the  French,  put  it  into  the  Hands  of  the  Russians — Threats  of  Napoleon 
against  the  Court  of  Vienna — Russia  sends  M.  d'Oubril  to  Paris,  with  a  Commission  to  prevent  a  Movement  of 
the  French  Army  against  Austria,  and  to  propose  Peace — Lord  Yarmouth  and  M.  d'Oubril  negotiate  jointly  at 
Paris — Possibility  of  a  general  Peace — Calculation  of  Napoleon  tending  to  protract  the  Negotiation — System 
of  the  French  Empire — Vassal  Kingdoms,  Grand-Duchies,  and  Duchies — Joseph  King  of  Naples,  Louis  King  of 
Holland — Dissolution  of  the  Germanic  Empire — Confederation  of  the  Rhine — Movements  of  the  French  Army 
— Internal  Administration — Public  Works — The  Column  of  the  Place  Venddme.  the  Louvre,  the  Rue  Imperiale, 
the  Arc  de  1'Etoile — Roads  and  Canals — Council  of  State — Institution  of  the  University— Budget  of  1806 — Re- 
establishment  of  the  Tax  on  Salt — New  System  of  the  Treasury — Reorganization  of  the  Bank  of  France — Con- 
tinuation of  the  Negotiations  with  Russia  and  England — Treaty  of  Peace  with  Russia  signed  on  the  20th  of 
July,  by  M.  d'Oubril — The  Signature  of  this  Treaty  decides  Lord  Yarmouth  to  produce  his  Powers — Lord  Lan- 
derdale  is  associated  with  Ix>rd  Yarmouth — Difficulties  of  the  Negotiation  with  England — Some  indiscretions 
committed  by  the  English  Negotiators  on  the  Subject  of  the  Restitution  of  Hanover,  excite  great  Uneasiness  at 
Berlin — False  Reports  inflame  the  Court  of  Prussia — New  Infatuation  at  Berlin  and  Resolution  to  arm — Sur- 
prise and  Distrust  of  Napoleon — Russia  refuses  to  ratify  the  Treaty  signed  by  M.  d'Oubril.  and  proposes  new 
Conditions — Napoleon  refuses  to  admit  them — General  Tendency  to  War — The  King  of  Prussia  insists  on  the 
French  Army  being  withdrawn — Napoleon  replies  by  insisting  on  the  Prussian  Army  being  withdrawn — Long 
Silence  on  both  Sides — Both  Sovereigns  set  out  for  the  Army — War  declared  between  Prussia  and  France. 


WHILE  Napoleon  was  staying  a  few  days  at  j 
Munich  to  celebrate  the  marriage  of  Eugene  I 
de  Beauharnais  with  the  Princess  Augusta  of 
Bavaria ;  while  he  was  stopping  one  day  at 
Stuttgard,  another  at  Carlsruhe,  to  receive  the 
congratulations  of  his  new  allies,  and  to  con- 
clude family  alliances  there;  the  people  of 
Paris  were  waiting  with  the  utmost  impa- 
tience to  testify  their  joy  and  their  admiration. 
France,  thoroughly  satisfied  with  the  conduct 
of  the  public  affairs,  though  no  longer  taking 
any  part  in  them,  seemed  to  have  recovered 
the  vivacity  of  the  first  days  of  the  Revolution 
to  applaud  the  marvellous  exploits  of  her 
armies  and  of  her  chief.  Napoleon,  who  with 
the  genius  for  great  things  combined  the  art  to 
set  them  off,  had  sent  before  him  the  colours 
taken  from  the  enemy.  He  had  given  orders 
for  a  distribution  of  them  that  was  very  skil- 
fully calculated.  He  had  divided  them  among 
the  Senate,  the  Tribunate,  the  city  of  Paris, 
and  the  ancient  church  of  Notre  Dame,  which 
had  witnessed  his  coronation.  He  gave  eight 
to  the  Tribunate,  eight  to  the  city  of  Paris, 
fifty-four  to  the  Senate,  fifty  to  the  church  of 
Notre  Dame.  During  the  whole  of  the  cam- 
paign, he  had  never  ceased  to  inform  the 
Senate  of  all  the  events  of  the  war,  and  when 
peace  was  signed,  he  had  hastened  to  com- 
municate to  it  by  a  message  the  treaty  of 
Presburg.  In  this  manner  he  repaid  by  con- 
tinual attentions  the  confidence  of  that  great 
body,  and,  in  acting  thus,  he  was  consistent 
with  his  policy ;  for  he  kept  in  a  high  rank 
loose  old  authors  of  the  Revolution,  whom  the 

Voi.  II.— 14 


new  generation  was  glad  to  get  rid  of,  when 
the  elections  furnished  it  with  the  means  of 
doing  so.  These  were  his  own  aristocracy, 
which  he  hoped  to  melt  down  by  degrees  into 
the  old  one. 

These  colours  passed  through  Paris  on  the 
15th  of  January,  1806,  and  were  borne  tri- 
umphantly along  the  streets  of  the  capital,  to 
be  placed  under  the  roofs  of  the  edifices  which 
were  to  contain  them.  An  immense  con- 
course collected  to  witness  this  spectacle. 

The  cool  and  unimpassioned  CambaceVes 
himself  says,  in  his  grave  Memoirs,  that  the 
joy  of  the  people  resembled  intoxication.  And 
wherefore,  indeed,  should  they  rejoice  if  not 
on  such  occasions!  Four  hundred  thousand 
Russians,  Swedes,  English,  Austrians,  were 
marching  from  all  points  of  the  horizon  against 
France,  two  hundred  thousand  Prussians  pro- 
mising to  join  them,  and,  all  at  once,  a  hun- 
dred thousand  French,  starting  from  the  coasts 
of  the  Ocean,  traversing  in  two  months  a  great 
part  of  the  European  continent,  taking  the  first 
army  opposed  to  them  without  fighting,  in- 
flicting redoubled  blows  on  the  others,  entering 
the  astonished  capital  of  the  ancient  Germanic 
empire,  passing  beyond  Vienna  and  going  to 
the  frontiers  of  Poland,  to  break  in  one  great 
battle  the  bond  of  the  coalition  ;  sending  back 
the  vanquished  Russians  to  their  frozen  plain.,, 
and  chaining  the  disconcerted  Prussians  to 
their  frontiers;  the  dread  of  a  war  which 
might  be  expected  to  last  long  terminated  in 
three  months ;  the  peace  of  the  continent  sud- 
denly restored,  the  peace  of  the  seas  justly 


106 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Jan.  1806. 


noped  for ;  all  the  prospects  of  prosperity 
given  back  to  France,  delighted  and  placed  at 
the  head  of  the  nations — for  what  should  peo- 
ple rejoice,  we  repeat,  if  not  for  such  marvels  ? 
And  as  at  that  time  none  could  foresee  the  too 
speedy  end  of  this  greatness,  or  yet  discern,  in 
the  too  fertile  genius  that  produced  it,  the  too 
ardent  genius  also  that  was  destined  to  com- 
promise it,  one  sympathized  in  the  public 
happiness  without  any  mixture  of  sinister 
presentiments. 

The  men  who  are  particularly  affected  by 
the  material  prosperity  of  States,  the  mer- 
chants, the  capitalists,  were  not  less  moved 
than  the  rest  of  the  nation.  The  great  com- 
mercial houses,  which  in  victory  applauded 
the  speedy  return  of  peace — the  great  com- 
mercial houses  were  delighted  to  see  the 
double  crisis  of  public  and  private  credit  ter- 
minated in  a  day,  and  to  have  reason  to  hope 
anew  for  that  profound  tranquillity,  which  for 
five  years  the  Consulate  had  conferred  on 
France.  The  Senate,  on  receiving  the  colours 
destined  for  it,  ordained  by  a  decree  that  a 
triumphal  monument  should  be  erected  to  Na- 
poleon the  Great.  Conformably  with  the  wish 
of  the  Tribunate,  this  monument  was  to  be  a 
column  surmounted  by  the  statue  of  Napo- 
leon. His  birthday  was  placed  among  the 
national  festivals,  and  it  was,  moreover,  de- 
termined that  a  spacious  edifice  should  be 
erected  in  one  of  the  public  places  of  the 
capital,  to  receive,  along  with  a  series  of 
sculptures  and  paintings,  dedicated  to  the 
glory  of  the  French  armies,  the  sword  which 
Napoleon  used  at  the  battle  of  Austerlitz. 

The  colours  destined  for  Notre  Dame  were 
delivered  to  the  clergy  of  that  cathedral  by  the 
municipal  authorities.  "These  colours,"  said 
the  venerable  Archbishop  of  Paris,  "suspend- 
ed from  the  roof  of  our  church,  will  attest  to 
our  latest  posterity  the  efforts  of  Europe  in 
arms  against  us,  the  great  achievements  of 
our  soldiers,  the  protection  of  Heaven  over 
France,  the  prodigious  successes  of  our  in- 
vincible Emperor,  and  the  homage  which  he 
pays  to  God  of  his  victories." 

It  was  amidst  this  profound  and  universal 
satisfaction  that  Napoleon  entered  Paris,  ac- 
companied by  the  Empress.  The  heads  of  the 
bank,  desirous  that  his  presence  should  be  the 
signal  of  the  public  prosperity,  had  waited  till 
the  day  before  his  arrival  to  resume  their  pay- 
ments in  cash.  Since  the  late  events,  reviving 
confidence  had  poured  abundance  of  specie 
into  its  coffers.  Of  the  temporary  embarrass- 
ments of  the  month  of  December  not  a  trace 
was  left 

With  Napoleon  joy  on  account  of  success 
never  interrupted  business.  His  indefatigable 
spirit  could  unite  at  once  business  and  plea- 
sure. Having  arrived  in  the  evening  of  the 
26th  of  January,  on  the  morning  of  the  27th  he 
was  wholly  absorbed  in  the  cares  of  govern- 
ment The  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres  was 
the  first  personage  of  the  Empire  with  whom 
he  conversed  on  that  day.  After  some  moments 
given  to  the  pleasure  of  receiving  his  congra- 
tulations, and  seeing  his  prudence  confounded 
by  the  prodigies  of  the  late  war,  he  spoke  to 
him  about  the  financial  crisis,  so  speedily  and 


so  happily  terminated.  He  believed,  and  with 
reason,  the  accuracy,  the  equity,  of  the  reports 
of  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres ;  he  wish- 
ed therefore  to  hear  him  before  any  other  per- 
son. He  was  extremely  irritated  against  M. 
de  Marbois,  whose  gravity  had  always  imposed 
upon  him,  and  whom  he  had  deemed  incapa- 
ble of  carelessness  in  business.  He  was  far 
from  suspecting  the  high  integrity  of  that  mi- 
nister, but  he  could  not  forgive  him  for  having 
delivered  up  all  the  resources  of  the  Treasury 
to  adventurous  speculators,  and  he  was  re- 
solved to  display  great  severity.  The  arch- 
chancellor  contrived  to  pacify  him,  and  to  de- 
monstrate that,  instead  of  using  rigour,  it  would 
be  better  to  treat  with  the  United  Merchants  for 
the  transfer  of  all  their  assets,  in  order  to  wind 
up  this  strange  transaction  with  the  least  pos- 
sible loss. 

Napoleon  immediately  summoned  a  council 
to  the  Tuileries,  and  desired  to  be  furnished 
with  a  detailed  report  of  the  operations  of  the 
Company,  which  were  still  obscure  to  him.  He 
required  the  attendance  of  all  the  ministers, 
and  also  of  M.  Mollien,  director  of  the  Sinking 
Fund,  whose  management  he  approved,  and 
whom  he  thought  to  possess  in  a  much  higher 
degree  than  M.  de  Marbois  the  dexterity  neces- 
sary for  the  administration  of  funds  on  a  great 
scale.  He  sent  an  authoritative  order  to  Mes- 
sieurs Desprez,  Vanlerberghe,  and  Ouvrard, 
and  to  the  clerk  who  was  accused  of  having 
deceived  the  minister  of  the  Treasury,  to  come 
to  the  Tuileries. 

All  the  persons  who  attended  were  intimi- 
dated by  the  presence  of  the  Emperor,  who  did 
not  conceal  his  resentment.  M.  de  Marbois 
began  reading  a  long  report  which  he  had 
drawn  up  relative  to  the  subject  under  discus- 
sion. He  had  not  read  far  before  Napoleon, 
interrupting  him,  said,  "  I  see  how  it  is.  It  was 
with  the  funds  of  the  Treasury  and  those  of 
the  bank  that  the  company  of  United  Merchant* 
calculated  on  providing  supplies  for  France 
and  Spain.  And,  as  Spain  had  nothing  to  give 
but  promises  of  piastres,  it  is  with  the  money 
of  France  that  the  wants  of  both  countries  have 
been  supplied.  Spain  owed  me  a  subsidy,  and 
it  is  I  who  have  furnished  her  with  one.  Now 
Messieurs  Desprez,  Vanlerberghe,  and  Ouv- 
rard, must  give  up  to  me  all  they  possess; 
Spain  must  pay  me  what  she  owes  them,  or  I 
will  shut  up  those  gentlemen  in  Vincennes 
and  send  an  army  to  Madrid." 

Napoleon  appeared  cold  and  stern  towards 
M.  de  Marbois. — "I  esteem  your  character," 
said  he,  "  but  you  have  been  the  dupe  of  men 
against  whom  I  warned  you  to  be  upon  your 
guard.  You  have  given  up  to  them  all  the 
effects  in  the  portfolio,  over  the  employment  of 
which  you  ought  to  have  been  more  watchful. 
I  regret  to  find  myself  obliged  to  withdraw  from 
you  the  administration  of  the  Treasury,  for, 
after  what  has  happened,  I  cannot  leave  it  to 
you  any  longer." — Napoleon  then  ordered  the 
members  of  the  Company,  who  had  been  sum- 
moned to  the  Tuileries,  to  be  introduced.  Mes- 
sieurs Vanlerberghe  and  Desprez,  though  the 
least  reprehensible,  melted  into  tears.  M.  Ouv- 
rard, who  had  compromised  the  Company  by 
hazardous  speculations,  was  perfectly  calm. 


Jan.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


107 


He  endeavoured  to  persuade  Napoleon  that  he 
ought  to  permit  him  to  wind  up  himself  the 
very  complicated  affairs  in  which  he  had  in- 
volved his  partners,  and  that  he  should  bring 
over  from  Mexico,  by  way  of  Holland  and  Eng- 
land, considerable  sums,  and  far  superior  to 
those  which  France  had  advanced.' 

It  is  probable  that  he  would  have  managed 
the  winding  up  of  these  affairs  much  better 
than  any  other  person ;  but  Napoleon  was  too 
incensed,  and  too  impatient  to  get  out  of  the 
hands  of  speculators,  to  trust  to  his  promises. 
He  left  M.  Ouvrard  and  his  partners  the  alter- 
native of  a  criminal  prosecution  or  the  imme- 
diate surrender  of  all  they  possessed,  whether 
stores,  paper  securities,  immovables,  or  pledges 
received  from  Spain.  They  submitted  to  this 
cruel  sacrifice. 

This  was  sure  to  prove  a  ruinous  liquidation 
for  them,  but  they  had  rendered  themselves 
liable  to  it  by  abusing  the  resources  of  the 
Treasury.  The  most  to  be  pitied  of  the  three 
was  M.  Vanlerberghe,  who,  without  intermed- 
dling in  the  speculations  of  his  partners,  had 
confined  himself  to  the  operations  of  a  corn 
trade,  carried  on  actively  and  honestly  through- 
out all  Europe,  for  the  service  of  the  French 
armies.2 

On  dismissing  the  council,  Napoleon  de- 
tained M.  Mollien,  and  without  waiting  either 
for  any  observation  from  him  or  for  his  con- 
sent, he  said,  "You  will  to-day  take  the  oath 
as  minister  of  the  Treasury."  M.  Mollien,  in- 
timidated, though  flattered  by  such  confidence, 
hesitated  to  reply.  "Have  you  any  objection 
to  be  minister  then1?"  added  Napoleon,  and  re- 
quired him  to  take  the  oath  the  same  day. 

It  was  requisite  to  get  out  of  the  embarrass- 
ments of  all  sorts  created  by  the  company  of 
the  United  Merchants.  M.  de  Marbois  had  al- 
ready withdrawn  the  service  of  the  Treasury 
from  the  hands  of  that  Company,  and  had 
committed  it  for  a  few  days  to  M.  Desprez, 
who  had  continued  it  from  that  moment  for 
the  account  of  the  state.  He  had  finally  en- 
trusted it  to  the  receivers-general,  on  moderate 
but  temporary  conditions.  The  course  to  be 
definitively  pursued  on  this  subject  was  not 
yet  decided  :  nothing  was  fixed  but  the  resolu- 
tion not  to  charge  speculators,  how  able  or 
how  upright  soever  they  might  be,  with  a  ser- 
vice so  extensive  and  so  important  as  the 
general  negotiation  of  the  assets  of  the  Trea- 
sury. 

This  service  consisted,  as  we  have  seen,  in 
discounting  the  obligations  of  the  receivers-general,  ' 
the  bills  of  the  customs  and  coupes  de  bois,  papers  J 
which  had   all  twelve,  fifteen,   and   eighteen 
months   to   run.     Till   the   institution  of  the 
company   of  the    United   Merchants,   the   only 


practice  was  to  make  partial  and  specific  dis- 
counts of  those  papers,  to  the  amount  of  twen- 
ty or  thirty  millions  at  a  time.    In  exchange 
for  the  effects  themselves,  the  funds  proceed- 
J  ing  from  the  discount  were  immediately  re- 
!  ceived.    It  was  gradually,  under  the  growing 
I  empire  of  necessity,  which  soon  supersedes 
confidence,  that  this  service  had  successively 
been  wholly  relinquished  to  a  single  company, 
that  the  portfolio  of  the  Treasury  had  been  left 
in  some  measure  at  its  discretion,  and  that,  so 
great  was  the  infatuation,  the  chests  of  ac- 
countable persons  were  placed  at  its  disposal. 
\  Had  the  minister  merely  transferred  to  it  spe- 
cific sums  in  paper  for  equivalent  sums  in 
cash,  allowing  it  to  receive  the  amount  of  the 
discounted  effects  only  when  they  became  due, 
i  no  confusion  would  have  taken  place  between 
|  its  affairs  and  those  of  the  state.     But  there 
had  been  given  up  to  the  United  Merchants  so 
'  much  as  470  millions  at  once,  in  obligations  of 
i  the  receivers-general,  bills  at  sight,  bills  of  the  cus- 
I  toms,  which  they  had  got  discounted  either  by 
the  bank  or  by  French  and  foreign  bankers. 
At  the  same  time,  for  greater  convenience, 
they  had  been  authorized  to  take  directly  from 
the   chests   of  the    receivers-general   all   the 
funds  paid  into   them,  to   be  afterwards  ac- 
counted  for;   so  that  the  bank,  as  we  have 
|  seen,  when  it  presented  the  effects   which  it 
had  discounted  and  which  were  due,  had  found 
in  the  chests  nothing  but  receipts  of  M.  Des- 
prez's,  attesting  that  he  had  already  been  paid 
them.     But  these   strange   facilities  had  not 
j  stopped  there.     When  M.  Desprez,  acting  for 
the  United  Merchants,  discounted  the  effects  of 
the  Treasury,  he  furnished  the  amount  not  in 
cash,  but  in  paper,  which  he  had  been  allowed 
to  introduce,  and  which  was  called  M.  Desprez's 
bills.    Thus  the  Company  had  been  enabled  to 
fill  the  chests  of  the  state  and  of  the  bank  with 
these  bills,  and  to  create  a  circulating  paper 
by  the  aid  of  which  it  had  for  some  time  met 
its  speculations  as  well  with  France  as  with 
Spain. 

The  real  fault  of  M.  de  Marbois  had  been  to 
lend  himself  to  this  confusion  of  affairs,  in 
consequence  of  which  it  was  no  longer  possi- 
ble to  distinguish  the  property  of  the  state 
from  that  of  the  Company.  Add  to  this 
abusive  complaisance,  the  dishonesty  of  a 
clerk,  who  alone  was  in  the  secret  respecting 
the  portfolio,  and  who  had  deceived  M.  de 
Marbois,  by  exaggerating  continually  to  him 
the  need  that  he  had  of  the  United  Merchants ; 
and  we  shall  have  an  explanation  of  this  in- 
credible financial  adventure.  For  this,  that 
clerk  had  received  one  million,  which  Napo- 
leon ordered  to  be  thrown  into  the  general 
mass  of  the  assets  of  the  Company.  The  ter- 


1  In  justice  to  the  memory  of  my  deceased  friend,  M. 
Gabriel  Julien  Ouvrard,  I  feel  called  upon  to  state  that, 
in  his  memoirs,  published  in  1826,  he  gives  a  very  dif- 
ferent version  of  these  transactions  and  of  his  interview 
with  Napoleon  on  the  above  occasion.  M.  Ouvrard 
expired  in  London  on  the  21st  of  October,  1846,  aged 
seventy-six  years.  The  manuscript  memoirs  which  he 
has  left,  and  which  form  the  sequel  of  his  published 
autobiography,  are  replete  with  interesting  matter,  and 
contain  some  startling  disclosures  respecting  the  French 
Revolution  of  1830,  and  the  intrigues  which  preceded, 
attended,  and  followed  it.  It  is  likely  that  the  English 


public  will  soon  be    enabled  to    peruse  in   print  these 
piquant  revelations. — D.  F.  C. 

2  I  borrow  this  account  from  the  most  authentic  sources ; 
in  the  first  place,  from  the  memoirs  of  Prince  Cambac6r6s ; 
next  from  the  interesting  and  instructive  memoirs  of  M 
le  Comte  Mollien,  which  are  not  yet  published  ;  and  last 
ly,  from  the  Archives  of  the  Treasury.  I  have  had  in  my 
hands,  and  read  myself  with  great  attention,  the  docu- 
ments of  the  proceedings  (procis),  and  especially  a  long 
and  interesting  report  which  the  minister  of  thn  Treasury 
drew  up  for  the  Emperor.  Here,  then,  I  advance  nothing 
but  from  official  and  incontestable  evidence. 


108 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


ror  excited  by  the  Emperor  was  so  great,  that 
the  parties  readily  confessed  and  restored 
every  thing.. 

However,  in  order  to  be  just  towards  every 
one,  we  must  say,  that  Napoleon  had  himself 
a  share  in  the  faults  committed  on  this  occa- 
sion, by  persisting  in  leaving  M.  de  Marbois 
under  the  pressure  of  enormous  charges,  by 
deferring  too  long  the  creation  of  extraordinary 
means.  It  would  have  been  requisite,  in  fact, 
that  M.  de  Marbois  should  provide  for  a  first 
arrear,  resulting  from  anterior  budgets  and  the 
insolvency  of  Spain,  who,  not  paying  her  sub- 
sidy, was  the  cause  of  a  fresh  deficit  of  about 
50  millions.  It  was  under  the  weight  of  these 
different  burdens,  that  this  upright  but  too  in- 
considerate minister  had  become  the  slave  of 
adventurous  men,  who  rendered  him  some  ser- 
vices, who  might  have  even  rendered  him  very 
great  ones,  if  their  calculations  had  been  made 
with  greater  precision.  Their  speculations 
were,  in  fact,  based  on  a  real  foundation, 
namely,  the  piastres  of  Mexico,  which  abso- 
lutely existed  in  the  chests  of  the  captains- 
general  of  Spain.  But  these  piastres  could 
not  be  so  easily  brought  to  Europe  as  M.  Ouv- 
rard  had  hoped,  and  this  had  led  to  the  embar- 
rassments of  the  Treasury  and  the  ruin  of  the 
Company. 

What  proves  the  height  of  the  confusion  to 
which  things  had  arrived,  was  the  difficulty 
that  was  found  to  fix  the  amount  of  the  debit  of 
the  Company  to  the  Treasury.  It  was  at  first 
supposed  to  be  73  millions.  A  new  examina- 
tion raised  it  to  84.  Lastly,  M.  Mollien,  re- 
solving on  his  entry  into  office,  to  make  a  strict 
investigation  into  the  state  of  the  finances,  dis- 
covered that  the  Company  had  contrived  to 
possess  itself  of  the  sum  of  141  millions,  for 
which  it  remained  debtor  lo  the  state. 

This  enormous  sum  of  141  millions  was 
made  up  in  the  following  manner.  The  United 
Merchants  had  drawn  directly  from  the  chests 
of  the  receivers-general  so  much  as  55  millions 
at  once ;  and,  by  means  of  various  repay- 
ments, their  debt  to  the  accountable  persons 
was  reduced  on  the  day  of  ihe  catastrophe  to 
23  millions.  There  were  in  the  chest,  to  the 
amount  of  73  millions,  bills  of  M.  Detprez's,  a 
species  of  money  which  M.  Desprez  gave 
instead  of  cash,  and  which  was  current  so 
long  as  his  credit,  upheld  by  the  bank,  re- 
mained intact,  but  which  had  now  become 
worthless  paper.  The  Company  owed  14 
millions  more  for  bills  of  the  central  cashier. 
(We  have  adverted  elsewhere  to  these  effects, 
devised  for  the  purpose  of  facilitating  the 
movements  of  funds  between  Paris  and  the 
provinces.)  These  14  millions,  taken  from 
the  portfolio,  had  not  been  followed  by  any 
payment  either  of  M.  Desprez's  bills  or  any 
other  assets.  M.  Desprez,  for  his  personal 
management  during  the  few  days  of  his  par- 
ticular service,  remained  debtor  of  17  mil- 
lions. Lastly,  among  the  commercial  effects 
with  which  the  Company  had  furnished  the 
Treasury,  for  various  payments  made  at  a 
distance,  there  was  bad  paper  to  the  amount 
of  13  or  14  millions.  These  five  different 
sums,  of  23  millions,  taken  directly  from  the 
accountable  persons,  73  millions  in  Desprez's 


[Jan.  i&06. 


bills,  now  worth  nothing,  14  millions  in  fcifl* 
of  the  central  cashier,  for  which  no  equivalent 
had  been  furnished,  17  millions  of  M.  Des 
prez's  personal  debit,  lastly,  14  millions  in  pro 
tested  bills  of  exchange,  composed  the  141 
millions  of  the  total  debit  of  the  Company. 

The  state,  however,  was  not  doomed  to  lose 
this  important  sum,  because  the  operations  of 
the  Company,  as  we  have  just  said,  had  a  real 
foundation,  the  commerce  in  piastres,  which 
had  lacked  nothing  but  precision  in  the  cal- 
culations. It  had  furnished  supplies  to  the 
French  land  and  naval  forces  to  the  amount 
of  40  millions.  The  house  of  Hope  had 
bought  about  10  millions'  worth  of  those 
famous  piastres  of  Mexico,  and  was  at  this 
moment  transmitting  the  amount  to  Paris. 
The  Company  possessed,  besides  immovable 
property,  Spanish  wool,  corn,  some  good  cre- 
dits, the  whole  amounting  to  about  30  mil 
lions.  These  various  sums  comprehended 
real  effects  to  the  worth  of  80  millions.  Thus 
60  millions  yet  remained  to  be  found  in  order 
to  balance  the  debt.  The  equivalent  of  this 
sum  really  existed  in  the  portfolio  of  the  Com- 
pany in  credits  upon  Spain. 

Napoleon,  after  obliging  the  United  Mer- 
chants to  give  up  to  him  all  that  they  possess- 
ed, required  that  the  French  Treasury  should 
be  put  into  the  Company's  place  in  regard  to 
Spain.  He  enjoined  M.  Mollien  to  treat  with 
a  particular  agent  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
M.  Isquierdo,  who  had  been  for  some  time  in 
Paris,  and  performed  the  functions  of  ambas 
sador,  much  more  than  Messieurs  d'Azara  and 
Gravina,  who  had  nothing  but  the  title.  The 
court  of  Madrid  had  no  refusal  to  oppose  to 
the  conqueror  of  Austerlitz ;  besides,  it  was 
really  debtor  to  the  Company,  and  conse- 
quently to  France  herself.  Negotiations  were, 
therefore,  commenced  with  her,  to  secure  the 
repayment  of  those  60  millions,  which  repre- 
sented not  only  the  subsidies  left  unpaid,  but 
the  provisions  with  which  her  armies  had 
been  supplied,  and  the  corn  which  had  been 
sent  to  her  people. 

The  Treasury  was  likely,  in  consequence, 
to  be  entirely  reimbursed,  thanks  to  the  40 
millions  in  anterior  supplies,  the  10  millions 
coming  from  Holland,  the  stores  existing  in 
the  warehouses,  the  immovables  seized,  and 
the  securities  which  Spain  was  about  to  give, 
and  part  of  which  the  house  of  Hope  offered 
to  discount  There  remained,  nevertheless,  a 
double  gap  to  fill,  arising  from  the  old  arrear 
of  the  budgets,  which  we  have  estimated  at 
80  or  90  millions,  and  from  resources  which 
the  Company  had  absorbed  for  its  use.  But 
every  thing  had  become  easy  since  the  victo- 
ries of  Napoleon,  and  since  the  peace,  which 
had  been  the  fruit  of  them.  The  capitalists, 
who  had  ruined  the  Company,  by  requiring 
1£  per  cent  per  month,  (that  is  to  say,  18  per 
cent,  per  annum)  to  discount  the  effects  of  the 
Treasury,  offered  to  take  them  at  £  per  cent, 
and  soon  began  to  dispute  them  with  each 
other  at  $,  that  is  to  say  at  6  per  cent  per  an- 
num. The  bank,  which  had  withdrawn  part 
of  its  notes  from  circulation,  since  it  had  done 
with  M.  Desprez,  which,  besides,  saw  the  me- 
tals ordered  to  be  purchased  all  over  Europe 


Jan.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


109 


daring  the  great  distress  pouring  into  its  cof- 
fers— the  bank  was  enabled  to  discount  all  that 
was  desired  at  a  moderate,  yet  sufficiently  ad- 
Viirtageous  rate.  Though  a  certain  amount 
of  ihe  effects  of  the  Treasury,  belonging  to 
1606,  had  been  previously  alienated  for  the 
use  of  the  Company,  the  greater  part  of  the 
effects  corresponding  to  that  service  remained 
intact,  and  were  about  to  be  discounted  on  the 
best  conditions.  But  victory  had  not  only 
procured  credit  for  Napoleon;  it  had  also  pro- 
cured for  him  material  wealth.  He  had  im- 
posed upon  Austria  a  contribution  of  40  mil- 
lions ;  adding  to  this  sum  30  millions,  which 
he  had  taken  directly  from  the  chests  of  that 
power,  the  sum  which  the  war  had  brought 
him  in,  may  be  computed  at  70  millions. 
Twenty  millions  had  been  expended  on  Ihe 
spot,  for  the  subsistence  of  the  army,  but  at 
the  charge  of  the  Treasury,  with  which  Na- 
poleon purposed  to  make  a  regulation,  the 
spirit  and  disposition  of  which  we  shall  pre- 
sently explain.  There  remained,  then,  50 
millions,  which  were  coming,  partly  in  gold 
and  silver,  in  the  artillery  wagons,  partly  in 
good  bills  of  exchange  on  Frankfort,  Leipzig, 
Hamburg,  and  Bremen.  As  the  garrison  of 
Hameln  was  to  return  to  France,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  cession  of  Hanover  to  Prussia, 
it  was  ordered  to  bring,  along  with  the  Eng- 
lish mri'eriel  taken  in  Hanover,  the  produce  of 
the  bills  of  exchange  due  at  Hamburg  and 
Bremen.  An  imposition  of  4  millions  had 
been  laid  on  the  city  of  Frankfort,  instead  of 
the  contingent  which  it  should  have  furnished, 
like  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  and  Bavaria.  France 
was,  therefore,  about  to  receive,  besides  con- 
siderable effects,  large  quantities  of  the  pre- 
cious metals,  and,  in  regard  to  specie  as  to 
every  thing  else,  abundance  was  about  to  suc- 
ceed the  momentary  distress,  which  the  sin- 
cere alarms  of  commerce  and  the  affected 
alarms  of  jobbers  had  produced. 

Napoleon,  whose  organizing  genius  would 
neveY  leave  to  things  the  character  of  accident, 
and  tended  incessant'y  to  convert  them  into 
durable  institutions,  had  projected  a  noble  and 
beneficent  creation,  founded  on  the  most  legi- 
timate profits  of  his  victories.  He  had  re- 
solved to  create  with  the  war  contributions  a 
fund  for  the  army,  which  he  would  not  touch 
from  any  motive  whatever,  not  even  for  his 
own  use:  for  his  civil  list,  administered  with 
perfect  order,  was  adequate  to  all  the  expenses 
of  a  magnificent  court,  and  even  to  the  for- 
mation of  a  particular  fund.  It  was  from  this 
army  fund  that  he  proposed  to  take  pensions 
for  his  generals,  for  his  officers,  for  his  sol- 
diers, and  for  their  widows  and  children.  He 
desired  not  to  enjoy  his  victories  alone;  he 
purposed  that  all  those  who  served  France 
and  her  vast  designs  should  acquire  not  glory 
only,  but  prosperity  ;  that  those  who,  by  dint 
of  heroism,  had  got  so  far  as  to  have  no  con- 
cern for  themselves  on  the  field  of  battle, 
should  have  none  on  account  of  their  families. 
Finding,  in  the  inexhaustible  fertility  of  his 
mind,  The  art  of  multiplying  the  utility  of 
things,  Napoleon  had  invented  a  combination, 
which  rendered  that  fund  quite  as  profitable 
to  the  finances  as  to  the  army  itself.  What 


had  hitherto  been  wanting  was  a  lender,  to 
lend  to  the  government  on  good  conditions. 
The  army  fund  would  be  that  lender,  whose 
demands  upon  the  state  Napoleon  would  him- 
self regulate.  The  army  was  to  have  50  mil- 
lions in  gold  and  silver,  besides  20  millions 
which  the  budget  owed  it  for  arrears  of  pay 
and,  lastly,  besides  a  large  amount  in  materiel 
of  war  conquered  by  it.  The  artillery  wagons 
were  bringing  from  Vienna  100,000  muskets, 
2000  pieces  of  cannon.  The  whole  of  the 
materiel  of  war  and  contributions  formed  a 
sum  of  about  80  millions,  of  which  the  army 
was  the  proprietor,  and  which  it  could  lend  to 
the  state.  Napoleon  purposed  that  all  that 
was  disposable  should  be  paid  over  to  the 
Sinking  Fund,  which  should  open  a  separate 
account,  and  employ  this  sum  either  in  dis- 
counting obligations  of  receivers-general,  bills  at 
sight,  bills  of  customs,  when  the  capitalists  should 
require  more  than  6  per  cent.,  or  in  buying  up 
national  domains  when  they  were  at  a  low 
price,  or  even  in  taking  rentes,  if  it  thought 
fit  to  make  a  loan  to  fill  up  the  arrear. 

This  combination,  therefore,  was  to  have 
the  double  utility  of  procuring  for  the  army  an 
advantageous  interest  for  its  money,  and  for 
the  government  all  the  sums  that  it  should 
have  need  of,  at  a  rate  which  would  not  be 
usurious. 

Napoleon  immediately  gave  orders  for  the 
execution  of  various  important  measures  by 
means  of  the  funds  which  he  had  at  his  dis- 
posal. One  consisted  in  collecting  a  dozen 
millions  in  cash  at  Strasburg,  in  case  of  the 
renewal  of  military  operations;  for,  if  Austria 
had  signed  the  peace,  Russia  had  not  begun 
to  negotiate,  Prussia  had  not  yet  sent  the  ratifi- 
cation of  the  treaty  of  Schonbrunn,  and  Eng- 
land continued  to  be  actively  engaged  in  her 
diplomatic  intrigues.  He  enjoined,  moreover, 
that  some  millions  should  be  kept  in  reserve 
at  the  Sinking  Fund,  and  that  the  number  of 
these  millions  should  remain  unknown,  to  be 
employed  on  a  sudden,  whenever  speculators 
were  disposed  to  be  extortionate.  The  thought 
that  the  Treasury  ought  to  take  upon  itself 
this  sort  of  expense,  as  a  man  submits  to  that 
of  a  spare  granary,  in  order  to  be  provided 
against  the  seasons  of  dearth,  and  that  the  in- 
terest lost  by  this  kind  of  hoard  would  be  a 
useful  sacrifice,  and  one  by  no  means  to  be 
regretted.  Lastly,  the  foreign  moneys  which 
were  brought  back  requiring  to  be  recoined 
and  converted  into  French  money,  he  ordered 
them  to  be  divided  among  the  different  mints, 
in  proportion  to  the  want  of  specie  in  each 
locality. 

These  first  dispositions  commanded  by  the 
moment  being  carried  into  effect,  Napoleon 
desired  that  attention  should  be  paid  without 
delay  to  a  new  organization  of  the  Treasury, 
to  a  new  constitution  of  the  Bank  of  France, 
and  gave  this  twofold  commission  to  M.  Mol- 
lien,  who  had  become  minister  of  the  Trea- 
sury. M.  Gaudin,  who  still  retained  the  port- 
folio of  the  finances,  for  we  must  bear  it  in 
mind  that,  at  this  period,  the  Treasury  and  the 
Finances  formed  two  distinct  ministries — M. 
Gaudin  received  orders  to  present  a  plan  for 
liquidating  the  arrear,  for  definitively  equaliz- 
K 


110 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Jan.  1806. 


ing  the  receipts  and  the  expenditure,  in  the 
double  hypothesis  of  peace  and  war,  even 
though  for  this  purpose  it  should  be  necessary 
to  recur  to  the  imposition  of  new  taxes. 

After  attending  to  the  finances,  Napoleon 
busied  himself  about  bringing  the  army  back 
to  France,  but  slowly,  so  that  it  should  not 
march  further  than  four  leagues  a  day.  He  had 
ordered  that  the  wounded  and  the  sick  should 
be  kept  till  spring  in  the  places  where  they  had 
received  the  first  attendance,  and  that  officers 
should  stay  with  them  to  superintend  their  cure ; 
and  for  this  essential  object  he  had  recourse 
to  the  chests  of  the  army.  He  had  left  Ber- 
thier  at  Munich  with  instructions  to  attend  to 
all  these  details,  and  to  preside  over  the  ex- 
changes of  territory,  always  so  difficult  among 
the  German  princes.  On  this  latter  point 
Berthier  was  to  concert  with  M.  Otto,  our 
representative  at  the  court  of  Bavaria. 

Napoleon  then  thought  of  taking  measures 
against  the  kingdom  of  Naples.  Massena, 
taking  with  him  40,000  men  drawn  from  Lom- 
bardy,  received  orders  to  march  through  Tus- 
cany and  the  southernmost  part  of  the  Roman 
State  to  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  without  list- 
ening to  any  proposal  of  peace  or  armistice. 
Napoleon,  uncertain  whether  Joseph,  who  had 
refused  the  vice-royalty  of  Italy,  would  accept 
the  crown  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  gave  him  only 
the  title  of  his  lieutenant-general.  Joseph 
was  not  to  command  the  army ;  it  was  Mas- 
sena alone  who  had  that  commission;  for  Na- 
poleon, though  he  sacrificed  the  interests  of 
policy  to  family  considerations,  did  not  so 
easily  sacrifice  to  them  the  interests  of  mili- 
tary operations.  But  Joseph,  once  introduced 
into  Naples  by  Massena,  was  to  seize  the  civil 
government  of  the  country  and  to  exercise 
there  all  the  powers  of  royalty. 

General  Molitor  was  at  the  same  time  de- 
spatched towards  Dalmatia.  On  his  rear  he 
had  General  Marmont  to  support  him.  The 
latter  was  commissioned  to  receive  Venice 
and  the  Venetian  state  from  the  hands  of  the 
Austrians.  Prince  Eugene  had  orders  to  go 
to  Venice,  and  to  take  upon  himself  the  admin- 
istration of  the  conquered  provinces,  without 
yet  annexing  them  to  the  kingdom  of  Italy, 
though  they  were  subsequently  to  be  united 
with  it.  Before  he  decided  upon  this  defini- 
tively, Napoleon  wished  to  conclude  various 
arrangements  with  the  representatives  of  the 
kingdom  of  Italy,  which  would  have  run 
counter  to  an  immediate  union. 

Lastly,  Napoleon,  wishing  to  excite  the 
spirit  of  his  soldiers,  and  to  communicate  that 
excitement  to  all  France,  ordered  that  the 
grand  army  should  be  assembled  at  Paris,  to 
receive  there  a  magnificent  fete,  which  was  to 
be  given  by  the  authorities  of  the  capital.  It 
was  impossible  to  convey  a  better  conception 
of  the  nation  treating  the  army  than  by  charg- 
ing the  citizens  of  Paris  to  treat  the  soldiers 
of  Austerlitz. 

While  he  was  thus  engaged  in  the  adminis- 
tration of  his  vast  empire,  and  attending  to  the 
concerns  of  peace,  after  having  been  engaged 
in  those  of  war,  Napoleon  had  also  his  eyes 
fixed  on  the  consequences  of  the  treaties  of 
Presburg  and  Schonbrunn.  Pruspia,  in  par- 


ticular, had  to  ratify  a  treaty  most  unforeseen 
by  her,  since  M.  de  Haugwitz,  who  came  to 
Vienna  to  dictate  conditions,  had  submitted  on 
the  contrary  to  receive  them,  and,  instead  of 
any  constraint  imposed  upon  Napoleon,  had 
brought  back  a  treaty  of  alliance  offensive  and 
defensive  with  him;  all  this  compensated,  it  is 
true,  by  a  rich  present,  that  of  Hanover. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  form  a  conception  of 
the  astonishment  of  Europe,  and  of  the  differ- 
ent sentiments,  satisfaction  and  chagrin,  grati- 
fied avidity  and  confusion,  which  prevailed  in 
Prussia  when  made  acquainted  with  the  treaty 
of  Schonbrunn.  Hints  had  frequently  been 
thrown  out  to  the  public  in  Berlin,  that  ai  one 
time  France,  at  another  Russia,  was  offering 
to  the  king  the  electorate  of  Hanover,  which, 
besides  having  the  advantage  of  rounding  the 
so  irregularly  defined  territory  of  Prussia,  had 
the  advantage  of  securing  to  her  the  control 
of  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser,  as  well  as  a  deci- 
sive influence  over  the  Hanseatic  cities  of 
Bremen  and  Hamburg.  This  offer,  so  fre- 
quently announced,  was  now  a  realized  acqui- 
sition, a  certainty.  It  was  a  subject  of  great 
satisfaction  for  a  country  which  is  one  of  the 
most  ambitious  in  Europe.  But,  to  counter- 
balance this  gift,  what  confusion — we  must 
not  mince  the  matter — what  disgrace,  would 
attend  the  conduct  of  the  court  of  Prussia! 
While  yielding  against  its  will  to  the  solicita- 
tions of  the  coalition,  it  had  engaged  to  unite 
itself  with  it,  if  in  a  month  Napoleon  had  not 
accepted  the  mediation  of  Prussia,  and  sub- 
mitted to  the  conditions  which  she  pretended 
to  impose  upon  him,  and  this  was  equivalent 
to  an  engagement  to  declare  war  against  him. 
And,  all  at  once,  finding  Napoleon  in  Moravia, 
not  embarrassed  but  all-powerful,  she  had 
turned  to  him,  accepted  his  alliance,  and  re- 
ceived from  his  hands  the  fairest  of  the  spoils 
of  the  coalition — Hanover,  the  ancient  patri- 
mony of  the  Kings  of  England. 

We  must  confess  that  honour  is  banished 
from  the  world,  if  such  things  are  not  punished 
with  a  signal  reprobation.  Accordingly,  the 
Prussian  nation,  we  must  do  it  this  justice, 
felt  how  severely  such  conduct  was  to  be  con- 
demned, and,  notwithstanding  the  value  of  the 
present  brought  by  M.  Haugwitz,  received  it 
with  chagrin  in  its  heart  and  humiliation  on 
its  brow.  The  disgrace,  however,  would  have 
been  effaced  from  the  memory  of  the  Prus- 
sians, and  would  have  left  place  only  for  plea- 
sure at  the  conquest,  if  other  sentiments  had 
not  come  and  mingled  with  that  of  remorse,  to 
poison  the  satisfaction  which  they  ought  to 
have  felt.  Though  profoundly  jealous  of  the 
Austrians,  still  the  Prussians,  seeing  them 
beaten,  felt  themselves  Germans;  and,  as  Ger- 
mans are  not  less  jealous  of  the  French  than 
the  Russians,  or  the  English,  they  beheld  our 
extraordinary  triumphs  with  mortification. 
Their  patriotism,  therefore,  began  to  awake  in 
favour  of  the  Austrians,  and  this  sentiment, 
united  with  that  of  remorse,  filled  the  nation 
with  intense  discomfort.  Of  all  the  classes, 
the  army  was  the  one  which  manifested  these 
dispositions  the  most  openly.  In  Prussia,  the 
army  is  not  impassible  as  .in  Austria;  it  re- 
flects the  national  passions  with  extreme  vivid 


Jan.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


Ill 


ness ;  it  represents  the  nation  much  more  than 
the  army  represents  it  in  the  other  countries 
of  Europe,  France  excepted;  and  it  then  re- 
presented a  nation  whose  opinion  was  already 
very  independent  of  its  sovereigns.  The  Prus- 
sian army,  which  felt  to  a  high  degree  the  sen- 
timent of  German  jealousy,  which  had  hoped 
for  a  moment  that  the  career  of  war  would  be 
opened  to  it,  and  which  found  it  suddenly 
closed  by  an  act  difficult  to  be  justified,  cen- 
sured the  cabinet  without  reserve.  The  Ger- 
man aristocracy,  which  saw  the  Germanic 
empire  ruined  by  the  peace  of  Presburg,  and 
the  cause  of  the  immediate  nobility  sacrificed 
to  the  sovereigns  of  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg, 
and  Baden, — the  German  aristocracy,  occupy- 
ing all  the  high  military  ranks,  contributed 
greatly  to  excite  discontent  in  the  army,  and 
carried  back  the  exaggerated  expression  of  this 
discontent  either  to  Berlin  or  to  Potsdam. 
These  passions  burst  forth  more  especially 
about  the  queen,  and  had  converted  her  coterie 
into  a  focus  of  boisterous  opposition.  Prince 
Louis,  who  reigned  in  this  coterie,  launched 
out  more  than  ever  into  chivalrous  declama- 
tions.  All  is  not  done  for  the  alliance  of  two 
countries,  when  their  interests  do  not  agree : 
the  self-love  of  both  ought  also  to  harmonize, 
and  this  last  condition  is  not  very  easily  re- 
alized. The  Prussians  were  then  the  only 
people  in  Europe  whose  policy  could  agree 
with  ours,  but  great  indulgence  would  have 
been  needed  for  the  excessive  pride  of  these 
heirs  of  the  great  Frederick,  and,  unluckily, ' 
the  weak,  ambiguous,  sometimes  dishonoura- 
ble conduct  of  their  cabinet  did  not  command 
that  respect  which  their  susceptibility  required. 

Napoleon,  after  six  years'  fruitless  relations  ; 
with  Prussia,  had  accustomed  himself  to  have 
no  consideration  for  her.  He  had  recently 
proved  it  by  passing  through  one  of  her  pro- 
vinces (authorized,  it  is  true,  by  precedents) 
without  even  giving  her  notice.  He  had  just 
proved  it  still  more  strongly,  in  appearing  so 
little  hurt  by  her  wrongs,  that,  after  the  con- 
vention of  Potsdam,  when  he  would  have  had 
a  right  to  be  incensed,  he  gave  her  Hanover, 
thus  treating  her  as  fit  only  to  be  bought.  She 
was,  and  ought  to  have  been,  deeply  wounded 
by  this  proceeding. 

The  human  conscience  feels  all  the  re- 
proaches that  it  has  deserved,  especially  when  , 
it  is  spared  them.  All  the  severe  things  to  i 
which  she  had  exposed  herself  on  the  part  of 
Napoleon,  Prussia  imagined  that  he  had  ex- 
pressed. It  was  asserted  in  Berlin  that  he  had  ; 
said  to  the  Austrian  negotiators,  when  they  ! 
propped  themselves  upon  the  support  of 
Prussia — "Prussia!  why  she  is  to  be  had  by 
the  best  bidder  ;  I  will  give  her  more  than  you, 
and  bring  her  over  to  my  side."  He  had 
thought  so,  perhaps  said  so,  to  M.  de  Talley- 
rand, but  he  affirmed  that  he  had  not  said  so  to 
the  Austrians.  Be  this  as  it  may,  this  expres- 
sion was  repeated  everywhere  in  Berlin  as  true. 
The  fault  of  Prussia  in  all  this  was  not  to  have 
deserved  the  respect  which  she  desired  to  ob- 
tain ;  that  of  Napoleon,  not  to  grant  it  her 
without  her  having  deserved  it.  One  has  not 
allies  any  more  than  friends,  unless  upon  con- 
dition of  sparing  their  pride  as  much  as  their 


I  interest,  upon  condition  of  perceiving  their 
faults,  nay  of  feeling  them  deeply,  and  not 
committing  the  like  against  them. 

M.  de  Haugwitz,  though  he  came  with  full 
hands,  was  therefore  received  with  very  dif- 
ferent feelings,  with  anger  by  the  court,  with 
pain  by  the  king,  with  a  mixture  of  content 
and  confusion  by  the  public,  and  by  nobody 
with  complete  satisfaction.  As  for  M.  de  Haug- 
witz himself,  he  made  his  appearance  without 
embarrassment  before  all  these  judges.  He 
brought  back  from  Schonbrunn  what  he  had 
invariably  advised,  the  aggrandizement  of 
Prussia  founded  on  the  alliance  of  France. 
His  only  fault  lay  in  having  given  way  for  a 
moment  to  the  empire  of  circumstances,  which 
subjected  him  to  the  grievous  contrast  of  be- 
ing now  the  signer  of  the  treaty  of  Schonbrunn. 
But  it  was  his  unskilful  successor,  his  ungrate- 
ful disciple,  M.de  Hardenberg,  who  had  brought 
about  these  circumstances  by  so  complicating 
the  relations  of  Prussia,  in  the  space  of  a  few 
months,  that  she  could  \iot  extricate  herself 
from  these  complications  but  by  clashing  con- 
tradictions. Besides,  M.  de  Haugwitz,  if  he 
had  been  hurried  away  for  a  moment,  had  been 
less  so  than  anybody ;  and,  after  all,  he  had 
just  saved  Prussia  from  the  abyss  into  which 
she  had  been  wellnigh  plunged.  Neither  must 
it  be  forgotten  that  at  Potsdam,  seduced  as  the 
court  was  by  the  presence  of  Alexander,  it  had 
been  strongly  recommended  to  M.  de  Haug- 
witz not  to  hurry  Prussia  into  a  war  before 
the  end  of  December,  and  that,  on  the  2d  of 
December,  he  had  found  him  whom  he  came 
to  control  or  to  fight,  victorious,  irresistible. 
He  had  been  placed  between  the  danger  of  a 
fatal  war  and  a  contradiction  amply  paid  for: 
what  would  they  have  him  do? — For  the  rest, 
he  said,  nothing  was  compromised.  Ground- 
ing himself  on  the  extraordinary  nature  and 
the  unforeseen  circumstances  of  the  situation, 
he  had  entered  with  Napoleon  into  such  en- 
gagements only  as  were  conditional,  subject 
more  expressly  than  usual  to  the  ratification 
of  his  court.  People  might,  if  they  were  so 
bold  as  they  boasted  of  being,  as  alive  to  ho- 
nour, as  insensible  to  interest,  as  they  pretended 
to  be, — they  might  refuse  to  ratify  the  treaty 
of  Schonbrunn.  He  had-  forewarned  Napo- 
leon; he  had  told  him  that,  treating  without 
having  instructions,  he  treated  without  binding 
himself.  They  might  choose  between  Hanover 
and  war  with  Napoleon.  The  position  was 
still  the  same  as  it  had  been  at  Schonbrunn, 
save  that  he  had  gained  the  month,  which  had 
been  declared  necessary  for  the  organization 
of  the  Prussian  army. 

Such  was  the  language  of  M.  de  Haugwitz, 
exaggerated  on  a  single  point,  namely  where 
he  alleged  that  he  had  been  placed  between  the 
acceptance  of  Hanover  and  war.  He  would, 
in  fact,  have  been  able  to  reconcile  Prussia 
with  Napoleon  without  accepting  Hanover.  It 
is  true  that  Napoleon  would  have  distrusted 
this  demi-reconciliation,  and  that  from  defiance 
to  war  it  was  but  a  step.  The  enemies  of  M. 
de  Haugwitz  censured  him  on  another  point. 
In  keeping  himself  at  Vienna,  they  said,  less 
aloof  from  the  Austrian  negotiators,  in  making 
common  cause  with  them,  he  would  have  been 


112 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


[Jan.  1806. 


better  able  to  withstand  Napoleon,  and  to  de- 
sert less  ostensibly  the  European  interests 
espoused  at  Potsdam,  or  not  to  desert  them 
but  with  the  consent  of  all.  But  that  presup- 
posed a  collective  negotiation,  and  to  this  Na- 
poleon objected  so  strongly  that  to  have  insisted 
upon  this  point  would  have  been  another  way 
to  lead  to  war.  It  was  therefore  war,  and  no- 
thing but  war,  wiih  a  terrible  adversary,  before 
the  fixed  term  of  the  end  of  December,  against 
the  well-known  wish  of  the  king,  and  against 
the  most  positive  interests  of  Prussia,  that,  as 
M.  de  Haugwitz  alleged,  had  stared  him  in  the 
face  at  Schonbrunn. 

The  embarrassment  of  this  position,  then, 
was  much  greater  for  others  than  for  himself; 
and,  besides,  he  had  an  imperturbable  firmness, 
mixed  with  tranquillity  and  urbanity,  which 
would  have  sufficed  to  support  him  in  presence 
of  his  adversaries,  had  he  even  committed  the 
blunders  which  he  had  not. 

Thus  M.  de  Haugwitz,  without  being  discon- 
ceVted  by  the  cries  that  rang  around  him,  with- 
out even  insisting  on  the  adoption  of  the  treaty, 
as  a  negotiator  attached  to  the  work  of  which 
he  was  the  author  might  have  done,  never 
ceased  repeating  that  the  cabinet  was  free, 
that  it  could  choose,  but  with  a  perfect  know- 
ledge that  it  must  choose  between  Hanover 
and  war.  He  left  to  others  the  embarrassment 
of  the  contradictions  of  Prussian  policy,  and 
reserved  for  himself  nothing  but  the  honour 
of. having  brought  back  his  country  into  the 
track,  from  which  it  ought  never  to  have  been 
made  to  swerve.  Happy  this  minister  had  he 
continued  in  that  line,  and  not  subsequently 
marred  that  situation  himself,  by  inconsisten- 
cies, which  ruined  him,  and  wellnigh  ruined 
his  country. 

The  enthusiasts,  whether  sincere  or  affected, 
of  Berlin,  said  that  this  gift  of  Hanover  was 
a  perfidious  gift,  which  would  involve  Prussia 
in  an  everlasting  war  with  England,  and  ruin 
the  national  commerce ;  that  it  was  purchased, 
besides,  by  the  sacrifice  of  fine  provinces  long 
attached  to  the  monarchy,  such  as  Cleves, 
Anspach,  and  Neufchatel.  They  asserted  that 
Prussia,  which,  in  ceding  Anspach,  Cleves, 
and  Neufchatel,  had  ceded  a  population  of 
'300,000  inhabitants  to  obtain  one  of  900,000, 
had  made  a  bad  bargain.  According  to  them, 
if  she  had  obtained  Hanover  without  giving 
up  any  thing,  without  losing  either  Neufchatel, 
or  Anspach,  or  Cleves,  and  even  acquired 
something  to  boot,  the  Hanseatic  cities,  for 
instance,  then  there  would  be  nothing  to  re- 
gret. The  defection,  thus  paid  for,  would  have 
been  worth  the  while ;  but  Hanover  was  no- 
thing since  they  had  it.  At  any  rate,  they 
added,  Prussia  was  disgraced,  covered  with 
infamy  in  the  eyes  of  Europe.  The  common 
country,  Germany,  was  given  up  to  foreigners. 
These  last  censures  were  more  specious  ;  but 
yet  it  might  have  been  urged  in  reply  that  still 
•vorse  things  had  been  done  in  the  last  parti- 
>ion  of  Poland,  and  almost  as  bad  in  the  re- 
ceut  partition  of  the  Germanic  indemnities. 
And  yet  nobody  had  cried  shame  upon  them ! 

Moderate  persons,  very  numerous  among 
the  wealthy  population  of  Berlin,  without  re- 
peating all  these  declamations,  dreaded  the 


reprisals  of  England  upon  Prussian  com- 
merce, were  pained  for  the  character  of  Prussia, 
felt  real  mortification  at  the  triumph  of  the 
French  armies  over  the  German  armies,  but 
dreaded  above  all  a  war  with  France. 

Such  were  at  bottom  the  sentiments  of  the 
king,  who,  with  the  heart  of  a  sound,  patriotic, 
but  moderate  German,  hesitated  between  these 
contrary  considerations.  He  was  racked  with 
regret  at  the  thought  of  the  fault  which  he  had 
committed  at  Potsdam,  which  reduced  him  to 
the  necessity  of  an  absolutely  disgraceful  in- 
consistency, the  only  objection  that  could  be 
alleged  against  the  fine  present  of  Napoleon. 
And  then,  though  he  was  not  deficient  in  per- 
sonal courage,  he  dreaded  war  as  the  greatest 
of  calamities ;  he  beheld  in  it  the  ruin  of  the 
treasure  of  Frederick,  foolishly  squandered  by 
his  father,  carefully  collected  again  by  himself, 
and  already  broken  into  by  the  late  armament ; 
above  all  he  beheld  in  it,  with  a  sagacity  which 
fear  often  imparts,  the  ruin  of  the  monarchy. 
Frederick  William  besought  Count  Haugwitz 
to  enlighten  him  with  his  intelligence,  and 
Count  Haugwitz  incessantly  repeated  to  him, 
not  knowing  what  else  to  say,  that  they  had 
the  choice  between  Hanover  and  war,  and  that, 
in  his  opinion,  any  war  against  Napoleon 
would  be  attended  with  disaster ;  that  the  Rus- 
sian and  Austrian  armies  were  not  inferior, 
whatever  people  might  say,  to  the  Prussian 
army,  which  would  not  do  better,  perhaps  not 
so  well  as  they,  for  at  this  moment  it  was 
much  less  habituated  to  war. 

A  council  was  held,  to  which  were  sum- 
moned the  principal  personages  of  the   mon- 
archy, Messieurs  de  Haugwitz,  De  Hardenberg, 
De  Schulenburg,  and  the  two  most  illustrious 
representatives  of  the  army,  Marshal  de  Mol- 
lendorf,  and  the  Duke  of  Brunswick.     The 
discussion  was  very  animated,  though  without 
any  mixture  of  court  passions ;  and,  yielding 
to  the  force  of  the  everlasting  argument  of 
Count  Haugwitz,  which  consisted  in  repeating 
j  that  they  could  refuse  Hanover  if  they  chose 
I  to  go  to  war,  the  council  adopted  a  middle 
course,  that  is  to  say  the  very  worst  they  could 
have  done.    They  decided  to  adopt  the  treaty 
with  modifications.     M.  de  Haugwitz  strongly 
opposed  this  resolution.     He  said  that  he  had 
taken  advantage  of  circumstances  at  Schon- 
j  brunn,  and  that  he  had  obtained  of  Napoleon 
what  he  should  not  obtain  a  second  time  ;  that 
the  latter  would  regard  the  modifications  made 
in  the  treaty  as  a  last  success  of  the  party  ini- 
mical to  France ;  that  he  would  at  last  cease 
!  to  reckon  at  all  upon   the  Prussian  alliance, 
j  that  he  would  act  in  conseqence,  and  that,  hold- 
ing himself  to  be  disengaged  by  a  ratification 
!  given  with  reservations,  he  would  place  Prussia 
between  worse  conditions  and  war. 

M.  de  Haugwitz  was  not  listened  to.  It  was 
alleged  that"  the  modifications  introduced, 
whether  good  or  bad,  saved  the  honour  of 
Prussia,  for  they  proved  that  they  did  not 
£  aw  up  treaties  from  the  dictation  of  Napoleon. 
This  reason,  of  so  little  value,  made  an  im- 
pression upon  those  who  had  need  to  deceive 
themselves ;  and,  after  several  alterations  had 
been  made  in  it,  the  treaty  was  adopted. 
The  first  of  these  altercations  plainly  indi- 


Feb.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


11.' 


cated  the  sentiments  of  those  who  had  pro- 
posed them,  and  the  nature  of  their  embarrass- 
ment. The  expression  offensive  and  defensive 
given  to  the  alliance  contracted  with  France 
was  struck  out  of  the  treaty,  in  order  that  the 
Prussian  cabinet  might  appear  before  Russia 
with  less  confusion.  Comments  were  added 
to  explain  in  what  cases  it  would  deem  itself 
obliged  to  make  common  cause  with  France. 
It  demanded  information  concerning  the  late 
arrangements  projected  in  Italy,  and  which 
were  to  be  comprehended  in  the  reciprocal 
guarantees  stipulated  by  the  treaty  of  Schon- 
brunn ;  for  it  made  a  point  of  not  formally 
approving  what  was  about  to  be  consummated 
at  Naples,  that  is  to  say,  the  dethronement  of  the 
Bourbons,  the  clients  and  proteges  of  Russia. 

These  modifications  signified  that  though 
obliged  to  enter  into  the  policy  of  France,  Prus- 
sia would  not  enter  frankly  into  it ;  that,  above 
all,  she  would  not  enter  into  it  so  far  as  not  to  be 
able  to  explain  her  conduct  at  St.  Petersburg 
and  at  Vienna.  The  intention  was  too  visible 
to  be  favourably  interpreted  at  Paris.  To  these 
modifications  were  added  some  others  still  less 
honourable.  These  were  not  written,  it  is 
true,  in  the  new  treaty,  but  M.  de  Haugwitz 
was  commissioned  to  propose  them  verbally. 
The  Prussian  cabinet  desired,  in  gaining 
Hanover,  not  to  cede  Anspach,  which  was  the 
only  concession  of  any  importance  required 
by  Napoleon,  and  which  formed  the  Franco- 
nian  patrimony  of  the  house  of  Brandenburg. 
It  desired  the  annexation  of  the  Hanseatic 
cities,  a  valuable  accession  from  its  commer- 
cial importance,  and,  in  thus  filling  the  mea- 
sure of  the  greediness  of  the  Prussian  nation, 
it  flattered  itself  that  it  should  stifle  the  voice 
of  honour  in  it  and  disarm  the  public  opinion. 

This  done,  M.  de  Laforest,  minister  of  France, 
charged  as  such  with  the  exchange  of  the  rati- 
fications, was  sent  for.  This  minister  knew 
his  sovereign  too  well  to  venture  to  ratify  a 
treaty  in  which  such  alterations  had  been 
made.  He  refused  at  first  to  do  so,  but  the 
solicitations  addressed  to  him  became  so  press- 
ing, and  M.  de  Haugwitz  represented  to  him 
so  forcibly  the  necessity  of  chaining  the  court 
of  Berlin,  to  save  it  from  its  continual  varia- 
tions, and  to  snatch  it  from  the  suggestions  of 
the  enemies  of  France,  that  M.  de  Laforest  con- 
sented to  ratify  the  modified  treaty,  sub  spe  rati,  a 
usual  precaution  in  diplomacy,  when  one  is  de- 
sirous to  reserve  the  pleasure  of  the  sovereign. 

It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  refer  to  Paris, 
to  obtain  the  approval  of  these  new  tergiver- 
sations of  the  court  of  Prussia.  M.  de  Haug- 
witz seemed  to  have  succeeded  with  Napoleon, 
and  he  was  considered  as  the  fittest  person  to 
be  sent  to  France  to  allay  the  storm  that  was 
foreseen.  M.  de  Haugwitz  long  declined  such 
a  mission  ;  but  the  king  assailed  him  with  such 
urgent  entreaties,  that  he  could  not  forbear  to 
make  up  his  mind  to  go  to  Paris,  and  to  con- 
front a  second  time  that  crowned  and  victori- 
ous negotiator,  with  whom  he  had  treated  at 
fechOnbrunn.  He  set  out,  therefore,  sending 
before  him  letters  couched  in  the  mildest  and 
most  obsequious  language,  to  prepare  for  him- 
self a  less  unfavourable  reception  than  that 
which  he  had  reason  to  apprehend. 

Voi..  II.— 15 


Napoleon,  when  apprized  of  these  last  shuf- 
fling tricks  of  Prussian  politics,  saw  in  them 
what  he  could  not  help  seeing,  new  weaknesses 
towards  his  enemies,  new  efforts  to  keep  on 
good  terms  with  them,  while  taking  occasion 
at  the  same  time  to  make  some  advantage  by 
him.  He  felt,  on  account  of  this  policy,  less 
consideration  than  before,  and,  what  was  a 
great  misfortune  for  Prussia  and  for  France,  he 
utterly  despaired  from  this  time  of  a  Prussian 
alliance.  Add,  to  this,  that,  upon  reflection, 
he  was  sorry  for  what  he  had  granted  at  Schon- 
brunn.  The  gift  of  Hanover,  indeed,  had  been 
granted  with  too  great  precipitation,  not  that  it 
could  be  better  placed  than  in  the  hands  of 
Prussia,  but  to  dispose  of  it  definitively  was 
rendering  the  struggle  with  England  more 
rancorous  ;  it  was  adding  to  irreconcilable  in- 
terests at  sea  irreconcilable  interests  on 
land,  for  old  King  George  III.  would  have 
sacrificed  the  richest  colonies  of  England 
rather  than  his  German  patrimony.  Assuredly, 
if  it  was  ascertained  that  England  was  for 
ever  implacable,  and  could  not  be  pacified  but 
by  force,  it  would  then  be  right  to  go  all 
lengths  against  her,  and  Hanover  would  be 
extremely  well  bestowed,  if  it  were  to  cement 
a  powerful  and  sincere  alliance,  capable  of 
rendering  continental  coalitions  impossible. 
But  none  of  these  suppositions  appeared  ac- 
tually true.  There  were  rumours  of  great 
discouragement  in  England,  of  the  speedy 
death  of  Mr.  Pitt,  of  the  probable  accession  of 
Mr.  Fox,  and  an  immediate  change  of  system. 
Napoleon,  therefore,  on  learning  the  last  pro- 
ceedings in  Prussia,  was  disposed  to  replace 
every  thing  on  the  old  footing  with  her ;  that 
is  to  say,  to  restore  Anspach,  Cleves,  and 
Neufchatel,  and  to  take  back  Hanover  from 
her,  to  be  kept  in  reserve.  At  the  point  to 
which  things  had  arrived,  either  through  the 
fault  of  men  or  through  the  fault  of  events,  the 
best  thing  that  could  be  done  was,  in  fact, 
to  revert  to  terms  of  civility  without  intimacy, 
and  to  take  back  what  each  had  given  to  the 
other.  Napoleon,  in  recovering  Hanover, 
would  have  in  his  hands  the  means  of  treat- 
ing with  England,  and  of  seizing  the  only  oc- 
casion that  was  likely  to  present  itself,  foi 
putting  an  end  to  an  inauspicious  war,  the  per- 
manent cause  of  universal  war. 

This  was  his  first  idea,  and  would  to  heaven 
that  he  had  acted  upon  it !  He  gave  instruc- 
tions in  this  spirit  to  M.  de  Talleyrand.  He 
desired  that  he  might  be  represented  to  M.  de 
Haugwitz,  as  more  irritated  than  he  was  at  the 
liberties  taken  with  France ;  that  France 
should  be  declared  to  be  completely  disen- 
gaged, and  that  she  would  keep  herself  free, 
either  to  take  back  Hanover,  to  make  it  a 
pledge  of  peace  with  England,  or  to  place 
every  thing  on  a  new  footing  with  Prussia, 
for  concluding  a  more  comprehensive  and 
more  solid  treaty  with  her.1 


1  We  quote  the  following  letter  which  precisely  ex- 
presses the  idea  of  Napoleon  on  this  occasion. 
"  To  M.  de  Talleyrand. 

"  Paris,  Feb.  4,  1806. 

"The  ministry  in  England  hag  been  entirely  changed 
since  the  death  of  Mr.  Pitt ;  Mr.  Fox  baa  the  portfolio  of 


114 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1806. 


M.  de  Haugwitz  arrived  at  Paris  on  the  1st 
of  February.  He  employed,  both  with  M.  de 
Talleyrand  and  with  the  Emperor,  all  the  art 
with  which  he  was  endowed,  and  that  art  was 
great.  He  laid  great  stress  on  the  embarrass- 
ments of  his  government,  placed  between 
France  and  coalesced  Europe,  inclining  more 
frequently  toward  the  first  than  hurried  away 
sometimes  towards  the  second  by  court  pas- 
sions; which  must  be  comprehended  and  ex- 
cused. He  exhibited  the  Prussian  govern- 
ment, painfully  returning  from  the  fault  com- 
mitted at  Potsdam,  needing  for  this  to  be 
supported,  encouraged,  by  the  courtesy  of  the 
French  government ;  he  so  well  depicted  him- 
self as  the  man  who  was  striving  alone  in 
Berlin  to  bring  back  Prussia  to  France,  and 
having  a  right  on  this  account  to  be  aided  by 
the  kindness  of  Napoleon,  that  the  latter  gave 
way,  and  unfortunately  consented  to  renew 
the  treaty  of  Schonbrunn,  but  on  somewhat 
harder  conditions  than  those  which  King 
Frederick  William  had  just  refused. 

"  I  will  not  constrain  you,"  said  Napoleon, 
to  M.  de  Haugwitz;  "I  still  offer  you  to  replace 
things  on  their  former  footing,  that  is,  to  take 
back  Hanover,  and  to  restore  Anspach,  Cleves, 
and  Neufchatel  to  you.  But,  if  we  treat,  if  I 
cede  Hanover  to  you  anew,  I  shall  not  cede  it 
on  the  same  conditions,  and  I  shall  require 
you,  moreover,  to  promise  me  to  become  a 
faithful  ally  of  France.  If  Prussia  is  frankly, 
publicly  on  my  side,  I  have  no  more  European 
coalitions  to  fear,  and,  without  a  European 
coalition  on  my  hands,  I  will  soon  settle  mat- 
ters with  England.  But  I  want  nothing  short 
of  this  certainty  to  induce  me  to  make  you  a 
present  of  Hanover,  and  to  feel  convinced 
that  I  act  wisely  in  giving  it  to  you." 

Napoleon  was  right,  saving  on  one  point, 
that  was  in  making  Prussia  pay  for  Hanover 
by  new  compensations,  in  not  giving  it  to  her, 
on  the  contrary,  on  the  most  advantageous 
conditions  ;  for  there  are  no  better  allies  than 
those  who  are  fully  satisfied.  M.  de  Haugwitz, 
who  was  sincere  in  his  desire  to  unite  France 
and  Prussia,  promised  Napoleon  all  that  he 

Mhe  foreign  affairs.  I  desire  you  to  present  to  ine  this 
evening  a  note  founded  on  this  idea: 

"The  undersigned  minister  of  foreign  relations  has 
received  express  orders  from  his  majesty  the  Emperor  to 
informM.de  Haugwitz,at  his  first  interview,  that  his  ma- 
jesty cannot  consider  the  treaty  concluded  at  Vienna  as 
existing,  from  default  of  ratification  within  the  prescribed 
tiiije  ;  that  his  majesty  does  not  allow  to  any  power,  and 
least  of  all  to  Prussia— for  experience  proves  that  he 
must  speak  plainly  and  without  circumlocution — a  right 
to  modify  and  interpret  according  to  its  own  interest  the 
different  articles  of  a  treaty ;  that  it  is  not  exchanging 
ratifications  to  have  two  different  versions  of  the  same 
treaty,  and  that  the  irregularity  appears  still  greater  if 
one  considers  the  three  or  four  pages  of  memorial  added 
to  the  ratifications  of  Prussia ;  that  M.  de  Laforest,  his 
majesty's  minister  charged  with  the  ratifications,  would 
be  culpable  had  he  not  himself  observed  all  the  irregular- 
ity of  the  proceeding  of  the  court  of  Prussia,  but  that  he 
had  accepted  the  exchange  only  on  condition  of  the  ap- 
probation of  the  Emperor. 

'•  The  undersigned  is,  therefore,  charged  to  declare  tb.it 
his  majesty  does  not  approve  it,  in  consideration  of  the 
sanctity  due  to  the  execution  of  treaties. 

"•But,  at  the  same  time,  the  undersigned  ia  charged  to 
ueciare  that  his  inaje«ty  is  still  desirous  that  the  differences 


required,  and  promised  it  with  all  the  appear- 
ances of  the  greatest  sincerity.  To  his  pro- 
mises he  added  some  very  pertinent  insinua- 
tions respecting  certain  slights  of  Napoleon 
towards  Prussia,  the  necessity  of  paying  some 
regard  to  the  dignity  of  the  king,  in  the  first 
place  for  the  sake  of  the  king  himself,  who, 
notwithstanding  his  timidity,  was  at  bottom 
susceptible  and  irritable,  and  also  for  the  sake 
of  the  nation  and  the  army,  which  identified 
themselves  with  the  sovereign,  and  took  highly 
amiss  whatever  looked,  like  a  want  of  respect 
for  him.  M.  de  Haugwitz  said,  that  the  viola- 
tion of  the  territory  of  Anspach  in  particular 
had  on  this  account  an  effect  that  was  to  be 
I  extremely  regretted,  and  caused  the  nation  to 
I  go  halves  with  the  court  in  the  excitement 
j  wh  ch  had  led  to  the  deplorable  treaty  of 
Potsdam. 

These  observations  were  just  and  striking. 
;But,  if  Prussia  needed  to  have  respect  paid 
her,  Napoleon  needed  to  be  satisfied  with  her 
I  before  he  paid  her  respect,  and  to  experience 
:  esteem  before  he  showed  it.  Here  was  a 
'.  double  difficulty,  which  none  had  yet  found 
j  means  to  surmount:  would  they  be  more  suo 
'  cessful  after  this  accommodation  1  That  was 
\  unfortunately  very  doubtful. 

A  second  treaty,  more   explicit  and  more 
|  stringent  than    the   former,    was    drawn    up. 
I  Hanover  was  given  to  Prussia  as  formally  as 
!  at  Schonbrunn,  but  on  condition  of  occupying 
|  it  immediately  and  in  right  of  sovereignty.    A 
i  new  and  arduous  obligation  was  the  price  of 
jthis  gift:   it  consisted  in  closing  the  Weser 
!  and  the  Elbe  against  the  English,  and  in  clos- 
•  ing  those  rivers  as  straightly  as  the  Fiench  had 
i  done  when  they  occupied  Hanover.     In  ex- 
change, Prussia  granted  the  same  cessions  as 
at   Schonbrunn ;    she    gave   the    Franconian 
principality  of  Anspach,  the  remnant  of  the 
duchy  of  Cleves,  situated  on  the  right  of  the 
|  Rhine,   and   the    principality  of   Neufchatel, 
forming  one  of  the  cantons  of  Switzerland. 
An  advantage  promised  to  the  King  of  Prussia 
in  the  treaty  of  Schonbrunn  was  suppressed 
in  this,  for  the  benefit  of  the  King  of  Bavaria. 


which  have  arisen  in  recent  circumstances  between 
France  and  Prussia  should  be  amicably  settled,  and  that 
the  old  friendship  which  existed  between  them  should 
subsist  as  formerly ;  he  is  even  desirous  that  the  treaty 
of  alliance,  offensive  and  defensive,  if  it  is  compatible 
with  the  other  engagements  of  Prussia,  should  subsist 
between  the  two  countries  and  insure  their  connection." 

This  note,  which  you  will  present  to  me  this  evening, 
shall  be  delivered  to-morrow  in  the  conference,  and  on  no 
pretext  whatever  do  I  leave  you  at  liberty  to  ouiit  to  de 
liver  it. 

You  comprehend,  yourself,  that  it  has  two  objects :  to 
leave  me  free  to  make  peace  with  England,  if,  a  few 
days  hence,  the  accounts  which  I  am  receiving  are  con- 
firmed, or  to  conclude  a  treaty  with  Prussia  on  a  wider 
basis. 

Let  the  wording  be  stern  and  plain,  but  you  will  add 
viva  vote  all  the  modifications,  all  the  softenings,  all 
the  illusions,  which  shall  make  M.  de  Haugwitz  believe 
that  it  is  an  effect  of  my  temper  which  is  irritated  at  this 
form,  but  that,  at  bottom,  I  am  in  the  same  sentiments  as 
ever  towards  Prussia.  My  opinion  is  that,  in  the  present 
circumstances,  if  Mr.  Fox  is  really  at  the  head  of  th« 
foreign  affairs,  we  cannot  cede  Hanover  to  Prussia  but 
by  a  comprehensive  system,  capable  of  securing  us  from 
the  fear  of  a  continuance  of  hostilities. 


Feb.  1806.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


115 


According  to  the  first  treaty,  the  Franconian 
principality  of  Bayreuth,  contiguous  to  that 
of  Anspach,  and  to  be  retained  by  Prussia, 
•was  to  be  limited  in  a  more  regular  manner 
by  taking  out  of  that  of  Anspach  a  district 
containing  20,000  inhabitants.  There  was  no 
further  question  about  this  district.  Lastly, 
the  obligations  imposed  upon  Prussia  were 
extended.  She  was  obliged  to  guarantee  not 
only  the  French  empire  as  it  was,  with  the 
new  arrangements  concluded  in  Germany  and 
Italy,  but  she  was  further  required  to  guaran- 
tee explicitly  the  future  results  of  the  war 
commenced  against  Naples,  that  is  to  say,  the 
dethronement  of  the  Bourbons  and  the  then 
presumed  establishment  of  a  branch  of  the 
Bonaparte  family  on  the  throne  of  the  Two 
Sicilies.  This  was  certainly  the  most  disa- 
greeable of  the  recent  conditions  imposed 
upon  Prussia,  for  it  rendered  the  situation  of 
the  king  towards  the  Emperor  Alexander  more 
difficult  than  ever,  on  account  of  the  professed 
protectorship  of  Russia,  in  respect  to  the 
Bourbons  of  Naples.  It  is  unnecessary  to 
say  that  the  guarantees  were  reciprocal,  and 
that  France  promised  to  support  Prussia  with 
her  armies,  and  to  insure  to  her  all  her  acqui- 
sitions past  and  present,  including  Hanover. 

This  second  treaty  was  signed  on  the  15th 
of  February. 

Thus  all  that  Prussia  had  gained  by  attempt- 
ing to  modify  the  treaty  of  Schonbrunn,  was  to 
be  deprived  of  the  additions  of  territory  which 
were  at  first  to  have  been  added  to  Bayreuth, 
to  be  compelled  to  a  very  dangerous  act,  the 
closing  of  the  Elbe  and  Weser,  lastly  to  be 
obliged  to  avow  publicly  what  was  about  to 
be  consummated  at  Naples.  The  only  results, 
in  short,  were  more  obligations  and  fewer  ad- 
vantages. 

M.  de  Haugwitz  could  not  have  done  better, 
unless  he  had  placed  things  in  Iheir  former  state, 
which  would  assuredly  have  been  preferable, 
for  he  would  have  spared  Prussia  the  embar- 
rassing engagements  of  a  patched  up  and  insin- 
cere alliance.  It  is  true  that  he  would  then 
have  deprived  her  of  the  illusion  of  a  brilliant 
acquisition,  extremely  useful  for  covering  in 
a  moment  all  the  meanness  of  Prussian  policy. 
Be  this  as  it  may,  M.  de  Haugwitz  would  not 
himself  carry  to  Berlin  this  bitter  fruit  of  the 
tergiversations  of  his  court,  and  he  resolved 
to  send  thither  M.  de  Lucchesini,  minister  of 
Prussia  in  Paris.  It  did  not  suit  him  to  solicit 
the  adoption  of  a  spoiled  work,  and  to  take 
upon  himself  alone  the  responsibility  of  the 
resolution  which  was  proposed  to  be  adopted. 
He  wished  to  leave  to  his  sovereign,  to  his  col- 
^agues,  and  to  the  royal  family,  who  interfered 
in  so  indiscreet  a  manner  in  affairs  of  state, 
the  business  of  choosing  between  the  treaty  of 
Schonbrunn,  made  a  great  deal  worse,  and 
war;  for  it  was  evident  this  time  that  Napo- 
leon, put  out  of  patience  by  a  new  rejection, 
ii'  he  did  not  take  fire  immediately,  on  account 
of  a  refused  alliance,  would  treat  Prussia  in 
such  a  manner  in  all  the  European  arrange- 
ments that  war  would  very  soon  become 
inevitable. 

He  therefore  sent  M.  de  Lucchesini,  whose 
luperior  he  was,  to  Berlin,  and  for  a  few  days 


took  his  place  as  minister  at  Paris.  He 
charged  him  to  carry  the  treaty  to  his  court 
to  explain  to  it  the  exact  state  of  thihgs  in 
France,  to  represent  the  real  dispositions  of 
Napoleon,  who  was  ready  to  become,  accord- 
ing to  the  manner  in  which  it  behaved,  either 
a  powerful  and  sincere  ally,  though  embarrass- 
ing from  his  spirit  of  enterprise,  or  a  formi- 
dable enemy,  if  he  was  forced  to  regard  Prus- 
sia as  a  second  Austria.  M.  de  Haugwitz  did 
not  commission  M.  de  Lucchesini  to  solicit  in 
his  name  the  adoption  of  the  new  treaty.  He 
wished  for  nothing  more,  for  he  was  already 
disgusted  with  a  task  which  had  become  too 
ungrateful,  and  with  the  fatigue  of  a  responsi- 
bility that  was  too  vexatious. 

He  remained  therefore  in  Paris,  treated  with 
the  highest  distinction  by  Napoleon,  studying 
attentively  that  extraordinary  man,  and  per- 
suading himself  more  and  more  every  day  of 
the  justice  of  his  own  policy,  and  of  the  pre- 
sent and  future  interests  which  Prussia  and 
France  alike  compromised  by  not  knowing 
how  to  agree. 

In  Europe,  every  thing  was  going  on  accord- 
ing to  the  wishes  of  the  fortunate  victor  of 
Austerlitz.  The  army  which  he  had  sent  to 
Naples,  under  the  apparent  command  of  Jo- 
seph Napoleon,  and  under  the  real  command 
of  Massena,  marched  directly  for  the  goal. 
The  Queen  of  Naples,  striving  once  more  to 
dispel  the  storm  gathered  by  her  faults,  im- 
plored all  the  courts,  and  successively  de- 
spatched Cardinal  Ruffo  and  the  heir-apparent 
to  the  crown  to  meet  Joseph,  and  to  try  to 
make  a  treaty,  whatever  might  be  the  condi- 
tions. Joseph,  bound  by  the  imperative  com- 
mands of  his  brother,  refused  Cardinal  Ruffo, 
received  with  respect  the  solicitations  of 
Prince  Ferdinand,  but  did  not  halt  for  a  mo- 
ment in  his  march  for  Naples.  The  French 
army,  40,000  strong,  passed  the  Garigliano  on 
the  8th  of  February,  and  advanced,  formed 
into  three  corps.  One,  that  of  the  right,  under 
General  Reynier,  went  to  blockade  Gaeta;  an- 
other, that  of  the  centre,  under  Marshal  Mas- 
sena, marched  upon  Capua ;  the  third,  that  of 
the  left,  under  General  St.  Cyr,  directed  its 
course  through  Apulia  and  the  Abruzzi,  to- 
wards the  Gulf  of  Tarento.  On  this  intelli- 
gence, the  English  embarked  with  such  preci- 
pitation, that  they  had  wellnigh  brought  their 
allies,  the  Russians,  into  danger.  The  former 
fled  to  Sicily,  the  latter  to  Corfu.  The  court 
of  Naples  took  refuge  at  Palermo,  after  having 
completely  emptied  the  public  coffers,  and  even 
those  of  the  Bank.  The  prince  royal,  with  the 
best  troops  that  were  left  in  the  Neapolitan 
army,  had  betaken  himself  to  the  Calabrias. 
Two  Neapolitan  gentlemen  were  sent  to  Capua 
to  treat  for  the  surrender  of  the  capital.  A 
convention  was  signed,  and  Joseph,  escorted  by 
Massena's  corps,  appeared  before  Naples.  He 
entered  the  city  on  the  15th  of  February,  with- 
out any  disturbance  of  order,  the  population 
of  the  lazzaroni  having  made  no  resistance. 

The  fortress  of  Gaeta,  though  included  in 
the  convention  of  Capua,  was  not  surrendered 
by  the  Prince  of  Hesse-Philippsthal,  who  was 
governor  of  it.  He  declared  that  he  won'd  de- 
fend himself  there  to  the  last  extremity  Tbf 


116 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1806. 


strength  of  this  place,  a  sort  of  Gibraltar,  con- 
nected only  by  an  isthmus  with  the  continent 
of  Italy,  rendered  it,  in  fact,  capable  of  a  long 
resistance.  General  Reynier  carried  the  ex- 
ternal positions  with  great  boldness,  and  strove 
to  coop  up  the  enemy  closely  in  the  place,  till 
he  should  be  supplied  with  the  materiel  neces- 
sary for  undertaking  a  regular  siege. 

Joseph,  master  of  Naples,  was  only  at  the 
beginning  of  the  difficulties  which  he  had  to 
encounter.  Though  he  assumed  as  yet  only 
the  quality  of  Napoleon's  lieutenant,  he  was 
not  the  less  in  all  eyes  the  designated  sovereign 
of  the  new  kingdom.  There  was  not  a  ducat 
in  the  chests  ;  all  the  military  stores  had  been 
carried  off;  the  principal  functionaries  were 
pone.  It  was  requisite  to  create  at  once 
finances  and  an  administration.  Joseph  had 
good  sense,  mildness,  but  no  part  of  that  pro- 
digious activity  with  which  his  brother  Napo- 
leon was  endued,  and  which  would  have  been 
necessary  here  to  found  a  government. 

He  fell,  nevertheless,  to  work.  The  gran- 
dees of  the  kingdom,  more  enlightened  than  the 
rest  of  the  nation,  as  is  the  case  in  all  countries 
at  all  civilized,  had  been  ill-treated  by  the 
queen,  who  reproached  them  with  being  too 
much  inclined  to  liberal  opinions,  and  who 
kept  them  in  fear  of  the  lazzaroni,  ignorant  and 
fanatic,  whom  she  incessantly  threatened  to 
let  loose  upon  them:  the  usual  conduct  of  roy- 
alty, which  everywhere  props  itself  upon  the 
people  against  the  aristocracy,  when  symp- 
toms of  resistance  appear  among  the  latter. 
The  grandees,  therefore,  gave  a  good  reception 
to  the  new  government,  for  which  they  hoped 
for  a  discreetly  reforming  administration,  and 
one  determined  to, afford  equal  protection  to 
all  classes.  Joseph,  finding  them  animatec 
with  favourable  sentiments,  studied  still  more 
to  draw  them  to  him,  and  restrained  the  lazza- 
roni by  the  dread  of  severe  executions.  Be- 
sides, the  naipe  of  Massena  made  disturber 
tremble.  A  gale  drove  a  Neapolitan  frigate 
and  cutter,  with  several  transports,  into  Na 
pies.  In  this  manner  some  military  stores 
and  other  things  of  considerable  value  were 
recovered.  The  forts  were  armed,  contribu 
butions  were  levied,  and  a  very  clever  Corsi 
can,  M.  Salicette,  sent  by  Napoleon  to  Naples 
was  placed  at  the  head  of  the  police.  Joseph 
applied  to  his  brother  for  assistance  in  money 
to  enable  him  to  overcome  these  first  diffi 
culties 

Eugene,  viceroy  of  upper  Italy,  had  receivec 
the  Venetian  States  from  the  hands  of  Austria 
He  had  entered  Venice,  to  the  great  satisfac 
tion  of  the  inhabitants  of  that  ancient  queen 
of  the  seas,  who  found  in  their  annexation  to 
an  Italian  kingdom,  constituted  on  wise  prin- 
ciples, a  certain  compensation  for  their  lost 
independence.  General  Marmont's  corps,  de- 
scending from  the  Styrian  Alps  into  Italy,  had 
proceeded  to  the  Izonzn.  and  formed  a  reserve 
ready  to  penetrate  into  Dalmatia,  if  this  junc- 
tion of  forces  should  become  necessary.  Ge- 
neral Molitor,  with  his  division,  had  made  a 
'apid  march  towards  Dalmatia,  to  take  posses- 
«;ion  of  a  country  to  which  Napoleon  attached 
great  value,  because  it  was  contiguous  to  the 
Turkish  empire.  That  general  had  entered 


he  town  of  Zara,  the  capital  of  Dalmatia. 
3ut  he  had  still  a  great  extent  of  coast  to  tra- 
verse before  he  reached  the  celebrated  mouths 
of  the  Cattaro,  the  southernmost  and  the  most 
mportant  of  the  positions  of  the  Adriatic,  and 
he  hastened  his  march,  in  order  to  awe  by  the 
error  of  his  approach  the  Montenegrins,  who 
lad  long  been  in  the  pay  of  Russia. 

For  the  rest,  the  court  of  Vienna,  sighing  for 
:he  retreat  of  the  French  army,  was  disposed 
to  execute  faithfully  the  treaty  of  Presburg. 
That  court,  exhausted  by  the  last  war,  which 
was  the  third  since  the  French  Revolution, 
terrified  by  the  blows  which  it  had  received  at 
Ulm  and  at  Austerlilz,  had,  undoubtedly,  not 
renounced  the  hope  of  raising  itself  again 
someday;  but,  for  the  present,  it  was  resolved 
to  introduce  some  order  into  its  finances,  and 
to  let  many  years  elapse  before  it  again  tried 
the  fortune  of  arms.  The  Archduke  Charles, 
having  again  become  minister  of  war,  was  di- 
rected to  seek  a  new  system  of  military  orga- 
nization, which,  without  too  great  a  reduction 
offeree,  should  produce  savings  that  could  be 
no  longer  deferred.  The  government,  there- 
fore, lost  no  time  in  executing  the  late  treaty 
of  peace,  in  paying  the  contribution  of  40  mil- 
lions, either  in  specie  or  bills  of  exchange,  in 
seconding  the  removal  of  the  cannon  and  of 
the  muskets  taken  at  Vienna,  that  the  succes- 
sive retreat  of  the  French  troops  might  speed- 
ily be  accomplished.  This  retreat  was  to  ter- 
minate on  the  1st  of  March,  with  the  evacua- 
tion of  Braunau. 

Napoleon,  who  had  left  Berthier  at  Munich 
to  superintend  the  return  of  the  army,  a  return 
which  he  purposed  to  render  slow  and  com- 
modious, had  enjoined  that  faithful  performer 
of  his  orders  to  repair  to  Braunau,  and  not  to 
restore  that  fortress  till  he  had  received  posi- 
tive intelligence  of  the  delivery  of  the  mouths 
of  Cattaro.  He  had  established  Marshal  Ney, 
with  his  corps,  in  the  country  of  Salzburg, 
that  he  might  live  there  as  long  as  possible  at 
the  expense  of  a  province  destined  to  become 
Austrian.  He  had  established  Marshal  Soult's 
corps  on  the  Inn,  a  cheval  on  the  archduchy  of 
Austria  and  Bavaria,  and  living  upon  both. 
The  corps  of  Marshals  Davout,  Lannes,  an 
Bernadotte,  being  too  great  a  burden  to  Bava- 
ria, whose  inhabitants  began  to  be  weary  of  it, 
were  marched  towards  the  new  countries 
ceded  to  the  German  princes  our  allies:  and, 
as  no  term  was  fixed  for  the  delivery  of  these 
countries,  still  dependent  on  litigious  arrange- 
ments, there  was  a  founded  pretext  for  keep- 
ing them  there  for  some  time.  Bernadotte's 
|  corps  was  therefore  removed  into  the  province 
!  of  Anspach,  ceded  by  Prussia  to  Bavaria.  It 
there  had  space  to  extend  itself  and  to  subsist 
Marshal  Davout's  corps  was  transferred  to  the 
bishopric  of  Eichstudt  and  the  principality  of 
!  Oettingen.  The  cavalry  was  divided  among 
'  the  different  corps.  Those  which  had  not  suf- 
|  ficient  space  to  supply  them  with  subsistence, 
had  permission  to  spread  themselves  among 
the  petty  princes  of  Suabia,  whose  existence 
I  was  rendered  problematical  by  the  treaty  of 
Presburg,  which  required  new  changes  in  the 
Germanic  constitution.  The  troops  of  Lannes, 
divided  between  Marshal  Mortier  and  General 


Feb.  1806.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


117 


Oudinot,  were  quartered  in  Suabia.  Oudi- 
not's  grenadiers  proceeded  through  Switzer- 
land towards  the  principality  of  Neufchatel,  to 
take  possession  of  it.  Lastly,  Augereau's 
corps,  reinforced  by  Dupont's  division  and 
General  Dumonceau's  Batavian  division,  was 
cantoned  around  Frankfort,  ready  to  march 
for  Prussia,  if  the  last  arrangements  concluded 
with  her  were  not  followed  up  by  sincere  and 
definitive  proceedings. 

These  different  corps  were  in  excellent  con- 
dition. They  began  to  feel  the  effect  of  the 
rest  which  had  been  granted  them ;  they  were 
recruited  by  the  arrival  of  young  conscripts,  in- 
cessantly setting  out  from  the  banks  of  the 
Rhine,  where  the  depots  had  been  united  under 
Marshals  Lefebvre  and  Kellermann.  Our  sol- 
diers were  fitter,  if  possible,  for  war,  than  be- 
fore the  late  campaign,  and  excessively  proud 
of  their  recent  victories.  They  proved  them- 
selves humane  towards  the  people  of  Germany, 
rather  boisterous,  it  is  true,  prone  to  boast  of 
their  exploits ;  but,  this  noise  over,  sociable  to 
the  highest  degree,  and  presenting  a  singular 
contrast  to  the  German  auxiliaries,  who  were 
much  harder  towards  their  countrymen  than 
we  ourselves  were.  Unfortunately,  Napoleon, 
from  a  spirit  of  economy,  useful  to  his  army, 
detrimental  to  his  policy,  allowed  the  soldiers 
to  be  paid  only  part  of  their  pay,  retaining  the 
remainder  for  their  benefit,  to  be  paid  them 
subsequently  after  their  return  to  France.  He 
required  that  provisions  should  be  furnished 
them  by  the  countries  in  which  they  were  en- 
camped, in  lieu  of  that  part  of  their  pay  which 
was  withheld,  and  this  was  a  very  heavy  bur- 
den to  the  inhabitants.  If  the  provisions  had 
been  paid  for,  the  presence  of  our  troops,  in- 
stead of  being  a  burden,  would  have  become 
an  advantage;  and  Germany,  which  knew  that 
they  had  been  brought  upon  its  soil  through 
the  fault  of  the  coalition,  would  have  had  on 
that  account  none  but  kindly  feelings  towards 
us.  It  was,  therefore,  an  ill-judged  saving,  and 
the  benefit  resulting  from  it  for  the  army  was 
not  equivalent  to  the  inconveniences  that  were 
liable  to  arise  from  the  sufferings  of  the  occu- 
pied countries.  Napoleon  like  wise  caused  the 
expenditure  for  clothing  to  be  deferred,  in  order 
to  new  clothe  the  soldiers  when  they  should 
repass  the  Rhine,  and  come  to  participate  in  the 
festivities  which  he  was  preparing  for  them. 
They,  for  their  part,  were  perfectly  satisfied, 
and  cheerfully  submitted  to  wear  their  old 
clothes,  and  to  receive  but  little  money,  saying 
that,  when  they  returned  to  France,  they  should 
have  new  clothes  and  plenty  of  savings  to 
spend. 

For  the  rest,  if  the  people  complained  of  the 
prolonged  stay  of  our  troops,  the  petty  princes 
had  finally  invoked  their  presence  as  a  benefit, 
for  nothing  was  to  be  compared  with  the  vio- 
lence and  the  spoliations  committed  by  the 
German  governments,  especially  those  which 
possessed  any  strength.  The  Grand-duke  of 
Baden  and  the  King  of  Bavaria  had  laid  their 
hands  on  the  possessions  of  the  immediate  no- 
bility, and,  though  they  acted  without  any  con- 
sideration, their  haste  was  humanity  compared 
with  the  violence  of  the  King  of  Wurtemberg, 
who  carried  rapacity  to  such  a  length  as  to 


cause  all  the  fiefs  to  be  seized  and  plundered, 
as  at  the  time  when  the  cry  in  France  was,  War 
with  the  mansions,  peace  urith  the  cottages.  His 
troops  entered  the  domains  of  princes,  enclosed 
in  his  kingdom,  upon  pretext  of  seizing  the 
possessions  of  the  immediate  nobility.  Having 
a  right  to  a  portion  only  of  the  Brisgau,  the 
King  of  Wurtemberg  had  occupied  nearly  the 
whole  of  it  But  for  the  French  troops,  the 
Wurtembergers  and  the  Badenars  would  have 
come  to  blows. 

Napoleon  had  appointed  M.  Otto,  minister  of 
France,  at  Munich,  and  Berthier,  major-general 
I  of  the  grand  army,  arbiters  of  the  differences 
;  which  he  foresaw  between  the  German  princes, 
great  and  small.   These  latter  had  all  hastened 
'  to  Munich,  whither  the  Diet  of  Ratisbon  ap- 
|  peared  to  have  transferred  its  seat,  and  there 
solicited  the  justice  of  France,  and  even  the 
presence,  how  burdensome  soever  it  might  be, 
of  French  troops.     On  all  sides  arose  inextri- 
I  cable  disputes,  which  apparently  it  would  be 
impossible  to  settle  without  new  moulding  the 
I  Germanic   constitution.      Meanwhile    detach- 
ments of  our  soldiers  held  possession  of  the 
places  in  litigation,  and  every  thing  was  refer- 
red to  the  arbitration  of  France  and  her  minis 
I  ters.     At  any  rate,  Napoleon  did  not  make  a 
i  handle  of  these  disputes  to  prolong  the  stay  of 
his  troops  in  Germany,  for  he  was  impatient  to 
;  order  the  return  of  the  army,  and  to  collect  it 
l  around  him  at  Paris ;  and  for  this  he  awaited 
only  the  entire  occupation  of  Dalmatia,  and  the 
definitive  answer  of  the  court  of  Prussia. 

That  court,  obliged  to  decide  definitively 
upon  the  modified  treaty  of  Schonbrunn,  at 
length  took  its  resolution.  It  accepted  this 
treaty,  which  had  become  less  advantageous 
since  its  double  remodelling  in  Berlin  and  in 
Paris,  and  received,  with  confusion  on  its  brow, 
with  ingratitude  in  its  heart,  the  gift  of  Hano- 
ver, which  at  any  other  time  would  have  filled 
it  with  joy.  What,  indeed,  could  be  done? 
There  was  no  other  course  to  take  but  to  close 
the  business  by  acceding  to  the 'proposals  of 
France,  or  to  make  up  its  mind  at  once  to  war, 
war,  for  which  the  Prussian  army  boastingly 
cried  out,  and  which  its  leaders,  more  consi- 
derate, and  above  all  the  king,  dreaded  as  a 
ruinous  experiment. 

As  for  choosing  war,  it  ought  to  have  decid- 
ed on  this  when  Napoleon  quitted  Ulm,  to  bury 
himself  in  the  long  valley  of  the  Danube,  and 
to  have  fallen  upon  his  rear,  while  the  Austro- 
Russians,  concentrated  at  Olmutz,  were  draw- 
ing him  into  Moravia.  But  the  Prussian  army 
was  not  ready  then ;  and,  after  the  2d  of  De- 
cember, when  Count  Haugwitz  conversed  with 
Napoleon,  it  was  too  late.  It  was  much  later 
now  that  the  French,  assembled  in  Suabia  and 
Franconia,  had  but  a  step  to  take  to  invade 
Prussia,  now  that  the  Russians  were  in  Poland, 
and  the  Austrians  in  a  completely  disarmed 
state. 

To  accept  the  gift  of  Hanover  on  the  con- 
ditions attached  to  it  by  France  was,  therefore, 
the  only  possible  resolution.  But  this  was  a 
singular  mode  of  commencing  an  intimate 
alliance.  The  treaty  of  the  15th  of  February 
was  ratified  on  the  24th.  M.  de  Lucchesini 
set  out  immediately  for  Paris  with  the  ratifi- 


118 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Feb.  1S06. 


cations.  M.  ae  Haugwitz,  on  his  part,  left 
Paris  to  return  to  Berlin,  highly  pleased  with 
the  personal  treatment  which  he  had  received 
from  Napoleon,  promising  him  anew  the  faith- 
ful alliance  of  Prussia,  but  anticipating  most 
arduous  trials,  at  sight  of  all  the  difficulties 
which  then  swarmed  in  Germany,  at  the  sight, 
more  especially,  of  those  petty  German  princes 
prostrate  at  the  feet  of  France,  to  save  them- 
selves from  the  exactions  with  which  they 
were  overwhelmed  by  the  more  powerful  or 
the  more  favoured  princes. 

On  his  arrival  in  Berlin,  M.  de  Haugwitz 
found  the  king  deeply  dejected  at  his  situation, 
deeply  afflicted  by  the  difficulties  opposed  to 
him  by  the  court,  more  excited  and  more  in- 
temperate than  ever.  The  audacity  of  the 
discontented  was  carried  to  such  a  length, 
that,  one  night,  all  the  windows  in  the  house 
of  M.  de  Haugwitz  were  broken  by  rioters, 
who  were  generally  believed  to  belong  to  the 
army,  and  who  were  publicly,  but  falsely, 
said  to  be  agents  of  Prince  Louis.  M.  de 
Haugwitz  affected  to  disdain  these  manifesta- 
tions, which,  very  insignificant  in  free  coun- 
tries, where  one  winks  at  while  despising 
these  excesses  of  the  multitude,  were  strange 
and  serious  in  an  absolute  monarchy,  espe- 
cially when  they  could  be  imputed  to  the 
army.  The  king  considered  them  as  a  serious 
matter,  and  declared  publicly  his  intention  to 
be  severe.  He  gave  formal  orders  for  a  search 
after  the  culprits,  whom  the  police,  either  from 
being  implicated  itself  or  powerless,  did  not 
succeed  in  discovering.  The  king,  driven  to 
extremity,  manifested  a  firm  and  decided  de- 
termination, which  overawed  the  discontented, 
and  particularly  the  queen.  He  gave  the  lat- 
ter to  understand  that  his  resolution  was 
taken,  that  the  welfare  of  the  monarchy  had 
commanded  him  to  take  it,  and  that  every 
body  about  him  must  assume  an  attitude  con- 
formable to  his  policy.  The  queen,  who,  for 
the  rest,  was  devoted  to  the  interest  of  the 
king,  her  husband,  was  silent,  and,  for  a  mo- 
ment, the  court  presented  a  decorous  aspect. 

M.  de  Hardenberg  quitted  the  ministry. 
This  personage  had  become  the  idol  of  the 
opposition.  He  had  been  the  creature  of  M. 
de  Haugwitz,  his  partisan,  his  imitator,  and 
the  most  zealous  advocate  of  the  French  alli- 
ance, particularly  in  1805,  when  Napoleon, 
from  his  camp  at  Boulogne,  offered  Hanover 
to  Prussia.  Then  M.  de  Hardenberg  regarded 
it  as  the  most  brilliant  of  glories  to  ensure 
this  aggrandizement  to  his  country,  and  com- 
plained to  the  French  ministers  of  the  hesita- 
tions of  his  sovereign,  who  was  too  back- 
ward, he  said,  in  attaching  himself  to  France. 
Since  then,  having  seen  that  scheme  mis- 
carry, he  had  thrown  himself,  with  the  impe- 
tuosity of  an  intemperate  character,  into  the 
arms  of  Russia,  and,  unable  to  extricate  him- 
self from  this  error,  he  loudly  declaimed 
against  France.  Napoleon,  informed  of  his 
conduct,  committed  a  great  fault  in  regard  to 
him,  which  he  repeated  more  than  once,  and 
which  was  to  mention  him  in  his  bulletins,  by 
making  an  offensive  allusion  to  a  Prussian  min- 
ister, seduced  by  the  gold  of  England.  The  im- 
putation was  unjust.  M.  de  Hardenberg  was  no 


more  seduced  by  the  gold  of  the  English  than 
was  M.  de  Haugwitz  by  the  gold  of  the  French : 
it  was  most  indecent  in  an  official  document, 
and  bespoke  too  strongly  the  license  of  the  sol- 
dier conqueror.  It  was  this  attack  which  pro- 
cured for  M.  de  Hardenberg  the  immense  po- 
pularity which  he  enjoyed.  The  king  allowed 
him  to  retire  with  testimonies  of  considera- 
tion, which  did  not  take  the  character  of  a  po- 
litical disgrace  from  his  retirement. 

But,  while  he  removed  M.  de  Hardenberg, 
Frederick  William  associated  with  M.  de 
Haugwitz,  a  second,  who  was  not  much  bet- 
ter: this  was  M.  de  Keller,  whom  the  court 
considered  as  one  of  its  own,  and  who  gave 
himself  out  publicly  as  inspector  over  his 
superior.  It  was  a  sort  of  satisfaction  granted 
to  the  party  hostile  to  France ;  for,  in  absolute 
governments,  rulers  are  frequently  obliged  to 
give  way  to  opposition,  just  as  in  free  govern- 
ments. Frederick  William  did  still  more;  he 
endeavoured  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  Rus- 
sia, to  explain  honourably  to  her  the  interested 
inconsistencies  which  he  had  committed. 

Since  Austerlitz,  the  cabinet  of  Berlin  had 
been  very  chary  of  communications  with  St. 
Petersburg.  After  all  the  boastings  of  Pots- 
dam, Russia  could  not  but  be  ashamed  of  her 
defeat,  and  Prussia  of  the  manner  in  which 
she  had  kept  the  oath  sworn  on  the  tomb  of 
the  great  Frederick.  Silence  was  for  the  mo- 
ment the  only  fitting  relation  between  the  two 
courts.  Russia,  however,  had  once  broken  it 
to  declare  that  her  forces  were  at  the  disposal 
of  Prussia,  if  the  treaty  of  Potsdam,  divulged, 
should  bring  a  war  upon  her.  Since  that  time 
she  had  said  nothing,  nor  Prussia  either. 

It  was  requisite  at  last  to  come  to  an  expla- 
nation. The  king  pressed  the  old  Duke  of 
Brunswick  to  go  to  St.  Petersburg,  to  oppose 
his  glory  to  the  censures  which  the  conduct 
pursued  at  SchOnbrunn  and  continued  in  Paris 
could  not  fail  to  call  forth.  This  respectable 
prince,  devoted  to  the  house  of  Brandenburg, 
set  out,  therefore,  notwithstanding  his  age,  for 
Russia.  He  went  not  to  declare  frankly  that 
Prussia  had  at  length  espoused  the  French 
alliance,  which  would  have  been  difficult,  but 
yet  preferable  to  a  continuation  of  ambiguities, 
already  very  pernicious :  he  went  to  say  that 
if  Prussia  had  taken  Hanover,  it  was  that  it 
might  not  be  left  in  the  hands  of  France,  and 
to  spare  herself  the  mortification  and  danger 
of  seeing  the  French  appear  again  in  the  north 
of  Germany;  that,  if  she  had  accepted  the 
term  alliance,  it  was  to  avoid  war,  and  that 
this  term  was  intended  to  signify  nothing  but 
neutrality:  that  neutrality  was  the  best  course 
for  both  of  them;  that  Russia  and  Prussia  had 
nothing  to  gain  by  war;  that,  by  persisting  in 
that  system  of  implacable  hostility  against 
France,  they  fostered  the  commercial  mono- 
poly of  England,  and  that  it  was  not  very  sure 
that  they  were  not  also  fostering  the  conti- 
nental domination  of  Napoleon. 

Such  was  the  language  which  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick  was  to  hold  at  St.  Petersburg. 

We  must  return  to  the  young  emperor,  who, 
hurried  into  war  by  vanity  and  against  the 
secret  whispers  of  his  reason,  had  served  at 
Austerlitz  such  a  sorry  apprenticeship  to  arms. 


Feb.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


119 


He  had  given  little  cause  for  being  talked  of 
during  the  last  three  months,  and  had  hidden  in 
his  distant  empire  the  confusion  of  his  defeat. 

A  general  outcry  was  raised  in  Russia 
against  the  young  men  who,  it  was  alleged, 
governed  and  compromised  the  empire.  These 
young  men,  placed,  some  in  the  army,  others 
in  the  cabinet,  had  fallen  out  with  one  another. 
The  party  of  the  Dolgoroukis  accused  the 
party  of  the  Czartoryskis,  and  reproached  it 
with  having  ruined  every  thing  by  its  misbe- 
haviour towards  Prussia.  They  would  have 
done  violence  to  her,  said  the  Dolgoroukis : 
they  had,  therefore,  estranged  instead  of  draw- 
ing her  nearer,  and  her  refusal  to  join  the 
coalition  had  prevented  its  success.  It  was  in 
a  particular  interest  that  they  had  so  acted;  it 
was  to  wrest  the  Polish  provinces  from  Prus- 
sia, and  to  reconstitute  Poland,  a  mischievous 
dream,  for  which  the  Polish  Prince  Czartoryski 
was  evidently  betraying  the  emperor. 

Prince  Czartoryski  and  his  friends  main- 
tained with  much  more  reason  that  it  was 
those  presumptuous  soldiers,  who  could  not 
wait  at  Olmutz  for  the  expiration  of  the  term 
fixed  for  the  intervention  of  Prussia,  that  had 
insisted  prematurely  on  giving  battle,  and  op- 
posing their  twenty-five  years'  experience  to 
the  skill  of  the  most  consummate  general  of 
modern  times — that  it  was  these  presumptuous 
and  incapable  soldiers  who  were  the  real 
authors  of  the  disasters  of  Russia. 

The  old  Russians,  dissatisfied,  condemned 
both  the  youthful  parties  ;  and  Alexander,  ac- 
cused of  allowing  himself  to  be  guided  some- 
times by  the  one,  sometimes  by  the  other,  had 
become,  at  this  period,  an  object  of  little  consi- 
deration for  his  subjects. 

He  had  been  deeply  dejected  in  the  first  days 
after  his  defeat,  and,  if  Prince  Czartoryski  had 
not  several  times  roused  him  to  a  sense  of  his 
own  dignity,  he  would  have  manifested  too 
plainly  the  profound  despondency  of  his  spirit. 
Prince  Czartoryski,  though  he  had  his  share 
in  the  inexperience  common  to  the  young  men 
who  governed  the  empire,  was  nevertheless 
consistent  and  serious  in  his  views.  He  was 
the  principal  author  of  that  system  of  European 
arbitration  which  had  led  Russia  to  take  arms 
against  France.  That  system,  which,  with 
Russian  statesmen,  was  in  reality  but  a  mask 
thrown  over  their  national  ambition,  was  with 
that  young  Pole  a  sincere  and  cordially  em- 
braced idea.  He  wished  Alexander  to  per- 
severe in  it;  and,  if  it  was  a  great  presump- 
tion in  men  so  young  to  pretend  to  control 
Europe,  especially  in  presence  of  the  powers 
which  were  then  disputing  the  empire  over  it, 
it  was  a  still  greater  levity  to  give  up  so  soon 
what  had  been  so  rashly  undertaken. 

Prince  Czartoryski  had  addressed  to  the 
young  emperor,  once  his  friend  and  beginning 
to  become  again  his  master,  noble  and  re- 
spectful remonstrances  which  would  do  honour 
to  a  minister  of  a  free  country,  which  must  do 
him  much  more  honour  where  resistance  to 
power  is  an  act  of  rare  devotedness  and  des- 
tined to  remain  unknown.  Prince  Czartoryski, 
recapitulating  to  Alexander  his  hesitations, 
his  weaknesses,  said,  "  Austria  is  abased,  but 
she  detests  her  conqueror;  Prussia  is  divided 


between  two  parties,  but  she  will  finally  yield 
herself  up  to  the  German  sentiment  which 
predominates  in  her.  In  managing  these 
powers,  wait  till  the  moment  arrives  when 
one  or  the  other  shall  be  ready  to  act.  Till 
then  you  are  out  of  reach :  you  can  remain 
some  time  without  making  either  peace  or 
war,  and  thus  wait  till  circumstances  permit 
you  either  to  resume  arms  or  to  retreat  with 
advantage.  Cease  not  to  be  allied  with  Eng- 
land, and  you  will  oblige  Napoleon  to  concede 
to  you  what  is  your  due." 

Deeply  sensible  of  the  greatness  of  Napo- 
leon, since  he  had  met  him  on  the  field  of 
battle  of  Austerlitz,  Alexander  thus  replied  to 
Prince  Czartoryski :  "  When  we  pretend  to 
assail  this  man  we  are  children  presuming  to 
tackle  a  giant."  And  he  added  that,  without 
Prussia  it  would  be  impossible  to  renew  the 
war,  for  without  her  there  was  no  chance  of 
maintaining  a  successful  war.  Alexander  had 
conceived  a  singular  esteem  for  the  Prussian 
army,  for  this  single  reason,  that  it  had  not  yet 
been  beaten  by  Napoleon.  That  army,  in  fact, 
was  then  the  illusion  and  the  hope  of  Europe. 
With  that  Alexander  was  ready  to  commence 
the  struggle  afresh,  but  not  without  it.  As  for 
England,  he  ceased  to  hope  for  any  very 
efficacious  support  from  her.  He  feared  that, 
after  the  deaih  of  Mr.  Pitt,  announced  as  cer- 
tain, after  the  accession  of  Mr.  Fox,  announced 
as  near  at  hand,  hatred  of  France  would  be 
extinguished,  if  not  in  the  hearts  of  the  Eng- 
lish, at  least  in  their  policy.  However,  the 
remonstrances  of  Prince  Czartoryski,  stimu- 
lating the  pride  of  Alexander,  had  raised  his 
spirit,  and  he  was  resolved,  before  he  delivered 
his  sword  to  Napoleon,  to  make  him  wait  for 
it.  But  though  useful,  the  lessons  of  his  young 
censor  were  annoying  to  him,  and  that  to  such 
a  degree  as  to  induce  him  to  seek,  among  the 
aged  persons  of  his  empire,  a  complaisant 
servant  without  capacity,  to  cover  with  a  great 
age  and  to  execute  with  submission  his  per- 
sonal will.  It  was  already  said  that  his  fa- 
vour was  fixed  on  General  Budberg. 

The  conduct  recommended  by  Prince  Czar- 
toryski was,  nevertheless,  followed  very  punc- 
tually. Russia  again  placed  herself  in  com- 
munication with  Austria;  she  seemed  to  have 
forgotten  the  coolness  of  Holitsch,  expressed 
to  that  court  great  sympathy  in  its  misfortunes, 
and  high  consideration  for  the  power  that  was 
yet  left  it ;  she  even  undertook  to  negotiate  in 
London  to  obtain  payment  for  her  of  a  year's 
subsidy,  though  the  war  had  lasted  only  three 
months.  As  for  Prussia,  she  avoided  every 
thing  that  could  have  offended  her,  abstaining, 
nevertheless,  from  approving  her  acts.  The 
Duke  of  Brunswick  had  arrived  in  the  first 
days  of  the  month  of  March.  He  was  most 
cordially  received,  he  was  loaded  with  atten- 
tions, which  seemed  to  be  addressed  to  his 
person,  to  his  age,  to  his  military  glory,  and  by 
no  means  to  the  court  of  which  he  was  the  re- 
presentative. His  reception  was  cooler  when 
he  began  to  converse  on  political  affairs.  He 
was  told  that  Russia  could  not  approve  of  the 
conduct  of  Prussia  in  accepting  Hanover  from 
the  hand  of  the  enemy  of  Europe ;  that,  for  the 
rest,  the  peace  which  she  had  made  with 


120 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[March,  1806. 


France  was  a  false  peace,  neither  solid  nor 
durable;  that  Prussia  would  soon  be  forced  to 
adopt  a  resolution  too  long  delayed,  and  at  last 
to  draw  the  sword  of  the  great  Frederick — 
"  Then,"  said  the  Emperor  Alexander  to  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick,  "  I  will  serve  under  your 
command,  and  glory  in  learning  the  art  of  war 
in  your  school." 

An  attempt,  however,  was  made  to  com- 
mence with  the  old  duke  a  negotiation  destined 
to  be  kept  profoundly  secret.  Upon  pretext 
that  the  conditions  would  not  be  faithfully 
kept  by  France,  it  was  proposed  to  conclude  a 
sub-alliance  with  Russia,  by  means  of  which 
Prussia,  if  she  were  dissatisfied  with  her  French 
ally,  might  have  recourse  to  her  Russian  ally, 
and  would  have  at  her  disposal  all  the  forces 
of  the  Muscovite  emperor.  What  was  offered 
was  nothing  less  than  treason  against  France. 
The  Duke  of  Brunswick,  wishing  to  leave  be- 
hind at  St.  Petersburg  dispositions  favourable 
to  Prussia,  consented  not  to  conclude  such  an 
engagement,  but  to  propose  it  to  the  king.  It 
was  agreed  that  this  negotiation  should  be  left 
open,  and  that  it  should  be  carried  on  secretly 
and  unknown  to  M.  de  Haugwitz,  thr&ugh  the 
medium  of  M.de  Hardenberg,the  same  minister 
who  was  apparently  disgraced,  and  who  con- 
tinued under  hand  to  treat  upon  the  most  im- 
portant affairs  of  the  monarchy. 

While  Prussia  Avas  thus  seeking  to  explain 
her  conduct  to  Russia,  she  attempted  also  to 
excuse  herself  in  London  for  the  occupation 
of  Hanover.  Nothing  was  more  singular  than 
her  manifesto  to  the  Hanoverian  people  and 
her  despatch  to  the  court  of  London.  To  the 
Hanoverians  she  said  that  it  was  with  pain 
she  took  possession  of  that  kingdom — posses- 
sion for  which  she  paid  by  a  severe  sacrifice, 
that  of  her  provinces  on  the  Rhine,  in  Franco- 
nia,  and  in  Switzerland;  but  that  she  did  so  to 
insure  peace  to  Germany,  and  to  spare  Han- 
over the  presence  of  foreign  armies.  After 
addressing  to  the  Hanoverian  people  these 
words  without  frankness  and  without  dignity, 
she  said  to  the  English  cabinet  that  she  did 
not  take  Hanover  from  England,  but  that  she 
received  it  from  Napoleon,  whose  conquest 
Hanover  was.  She  received  it,  she  added, 
against  her  will,  and  as  an  exchange  that  was 
'forced  upon  her  for  provinces  which  were  the 
object  of  her  keenest  regret;  that  it  was  one 
of  the  consequences  of  the  imprudent  war 
which  Prussia  had  always  blamed,  which  had 
been  undertaken  contrary  to  her  advice,  and 
the  consequences  of  which  the  allies  must  im- 
pute to  themselves,  for,  in  combating  it  unsea- 
sonably, they  had  raised  up  that  colossal  power 
which  took  from  one  to  give  to  another,  and 
which  did  violence  as  well  to  those  whom  it 
favoured  with  its  gifts  as  to  those  whom  it 
despoiled. 

England  was  not  to  be  satisfied  with  such 
reasons.  She  replied  in  a  manifesto,  in  which 
she  overwhelmed  the  court  of  Prussia  with  in- 
vectives, declared  it  miserably  fallen  under  the 
yoke  of  Napoleon,  unworthy  of  being  listened 
to,  and  as  contemptible  for  its  greediness  as 
foi  its  dependence.  Still  the  British  cabinet, 
that  it  might  not  appear  in  the  eyes  of  the  na- 
tion to  bring  an  additional  enemy  upon  its 


hands,  for  an  interest  belonging  exclusively  to 
the  royal  family,  said  that  it  would  have  suffered 
this  new  invasion  of  Hanover,  the  inevitable 
result  of  the  continental  war,  if  Prussia  had 
confined  herself  to  a  mere  occupation;  but  that 
this  power,  having  announced  the  closing  of 
the  rivers,  had  committed  a  hostile  act,  an  act 
supremely  injurious  to  English  commerce,  and 
that  in  consequence  it  declared  war  against 
her.  Orders  were  given  to  all  the  ships  of  the 
royal  navy  to  take  all  vessels  sailing  under 
the  Prussian  flag.  Great  was  the  consequent 
perturbation  in  Germany;  for  the  vessels  of 
the  Baltic  usually  covered  themselves  with 
that  flag,  which  was  more  respected  than  the 
others  by  the  lords  of  the  sea. 

The  ascendency  of  the  battle  of  Marengo 
had  reconciled  England  with  Napoleon,  the 
ascendency  of  that  of  Austerlitz  brought  her 
back  to  him  once  more,  for  the  victories  of  our 
land  armies  were  means  of  disarming  her  quite 
as  sure  though  less  direct.  The  first  of  these 
victories  had  produced  the  resignation  of  Mr. 
Pitt,  the  second  caused  his  death.  This  great 
minister,  having  resumed  his  seat  in  the  cabi- 
net in  1803,  for  no  more  than  two  years,  ap- 
peared there  only  to  drink  deeply  of  mortifica- 
tions. Having  returned  without  Mr.  Wyndham 
and  Lord  Grenville,  his  former  colleagues, 
without  Mr.  Fox,  his  recent  ally,  he  had  had  to 
fight  in  parliament  his  old  and  his  new  friends, 
in  Europe  Napoleon,  become  emperor,  and 
more  powerful  than  ever.  At  his  voice,  so 
well  known  to  the  enemies  of  France,  the  cry 
of  arms  had  rung  on  all  sides ;  a  third  coali- 
tion had  been  formed,  and  the  French  army 
had  been  drawn  away  from  Dover  to  Vienna. 
But  this  third  coalition  once  dissolved  at  Aus- 
terlitz, Mr.  Pitt  had  seen  his  plans  frustrated, 
Napoleon  at  liberty  to  return  to  Boulogne,  and 
the  keen  anxieties  of  England  about  to  be 
renewed. 

The  idea  of  again  seeing  Napoleon  on  the 
shores  of  the  Channel  engrossed  all  minds  in 
England.  Reliance  was  still  placed,  it  is  true, 
on  the  immense  difficulty  of  the  passage,  but 
people  began  to  fear  that  nothing  was  impos- 
sible with  the  extraordinary  man  who  shook 
the  world;  and  they  asked  if  it  was  worth 
while  to^risk  such  chances,  for  the  sake  of  ac- 
quiring an  island  more,  when  they  already  had 
all  India,  when  they  held  the  Cape  of  Good 
Hope  and  Malta  too  firmly  to  be  dispossessed 
of  them.  They  said  to  themselves  that  the 
battle  of  Trafalgar  had  definitively  insured  the 
superiority  of  England  on  the  seas,  but  that 
the  European  continent  was  left  to  Napoleon, 
that  he  was  about  to  close  all  its  outlets,  that 
this  continent,  after  all,  was  the  world,  and 
that  one  could  not  live  cut  off  from  it  for  ever; 
that  the  most  splendid  naval  victories  would 
not  prevent  Napoleon,  taking  advantage  some 
day  of  some  accidental  circumstance,  from 
leaving  that  continent  to  invade  England. 
The  system  of  war  to  the  utmost  extremity 
was,  therefore,  universally  discredited  among 
rational  Englishmen,  and,  though  that  system 
was  subsequently  successful,  yet  they  were 
then  sensible  of  the  danger  which  was  great, 
too  great  for  the  advantages  that  might  be 
gained  by  a  prolonged  struggle. 


March,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


12' 


Now,  as  men  are  the  slaves  of  fortune,  and 
readily  take  her  momentary  caprices  for  eter- 
nal, they  were  cruel  towards  Mr.  Pitt ;  they 
forgot  the  services  which  for  twenty  years 
that  minister  had  rendered  to  his  country,  and 
the  degree  of  greatness  to  which  he  had 
raised  it  by  the  energy  of  his  patriotism,  and 
by  the  parliamentary  talents  by  which  he  had 
subjugated  the  House  of  Commons.  They 
considered  him  as  vanquished,  and  treated 
him  as  such.  His  enemies  railed  at  his  policy 
and  the  results  which  it  had  produced.  They 
imputed  to  him  the  faults  of  General  Mack, 
the  precipitation  of  the  Austrians  in.  taking 
the  field  without  waiting  for  the  Russians,  and 
the  precipitation  of  the  Russians  in  giving 
battle  without  waiting  for  the  Prussians.  All 
this  they  imputed  to  the  vehement  impatience 
of  Mr.  Pitt;  they  affected  great  sympathy  for 
Austria,  while  they  accused  him  of  having 
ruined  her,  and  of  having  ruined  in  her  the 
only  genuine  friend  of  England. 

Mr.  Pitt,  nevertheless,  was  a  stranger  to  the 
plan  of  the  campaign,  and  had  participated  in 
nothing  but  the  coalition.  It  was  he  who  had 
principally  knitted  it,  and  in  knitting  it  he  had 
prevented  the  Boulogne  expedition.  People 
gave  him  no  thanks  for  it. 

A  singular  circumstance  had  rendered  the 
effect  of  Napoleon's  late  victory  more  painful. 
On  the  day  after  Austerliiz,  as  on  the  day  aAer 
Marengo,  it  was  asserted  for  a  few  moments, 
before  the  truth  was  known,  that  Napoleon 
had  lost  in  a  great  battle  twenty-seven  thou- 
sand men  and  all  his  artillery.  But  accurate 
information  had  very  soon  been  circulated, 
and  the  members  of  the  opposition,  getting 
the  French  bulletins  translated  and  printed, 
distributed  and  sent  them  to  the  door  of  Mr. 
Pitt  and  the  Russian  ambassador. 

In  order  to  the  enjoyment  of  all  his  glory, 
Napoleon  would  have  had  only  to  pass  the 
Strait,  and  listen  to  what  was  said  of  him,  of 
his  genius,  of  his  fortune.  Melancholy  vicis- 
situdes of  this  world !  what  Mr.  Pitt  under- 
went at  this  period,  Napoleon  had  to  undergo 
later,  and  with  a  greatness  of  injustice  and  of 
passion  proportioned  to  the  greatness  of  his 
genius  and  of  his  destiny. 

Twenty-five  years'  parliamentary  conflicts, 
consuming  conflicts,  which  wear  out  soul  and 
body,  had  ruined  the  health  of  Mr.  Pitt.  An 
hereditary  disorder,  which  business,  fatigues, 
and  recent  vexations  had  rendered  mortal, 
caused  his  premature  end  on  the  23d  of  Janu- 
ary, 1806,  after  having  governed  his  country 
more  than  twenty  years,  with  as  much  power 
as  can  be  exercised  in  an  absolute  monarchy; 
and  yet  he  lived  in  a  free  country,  and  yet  he 
enjoyed  not  the  favour  of  his  sovereign,  and 
had  to  conquer  the  suffrages  of  the  most  in- 
dependent assembly  in  the  world. 

If  we  admire  those  ministers  who  in  abso- 
lute monarchies  have  the  skill  to  chain  for  a 
long  time  the  weakness  of  the  prince,  the  in- 
stability of  the  court,  and  to  reign  in  the  name 
of  their  master  over  an  enslaved  country, 
what  admiration  ought  we  not  to  feel  for  a 
man,  whose  power,  established  over  a  free  na- 
tion, lasted  twenty  years !  Courts  are  ex- 
tremely capricious  no  doubt :  they  are  not 

VOL.  II.— 16 


more  so  than  great  deliberative  assemblies. 
All  the  caprices  of  public  opinion,  excited  by 
the  thousand  stimulants  of  the  daily  press, 
and  reflected  in  a  parliament  where  they  as- 
sume the  authority  of  the  national  sovereignty, 
compose  that  variable  will,  alternately  servile 
and  despotic,  which  it  is  necessary  to  capti- 
!  vate  in  order  to  reign  one's  self  over  that  mul- 
i  titude  of  heads  which  pretend  to  reign.  To 
:  hold  sway  there,  it  requires  not  only  the  art 
of  flattery  which  wins  success  in  courts,  but 
also  that  very  different  art  of  public  speaking, 
sometimes  vulgar,  sometimes  sublime,  which 
is  indispensable  to  obtain  a  hearing  from  an 
'  assembly;  it  requires,  further,  that  which  is 
not  an  art,  which  is  a  gift,  the  temper  with 
I  which  one  succeeds  in  quelling  and  control- 
i  ling  the  excited  passions.  All  these  natural 
j  or  acquired  qualities  Mr.  Pitt  possessed  in  the 
I  highest  degree.  Never  in  modern  times  has 
there  existed  a  more  able  leader  of  an  assem- 
bly. Exposed  for  a  quarter  of  a  century  to 
the  impetuous  vehemence  of  Mr.  Fox,  to  the 
cutting  sarcasms  of  Mr.  Sheridan,  he  bore 
himself  up  with  imperturbable  composure, 
spoke  at  all  times  justly,  opportunely,  tempe- 
rately, and,  when  the  ringing  voice  of  his 
adversaries  was  joined  by  the  still  more  power- 
ful voice  of  events,  when  the  French  Revolu- 
tion, incessantly  disconcerting  the  most  expe- 
rienced statesman  and  general  in  Europe, 
flung  across  his  way  either  Fleurusor  Zurich, 
or  Marengo,  he  always  knew  how  to  restrain 
the  excited  minds  of  the  British  parliament 
by  his  firmness  and  by  the  pertinence  of  his 
answers.  It  is  for  this  more  particularly  that 
Mr.  Pitt  was  remarkable,  for  he  had  not,  as 
we  have  elsewhere  observed,  either  the  organ- 
izing genius  or  the  profound  faculties  of  the 
statesman.  With  the  exception  of  some 
financial  institutions  of  disputed  merit,  he 
created  nothing  in  England ;  he  was  often 
mistaken  respecting  the  relative  strength  of 
the  European  powers  and  the  course  of  events, 
but  to  the  talents  of  a  great  political  orator  he 
added  ardent  love  for  his  country,  and  a  pas- 
sionate hatred  of  the  French  Revolution. 
Representing  in  England  not  the  titled  aris- 
tocracy, but  the  commercial  aristocracy, 
which  lavished  its  treasures  upon  him  in 
the  way  of  loans,  he  resisted  the  greatness 
of  France  and  the  contagion  of  democratic 
disorders  with  immovable  perseverance,  and 
maintained  order  in  his  country  without  di- 
minishing liberty.  He  left  it  burdened  with 
debt,  it  is  true,  but  quiet  possessor  of  the  seas 
and  of  India.  He  used  and  abused  the 
strength  of  England,  but  she  was  the  sect  nd 
power  in  the  world  when  he  died,  and  the 
first,  eight  years  after  his  death.  And  what 
would  the  strength  of  nations  be  good  for 
unless  to  endeavour  to  control  one  another! 
Vast  dominations  are  among  the  designs  of 
Providence.  What  a  man  of  genius  is  to  a  na- 
tion, a  great  nation  is  to  mankind.  Great  na- 
tions civilize,  enlighten  the  world,  and  acce 
lerate  its  progress  in  every  way.  Only  it  is  ne- 
cessary to  counsel  them  to  unite  with  strength 
the  prudence  which  gives  success  to  strength, 
and  the  justice  which  honours  it. 
Mr.  Pitt,  so  prosperous  for  eighteen  years. 


122 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


[March,  1808. 


was  unfortunate  in  the  last  days  of  his  life. 
We  were  avenged,  we  French,  on  that  cruel 
enemy ;  for  he  had  reason  to  conclude  that  we 
should  be  victorious  forever,  to  doubt  the  ex- 
cellence of  his  policy,  and  to  tremble  for  the 
futurity  of  his  country.  It  was  one  of  the 
least  gifted  of  his  successors,  Lord  Castle- 
reagh,  who  was  destined  to  enjoy  our  disas- 
ters. 

Amidst  accusations  the  most  diverse  and  the 
most  violent,  Mr.  Pitt  had  the  good  fortune  not 
to  see  his  integrity  assailed.  He  lived  upon 
his  emoluments,  which  were  considerable,  and 
without  being  poor,  was  reputed  to  be  so. 
When  his  death  was  made  known,  one  of  the 
ministerial  majority  proposed  to  pay  his  debts. 
This  motion,  being  submitted  to  parliament, 
was  received  with  respect,  but  resisted  by  his 
old  friends,  who  had  become  his  enemies,  and 
particularly  by  Mr.  Wyndham,  who  had  so 
long  been  his  colleague  in  the  ministry.  His 
noble  antagonist,  Mr.  Fox,  refused  to  support 
the  motion,  but  with  grief.  "  I  honour,"  he 
exclaimed,  in  a  tone  that  moved  the  assembled 
Commons,  "  I  honour  my  illustrious  adver- 
sary, and  I  account  it  the  glory  of  my  life  to 
have  been  sometimes  called  his  rival.  But 
for  twenty  years  I  have  opposed  his  policy, 
and  what  would  the  present  generation  say 
of  me  if  it  were  to  see  me  approving  a  propo- 
sal designed  to  be  the  last  and  the  most  sig- 
nal homage  to  that  policy,  which  I  have  be- 
lieved, which  I  still  believe,  to  be  prejudicial 
to  England."  Everybody  comprehended  the 
vote  of  Mr.  Fox,  and  applauded  the  noble  spirit 
of  his  language. 

A  few  days  afterwards,  the  motion  having 
assumed  another  character,  parliament  unani- 
mously voted  50,000/.  sterling  (1,250,000 
francs)  to  pay  Mr.  Pitt's  debts.  It  was  de- 
cided that  he  should  be  buried  at  Westminster. 

Mr.  Pitt  left  vacant  the  offices  of  first  lord 
of  the  treasury,  chancellor  of  the  exchequer, 
lord  warden  of  the  Cinque  ports,  chancellor  of 
the  university  of  Cambridge,  and  several 
others  of  less  importance. 

It  was  very  difficult  to  supply  his  place,  not 
in  these  different  offices,  for  which  numerous 
,  ambitions  were  ready  to  dispute,  but  in  that 
of  prime  minister,  in  which  there  was  some- 
thing awful  in  presence  of  Napoleon,  conque- 
ror of  the  European  coalition.  One  idea  had 
taken  possession  of  all  minds  immediately 
after  the  renewal  of  the  war  in  1803,  and  at 
the  sight  of  the  weak  ministry  of  Mr.  Adding- 
ton,  who  then  governed.  The  concerted  op- 
position of  Pitt  and  Fox  against  the  Addington 
cabinet,  rendered  this  coalition  of  talents  more 
natural  and  more  easy.  Mr.  Pitt  desired  it, 
but  not  so  strongly  as  to  overcome  George  III. 
He  entered  upon  the  ministry  without  Mr.  Fox, 
and,  by  a  sort  of  compensation,  without  his 
stanchest  friends  in  the  old  tory  system,  with- 
out Lord  Grenville  and  Mr.  Wyndham,  whom 
he  had  found  too  ardent  to  associate  them 
again  with  himself. 

These,  left  out  by  Mr.  Pitt,  had  been  gradu- 
ally drawing  nearer  to  Mr.  Fox  by  the  way  of 
opposition,  though,  from  the  nature  of  their 
opinions,  they  were  further  from  him  than  Mr. 
P'tt  him^e.'.l.  A  common  struggle  of  two  years 


had  contributed  to  unite  them,  and  few  differ- 
ences divided  them  when  Mr.  Pitt  died.  A 
general  opinion  called  them  together  to  the 
ministry,  to  replace  by  their  combined  talents 
the  great  minister  whom  the  country  had  just 
lost;  to  endeavour  to  make  peace  by  means  of 
the  friendly  relations  between  Mr.  Fox  and 
Napoleon ;  and  to  continue  the  struggle  with 
all  the  known  energy  of  the  Grenvilles  and  the 
Wyndhams,  if  they  did  not  succeed  in  arrang- 
ing with  France. 

If,  in  1803,  George  III.  had  taken  Mr.  Pitt, 
whom  he  disliked,  in  order  to  dispense  with 
Mr.  Fox,  whom  he  disliked  still  more,  he  was 
forced  after  Mr.  Pitt's  death  to  submit  to  the 
empire  of  public  opinion,  and  to  call  into  one 
and  the  same  cabinet,  Fox,  Grenville,  Wynd- 
ham, and  their  friends.  Lord  Grenville  had 
the  office  of  first  lord  of  the  treasury,  that  is  to 
say,  prime  minister ;  Mr.  Wyndham,  that  which 
he  had  always  occupied,  the  administration  of 
war;  Mr.  Fox,  the  foreign  affairs;  Mr.  Grey, 
the  Admiralty.  The  other  departments  were 
distributed  among  the  friends  of  these  political 
personages,  but  in  such  a  manner  that  Mr. 
Fox  numbered  most  votes  in  the  new  minis- 
try. 

This  cabinet,  thus  formed,  obtained  a  great 
majority,  notwithstanding  the  attacks  of  the 
ousted  colleagues  of  Mr.  Pitt,  Lord  Castlereagh 
and  Mr.  Canning.  It  directed  its  immediate 
attention  to  two  essential  objects,  the  organi- 
zation of  the  army,  and  the  relations  with 
France. 

As  for  the  army,  it  was  not  possible  to  leave 
it  as  it  had  been  since  1803,  that  is  to  say, 
composed  of  an  insufficient  regular  force,  and 
of  300,000  volunteers,  as  expensive  as  they 
were  ill  disciplined.  It  was  an  organization 
of  emergency,  devised  for  the  moment  of  dan- 
ger. Mr.  Wyndham,  who  had  always  been 
sarcastic  upon  the  volunteers,  had  maintained 
that  nothing  great  could  be  done  but  with 
regular  armies,  which  had  furnished  him  with 
occasion  to  speak  in  magnificent  terms  of 
the  French  army — Mr.  Wyndham  could  less 
than  any  other  retain  the  present  organiza- 
tion. He  proposed,  therefore,  a  sort  of  dis- 
guised disbanding  of  the  volunteers,  and  cer- 
tain changes  in  the  troops  of  the  line,  which 
were  designed  to  facilitate  the  recruiting  of  the 
latter.  We  have  already  seen  that  the  Eng- 
lish army,  like  all  mercenary  armies,  was  re- 
cruited by  voluntary  enlistment.  But  this  en- 
listment was  for  life,  and  rendered  recruiting 
difficult.  Mr.  Wyndham  proposed  to  convert 
it  into  temporary  enlistment  for  a  term  of  seven 
to  twenty-one  years,  and  to  add  to  it  consider- 
able advantages  of  pay.  He  contributed  thus 
to  procure  a  much  stronger  organization  for  the 
English  army ;  but  he  had  to  contend  wi*h  the 
prejudice  which  standing  armies  excite  in  all 
free  natkns,  with  the  favour  which  the  volun- 
teers had  acquired,  and  above  all  with  the  in- 
terests created  by  that  institution;  for  it  had 
been  necessary  to  form  a  corps  of  officers  for  the 
volunteers,  which  government  was  now  obliged 
to  dissolve.  An  attempt  had  been  made  to  set 
Mr.  Wyndham  at  variance  with  his  new  col- 
league, Mr.  Fox,  who,  participating  in  the  po 
pular  prejudices  of  his  party,  had  formerly 


March,  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


123 


shown  a  greater  predilection  for  the  institution 
of  the  volunteers  than  for  the  extension  of  the 
regular  army.  Notwithstanding  all  these  ob- 
stacles, the  ministerial  plan  was  adopted.  A 
large  augmentation  to  the  regular  army  was 
voted;  till  the  complete  development  of  the 
new  system,  it  was  to  consist  of  267,000  men, 
75,000  of  whom  were  local  militia,  and  1 92,000 
troops  of  the  line,  distributed  throughout  the 
three  kingdoms  and  colonies.  The  total  ex- 
pense of  the  budget  still  amounted  to  about  83 
millions  sterling,  that  is,  more  than  two  thou- 
sand million  francs,  made  up  by  taxes  to  the 
amount  of  1500  millions,  and  a  loan,  to  be 
contracted  in  the  course  of  the  year,  for  500. 

It  was  with  these  mighty  resources  that 
England  purposed  to  appear  before  Napoleon, 
in  order  to  negotiate.  From  Mr.  For,  from  his 
situation,  from  his  friendly  relations  with  the 
Emperor,  were  expected  facilities  which  no 
other  could  possess  for  tendering  pacific  over- 
tures. A  fortunate  accident,  which  Providence 
owed  to  that  honest  man,  furnished  him  with 
a  most  honourable  and  most  natural  opportu- 
nity. A  wretch,  judging  of  the  new  English 
administration  from  the  preceding,  introduced 
himself  to  Mr.  Fox,  and  offered  to  assassinate 
Napoleon.  Mr.  Fox  indignantly  ordered  him 
to  be  seized  by  the  door-keepers,  and  delivered 
up  to  the  English  police.  He  wrote  immedi- 
ately a  very  noble  letter  to  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
denouncing  the  odious  proposal  which  he  had 
just  received,  and  offering  to  place  at  his  dis- 
posal all  the  means  for  prosecuting  the  author, 
if  his  scheme  appeared  to  involve  any  thing 
serious. 

Napoleon  was  touched,  as  well  he  might  be, 
at  so  generous  a  procedure,  and  ordered  M.  de 
Talleyrand  to  address  to  Mr.  Fox  such  an 
answer  as  the  latter  deserved.  "I  have  laid 
your  excellency's  letter  before  his  majesty," 
wrote  M.  de  Talleyrand.  "  There,"  he  ex- 
claimed, "  I  recognise  the  principles  of  honour 
and  virtue  which  have  always  animated  Mr. 
Fox.  Thank  him  in  my  name,  he  added,  and 
tell  him  that,  whether  the  policy  of  his  sove- 
reign causes  us  to  continue  much  longer  at 
war,  or  whether  as  speedy  an  end  as  the  two 
nations  can  desire  is  put  to  a  quarrel  useless 
for  humanity,  I  rejoice  at  the  new  character 
which,  from  this  proceeding,  the  war  has  al- 
ready taken,  and  which  is  an  omen  of  what 
may  be  expected  from  a  cabinet,  of  the  prin- 
ciples of  which  I  am  delighted  to  judge  from 
those  of  Mr.  Fox,  who  is  one  of  the  men  most 
fitted  to  feel  in  every  thing  what  is  excellent, 
what  is  truly  great." 

M.  de  Talleyrand  said  nothing  more,  and  this 
was  sufficient  to  produce  a  continuation  of 
communications  so  nobly  commenced.  Mr. 
Fox  immediately  answered  by  a  frank  and 
cordial  letter,  in  which,  without  circumlocu- 
tion, without  diplomatic  quirk,  he  offered  peace 
on  safe  and  honourable  conditions,  and  by 
means  as  simple  as  they  were  prompt.  The 
bases  of  the  treaty  of  Amiens  were  much 
changed,  according  to  Mr.  Fox  ;  they  were  so 
in  consequence  of  the  very  advantages  obtained 
by  France  and  England,  on  the  two  elements 
which  were  the  ordinary  theatre  of  their  suc- 
cesses. It  was,  therefore,  necessary  to  seek 


new  conditions,  which  should  not  hurt  the 
pride  of  either  of  the  two  nations,  and  which 
should  procure  for  Europe  guarantees  of  future 
tranquillity  and  safety.  These  conditions,  if 
both  sides  chose  to  be  reasonable,  were  not 
difficult  to  be  found.  According  to  anterior 
treaties,  England  could  not  negotiate  separately 
from  Russia,  but,  till  the  latter  could  be  con- 
sulted, it  was  allowable  to  commit  to  chosen 
agents  the  task  of  discussing  the  interests  of 
the  belligerent  powers,  and  paving  the  way  to 
their  adjustment.  Mr.  Fox  offered  to  appoint 
immediately  the  persons  who  should  be  charged 
with  this  mission,  and  the  place  where  they 
were  to  meet. 

This  proposal  delighted  Napoleon,  who,  at 
bottom,  wished  for  a  reconciliation  with  Great 
Britain,  for  from  her  every  war  proceeded, 
like  water  from  its  source,  and  there  were  few 
direct  means  of  conquering  her,  one  alone 
excepted,  extremely  decisive,  but  extremely 
precarious,  and  practicable  for  him  only,  an 
invasion.  He  was  sincerely  rejoiced  at  this 
frank  overture,  and  accepted  it  with  the  great- 
est cordiality. 

Without  entering  into  any  explanation  of 
the  conditions,  he  intimated  in  his  reply  that 
France  would  not  dispute  much  with  England 
the  conquests  which  she  had  made,  (she  had 
retained  Malta,  as  it  will  be  recollected,  and 
taken  the  Cape,)  that  France,  on  her  side,  had 
said  her  last  word  to  Europe  in  the  treaty  of 
Presburg,  and  that  she  claimed  nothing  further; 
that  it  would,  therefore,  be  easy  to  lay  down 
the  bases,  if  England  had  not  particular  and 
inadmissible  views  relative  to  commercial 
interests.  "The  Emperor  is  persuaded,"  said 
M.  de  Talleyrand,  "  that  the  real  cause  of  the 
rupture  of  the  peace  of  Amiens  was  no  other 
than  the  refusal  to  conclude  a  commercial 
treat}'.  Be  assured  that  the  Emperor,  without 
refusing  certain  commercial  advantages,  if 
they  are  possible,  will  not  admit  of  any  treaty 
prejudicial  to  French  industry,  which  he  means 
to  protect  by  all  duties  or  prohibitions  that 
can  favour  its  development.  He  insists  oa 
having  liberty  to  do  at  home  all  that  he  pleases, 
all  that  is  deemed  beneficial,  without  any  rival 
nation  having  a  right  to  find  fault  with  him." 

As  for  the  intervention  of  Russia  in  tht 
treaty,  Napoleon  directed  a  positive  declara- 
tion to  be  made  that  he  would  not  permit  it. 
The  principle  of  his  diplomacy  was  that  of 
separate  peace,  and  this  principle  was  equally 
just  and  ably  conceived.  Europe  had  always 
employed  the  medium  of  coalitions  against 
France;  it  would  be  favouring  them  to  admit 
of  collective  negotiations,  for  it  would  be  lend- 
ing one's  self  to  the  essential  condition  of 
every  coalition,  that  which  forbids  its  members 
to  treat  separately.  Napoleon,  who,  in  war, 
strove  to  meet  his  enemies  separated  from 
each  other,  in  order  to  beat  them  in  detail, 
could  do  no  other  than  strive  in  diplomacy  to 
meet  with  them  in  the  same  position.  Accord 
ingly,  he  had  opposed  absolute  refusals  to  all 
offers  of  negotiating  collectively,  and  he  was 
right,  with  the  salvo  to  depart  from  this  prin- 
ciple of  conduct,  in  case  Mr.  Fox  should  be 
bound  by  engagements  which  wou.d  not  per- 
mit him  to  tr»at  -yithout  Russiv  Napoleou, 


124 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[April,  1808 


after  he  had  laid  down  the  principle  of  a  sepa- 
rate negotiation,  enjoined  his  minister  to  inti- 
mate further  that  he  was  ready  to  choose  for 
the  place  of  the  negotiation,  not  that  Amiens 
which  reminded  one  of  bases  of  peace  hence- 
forward abandoned,  but  Lille,  and  to  send  a 
minister  plenipotentiary  thither  immediately. 

Mr.  Fox  instantly  replied  that  the  first  con- 
dition which  had  been  agreed  upon  at  the 
outset  of  these  parleys  was,  that  the  peace 
should  be  equally  honourable  for  both  nations, 
and  that  it  would  not  be  so  for  England,  if  she 
treated  without  Russia,  for  she  had  formally 
engaged  by  an  article  of  a  treaty  (that  which 
had  constituted  the  coalition  of  1805)  not  to 
conclude  a  separate  peace.  This  obligation 
was  absolute,  according  to  Mr.  Fox,  and  could 
not  be  eluded.  He  said  that,  if  France  had  a 
principle,  that  of  not  authorizing  coalitions  by 
her  manner  of  negotiating,  England  had  an- 
other, that  of  not  suffering  herself  to  be  excluded 
from  the  continent  by  lending  herself  to  the 
dissolution  of  her  continental  alliances;  that, 
on  this  point,  people  in  England  were  quite  as 
jealous  as  they  could  be  in  France  on  the  sub- 
ject of  coalitions.  Mr.  Fox,  who  accompanied 
each  of  his  official  despatches  with  a  private 
letter  full  of  frankness  and  honour,  an  example 
which  M.  de  Talleyrand  followed  on  his  side — 
Mr.  Fox  finished  with  saying  that  the  negotia- 
tion would  perhaps  be  stopped  by  an  absolute 
obstacle,  which  he  sincerely  regretted,  but 
that,  at  any  rate,  the  war  would  be  honourable 
and  worthy  of  the  two  great  nations  which 
waged  it.  He  added  these  remarkable  words: 
"  I  am  sensible  to  the  highest  degree,  as  I  ought 
to  be,  to  the  obliging  expressions  which  the 
great  man  whom  you  serve  has  used  in  regard 
to  me.  Regret  is  unavailing,  but,  if  he  could 
see,  with  the  same  eye  that  I  behold  it,  the  true 
glory  which  he  would  have  a  right  to  acquire 
by  a  just  and  moderate  peace,  what  happiness 
would  not  result  from  it  for  France  and  for  all 
Europe! 

"  C.  J.  Fox. 

"  London,  April  23,  1806.'' 

Amidst  this  rancorous,  one  might  say  fero- 
cious contest,  when  one  reviews  the  sangui- 
nary scenes  which  have  marked  it,  the  mind 
loves  to  dwell  on  that  noble  and  kindly  inter- 
course, to  which  a  man  as  generous  as  he  was 
eloquent  gave  rise  for  a  moment,  between  the 
two  greatest  nations  of  the  globe,  and  the 
heart  is  filled  with  painful,  inconsolable  regret. 

Napoleon  was  himself  deeply  touched  by 
the  language  of  Mr.  Fox,  and  he  was  i-incerely 
desirous  of  peace.  M.  de  Talleyrand,  though 
mistaken  in  regard  to  the  system  of  our  al- 
liances, was  never  wrong  on  the  main  point 
of  the  policy  of  the  time,  and  he  ceased  not 
for  a  moment  to  believe  that,  at  the  height  of 
greatness  to  which  we  had  attained,  peace  was 
our  primary  interest.  He  found  a  courage  to 
say  this  which  he  had  not  in  general,  and  he 
earnestly  pressed  Napoleon  to  seize  the  unique 
occasion  offered  by  the  presence  of  Mr.  Fox 
in  office,  to  negotiate  with  Great  Britain.  For 
the  rest,  he  had  no  difficulty  to  gain  a  hearing, 
for  Napoleon  was  not  less  disposed  than  him- 
seif  to  profit  by  this  alike  fortunate  and  unex- 
pected occasion. 


Circumstances,  moreover,  assisted  to  over- 
come the  obstacle  which  seemed  to  stop  the 
negotiation  at  its  outset.  There  was  more 
than  one  reason  to  believe,  from  reports  which 
came  from  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  from 
the  consul  of  France  at  St.  Petersburg,  that 
Alexander,  uneasy  about  the  consequences  of 
the  war,  mistrusting  the  silence  of  the  British 
cabinet  towards  him,  and  the  personal  disposi- 
tions of  Mr.  Fox,  wished  for  the  re-establish- 
ment of  peace.  The  consul  of  France  had 
sent  to  Paris  the  chancellor  of  the  consulate 
to  report  what  he  had  learned,  and  every  thing 
seemed  to  encourage  a  hope  of  opening  a 
direct  negotiation  with  Russia.  In  this  case, 
Mr.  Fox  could  no  longer  insist  on  the  principle 
of  a  collective  negotiation,  since  Russia  would 
herself  have  set  the  example  of  renouncing  it. 

It  was  determined,  therefore,  to  prosecute 
the  parleys  commenced  by  Mr.  Fox,  and  for 
this  purpose  there  was  employed  an  agent, 
whom  a  lucky  chance  had  just  presented.  To 
the  generous  words  exchanged  with  Mr.  Fox 
were  added  proceedings  not  less  generous. 
Ever  since  the  apprehension  of  the  English, 
ordered  by  Napoleon,  at  the  time  of  the  rup- 
ture of  the  peace  of  Amiens,  by  way  of  re- 
prisals for  the  seizure  of  French  vessels, 
many  members  of  the  highest  families  in  Eng- 
land had  been  detained  at  Verdun.  Mr.  Fox 
had  applied  for  the  release  of  several  of  them 
on  parole.  His  solicitations  had  been  cheer- 
fully complied  with,  and  though,  not  daring  to 
insist  upon  all  of  them  in  an  equal  degree,  he 
had  classed  them  according  to  the  interest 
which  he  felt  for  them,  Napoleon  resolved  to 
grant  them  all,  and  the  English  designated  by 
him  had  been  released  without  any  exception. 
In  return  for  this  noble  proceeding,  Mr.  Fox 
had  selected,  for  the  purpose  of  releasing 
them,  the  most  distinguished  prisoners  taken 
at  the  battle  of  Trafalgar,  the  unfortunate 
Villeneuve,  Captain  Lucas,  the  heroic  com- 
mander of  the  Redoutable,  and  many  others, 
equal  in  number  to  the  English  set  at  liberty. 

Among  the  prisoners  restored  to  Mr.  Fox 
was  one  of  the  richest  and  one  of  the  cleverest 
English  noblemen,  Lord  Yarmouth,  afterwards 
Marquis  of  Hertford,  a  stanch  Tory,  but  an 
intimate  friend  of  Mr.  Fox's,  a  decided  parti- 
san of  peace,  which  enabled  him  to  live  abroad 
and  enjoy  the  pleasures  of  the  Continent,  of 
which  he  was  deprived  by  the  war.  This 
young  nobleman,  acquainted  with  the  most 
brilliant  of  the  youth  of  Paris,  in  whose  dis- 
sipations he  partook,  was  well  known  to  M. 
de  Talleyrand,  who  liked  the  English  nobility, 
especially  such  of  them  as  had  talents,  ele- 
gance, and  dissolute  habits.  Lord  Yarmouth 
was  pointed  out  to  him  as  particularly  con- 
nected with  Mr.  Fox,  and  as  well  worthy  of 
the  confidence  of  both  governments.  He  sent 
for  him,  told  him  that  the  Emperor  was  sin- 
cerely desirous  of  peace,  that  they  must  set 
aside  the  ceremony  of  diplomatic  forms,  and 
come  to  a  frank  explanation  upon  the  condi- 
tions acceptable  on  both  sides ;  that  these  con- 
ditians  could  not  be  very  difficult  to  find,  since 
France  would  no  longer  dispute  with  England 
what  she  had  conquered,  that  is  to  say,  Malta 
and  the  Cape ;  that  the  question,  therefore,  was 


April,  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


125 


reduced  to  a  few  islands  of  little  importance ; 
that,  in  regard  to  France,  she  spoke  out  in  a 
clear  and  straightforward  manner  ;  she  desired 
that,  besides  her  natural  territory,  the  Rhine 
and  the  Alps.no  power  should  henceforth  con- 
test with  her  the  whole  of  Italy,  including  the 
kingdom  of  Naples,  and  her  alliances  in  Ger- 
many, on  condition  of  restoring  their  independ- 
ence to  Switzerland  and  Holland,  as  .soon  as 
peace  should  be  signed  ;  thai,  consequently, 
there  was  no  serious  obstacle  to  an  immediate 
reconciliation  of  the  two  countries,  since  both 
must  be  disposed  to  concede  the  things  just 
specified  ;  that,  relative  to  the  difficulty  arising 
from  the  form  of  the  negotiation,  collective  or 
separate,  they  should  soon  find  a  solution  of  that, 
thanks  to  the  inclination  shown  by  Russia  to 
treat  directly  with  France. 

There  was  one  capital  point  on  which  no 
explanation  was  given,  but  respecting  which 
France  gave  to  understand  that  in  the  end  she 
should  tell  her  secret,  and  tell  it  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  satisfy  the  royal  family  of  Eng- 
land— that  was  Hanover. 

Napoleon  had  actually  determined  to  restore 
it  to  George  III.,  and  it  was  the  recent  conduct 
of  Prussia  which  had  provoked  him  to  this 
serious  resolution.  The  hypocritical  language 
of  that  court  in  its  manifestoes,  tending  to  re- 
present it  to  the  Hanoverians  and  to  the  Eng- 
!i.-h  as  an  oppressed  power  which  had  been 
forced  with  the  sword  at  its  throat,  to  accept  a 
fine  kingdom,  had  transported  him  with  anger. 
He  was  for  tearing  that  moment  the  treaty  of 
the  15th  of  February,  and  obliging  Prussia  to 
replace  every  thing  on  the  former  footing. 
But  for  the  reflections  which  time  and  M.  de 
Talleyrand  suggested,  he  would  have  made  a 
disturbance.  Another  more  recent  circum- 
stance had  contributed  to  detach  him  entirely 
from  Prussia,  that  was  the  publication  by  Lord 
Castlereagh  and  Mr.  Pitt's  retiring  colleagues, 
of  the  negotiations  of  1805.  The  latter  were 
intent  on  avenging  the  memory  of  their  illus- 
trious leader,  by  showing  that  he  had  had  no- 
thing to  do  with  the  military  operations,  though 
he  had  had  the  greatest  share  in  the  formation 
of  the  coalition  of  1805,  which  had  saved  Eng- 
land, by  causing  the  breaking  up  of  the  camp 
of  Boulogne.  But,  in  defending  the  memory 
of  their  leader,  they  had  compromised  most  of 
the  courts.  Mr.  Fox  had  reproached  them  with 
it  in  the  House  of  Commons  with  extreme 
vehemence,  and  had  attributed  to  them  the 
change  in  all  the  relations  of  England  with 
the  European  powers.  There  was  in  fact  a 
universal  outcry  against  English  diplomacy 
in  the  cabinets,  which  found  themselves  de- 
nounced to  France  by  this  imprudent  publica- 
tion. On  this  occasion,  an  unlucky  light  had 
been  thrown  on  the  conduct  of  Prussia.  Her 
hyp<  critical  and  recentdeclarations  to  England 
relative  to  Hanover,  the  hopes  which  she  had 
held  out  to  the  coalition,  before  and  after  the 
events  of  Potsdam,  were  all  divulged.  Napo- 
leon, without  complaining,  had  ordered  the  in- 
sertion of  these  documents  in  the  Moniteur, 
leaving  every  one  to  guess  what  he  ought  to 
think  of  them. 

But  the  opinion  of  Napoleon  in   regard  to  !  Napoleon  ordered  it  to  halt  on  the  Inn,  to  re- 
Prussia  was  formed.    He  no  longer  considered  '  arm   Brannau,   to   re-establish   itself,  and  lo 

1.2 


her  worth  the  trouble  of  a  prolonged  contest 
with  England :  he  was  determined  lo  restore 
Hanover  to  the  latter,  and  to  offer  Prussia  one 
of  two  things,  either  an  equivalent  to  Hanover 
to  be  found  in  Germany,  or  the  restitution  of 
what  he  had  received  from  her,  Anspach, 
Cleves,  and  Neufchatel.  There  the  cabinet  of 
Berlin  would  reap  what  it  had  sown,  and  would 
meet  with  no  more  fidelity  than  it  had  mani- 
fested. Still  Napoleon  was  ignorant  of  the 
secret  negotiation  begun  with  Russia  through 
the  medium  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  M. 
de  Hardenberg. 

Without  completely  explaining,  the  French 
government  gave  Lord  Yarmouth  to  under- 
stand that  the  peace  would  not  depend  on 
Hanover,  and  he  set  out,  promising  to  return 
soon  with  the  secret  of  Mr.  Fox's  intentions. 

A  singular  event,  which  for  some  days  im- 
parted to  things  a  strong  appearance  of  war, 
contributed  on  the  contrary  to  turn  them  to 
peace,  by  accelerating  the  resolutions  of  the 
Russian  cabinet.  The  French  troops  ordered 
to  occupy  Dalmatia,  had  hastened  their  march 
to  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  to  preserve  them 
from  the  danger  with  which  they  were  threat- 
ened. The  Montenegrins,  whose  bishop  and 
principal  chief  subsisted  on  the  bounty  of 
Russia,  were  greatly  agitated  on  learning  the 
approach  of  the  French,  and  had  sent  for 
Admiral  Siniavin,  the  same  who  had  conveyed 
from  Corfu  to  Naples  and  from  Naples  to 
Corfu  the  Russians  sent  to  overrun  the  south 
of  Italy.  That  admiral,  informed  of  the  oppor- 
tunity which  offered  to  seize  the  mouths  of  the 
Cattaro,  had  hastily  embarked  a  few  hundred 
Russians,  joined  them  to  a  body  of  Montene- 
grins who  had  descended  from  their  moun- 
tains and  appeared  before  the  forts.  An  Aus- 
trian officer  who  occupied  them,  and  a  com- 
missioner charged  by  Austria  to  surrender 
them  to  the  French,  declaring  that  they  were 
constrained  by  a  superior  force,  delivered  them 
up  to  the  Russians.  This  allegation  of  a  su- 
perior force  was  wholly  unfounded,  for,  in  the 
forts  of  Cattaro  there  were  two  Austrian  bat- 
talions very  capable  of  defending  them  even 
against  a  regular  army  possessing  the  means 
of  siege,  of  which  the  Russians  were  destitute. 
This  perfidy  was  chiefly  the  deed  of  the  Aus- 
trian commissioner,  Marquis  de  Ghisilieri,  a 
most  artful  Italian,  blamed  afterwards  by  his 
government,  and  put  upon  his  trial  for  this 
dishonourable  act. 

When  the  report  of  this  fact,  transmitted  to 
Paris  by  an  extraordinary  courier,  reached 
Napoleon,  he  was  extremely  irritated,  for  he 
attached  infinite  importance  to  the  mouths  of 
the  Cattaro,  not  so  much  on  account  of  the 
advantages,  though  very  positive,  of  their  ma- 
ritime position,  as  for  their  vicinity  to  Turkey, 
on  which  they  enabled  the  holder  to  exercise 
an  influence,  either  protective  or  repressive. 
But  he  was  angry  with  the  cabinet  of  Vienna 
alone,  for  it  was  that  cabinet  which  ought  to 
deliver  the  territory  of  Dalmatia  to  him,  and 
which  was  the  only  debtor  in  regard  to  him. 
The  corps  of  Marshal  Sonlt  was  on  the  point 
of  repassing  the  Inn  and  evacuating  Brnunau. 


126 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[April,  I80a 


create  an  absolute  place  d'armes  there.  At  the 
same  time  he  declared  to  Austria  that  the 
French  troops  should  turn  back,  that  the  Aus- 
trian prisoners  on  their  march  home  should 
be  detained,  and  that,  if  need  were,  things 
should  be  carried  so  far  as  the  renewal  of  hos- 
tilities, unless  one  of  these  two  satisfactions 
were  given  him ;  either  the  immediate  restitu- 
tion of  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro  or  the  de- 
spatch of  an  Austrian  military  force  to  retake 
them  from  the  Russians  in  conjunction  with 
the  French.  This  second  alternative  was  not 
the  one  that  he  should  have  liked  least,  for  it 
would  set  Austria  at  variance  with  Russia. 
When  these  declarations,  made  with  the 
peremptory  tone  usual  with  Napoleon,  had 
reached  Vienna,  they  produced  real  consterna- 
tion there.  The  Austrian  cabinet  was  in  no 
wise  implicated  in  this  treachery  of  an  infe- 
rior agent.  The  latter  had  acted  without 
order,  thinking  to  please  his  government  by  a 
perfidy  against  the  French.  Letters  were  im- 
mediately despatched  from  Vienna  to  St.  Pe- 
tersburg, to  inform  the  Emperor  Alexander  of 
the  new  perils  to  which  Austria  found  herself 
exposed,  and  to  declare  that,  unwilling  on  any 
account  to  see  the  French  again  at  Vienna, 
she  would  rather  submit  to  the  painful  neces- 
sity of  attacking  the  Russians  in  the  forts  of 
the  Cattaro. 

Admiral  Siniavin,  who  had  taken  possession 
of  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  had  acted  with- 
out orders,  as  well  as  the  Marquis  de  Ghisilieri 
who   had   delivered   them.      Alexander    was 
grieved  at  the  position  in  which  his  ally  the 
Emperor  Francis   had  been  placed;  he  was 
grieved  at  the  position  in  which  he  was  him- 
self placed,  between    the   embarrassment  of 
restoring  and  that  of  retaining.    He  was  more 
and  more  annoyed  by  the  solicitations  of  his 
young  friends,  who  talked  to  him  incessantly 
about  perseverance  in  conduct;  he  was  un- 
easy  respecting   the   negotiations   begun    by 
Napoleon  with  England ;  and,  though  the  lat- 
ter had  at  length  broken  the  silence  which  she 
had  observed  during  the  ministerial  crisis,  he 
distrusted  his  allies,  and  was  inclined  to  fol- 
low the  general  example  and  to  reconcile  him- 
self with  France.     Accordingly,  he  took  occa- 
sion from  the  very  circumstance  of  the  mouths 
of  the  Cattaro,  which  seemed  rather  an  occa- 
sion for  war  than  for  peace,  to  commence  a 
pacific  negotiation.     He  had  at  hand  the  for- 
mer secretary  of  the  Russian  legation  at  Pa- 
ris, M.  d'Oubril,  who  had  conducted  himself 
there  to  the  satisfaction  of  both  governments 
and   who   had,  moreover,   the   advantage  of 
being  well-known  in  France.     He  was  direct- 
ed to  proceed  to  Vienna,  and  to  apply  there 
for  passports  to  Paris.    The  ostensible  pretex 
was  to  be  business  relating  to  the  Russian 
prisoners,  but  his  real  errand  was  to  treat  ol 
the  affair  of  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  and  to 
include  it  in  a  general  settlement  of  all  the 
questions  which  had  divided  the  two  empires 
M.  d'Oubril   had  orders  to  delay  as   long  as 
possible  the  restitution  of  the  mouths  of  the 
Cattaro,  to  give  them  up,  nevertheless,  if  ther 
were  no  means  of  preventing  a  renewal  o 
'lostilicies   against   Austria;   and   to  manage 
above  all  to  re-establish  an. honourable  peac 


>etween  Russia  and  France.  It  will  be  thought 
lonourable,  he  was  told,  if  something,  no  mat- 
er what,  is  obtained  for  the  two  habitual  pro- 
eges  of  the  Russian  cabinet,  Naples  and 
i'iedmont;  for  the  two  empires  had,  for  the 
rest,  nothing  to  dispute  with  each  other,  and 
were  carrying  on  merely  a  war  of  influence. 
3efore  he  set  off,  M.  d'Oubril  conversed  with 
he  Emperor  Alexander,  and  it  became  mani- 
est  to  him  that  this  prince  was  visibly  much 
more  disposed  to  peace  than  the  Russian  min- 
stry,  which  besides  was  tottering,  and  on  the 
)oint  of  being  dismissed.  He  set  out,  there- 
ore,  inclining  to  that  side  to  which  his  master 
nclined.  He  was  furnished  with  double 
>owers,  the  one  limited,  the  other  complete, 
and  embracing  all  the  questions  that  he  could 
lave  to  resolve.  He  had  orders  to  concert 
with  the  English  negotiator  relative  to  the 
conditions  of  peace,  but  without  requiring  a 
collective  negotiation,  which,  in  fact,  did  away 
with  the  difficulties  that  had  arisen  between 
France  and  England. 

M.  d'Oubril  set  out  for  Vienna  and  by  his 
aresence  restored  composure  to  the  Emperor 
Francis,  who  feared  that  he  should  either  see 
the  French  come  back  to  his  country,  or  that 
ic  should  have  to  fight  the  Russians.  The 
second  alternative  alarming  him  much  less 
than  the  first,  that  prince  had  sent  off  an  Aus- 
trian corps  for  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  with 
orders  to  second  the  French  troops,  if  neces- 
sary. M.  d'Oubril  cheered  him  by  showing  his 
powers,  and  applied  for  passports  through 
Count  Rausmousky,  in  order  to  proceed  as> 
speedily  as  possible  to  Paris. 

Napoleon  desired  that  an  immediate  and 
favourable  answer  should  be  given  to  the  de- 
mand of  M.  d'Oubril,  but  at  the  same  time  he 
took  care  to  make  a  distinction  between  the 
affair  of  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro  and  that  of 
the  re-establishment  of  peace.  The  affair  of 
the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  according  to  what 
was  said  on  his  behalf,  could  not  be  the  sub- 
ject of  any  negotiation,  since  it  related  to  an 
engagement  of  Austria's  which  remained  un- 
executed, and  respecting  which  France  had 
nothing  to  discuss  with  Russia.  As  to  the  re- 
establishment  of  peace,  the  French  govern- 
ment was  ready  to  listen  most  cheerfully  to 
the  proposals  of  M.  d'Oubril,  for  it  was  sin- 
cerely desirous  to  put  an  end  to  a  war,  alike 
without  object  and  without  interest  for  the  two 
empires.  The  passports  of  M.  d'Oubril  were 
immediately  despatched  to  Vienna. 

Napoleon  thus  saw  Austria,  exhausted  by 
three  wars,  striving  to  avoid  any  new  hostility 
against  France;  Russia,  disgusted  with  a  con- 
test too  lightly  undertaken,  and  determined 
not  to  prolong  it;  England,  satisfied  with  her 
naval  successes,  thinking  it  not  worih  while  to 
expose  herself  again  to  some  formidable  ex- 
pedition ;  lastly,  Prussia,  stripped  of  all  re 
spect,  of  no  value  in  the  estimation  of  any 
one.  and  in  this  state,  the  whole  world  desirous 
to  preserve  or  to  obtain  peace,  on  conditions, 
it  is  true,  which  were  not  yet  clearly  defined, 
but  which,  whatever  they  were,  would  leave 
France  in  the  rank  of  the  first  power  in  the 
world. 
Napoleon  keenly  enjoyed  this  situation,  and 


April,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


127 


had  no  inclination  whatever  to  compromise  it 
even  to  gain  new  victories.  But  he  meditated 
vast  projects  which  he  conceived  that  he  could 
cause  10  spring  naturally  and  immediately 
from  the  treaty  of  Presburg.  These  projects 
seemed  to  him  to  be  so  generally  foreseen, 
that,  upon  the  single  condition  of  accomplish- 
ing them  forthwith,  he  hoped  to  get  them  com- 
prehended in  the  double  peace  which  was 
negotiating  with  Russia  and  England.  Then 
his  empire,  such  as  he  had  conceived  it  in  his 
mighty  mind,  would  be  definitively  constituted 
and  accepted  by  Europe.  These  results  ob- 
tained, he  considered  peace  as  the  completion 
and  the  ratification  of  his  work,  as  the  prize 
due  to  his  labours  and  to  those  of  his  people, 
as  the  accomplishment  of  his  fondest  wishes. 
He  was  a  man,  in  short,  as  he  had  already 
sent  word  to  Mr.  Fox,  and  he  was  far  from 
being  insensible  to  the  charms  of  repose.  With 
the  powerful  versatility  of  his  mind,  he  was  as 
much  disposed  to  enjoy  the  sweets  of  peace 
and  the  glory  of  the  useful  arts  as  to  transport 
himself  again  to  fields  of  battle,  to  bivouac 
among  his  soldiers  upon  the  snow. 

Lord  Yarmouth  had  returned  from  London, 
with  a  private  letter  from  Mr.  Fox,  attesting 
that  he  possessed  the  entire  confidence  of  that 
minister,  and  that  he  might  be  talked  to  with- 
out reserve.  This  letter  added,  that  Lord  Yar- 
mouth should  receive  powers,  as  soon  as  there 
should  be  a  well-founded  hope  of  an  arrange- 
ment. M.  de  Talleyrand  had  then  informed 
him  of  the  communications  established  with 
Russia,  and  had  thus  proved  the  inutility  of 
insisting  on  a  collective  negotiation,  when 
Russia  lent  herself  to  a  separate  negotiation. 
As  for  the  pretension  of  England  not  to  be  ex- 
cluded from  the  affairs  of  the  continent,  M.  de 
Talleyrand  offered  Lord  Yarmouth  an  official 
recognition  of  an  equal  right  for  both,  powers  of 
intervention  and  guarantee  in  continental  and 
maritime  uffnirs.1  Thus  the  question  of  a  sepa- 
rate negotiation  seemed  to  be  a  question  no 
longer,  and  the  conditions  of  peace  themselves 
appeared  to  present  no  further  insoluble  diffi- 
culties. England  wished  to  retain  the  Cape 
and  Malta ;  she  also  showed  a  desire  to  keep 
our  establishments  in  India,  such  as  Chander- 
nagor  and  Pondicherry,  the  French  islands  of 
Tobago  and  St.  Lucia,  and  above  all  the  Dutch 
colony  of  Surinam,  Mtuated  on  the  American 
continent.  Among  these  different  possessions, 
Surinam  alone  was  of  any  importance,  Pondi- 
cherry being  but  a  mere  wreck  of  our  ancient 
power  in  India ;  Tobago  and  St.  Lacia  were 
not  of  sufficient  value  to  induce  a  refusal. 
Respecting  Surinam,  England  did  not  abso- 
lutely insist.  As  for  our  continental  con- 
quests, assuredly  as  important  as  our  maritime 
conquests,  she  was  ready  to  concede  all  of 
them  to  us,  without  excepting  Genoa,  Venice, 
Dalmatia,  and  Naples.  Sicily  alone  appeared 
to  form  a  difficulty.  Lord  Yarmouth,  explain- 
ing himself  confidentially,  said  that  England 
was  tired  of  protecting  those  Bourbons  of 
Naples,  that  imbecile  king,  that  mad  queen  ; 
that,  nevertheless,  since  they  possessed  Sicily 
de  facto,  for  Joseph  had  not  yet  conquered  it, 


1  The  words  of  the  despatch. 


one  would  be  obliged  to  demand  it  for  them, 
but  that  this  would  be  a  question  which  would 
depend  on  the  result  of  the  military  operations 
already  undertaken.  In  case,  however,  Sicily 
•  should  be  taken  from  them,  Lord  Yarmouth 
added,  that  an  indemnity  must  somewhere  be 
found  for  them.  It  was  tacitly  implied  that, 
in  return  for  these  various  concessions,  Han- 
over should  be  restored  to  England.  But  on. 
both  sides  the  matter  was  reserved  without 
being  formally  mentioned. 

Sicily,  therefore,  was  the  only  serious  diffi- 
culty, and  yet  the  immediate  conquest  of  the 
island,  upon  condition  of  an  indemnity,  how- 
ever insignificant  it  might  be,  would  be  capa- 
ble of  arranging  every  thing.  Passports  had 
been  sent  to  M.  d'Oubril;  it  was  not  known 
what  pretensions  he  might  bring,  but  they 
could  not  be  essentially  different  from  the  Eng- 
lish pretensions. 

Napoleon  clearly  perceived  that,  by  not  hur- 
rying the  negotiations  and  by  accelerating,  on. 
the  other  hand,  the  execution  of  his  plans,  he 
should  attain  his  twofold  aim,  that  of  consti- 
tuting his  empire  as  he  pleased,  and  of  obtain- 
ing the  confirmation  of  its  establishment  by 
the  general  peace. 

From  the  first,  in  preferring  the  title  of  em- 
peror to  that  of  king,  he  had  conceived  a  vast 
system  of  empire,  on  which  vassal  royalties 
should  be  dependent,  in  imitation  of  the  Ger- 
manic empire,  an  empire  so  enfeebled  that  it 
no  longer  existed  but  in  name,  and  which  held 
out  a  temptation  to  replace  it  in  Europe.  The 
late  victories  of  Napoleon  had  heated  his  ima- 
gination, and  he  dreamed  of  nothing  else  but  of 
reviving  the  empire  of  the  West,  placing  its 
crown  on  his  head,  and  thus  re-establishing  it 
for  the  advantage  of  France.  The  new  vassal 
royalties  were  all  found,  and  they  were  to  be 
distributed  among  the  members  of  the  Bona- 
parte family.  Eugene  de  Beauharnais,  adopted 
as  son,  become  the  husband  of  a  Bavarian 
princess,  was  already  viceroy  of  Italy,  and  this 
viceroyalty  comprehended  the  more  important 
half  of  the  Italian  peninsula,  since  it  extended 
from  Tuscany  to  the  Julian  Alps.  Joseph, 
elder  brother  of  Napoleon,  was  destined  for 
king  of  Naples.  Nothing  more  was  required 
but  to  procure  Sicily  for  him,  in  order  to  put 
him  in  possession  of  one  of  the  finest  kingdoms 
of  the  second  order.  Holland,  which  had  great 
difficulty  to  govern  itself  as  a  republic,  was 
under  the  absolute  dependence  of  Napoleon; 
and  he  thought  that  he  could  include  it  in  his 
system,  by  constituting  it  a  kingdom  in  favour 
of  his  brother  Louis.  These  made  three  king- 
doms to  be  placed  under  the  paramountship  of 
his  empire.  Sometimes,  when  he  extended  the 
dream  of  his  greatness  further,  he  thought  of 
Spain  and  Portugal,  which  were  daily  giving 
him  signs,  Spain  of  a  secret  hostility,  Portugal 
of  an  open  hostility.  But  this  was  yet  placed 
at  a  great  distance  in  the  wide  horizon  of  his 
imagination.  It  was  requisite  that  Europe 
should  oblige  him  by  some  new  startling 
achievement,  like  that  of  Austerlitz,  to  decide 
upon  the  complete  expulsion  of  the  house  of 
Bourbon.  It  is  certain,  however,  that  this  ex- 
pulsion began  to  be  a  systematic  idea  with 
him.  Since  he  had  been  led  to  proclaim  the 


128 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[April,  180ft. 


dethronement  of  the  Bourbons  of  Naples,  he 
considered  the  family  of  Bonaparte  as  destined 
to  replace  the  house  of  Bourbon  on  all  the 
thrones  of  the  south  of  Europe. 

In  this  vast  hierarchy  of  vassal  states  de- 
pendent on  the  French  Empire,  he  planned  a 
second  and  a  third  rank,  composed  of  great 
and  small  duchies,  after  the  model  of  the  fiefs 
of  the  Germanic  empire.  He  had  already  con- 
stituted for  the  benefit  of  his  eldest  sister  the 
duchy  of  Lucca,  which  he  purposed  to  aug- 
ment by  the  addition  of  the  principality  of 
Massa,  detached  from  the  kingdom  of  Italy. 
He  projected  the  creation  of  another,  that  of 
Guastalla,  by  detaching  it  also  from  the  king- 
dom of  Italy.  These  two  dismemberments 
were  very  insignificant,  in  comparison  with 
the  magnificent  accession  of  the  Venetian 
States.  Napoleon  had  just  obtained  from  Prus- 
sia, Neufchatel.  Anspach,  and  the  remnant  of 
the  duchy  of  Cleves.  He  had  given  Anspach 
to  Bavaria,  in  order  to  procure  the  duchy  of  ! 
Berg,  a  fine  country,  situated  on  the  right  of 
the  Rhine,  below  Cologne,  and  comprehending 
the  important  fortress  of  Wesel. — Strasburg, 
Mayence,  and  Wesel,  said  Napoleon,  are  the 
three  bridles  of  the  Rhine. 

He  had  still,  in  Upper  Italy,  Parma  and  Pla- 
centia,  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  Ponte  Corvo 
and  Benevento,  fiefs  disputed  between  Naples 
and  the  Pope,  who  gave  him  at  this  moment 
the  most  serious  causes  of  displeasure.  Pius 
VII.  had  not  carried  with  him  from  Paris  the 
satisfactions  which  he  expected.  Flattered  by 
the  attentions  of  Napoleon,  he  had  deceived 
himself  in  his  hopes  of  a  territorial  compensa- 
tion. Besides,  the  invasion  of  .ill  Italy  by  the 
French,  now  that  they  had  spread  themselves 
from  the  Julian  Alps  to  the  Strait  of  Messina, 
had  appeared  to  him  to  complete  the  depend- 
ence of  the  Roman  States.  He  was  excessively 
mortified  at  this,  and  showed  it  in  all  ways. 
He  would  not  organize  the  church  of  Germany, 
which  was  left  without  prelates,  without  chap- 
ters, ever  since  the  secularizations.  He  ad-  ! 
rnitted  of  none  of  the  religious  arrangements  j 
adopted  for  Italy.  On  occasion  of  the  marriage  j 
which  Jerome  Bonaparte  had  contracted  in  the 
United  States  with  a  Protestant,  and  which  ! 
N*apoleon  wished  to  get  dissolved,  the  Pope  ' 
opposed  an  insincere  but  obstinate  resistance, 
thus  employing  his  spiritual  arms  in  default 
of  temporal  arms.  Napoleon  had  sent  him 
word  that  he  considered  himself  as  master 
of  Italy,  including  Rome,  and  that  he  would  j 
not  suffer  any  secret  enemy  there;  that  he! 
should  follow  the  example  of  those  princes 
who,  continuing  faithful  to  the  Church,  had 
known  how  to  control  it;  that  he  was  a  real 
Charlemagne  for  the  Church  of  Rome,  for  he 
had  re-established  it,  and  he  claimed  to  be 
treated  as  such.  Meanwhile,  he  expressed  his 
displeasure  by  taking  Ponte  Corvo  and  Bene- 
vento. This  was  the  deplorable  commence- 
ment of  a  baneful  misunderstanding,  to  which 
Napoleon  then  conceived  that  he  could  set  any 
bounds  he  pleased,  for  the  interests  of  religion 
and  the  empire. 

Thus,  besides  several  thrones  to  give  away, 
ne  had  Lucca,  Guastalla,  Benevento,  Ponte 
Corvo,  Placentia,  Parma,  Neufchatel,  and  Berg,  ! 


1  to  distribute  among  his  sisters  and  his  most 
faithful  servants,  with  the  titles  of  principali- 
ties or  duchies.  While  giving  kingdoms  such 
as  Naples  to  Joseph,  augmentations  such  as 
the  Venetian  States  to  Eugene,  he  thought  of 
creating  a  score  of  minor  duchies,  destined  as 
well  for  his  generals  as  for  his  best  servants 
of  the  civil  order,  to  form  a  third  rank  in  his 
imperial  hierarchy,  and  to  reward  in  a  signal 
manner  those  men  to  whom  he  owed  the  throne, 
and  to  whom  France  owed  her  greatness. 

While,  in  placing  the  imperial  crown  on  his 
head,  he  had  adjudged  to  himself  the  prize  of 
the  marvellous  exploits  performed  by  the  con- 
temporary generation,  he  had  raised  longings 
in  the  companions  of  his  glory,  and  they,  too, 
aspired  to  obtain  the  reward  of  their  exertions. 
Unfortunately,  they  no  longer  imitated  the 
abstinence  of  the  generals  of  the  Republic, 
and  frequently  took  what  he  was  in  no  haste 
to  give  them.  In  Italy,  and  especially  in  the 
Venetian  States,  had  recently  been  committed 
scandalous  extortions,  which  Napoleon  made 
a  point  of  repressing  with  the  utmost  rigour. 
He  had,  with  incredible  vigilance,  sought  and 
discovered  the  secret  of  those  exactions,  sum- 
moned before  him  the  persons  who  had  been 
guilty  of  them,  wrung  from  them  a  confession 
of  the  sums  appropriated,  and  required  the 
immediate  restitution  of  those  amounts,  be- 
ginning with  the  general-in-chief,  who  was 
obliged  to  pay  a  considerable  sum  into  the 
chest  of  the  army. 

But  he  meant  not  to  impose  strict  integrity 
on  his  generals,  without  rewarding  their  hero- 
ism. Tell  them,  he  wrote  to  Eugene  and  to 
Joseph,  about  whom  were  employed  several 
of  the  officers  whose  conduct  he  had  just 
corrected,  tell  them  that  I  will  give  them  all 
much  more  than  they  could  ever  take  them- 
selves; that  what  they  would  take  would 
cover  them  with  shame,  that  what  I  shall  give 
them  will  do  them  honour,  and  will  be  an 
everlasting  testimony  of  their  glory;  that,  in 
paying  themselves  with  their  own  hands,  they 
would  vex  my  subjects,  make  France  the  ob- 
ject of  the  maledictions  of  the  conquered,  and 
that  what  I  shall  give  them,  on  the  contrary, 
accumulated  by  my  foresight,  will  not  be  a 
robbery  of  any  one.  Let  them  wait,  he  added, 
and  they  shall  be  rich  and  honoured,  without 
having  to  blush  for  any  extortion. 

Profound  ideas  were  mingled,  as  we  see, 
with  his  conceptions,  apparently  the  most 
vain.  He  was,  therefore,  resolved  to  gratify 
the  desire  of  his  generals  for  enjoyments,  but 
to  direct  it  towards  noble  rewards  legitimately 
acquired.  Under  the  Consulate,  when  every 
thing  still  had  the  republican  form,  he  had  de- 
vised the  Legion  of  Honour.  Now  that  all 
about  him  assumed  the  monarchical  form,  and 
that  he  was  perceptibly  growing  greater,  he 
wished  every  one  to  grow  great  along  with 
him.  He  meditated  the  creation  of  kings, 
grand-dukes,  dukes,  counts,  &c.  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand, a  warm  advocate  for  creations  of  this 
kind,  had,  during  the  last  campaign,  assisted 
Napoleon  much  in  his  business,  and  had  con- 
versed with  him  on  this  subject  as  well  as 
upon  the  arrangement  of  Europe,  which  he 
was  commissioned  to  negotiate  at  Presburg. 


April,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


129 


They  two  had  conceived  an  extensive  system 
of  vassalage,  comprehending  dukes,  grand- 
dukes,  kings,  under  the  paramountship  of  the 
Emperor,  and  possessing  not  empty  titles  but 
real  principalities,  either  in  territorial  domains 
or  in  ample  revenues. 

The  new  kings  were,  for  the  sake  of  the 
greater  conformity  with  the  Germanic  empire, 
to  retain  upon  the  thrones  which  they  were 
about  to  occupy,  their  quality  of  grand  digni- 
taries of  the  French  Empire.  Joseph  was  to 
remain  grand-elector,  Louis  constable,  Eugene 
arch-chancellor  of  state,  Murat  grand-admiral, 
when  they  should  become  kings  or  grand-dukes. 
Supplementary  dignitaries,  such  as  a  vice- 
constable,  a  vicegrand-elector,  &c.,  taken  from 
among  the  principal  personages  of  the  state, 
were  to  perform  their  functions  when  they 
were  absent,  and  would  thus  multiply  the 
offices  to  be  distributed.  The  kings,  who  con- 
tinued dignitaries  of  the  French  Empire,  were 
to  reside  frequently  in  France,  and  to  have  a 
royal  establishment  in  the  Louvre  appropri- 
ated to  their  use.  They  were  to  form  the 
council  of  the  imperial  family,  to  perform 
certain  special  functions  in  it  during  minori- 
ties, and  even  to  elect  the  Emperor,  in  case  the 
male  line  should  become  extinct,  which  some- 
times happens  in  reigning  families. 

The  assimilation  with  the  German  Empire 
was  complete,  and.  that  empire  falling  to  ruin 
on  all  sides,  liable  itself  to  be  swept  away  by 
a  mere  effect  of  the  will  of  Napoleon,  the 
French  Empire  would  be  there,  quite  ready  to 
take  its  place  in  Europe.  The  empire  of  the 
Franks  might  again  become  what  it  was  under 
Charlemagne,  the  empire  of  the  West,  and 
even  assume  that  title.  This  was  the  final 
wish  of  that  immense  ambition,  the  only  one 
which  it  did  not  realize,  that  for  which  it  tor- 
mented the  world,  for  which  perhaps  it  perished. 
M.  de  Talleyrand,  who,  while  recommending 
peace,  sometimes  flattered  the  passions  which 
lead  to  war,  frequently  presented  this  idea  to 
Napoleon,  knowing  what  a  profound  emotion 
it  excited  in  his  soul.  Whenever  he  men- 
tioned it  to  him,  he  saw  all  the  fire  of  ambition 
flashing  in  his  eyes,  sparkling  with  genius. 
Swayed,  however,  by  a  sort  of  modesty,  as  on 
the  day  before  that  when  he  assumed  the  su- 
preme power,  Napoleon  durst  not  avow  the 
full  extent  of  his  desires.  The  Arch-chancellor 
Cambaceres,  to  whom  he  opened  himself  more, 
because  he  was  more  sure  of  his  absolute  dis- 
cretion, had  been  half-intrusted  with  his  secret 
wishes,  and  had  taken  care  not  to  encourage 
them,  because  in  him  attachment  never  si- 
lenced prudence.  But  it  was  evident  that,  at 
the  summit  of  human  greatness,  having  ar- 
rived at  that  point  beyond  which  Alexander, 
Caesar,  Charlemagne  had  not  passed,  the  rest- 
less and  insatiable  spirit  of  Napoleon  longed 
for  something  more,  and  that  was  the  title  of 
Emperor  of  the  West,  which  nobody  in  the 
world  had  borne  for  a  thousand  years. 

Between  the  nations  of  the  south  and  the 
west,  the  French,  the  Italians,  the  Spaniards, 
all  children  of  Roman  civilization,  there  exists 
a  certain  conformity  of  genius,  manners,  inte- 
rests, sometimes  of  territory,  which  is  not 

Voi.  IL— 17 


found  beyond  the  Channel,  the  Rhine,  and  the 
circle  of  the  Alps,  among  the  English  and  the 
Germans.  This  conformity  is  an  indication 
of  a  natural  alliance,  which  the  house  of 
Bourbon,  by  uniting  under  its  royal  sceptre 
Paris,  Madrid,  Naples,  and  sometimes  Milan, 
Parma,  Florence,  had  partly  realized.  If  that 
was  what  Napoleon  meant,  if,  master  of 
France,  of  that  which  terminated  at  the  mouths 
of  the  Meuse  and  of  the  Rhine  and  at  the  sum- 
mit of  the  Alps,  if,  master  of  all  Italy,  having 
it  in  his  power  soon  to  become  so  of  Spain, 
he  purposed  only  to  reconstitute  that  alliance 
of  nations  of  Latin  origin,  by  giving  to  it  the 
symbolical  form,  sublime  for  its  memorials,  of 
the  empire  of  the  West,  the  nature  of  things, 
though  strained,  was  not  much  outraged. 
The  family  of  Bonaparte  stepped  into  the 
place  of  the  house  of  Bourbon,  to  reign  in  a 
more  complete  manner  over  the  extent  of  the 
countries  which  that  ancient  house  had  as- 
pired to  rule,  in  order  to  attach  them  by  a 
simple  bond  of  paramountship  to  the  head  of 
the  family,  a  bond  which  left  each  of  the 
southern  nations  its  independence,  by  giving 
greater  strength  to  the  useful  bundle  of  their 
alliance.  With  the  genius  of  Napoleon,  by 
transfusing  into  his  policy  the  prudence  which 
he  displayed  in  war,  with  a  very  long  reign, 
it  might  not  perhaps  have  been  impossible  to 
realize  this  conception.  But  that  nature  of 
things  which  always  avenges  itself  severely 
on  those  who  disregard  it,  was  foolishly  out- 
raged, when,  in  his  ambition,  Napoleon  ceased 
to  respect  the  boundary  of  the  Rhine,  when  he 
set  about  uniting  the  Germans  to  the  Gauls, 
subjecting  the  nations  of  the  north  to  the  na- 
tions of  the  south,  placing  French  princes  in 
Germany,  in  spite  of  the  invincible  antipathies 
of  manners ;  and  he  then  set  before  all  eyes 
the  phantom  of  that  universal  monarchy 
which  Europe  dreads  and  detests,  which  it  has 
combated,  which  it  will  do  well  to  combat  in- 
cessantly, but  to  which  it  will  some  day  per- 
haps be  subjected,  by  the  nations  of  the  north, 
after  having  refused  to  submit  to  it  from  the 
hand  of  the  nations  of  the  west. 

A  concatenation  of  events,  unforeseen  even 
by  the  vast  and  provident  ambition  of  Napo- 
leon, led  at  this  moment  to  the  dissolution  of 
the  Germanic  empire,  and  was  about  to  render 
vacant  that  noble  title  of  Emperor  of  Germa- 
ny, which  had  been  assumed  by  the  successors 
of  Charlemagne  instead  of  the  title  of  Em- 
peror of  the  West.  It  was  a  new  and  fatal 
encouragement  for  the  projects  which  Napo- 
leon cherished  in  his  soul,  without  yet  daring 
to  reveal  them. 

When  Napoleon,  in  his  late  treaties  with 
Austria,  thought  of  recompensing  his  three* 
allies  in  South  Germany,  the  Princes  of  Bava- 
ria, Wurtemberg,  and  Baden,  and  of  putting 
an  end  to  all  subject  of  collision  between 
them  and  the  head  of  the  empire  by  the  solu- 
tion of  certain  questions  left  undecided  in 
1803,  he  had  pronounced,  but  without  being 
aware  of  it,  the  speedy  dissolution  of  the  old 
German  empire.  The  providential,  sometimes 
involuntary,  almost  always  misconceived  in- 
strument of  that  French  Revolution  wbJc> 


130 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[April,  1806. 


was  to  change  the  face  of  the  world,  he  had 
prepared,  unknown  to  himself,  one  of  the 
greatest  European  reforms. 

It  will  be  recollected  how,  in  1803,  France 
had  been  called  upon  to  interfere  in  the  inter- 
nal government  of  Germany ;  how  the  princes, 
who  had  lost  all  or  part  of  their  territories  by 
the  cession  of  the  left  bank  of  the  Rhine,  had 
resolved  to  indemnify  themselves  by  secular- 
izing the  ecclesiastical  principalities.  Unable 
to  agree  about  the  division  of  these  principali- 
ties, they  had  called  Napoleon  to  their  aid,  in 
order  to  effect  with  equity  and  decision  that 
partition  which  otherwise  was  impossible. 
Prussia  and  Austria  had  received  possessions 
of  the  Church  from  his  own  hand,  with  a  sin- 
gle motive  for  displeasure, — that  they  had  not 
received  more.  The  suppression  of  the  eccle- 
siastical principalities  had  led  to  the  modifica- 
tion of  the  three  colleges  composing  the  Diet. 
About  the  college  of  the  electors  they  had 
agreed,  but  not  about  that  of  the  princes,  in 
which  Austria  claimed  a  greater  number  of 
Catholic  votes  than  had  been  granted  to  her. 
They  had  also  agreed  respecting  the  college 
of  the  cities,  reducing  the  number  to  six,  and 
almost  entirely  destroying  their  influence.  No- 
thing had  been  decided  respecting  a  new  or- 
ganization of  the  circles  charged  to  uphold 
respect  for  the  laws  in  each  great  German 
province,  relative  to  a  new  religious  organiza- 
tion, rendered  necessary  since  the  suppression 
of  a  great  number  of  sees,  and  indefinitely  de- 
ferred through  the  ill-will  of  the  Pope.  Lastly, 
the  serious  question  respecting  the  immediate 
nobility  had  not  been  resolved,  because  it  in- 
terested the  whole  German  aristocracy,  and 
particularly  Austria,  which  had  in  the  mem- 
bers of  that  nobility  vassals  dependent  on  the 
empire,  independent  of  the  territorial  princes, 
and  rendering  a  number  of  services,  of  which 
the  recruiting,  authorized  in  their  possessions, 
was  not  the  least. 

The  mediating  powers  of  France  and  Rus- 
sia, tired  of  this  long  mediation,  occupied  else- 
where by  other  circumstances,  had  no  sooner 
withdrawn  their  hands,  leaving  Germany  half  j 
remodelled,  than  anarchy  seized  that  unhappy 
country.  Austria,  upon  pretext  of  a  right  of 
waifs,  had  usurped  the  dependencies  of  the 
ecclesiastical  possessions  given  as  indemni- 
ties, and  had  deprived  the  indemnified  princes 
of  a  considerable  portion  of  what  was  their 
due.  These  princes,  on  their  part,  had  seized 
the  lands  of  the  immediate  nobility,  and  had 
availed  themselves  for  this  of  the  uncertainties 
of  the  last  recess. 

The  war  of  1805  having  again  brought  Na- 
poleon beyond  the  Rhine,  he  had  taken  advan- 
tage of  the  occasion  to  resolve  the  questions 
left  undecided  for  the  benefit  of  the  princes, 
his  allies,  and  he  had  thus  created  in  the 
countries  of  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  and  Bava- 
ria, a  sort  of  dissonance  with  the  rest  of  Ger- 
many. But  the  greediness  of  these  same 
allies  had  given  rise  to  difficulties  which  ex- 
tended to  the  whole  of  Germany.  The  King 
of  Wur'°mberg,  observing  no  moderation,  had 
usurped  the  land?  of  the  immediate  nobility, 
as  well  those  which  had  that  quality  as  those 
which  had  not.  He  had  arrogated  to  himself 


more  than  the  rights  of  the  territorial  sove- 
reign, and  had  seized  many  of  the  mansions 
of  the  nobility,  as  if  he  had  been  their  real 
owner.  Of  all  those  rights  of  feudal  origin, 
which  Austria  had  insisted  on  exercising  in 
Suabia,  and  the  nature  of  which  was  danger- 
ously arbitrary,  he  had  declared  himself  the 
new  possessor  in  virtue  of  the  possession  of 
certain  feudal  chief  towns  which  the  partition 
of  Austria  and  Suabia  had  procured  him,  and 
he  began  to  exercise  them  with  greater  vigour 
than  the  Austrian  chancellery  itself.  The 
houses  of  Baden  and  Bavaria,  annoyed  by 
him,  and  authorized  by  his  example,  com- 
mitted the  like  excesses  in  their  territories. 
The  contempt  of  right  had  been  carried  so  far 
as  to  penetrate  into  the  sovereign  principali- 
ties enclosed  in  the  dominions  of  the  three 
princes,  upon  pretext  of  searching  in  them 
for  domains  of  the  immediate  nobility,  which 
could  not  in  any  case  belong  to  them,  for,  if 
those  domains  belonged  to  any  other  than  the 
immediate  nobles  themselves,  it  must  have 
been  to  the  sovereign  prince  on  whom  they 
were  immediately  dependent. 

Napoleon  had  charged  M.  Otto,  his  minister 
at  Munich,  as  umpire,  and  Berthier,  as  head 
of  the  executive  power,  to  settle  all  disputes 
between  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  and  Bavaria, 
arising  out  of  the  partition  of  the  Austrian 
territories  in  Suabia.  The  difficulties  becom- 
ing more  complicated,  Napoleon  had  associ- 
ated with  them  General  Clarke,  to  assist  them 
in  reducing  this  chaos  to  order.  This  all  of 
them  alike  despaired  of  accomplishing.  The 
princes  who  had  suffered  this  violence  first 
carried  their  complaints  to  Ratisbon  ;  but  the 
ministers  at  the  Diet,  having  neither  courage 
nor  authority  since  Austria  no  longer  gave  it 
to  them,  declared  themselves  unable  to  check 
the  disorder  spreading  on  all  sides.  Austria 
herself  had  almost  reduced  them  to  this  im- 
potence, of  which  they  complained,  by  refus- 
ing in  the  preceding  year  to  authorize  any 
serious  deliberation,  so  long  as  the  college  of 
princes  was  not  reconstituted  according  to  her 
pleasure,  and  the  number  of  Catholic  votes 
which  she  claimed  were  not  added  to  it.  And 
now,  definitively  conquered,  wholly  engrossed 
with  her  own  welfare,  she  completed  the  anni- 
hilation of  the  Diet,  by  showing  that  she  was 
no  further  to  be  relied  on  for  any  efficacious 
aid.  The  Diet,  therefore,  was  a  destroyed 
body,  receiving  at  most  the  communications 
that  were  made  to  it,  scarcely  acknowledging 
the  receipt  of  them,  but  not  deliberating  oil 
any  subject  whatever. 

At  this  sight,  the  petty  sovereign  princes, 
the  immediate  nobles,  exposed  to  all  sorts  of 
usurpations,  the  free  cities,  reduced  to  six  or 
five  by  the  gift  of  Augsburg  to  Bavaria,  the 
secularized  ecclesiastical  princes,  whose  pen- 
sions were  noJ  paid,  hastened  to  Munich  to 
claim  from  Messieurs  Otto,  Berthier,  and 
Clarke,  the  protection  of  France.  These 
gentlemen,  indignant  at  the  spectacle  of  op- 
pression which  they  witnessed,  had  at  first 
formed  a  sort  of  congress  to  reconcile  all 
interests,  and  to  prevent  the  commission  of 
unjust  acts  under  the  shadow  of  the  protection 
of  France.  M.  Otto  had  conceived  a  plan  of 


April,  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


arrangement,  which  France  was  to  submit  to 
the  principal  oppressors,  the  sovereigns  of 
Bavaria,  Baden,  and  Wurtemberg.  But  he 
had  soon  discovered  that  he  had  done  nothing 
less  than  frame  a  new  plan  for  a  Germanic 
constitution;  and,  moreover,  the  agents  of  the 
King  of  Wurtemberg,  when  he  had  submitted 
this  plan  to  them,  had  loudly  cried  out  against 
it,  and  declared  that  their  master  would  never 
consent  to  the  proposed  concessions.  One 
would  have  said  that  this  prince,  whom  France 
had  just  made  a  king,  whose  dominions  she 
had  augmented,  whose  sovereign  prerogatives 
she  had  doubled,  was  robbed  by  her,  because 
she  required  some  respect  for  property,  and 
some  neighbourly  regard  for  the  weakest  of 
his  neighbours.  Not  knowing  what  more  to 
do,  M.  Otto  had  sent  all  to  Paris,  both  claims 
and  claimants,  and  the  plan  of  arrangement 
which  he  had  devised  with  the  intention  of 
justice.  This  reference  had  taken  place  at 
the  end  of  March. 

Ever  since  that  period,  oppressed  and  op- 
pressors were  at  the  foot  of  the  throne  of  Na- 
poleon. It  became  evident  that  the  sceptre  of 
Charlemagne  had  passed  from  the  Germans  to 
the  French. 

This  was  what  had  been  said  and  written  in 
all  forms  by  the  prince  arch-chancellor,  the 
last  ecclesiastical  elector  retained  by  Napo- 
leon, and  transferred  by  him,  as  it  will  be  re- 
collected, from  Mayence  to  Ratisbon.  This 
prince,  whose  amiable  and  fickle  character, 
and  whose  sumptuous  propensities  we  have 
elsewhere  sketched,  seeking  force  where  it 
existed,  never  ceased  to  beseech  Napoleon  to 
take  in  hand  the  sceptre  of  Germany ;  and  if 
any  one  had  made  the  dangerous  name  of 
Charlemagne  ring  in  Napoleon's  ears,  it  was 
certainly  he. — You  are  Charlemagne,  said  he 
to  him ;  be  the  nthe  master,  the  regulator,  the 
saviour  of  Germany. — If  that  name,  which 
was  not  the  one  that  best  pleased  the  pride  of 
Napoleon,  for  he  had  in  Alexander  and  Caesar 
rivals  more  worthy  of  his  genius,  but  which 
particularly  flattered  his  ambition,  because  it 
established  more  relations  with  his  plans  re- 
lative to  Europe — if  that  name  was  always 
blended  with  his  own,  it  was  less  from  his 
doing  than  from  the  doing  of  all  those  who 
had  recourse  to  his  protecting  power.  If  the 
Church  wanted  something  of  him,  You  are 


Charlemagne,  said  she,  give  us  what  he  gave 
us.  When  the  German  princes  of  all  the 
states  were  oppressed,  they  said  to  him,  You 
are  Charlemagne,  protect  us  as  he  would  have 
done. 

Thus  ideas  were  suggested  to  him,  which 
his  ambition  might  not  so  soon  have  conceived, 
if  it  had  been  slow  in  its  desires.  But  the 
wants  of  nations  and  his  ambition  then  kept 
pace  with  one  another. 

In  all  ages,  the  princes  of  Germany,  besides 
the  Germanic  confederation,  a  legal  authority 
and  recognised  by  them,  had  formed  particular 
leagues  to  defend  such  rights  or  such  interests 
as  were  common  to  certain  of  them.  All  that 
were  left  of  these  leagues  addressed  them- 
selves to  Napoleon,  soliciting  him  to  interfere 
in  their  favour,  both  as  author  and  guarantee 
of  the  act  of  mediation  of  1803,  and  as  the 
signer  and  executor  of  the  treaty  of  Presburg. 
Some  proposed  to  form  new  leagues  under  his 
protection,  others  to  form  a  new  Germanic 
confederation  under  his  imperial  sceptre.  The 
princes  whose  possessions  were  usurped,  the 
immediate  nobles  whose  lands  were  seized, 
the  free  cities  threatened  with  suppression, 
proposed  various  plans,  but  were  ready,  on 
condition  of  protection,  to  adopt  the  plan  that 
should  be  most  generally  approved. 

The  prince  arch-chancellor,  fearing  lest  his 
ecclesiastical  electorate,  the  last  relic  of  the 
wreck,  should  be  swept  away  in  this  second 
tempest,  devised  a  plan  to  save  it ;  this  was  to 
form  a  new  Germanic  confederation,  called  to 
deliberate  under  his  presidency  and  compre- 
hending all  the  German  States,  excepting 
Prussia  and  Austria.  In  order  to  interest  Na- 
poleon in  this  creation,  he  invented  two  ex- 
pedients. The  first  consisted  in  creating  an 
electorate  attached  to  the  Duchy  of  Berg,  which 
was  known  to  be  destined  for  Murat,  and  the 
second  to  appoint  immediately  a  coadjutor  for 
the  archbishopric  of  Ratisbon,  and  10  choose 
him  from  the  imperial  family.  This  coadjutor, 
being  archbishop  elect  of  Ratisbon,  future  arch- 
chancellor  of  the  confederation,  would  of 
course  place  the  new  Diet  under  the  control 
of  Napoleon.  The  member  of  the  Bonaparte 
family  was  plainly  pointed  out  by  his  eccle- 
siastical profession:  it  was  Cardinal  Fesch, 
Archbishop  of  Lyons,  ambassador  at  Rome.1 

Without  waiting  for  such  a  plan  to  be  pro- 


1  We  quote  the  curious  document  which  was  addressed 
to  Napoleon. 

"  Ratisbo*,  ApriH9, 1806. 
"Sire, 

••  The  genius  of  Napoleon  is  not  limited  to  creating  the 
happiness  of  France ;   Providence  grants  the  superior  j 
man  (o  the  universe.     The  estimable  German  nation 
groans  under  the  miseries  of  political  and  religious  anar- 
chy  :  be,  sire,  the  regenerator  of  its  constitution.    Here 
are  some  wishes  dictated  by  the  state  of  things ;  let  the  j 
Duke  of  Cleves  become  elector,  let  him  obtain  the  toll  of  ; 
the  Rhine  on  the  whole  of  the  right  bank  ;  let  Cardinal 
Fesch  be  my  coadjutor;    let  the  annuities  settled  on 
twelve  states  of  the  empire  out  of  the  toll,  be  founded 
on  some  other  basis.    Your  imperial  and  royal  majesty 
will  judge  in  your  sublimity  whether  it  is  conducive  to 
the  general  welfare  to  realize  these  ideas.     If  any  ideo- 
logic error  misleads  me  on  this  point,  my  heart  at  least 
attests  the  purity  of  my  intentions. 

'•  I  am,  with  an  inviolable  attachment  and  the  most  , 


profound  respect,  sire,  your  imperial  and  royal  majesty's 
most  humble  and  most  devoted  admirer, 

"CHARLES, 

"  Ejector  Jlrch-chancellor." 

"  The  Germanic  nation  needs  that  its  constitution  should 
be  regenerated ;  the  greater  part  of  its  laws  consist  only 
of  words  devoid  of  meaning,  since  the  tribunal,  the  cir- 
cles, the  diet  of  the  empire,  no  longer -possess  the  means 
necessary  to  uphold  the  rights  of  property  and  the  perso- 
nal safety  of  the  individuals  who  compose  the  nation,  and 
since  these  institutions  can  no  longer  protect  the  op- 
pressed against  the  encroachments  of  arbitrary  power 
and  rapacity.  Such  a  state  is  anarchical ;  the  noonle 
bear  the  burdens  of  the  civil  condition,  without  enjoying 
its  principal  advantages — a  disastrous  position  for  a  na 
tion  thoroughly  estimable  for  its  loyalty,  its  industry,  it* 
primitive  energy.  The  Germanic  constitution  can  be 
regenerated  only  by  a  head  of  the  empire  of  a  great  cha- 
racter, who  shall  restore  vigour  to  the  laws  by  concen- 
trating the  executive  power  in  his  hands.  The  states  of 


132 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


[April,  1806. 


posed,  discussed,  and  accepted,  the  arch-chan- 
cellor, anxious  to  insure  the  preservation  of  his 
see  by  an  adoption  which  would  render  its  de- 
struction impossible,  unless  Napoleon  chose 
to  do  an  injury  to  the  interests  of  his  family, 
which  it  would  not  quietly  endure,  and  which 
he  was  not  fond  of  doing,  the  arch-chancellor, 
•without  consulting  an}'  person,  to  the  great 
astonishment  of  his  co-estates,  chose  Cardinal 
Fesch  coadjutor  of  the  archbishopric  of  Ratis- 
bon,  and  wrote  to  Napoleon  to  acquaint  him 
wi'h  this  choice. 

Napoleon  had  no  reason  to  love  Cardinal 
Fesch,  a  vain  and  obstinate  man,  who  was  not 
the  least  troublesome  of  his  relations,  and  he 
had  no  particular  desire  to  place  him  at  the 
head  of  the  German  empire.  However,  he 
permitted  this  strange  appointment,  without 
explanation.  It  was  a  striking  symptom  of 
that  disposition  of  the  oppressed  German 
princes  to  put  the  new  imperial  sceptre  into 
his  hands. 

Napoleon  had  no  intention  to  take,  in  a  di- 
rect manner,  that  sceptre  from  ihe  head  of  the 
house  of  Austria.  It  was  an  enterprise,  which 
seemed  to  him  too  great  for  the  moment,  though 
there  was  little  that  would  have  frightened  him 
since  Austerlitz.  But  he  was  enlightened  as  to 
how  far  he  might  venture  at  that  moment  in 
Germany,  and  fixed  as  to  what  it  was  proper 
for  him  to  do.  For  the  present,  he  resolved  to 
dislocate,  to  weaken,  the  German  empire  in 
such  a  manner  that  the  French  empire  alone 
should  shine  in  the  west.  He  purposed  then 
to  unite  the  princes  of  South  Germany,  situated 
on  the  banks  of  the  Rhine,  in  Franconia,  Sua- 
bia,  Bavaria,  and  to  form  them  into  a  confede- 
ration under  his  avowed  protectorship.  This 
confederation  should  declare  its  connection 
with  the  German  empire  dissolved.  As  for 
the  other  princes  of  Germany,  they  might 
either  continue  in  the  old  confederation,  under 
the  authority  of  Austria,  or,  what  was  more 
probable,  they  would  leave  it  and  group  them- 
selves at  pleasure,  some  about  Prussia,  others 
about  Austria.  Then  the  French  empire, hav- 
ing under  its  formal  paramountship  Italy,  Na- 
ples, Holland,  perhaps  some  day  the  Spanish 
peninsula,  under  its  protectorship  the  south  of 
Germany,  would  comprehend  nearly  the  same 
states  which  belonged  to  Charlemagne,  and 


would  take  the  place  of  the  Empire  of  the 
West.  To  give  it  this  title  was  no  longer  a 
mere  affair  of  words,  but  yet  a  serious  one  on 
account  of  the  jealousies  of  Europe,  but  to  be 
realized  some  day  by  victory  or  successful 
negotiation. 

To  accomplish  such  a  project  there  was  bat 
little  to  do,  for  Bavaria,  Wurtemberg,  Baden, 
were  then  treating  at  Paris,  in  order  to  arrive 
at  some  settlement  of  their  situation,  aggran- 
dized but  uncertain.  All  the  other  princes  ap- 
plied to  be  included,  no  matter  under  what  ti- 
tle, no  matter  upon  what  condition,  in  the  new 
federative  system,  which  was  foreseen  and  des- 
cried as  inevitable.  To  be  comprehended  in 
it  was  to  live,  to  be  excluded  from  it  was  to 
perish.  It  was,  therefore,  unnecessary  to  ne- 
gotiate with  any  others  than  with  the  sovereigns 
of  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  and  Bavaria,  and  care 
was  taken  to  consult  them  only  with  a  certain 
degree  of  caution,  and  to  exclude  all  excepting 
them  from  the  negotiation.  It  was~propo^ed  to 
present  the  treaty  ready  drawn  up,  to  such  of  the 
princes  as  one  was  desirous  to  retain,  and  to 
admit  them  to  sign  purely  and  simply.  The 
new  confederation  was  to  bear  the  title  of  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine,  and  Napoleon  that  of 
Protector. 

M.  de  Talleyrand  was  charged,  with  a  very 
clever  first  clerk,  M.  de  Labesnaudiere,  to 
draw  up  the  plan  of  the  new  confederation, 
and  then  to  submit  it  to  the  Emperor.1 

Such  was,  as  we  see,  the  chain  of  events, 
which  led  France  twice  to  intermeddle  in  the 
affairs  of  Germany.  The  first  time,  the  inevi- 
table jsartition  of  the  ecclesiastical  possessions 
threatening  Germany  with  a  convulsion,  its 
princes  came  themselves  to  solicit  Napoleon 
to  make  this  partition  himself,  and  to  add  such 
changes  as  were  to  result  from  it  in  the  Ger- 
manic constitution.  The  second  time,  Napo- 
leon called  away  from  the  shores  of  the  ocean 
to  the  banks  of  the  Danube,  by  the  irruption 
of  the  Austrians  into  Bavaria,  obliged  to  cre- 
ate allies  for  himself  in  the  south  of  Germany, 
to  recompense  them,  to  aggrandize  them,  to 
restrain  them  at  the  same  time  when  they  at- 
tempted to  abuse  his  alliance,  was  again 
obliged  to  interfere  in  order- to  regulate  the 
situation  of  the  German  princes  who  geogra- 
phically interested  France. 


the  empire  will  enjoy  their  domains  all  the  better,  when 
the  wishes  of  the  people  shall  be  expressed  and  discussed 
in  the  diet,  the  tribunals  better  organized  and  justice  ad- 
ministered in  a  more  efficacious  manner.  His  majesty, 
the  Emperor  of  Austria,  Francis  II.,  would  be  a  reputable 
individual  for  his  personal  qualities,  but  in  point  of  fact 
the  sceptre  of  Germany  is  slipping  out  of  his  hands,  be- 
cause he  (vis  now  the  majority  ef  the  diet  against  him; 
because  he  has  violated  his  capitulation  by  occupying 
Bavaria,  by  introducing  the  Russians  into  Germany,  by 
dismembering  portions  nf  ihe  empire  to  pay  for  faults 
committed  in  the  private  quarrels  of  his  house.  Let  him 
be  emperor  of  the  east  to  withstand  the  Russians,  and  let 
the  empire  of  ihe  vest  revive  in  the  empire  of  Napoleon, 
tuck  as  it  was  under  Charlemagne,  composed  of  Italy, 
France,  and  Germany!  It  appears  not  impossible  that 
the  evils  of  anarchy  may  render  the  majority  of  the  elec- 
tors sensible  of  the  necessity  of  such  a  regeneration;  it 
was  thus  that  they  chose  Rodolph  of  flapsburg  after  the 
troubles  of  a  long  interregnum.  The  means  of  the  arch- 
rliancellor  arc  extremely  limited,  but  it  is  at  least  with  a 


pure  intention  thit  he  reckons  upon  the  understanding 
of  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  particularly  on  matters  likely 
to  agitate  the  south  of  Germany,  more  especially  devoted 
to  that  monarch.  The  regeneration  of  the  Germanic 
constitution  has  always  been  the  object  of  ihe  wishes  of 
the  elector  arch-chancellor;  he  neither  asks  for  nor  would 
accept  any  thing  for  himself;  he  thinks  that,  if  his  ma- 
jesty, the  Emperor  Napoleon,  could  for  a  ft-w  weeks, 
every  year,  personally  meet  the  princes,  who  a  re  attached 
to  him,  at  Mayence,  or  some  other  place,  the  seeds  of 
Germanic  regeneration  would  soon  be  developed.  M. 
d'Hedouville  has  gained  the  entire  confidence  of  the 
elector  arch-chancellor,  who  would  be  glad  if  he  wc.uld  be 
pleased  to  submit  these  ideas  in  all  their  purity  to  hia 
majesty,  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  arid  to  his  minister 
M.  de  Tallevrand.  "CHARLES, 

"  Elector  Arch  -chancellor." 

1  It  is  from  M.  de  Labesnaudiere  himself,  the  only  con 
tidaiit  of  this  new  creation,  that  we  derive  all  these  pat 
ticulars,  supported  besides  by  a  multitude  of  authentic 
documents. 


April,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


133 


[f  he  had  any  personal  view  in  all  that  he 
did  on  this  occasion,  it  was  to  render  vacant 
an  august  title  by  the  dissolution  of  the  Ger- 
manic empire,  and  to  suffer  the  French  em- 
pire alone  to  exist  in  the  eyes  of  the  nations. 
Nevertheless,  the  essential  causes  of  his  inter- 
vention were  no  other  than  the  violence  of  the 
strong,  the  cries  of  the  weak,  and  the  two-fold 
desire,  reasonable  enough,  to  repress  injustice 
committed  in  his  name,  and  to  remodel  Ger- 
many in  a  manner  conformable  to  the  sugges- 
tions of  his  good  sense,  since  he  could  no  lon- 
ger withhold  his  interference. 

This  intervention  in  the  affairs  of  Germany, 
carried  beyond  certain  bounds,  was  none  the 
less  a  grievous  fault  on  the  part  of  Napoleon; 
to  pretend  to  exercise  a  predominant  influence 
over  the  south  of  Europe,  over  Italy,  even  over 
Spain,  was  consistent  with  French  policy  in 
all  ages;  and  vast  as  was  this  ambition,  sig- 
nal victories  might  justify  its  magnitude.  But 
to  attempt  to  extend  his  power  to  the  north  of 
Europe,  that  is  to  say  into  Germany,  was  driv- 
ing the  despair  of  Austria  to  extremity ;  it  was 
kindling  in  Prussia  a  species  of  jealousy 
which  France  had  not  yet  excited  in  her.  It 
was  taking  upon  himself  the  difficulties  which 
were  arising  from  the  dissensions  of  all  those 
petty  princes  among  themselves;  it  was  pass- 
ing for  the  supporter  and  accomplice  of  the 
oppressors,  when  he  was  the  defender  of  the 
oppressed;  it  was  setting  against  him  those 
who  were  not  favoured,  without  setting  for  him 
those  who  were  ;  for  these  latter  already  ex- 
pressed themselves  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
foreshow  that,  after  they  had  enriched  them- 
selves by  us,  they  would  be  capable  of  turning 
against  us,  in  order  to  purchase  the  preserva- 
tion of  what  they  had  acquired.  And  as  for 
the  assistance  which  he  anticipated  find- 
ing in  their  troops,  it  was  a  dangerous  decep- 
tion ;  for  he  might  be  induced  to  consider  as 
auxiliaries  soldiers  quite  ready  upon  occasion 
to  turn  traitors.  It  was  a  still  greater  fault  to 
change  the  old  combinations  of  Germany, 
which  made  Prussia  an  ever  jealous  rival  of 
Austria,  and  consequently  an  ally  of  France, 
and  all  the  petty  princes  of  Germany,  filled 
with  envy  of  each  other,  thenceforward  clients 
of  our  policy  from  which  they  sought  support. 
Had  France  added  something  to  the  influence 
of  Prussia,  and  retrenched  something  from 
that  of  Austria,  that  would  have  been  doing 
enough  for  a  century,  nay  it  would  have  been 
all  that  Germany  needed.  Beyond  this,  there 
was  nothing  but  an  overturning  of  European 
policy,  baneful  rather  than  beneficial.  If  these 
changes  were  carried  so  far  as  to  render 
Prussia  all-powerful,  it  would  be  merely  re- 
moving the  danger  from  one  place  to  another, 
transferring  to  Berlin  the  enemy  whom  we 
had  always  had  at  Vienna:  if  they  went  so 
far  as  to  destroy  Prussia  and  Austria,  the  ef- 
fect would  be  to  rouse  all  Germany ;  and,  as 
for  the  small  states,  all  that  went  beyond  a  just 
protection  for  certain  second-rate  princes,  as 
Bavaria,  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  usually  allies 
of  France,  all  that  went  beyond,  given  after  a 
war  for  their  alliance,  was  a  dangerous  inter- 
ference in  the  affairs  of  others,  a  gratuitous 
acceptance  of  difficulties  not  our  own,  and, 


under  an  apparent  violation  of  foreign  inde- 
pendence, an  egregious  cheat.  There  was  but 
one  greater  fault  to  commit;  that  was  to  found 
French  kingdoms  in  Germany.  Napoleon  had 
not  yet  arrived  at  this  degree  of  power  and  of 
error.  The  old  Germanic  constitution,  modi- 
fied by  the  recess  of  1803,  with  some  additional 
solutions,  neglected  at  the  time  of  that  recess, 
with  the  former  influences  modified  merely  in 
their  proportion,  was  all  that  was  suitable  for 
France,  for  Europe,  and  for  Germany.  We 
undertook  more  for  the  welfare  of  Germany 
than  for  our  own ;  she  cherished  a  deep  re- 
sentment for  it,  and  awaited  ihe  moment  of  our 
final  retreat  to  fire  in  rear  upon  our  soldiers, 
overwhelmed  by  numbers.  Such  is  the  price 
that  must  be  paid  for  faults  ! 

Napoleon  left  M.  de  Talleyrand  and  M.  de 
Labesnaudiere  to  arrange  in  secret  the  details 
of  the  new  plan  of  Germanic  confederation 
with  the  ministers  of  Baden,  Wurtemberg, 
and  Bavaria,  before  he  began  to  proceed  to 
the  execution  of  his  general  plan,  particularly 
relative  to  Italy  and  Holland,  in  order  that  the 
English  and  Russian  negotiators,  treating  each 
on  their  own  part,  might  find  consummated  and 
irrevocable  resolutions  relative  to  the  new  roy- 
alties which  he  purposed  to  create. 

The  crown  of  Naples  had  been  destined  for 
Joseph,  that  of  Holland  for  Louis.  The  insti- 
tution of  these  royalties  was  for  Napoleon  at 
once  a  political  calculation  and  a  gratification 
of  feeling.  He  was  not  only  great,  he  was 
good,  and  sensible  to  the  affections  of  blood, 
sometimes  even  to  weakness.  He  did  not  al- 
ways reap  the  reward  of  his  sentiments;  for 
there  is  nothing  so  exigent  as  an  upstart  family. 
There  was  not  one  of  his  relations,  who,  though 
acknowledging  that  it  was  the  conqueror  of 
Rivoli,  of  the  Pyramids,  and  of  Austerlitz,  who 
had  founded  the  greatness  of  the  Bonapartes, 
nevertheless  fancied  that  he  was  somebody, 
and  looked  upon  himself  as  treated  unjustly, 
hardly,  or  in  a  manner  disproportioned  to  his 
merits.  His  mother,  incessantly  repeating 
that  she  had  given  him  birth,  complained  that 
she  was  not  surrounded  with  sufficient  homage 
and  respect;  and  she  was  nevertheless  the 
most  moderate  and  the  least  intoxicated  of  the 
females  of  that  family.  lucien  Bonaparte 
had  placed,  he  said,  the  crown  upon  the  head 
of  his  brother,  for  he  alone  had  been  unshaken 
on  the  18th  of  Brumaire,  and  for  the  reward 
of  this  service  he  lived  in  exile.  Joseph,  the 
meekest  and  the  most  sensible  of  all,  said  in  his 
turn  that  he  was  the  eldest,  and  that  the  def3- 
rence  due  to  that  title  was  not  paid  him.  He 
was  even  somewhat  disposed  to  believe  that 
the  treaties  of  Luneville,  of  Amiens,  of  the 
Concordat,  which  Napoleon  had  complaisantly 
commissioned  him  to  sign,  to  the  detriment  of 
M.  de  Talleyrand,  were  the  work  of  his  per- 
sonal ability,  as  well  as  the  great  exploits  of 
his  brother.  Louis,  sickly,  mistrustful,  fillet 
with  pride,  affecting  virtue,  pretended  that  he 
was  sacrificed  to  an  infamous  office,  that  of 
cloaking,  by  marrying  her,  the  weaknesses  of 
Hortense  de  Beauharnais  for  Napoleon — an 
odious  calumny,  invented  by  the  emigrants, 
repeated  in  a  thousand  pamphlets,  and  by 
which  Louis  wrongfully  showed  himself  to  be 


134 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[April,  180«. 


so  prepossessed,  as  to  cause  it  to  be  supposed  ' 
that  he  himself  believed  it.  Thus  each  of 
them  conceived  himself  to  be  a  victim  in  some 
way,  and  ill  paid  for  the  part  which  he  had 
taken  in  his  brother's  greatness.  The  sisters 
of  Napoleon,  not  daring  to  have  such  preten- 
sions, were  restless  around  him,  and  by  their 
rivalries,  sometimes  by  their  discontent,  ruffled 
his  spirit,  a  prey  to  a  thousand  other  inquiet- 
udes. Caroline  was  incessantly  soliciting  for 
Murat,  who,  with  all  his  levity,  at  least  repaid 
the  bounty  of  his  brother-in-law  with  an  at- 
tachment which  at  that  time  afforded  no  reason 
to  augur  his  subsequent  conduct,  though,  it  is 
true,  one  may  expect  any  thing  from  levity. 
Elisa,  the  eldest,  transferred  to  Lucca,  where 
she  aspired  to  the  personal  glory  of  well  ma- 
naging a  little  state,  and  who  really  conducted 
it  with  great  ability,  desired  an  augmentation 
of  her  duchy. 

In  this  whole  family,  Jerome  as  the  young- 
est, Pauline  as  the  most  dissipated,  were  ex- 
empt from  those  exigencies,  those  resentments, 
those  jealousies,  which  disturb  the  interior  of 
the  imperial  house.  Jerome,  the  irregularities 
of  whose  youth  had  frequently  provoked  the 
severity  of  Napoleon,  considered  him  as  a  fa- 
ther rather  than  a  brother,  and  received  his 
bounty  with  a  heart  full  of  unmixed  gratitude. 
Pauline,  given  up  to  her  pleasures,  like  a 
princess  of  the  family  of  the  Caesars,  beautiful 
as  an  antique  Venus,  sought  in  the  greatness 
of  her  brother  only  the  means  of  gratifying 
her  loose  propensities,  desired  no  higher  titles 
than  those  of  the  Borgheses,  whose  name  she 
bore,  was  disposed  to  prefer  fortune,  the  source 
of  pleasure,  to  greatness,  the  satisfaction  of 
pride.  She  was  so  fond  of  her  brother  that, 
when  he  was  at  war,  the  Arch-chancellor  Cam- 
baceres,  commissioned  to  govern  the  reigning 
family  and  the  state,  was  obliged  to  send  this 
princess  news  the  moment  he  received  it,  for 
the  least  delay  threw  her  into  the  most  painful 
anxiety. 

It  was  the  fear  of  seeing  the  children  of  the 
Beauharnais  family  preferred  to  themselves 
that  had  urged  the  Bonapartes  to  be  enemies 
to  Josephine.  In  this  they  paid  no  regard 
even  to  the  heart  of  Napoleon,  and  tormented 
him  in  a  thousand  ways.  The  precocious 


greatness  of  Eugene,  who  had  become  viceroy 
and  destined  heir  to  the  fine  kingdom  of  Italy, 
singularly  eclipsed  them,  and  yet  this  crown 
had  been  offered  to  Joseph,  who  had  declined  it 
because  it  placed  him  too  immediately  under 
the  control  of  the  Emperor  of  the  French.  He 
wanted  to  reign,  he  said,  in  an  independent 
manner.  We  shall  see  by  and  by  inio  what 
difficulties  this  fondness  for  independence, 
common  to  all  the  members  of  the  imperial 
family,  combined  with  the  tendencies  of  the 
nations  over  whom  they  were  called  to  reign, 
was  destined  to  bring  the  government  of  Na- 
poleon, and  what  new  causes  of  misfortune  it 
added  to  our  misfortunes. 

It  was  among  all  the  members  of  his  family 
that  he  had  to  distribute  the  kingdoms  and  the 
duchies  of  new  creation.  The  crown  of  Na- 
ples insured  to  Joseph  a  situation  sufficiently 
independent,  and  was,  besides,  brilliant  enough 
to  be  accepted.  One  feels  some  surprise  to  be 
obliged  to  employ  such  words  to  characterize 
the  sentiments  with  which  these  fine  kingdoms 
were  received  by  princes  born  so  far  from  the 
throne,  and  so  far  even  from  that  greatness 
which  individuals  sometimes  owe  to  birth  and 
fortune.  But  it  is  one  of  the  singularities  of 
the  fantastic  spectacle  exhibited  by  the  French 
Revolution  and  by  the  extraordinary  man  whom 
it  placed  at  its  head,  that  these  refusals,  these 
hesitations,  almost  this  disdain  of  anticipated 
satiety,  should  be  expressed  for  the  fairest 
crowns  by  personages  who  in  their  youth 
could  never  have  expected  to  wear  them.  Na- 
poleon, who  had  seen  Joseph  disdain  at  one 
time  the  presidency  of  the  Senate,  at  another 
the  viceroyalty  of  Italy,  was  not  sure  that  he 
would  accept  the  throne  of  Naples,  and  had  at 
first  conferred  on  him  only  the  title  of  his 
lieutenant.1  Having  afterwards  ascertained 
his  acceptance  of  it,  he  had  inserted  his  name 
in  the  decrees  destined  to  be  presented  to  the 
Senate. 

As  for  Holland,  he  had  designated  Louis, 
who  has  since  told  all  Europe,  in  a  book  re- 
flecting upon  his  brother,  how  highly  he  was 
offended  because  he  had  scarcely  been  con- 
sulted upon  this  arrangement.  In  fact,  Napo- 
leon, without  concerning  himself  about  Louis, 
whose  will  seemed  to  him  not  to  be  an  obsta- 


1  We  quote  the  following  letters,  which  show  how  Na- 
poleon gave  crowns  and  how  they  were  received  : 

"  To  the  Minister  of  War. 

"  Munich,  January  6,  1806. 

"  Despatch  General  Berthier,  your  brother,  with  the 
decree  appointing  Prince  Joseph  to  the  command  of  the 
army  of  Italy.  He  will  observe  the  most  profound  se- 
crecy, and  he  must  not  deliver  the  decree  till  the  prince 
arrives.  I  say  he  must  observe  the  most  profound  se- 
crecy, because  I  am  not  sure  that  Prince  Joseph  will  go 
thither,  and  on  this  point  I  desire  that  nothing  may  be 
known." 

"  To  Prince  Joseph. 

"  Stuttgart,  January  12,  1806. 

"My  intention  is  that  in  the  first  days  of  February  you 
should  enter  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  and  that  I  should  be 
informed  in  the  course  of  February  that  my  eagles  hang 
over  that  capital.  You  will  not  make  any  suspension  of 
arms  or  capitulation.  My  intention  is  that  the  Bourbons 
should  have  ceased  to  reign  in  Naples,  and  I  wish  to  seat 
on  hat  throne  a  prince  of  my  house,  you  in  the  first 
olic*.  if  that  suits  you, .another  if  that  does  not  suit  you. 


"  I  repeat  to  you  not  to  divide  your  forces  ;  let  all  your 
army  cross  the  Apennines,  and  let  your  three  corps  d'ar- 
mee  proceed  direct  f«r  Naples,  so  as  to  meet  in  one  day 
on  the  same  field  of  battle. 

"  Leave  a  general  of  the  depots,  of  victualling,  and  a 
few  artillerymen  at  Annum  to  defend  that  place.  When 
Naples  is  taken,  the  extremities  will  fall  of  themselves; 
all  that  shall  be  in  the  Abruzzi  must  be  taken  en  revere, 
and  you  will  send  a  division  to  Tarento  and  one  towards 
Sicily,  to  complete  the  conquest  of  the  kingdom. 

"  My  intention  is  to  leave  under  your  command  during 
the  year,  till  I  have  made  new  dispositions,  14  regiments 
of  infantry  competed  to  the  full  complement  of  war,  and 
12  of  French  cavalry  also  at  the  full  complement. 

"The  country  must  supply  you  with  provisions,  cloth- 
ing, remounts,  and  all  that  is  necessary,  so  as  nut  to  cost 
me  a  sou.  My  troops  of  the  kingdom  of  Italy  shall  re- 
main there  no  longer  than  you  shall  judge  necesiary, 
after  which  time  they  shall  return  home. 

"You  will  raise  a  Neapolitan  legion,  into  which  you 
will  admit  none  but  Neapolitan  officers  and  soldiers  na- 
tives of  the  country,  willing  to  attach  themselves  to  mjr 
cause." 


April,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


135 


cle  to  foresee"  and  to  conquer,  had  sent  word 
lo  some  of  the  principal  citizens  of  Holland, 
particularly  to  Admiral  Verhuel,  the  valiant 
and  able  commander  of  the  flotilla,  to  dispose 
Holland  to  renounce  at  length  its  ancient  re- 
publican government,  and  to  constitute  itself 
a  monarchy.  This  is  another  trait  of  the  pic- 
ture which  we  are  here  presenting,  that  French 
Revolution,  of  setting  out  with  endeavouring  ] 
to  convert  all  thrones  into  republics,  and  now 
exerting  itself  to  convert  the  most  ancient  re- 
publics into  monarchies.  The  republics  of 
Venice  and  Genoa,  become  provinces  of  dif- 
ferent kingdoms,  the  free  cities  of  Germany 
absorbed  into  various  principalities,  had  al- 
ready demonstrated  that  singular  tendency. 
The  royalty  of  Holland  was  its  last  and  most 
striking  phenomenon.  Holland,  after  throw- 
ing herself  into  the  arms  of  France  to  escape 
the  Stadtholder,  was  discontented  to  find  her- 
self doomed  to  an  everlasting  war,  and  was 
deficient  in.  gratitude  to  Napoleon,  who  had 
made  at  Amiens  and  daily  renewed  the  great- 
est efforts  for  insuring  to  her  the  restitution  of 
her  colonies.  The  Dutch,  half  English  by 
their  religion,  their  manners,  their  mercantile 
spirit,  though  enemies  of  England,  in  conse- 
quence of  their  maritime  interests,  had  no 
sympathy  with  the  government  of  Napoleon 
and  his  exclusively  continental  greatness.  The 
most  insignificant  victory  at  sea  would  have 
charmed  them  much  more  than  the  most  splen- 
did victory  on  land.  They  showed  sufficient 
disdain  for  the  semi-monarchical  government 
of  a  grand-pensionary,  which  Napoleon  had 
induced  them  to  adopt,  when  he  was  instituting 
a  sort  of  first  consul  in  all  the  countries  under 
the  influence  of  France.  This  grand-pension- 
ary, who  was  M.  de  Schimmelpenninck,  a  good 
citizen  and  an  honourable  man,  was  in  their 
eyes  nothing  but  a  French  prefect,  charged  to 
commit  extortions,  because  he  demanded  taxes 
and  loans  in  order  to  defray  the  expenses  of  a 
war  establishment.  The  dislike  excited  by 
this  government  of  a  grand-pensionary  was 
the  only  facility  which  the  situation  of  Holland 
afforded  for  procuring  the  acceptance  of  a 
king.  Though  overtaken  by  that  weariness 
which,  at  the  end  of  revolutions,  renders  peo- 
ple indifferent  to  every  thing,  the  Dutch  ex- 
perienced a  painful  feeling,  on  finding  them- 
selves deprived  of  their  republican  system. 
However,  the  assurance  that  their  laws,  espe- 
cially their  municipal  laws,  should  be  left  them, 
the  favourable  reports  made  to  them  of  Louis 
Bonaparte,  of  the  regularity  of  his  manners, 
of  his  disposition  to  economy,  of  the  independ- 
ence of  his  character,  lastly  the  usual  resigna- 
tion to  things  long  foreseen,  decided  the  prin- 
cipal representatives  of  Holland  to  accede  to 
the  institution  of  royalty.  A  treaty  was  to 
convert  the  new  situation  of  Holland  in  regard 
to  France  into  an  alliance  between  state  and 
state. 

The  Venetian  provinces — which  Napoleon 
had  not  immediately  united  to  the  kingdom  of 
Italy,  that  he  might  be  more  at  liberty  to  study 
their  resources  and  to  employ  them  according 
to  his  designs — the  Venetian  provinces,  in- 
cluding Dalmatia,  were  annexed  to  the  king- 
dom of  Italy,  upon  condition  of  ceding  the 


country  of  Massa  to  the  Princess  Elisa,  to  aug- 
ment the  duchy  of  Lucca,  and  the  duchy  of 
Guastalla  to  the  Princess  Pauline  Borghese, 
who  had  not  yet  received  any  thing  from  her 
brother's  munificence.  The  latter  would  not 
keep  her  duchy,  and  sold  it  back  to  the  king- 
dom of  Italy  for  some  millions. 

It  was  now,  perhaps,  the  time  to  think  of  the 
Pope  and  the  real  cause  of  his  discontent.  At 
the  moment  when  Italy  was  a  twelfth-cake, 
divided  with  the  sword,  it  would  have  been 
easy  to  reserve  a  share  for  St.  Peter,  and  to 
conciliate  by  some  temporal  advantages  that 
spiritual  power,  which  it  is  dangerous  to  quar- 
rel with,  even  in  our  times  of  doubtful  faith, 
and  which  is  far  more  to  be  dreaded  when  it 
is  oppressed  than  when  it  oppresses.  These 
new  monarchs  ought  to  have  been  very  glad 
to  receive  their  states,  even  with  a  province 
the  fewer;  and  Pius  VII..  indemnified,  might 
have  been  induced  to  submit  with  more  pa- 
tience to  be  completely  invested  by  the  French 
power,  as  he  was  after  the  establishment  of 
Joseph  at  Naples.  At  any  rate,  Napoleon  had 
still  Parma  and  Placentia  to  give  away,  and  he 
could  not  have  made  a  better  use  of  them  than 
by  employing  them  to  console  the  court  of 
Rome.  But  Napoleon  began  to  care  much 
less  for  either  physical  or  moral  resistance 
since  Austerlitz.  He  was  extremely  displeased 
with  the  Pope  for  his  hostile  underhand  pro- 
ceedings against  the  new  king  of  Naples,  and 
he  felt  more  disposed  to  reduce  than  to  aug- 
ment the  patrimony  of  St.  Peter.  Besides,  he 
reserved  Parma  and  Placentia  for  a  use  which 
had  also  its  merit.  He  thought  to  make  them 
an  indemnity  for  some  of  the  princes  protected 
by  Russia  or  England,  such  as  the  sovereigns 
of  Naples  and  Piedmont,  old  dethroned  kings, 
to  whom  he  meant  to  throw  a  few  crumbs  from 
the  sumptuous  board  around  which  the  new 
kings  were  seated.  This  idea  was  certainly 
good,  but  there  was  still  the  fault  of  leaving 
the  Pope  discontented,  ready  to  break  out  with 
vehemence,  and  whom  it  would  have  been  so 
easy  to  satisfy,  without  any  great  detriment  to 
the  recently  instituted  kingdoms. 

It  was  necessary  to  provide  for  Murat,  the 
husband  of  Caroline  Bonaparte,  and  who  had 
at  least  deserved  by  war  what  was  about  to  be 
done  for  him  on  the  score  of  relationship.  But 
he,  too,  had  his  exigencies,  which  were  rather 
his  wife's  than  his  own.  Napoleon  had  thought 
of  giving  them  the  principality  of  Neufchatel, 
which  neither  husband  nor  wife  would  accept. 
The  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres,  who  usually 
interposed  between  Napoleon  and  his  family 
with  that  conciliatory  patience  which  allays 
reciprocal  irritations,  which  listens  to  every 
thing  and  repeats  nothing  but  what  is  fit  to  be 
repeated  —  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres 
was  informed  in  confidence  of  their  violent 
displeasure.  They  thought  themselves  treat- 
ed with  a  cutting  inequality.  Napoleon  then 
thought  of  the  duchy  of  Berg,  ceded  to  France 
by  Bavaria  in  exchange  for  Anspach,  increas- 
ed by  the  remnant  of  the  duchy  of  Cleves,  a 
fine  country,  happily  situated  on  the  right  ol 
the  Rhine,  containing  320,000  inhabitants,  pro 
ducing,  all  costs  of  administration  paid,  a  re 
venue  of  400,000  florins,  allowing  tn^  <»grj 


136 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[April,  380ft. 


ments  to  be  kept  on  foot,  and  capable  of  con- 
ferring on  its  possessor  a  certain  importance 
in  the  new  confederation.  The  fertile  imagi- 
nation of  Murat  and  of  his  wife  failed  not,  in 
fact,  to  dream  of  some  very  distinguished  part 
decorated  externally  by  some  renewed  high 
title  of  the  Holy  Empire. 

The  reigning  family  was  provided  for.  But 
the  brother  and  sisters  of  Napoleon  were  not 
all  that  he  loved.  There  yet  remained  his  com- 
panions in  arms  and  the  fellow-labourers  in 
his  civil  toils.  His  natural  kindness,  in  ac- 
cordance here  with  his  policy,  took  delight  in 
paying  those  for  their  blood,  these  for  their 
vigils.  He  required  them  to  be  brave,  labori- 
ous, upright,  and  for  this  he  thought  that  he 
ought  to  reward  them  amply.  To  see  the  smile 
on  the  countenance  of  his. servants,  the  smile, 
not  of  gratitude,  upon  which  he  reckoned  but 
little  in  general,  but  of  content,  was  one  of  the 
greatest  pleasures  of  his  noble  heart. 

He  consulted  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambace- 
res  upon  the  distribution  of  the  new  favours, 
and  he,  seeing  how  great  soever  might  be  the 
booty  to  be  divided,  the  extent  of  the  services 
and  of  the  ambitions  was  still  greater,  guessed 
the  embarrassment  of  Napoleon,  and  began  by 
putting  an  end  to  that  embarrassment,  as  far 
as  concerned  himself.  He  begged  Napoleon 
not  to  think  of  him  for  the  new  duchies.  No 
man  knew  so  well  that  when  one  has  attained 
a  certain  degree  of  fortune,  it  is  better  to  pre- 
serve than  to  acquire;  and  an  empire,  having 
him  to  direct  its  policy,  Napoleon  to  direct  the 
administration  and  the  armies,  would  have 
continued  the  greatest  of  all,  after  it  had  be- 
come so.  The  arch-chancellor  desired  but  one 
thing,  to  retain  his  present  greatness ;  and  the 
certainty  of  retaining  it  appeared  to  him  pre- 
ferable to  the  finest  duchies.  He  had  acquired 
this  certainty  on  the  following  occasion.  For  a 
moment  he  had  feared,  when  he  saw  Napoleon 
requiring  that  the  new  kings  should  retain  their 
French  dignities,  that  it  was  his  intention  to  have 
kings  exclusively  for  dignitaries  of  the  Empire, 
and  that  the  titles  of  arch-chancellor,  which  he 
possessed,  and  of  arch-treasurer,  which  Prince 
Lebrun  enjoyed,  would  soon  be  transferred  to 
one  of  the  monarchs  newly  created,  or  to  be 
created.  Wishing  to  ascertain  the  intention  of 
Napoleon  on  this  point,  he  said  to  him,  "  When 
you  have  a  king  quite  ready  to  receive  the  title 
of  arch-chancellor,  let  me  know,  and  I  will  give 
my  resignation." — "  Be  easy,"  replied  Napo- 
leon, "  I  must  have  a  lawyer  for  that  post,  and 
you  shall  keep  it." — In  fact,  among  the  crown- 
ed heads  which  formerly  composed  the  Ger- 
•nanic  empire,  there  were  three  places  for  mere 
prelates,  the  electors  of  Mayence,  Treves,  and 
Cologne.  In  like  manner,  amidst  those  kings, 
iignJlanes  of  his  empire,  Napoleon  took  plea- 
sure in  reserving  one  place  for  the  first,  the 
gravest  magistrate  of  his  time,  called  to  intro- 
duce into  his  councils  that  wisdom  which 
could  not  always  enter  them  along  with  kings. 
Nothing  more  was  required  to  give  complete 
content  to  the  prudent  arch-chancellor.  Thence- 
torward  desiring,  soliciting  nothing  for  him- 
self, he  assisted  Napoleon  most  usefully  in  the 
distribution  which  he  had  to  make.  They  both 
agreed  about  the  first  personage  to  be  largely 


recompensed:  this  was  Berthier,  the  most  as- 
siduous, the  most  punctual,  the  most  enlight- 
ened perhaps,  of  Napoleon's  lieutenants,  he 
who  was  always  about  him  amidst  the  balls, 
and  who  submitted  without  any  appearance  of 
displeasure  to  a  life,  the  perils  of  which  were 
not  above  his  great  courage,  but  the  fatigues 
of  which  he  began  to  dislike.  Napoleon  felt 
sincere  satisfaction  in  having  it  in  his  power 
to  pay  him  for  his  service*.  He  granted  to 
him  the  principality  of  Neufchatel,  which  con- 
stituted him  a  sovereign  prince. 

There  was  one  of  his  servants  who  occupied 
a  higher  rank  in  Europe  than  any  other,  M.  de 
Talleyrand,  who  served  him  much  more  by 
his  art  in  treating  with  foreign  ministers,  and 
the  elegance  of  his  manners,  than  by  his 
abilities  in  the  council,  in  which,  however,  he 
had  the  merit  of  always  recommending  a  mo- 
derate policy.  Napoleon  was  not  fond  of  him, 
and  he  mistrusted  him;  but  he  was  grieved  to 
see  him  dissatisfied,  and  M.  de  Talleyrand  was 
\  so  because  he  had  not  been  included  among 
the  grand  dignitaries.  Napoleon,  to  compen- 
i  sate  him,  conferred  on  him  the  fine  principality 
of  Benevento,  one  of  the  two  which  had  re- 
cently been  taken  from  the  pope  as  districts 
enclosed  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples. 

Napoleon  still  had  left  that  of  Ponte  Corvo, 

likewise  enclosed  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples, 

and,  like  the  preceding,  taken  from  the  pope. 

He  determined  to  give  it  to  a  personage  who 

had  rendered  no  considerable  service,  who  had 

treachery  in  his  heart,  but  who  was  the  brother- 

i  in-law  of  Joseph:   this   was   Marshal   Berna- 

j  dotte.     In  granting  this  dignity,  Napoleon  was 

|  obliged  to  do  violence  to  himself.  He  made  up 

his  mind  to  it,  influenced  by  expediency,  family 

motives,  and  oblivion  of  injuries. 

It  would  have  been  doing  but  little  to  reward 
these  three  or  four  servants,  if  Napoleon  had 
not  thought  of  others,  more  numerous  and 
more  deserving,  Berthier  excepted,  whom  he 
had  about  him,  and  who  expected  their  share 
of  the  fruits  of  victory.  He  provided  for  what 
concerned  them  by  means  of  an  institution 
very  cleverly  conceived.  In  giving  kingdoms, 
he  granted  them  to  the  new  kings  on  one  con- 
dition, namely,  to  institute  duchies,  with  ample 
revenues,  and  to  give  up  to  him  a  certain  por- 
tion of  the  national  domains.  Thus,  in  adding 
the  Venetian  States  to  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  he 
reserved  the  creation  of  twelve  duchies,  under 
the  following  titles:  duchies  of  Dalmatia,  Is- 
tria,  Friule,  Cadore,  Belluno,  Conegliano,  Tre- 
viso,  Feltre,  Bassano,  Vicenza,  Padua,  and 
Rovigo.  These  duchies  conferred  no  power, 
bul  they  insured  a  yearly  income,  taken  out 
of  the  reserved  fifteenth  of  the  revenues  of  the 
I  country.  He  gave  the  kingdom  of  Naples  to 
i  Joseph,  on  condition  to  reserve  six  fiefs  in  it, 
of  which  the  two  principalities  of  Benevento 
and  Ponte  Corvo  already  mentioned  formed  a 
part,  and  which  were  completed  by  the  duchies 
of  Gaeta,  Otranto,  Tarento,  and  Reggio.  In, 
adding  to  the  principality  of  Massa  that  of 
Lucca,  Napoleon  stipulated  the  creation  of  the 
duchy  of  Massa.  He  insiiluted  three  others  in 
the  countries  of  Parma  and  Placentia.  One 
of  the  three  was  granted  to  the  Arch-treasurer 
1  Lebrun.  Among  all  these  titles  which  we 


one,  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


137 


have  just  enumerated,  we  find  those  figuring 
which  were  soon  borne  by  the  most  illustrious 
servants  of  the  Empire,  and  which  are  still 
borne  by  their  children,  the  last  and  living 
memorials  of  our  past  greatness.  All  these 
duchies  were  instituted  on  the  same  conditions 
as  the  twelve  which  had  been  created  in  the 
Venetian  States,  without  any  power,  but  with 
a  share  in  the  fifteenth  of  the  revenues.  Na- 
poleon designed  that  there  should  be  rewards 
for  every  rank,  and  he  required  that  there 
should  be  assigned  to  him  in  each  of  these 
countries  national  domains  and  annuities,  in 
order  to  create  endowments.  Thus  he  secured 
30  millions'  worth  of  national  domains  in  the 
State  of  Venice,  and  an  inscription  of  rente  to 
the  amount  of  1200  thousand  francs,  in  the 
great  book  of  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  He  re- 
served for  himself,  for  the  same  purpose,  the 
national  domains  of  Parma  and  Placentia,  a 
rente  of  a  million  upon  the  kingdom  of  Naples, 
and  four  millions'  worth  of  national  domains 
in  the  principality  of  Lucca  and  Massa.  The 
whole  formed  22  duchies,  34  millions  in  na- 
tional property,  2,400,000  francs  in  rentes,  and, 
added  to  the  treasure  of  the  army,  which  a 
first  war  contribution  had  already  raised  to 
70  millions,  and  which  new  victories  were 
about  to  increase  indefinitely,  would  serve  for 
granting  pensions  to  all  ranks,  from  the  com- 
mon soldier  to  the  marshal.  The  civil  func- 
tionaries were  to  have  their  share  in  these 
pensions.  Napoleon  had  already  discussed 
with  M.  de  Talleyrand  a  plan  for  the  reconsti- 
tution  of  the  nobility,  for  he  found  that  the 
Legion  of  Honour  and  the  duchies  were  not 
sufficient.  He  purposed  to  create  counts, 
barons,  believing  in  the  necessity  of  these 
social  distinctions,  and  desiring  that  every  one 
should  grow  great  with  him,  in  proportion  to 
his  merits.  But  he  intended  to  correct  the 
profound  vanity  of  these  titles  in  two  ways,  by 
making  them  the  reward  of  great  services, 
and  by  endowing  them  with  revenues,  securing 
a  permanent  provision  to  the  families. 

These  various  resolutions  were  successively 
presented  to  the  Senate,  to  be  converted  into 
articles  of  the  constitutions  of  the  Empire,  in 
the  months  of  March,  April,  and  June. 

On  the  15th  of  March,  in  this  year  1806, 
Murat  was  proclaimed  Grand-duke  of  Cleves 
and  Berg.  On  the  30th  of  March,  Joseph  was 
proclaimed  King  of  Naples  and  Sicily ;  Pauline 
Borghese,  Duchess  of  Guastalla  ;  Berthier, 
Prince  of  Neufchatel.  On  the  5th  of  June 
only  (the  negotiations  with  Holland  having 
occasioned  some  delay),  Louis  was  proclaim- 
ed King  of  Holland,  M.  de  Talleyrand  Prince 
of  Benevento,  Bernadotte  Prince  of  Ponte 
Corvo.  One  might  have  imagined  one's  self 
carried  back  to  the  times  of  the  Roman  Em- 
pire, when  a  mere  decree  of  the  Senate  took 
away  or  conferred  crowns. 

This  series  of  extraordinary  acts  was  termi- 
nated by  the  definitive  creation  of  the  new 
confederation  of  the  Rhine.  The  negotiation 
had  secretly  passed  between  M.  de  Talleyrand 
and  the  ministers  of  Bavaria,  Baden,  and 
Wurtemberg.  From  the  visible  agitation  of 
the  German  princes,  everybody  suspected 
that  another  new  constitution  for  Germany 

Voi.  II.— 18 


was  preparing.  Those  who,  from  the  geo- 
graphical situation  of  their  territories,  could 
be  included  in  the  new  confederation,  soli- 
cited the  favour  of  being  admitted  into  it, 
in  order  to  preserve  their  existence.  Those 
who  were  likely  to  border  upon  it  strove  to 
fathom  the  secret  of  its  constitution,  in  order 
to  ascertain  what  would  be  their  relations 
with  this  new  power,  and  desired  nothing 
belter  than  to  become  members  of  it  on  condi- 
tion of  certain  advantages.  Austria,  for  some 
time  past  considering  the  empire  as  dissolved, 
and  thenceforth  useless  for  her,  beheld  this 
spectacle  with  apparent  indifference.  Prussia, 
on  the  contrary,  which  regarded  the  fall  of  the 
old  Germanic  confederation  as  an  immeuse 
revolution,  would  fain  have  shared  at  least 
with  France  the  imperial  power  wrested  from 
the  house  of  Austria,  and  had  the  patronage 
of  the  north  of  Germany,  while  France  arro- 
gated to  herself  that  of  the  south — Prussia  was 
listening  to  find  out  what  was  going  forward. 
The  manner  in  which  she  had  just  taken  pos- 
session of  Hanover,  the  despatches  published 
in  London,  had  so  cooled  Napoleon  towards 
her,  that  he  did  not  even  take  the  trouble  to 
apprize  her  of  things  which  ought  not  to  have 
been  done  but  in  concert  with  her.  Not  only 
was  she  excluded  from  the  affairs  of  Germany, 
which  were  her  own ;  a  thousand  rumours 
were  circulated  of  changes  of  territory,  changes 
by  which  provinces  were  taken  from  her  and 
others  given  to  her,  but  always  smaller  than 
those  that  were  taken. 

Two  Germanic  princes,  the  one  as  ancient 
as  the  other  was  new,  gave  rise  to  all  these 
rumours  by  their  impatient  ambition.  The 
one  was  the  Elector  of  Hesse-Cassel,  a  wily 
prince,  avaricious,  rich,  from  the  produce  of 
his  mines  and  the  blood  of  his  subjects  sold 
to  foreigners,  striving  to  keep  on  good  terms 
with  England,  where  he  had  large  capitals 
deposited,  with  Prussia,  whose  neighbour  he 
was  and  one  of  her  generals,  lastly  with 
France,  which  at  this  moment  was  building 
up  or  throwing  down  the  fortune  of  all  the 
sovereign  houses.  There  was  no  artifice  that 
he  did  not  employ  with  M.  de  Talleyrand  to  be 
j  comprehended  in  the  new  arrangements,  and 
to  gain  some  advantage  by  them.  Thus  he 
offered  to  join  the  projected  confederation,  and 
to  place  in  consequence  under  our  influence 
one  of  the  most  important  portions  of  Ger- 
many, namely,  Hesse,  but  on  one  condition, 
that  of  putting  him  in  possession  of  a  great 
part  of  the  territory  of  Hesse-Darmstadt,  which 
he  detested  with  that  hatred  of  the  direct  branch 
for  the  collateral  branch  so  frequent  in  German 
families.  He  insisted  strongly  on  this  point, 
and  had  submitted  a  very  extensive  and  very 
detailed  plan.  At  the  same  time,  he  wrote  to 
the  King  of  Prussia  to  denounce  to  him  what 
was  scheming  at  Paris,  to  tell  him  that  a  con- 
federation was  preparing,  which  would  ruin 
the  influence  of  Prussia  as  much  as  that  of 
Austria,  and  that  they  were  employing  all 
sorts  of  means  to  induce  him  to  enter  into  it. 

The  new  German  Prince,  Murat,  took  a  dif- 
ferent   course.      Not    content   with    the   fine 
Duchy  of  Berg,  containing,  as  we  have  said, 
320,000  inhabitants,  and  yielding  a  revenue  of 
x  2 


138 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[June,  1808. 


400,000  florins,  which  furnished  him  with  the  would  have- accepted  the  Hanseatic  cities,  for 
means  of  keeping  two  regiments,  and  put  into  which  she  was  applying  every  day.  This 
his  hands  the  important  fortress  of  Wesel,  he  scheme,  which  was  kept  a  secret  from  Euro- 
wanted  to  be  at  least  the  equal  of  the  sove-  pean  diplomacy,  and  which  was  the  price  of 
reign  of  Wurtemberg,  or  of  Baden,  and  to  the  continual  intrigues  of  the  house  of  Hesse- 
attain  this  end  he  desired  that  a  State  with  a  Cassel  with  the  enemies  of  France,  was  the 
million  of  inhabitants  should  be  created  for  cause  of  the  refusals  unexplained  at  the  time, 
him  in  Westphalia.  For  this  purpose  he  beset  given  to  the  solicitations  of  the  elector  to  be 
M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  was  always  extremely  admitted  into  the  new  confederation,  and  of 
solicitous  to  please  members  of  the  imperial  fa-  the  false  fidelity  towards  Prussia  which  he 
mily.  He  framed  plans  upon  plans  for  compos-  soon  made  a  boast  of. 

ing  a  territory  for  him.  Of  course  Prussia  fur-  Every  thing  being  agreed  upon  with  the 
nished  the  materials  with  Munster,  Osnabriick,  sovereigns  of  Baden,  Wurtemberg,  and  Bava- 
and  East  Friesland.  It  was  contemplated,  it  is  ria,  the  only  princes  who  were  consulted,  the 
true,  to  give  this  power  in  exchange  the  treaty  was  presented  for  signature  to  the  other 
Hanseatic  cities,  which  would  form  a  fine  princes,  who  were  comprehended  at  their  re- 
compensation,  if  not  in  territory,  at  least  in  quest  in  the  new  confederation,  but  without 
wealth  and  importance.  |  taking  their  opinion  on  the  nature  of  the  act 

All  these  plans,  prepared  without  the  know- I  by  which  it  was  constituted.  This  treaty, 
ledge  of  Napoleon,  were  disapproved  by  him  dated  the  12th  of  July,  contained  the  following 
as  soon  as  he  was  made  acquainted  with  dispositions : — 

them.  He  had  it  not  so  much  at  heart  to  i  The  new  confederation  was  to  bear  a  re- 
gratify  the  ambition  of  Murat  as  to  set  about  j  stricted  and  well-chosen  title,  that  of  Confede- 
fresh  dismemberments  in  Germany:  he  was  ;  ration  of  the  Rhine,  a  title  which  excluded  the 
determined  in  particular  not  to  incorporate  '  pretension  of  comprehending  all  Germany,  and 
the  Hanseatic  cities  with  any  great  European  applied  exclusively  to  the  states  bordering  on 
state.  His  last  combinations  had  already  France,  and  having  incontestible  relations  of 
swept  away  Augsburg,  and  were  about  to  interest  with  her.  The  title,  then,  corrected  in 
sweep  away  Nuremberg,  cities  through  which  some  degree  the  fault  of  the  institution.  The 
passed  the  commerce  of  France  with  the  centre  princes  who  signed  it  formed  a  confederation 
and  the  south  of  Germany.  Our  commerce  under  the  presidency  of  the  prince  arch-chan- 
with  the  north  passed  through  Hamburg,  Bre-  cellor,  and  under  the  protectorship  of  the  Em- 
men,  Lubeck.  Napoleon  would  take  good  '  peror  of  the  French.  All  disputes  among  them 
care  not  to  sacrifice  cities  whose  independ-  j  were  to  be  settled  in  a  diet  meeting  at  Frank- 
ence  interested  France  and  Europe.  French  j  fort,  and  composed  of  two  colleges  only,  one 
wines  and  stuffs  penetrated  into  Germany  and  called  the  college  of  the  kings,  the  other  the 
into  Russia  under  the  neutral  flag  of  the  college  of  the  princes.  The  first  corresponded 
Hanseatic  cities,  and  under  the  same  flag  with  the  old  college  of  the  electors,  which 
were  returned  naval  stores,  sometimes  corn,  would  have  had  no  meaning  now  that  there 
when  the  state  of  the  crops  in  France  required  was  no  longer  an  emperor  to  elect;  the  second, 
it  To  shut  up  these  cities  by  the  custom-  by  the  title  and  the  thing,  was  the  old  college 
houses  of  a  great  state  would  have  been  fet-  of  the  princes.  There  was  no  college  answer- 
tering  their  trade  and  ours.  It  was  quite  ,  ing  to  the  former  college  of  the  cities. 
enough  to  deprive  ourselves  of  Nuremberg  The  confederated  princes  were  in  a  perpe- 
and  Augsburg,  which  sent  their  mercery  and  tual  state  of  alliance,  offensive  and  defensive, 
their  hardware  to  France,  and  took  back  our  ;  with  France.  Any  war  in  which  the  confede- 
wines,  our  stuffs,  our  colonial  produce,  which  ration  or  France  might  be  engaged,  should  be 
they  afterwards  distributed  over  the  whole  common  to  both.  France  was  to  furnish 
south  of  Germany.  200,000  men,  and  the  confederation  63,000,  in 

Napoleon,  firmly  resolved  not  to  sacrifice  these  proportions :  Bavaria  30,000,  Wurtem- 
the  Hanseatic  cities,  rejected  every  combina-  berg  12,  the  grand-duchy  of  Baden  8,  the  grand- 
tion  that  would  have  tended  to  give  them  to  duchy  of  Berg  5,  that  of  Hesse-Darmstadt  4 ; 
any  state  whatever,  great  or  small.  Of  course,  lastly  the  petty  states  4000  among  them.  On 
he  approved  of  none  of  Murat's  plans.  As  for  the  death  of  the  prince  arch-chancellor,  the 
the  Elector  of  Hesse,  he  detested  that  false,  Emperor  of  the  French  had  the  right  of  nomi- 
greedy  prince,  cloaking  an  implacable  enmity  nating  his  successor. 

under  the  exterior  of  a  sort  of  indifference,  and  The  confederates  declared  themselves  sepa- 
purposed  on  the  first  occasion  to  repay  the  rated  for  ever  from  the  German  empire,  and 
sentiments  which  he  cherished  for  France,  were  to  make  an  immediate  and  solemn  decla- 
Napoleon  would  not,  therefore,  bind  himself  ration  to  that  effect  to  the  Diet  of  Ratisbon. 
towards  him  by  introducing  him  into  the  con-  They  were  to  govern  themselves  in  their  rela- 
federation,  which  he  was  organizing,  for  it  tions  with  each  other,  and  relatively  to  thei 
would  have  been  rendering  impossible  an  German  affairs,  upon  which  the  Diet  of  Frank 
eventual  plan  for  bringing  about  the  speedy  fort  would  be  called  speedily  to  deliberate, 
and  well-merited  ruin  of  that  prince.  If  France  By  a  special  article,  all  the  German  houses 
were  induced  to  restore  Hanover  to  England,  had  the  faculty  of  adhering  in  the  sequel  to 
it  would  be  necessary  to  find  a  compensation  this  treaty,  upon  condition  of  a  pure  and  siia- 
4br  Prussia,  and  Napoleon  was  determined  to  pie  adhesion. 

offer, her  Hesse,  which  she  would  certainly  j  For  the  present,  the  Confederation  of  the 
have  accepted,  as  she  had  accepted  the  eccle-  Rhine  comprehended  the  Kings  of  Bavaria  and 
iiastical  principalities  and  Hanover,  as  she  j  Wurtemberg,  the  prince  arch-chancellor  Arch 


July,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


189 


bishop  of  Ratisbon,  the  Grand-dukes  of  Baden, 
Berg,  and  Hesse-Darmstadt,  the  Dukes  of  Nas- 
sau-Usingen,  and  Nassau  Weilburg,  the  Princes 
of  Hohenzollern-Hechingen,and  Hohenzollern- 
Sigmaringen,  of  Salm-Salm  and  Salm-Kirburg, ' 
of  Isenburg,  Aremberg,  Lichtenstein,  and  De  la 
Leyen. 

The  Hohenzollerns  and  the  Salms  were  ad- 
mitted into  the  new  confederation  on  account  of 
the  long  residence  of  several  of  the  members 
of  those  families  in  France,  and  of  the  attach- 
ment which  they  had  professed  to  our  interests. 
Prince  Lichtenstein  obtained  his  admission, 
and  thus  retained  his  quality  of  reigning  prince, 
though  an  Austrian  prince,  on  account  of  the 
treaty  of  Presburg  which  he  had  signed.  To 
his  principality  and  to  several  of  those  which 
were  preserved,  greedy  claims  had  been  pre-  • 
ferred,  but  rejected  by  France. 

The  geographical  boundaries  of  the  Con- ' 
federation  of  the  Rhine  included  the  territories  | 
situated  between  the  Sieg,  the  Lahn,  the  Mayn, ' 
the  Neckar,  the  Upper  Danube,  the  Isar,  and  j 
the  Inn,  that  is  to  say,  the  countries  of  Nassau  ; 
and  Baden,  Franconia,  Suabia,  the  Upper  Pa- 
latinate, and  Bavaria.     Any  prince,  compre- 
hended within  these  boundaries,  if  he  was  not 
named  in  the  constitutive  act,  lost  the  quality 
of  reigning  prince.     He  was  mediatised,  an  ex- 
pression borrowed  from  ancient  Germanic  law, 
signifying  that  a  prince  ceased  to  depend  im- 
mediately on  the  supreme  head  of  the  Empire, 
so  as  to  depend  on  him  only  mediately,  that  he 
fell  in  consequence  under  the  authority  of  the 
territorial  sovereign  in  whose  territories  he 
was  enclosed,  and  was  thus  stripped  of  his  ! 
sovereignty. 

The  mediatised  princes  and  counts  retained 
certain  princely  rights  and  lost  only  the  sove- 
reign rights,  which  were  transferred  to  the 
prince  whose  subjects  they  became.  The 
transferred  sovereign  rights  were  those  of 
legislation,  of  supreme  jurisdiction,  of  high 
police,  of  taxation,  and  of  recruiting.  The 
lower  and  middle  justice,  the  forest  police,  the 
rights  of  fishing,  hunting,  pasturage,  the  work- 
ing of  mines,  and  all  dues  of  a  feudal  nature, 
without  including  personal  property,  composed 
the  prerogatives  left  to  the  mediatised, 

They  retained  the  right  to  be  tried  by  their 
peers,  called  austregues  in  the  ancient  German 
constitution. 

The  immediate  nobility  was  definitively  in- 
corporated. 

The  mediatised,  reduced  from  the  state  of 
reigning  princes  to  that  of  privilized  subjects, 
were  very  numerous,  and  would  have  been 
more  so,  but  for  the  intervention  of  France. 
Among  the  number  were  the  Princes  of  Fiirs- 
tenberg,  attached  to  Austria,  of  Hohenlohe  to 
Prussia,  the  Prince  of  Tour  and  Taxis,  who 
was  deprived  of  the  monopoly  of  the  German 
posts,  the  Princes  of  Lowenstein-Wertheim,  ; 
Linange,  Loos,  Schwarzenberg,  Solms,  Witt- 
genstein-Perleberg,  and  some  others.  The  ; 
house  of  Nassau-Fulda,  that  of  the  late  Stadt- 
holder,  lost  some  portions  of  its  domains  in 
consequence  of  its  contiguity  of  territory  to 
the  new  confederation.  The  court  of  Berlin, 
independently  of  the  serious  uneasiness  which 
such  a  confederation  could  not  fail  to  excite  in  i 


it,  found  two  causes  of  personal  mortification 
in  the  losses  sustained  by  the  two  houses  of 
Nassau-Fulda,  and  Tour  and  Taxis,  whose 
near  relationship  to  the  royal  family  of  Prussia 
we  have  already  explained. 

To  these  fundamental  dispositions,  the  treaty 
added  the  regulations  of  territory  wnich  were 
necessary  to  produce  harmony  between  the 
sovereigns  of  Wurtemberg,  Baden,  and  Ba- 
varia, irreconcilable  co-sharers  in  Austrian 
Suabia,  in  the  domains  of  the  immediate  no- 
bility, in  the  territories  belonging  to  the  medico 
tised  princes. 

The  free  city  of  Nuremberg,  the  condition 
of  which  one  knew  not  how  to  regulate,  what 
with  a  restless  population  of  citizens  which 
agitated  it,  and  what  with  a  patrician  nobility 
which  ruined  it  by  the  most  expensive  admin- 
istration, was  given  to  Bavaria,  as  well  as  the 
city  of  Ratisbon,  in  return  for  some  cessions 
made  in  the  Tyrol  to  the  kingdom  of  Italy. 
The  prince  arch-chancellor  found  an  ample 
compensation  in  the  city  and  territory  of 
Frankfort  It  was  in  Frankfort  that  the  new 
diet  was  to  be  held. 

This  celebrated  treaty  of  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine  put  an  end  to  the  ancient  German 
empire  after  an  existence  of  1006  years,  from 
Charlemagne  crowned  in  800,  to  Francis  IL, 
dispossessed  in  1806.  It  furnished  the  new 
model,  after  which  modern  Germany  was  to 
be  constituted ;  it  was  on  this  ground  the 
social  reform  of  it,  and  for  the  present  it  placed 
the  states  of  the  south  of  Germany  under  the 
temporary  influence  of  France,  leaving  those 
of  the  north  to  wander  among  the  protectors 
whom  tKey  should  think  fit  to  choose. 

This  treaty,  published  on  the  12th  of  July 
with  great  ceremony,  caused  no  surprise,  but 
completed  obviously  to  all  eyes  the  European 
system  of  Napoleon.  Holding  all  the  south 
of  Europe  under  his  imperial  paramountship 
by  the  family  royalties,  having  the  princes  of 
the  Rhine  under  his  protectorship,  he  lacked 
nothing  of  the  empire  of  the  west  but  the  title. 

It  was  necessary  to  communicate  this  re- 
sult to  the  parties  interested,  that  is,  to  the 
Diet  of  Ratisbon,  to  the  Emperor  of  Austria, 
and  to  the  King  of  Prussia.  The  declaration 
to  the  Diet  was  simple ;  it  merely  notified  that 
it  was  no  longer  acknowledged  by  the  Confed- 
eration. To  the  Emperor  of  Austria  was  ad- 
dressed a  note,  in  which  without  dictating  to 
him  the  conduct  which  he  had  to  pursue,  and 
which  was  clearly  foreseen,  the  German  empire 
was  spoken  of  as  an  institution  as  completely 
worn  out  as  the  republic  of  Venice,  crumbling 
to  ruin  in  all  its  parts,  no  longer  giving  pro- 
tection to  weak  states,  influence  to  strong 
states,  not  corresponding  either  with  the  wants 
of  the  time  or  with  the  relative  proportion  of 
the  German  states  to  each  other;  lastly,  con- 
ferring on  the  house  of  Austria  itself  but  an 
empty  title,  that  cf  Emperor  of  Germany, 
which  had  released  the  court  of  Vienna  from 
all  dependence  in  regard  to  the  electoral  houses 
The  Confederation  seemed,  therefore,  to  hope 
without  demanding  it,  that  the  Emperor  Frail- 
cis  would  abdicate  a  title  which  was  about  to 
cease  de  facto  in  a  great  part  of  Germany,  in 
all  that  comprising  the  Confederation  of  tb« 


140 


HISTORY    O*    THE 


[July,  1806. 


Rhine,  and  which  would  be  no  longer  recog- 
nised by  France. 

As  for  Prussia,  the  French  cabinet  congratu- 
lated her  on  being  delivered  from  the  trammels 
of  that  German  empire,  usually  under  the 
control  of  Austria,  and,  to  compensate  her  for 
having  taken  the  south  of  Germany  under  its 
dependence,  it  recommended  to  her  to  place 
the  north  under  the  like  dependence.  "  The 
Emperor  Napoleon,"  wrote  that  cabinet, "  will 
see  without  pain,  nay  even  with  pleasure, 
Prussia  ranging  under  her  influence  all  the 
states  of  the  north  of  Germany  by  means  of  a 
confederation  similar  to  that  of  the  Rhine." 
The  princes  were  not  designated,  consequently 
none  of  them  were  excluded,  but  the  number 
could  not  be  great  and  their  importance  not 
greater.  They  were  Hesse-Cassel,  Saxony, 
with  its  various  branches,  the  two  houses  of 
Mecklenburg ;  lastly,  the  petty  princes  of  the 
north,  whom  it  would  be  superfluous  to  enu- 
merate. A  promise  was  given  not  to  throw 
any  impediment  in  the  way  of  a  confederation 
of  that  kind. 

Napoleon,  however,  had  not  ventured  upon 
such  things  without  taking  energetic  and  os- 
tensible precautions.  Watching  with  his  usual 
activity  what  was  passing  at  Naples,  at  Ven- 
ice, in  Dalmatia,  without  taking  off  his  atten- 
tion from  the  internal  administration  of  the 
Empire,  he  had  applied  himself  to  putting  the 
grand  army  on  a  formidable  footing.  That 
army,  scattered  as  we  have  seen,  over  Bava- 
ria, Franconia,  andSaubia,  living  in  good  can- 
tonments, had  rested  itself,  and  was  ready  to 
march  again,  either  if  it  was  obliged  to  pour 
back  through  Bavaria  towards  Austria,  or  to 
traverse  Franconia  and  Saxony,  and  fall  upon 
Russia.  Napoleon  had  strengthened  his  ranks 
with  the  two  reserves  formed  at  Strasburg  and 
Mayence  under  Marshals-senators  Kellermann 
and  Lefebvre.  It  was  an  increase  of  about 
40,000  men,  perfectly  disciplined,  trained,  pre- 
pared for  fatigue.  Some  of  them  even,  who 
belonged  to  the  reserves  of  the  preceding  years, 
had  attained  the  age  of  full  strength,  that  is  to 
say,  twenty-four  or  twenty-five  years.  The 
army,  diminished  in  consequence  of  the  late 
campaign  by  about  20,000  men,  a  fourth  of 
whom  had  rejoined  the  ranks,  found  itself, 
thanks  to  this  reinforcement,  augmented  and 
invigorated.  Napoleon,  taking  advantage  of 
the  circumstance  that  part  of  his  troops  were 
subsisted  abroad,  had  raised  the  total  force  of 
France  to  450,000  men,  152,000  of  them  in  the 
interior,  (the  gendarmes,  veterans,  invalids, 
and  depots,  being  included  in  that  number,) 
40,000  at  Naples,  50,000  in  Lombardy,  20,000 
in  Dalmatia,  6000  in  Holland,  12.000  at  the 
camp  of  Boulogne,  and  170,000  at  the  grand 
army.  These  latter,  collected  into  a  single  mass, 
on  the  complete  war  footing,  numbering  30,000 
horse,  10,000  artillerymen,  and  130,000  foot, 
had  arrived  at  the  highest  degree  of  perfection 
which  it  is  possible  to  attain  by  discipline  and 
war,  and  was  under  the  direction  of  the  great- 
est of  captains.  It  should  be  observed  that  from 
this  army  General  Marmont  had  been  detached 
to' Dalmatia,  and  the  Dutch  to  Holland,  and 
that  it  no  longer  included  any  Bavarians  in  its 


ranks,  which  explains  why  it  was  not  more 
numerous  after  the  junction  of  the  reserves. 

In  this  imposing  situation,  Napoleon  could 
await  the  effects  produced  in  Ber._i  and  Vienna 
by  the  whole  of  his  plans,  and  the  result  of 
the  negotiations  opened  at  Paris  with  England 
and  Russia. 

For  the  rest,  he  had  no  inclination  to  pro 
long  the  war,  if  he  were  not  obliged  to  do  so  for 
the  execution  of  his  designs.  He  was  impa- 
tient, on  the  contrary,  to  assemble  his  soldiers 
about  him  at  the  magnificent  entertainment 
which  the  city  of  Paris  was  to  give  to  the  grand 
army.  It  was  a  happy  and  a  fine  idea  to  let 
that  heroic  army  be  feasted  by  that  noble  cap- 
ital, which  feels  so  strongly  all  the  emotions 
of  France,  and  which,  if  it  does  not  feel  them 
in  a  more  powerful  manner,  communicates 
them  at  least  more  rapidly  and  energetically, 
thanks  to  the  might  of  number  and  to  the  habit 
of  taking  the  lead  in  all  things,  and  of  speak- 
ing for  the  country  on  all  occasions. 

Disposed  to  greatness  by  nature  and  also  by 
success,  which  elevated  his  imagination,  Na- 
poleon, amidst  those  negotiations,  so  vast  and 
so  varied,  those  military  cares,  which  extended 
from  Naples  to  Illyria,  from  Illyria  to  Germany, 
and  from  Germany  to  Holland,  devoted  himself 
with  ardent  fondness  to  magnificent  creations 
of  art  and  public  utility.  Having  visited, 
during  the  brief  snatches  of  leisure  left  him  by 
war,  almost  all  the  places  of  the  capital,  he 
had  not  beheld  one  of  them  without  being 
struck  at  the  moment  by  some  grand,  moral, 
or  useful  idea,  the  realization  of  which  we  see 
at  this  day  on  the  soil  of  Paris.  He  had  been 
to  St.  Denis,  and  finding  that  ancient  church 
in  a  deplorable  state  of  dilapidation,  especially 
since  the  violation  of  the  royal  tombs,  he  or- 
dered by  a  decree  the  repair  of  that  vene- 
rable edifice.  He  decided  that  four  chapels 
should  be  erected;  three  for  the  kings  of  the 
first  races,  and  one  for  the  princes  of  his  own 
dynas^v.  Marbles  bearing  the  names  of  the 
kings  ouriea  there  and  whose  sepulchres  had 
been  profaned,  were  to  replace  their  dispersed 
relics.  He  instituted  a  chapter  of  ten  aged 
bishops  to  pray  perpetually  in  that  funereal  asy- 
lum of  our  royal  races. 

After  he  had  visited  St.  Genevieve,  he  or- 
dered that  beautiful  church  to  be  finished 
and  restored  to  public  worship,  but  retaining 
the  destination  which  the  Constituent  Assem- 
bly had  assigned  to  it,  that  of  receiving  the 
illustrious  men  of  France.  The  chapter  of  the 
cathedral,  augmented,  was  to  chant  the  service 
there  every  day. 

A  triumphal  monument  had  been  ordered 
by  the  Senate  on  the  proposition  of  the  Tribu- 
nate. After  many  rejected  plans,  Napoleon 
fixed  upon  the  idea  of  erecting  in  the  finest  Place 
in  Paris,  a  bronze  pillar,  similar  in  form  and 
dimensions  to  Trajan's  pillar, consecrated  to  the 
grand  army,  and  displaying  on  a  long  basso  re- 
lievo winding  round  its  magnificent  shaft,  the 
exploits  of  the  campaign  of  1 805.  It  was  decided 
that  the  cannon  taken  from  the  enemy  should 
furnish  the  material  for  it.  The  statue  of  Na- 
poleon, in  imperial  costume,  was  to  surmount 
the  capital.  It  is  that  very  column  in  the 


July,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


141 


x'lace  Vendome,  at  the  foot  of  which  pass  and 
will  pass  the  present  and  future  generations, 
the  subject  of  a  generous  emulation  for  them, 
so  long  as  they  shall  cherish  the  love  of  na- 
tional glory,  the  subject  of  everlasting  reproach 
if  they  were  ever  capable  of  losing  that  noble 
sentiment. 

Napoleon  afterwards  settled  the  plan  of  a 
triumphal  arch  on  the  Place  du  Carrousel,  the 
same  that  exists  at  this  day.  That  arch  formed 
part  of  the  plan  for  completing  the  Louvre 
and  the  Tuileries.  He  purposed  to  join  those 
two  palaces,  and  to  compose  out  of  them  but 
one,  which  should  be  the  most  extensive  ever 
seen  in  any  country.  Placing  himself  one  day 
under  the  porch  of  the  Louvre  and  looking  to- 
wards the  Hotel  de  Ville,  he  conceived  the  idea 
of  an  immense  street,  which  was  to  be  uni- 
formly built,  wide  as  the  Rue  de  la  Paix,  run- 
ning to  the  Barriere  du  Trone,  so  that  the  eye 
might  penetrate  on  one  side  to  the  Champs 
Elysees,  on  the  other  to  the  first  trees  of  Vin- 
cennes.  The  name  destined  for  this  street 
was  that  of  RUE  IMPERIALS.  A  monument 
had  long  ago  been  decreed  on  the  site  of  the 
ancient  Bastile.  Napoleon  proposed  that  it 
should  be  a  triumphal  arch,  spacious  enough 
to  afford  a  passage  through  the  centre  portal 
to  the  great  projected  street,  and  placed  at  the 
intersection  of  that  street  and  the  Canal  of  St. 
Martin.  The  architects  having  declared  it  to 
be  impossible  to  erect  such  a  structure  on  such 
a  base,  Napoleon  determined  to  transfer  that 
arch  to  the  Place  de  1'Etoile,  that  it  might  face 
the  Tuileries  and  become  one  of  the  extremi- 
ties of  the  immense  line  which  he  meant  to 
form  in  the  heart  of  his  capital.  The  present 
generation  has  completed  most  of  the  monu- 
ments which  Napoleon  had  not  time  to  finish. 
It  has  neither  completed  the  Louvre  nor  cre- 
ated that  magnificent  street  which  he  pro- 
jected. 

It  was  not  to  works  of  mere  embellishment 
that  he  limited  his  cares  for  the  city  of  Paris. 
He  deemed  it  unworthy  of  the  prosperity  of 
the  Empire  that  the  capital  should  be  destitute 
of  water,  while  a  fine,  limpid  stream  ran 
through  the  heart  of  it.  The  fountains  were 
open  in  the  daytime  only :  he  ordered  works 
to  be  executed  immediately  at  the  pumps  of 
Notre-Dame,  of  the  Pont-Neuf,  of  Chaillot, 
and  of  Gros-Chaillot,  to  make  the  water  run 
day  and  night.  He  ordered,  moreover,  the 
erection  of  fifteen  new  fountains.  That  of 
the  Chateau  d'Eau  was  included  in  this  crea- 
tion. In  two  months,  a  part  of  these  orders 
was  executed,  and  the  water  sprang  up  night 
and  day  from  the  sixty-five  ancient  fountain.". 
On  the  site  of  those  which  were  recently  de- 
creed, temporary  channels  distributed  the 
water  till  the  fountains  themselves  should  be 
erected.  It  was  the  public  Treasury  which 
furnished  the  funds  necessary  for  this  ex- 
pense. 

Napoleon  prescribed  the  continuation  of 
the  quays  of  the  Seine,  and  decided  that  the 
bridge  of  the  Jardin  des  Plantes,  then  build- 
ing, should  bear  the  glorious  name  of  Auster- 
litz.  Having,  lastly,  perceived,  when  visiting 
the  Champ  de  Mars,  to  determine  the  plan  of 
the  fetes  for  which  preparations  were  making, 


that  a  communication  between  the  two  banks 
of  the  Seine  was  indispensable  at  this  point, 
ic  ordered  the  construction  of  a  stone  bridge, 
which  was  to  be  the  finest  in  the  capital,  and 
las  borne  the  name  of  the  Bridge  of  Jena. 

The  most  distant  departments  of  the  Em- 
pire shared  in  his  munificence.  He  decreed 
:his  year  the  canal  from  the  Rhone  to  the 
Rhine,  the  canal  from  the  Scheldt  to  the 
Rhine,  and  ordered  surveys  for  the  canal  from 
Nantes  to  Brest.  He  devoted  funds  to  the 
continuation  of  the  canals  of  the  Ourcq,  of 
St.  Quentin,  and  of  Burgundy.  He  pre- 
scribed the  construction  of  a  high  road,  sixty 
leagues  in  length,  from  Metz  to  Mayence, 
through  the  valley  of  the  Moselle.  He  gave 
orders  for  commencing  the  road  from  Roanne 
to  Lyons,  where  there  is  that  fine  descent  of 
Tarare,  almost  worthy  of  the  Simplon ;  the 
celebrated  road  of  La  Corniche,  running  from 
Nice  to  Genoa,  along  the  flanks  of  the  Apen- 
nines, between  the  sea  and  the  summits  of 
those  mountains.  He  directed  that  of  the 
Simplon,  already  nearly  finished,  those  of 
Mont  Cenis  and  Mont  Genevre,  that  along  the 
banks  of  the  Rhine,  to  be  continued.  Napo- 
leon ordered,  besides,  new  works  at  the  arse- 
nal of  Antwerp. 

It  seems  as  if  victory  had  fecundated  his 
spirit,  for  most  of  his  great  creations  date 
from  this  memorable  year,  placed  between  the 
first  half  of  his  career,  that  so  glorious  half, 
when  wisdom  almost  always  guided  his  steps, 
and  that  second  half,  so  extraordinary  and  so 
sad,  when  his  genius,  intoxicated  by  success, 
overleaped  all  the  limits  of  the  possible,  to 
perish  in  an  abyss. 

The  Legislative  Body,  which  was  assembled, 
quietly  adopted  the  plans  projected  by  Napo- 
leon, and  discussed  by  the  council  of  state. 
None  of  those  stormy  scenes  of  the  Revolu- 
tion were  now  witnessed,  neither  were  yet  the 
scenes  of  a  free  parliament.  The  assembly 
was  seen  adopting  with  confidence  plans 
which  it  knew  to  be  as  ably  conceived  as  they 
were  ably  explained. 

A  new  code  was  presented  this  year,  the 
fruit  of  long  conferences  between  the  tribunes* 
and  the  councillors  of  state,  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres:  it 
was  the  Code  of  Civil  Procedure,  prescribing 
the  manner  of  proceeding  before  our  tribu- 
nals, in  consequence  of  their  new  form  and 
the  simplification  of  our  laws.  This  code 
was  adopted  without  difficulty,  the  questions 
liable  to  produce  disputes  having  been  settled 
beforehand  in  the  preparatory  discussions  of 
the  Council  of  State  and  the  Tribunate. 

A  great  improvement  was  made  in  the  or 
gaiization  of  the  Council  of  State.  Hitherto 
that  body  had  examined  the  projets  de  hi,  dis- 
cussed great  measures  of  government,  such 
as  the  Concordat,  the  coronation,  the  Pope's 
journey  to  Paris,  the  grave  diplomatic  ques- 
tion of  St.  Julien's  preliminaries  not  ratified 
by  Austria.  Initiated  into  all  the  affairs  of 
state,  it  was  rather  a  council  of  government 
than  a  council  of  administration.  But  these 
high  questions  became  every  day  more  rare 
in  its  bosom,  and  gave  place  to  purely  admi- 
nistrative questions,  which  the  progress  of 


142 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[July,  1806- 


time  and  the  increasing  extent  of  the  Empire 
were  incessantly  multiplying.  The  council- 
lors of  state,  important  personages,  almost 
the  equals  of  the  ministers,  were  too  high  in 
rank  and  too  few  in  number  to  trouble  them- 
selves with  all  the  reports.  While  the  quan- 
tity of  business  increased,  and  they  assumed 
the  exclusively  administrative  character,  an- 
other necessity  was  felt,  that  of  training  per- 
sons for  the  Council  of  State,  of  creating  a 
ladder  for  them  to  climb  to  it,  and,  above  all, 
for  employing  young  men  of  high  rank,  whom 
Napoleon  was  desirous  to  draw  to  him  by  all 
ways  at  once,  those  of  war  and  of  civil  func- 
tions. After  conferring  on  the  subject  with 
the  arch-chancellor,  he  created  masters  of  re- 
quests, holding  an  intermediate  rank  between 
the  auditors  and  the  councillors  of  state, 
charged  with  the  greater  number  of  the  re- 
ports, having  the  faculty  of  deliberating  upon 
the  questions  on  which  they  had  reported,  and 
receiving  a  salary  proportioned  to  the  import- 
ance of  their  attributions.  Messieurs  Portalis, 
junior,  Mole,  and  Pasquier,  then  very  young, 
and  nominated  immediately  masters  of  re- 
quests, indicated  the  utility  and  the  intention 
of  the  plan.  The  Emperor  cherished  that 
merit  to  which  recollections  were  attached, 
without  excluding  that  merit  which  awakened 
none. 

To  this  wise  innovation,  which  has  created 
a  nursery  of  able  administrators,  Napoleon 
immediately  added  another.  There  was  no 
jurisdiction  for  the  contractors  who  treated 
with  the  state,  whether  they  executed  public 
works,  furnished  supplies,  or  made  financial 
engagements.  It  was  the  affair  of  the  United 
Merchants  which  had  revealed  this  deficiency; 
for  Napoleon,  not  knowing  to  whom  to  con- 
sign it,  had  thought  for  a  moment  of  sending 
it  before  the  Legislative  Body.  This  jurisdic- 
tion could  not  be  attributed  to  the  tribunals,  as 
well  on  account  of  the  special  knowledge 
which  it  presupposes,  as  the  turn  of  mind 
which  it  requires,  and  which  ought  to  be 
administrative  rather  than  judicial.  It  was 
for  this  reason  that  all  the  bargains  made  by 
the  government  were  referred  to  the  Council 
of  State.  This  was  the  principal  origin  of  the 
contentious  attributions.  Hence  there  were 
*at  the  same  time  created  advocates  to  the  council, 
charged  to  defend  by  written  memorials  the 
interests  of  the  parties  about  to  be  summoned 
before  this  new  jurisdiction. 

To  all  these  creations,  Napoleon  added  one 
more,  the  best  perhaps  of  his  reign,  the  Uni- 
versity. We  have  seen  what  system  of  edu- 
cation he  adopted  in  1802,  when  he  laid  the 
foundations  of  new  French  society.  Amidst 
the  old  generations,  which  the  Revolution  had 
made, enemies  of,  some  of  which  regretted  the 
old  system,  while  others  were  disgusted  with 
the  new  without  being  disposed  to  return  to 
the  old,  he  purposed  to  form  by  education  a 
young  generation  made  for  our  modern  insti- 
tutions and  by  them.  Instead  of  those  central 
schools,  which  were  public  courses,  attended 
by  youths  brought  up  at  home  or  in  private 
boarding-schools,  and  in  which  they  heard 
professors  teach,  at  the  pleasure  of  their  ca- 
price, or  of  the  caprice  of  the  time,  the  physical 


sciences    much   more  than  letters,  Napoleon 
nstituted,  as    we   have    seen,   houses   where 
youth,  lodged  and  fed,  received  from  the  hands 
of  the   state   instruction   and   education,  and 
where  letters  resumed  the  place  which   they 
ought  never  to  have  lost,  and  where  the  sci- 
ences   had   nevertheless    not   lost   the    place 
which   they   had   gained.     Napoleon,   clearly 
foreseeing   that    prejudice    and    malevolence 
would  assail  the  establishments  which  he  was 
instituting,  had  founded  six  thousand  exhibi- 
tions, and  had  thus   composed  by  authority 
(but  by  the  authority  of  bounty)  the  popula- 
tion of  the  new  colleges,  called  by  the  name 
of   Lyceums.     Some,   very   recently   opened, 
others,   being   only   old   houses   transformed, 
exhibited   already   in    1806   the   spectacle   of 
order,  good  morals,  and  sound  studies.     There 
were   twenty-nine  of    them.     Napoleon    pur- 
posed to  extend  the  number,  and  to  raise  it  to 
a  hundred.     Three  hundred  and  ten  secondary 
schools  established  by  the  communes,  a  like 
number  of  secondary  schools  opened  by  indi- 
viduals, the   former  restricted   to   follow  the 
rules  of  the  Lyceums,  the  latter  to  send  their 
pupils  thither,  made  up  the  whole  of  the  new 
establishments.    This  system  had  completely 
succeeded.     The  masters  of  private  schools, 
parents  infatuated  with  old  prejudices,  priests 
dreaming  of  the  conquest  of  the  public  edu- 
cation, calumniated  the  Lyceums.    They  said 
nothing  was  taught  in  them  but  mathematics, 
because  the  government  desired  to  train  up 
soldiers  only,  that  religion  was  neglected,  and 
that  morals  were  corrupt  there.    Nothing  was 
further  from  the  truth,  for  government  had  the 
express  intention  to  bring  letters  into  credit 
again,  and   had    attained   the   proposed   end. 
Religion   was   taught  there  by  chaplains,  as 
seriously  as  the  will  of  the  author  of  the  Con- 
cordat could  cause  it  to  be  done,  and  with  as 
much  success  as  the  spirit  of   the  age   per- 
mitted.    Lastly,  a  hard,  almost  military  life, 
and  continual  exercises  preserved  youth  there 
from  precocious  passions;  and,  in  regard  to 
morals,  the  Lyceums  were  certainly  preferable 
to  private  schools.    For  the  rest,  notwithstand- 
ing the   slanders  of  the  peevish  partisans  of 
the  past,  these  establishments  had  made  rapid 
progress.     Youth   brought  by  the  bounty  of 
the  exhibitions  and  by  the  confidence  of  pa- 
rents began  to  throng  to  them. 

But,  according  to  Napoleon,  the  work  was 
scarcely  begun.  It  was  not  enough  to  attract 
pupils,  it  was  necessary  to  give  them  profes- 
sors :  a  corps  of  teachers  was  to  be  created. 
This  was  a  great  question,  on  which  Napoleon 
was  fixed  with  the  same  firmness  of  mind 
that  he  applied  himself  to  every  thing.  To 
resign  education  again  to  priests  was  inad- 
missible in  his  eyes.  He  had  restored  public 
worship,  and  had  done  so  with  a  deep  convic- 
tion that  a  religion  is  necessary  for  every 
society,  not  as  an  additional  instrument  of 
police,  but  as  a  satisfaction  due  to  the  noblest 
wants  of  the  human  soul.  Nevertheless,  he 
would  not  relinquish  the  duty  of  forming  the 
new  society  to  the  clergy,  who,  by  their  obsti- 
nate prejudices,  by  their  fondness  for  the  past, 
by  their  hatred  of  the  present,  by  their  dread 
of  the  future,  could  only  prppagate  iu  youth 


July,  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


143 


the  sad  passions  of  the  generations  that  were 
dying  off.  It  is  requisite  that  youth  should  be 
formed  after  the  model  of  the  society  in  which 
it  is  destined  to  live ;  it  is  necessary  that  ii 
should  find  in  the  college  the  family  spirit,  in 
the  family  the  spirit  of  society,  with  purer 
morals,  more  regular  habits,  more  steady  dili- 
gence. It  is  requisite,  in  short,  that  the  col- 
ege  should  be  society  itself  improved.  If 
there  is  any  difference  whatever  between  the 
two,  if  youth  hear  masters  and  parents  speak- 
ing discordantly,  and  hear  these  praise  what 
those  censure,  there  arises  a  mischievous  con- 
trast which  disturbs  the  mind,  and  which 
causes  them  to  despise  their  masters,  if  they 
have  more  confidence  in  their  parents;  their 
parents,  if  (hey  have  more  confidence  in  their 
masters.  The  second  part  of  life  is  in  this 
case  employed  in  believing  nothing  of  what 
has  been  learned  in  the  first  Religion  itself, 
if  it  is  imposed  with  affectation,  instead  of 
being  professed  with  respect  in  the  presence 
of  youth — religion  becomes  nothing  but  a 
yoke,  from  which  the  young  man,  as  soon  as 
he  is  free,  hastens  to  escape,  as  from  all  the 
college  yokes.  Such  were  considerations 
which  made  Napoleon  averse  to  the  idea  of 
giving  up  youth  to  the  clergy.  Another  rea- 
son completely  decided  him.  Was  the  clergy 
'fit  to  educate  Jews,  Protestants  ]  Certainly 
not.  Then  one  could  not  have  Jews,  Protest- 
ants, Catholics  educated  together,  to  compose 
with  them  an  enlightened,  tolerant  youth,  fond 
of  its  country,  fit  for  all  careers,  ONE,  in  short, 
as  new  France  ought  to  be. 

If,  however,  the  clergy  had  not  the  qualities 
necessary  for  this  task,  it  had  some  which 
were  highly  valuable,  and  which  one  ought  to 
strive  to  borrow  from  it.  A  regular,  laborious, 
sober,  modest  life  was  an  indispensable  con- 
dition for  educating  youth ;  for  one  ought  not 
to  be  content,  for  such  a  charge,  with  the  first 
comers,  formed  by  the  hazards  of  the  times 
and  of  a  dissipated  society.  But  was  it  im- 
possible to  give  to  laymen  certain  qualities  of 
the  clergy  1  Napoleon  thought  not,  and  expe- 
rience has  proved  that  he  was  right.  Studious 
life  has  more  than  one  analogy  with  religious 
life;  it  is  compatible  with  regularity  of  man- 
ners and  mediocrity  of  fortune.  Napoleon 
conceived  that  one  might,  by  regulations,  cre- 
ate a  corps  of  teachers,  who,  without  observ- 
ing celibacy,  would  bring  to  the  education  of 
youth  the  same  application,  the  same  perse- 
verance, the  same  professional  constancy  as 
the  clergy.  There  is  every  year  in  the  gene- 
rations arriving  at  the  adult  state,  like  crops 
growing  on  the  ground  arriving  at  maturity,  a 
portion  of  young  minds  having  a  fondness 
for  study,  and  belonging  to  families  without 
fortune.  To  collect  these  minds,  to  subject 
them  to  preparatory  trials,  to  a  common  disci- 
pline, to  draw  them  and  to  retain  them  by  the 
attraction  of  a  moderate  but  sure  provision — 
such  was  the  problem  to  be  resolved ;  and  Na- 
poleon did  not  consider  it  incapable  of  being 
solved.  He  had  faith  in  the  esprit  de  corps,  and 
he  was  fond  of  it.  One  of  the  expressions 
which  he  most  frequently  repeated,  because  it 
expressed  one  of  the  ideas  by  which  he  was 
most  frequently  struck,  was,  that  society  was  in 


the  dust.  It  was  natural  that  he  should  feel 
that  sentiment  at  the  sight  of  a  country  where 
there  existed  no  longer  either  nobility,  or 
clergy,  or  parliament,  or  corporations.  He 
was  continually  saying  to  the  men  of  the  Re- 
volution, Learn  to  constitute  yourselves,  if  you 
would  defend  yourselves,  for  see  how  the 
priests  and  the  emigrants,  animated  by  the 
last  breath  of  the  great  bodies  destroyed,  de- 
fend themselves  ! — He  designed,  therefore,  to 
commit  to  a  body  which  would  Jive  and  defend 
itself  the  office  of  educating  future  genera- 
tions. He  has  resolved  it,  he  has  done  it,  and 
he  has  succeeded. 

Napoleon  established  the  University  on  the 
following  principles:  A  special  education  for 
the  men  destined  for  the  professorship;  pre- 
paratory examinations  before  becoming  pro- 
fessors; the  entry  after  these  examinations 
into  a  vast  body,  by  whose  sentence  alone 
their  career  could  be  either  suspended  or  cut 
short,  and  in  which  they  would  rise  in  time 
and  by  their  merits  to  the  head  of  that  corps, 
a  superior  council  composed  of  professors, 
who  should  have  distinguished  themselves  by 
their  talents,  applying  the  rules,  directing  the 
instruction ;  lastly,  the  privilege  of  public 
education  attributed  exclusively  to  the  new 
institution,  with  an  endowment  in  rentes  on 
the  state,  which  would  add  to  the  energy  of 
the  esprit  de  corps  and  to  the  energy  of  the 
spirit  of  property. — Such  were  the  ideas  ac- 
cording to  which  Napoleon  designed  the  Uni- 
versity to  be  organized.  But  he  had  too  much 
experience  to  insert  all  these  dispositions  in  a 
law.  Availing  himself  with  profound  intelli- 
gence of  the  public  confidence,  which  per- 
mitted him  to  present  very  general  laws, 
which  he  afterwards  completed  by  decrees, 
when  experience  called  for  them,  he  charged 
M.  Fourcroy,  the  administrator  of  public  in- 
struction under  the  minister  of  the  interior,  tc 
draw  up  a  projet  de  hi  which  should  be  com 
prised  in  three  articles  only.  By  the  first  i' 
was  said  that  there  should  be  formed,  undei 
the  name  of  Imperial  University,  a  teaching 
body,  charged  with  the  public  education 
throughout  the  whole  empire;  by  the  second 
that  the  members  of  the  teaching  body  should 
contract  obligations,  civil,  special,  and  temporary 
(this  word  was  employed  to  exclude  the  idea 
of  monastic  vows ;)  by  the  third,  that  the  or- 
ganization of  the  teaching  corps,  modified 
from  experience,  should  be  converted  into  a 
law  in  the  session  of  1810.  It  is  only  with 
this  latitude  of  action  that  great  things  are  to 
be  accomplished. 

This  projet,  presented  on  the  6th  of  May, 
was  adopted,  like  all  the  others,  with  confi- 
dence and  silence.  We  shall  not  advise  the 
adoption  in  this  manner  of  laws,  but  when 
there  shall  be  such  a  man,  such  acts,  and, 
what  is  still  more  cogent,  such  a  situation. 

This  brief  and  fertile  session  was  termi- 
nated by  the  financial  laws.  Napoleon  justly 
considered  the  finances  as  a  foundation  quite 
as  indispensable  as  the  army,  to  the  greatness 
of  an  empire.  The  late  crisis,  though  past, 
was  a  serious  warning  to  decree  at  length  a 
complete  system  of  finances,  to  raise  the 
resources  to  the  level  of  the  necessities,  and 


144 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[July,  1806 


to  establish  a  service  of  the  Treasury,  which 
should  render  it  needless  to  resort  to  jobbing 
men  of  business.  As  for  the  creation  of  the 
resources  necessary  to  defray  the  expenses  of 
the  war,  Napoleon  persisted  in  his  determina- 
tion not  to  make  a  loan.  In  fact,  even  amidst 
the  prosperity  which  he  caused  France  to 
enjoy,  the  5  per  cent,  rente  had  never  risen 
above  60.  Had  a  loan  been  announced,  the 
course  would  have  sunk  lower,  perhaps  to  50, 
and  there  would  have  been  a  perpetual  interest 
of  10  per  cent,  to  provide  for.  It  was  neces- 
sary, however,  lo  make  up  the  deficit  of  the 
last  budgets,  and  to  place  the  resources  defi- 
nitively in  equilibrium  with  the  state  of  war, 
which  for  fifteen  years  past  seemed  to  have 
become  the  usual  state  of  France.  It  was  a 
bold  attempt,  which  has  never  been  realized, 
to  defray  the  expenses  of  an  obstinate  strug- 
gle with  the  permanent  imposts.  Napoleon 
had  not  renounced  it,  and  he  had  the  courage 
to  propose  to  the  country,  or  rather  to  impose 
upon  it,  the  burdens  which  were  to  furnish 
the  means  of  attaining  that  result. 

The  arrear  of  the  last  budgets  might  be  li- 
quidated with  60  millions,  the  debt  to  the  Sink- 
ing Fund  being  deducted  from  it.  This  debt 
consisted,  as  it  will  be  recollected,  of  securities 
which  had  been  disposed  of,  and  produce  of 
the  sale  of 'national  domains,  which  the  Trea- 
sury had  absorbed  for  its  use,  though  they  be- 
longed to  the  Sinking  Fund.  It  was  necessary, 
therefore,  to  provide  for  these  60  millions,  for 
the  debt  contracted  with  the  Sinking  Fund,  and 
for  an  annual  budget,  which,  from  the  expe- 
rience of  1806,  could  not  amount  to  less  than 
700  millions  in  time  of  war,  (820  with  the  costs 
of  collection.) 

The  means  devised  were  the  following: — 

It  was  perceived  that  the  Sinking  Fund  had 
Kold,  very  advantageously,  the  domains,  the 
alienation  of  which  had  been  intrusted  to  it  by 
way  of  experiment.  At  that  time,  instead  of 
selling  for  itself  the  70  millions'  worth,  which 
the  law  of  the  year  IX.  attributed  to  it,  with  a 
view  to  indemnify  it  for  the  rentes  then  cre- 
ated, and  for  which  it  was  to  be  paid  at  the 
rate  of  10  millions  per  annum,  those  domains 
themselves  had  been  given  up  to  them.  As  to 
4he  securities  for  reimbursing  it,  government 
had  decided  to  pay  them  to  the  same  amount, 
that  is  to  say  in  domains,  on  condition  that  it 
should  dispose  of  them  with  the  necessary  pre- 
cautions, which  had  already  been  so  eminently 
successful.  This  same  observation  had  led 
Napoleon,  who  was  the  inventor  of  that  liqui- 
dation, to  find  the  means  of  covering  the  60 
millions  of  arrear. 

He  had  endowed  the  Senate,  the  Legion  of 
Honour,  the  Public  Instruction,  and  certain  in- 
stitutions, with  the  remainder  of  the  national 
domains.  His  intention,  in  acting  thus,  had 
heen  to  save  them  from  the  waste  of  disadvan- 
tageous alienations.  But,  on  the  one  hand,  it 
had  been  perceived  that  the  alienations  could 
be  effected  in  an  advantageous  manner,  by  in- 
trusting them  to  the  Sinking  Fund ;  and  on  the 
other,  there  had  been  discovered  in  that  system 
of  endowments  the  vice  peculiar  to  estates  in 
mortmain,  the  condition  of  which  is  to  be  ill- 
coltivated  and  far  from  productive.  Napoleon 


resolved  to  take  back  those  domains  from  the 
Senate  and  the  Legion  of  Honour,  and  to  give 
them  an  equivalent  by  creating  three  millions 
of  rentes  at  5  per  cent  to  the  capital  of  60  mil- 
lions. If  the  rentes  delivered  to  the  public 
were  threatened  with  an  immediate  deprecia- 
tion, assigned  as  endowments  to  permanent 
bodies  which  would  not  alienate  them,  they 
would  have  none  of  the  inconveniences  of 
loans,  they  would  occasion  no  fall  of  the 
course,  and  they  would  even  procure  an  ad- 
vantage for  the  public  establishments  which 
should  receive  them,  that  is  to  insure  them  an 
income  of  5,  instead  of  an  income  of  2$  or  3 
per  cent,  which  the  national  domains  yielded. 
These  domains,  transferred  afterwards  to  the 
Sinking  Fund,  which  would  dispose  of  them 
gradually,  would  procure  the  GO  millions  which 
were  needed. 

It  is  true  that  the  amount  of  these  60  mil- 
lions was  required  immediately  to  pay  the  ar- 
rears of  anterior  budgets.  The  idea  was  con- 
ceived of  creating  temporary  effects,  yielding 
from  6  to  7  per  cent.,  according  to  the  period 
of  their  payment,  due  at  a  fixed  term,  payable 
to  the  Sinking  Fund,  at  the  rate  of  a  million 
per  month,  from  the  1st  of  July,  1806,  to  the 
first  of  July,  1811,  mortgaged  on  the  capital 
of  the  said  Fund,  which  would  have,  with 
what  it  already  possessed,  and  what  it  was  go- 
ing to  acquire,  about  130  millions'  worth  of 
national  domains,  and  which,  lastly,  combined 
a  well-established  credit  with  this  immovable 
property. 

These  effects,  bearing  an  advantageous  but 
not  usurious  interest,  and  repayable  at  short 
fixed  terms,  could  not  fall  like  a  rente,  for  their 
monthly  and  sure  expiration  for  the  period  of 
five  years,  would  tend  to  raise  them  by  the 
certainty  of  recovering  the  entire  capital  from 
month  to  month.  It  is  a  combination  which 
has  since  succeeded  several  times,  and  which 
was  excellent. 

The  process  for  liquidating  the  arrear  con- 
sisted then  in  taking  back  the  domains  as- 
signed to  the  great  bodies,  in  giving  them 
rentes  instead,  which  gave  them  the  advantage 
of  an  immediate  increase  of  revenue,  in  caus- 
ing these  domains  to  be  sold  by  the  Sinking 
Fund,  which  it  could  accomplish  with  success 
in  five  years,  and  in  realizing  their  value  be- 
forehand, by  means  of  paper  due  at  a  fixed 
term,  which  could  not  be  depreciated,  thanks 
to  the  certain  and  not  distant  reimbursement, 
thanks,  in  short,  to  an  interest  of  G  or  7  per 
cent. 

The  only  difficulty,  and  that  not  a  very  se- 
rious one,  of  this  combination  was  that  the 
sum  of  the  rentes  composing  the  public  debt, 
was  about  to  be  increased  to  51  millions,  in- 
stead of  50,  as  prescribed  by  anterior  laws. 
But  the  infraction  was  unimportant,  and  go- 
vernment satisfied  the  law,  by  establishing  a 
more  rapid  extinction  for  that  surplus  mil- 
lion. 

There  was  still  left  to  provide  for  future 
budgets,  by  creating  sufficient  resources  either 
for  peace  or  war.  Napoleon  made  a  bold  and 
at  the  same  time  a  very  wise  declaration,  in  a 
financial  point  of  view,  to  the  Legislative  Body 
and  to  Europe.  He  was  desirous  of  peace,  for 


July,  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


145 


ne  proudly  said  that  he  had  exhausted  military 
glory :  he  was  -desirous  of  peace,  for  he  had 
given  it  to  Austria.  He  was  ready  at  this  mo- 
ment to  conclude  it  with  Russia,  and  he  was 
engaged  in  negotiatigns  with  England.  But 
the  powers  had  become  accustomed  to  consi- 
der treaties  as  truces,  which  they  could  break 
at  the  first  signal  from  London.  It  was  requi- 
site, till  they  could  be  brought  to  respect  their 
engagements  and  to  endure  with  resignation 
the  greatness  of  France — it  was  requisite  to  be 
ready  to  bear  the  charges  of  war  so  long  as  it 
should  be  necessar}'.  Great  Britain  pretended 
to  defray  them  by  loans.  Let  her  do  so,  while 
she  continued  to  hold  that  resource  in  her 
hands.  It  behoved  France  to  provide  for  them 
in  a  different  manner,  with  means  which  were 
her  own,  that  is  to  say,  with  the  taxes,  a  re- 
source far  otherwise  durable,  and  which  left 
no  burden  behind  it.  In  consequence  he  de- 
clared that  the  sum  of  600  millions  was  re- 
quired for  peace,  700  millions  for  war  (720 
and  820  millions,  including  the  costs  of  collec- 
tion.) The  budget  of  the  most  peaceful  year 
of  the  present  government,  that  of  1802,  had 
confined  itself  to  an  expenditure  of  500  mil- 
lions. But,  since  1802,  the  increase  of  the 
debt,  the  extension  given  to  works  of  public 
utility,  the  endowment  of  the  clergy  conse- 
quent on  the  Concordat,  the  re-establishment 
of  the  monarchy  which  had  led  to  the  creation 
of  a  civil  list,  augmented  to  600  millions  the 
fixed  expenses  of  a  state  of  peace.  The  ordi- 
nary resources  far  exceeded  that  sum.  As  for 
the  expenses  of  a  state  of  war,  which  Napo- 
leon was  determined  to  keep  up  as  long  as  it 
should  be  necessary,  they  raised  the  budget  to 
700  millions.  At  this  rate  130  millions  could 
be  devoted  annually  to  the  navy,  about  300 
millions  to  the  army,  50  armed  ships  kept, 
and  450,000  men  always  ready  to  march. 
France,  on  this  footing,  was  able  to  face  all 
dangers.  Now,  she  could,  without  injuring 
herself,  impose  this  burden,  for  her  ordinary 
revenues  already  supplied  above  600  mil- 
lions. The  kingdom  of  Italy  furnished  30 
millions  of  that  sum  for  the  French  army 
which  attended  to  its  safety,  and  it  would  be 
easy  to  obtain  60  or  70  millions  more  by  the 
ordinary  taxes. 

After  this  bold  declaration,  Napoleon  had 
the  courage  to  develop  the  great  resource  of 
the  indirect  contributions,  which  he  had  al- 
ready restored  to  the  country,  and  to  create  a 
new  resource,  not  less  useful,  not  less  abun- 
dant, and  which  had  no  other  inconvenience 
but  that  of  affecting  the  generality  of  the  peo- 
ple, but  affecting  them  slightly,  the  tax  on  salt. 
In  consequence,  he  proposed,  besides  the  dnty 
on  liquors,  called  droit  ifmvcniaire,  (a  duty 
levied  at  the  proprietor's  at  the  moment  of 
their  being  taken  away,)  another  duty  on  the 
wholesale  trade,  and  on  the  retail  sale,  and 
for  that  purpose  the  exercise,  that  is  to  say, 
the  superintendence,  over  liquors  upon  the 
roads,  and  ihe  admission  of  agents  of  the  ex- 
cise into  the  cellars  of  the  dealers  in  wine. 
The  indirect  taxes,  which  already  produced  25 
millions,  were  expected  to  produce  more  than 
30  in  consequence  of  this  extension. 

As  for  the  tax  on  salt,  its  re-establishment 

Voi»  II.— 19 


was  occasioned  by  the  suppression  of  another 
tax  which  had  become  insupportable,  the  turn- 
pike toll  on  the  roads.  This  tax  was  so  incon- 
gruous with  our  habits,  and  so  annoying  to 
agriculture,  that  all  the  councils-general  had 
solicited  its  abolition.  It  brought  in  but  15 
millions,  which  was  insufficient  for  the  main- 
tenance of  the  roads  of  the  Empire,  which 
cost  the  state  an  additional  10  millions  a  year, 
and  still  the  roads  were  not  brought  into  a 
desirable  condition:  for  the  sum  necessary  for 
keeping  them  in  a  proper  state  was  estimated  * 
at  35  millions  at  least.  By  imposing  a  very 
light  tax,  two  decimes  per  kilogramme  (two 
sous  per  pound)  on  salt,  to  be  levied  at  the 
salt-marshes  by  the  custom-house  officers  sur- 
rounding those  marshes,  almost  all  of  them 
situated  on  the  frontier,  one  might  hope  for  a 
produce  of  35  millions,  that  is  to  say,  suffi- 
cient to  keep  the  roads  in  a  real  state  of  per- 
fection, and  to  ease  the  Treasury  of  an  expense 
of  10  millions.  This  tax  was  of  a  totally  dif- 
ferent nature  from  the  ancient  gabellcs,  un- 
equally assessed,  aggravated  by  the  collection, 
and  sometimes  raising  salt  to  14  sous  per 
pound;  a  price  which,  for  the  lower  class  of 
people,  was  exorbitant. 

With  the  annually  increasing  produce  of 
these  new  taxes,  and  with  some  accidental 
resources,  which  enabled  the  government  to 
wait  for  their  complete  development,  France 
would  find  herself  capable  of  supporting  a 
state  of  war,  so  long  as  it  should  last,  and  as 
soon  as  it  was  over,  to  bestow  on  the  people 
of  the  Empire  the  blessings  of  peace,  by  the 
diminution  of  the  land-tax,  the  only  one  that 
was  really  burdensome. 

By  this  creation  Napoleon  completed  the 
re-establishment  of  our  finances,  which  the 
suppression  of  the  indirect  taxes  had  ruined  in 
1789;  and  he  exhibited  to  Europe  a  picture 
discouraging  to  our  enemies,  that  is  to  say,  50 
ships,  450,000  men,  maintained  without  loan, 
and  for  the  whole  time  that  the  war  should 
last. 

The  budget  of  1806  was,  therefore,  fixed  at 
700  millions  for  expenditure  and  receipts  (820 
with  the  expenses  of  collection.)  An  acci- 
dental circumstance,  the  restoration  of  the 
Gregorian  calendar,  raised  it  to  15  months  in- 
stead of  12,  and  to  900  millions  instead  of 
700.  In  fact,  the  preceding  budget,  that  of  the 
year  XIII.,  stopping  at  the  21st  of  September, 
1805,  it  was  necessary,  in  order  to  comprehend 
the  time  to  January  1st,  1806,  to  add  about 
three  months,  which  must  of  course  raise  the 
budget  of  1806  to  fifteen  months  and  to  900 
millions. 

There  was  yet  left  a  task  to  be  performed, 
that  was  to  organize  the  Treasury  and  the 
Bank  of  France.  Enlightened  by  recent 
events,  Napoleon  resolved  to  reform  both. 

We  have  already  repeated  several  times  in 
this  history  that  the  amount  of  the  taxes  was 
sent  to  the  Treasury,  in  the  form  of  obliga- 
tions at  a  certain  date,  or  bills  at  sight,  signed 
by  the  receivers-general,  and  payable  month 
by  month  at  their  office.  The  discount  of  this 
paper  procured  cash,  when  there  was  a  ne- 
cessity to  anticipate  its  falling  due.  To  leaves 
this  discount  to  a  company  had  proved  an  un- 


140 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[July,  1806. 


safe  course.  It  had  been  intrusted  anew  to  an 
agency  of  the  receivers-general  which  acted 
in  Paris  for  the  whole  body.  Ever  since  the 
relurn  of  credit,  capitals  were  plentiful,  and  the 
receivers-general  could  procure  for  the  state, 
by  discounting  their  own  engagements,  all  the 
funds  that  it  needed.  Nevertheless,  a  long 
discussion  took  place  before  Napoleon,  in  the 
council  of  finances,  whether  this  service  ought 
not  to  be  assigned  to  the  bank,  more  powerful 
than  the  agency  of  the  receivers-general  ever 
could  be.  Napoleon  was  at  first  of  opinion 
that  for  this  and  for  other  services  the  bank 
was  not  constituted  strongly  enough.  He  re- 
solved therefore  to  double  its  capital  by  raising 
the  number  of  shares  from  45.COO  to  90,000, 
which,  at  1000  francs  per  share,  would  form  a 
capital  of  90  millions.  He  resolved,  moreover, 
to  render  its  organization  monarchical,  by 
converting  the  elected  president  who  was  at 
his  head  into  a  governor  nominated  by  the 
Emperor,  who  would  direct  it  for  the  twofold 
interest  of  commerce  and  of  the  Treasury,  to 
place  three  receivers-general  in  its  council,  to 
connect  it  more  closely  with  the  government; 
lastly,  to  suppress  the  regulation  according  to 
which  the  discounts  were  proportioned  to  the 
number  of  shares  held  by  the  presenters  of 
effects,  and  to  adopt  in  its  stead  a  much  more 
judicious  arrangement,  consisting  in  propor- 
tioning these  discounts  to  the  known  credit  of 
the  mercantile  men  who  applied  for  them. 
These  changes,  proposed  in  a  law,  were 
adopted  by  the  Legislative  Body,  and,  under 
this  strong  and  excellent  constitution,  the  Bank 
of  France  is  become  one  of  the  most  solid 
establishments  in  the  world,  for  it  has  been 
seen  in  our  days  assisting  the  Bank  of  Eng- 
land itself,  and  getting  over,  without  flinching, 
the  greatest  political  catastrophes. 

Even  after  he  had  thus  enlarged  it,  Napoleon 
would  not  consign,  in  a  constant  and  definitive 
manner,  the  service  of  the  Treasury  to  the 
Bank  of  France.  He  intended,  in  case  of  need, 
and  accidentally,  to  make  use  of  the  new  power 
which  he  had  insured  to  himself  for  discount- 
ing this  or  that  sum,  in  obligations  of  the  receiv- 
ers-zeneral  or  bills  at  sight,  but  he  could  not  de- 
cide to  deliver  up  to  it  definitively  the  portfolio 
\)f  the  Treasury.  It  was  a  company  of  com- 
mercial men,  deliberating,  it  is  true,  under  a 
president  appointed  by  him,  but  placed  out  of 
his  government,  and  he  would  not,  he  said, 
commit  to  them  the  secret  of  his  military  ope- 
rations, in  committing  to  them  the  secret  of  his 
financial  operations.  "I  will  have  it  in  my 
power,"  he  added,  "  to  move  a  body  of  troops, 
without  the  bank  knowing  it,  and  it  would 
know  it,  if  it  were  acquainted  with  my  pecu- 
niary wants." 

However,  he  had  a  trial  made,  but  only  a 
trial,  of  a  new  system  for  payment  of  funds 
by  accountable  persons.  Though  the  system 
of  obligations  had  rendered  great  services,  it 
was  not  the  last  term  of  perfection  in  the  way 
of  recovery.  It  frequently  happened  that  the 
receivers-general  had  considerable  funds  in 
hand,  of  which  they  made  a  profit,  till  their 
obligations  became  due.  These  obligations, 
moreover,  gave  rise  to  a  very  active  jobbing. 
A  mere,  account  current  kept  between  the  state 


and  the  accountable  persons,  by  means  of 
which,  every  amount  that  entefed  their  chests 
should  belong  to  the  state,  should  bear  interest 
for  its  profit,  and  every  amount  that  came  out 
of  the  chest  should  bear  interest  for  the  profit 
of  the  accountable  person  who  had  paid  it. 
An  account  current  so  regulated,  was  a  much 
more  simple,  more  true  system,  which  did  not 
prevent  granting  to  the  receivers-general  the 
advantages  which  it  had  been  deemed  neces- 
sary to  allow  them  to  enjoy.  But  there  was 
required,  in  the  first  place,  a  system  of  entry 
which  admitted  not  of  error;  there  was  required 
in  the  accounts  of  the  Treasury  the  introduc- 
tion of  double-entry,  which  is  employed  by 
commerce.  M.  Mollien  proposed  the  account 
current  and  the  double-entry.  Napoleon  readi- 
ly assented  to  it,  but  he  wished  this  system  to 
be  tried  with  some  of  the  receivers-general,  in 
order  to  judge  of  its  merit  from  experience. 

Such  were  the  civil  labours  of  Napoleon  in 
that  memorable  year  1806,  the  moM  glorious 
of  the  Empire,  as  1802  was  the  most  glorious 
of  the  Consulate  :  years  fecundated  the  one  by 
the  other;  in  which  France  was  constituted  a 
dictatorial  republic  in  1802,  and  a  vast  federa- 
tive empire  in  1806.  In  this  latter  year,  Na- 
poleon founded  at  once  vassal  royalties  for  his 
brothers,  duchies  for  his  generals  and  his  ser- 
vants, rich  ^endowments  for  his  soldiers,  sup- 
pressed the  German  empire,  and  left  the  French 
empire  to  fill  the  West  by  itself.  He  continued 
the  roads,  the  bridges,  the  canals,  the  works, 
already  begun,  and  commenced  still  more  im- 
portant ones,  the  canals  from  the  Rhone  to  the 
Rhine,  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Scheldt,  the  roads 
of  La  Corniche  and  Tarare,  and  from  Metz  to 
Mayence.  He  projected  the  great  monuments 
of  the  capital,  the  column  of  the  Place  Ven- 
dome,  the  arch  of  1'Etoile,  the  completion  of 
the  Louvre,  the  street  to  be  called  Rue  Impe- 
riale,  and  the  principal  fountains  of  Paris. 
He  commenced  the  restoration  of  St.  Denis,  he 
ordered  the  finishing  of  the  Pantheon  ;  he  pro- 
mulgated the  Code  of  Civil  Proceeding,  im- 
proved the  organization  of  the  Council  of  State, 
created  the  University,  liquidated  definitively 
the  financial  arrears,  completed  the  system  of 
the  taxes,  reorganized  the  Bank  of  France,  and 
prepared  the  new  system  of  the  French  Trea- 
sury. All  this,  undertaken  in  January,  1806, 
was  finished  in  July  the  same  year.  What 
mind  ever  conceived  more  things,  more  vast, 
more  profound,  and  ever  realized  them  in  less 
time]  It  is  true  that  we  approach  the  acme 
of  this  prodigious  reign,  a  height  of  elevation 
that  has  not  been  equalled,  and  of  which  one 
may  say,  while  surveying  the  entire  catalogue 
of  human  greatness,  that  none  surpasses,  if 
there  be  any  that  comes  up  to  it. 

Unfortunately,  this  incomparable  year,  in- 
stead of  concluding  amidst  peace,  as  one  might 
have  hoped,  concluded  amidst  war,  half  through 
the  fault  of  Europe,  half  through  that  of  Na- 
poleon, and  also  through  a  cruel  stroke  of 
death,  which  carried  off"  Mr.  Fox,  in  this  very 
same  year  that  he  had  already  carried  off  Mr. 
Pitt. 

The  negotiations  opened  with  Russia  and 
England  had  been  continued  during  the  la- 
bours of  all  kinds,  of  which  we  have  iust  given 


July,  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


147 


a  sketch.  Lord  Yarmouth,  the  conferences 
with  whom  had  been  purposely  prolonged, 
adhered  to  the  first  proposals.  England  pur- 
posed to  keep  most  of  her  maritime  conquests, 
gave  up  to  us  our  continental  conquests,  Hano- 
ver always  excepted,  and  confined  herself  to 
inquiring  what  we  should  do  to  indemnify  the 
King  of  Naples.  As  for  the  new  royalties,  as 
for  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  she  ap- 
peared not  to  care  about  them.  Napoleon, 
who  no  longer  had  reason  to  defer  the  term  of 
the  negotiations,  his  principal  projects  being 
accomplished,  pressed  Lord  Yarmouth  to  pro- 
cure powers,  in  order  to  come  to  a  conclusion. 
Lord  Yarmouth  had  at  length  received  them, 
but  with  orders  not  to  produce  them  till  he 
should  perceive  a  possibility  of  arranging 
with  France,  and  after  he  had  come  to  an  un- 
derstanding with  the  Russian  negotiator. 

M.  d'Oubril  had  arrived  in  June,  with  powers 
in  due  form,  and  with  double  instructions,  first 
to  gain  time  for  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  and 
thus  to  spare  Austria  the  military  execution 
with  which  she  was  threatened;  secondly,  to 
put  an  end  to  all  existing  differences  by  a 
treaty  of  peace,  if  France  acceded  to  conditions 
which  would  save  the  dignity  of  the  Russian 
empire.  One  circumstance  had  confirmed  M. 
d'Oubril  in  the  idea  of  settling  matters  by  a 
treaty  of  peace.  While  he  was  on  the  way, 
the  Russian  ministry  had  been  changed. 
Prince  Czartoryski  and  his  friends,  being  de- 
sirous that  Russia  should  connect  herself  more 
closely  with  England,  not  precisely  to  continue 
the  war,  but  to  treat  with  greater  advantage, 
Alexander,  weary  of  their  remonstrances, 
dreading  too  strict  engagements  with  the  Bri- 
tish cabinet,  had  at  length  accepted  the  resig- 
nations so  frequently  offered,  and  replaced 
Prince  Czartoryski  by  General  Budberg.  The 
latter  had  formerly  been  the  governor  of  the 
Emperor,  a  friend  of  the  empress-mother's, 
and  had  neither  energy  or  humour  to  resist 
his  master.  M.  d'Oubril,  having  found  the 
Emperor  more  inclined  to  peace  than  his  minis- 
ters, could  not  but  deem  himself  authorized  by 
this  change  to  incline  more  towards  a  pacific 
conclusion. 

M.  de  Talleyrand  had  no  difficulty  to  per- 
suade M.  d'Oubril,  when  he  maintained  that 
there  was  no  serious  interest  to  discuss  be- 
tween the  two  empires,  at  most  only  a  ques- 
tion of  influence  to  consider,  on  account  of 
two  or  three  petty  powers,  which  Russia 
had  taken  under  her  protection.  But,  as  for 
these  latter,  Russia,  beaten  at  Austerlitz,  and 
not  disposed  to  begin  again,  since  Austria  had 
surrendered  her  sword,  since  Prussia  was  de- 
pendent, and  since  England  appeared  wearied 
out — Russia  could  not  be  very  exigent.  She 
desired  merely  to  save  her  pride  from  too  rude 
a  shock.  She  was  ready,  therefore,  to  take 
no  notice  of  the  new  arrangements  made  in 
Germany,  and  those  relative  to  the  annexation 
of  Genoa  and  the  Venetian  States;  she  was  even 
determined  to  be  silent  respecting  the  conquest 
of  Naples,  for  the  arming  of  the  Neapolitans 
after  a  convention  of  neutrality  justified  all  the 
severity  of  Napoleon.  Still,  in  regard  to  Pied-! 
raont  and  the  Bourbons  of  Naples,  Russia  hadi 
written  engagements,  and  she  could  do  no  less! 


than  demand  something  for  them,  were  it  ever 
so  little.  The  engagements  in  regard  to  Pied- 
mont began  to  be  antiquated,  but  those  which 
had  been  contracted  with  Queen  Caroline  and 
pushed  her  into  the  abyss,  were  too  recent  and 
too  authentic  for  Russia  not  to  interfere  in  hei 
favour. 

Hence  this  was  the  essential  and  difficult 
question  to  resolve  between  M.  de  Talleyrand 
and  M.  d'Oubril.  The  latter  would  have 
wished  to  obtain  some  compensation,  however 
small,  for  the  King  of  Piedmont,  to  insure  Si- 
cily to  the  Bourbons  of  Naples,  and  to  intro- 
duce into  the  treaty  certain  expressions,  which 
should  give  Russia  an  appearance  of  useful 
and  honourable  intervention  in  the  affairs  of 
Europe.  Though  Napoleon  had  at  first  pur- 
posed to  have  a  dry  and  empty  treaty,  which 
should  purely  and  simply  re-establish  peace 
between  the  t\vo  empires,  in  order  to  demon- 
strate that  he  did  not  recognise  the  influence 
which  Russia  pretended  to  arrogate  to  herself, 
this  rigorous  intention  could  not  but  give  way 
before  the  possibility  of  an -immediate  peace, 
which  by  its  reaction  would  bring  England 
per  force  to  treat  on  reasonable  conditions. 
Napoleon,  therefore,  permitted  M.  de  Talley- 
rand to  grant  all  the  semblances  of  influence 
which  could  save  the  dignity  of  the  Russian 
cabinet.  Accordingly  that  minister  was  au- 
thorized in  the  patent  treaty  to  guarantee  the 
evacuation  of  Germany,  the  integrity  of  the 
Ottoman  empire,  the  independence  of  the  re- 
public of  Ragusa,  to  promise  the  good  offices 
of  France  for  reconciling  Prussia  and  Sweden, 
and  lastly,  to  accept  the  good  offices  of  Russia 
for  the  re-establishment  of  peace  between 
France  and  England.  Here  was  sufficient  to 
form  a  treaty  less  insignificant  than  that  which 
Napoleon  had  at  first  contemplated,  and  con- 
sequently, more  flattering  for  the  pride  of  Rus- 
sia. But  some  compensation  or  other  was 
required  for  the  Kings  of  Piedmont  and  Naples. 
W;th  respect  to  the  King  of  Piedmont,  Napo- 
leon gave  a  positive  refusal,  and  Russia  was 
obliged  to  renounce  that.  As  for  Naples,  he 
would  never  consent  to  cede  Sicily,  and  he 
required  that  island  to  be  restored  to  Naples, 
now  possessed  by  Joseph.  By  dint  of  seek- 
ing a  combination  to  reconcile  the  opposite 
pretensions,  a  middle  term  was  hit  upon, 
which  consisted  in  giving  the  Balearic  Islands 
to  the  Prince-royal  of  Naples,  and  a  pecuniary 
indemnity  to  the  dethroned  king  and  queen. 
The  Balearic  Islands  belonged,  it  is  true,  to 
Spain,  but  Napoleon  had  wherewithal  to  fur- 
nish an  equivalent  for  the  latter,  by  aggrandiz- 
ing the  little  kingdom  of  Etruria  with  some 
fragments  of  the  duchies  of  Parma  and  Pla- 
centia.  He  had,  moreover,  an  -excellent  and 
highly  moral  lesson  to  impress  upon  the  court 
of  Madrid,  namely,  that  the  Prince-royal  of 
Naples  had  become  the  son-in-law  of  Charles 
IV.,  on  the  same  day  that  a  princess  of  Naples 
had  married  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias.  To 
crown  his  excellent  reasons,  Napoleon  pos 
sessed  power.  He  could  therefore  venture  10 
contract  a  serious  engagement  respecting  tb«* 
Balearic  Islands. 

This  combination  devis  ^d,  it  was  requisite 
to  bring  the  affair  to  a  conclusion.    M.  d'Oubril 


148 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[July,  1806. 


had  placed  himself  in  communication  with 
Lord  Yarmouth,  who,  though  professing:  very 
friendly  sentiments  towards  France,  neverthe- 
less thought  that  there  was  weakness  in  con- 
ceding every  thing  that  M.  de  Talleyrand  de- 
manded. Like  a  good  Englishman  as  he  was, 
he  would  have  had  Sicily  left  to  Queen  Caro- 
line, for  to  preserve  it  for  that  queen  was 
giving  it  to  England.  Accordingly,  he  did  not 
fail  to  urge  M.  d'Oubril  to  prolong  the  resist- 
ance of  Russia. 

But  M.  de  Talleyrand  had  an  expedient, 
which  Napoleon  had  suggested  to  him,  and  of 
which  he  skilfully  availed  himself,  namely, 
to  threaten  Austria  to  act  immediately  unless 
the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro  were  given  up. 
Napoleon,  as  we  have  said,  set  a  great  value 
on  these  mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  for  their  happy 
situation  in  the  Adriatic,  and  above  all  fur 
their  vicinity  to  the  Turkish  frontiers.  He 
was  therefore  fully  determined  to  require  their 
restitution,  and  it  was  the  easier  for  him  to 
threaten  because  he  had  the  resolution  to  act. 
For  this  purpose,  moreover,  he  had  but  a  step 
to  go,  for  his  troops  were  still  on  the  Inn  and 
occupied  Braunau.  In  consequence,  M.  de 
Talleyrand  declared  to  M.  d'Onbril  that  he 
must  conclude  the  business  and  sign  the  treaty 
which  would  lead  to  the  surrender  of  the 
mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  or  leave  Paris,  after 
which  Austria  would  be  attacked,  unless  she 
united  her  efforts  with  those  of  France  to  re- 
take the  position  so  dishonourably  delivered 
up  to  the  Russians. 

M.  d'Oubril,  intimidated  by  this  peremptory 
declaration,  communicated  his  embarrass- 
ment to  Lord  Yarmouth,  saying  that  his  in- 
structions enjoined  him  to  save  Austria  from 
immediate  constraint,  and  that  he  was  obliged 
to  conform  to  them ;  that,  for  the  rest,  nothing 
would  be  gained  by  delay  with  such  a  cha- 
racter as  that  of  Napoleon,  for  every  day  he 
committed  some  fresh  act,  which  was  after- 
wards to  be  considered  as  a  decided  thing,  if 
one  did  not  choose  to  break  with  him  ;  that  if 
one  had  treated  before  the  month  of  April, 
Joseph  Bonaparte  would  not  have  been  pro- 
claimed King  of  Naples;  if  one  had  treated 
before  the  month  of  June,  Louis  Bonaparte 
would  not  have  become  King  of  Holland  ; 
that,  lastly,  if  one  had  treated  before  the  month 
of  July,  the  German  empire  would  not  have 
been  dissolved.  M.  d'Oubril  therefore  made 
up  his  mind,  and  signed  on  the  20th  of  July, 
notwithstanding  the  solicitations  of  Lord  Yar- 
mouth, a  treaty  of  peace  with  France. 

In  the  patent,  articles  were  stipulated,  as  we 
have  already  shown,  the  evacuation  of  Ger- 
many, the  independence  of  the  republic  of 
Ragusa,  the  integrity  of  the  Turkish  empire. 
In  these  same  articles  were  promised  the  good 
offices  of  the  two  contracting  powers  for  put- 
ting an  end  to  the  difference  which  had  arisen 
between  Prussia  and  Sweden ;  and  France 
formally  accepted  the  good  offices  of  Russia 
for  the  re-establishment  of  peace  with  Eng- 
land, all  of  them  things  which  gave  Russia  an 
appearance  of  influence  which  she  was  desi- 
rous not  to  lose.  The  independence  of  the 
Beveu  Islands  and  the  immediate  evacuation 
of  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro  were  promised 


anew.  In  the  secret  articles,  the  Balearic 
Islands  were  given  to  the  Prince-royal  of 
Naples;  but  upon  condition  of  not  admitting 
the  English  into  them  in  time  of  war;  a  pen- 
sion was  insured  to  his  mother  and  father; 
and  there  was  a  stipulation  that  Swedish 
Pomerania  should  be  assured  to  Sweden  in 
the  engagements  which  were  to  be  negotiated 
between  Sweden  and  Prussia. 

This  treaty,  in  the  situation  of  Europe,  was 
acceptable  on  the  part  of  Russia,  unless,  for 
the  sake  of  the  Queen  of  Naples,  she  preferred 
war,  which  could  bring  her  nothing  but  dis- 
asters. 

M.  d'Oubril,  after  concluding  it,  set  out  im- 
mediately for  St.  Petersburg  in  order  to  obtain 
the  ratificaiions  of  his  government.  He  ima- 
gined that  he  had  cleverly  performed  his  task; 
for,  if  the  peace  which  he  had  concluded  were 
rejected  by  his  cabinet,  he  had  at  least  delayed 
for  six  weeks  the  execution  with  which  Aus- 
tria was  threatened  On  this  point,  there  is 
ground  for  asserting  that  the  peace  was  not 
signed  with  perfect  sincerity. 

M.  de  Talleyrand  had  now  to  deal  with 
Lord  Yarmouth  only,  who  was  much  weak- 
ened since  the  return  of  M.  d'Oubril.  The 
French  minister  understood  how  to  follow  up 
his  advantages,  and  to  make  the  most  of  the 
treaty  with  Russia,  in  order  to  oblige  Yar- 
mouth to  produce  his  powers  which  he  had 
always  refused  to  do.  M.  de  Talleyrand  told 
him  that  it  was  impossible  to  prolong  this  kind 
of  comedy  of  an  accredited  negotiator,  who 
would  not  show  his  powers ;  that  if  he  deferred 
producing  them  much  longer,  one  would  be 
authorized  to  believe  that  he  had  none,  and 
that  his  presence  in  Paris  had  but  a  delusive 
object,  that  of  gaining  the  bad  season,  in  order 
to  prevent  France  from  acting  either  against 
England  or  against  her  other  enemies.  Those 
enemies  were  not  specified,  but  some  move- 
ments of  troops  towards  Bayonne  might  excite 
apprehension  that  Portugal  was  one  of  them. 
M.  de  Talleyrand  added  that  he  must  come  to 
an  immediate  decision,  quit  Paris,  or  give  a 
serious  character  to  the  negotiation  by  pro- 
ducing his  powers,  for  they  had  at  last  awak- 
ened the  suspicions  of  Prussia,  who  required 
a  satisfactory  declaration  in  regard  to  Han- 
over; that,  unwilling  to  lose  such  an  ally,  the 
French  cabinet  was  ready  to  make  the  declara- 
tion demanded,  and  that,  once  made,  it  would 
not  be  possible  to  recede  from  it;  that  the  war 
then  would  be  everlastin?,  or  that  peace  must 
be  concluded  without  the  restitution  of  Han- 
over; that,  for  the  rest,  nothing  would  be 
gained  by  fresh  delays,  and  that  two  or  three 
months  later  England  would  be  obliged  to 
consent  perhaps  to  the  conquest  of  Portugal, 
as  she  had  consented  to  the  conquest  of 
Naples. 

Overcome  by  these  reasons,  by  the  signa- 
ture given  by  M.  d'Oubril,  by  the  love  of  peace, 
and  also  by  the  very  natural  ambition  of 
writing  his  name  at  the  foot  of  such  a  treaty, 
Lord  Yarmouth  at  length  determined  to  ex- 
hibit his  powers.  It  was  the  first  advantage 
that  M.  de  Talleyrand  desired  to  gain,  and  he 
hastened  to  make  it  irrevocable,  by  getting  a 
French  plenipotentiary  nominated  to  new 


Ju.y,  \%06.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


149 


tiate  publicly  with  Lord  Yarmouth.  Napoleon 
chose  General  Clarke,  and  conferred  on  him 
formal  and  patent  powers.  From  that  mo- 
ment, the  22d  of  July,  the  negotiation  was 
officially  opened. 

General  Clarke  and  Lord  Yarmouth  confer- 
red, an.i,  with  the  exception  of  Sicily,  the  two 
negotiators  were  agreed.  France  granted  Mal- 
ta, the  Cape,  the  conquest  of  India;  she  in- 
sisted on  the  restitution  of  the  factories  of 
Pondicherry  and  Chandernagor,  consenting  to 
limit  the  number  of  troops  that  she  should  keep 
there;  she  demanded  also  that  St.  Lucia  and 
Tobago  should  be  restored  to  her,  but  she  made 
an  especial  point  only  of  the  restitution  of 
Surinam,  a  point  on  which  the  instructions 
of  the  English  negotiator  were  not  peremptory. 
The  only  serious  difficulty  still  consisted  in 
Sicily,  which  Lord  Yarmouth  was  not  formally 
authorized  to  cede,  especially  for  so  insignifi- 
cant an  indemnity  as  the  Balearic  Islands. 
Napoleon  was  desirous  to  obtain  Sicily  for  his 
brother  Joseph,  for  very  "weighty  reasons.  Ac- 
cording to  him,  so  long  as  Queen  Caroline 
should  reside  at  Palermo,  Joseph  would  not  be 
firmly  established  in  Naples ;  there  would  be 
everlasting  war  between  those  two  portions  of 
the  late  kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies ;  the  Ca- 
labrias  would  always  be  exposed  to  underhand 
excitement,  and,  what  was  still  worse,  Queen 
Caroline,  confined  at  Palermo,  unable  to  stand 
her  ground  in  her  island  without  the  support 
of  the  English,  would  give  it  up  entirely  to 
them.  It  would  therefore  be  securing  the  en- 
joyment of  Sicily  to  the  English  to  leave  it  to 
the  Bourbons,  an  infinitely  disastrous  conse- 
quence for  the  Mediterranean. 

Lord  Yarmouth,  on  his  part,  notwithstand- 
ing his  desire  to  conclude,  durst  not  venture. 
But  a  new  obstacle  soon  intervened  to  fetter 
his  good  will. 

The  British  cabinet,  when  apprized  of  the 
conduct  of  M.  d'Oubril,  was  extremely  irritated, 
and  hastened  to  send  couriers  to  St.  Peters- 
burg, to  complain  of  the  Russian  negotiator  for 
having  deserted  the  English  negotiator.  It  did 
not  stop  there,  but  blamed  Lord  Yarmouth,  its 
own  negotiator,  for  having  so  soon  produced 
his  powers.  Fearful  even  of  the  influences  to 
which  Lord  Yarmouth  migjit  be  exposed  by  his 
personal  intimacy  with  the  French  diplomat- 
ists, it  made  choice  of  a  Whig,  Lord  Lauder- 
dale,  a  personage  very  hard  to  please,  to  asso- 
ciate him  in  the  negotiation.  This  second  ple- 
nipotentiary was  immediately  despatched,  with 
precise  instructions,  but  which  nevertheless 
left  certain  facilities  relative  to  Sicily  with 
which  Lord  Yarmouth  was  not  furnished. 
Lord  Lauderdale  was  an  exact  and  formal  di- 
plomatist He  had  orders  to  require  the  fixing 
of  a  basis  of  negotiation,  the  uti  possidetit,  which 
covered  the  maritime  conquests  of  the  Eng- 
lish, and  particularly  Sicily,  which  had  not  yet 
been  conquered  by  Joseph  Bonaparte.  It  is 
true  that  this  same  basis  excluded  the  restitu- 
tion of  Hanover,  but  that  kingdom  was  out  of 
the  discussion,  the  English  having  always 
declared  that  they  would  not  even  allow  any 
debate  on  that  point  The  basis  being  admit- 
ted, Lord  Lauderdale  was  to  agree  that  the  uti 
pottidetis  should  be  applied  in  an  absolute  man- 


ner, especially  in  regard  to  Sicily,  and  that 
this  island  might  be  relinquished  for  a  com- 
pensation. Thus  a  sacrifice  in  Dalmatia,  add- 
ed to  the  cession  of  the  Balearic  Islands,  might 
furnish  a  medium  of  accommodation. 

Lord  Lauderdale  proceeded  without  delay  to 
Paris.  He  was  a  Whig,  consequently  a  friend, 
rather  than  a  foe,  to  peace.  But  he  had  been 
warned  to  be  on  his  guard  against  the  seduc- 
tions of  M.  de  Talleyrand,  which,  it  was  fear- 
ed, Lord  Yarmouth  was  not  capable  of  resisting. 

Lord  Lauderdale  was  received  politely  and 
coldly,  for  it  had  been  guessed  that  he  was 
sent  over  to  serve  as  a  corrective  of  Lord  Yar- 
mouth's too  easy  temper,  as  it  was  judged  to 
be.  Napoleon,  in  reply  to  the  mission  of  Lord 
Lauderdale,  appointed  M.  de  Champagny  se- 
cond French  negotiator.  From  that  moment 
they  were  two  against  two:  Messieurs  Clarke 
and  Champagny  against  Lord  Yarmouth  and 
Lord  Lauderdale. 

No  sooner  had  Lord  Lauderdale  entered  this 
congress  than  he  set  out  with  a  long,  absolute 
note,  in  which  he  recapitulated  the  confidential 
and  official  negotiation,  and  required,  before 
proceeding  any  further,  that  the  principle  of 
the  uti  possidetis  should  be  admitted.  Napoleon 
was  frankly  desirous  of  peace,  and  imagined 
that  he  had  it  in  his  grasp  ever  since  he  had 
guided  the  hand  of  M.  d'Oubril  so  far  as  to  sign 
the  treaty  of  the  20th  of  July.  But  it  was 
wrong,  nevertheless,  to  provoke  his  susceptible 
and  by  no  means  patient  temper.  He  caused 
the  answer  to  be  deferred  as  the  first  sign 
of  dissatisfaction.  Lord  Lauderdale  did  not 
consider  himself  beaten,  and  repeated  his  de- 
claration. He  was  then  answered  in  an  ener- 
getic and  dignified  despatch,  in  which  he  was 
told  that  so  far  the  negotiation  had  proceeded 
with  frankness  and  cordiality,  and  without 
those  pedantic  forms  which  the  new  negotiator 
desired  to  introduce  into  it;  that,  if  the  inten- 
tions were  changed,  if  all  this  diplomatic  pa- 
rade disguised  a  secret  intention  of  breaking 
off,  after  procuring  a  few  papers  to  produce  to 
parliament,  the  sooner  Lord  Lauderdale  was 
gone  the  better,  for  the  French  cabinet  was  not 
disposed  to  lend  itself  to  the  parliamentary 
calculations  of  the  British  cabinet.  Lord  Lau- 
derdale had  no  desire  to  produce  a  rupture ;  he 
was  awkward,  that  was  all.  Explanations  en- 
sued. It  was  understood  that  the  production  of 
Lord  Lauderdale's  note  was  an  aflair  of  mere 
formality,  which,  at  bottom,  excluded  none  of 
the  conditions  previously  admitted  by  Lord 
Yarmouth ;  that  even  the  relinquishment  of 
Sicily  on  condition  of  a  more  extensive  indem- 
nity than  the  Balearic  Islands,  had  become 
more  explicit  since  the  arrival  of  Lord  Lauder- 
dale, and  the  negotiators  then  began  to  confer 
on  the  subject  of  Pondicherry,  Surinam,  Toba- 
go, and  St.  Lucia. 

The  English  negotiators  seemed  persuaded 
that  Russia,  touched  by  the  representations  of 
the  British  cabinet,  would  not  ratify  D'Ou  jril's 
treaty.  Napoleon,  on  the  contrary,  could  not 
believe  that  M.  d'Oubril  would  have  gone  so 
far  as  to  conclude  such  a  treaty,  if  his  instruc 
tions  had  not  authorized  him  to  do  so ;  still  less 
did  he  believe  that  Russia  dared  cancel  an  acl 
which  she  had  authorized  her  representative 
x  2 


150 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[July,  1806. 


ro  sign.  He  thought,  therefore,  that  it  would 
be  advantageous  to  wait  for  the  new  Russian 
ratifications,  which  to  him  appeared  certain, 
and  that  England  would  then  be  obliged  to 
submit  to  the  conditions  which  he  had  it  so 
much  at  heart  to  see  her  accept.  In  conse- 
quence, he  ordered  the  two  French  negotiators 
to  continue  to  gain  time,  till  the  day  when  the 
answer  from  St.  Petersburg  should  reach  Paris. 
M.  d'Oubril  had  set  out  on  the  22d  of  July; 
that  answer  must  arrive  by  the  end  of  August. 

Napoleon  was  mistaken,  and  this  was  one 
of  the  very  rare  occasions  on  which  he  had 
not  divined  the  thoughts  of  his  adversaries. 
Nothing,  in  fact,  was  more  doubtfdl  than  the 
Russian  ratifications,  and  besides,  the  then 
failing  health  of  Mr.  Fox  was  a  new  peril  for 
the  negotiation.  If  this  generous  friend  of 
humanity  were  to  sink  under  the  cares  of 
government,  to  which  he  had  long  been  unac- 
customed, the  war  party  might  get  the  better 
of  the  peace  party  in  the  British  cabinet. 

But,  at  the  moment,  a  serious  circumstance 
put  peace  in  much  greater  jeopardy  than  the 
temporizing  enjoined  by  Napoleon.  Prussia 
had  fallen  into  a  melancholy  state  of  despond- 
ency. Since  her  occupation  of  Hanover,  and 
the  publication  in  London  of  her  communica- 
tions with  England,  Napoleon,  as  we  have 
said,  had  taken  no  account  of  her,  and  treated 
her  as  an  ally  from  whom  there  was  nothing 
to  hope  for.  Thus  every  creature  in  Europe 
knew  that  he  was  engaged  in  the  organization 
of  the  new  Germanic  body,  and  Prussia  was 
as  uninformed  on  this  subject  as  the  petty 
German  powers.  Everybody  knew  that  France 
was  negotiating  with  England,  that  conse- 
quently the  question  of  Hanover  must  come 
under  Liscussion,  and  she  had  not  received  a 
single  communication  on  this  subject  capable 
of  rendering  her  easy.  King  Frederick  Wil- 
liam was  obliged  to  appear  informed  of  that 
which  he  was  ignorant  of,  that  he  might  not 
make  the  state  of  neglect  in  which  he  was  left 
too  evident.  Though  keeping  up  secret  and 
not  very  honourable  relations  with  Russia,  he 
was  treated  by  the  latter  without  much  consi- 
deration, and  he  could  perceive  that  she  prized 
him  less  every  day,  in  proportion  as  she  be- 
came more  reconciled  with  France.  In  cold- 
ness with  Austria,  who  did  not  forgive  him  for 
having  deserted  her  on  the  eve  of  Austerlitz, 
at  war  with  England,  which  had  just  seized 
three  hundred  Prussian  merchantmen,  he 
found  himself  alone  in  Europe,  and  so  little 
respected  that  even  the  King  of  Sweden  him- 
self had  not  been  afraid  to  oflfer  him  the  most 
grievous  of  affronts.  When  the  Prussian 
troops  had  appeared  to  occupy  the  dependen- 
cies of  Hanover  bordering  on  Swedish  Pcme- 
rania,  the  King  of  Sweden,  who  held  them,  as 
ne  said,  on  behalf  of  the  King  of  England,  his 
ally,  had  defended  himself  there,  and  fired 
upon  tue  troops  that  were  sent.  It  was  the 
last  degree  of  humiliation  to  be  thus  treated 
by  a  prince  who  had  no  other  strength  but  his 
insanity,  protected  by  his  alliances. 

This  situation  produced  in  the  Prussian 
cabinet  reflections  equally  painful  and  alarm- 
ing. Russia,  England  herself,  were,  at  this 
moment  taking  steps  towards  France.  The 


coalition  must  soon  find  itself  dissolved,  and, 
as  Prussia  had  been  courted  only  because  she 
formed  the  necessary  complement  of  that 
coalition,  what  would  become  of  her  at  the 
time  of  the  general  disarming?  Would  she 
not  be  delivered  up  defenceless  to  Napoleon, 
who,  highly  dissatisfied  with  her  conduct, 
would  treat  her  as  he  pleased,  either  in  order 
to  purchase  peace  with  England  and  Russia, 
or  to  aggrandize  the  states  that  he  should  think 
fit  to  found  ?  and,  whatever  he  might  do,  he 
was  sure  not  to  have  one  disapprover  in 
Europe,  for  nobody  now  felt  the  slightest  in- 
terest for  Prussia. 

The  strangest  reports  confirmed  these  cut- 
ting reflections.  The  idea  of  restoring  Han- 
over to  England,  in  order  to  have  a  maritime 
peace,  was  so  natural  and  so  simple  that  it 
sprang  up  in  all  minds  at  once.  So  little  was 
Prussia  esteemed,  that,  notwithstanding  the 
virtues  of  her  king,  it  was  not  taken  amiss 
that  Napoleon  should  act  thus  towards  a  court 
which  knew  not  how  to  be  either  friend  or 
enemy  to  any  one.  The  allies  of  France, 
Spain  in  particular,  who  suffered  cruelly  by 
the  war,  said  aloud  that  Prussia  did  not  de- 
serve to  have  the  calamities  of  war  prolonged 
a  single  day  on  her  account.  General  Pardo, 
ambassador  of  Spain  in  Berlin,  repeated  this 
so  publicly,  that  people  everywhere  inquired 
the  cause  of  such  bold  language.  Thus,  with- 
out being  informed  on  the  subject,  every  one 
related  circumstances  as  they  were  passing  in 
Paris  between  Lord  Yarmouth  and  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand. 

Then  came  the  malevolent,  who,  adding  the 
improbable  to  the  probable,  took  delight  in  the 
most  mischievous  inventions.  Some  pretended 
that  France  was  about  to  reconcile  herself 
with  Russia  by  reconstituting  the  kingdom  of 
Poland  in  behalf  of  the  Grand-duke  Constan- 
tine,  and  that  for  this  purpose  the  Polish  pro- 
vinces, ceded  to  Prussia  at  the  time  of  the  last 
partition,  would  be  taken  from  her.  Others 
maintained  that  Murat  was  about  to  be  pro- 
claimed King  of  Westphalia,  and  that  it  was 
in  contemplation  to  give  him  Miinster,  Osna- 
brilck,  and  East  Friesland. 

It  is  a  mixture  of  falsehood  and  truth  of 
which  all  rumours  are  usually  composed,  and 
there  is  always  sufficient  of  the  latter  mingled 
with  them  to  gain  belief  for  the  lie.  This  may 
be  perceived  in  the  present  instance,  when  ac- 
curate but  distorted  facts  had  served  for  a 
foundation  to  the  falsest  reports.  Napoleon 
was,  in  fact,  thinking  of  restoring  Hanover  to 
England,  since  Prussia  no  longer  seemed  to 
him  an  ally  that  could  be  relied  on,  but  secur- 
ing an  indemnity  for  the  latter  or  restoring  to 
her  all  that  he  had  received  from  her.  The 
plan  for  taking  the  Polish  provinces  from  her 
had  been  entertained  for  a  moment,  but  by  the 
Russians  and  not  by  the  French.  Lastly, 
Murat's  pretended  kingdom  was  an  invention 
of  M.  de  Talleyrand's  clerks,  for  the  purpose 
of  flattering  the  imperial  family ;  and  as  yet 
Napoleon  had  thought  of  this  only  on  condition 
of  giving  Prussia  the  Hanseatic  cities,  which 
she  eagerly  coveted.  At  any  rate,  he  had 
never  wished  to  hear  such  a  scheme  talked  ofi 

But  it  is  not  with  this  scrupulous  accuracy 


July,  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


151 


that  newsmongers  construct  their  inventions. 
To  ridicule  those  whom  they  suppose  to  be 
deceived,  to  affect  indignation  against  those 
whom  they  suppose  to  be  deceivers,  is  suffi- 
cient for  their  malevolent  idleness,  and  this  is 
a  species  of  persons  not  more  rare  in  the  di- 
plomatic circles  than  in  the  curious  and  igno- 
rant public  of  great  capitals. 

Soldierly  imprudences  gave  a  certain  pro- 
bability to  these  rumours.  Murat  kept  in  his 
duchy  of  Berg  a  military  court,  where  the 
most  extraordinar}'  language  was  used. 

His  was,  observed   his   comrades   in  war, ; 
who   had   become   his   courtiers — his  was   a  ( 
very  small  state  for  a  brother-in-law  of  the  ! 
Emperor's.     By  and  by,  no  doubt,  he  would  be  • 
king  of  Westphalia,  and  a  fine  kingdom  would 
be  composed  for  him,  at  the  expense  of  that 
scurvy  court  of  Prussia,  which  betrayed  every- 
body.    It  was  not  only  those  about  Murat  who 
talked  thus.   The  French  troops,  brought  back 
into  the  country  of  Darmstadt,  into  Franconia ' 
and  Suabia,  had  but  a  step  to  take  to  overrun 
Saxony  and  Prussia.     All  these  military  men, : 
who  had  a  desire  to  continue  the  war,  and  who 
attributed  the  same  desire   to   their   master, 
flattered  themselves  that  they  should  soon  be- 
gin it  again,  and  enter  Berlin  as  they  had  en- 
tered  Vienna.     The    new    Prince   of    Ponte 
Corvo,   Bernadotte,   established   at  Anspach, 
devised  plans,  ridiculous   enough,  which   he 
showed  publicly,  and  which  he   ascribed  to 
Napoleon.     Augereau,  caring  still  less  what 
he  said,  drank  at  table  with  his  staff,  to  the 
success  of  the  approaching  war  with  Prussia. 

These  extravagances  of  idle  soldiers,  re- 
ported in  Berlin,  naturally  produced  the  most 
unpleasant  sensation.  Related  at  court,  they 
were  then  transmitted  to  the  entire  population, : 
and  excited  the  pride,  always  ready  to  take 
fire,  of  the  Prussian  nation.  The  king  was 
more  especially  affected  by  them,  on  account 
of  the  effect  which  they  could  not  fail  to  pro- 
duce on  the  public  opinion.  The  queen,  dis- 
tressed about  what  had  befallen  her  sister,  the 
Princess  of  Tour  and  Taxis,  who  had  been 
included  in  the  recent  mediatisation,  said  no- 
thing, having  for  some  time  made  up  her  mind 
to  be  silent,  and  quite  aware  that  she  had  no 
claim  upon  Napoleon,  to  induce  him  to  favour 
the  princes  of  her  family.  But  her  silence  was 
signiiicant.  M.  de  Haugwitz  was  more  dis- 
heartened than  he  chose  to  confess  to  his  mas- 
ter. The  faults  committed  during  his  absence, 
and  contrary  to  his  advice,  at  length  produced 
their  irresistible  consequences.  He  was,  never-  ' 
theless,  blamed  for  all  events,  as  though  he  had 
been  their  real  cause.  The  seizure  of  three  hun- 
dred vessels,  so  injurious  to  Prussian  commerce, 
was  imputed  to  him  as  one  of  his  works.  The 
minister  of  the  finances  had  reproached  him 
with  it  in  full  council,  and  with  the  greatest 
asperity.  A  general  of  renown  in  the  army, 
General  Ruchel,  had  carried  rudeness  towards 
him  to  the  length  of  insult.  Public  opinion  in 
Prussia  rose  from  hour  to  hour  against  M.  de 
Haugwitz,  who,  however,  had  done  nothing 
wrong  but  in  returning  to  business  at  the  soli- 
citation of  the  king,  when  his  system  of  alli- 
ance with  France  was  so  compromised  that  it 
s  rendered  impossible  The  sentiment  of 


German  patriotism  combined  with  all  the  rest 
to  hasten  a  crisis.  Some  booksellers  of  Nu- 
remberg, having  circulated  pamphlets  against 
France,  Napoleon  had  ordered  them  to  be  ap- 
prehended, and,  applying  to  one  of  them  the 
severity  of  the  military  laws,  which  treat  as 
an  enemy  any  one  who  endeavours  to  excite 
a  country  against  the  army  that  occupies  it, 
had  caused  him  to  be  shot.  This  deplorable 
act  had  inflamed  the  public  opinion  against 
the  French  and  their  partisans. 

King  Frederick  William,  and  M.  de  Haug- 
witz, had  reckoned  upon  a  success  for  calm- 
ing the  public  mind :  they  hoped  that  a  con- 
federation o'f  the  German  powers  of  the  north 
under  the  protectorship  of  Prussia,  would 
form  a  counterpoise  to  the  confederation  of  the 
Rhine ;  Napoleon  himself  had  suggested  the 
idea  of  it.  An  aide-de-camp  of  the  king  had 
been  sent  to  Dresden,  to  decide  Saxony  to  en- 
ter into  this  confederation,  and  the  chief  min- 
ister of  the  Elector  of  Hesse  Cassel  had 
come  himself  to  Berlin  to  confer  on  the  sub- 
ject. But  these  two  courts  manifested  ex- 
treme coldness  towards  the  proposal.  Sax- 
ony, the  most  honest  of  the  German  powers, 
had  a  natural  mistrust  of  Prussia,  and,  if  she 
had  resolved  to  join  any  new  confederacy,  she 
would  rather  have  inclined  to  Austria,  which 
had  never  coveted  her  states,  than  Prussia, 
which,  surrounding  them  on  all  sides,  was 
evidently  longing  for  them.  She  was,  there- 
fore, not  disposed  to  do  what  was  asked  of 
her,  and  regulated  her  conduct  by  that  of  the 
other  powers  of  the  north  of  Germany.  Hesse, 
dissatisfied  with  Prussia,  which,  in  1803,  had 
caused  the  country  of  Fulda  to  be  given  to 
the  house  of  Nassau-Orange,  dissatisfied  with 
France,  which  had  refused  to  include  her  in 
the  confederation  of  the  Rhine,  and  at  the 
same  time  to  aggrandize  her,  deceiving,  be- 
sides, all  those  with  whom  she  treated,  would 
not  decide  in  favour  of  Prussia  any  more  than 
of  France,  for  to  her  the  danger  appeared 
equal.  To  excuse  herself  to  Prussia,  to  whom 
she  owed  an  at  least  apparent  attachment,  she 
had  invented  an  odious  lie,  and  pretended  that 
France  had  thrown  out  violent  underhand 
threats  if  she  joined  the  confederation  of  the 
north.  This  was  not  the  case;  the  most 
secret  despatches  of  the  French  government' 
enjoined  its  agents  on  the  contrary  not  to  op- 
pose any  obstacle  to  the  formation  of  this 
confederation,  to  be  silent  on  the  subject,  and, 
if  consulted,  to  declare  that  France  would  see 
it  without  displeasure.  It  was  the  Hanseatic 
cities  only  to  which  France  resolved  to  forbid 
that  accession,  for  purely  commercial  reasons; 
and  this  she  had  not  concealed. 

The  Hessian  minister,  then,  carried  to  Ber- 
lin the  falsest  assertions ;  and,  all  that  his 
sovereign  had  demanded  of  France,  when 
offering  to  join  the  confederation  of  the  Rhine, 
he  pretended  that  France  had  offered  him  to 
draw  him  away  from  the  confederation  of  the 
north.  He  even  accused  M.  Bignon,  our 

1  I  have  read  all  these  despatches  with  the  greatest 
attention  ;  and,  as  I  .e(l  the  truth  in  regard  to  all  the 
courts,  great  and  small,  1  should  tell  it  in  regard  to  Hesse, 
were  that  truth  favourable  to  it,  and  unfavourable  to 
France. 


152 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Aug.  1806. 


minister  at  Cassel,  of  language  which  the 
latter  had  not  used,  and  which  he  contradicted 
most  energetically.  It  is  possible  that  M.  Big- 
non,  before  the  confederation  of  the  north  was 
contemplated,  and  when  all  the  German  diplo- 
matists were  talking  of  the  confederation  of 
the  Rhine,  had  extolled  in  general  terms  the 
advantages  to  be  derived  from  the  French  al- 
liance, that  in  his  language  he  had  even  gone 
beyond  his  instructions,  but  this  was  from  in- 
discreet zeal ;  and  a  proof  that  he  acted  with- 
out orders  is  that  Napoleen  had  enjoined  M. 
de  Talleyrand  by  a  letter  to  refuse  the  junction 
of  the  Elector  of  Hesse.1  Nevertheless,  the 
minister  of  the  Elector  of  Hesse,  sent  ex- 
traordinarily to  Berlin,  with  a  view  to  justify 
an  unexpected  refusal,  came  to  report  in  the 
falsest  manner  the  pretended  threats  and  the 
pretended  offers  between  which  France  had 
placed  the  petty  court  of  Hesse. 

On  this  utterly  false  representation,  the 
King  of  Prussia  conceived  that  he  had  disco- 
vered the  blackest  treachery  in  the  conduct 
of  Napoleon,  thought  himself  tricked,  op- 
pressed, and  gave  way  to  a  violent  irritation. 
While  these  reports  were  reaching  him  from 
the  court  of  Cassel,  a  despatch  from  M.  de 
Lucchesini  arrived  from  France.  That  am- 
bassador, a  man  of  talent,  but  unsteady,  insin- 
cere, living  in  Paris  with  all  the  enemies  of 
the  government,  and  being,  nevertheless,  one 
of  the  most  assiduous  courtiers  of  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand, had  picked  up,  some  days  before,  the  ! 
reports  circulated  respecting  the  lot  reserved 
for  Prussia.  A  confidential  intimation  ob- 
tained from  the  English  negotiators  relative  to 
Hanover,  the  restitution  of  which  had  been 
tacitly  promised,  appeared  to  him  to  crown  all 
the  threatening  circumstances  of  the  moment, 
and  as,  in  his  ambiguous  conduct,  alternately 
the  adversary  or  the  partisan  of  M.  de  Haug- 
witz,  he  had  very  recently  supported  the  treaty 
of  the  15th  of  February,  as  he  had  even  car- 
ried it  to  Berlin,  he  considered  his  responsi- 
bility as  deeply  involved,  if  the  last  attempt 
at  an  alliance  with  France  turned  out  ill.  He 
therefore  exaggerated  in  his  reports  in  the 
most  imprudent  manner.  An  agent  ought 
to  conceal  nothing  from  his  government,  but 
Vie  ought  to  weigh  his  assertions,  to  add  no- 
thing to  the  truth,  to  retrench  nothing  from  it, 
especially  when  baneful  resolutions  may  be 
the  consequence. 

The  courier  who  left  Paris  on  the  29th  of 
July,  arrived  at  Berlin  oa  the  5th  or  6th  of 
August.  He  caused  an  extraordinary  sensa- 
tion there.  A  second,  bringing  the  despatches 
of  the  2d  of  August,  who  arrived  on  the  9th, 
only  added  to  the  effect  produced  by  the  first. 
The  explosion  was  instantaneous. 

As  a  heart,  full  of  long  repressed  senti- 
ments, suddenly  breaks  forth,  if  a  last  impres- 
sion comes  to  aggravate  what  it  has  felt,  the 
king  and  his  ministers  burst  into  sudden  pas- 
sions against  France.  Both  of  them  equalled 
in  their  external  demonstrations  the  most  vio- 
lent members  of  the  party  which  desired  war. 
M.  de  Haugwitz,  usually  calm,  certainly  could, 

!  This  letter  exists  in  the  dep6t  of  the  secretary  of 
state's  office  in  the  Louvre. 


in  reviewing  the  past,  call  to  mind  the  faults 
of  the  court  of  Berlin,  explain  to  himself  the 
consequences  of  those  faults  on  the  irritable 
mind  of  Napoleon,  comprehend  from  that 
time  the  neglect  with  which  the  latter  repaid 
an  unfaithful  alliance,  reduce  thus  to  their 
true  value  the  alleged  plans  with  which  Prus- 
sia was  threatened,  and  wait  for  more  accu- 
rate reports,  before  the  Prussian  cabinet  pro- 
ceeded to  form  an  opinion  and  to  decide  upon 
a  line  of  conduct.  Here  commence  the  real 
faults  of  M.  de  Haugwitz.  Believing  only  a 
part  of  what  was  told  him,  but  desiring  to 
cover  his  responsibility,  and  above  all  flatter- 
ing himself  that  he  could  control  the  violent 
party  by  putting  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
military  demonstrations,  he  assented  to  all 
that  was  proposed  in  this  moment  of  agitation. 
His  system  being  thus  overthrown,  he  ought 
to  have  retired  and  left  to  others  the  chances 
of  a  rupture  with  France,  which  he  foresaw 
must  be  disastrous.  But  he  gave  way  to  the 
general  movement  of  minds,  and  all  the  parti- 
sans he  had  about  the  king,  M.  Lombard  in 
particular,  studiously  imitated  him.  We  shall 
discover  that  there  is  no  need  of  a  free  go- 
vernment, for  nations  to  furnish  the  spectacle 
of  the  most  inconceivable  popular  excitements. 

A  council  was  called  at  Potsdam.  The  old 
generals,  such  as  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and 
Marshal  de  Mollendorf,  formed  part  of  it. 
When  these  men,  who  till  then  had  shown 
such  discretion,  saw  the  king  and  M.  de  Haug- 
witz himself  consider  the  treachery  attributed 
to  France  as  possible  and  even  as  true,  they 
hesitated  no  longer,  and  the  resolution  to  re- 
place the  whole  Prussian  army  on  the  war 
footing,  as  it  had  been  six  months  before,  was 
unanimously  adopted.  The  majority  of  the 
council,  the  king  included,  regarded  this  as  a 
measure  of  safety,  M.  de  Haugwitz  as  an  an- 
swer to  all  those  who  alleged  that  Prussia 
was  given  up  to  Napoleon. 

All  at  once,  a  report  was  circulated  in  Ber- 
lin, on  the  10th  of  August,  that  the  king  had  de- 
cided to  arm,  that  great  difficulties  had  arisen 
between  Prussia  and  France,  that  hidden  dan- 
gers had  even  been  discovered,  a  sort  of  medi- 
tated treachery,  which  accounted  for  the  stay  of 
the  French  troops  in  Suabia,  Franconia,  and 
Westphalia.  The  opinion  frequently  agitated, 
but  always  repressed  by  the  example  of  the 
king,  in  which  people  had  confidence,  was 
violently  expressed.  The  hearts  of  the  subjects 
overflowed  like  that  of  the  princes.  We  may 
well  say,  was  the  cry  on  all  sides,  that  France 
would  not  spare  Prussia  any  more  than  Aus- 
tria ;  that  she  is  determined  to  overrun  and 
ravage  all  Germany ;  that  the  partisans  of 
French  alliance  were  either  dupes  or  traitors ; 
that  it  was  not  M.  de  Hardenberg  who  was 
sold  to  England,  but  M.  de  Haugwitz  to 
France ;  that  it  was  well  to  find  him  out  at 
last,  only  it  was  finding  him  out  too  late  ;  that 
it  was  not  to-day,  but  six  months  ago,  on  the 
eve  or  the  morrow  of  Austerlitz,  that  Prussia 
ought  to  have  armed ;  that,  besides,  it  was  of 
little  consequence,  if  they  must,  though  late, 
defend  themselves  or  perish ;  that  England 
and  Russia  would  no  doubt  hasten  to  tht  as- 
sistance of  any  one  who  would  resist  Napo 


Aug.  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


153 


Icon  ;  that,  after  all,  the  French  had  vanquished 
the  Austrians  without  energy,  the  Russians 
without  instruction,  but  they  would  find  it 
a  more  difficult  task  to  beat  the  soldiers  of  the 
great  Frederick. 

Persons  who  saw  Berlin  at  this  period  say, 
that  there  never  was  an  instance  of  such  fer- 
mentation and  excitement.  M.  de  Haugwitz 
already  perceived  with  dread  that  he  had  been 
urged  far  beyond  the  goal  which  he  meant  to 
reach,  for  he  had  contemplated  mere  demon- 
strations, and  the  nation  demanded  war.  The 
army,  in  particular,  called  aloud  for  it.  The 
queen,  Prince  Louis,  the  court,  recently  con- 
trolled by  the  express  will  of  the  king,  now 
broke  out  without  restraint.  According  to  them, 
they  were  not  German,  they  were  not  Prus- 
sian, till  that  day;  people  listened  at  last  to  the 
troice  of  interest  and  honour;  they  were  throw- 
ing off  the  illusions  of  a  perfidious  and  dis- 
graceful alliance ;  they  were  worthy  of  them- 
selves, of  the  founder  of  the  Prussian  mon- 
archy, of  the  great  Frederick.  Never  has 
such  infatuation  been  witnessed,  but  where 
the  multitude  leads  the  wise,  where  courts  lead 
weak  kings. 

Yet,  what  had  happened  to  justify  this  out- 
burst! Prussia,  on  the  point  of  signing  in 
1805  a  treaty  of  close  alliance  with  France, 
had,  under  the  false  pretext  of  the  violation  of 
the  territory  of  Anspach,  yielded  to  the  solici- 
tations of  the  European  coalition,  to  the  cries 
of  the  German  aristocracy,  to  the  caresses  of 
Alexander,  which  was  a  sort  of  treachery. 
Finding  France  victorious  at  Austerlitz,  she 
had  abruptly  changed  sides,  and  accepted  Han- 
over from  Napoleon,  after  accepting  it  from 
Alexander  a  few  days  before.  Napoleon  had 
sincerely  desired  to  attach  her  to  himself  by 
such  a  gift,  and  he  waited  for  this  last  trial  to 
see  whether  he  could  be  trusted.  But  this  gift, 
accepted  with  confusion,  Prussia  had  not  dared 
to  avow  to  the  world;  she  had  almost  excused 
herself  to  the  English  for  the  occupation  of 
Hanover ;  she  had  not  taken  that  frank  posi- 
tion between  Napoleon  and  his  enemies  which 
the  ought  to  have  taken  to  inspire  confidence. 
Disgusted  with  such  relations,  Napoleon  had 
formed  the  secret  design  to  take  back  Hanover, 
in  order  to  obtain  from  England  a  peace,  which 
he  had  no  longer  any  hope  of  imposing  on  her  by 
the  alliance  of  Prussia.  But  he  had  thought 
of  a  compensation,  he  had  prepared  in  his  mind, 
but  he  had  said  nothing,  fearful  of  opening 
himself  to  a  court  for  which  he  no  longer  felt 
any  esteem.  Was  this  a  proceeding  to  be 
compared  to  the  conduct  of  Prussia,  continu- 
ing in  secret  connection  with  Russia,  through 
M.  de  Hardenberg,  notwithstanding  the  formal 
treaty  of  alliance  signed  at  Schiinbrunn,  and 
renewed  at  Paris  on  the  15th  of  February  ? 
Certainly  not.  The  faults  of  Napoleon  are 
confined  to  want  of  respect,  which  he  ought 
not  to  have  shown,  but  which  the  equivocal  con- 
duct of  Prussia  excused,  if  it  did  not  justify. 

In  reality,  Prussia  felt  humbled  by  the  part 
which  she,  had  acted,  alarmed  at  the  lonely 
situation  in  which  she  would  find  herself,  if 
England  and  Russia  should  reconcile  them- 
selves with  France,  confusedly  troubled  about 
the  treatment  which  she  should  then  be  liable  to 

VOL.  II.— 20 


experience  from  Napoleon,  without  having  a 
person  to  complain  to ;  and  in  this  state  she  was 
ready  to  take  the  falsest,  the  most  improbable 
rumours  for  real.  In  all  that  was  passing  in 
Berlin,  one  thing  only  was  true  and  honourable, 
that  was  German  patriotism  humiliated  by  the 
successes  of  France,  bursting  out  on  the  first 
pretext,  founded  or  not.  But  this  sentiment 
burst  forth  unseasonably.  In  1805,  when  Na- 
poleon left  Boulogne,  Prussia  ought  either  to 
have  declared  herself  loudly  for  France,  stat- 
ing her  motives  for  acting  thus,  and  pledging 
Prussian  honour  in  this  sense,  or  declared  her- 
self against  France  from  that  time,  and  strug- 
gle against  her,  while  Austria  and  Russia  were 
in  arms.  Now  she  was  rushing  into  ruin  by 
a  way  that  was  not  even  honourable. 

The  despatches  of  M.  de  Lucchesini  had 
been  intercepted  by  Napoleon's  police,  and  he 
was  acquainted  with  their  contents.  Incensed 
at  them,  he  had  immediately  ordered  a  letter 
to  be  written  to  M.  de  Laforest,  to  apprize  him 
of  the  sending  of  these  despatches,  to  charge 
him  to  contradict  all  the  allegations  of  the 
Prussian  minister,  and  to  require  his  recall. 
Unfortunately,  it  was  too  late,  for  already  the 
impulsion  given  to  the  public  opinion  in  Prus- 
sia was  not  to  be  controlled.  M.  de  Haug- 
wilz,  moreover,  embarrassed  by  the  so  differ- 
rent  parts  which  he  had  been  forced  to  act  for 
a  year  past,  had  no  longer  the  courage  of  good 
resolutions.  He  durst  neither  see  the  minister 
of  France,  nor  declare  to  the  fools  whose  folly 
he  had  flattered,  that  he  should  leave  them  once 
more  to  join  the  wise,  who  were  then  extremely 
rare  in  Berlin. 

M.  de  Laforest  found  him  reserved  and  shun- 
ning explanations.  However,  after  several 
attempts,  he  obtained  an  interview,  and  asked 
how  he  could  be  deficient  to  such  a  degree  of 
his  usual  presence  of  mind;  how  he  could 
believe  the  lying  tales  invented  by  Hesse,  the 
giddy  expressions  picked  up  by  M.  de  Lucche- 
sini; why  he  had  not  waited,  or  sought  for 
more  accurate  information,  before  he  took 
such  serious  resolutions  as  were  publicly  an- 
nounced. M.  de  Haugwitz,  distressed  in  pro- 
portion as  the  light,  obscured  for  a  moment  in 
his  mind,  began  to  shine  forth  again,  appeared 
grieved  at  the  conduct  which  he  had  pursued, 
acknowledged  candidly  the  impetuosity  of  the 
current  which  had  carried  away  the  king,  the 
court,  and  himself;  and,  lastly,  declared  that 
unless  they  received  assistance,  they  should 
run  perhaps  to  perish  upon  the  rock  of  war; 
that  nothing  was  yet  lost,  if  Napoleon  would 
take  any  step  whatever  that  would  be  a  satis- 
faction for  the  pride  of  the  multitude,  for  the 
prudence  of  the  cabinet  a  reason  to  take  cou- 
rage; that  the  removal  of  the  French  army, 
accumulated  for  some  time  on  the  roads  lead- 
ing to  Prussia,  would  fulfil  this  twofold  object ; 
that  the  armaments  might  then  be  counter- 
manded, the  government  alleging  as  a  reason 
for  having  armed  the  assemblage  of  French 
troops,  and  as  a  reason  for  disarming  their  re- 
tirement beyond  the  Rhine.  M.  de  Haugwitz 
added  that,  to  facilitate  the  explanations,  M.de 
Lucchesini  should  be  recalled,  and  a  discreet 
and  safe  man,  M.  de  Knobelsdorf,  sent  if 
I  Paris. 


154 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Aug.  180«. 


Napoleon  could  have  consented  to  the  pro- 
posed step  without  compromising  his  glory, 
for  he  had  never  thought  of  invading  Prussia. 
He  had  merely  taken  some  precautions  on  the 
refusal  to  ratify  the  treaty  of  Schonbruun. 
But,  since  then,  he  had  thought  only  of  Austria 
and  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro;  he  thought 
only  of  obtaining  restitution  of  them  by  some 
threat,  and,  since  the  treaty  signed  with  M. 
d'Oubril,  he  was  even  strongly  disposed  to 
bring  his  troops  back  to  France.  He  had 
given  orders  for  a  vast  camp  at  Meudon,  with 
the  intention  of  assembling  the  grand  army 
there,  and  holding  magnificent  fetes  in  Sep- 
tember. The  order  for  this  purpose  was  al- 
ready despatched.  But  a  serious  and  unfore- 
seen event  intervened,  to  render  this  conduct 
difficult  on  his  part.  Contrary  to  his  expecta- 
tion, the  Emperor  Alexander  had  refused  to 
ratify  the  treaty  of  peace  signed  by  M.  d'Oubril. 
He  had  adopted  this  resolution  at  the  urgent 
representations  of  England,  which  had  laid 
stress  on  her  fidelity,  referred  to  her  recent 
refusal  to  treat  without  Russia,  and  desired,  in 
return  for  this  fidelity,  that  he  should  reject  a 
treaty  too  hastily  concluded,  and  on  evidently 
disadvantageous  conditions.  The  Emperor 
Alexander,  though  greatly  dreading  the  conse- 
quences of  war  with  Napoleon,  dreaded  them 
rather  less  on  seeing  England  more  backward 
than  he  had  imagined  to  throw  herself  into  the 
arms  of  France.  It  would  even  appear,  that 
something  had  already  transpired  respecting 
the  agitations  of  the  court  of  Prussia,  and  the 
possibility  of  drawing  that  court  into  a  war. 
Lastly,  the  recently  acquired  knowledge  of  the 
dissolution  of  the  Germanic  empire,  adding  to 
the  jealousies  of  Russia,  as  to  those  of  all  the 
powers,  and  producing  an  expectation  of  re- 
doubled hatred  against  Napoleon,  Alexander 
had  decided  not  to  ratify  M.  d'Oubril's  treaty. 
He  replied,  however,  that  he  was  ready  to  re- 
sume ihe  negotiations,  but  in  concert  with 
England;  that  he  even  charged  the  latter  with 
his  powers  for  treating,  on  condition  that  not 
only  Sicily  should  be  left  to  the  royal  family 
of  Naples,  but  the  whole  of  Dalmatia,  and 
that  the  Balearic  Islands  should  be  given  to 
the  King  of  Piedmont. 

The  courier,  who  brought  this  communica- 
tion, arrived  at  Paris  on  ihe  3d  of  September, 
at  the  very  moment  when  the  armaments  of 
Prussia  were  engaging  the  attention  of  all 
Europe,  and  when  Napoleon  was  desired  to 
extricate  M.  de  Haugwitz,  and  King  Frederick 
William,  from  embarrassment,  by  ordering 
the  French  troops  to  fall  back.  Napoleon,  in 
his  turn,  conceived  a  most  profound  mistrust, 
and  imagined  that  he  was  betrayed.  The  re- 
collection of  the  conduct  of  Austria,  in  the 
preceding  year,  the  recollection  of  her  arma- 
ments, so  frequently  and  so  obstinately  denied, 
even  when  her  troops  were  marching,  this  re- 
collection recurring  to  his  mind,  persuaded 
him  thai  the  same  would  be  the  case  this  time, 
that  the  sudden  armaments  of  Prussia  were 
but  a  perfidy,  and  that  he  was  in  danger  of 
being  surprised  in  September,  1806,  as  he  had 
wellnigh  been  in  September,  1805.  He  was, 
therefore,  not  at  all  disposed  to  withdraw  his 
troops  from  Franconia,  a  very  important  mili- 


tary position,  as  we  shall  soon  see,  for  a  war 
against  Prussia.  Another  circumstance  led 
him  to  believe  in  a  coalition.  Mr.  Fox,  after 
an  illness  of  two  months,  was  just  dead. 
Thus,  in  the  same  year,  the  fatigues  of  long 
power  had  killed  Mr.  Pitt,  and  the  first  trials 
of  a  power  which  had  become  new  to  him  had 
hastened  the  end  of  Mr.  Fox.  Mr.  Fox  carried 
with  him  the  peace  of  the  world,  and  the  pos- 
sibility of  a  fertile  alliance  between  France 
and  England.  If  England  had  sustained  a 
great  loss  in  Mr.  Pitt,  Europe  and  humanity 
suffered  an  immense  loss  in  Mr.  Fox.  He 
being  dead,  the  war  party  was  about  to  triumph 
over  the  peace  party  in  the  bosom  of  th« 
British  cabinet. 

That  cabinet,  however,  durst  not  make  any 
considerable  change  in  the  conditions  of  peace 
previously  sent  to  Paris.  Lord  Yarmouth  had 
relinquished  the  negotiation  in  disgust.  Lord 
Lauderdale  was  left  alone.  He  received  or- 
ders from  London  to  present  the  demands  of 
Russia,  consisting  in  the  claim  of  Sicily  and 
Dalmatia  for  the  court  of  Naples,  and  the 
Balearic  Islands  for  the  King  of  Piedmonu 
Lord  Lauderdale,  in  presenting  these  new  con- 
ditions, acted  in  the  name  of  both  courts,  and 
as  having  the  powers  of  both.  Thus,  by  wait- 
ing for  the  effect  of  the  ratifications  of  St 
Petersburg,  Napoleon  had  missed  the  decisive 
occasion  for  having  peace.  The  greatest 
minds  are  liable  to  these  mistakes  in  the  field 
of  politics,  as  in  the  field  of  war. 

Napoleon  felt  on  this  account  a  sort  of  irri- 
tation, which  induced  him  still  more  to  sup- 
pose the  existence  of  a  European  conspiracy. 
He  was,  therefore,  much  more  inclined  to  ap- 
peal to  arms  than  to  give  way.  He  received 
about  this  time  M.  de  Knobelsdorf,  who  had 
come  in  the  utmost  haste  to  supply  the  place 
of  M.  de  Lucchesini.  He  gave  him  personally 
an  obliging  reception,  affirmed  positively  that 
he  had  no  design  against  Prussia,  that  he 
could  not  comprehend  what  she  wanted  of 
him,  for  he  wanted  nothing  of  her  but  the 
execution  of  treaties ;  that  he  had  no  thoughts 
of  taking  any  thing  from  her,  and  that  all  that 
had  been  published  on  this  subject  was  false ; 
and  he  alluded  in  these  words  to  the  reports 
of  M.  de  Lucchesini,  who  had  on  the  same 
day  delivered  his  letters  of  recall.  Then,  with 
a  candour  worthy  of  his  greatness,  he  added 
that,  in  the  false  rumours  which  were  circu- 
lated, one  thing  was  true,  namely,  what  was 
said  about  Hanover;  that,  in  fact,  he  had 
heard  England  on  that  subject;  that,  seeing 
the  peace  of  the  world  involved  in  that  ques- 
tion, he  had  purposed  to  address  himself  to 
Prussia,  to  explain  his  situation,  in  its  naked 
truth,  to  give  her  the  choice  of  a  general  peace 
purchased  by  the  restitution  of  Hanover,  on 
condition  of  a  compensation,  or  the  continu- 
ance of  the  War  against  England,  but  war  to 
the  last  extremity,  and  after  an  explanation, 
indeed,  of  the  degree  of  energy  which  King 
Frederick  William  intended  to  exert  in  it. 
He  affirmed,  moreover,  that,  at  any  rate,  he 
should  not  have  taken  any  resolution  without 
opening  his  mind  frankly  and  completely  to 
Prussia. 

An   explanation   so  candid  ought  to  hava 


Sept.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


15$ 


banished  all  doubts.  But  Prussia  wanted 
more ;  she  wanted  an  act  of  deference,  which 
should  save  her  pride.  Napoleon  might,  per- 
haps, have  complied,  if  he  had  not  been  at 
this  moment  full  of  mistrust,  and  if  he  had 
not  believed  that  there  was  a  new  coalition, 
which  had  as  yet  no  existence,  though  it  was 
not  long  before  it  did  exist.  But,  in  that  ex- 
citement of  mind  which  events  occasion,  we 
cannot  always  judge  correctly  what  is  passing 
among  our  adversaries.  In  consequence,  he 
ordered  M.  de  Laforest,  to  conduct  himself 
with  reserve,  to  tell  M.  de  Haugwitz  that 
Prussia  should  have  no  other  explanations 
than  what  he  had  given  to  Messieurs  de  Kno- 
belsd  rf  and  De  Lucchesini ;  that  as  for  the 
demand  relative  to  the  armies,  he  replied  by  a 
demand  exactly  similar,  and  that,  if  Prussia 
countermanded  her  armaments,  he  would  en- 
gage to  give  immediate  orders  to  his  troops  to 
repass  the  Rhine.  He  enjoined  M.  de  Laforest 
to  be  silent  afterwards,  and  to  watch  events. 
"In  such  a  situation,"  he  wrote,  "one  ought 
not  to  believe  protestations,  how  sincere  so- 
ever they  may  appear.  We  have  been  de- 
ceived too  often.  We  must  have  facts ;  let 
Prussia  disarm,  and  the  French  shall  repass 
the  Rhine,  not  before." 

M.  de  Laforest  punctually  obeyed  the  injunc- 
tions of  his  sovereign,  had  no  difficulty  to  con- 
vince M.  de  Haugwitz  who  was  previously 
convinced,  but  overruled  by  events;  and  then 
he  was  silent.  It  was  not  enough  for  the 
Prussian  cabinet  to  be  enlightened  respecting 
the  intentions  of  Napoleon  ;  it  wanted  a  pal- 
pable explanation  to  give  to  the  public  opinion, 
and  for  itself  also  facts,  but  clear  and  positive' 
facts,  such  as  the  retirement  of  the  French. 
Even  then,  the  excited  imaginations  would 
scarcely  have  been  pacified  even  by  a  soothing 
act.  Prussian  pride  claimed  a  satisfaction. 


One  has  as  much,  even  more  need  of  satisfac- 
tion, when  one  is  in  the  wrong,  than  when 
one  is  in  the  right. 

The  king  and  M.  de  Haugwitz  suffered  a 
few  more  days  to  elapse,  to  see  if  Napoleon 
would  communicate  any  thing  more  explicit, 
more  satisfactory.  This  silence  ruins  every 
thing, saidM.de Haugwitz  toM.de  Laforest.  But 
the  die  was  cast :  Prussia,  by  tergiversations, 
which  had  alienated  from  her  the  confidence 
of  Napoleon,  France  by  too  slighting  conduct, 
were  both  to  be  led  into  a  destructive  war,  the 
more  to  be  regretted,  as,  in  the  state  of  the 
world,  they  were  the  only  two  powers  whose 
interests  were  reconcilable.  The  silence  en- 
joined by  M.  de  Laforest  was  invariably  main- 
tained by  him ;  but  the  grief  in  his  counte- 
nance, an  expressive  grief  and  sufficiently 
significant,  if  the  court  of  Prussia  had  chosen 
to  comprehend  it,  and  to  guide  itself  by  what 
it  had  comprehended.  But  such  was  no  longer 
the  case,  either  with  King  Frederick  William 
or  with  his  ministers.  Regiments  passed 
every  day  through  Berlin  singing  patriotic 
songs,  which  were  repeated  by  the  crowds 
collected  in  the  streets.  People  were  every- 
where inquiring  when  the  king  would  set  out 
for  the  army,  and  if  it  was  true  that  he  would 
remain  at  Potsdam,  with  the  intention  of 
changing  his  first  determination.  So  great 
became  the  outcry  that  it  was  necessary  to 
satisfy  the  public  opinion.  The  unfortunate 
Frederick  William  set  out  on  the  21st  of  Sep- 
tember for  Magdeburg.  This  was  the  signal 
for  war,  which  was  expected  in  Germany,  and 
which  Napoleon  was  waiting  for  in  Paris. 
We  shall  see  in  the  next  book  the  terrible 
vicissitudes,  the  disastrous  consequences  for 
Prussia  and  the  glorious  results  for  Napoleon, 
results  which  would  excite  unmixed  satisfac- 
tion, if  policy  had  harmonized  with  victory. 


156 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept  1808. 


BOOK  XXV. 

JENA. 

Situation  of  the  French  Empire  at  the  Moment  of  the  War  with  Prussia — Affairs  of  Naples,  Dalmatia,  and  Hol- 
land— Means  of  Defence  prepared  by  Napoleon,  in  case  of  a  general  Coalition — Napoleon  leaves  Paris,  and 
repairs  to  Wurzburg — The  Court  of  Prussia  also  joins  the  Army — The  King,  the  Queen,  Prince  Louis,  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick,  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe — First  Military  Operations — Actions  at  Schleiz  and  Saalfeld— Death  of 
Prince  Louis — Perturbation  in  the  Prussian  Staff— The  Duke  of  Brunswick  resolves  to  retire  upon  the  Elbe, 
covering  himself  with  the  Saale — Memorable  Battles  of  Jena  and  Auerstadt — Rout  and  Disorganization  of  the 
Prussian  Army — Capitulation  of  Erfurt — The  Prince  of  Wirtemberg's  Corps  of  Reserve  surprised  and  beaten 
at  Halle — Divergent  and  precipitate  Retreat  of  the  Duke  of  Weimar,  General  Blucher,  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
lohe, Marshal  Kalkreuth — Offensive  March  of  Napoleon — Occupation  of  Leipzig,  Wittenberg,  Dessau — Pas- 
sage of  the  Elbe — Investment  of  Magdeburg — Triumphal  Entry  of  Napoleon  into  Berlin — His  Disposition?  in 
regard  to  the  Prussians — Pardon  granted  to  the  Prince  de  Hatzfeld — Occupation  of  the  Line  of  the  Oder — Pur- 
suit of  the  Wrecks  of  the  Prussian  Army  by  Murat's  Cavalry,  and  by  the  Infantry  of  Marshals  Lannes.  Soult. 
and  Bernadotte — Capitulation  of  Prenzlau  and  Liibeck — Surrender  of  the  Fortresses  of  Magdeburg,  Stettin,  and 
Ciistrin— Napoleon  Master  in  a  Month  of  therwhole  Prussian  Monarchy. 


IT  was  the  height  of  imprudence  on  the  part 
cf  Prussia  to  enter  into  a  contest  with  Napo- 
/eon,  at  a  moment  when  the  French  army,  re- 
turning from  Austerlitz,  was  still  in  the  heart 
of  Germany,  and  more  capable  of  acting  than 
any  army  ever  was.  It  was  above  all  an  ex- 
treme inconsistency  in  her  to  rush  into  a  war, 
single-handed,  after  she  had  not  dared  venture 
upon  it  in  the  preceding  year,  when  she  would 
have  had  Austria,  Russia,  England,  Sweden, 
and  Naples  for  allies.  Now,  on  the  contrary, 
Austria,  exhausted  by  her  late  efforts,  irritated 
by  the  indifference  manifested  towards  her, 
was  resolved  to  remain  in  her  turn  a  quiet 
spectator  of  the  disasters  of  another.  Russia 
was  again  placed  at  her  natural  distance  by 
the  retreat  of  her  troops  upon  the  Vistula. 
England,  exasperated  at  the  occupation  of 
Hanover,  had  declared  war  against  Prussia. 
Sweden  had  followed  her  example.  Naples 
no  longer  existed.  It  is  true  that  every  friend 
of  France,  on  becoming  her  enemy,  might 
reckon  with  certainty  on  a  speedy  reconciliation 
with  England,  and  with  the  auxiliaries  whom 
she  had  in  her  pay.  But  it  would  have  been 
necessary  to  enter  into  explanations  with  the 
British  cabinet,  and  to  set  out  with  the  imme- 
diate restitution  of  Hanover,  which  would 
never  have  taken  place,  at  least  without  com- 
pensation, from  the  very  worst  terms  on 
which  Prussia  could  be  with  France.  Russia, 
though  awakened  from  her  first  dreams  of 
glory,  was  nevertheless  disposed  to  try  once 
more  the  fortune  of  arms  in  company  with 
the  Prussian  troops,  the  only  troops  in  Europe 
in  which  she  had  any  confidence.  But  several 
months  must  elapse  before  her  armies  could 
get  into  line,  and,  besides,  she  had  no  inclina- 
tion whatever  to  push  them  on  so  far  as  in 

1805.  Prussia,  therefore,   was  liable  to  find 
herself  for  some  time  opposed  unaided  to  Na- 
poleon.    She  went  to  meet  him   in  October, 

1806,  in  the  heart  of  Saxony,  as  Austria  had 
met  him  in  1805  in  the  heart  of  Bavaria,  but 
with  this  most  disadvantageous  difference  for 
her,  that  he  had  not  now  to  overcome  the  ob- 
stacle  of  distance,  for,  instead  of  being  en- 
camped on  the  shores  of  the  ocean,  he  was  in 
the  very  centre  of  Germany,  within  two  or 
three  marches  only  of  the  Prussian  frontier. 

Nothing  short  of  the  most  fatal  infatuation 
could  account  for  the  conduct  of  Prussia;  but 


such  is  party  spirit,  such  are  its  incurable  illu- 
sions, that  in  all  quarters  this  war  was  con- 
sidered as  likely  to  offer  unforeseen  chances, 
and  to  open  new  prospects  to  vanquished  Eu- 
rope. Napoleon,  it  was  alleged,  had  triumphed 
over  the  weakness  of  the  Austrians  and  the 
ignorance  of  the  Russians,  but  this  time  he 
would  have  to  encounter  disciples  of  the  great 
Frederick,  the  sole  heirs  of  genuine  military 
traditions,  and  perhaps  instead  of  Austerlit? 
he  might  find  a  Rosbach.  By  dint  of  repeat- 
ing such  language,  people  had  wellnigh  con- 
vinced themselves  that  it  would  be  verified; 
and  the  Prussians,  who  ought  to  have  trem- 
bled at  the  idea  of  a  rencounter  with  the 
French,  had  conceived  the  most  extravagant 
confidence  in  their  own  strength.  Discreet 
minds,  nevertheless,  knew  what  was  to  be 
thought  of  these  silly  hopes;  and  a  mixture 
of  surprise  and  satisfaction  was  felt  at  Vienna 
on  seeing  those  vaunted  Prussians  put  to  the 
test  in  their  turn,  and  opposed  to  that  captain, 
who  owed  his  glory,  so  it  was  asserted,  solely  to 
the  degeneracy  of  the  Austrian  army.  A  momen- 
tary joy,  therefore,  pervaded  the  enemies  of 
France,  who  believed  that  the  term  of  her  great- 
ness had  arrived.  Unfortunately,  that  term  was 
destined  to  arrive,  but  not  so  soon,  not  till  after 
faults,  none  of  which  had  then  been  committed. 
Napoleon,  on  his  part,  felt  not  the  least  con- 
cern about  the  approaching  war.  ,He  was  un- 
acquainted with  the  Prussians,  for  he  had 
never  yet  met  them  on  the  field  of  battle.  But 
he  said  to  himself,  that  those  Prussians  to 
whom  all  sorts  of  merit  were  attributed  since 
they  had  become  his  adversaries,  had  gained 
fewer  advantages  over  the  raw  French  troops 
of  1792  than  the  Austrians;  and  that,  if  they 
could  not  beat  volunteers  raised  in  haste,  still 
less  would  they  beat  an  accomplished  army, 
of  which  he  was  the  general.  Accordingly, 
he  wrote  to  his  brothers  at  Naples  and  in  Hol- 
land, assuring  them  that  they  need  not  give 
themselves  any  uneasiness,  that  the  present 
struggle  would  be  terminated  more  speedily 
than  the  preceding;  that  Prussia  and  her 
allies,  be  they  who  they  might,  would  be 
crushed,  but  that  this  time  he  would  settle 
finally  with  Europe,  and  put  it  out,  of  the  power 
of  his  enemies  to  stir  for  ten  years.  Such  are  the 
very  expressions  which  he  used  in  his  letters 
to  the  kings  of  Holland  and  Naples. 


Sept  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


157 


A  leader  not  less  prudent  than  bold,  he  took 
as  great  pains  to-succeed  as  if  he  had  been 
about  to  fight  soldiers  and  generals  equal  or 


growing  extent  of  his  empire.  He  had  to  at- 
tend to  Italy,  from  the  Strait  of  Messina  to  the 
Izonzo,  and  even  beyond  it,  since  Dalmatia 


superior  to  his  own.  Though  he  could  not ;  belonged  to  him.  He  had  to  attend  to  Holland, 
give  the  Prussians  credit  for  all  that  rumour  j  turned  from  an  allied  state  into  a  family  king- 
aflected  to  publish  concerning  them,  s^jll  he  i  dom.  He  was  obliged  to  provide  for  the  guard 
followed  that  wise  precept  of  prudence  which  of  these  numerous  countries,  and  for  their  go- 


enjoins  us  to  estimate  at  his  full  value  the 
enemy  whom  we  know,  and  the  enemy  whom 
we  do  not  know,  still  more  highly  than  he  de- 
serves. With  this  consideration  was  coupled 


vernment  to   boot,   since   his   brothers   were 
seated  upon  their  thrones. 

It  is  not  to  be  denied  that,  by  placing  the 
crown  of  the  Two  Sicilies  in  his  family,  Na- 


another  for  stimulating  his  active  forecast:  he  j  poleon  had  added  as  much  to  his  difficulties  as 


was  resolved  to  push  to  extremity  the  conflict 
•with  the  continent,  and,  despairing  of  his 
maritime  means,  he  determined  to  conquer 
England  in  her  allies,  by  following  them  up 
till  he  had  forced  them  to  drop  their  arms. 
Without  being  decided  respecting  the  extent 
and  the  duration  of  this  new  war,  he  pre- 
sumed that  he  should  have  to  advance  very  far 
northward,  and  perhaps  be  obliged  to  seek 
Russia  in  her  own  territory.  Astonished  at 
the  last  proceedings  of  Prussia,  unable  to 
guess,  at  the  distance  of  Paris  from  Berlin, 


to  his  power.  On  closely  considering  the  anxi- 
eties and  the  expenses  in  men  and  money 
which  his  brother  Joseph's  new  establishment 
at  Naples  cost  him,  one  is  led  to  believe  that, 
instead  of  driving  the  Bourbons  from  the 
south  of  Italy,  he  had  better  have  left  them 
there  submissive,  trembling,  punished  for  their 
last  treachery  by  heavy  war  contributions,  by 
reductions  of  territory,  and  by  the  hard  obli- 
gation to  exclude  the  English  from  the  ports 
of  Calabria  and  Sicily.  It  is  true  that  ho 
would  not  then  have  completed  the  regenera- 


the  various  and  complicated  causes  which  in-  tion  of  Italy;  he  would  not  have  entirely 
duced  her  to  act,  he  imagined  that,  in  Septeni-  j  wrested  that  noble  and  beautiful  country  from 
ber,  1806,  as  in  September,  1805,  a  great  coa-  ,  the  barbarous  system  under  which  it  lived  op- 
lition,  secretly  formed,  was  about  to  burst  |  pressed ;  he  would  not  have  wholly  associated 
forth;  thai  the  unaccustomed  boldness  of  i  it  with  the  social  and  political  system  of 
King  Frederick  William  was  but  the  first  (  France  ;  it  is  true  that  he  would  still  have  had 
symptom  of  it ;  and  he  expected  to  see  all  I  in  the  courts  of  Naples  and  Rome  two  secret 
Europe  rush  upon  him,  Austria  included,  not-  |  enemies,  ready  to  call  in  the  English  and  the 


withstanding  the  pacific  protestations  of  this 
latter.  The  very  natural  mistrust  excited  in 
him  by  the  aggression  of  the  preceding  year 
was,  nevertheless,  unfounded.  A  new  coali- 
tion was  certainly  destined  to  result  from  the 
resolution  just  taken  by  Prussia,  but  it  would 
be  the  effect  instead  of  being  the  cause  of  it. 
For  the  rest,  everybody  in  Europe  was  as 
much  surprised  as  Napoleon  at  what  was 
passing  in  Berlin,  for  in  cabinets  people  are 
determined  to  see  calculations  only,  never 
passions.  They  are  not  free  from  them,  how- 
ever, and  those  sudden  irritations  which,  in 


Russians.  But  these  reasons,  which  were  cer- 
tainly powerful,  and  which  justified  Napoleon 
for  having  undertaken  the  conquest  of  the 
Italian  peninsula  from  the  Izonzo  to  Tarento, 
then  became  decisive  reasons,  not  for  limiting 
his  enterprises  in  the  south  of  Europe,  but  for 
limiting  them  in  the  north :  for  Dalmatia  re- 
quired 20,000  men,  Lombardy,  50,000,  Naples, 
50,000,  that  is  to  say,  120,000  for  Italy  alone; 
and  if  there  should  be  still  wanted  two  or 
three  hundred  thousand  more  from  the  Danube 
to  the  Elbe,  it  was  to  be  feared  that  such 
charges  could  not  long  continue  to  be  defrayed, 


private  life,  sometimes  seize  two  men  and  put  (  and  that  he  would  fail  in  the  north  because  he 


weapons  into  their  hands,  are  quite  as  often, 
more  often  than  a  maturely  weighed  interest, 
the  cause  that  urges  two  nations  to  attack 
each  other.  The  moral  soreness  of  Prussia 
arose  from  her  faults,  and  the  treatment  which 
those  faults  had  drawn  upon  her  on  the  part 


had  extended  himself  too  far  in  the  south,  or 
in  the  south  by  attempting  too  much  in  the 
north.  We  will  repeat  on  this  occasion  what 
we  have  said  elsewhere,  that,  if  he  limited  him- 
self in  any  quarter,  it  was  better  to  limit  him- 
self in  the  north,  for  the  Bonaparte  family, 


of  Napoleon  was,  far  more  than  any  meditated    striving  to  extend  itself  in  Italy  or  in  Spain,  as 
treachery,  the  real  cause  of  her  sudden,  unin-  I  the  ancient  house  of  Bourbon  had  done,  was 


telligible  exasperation,  which   nobody   knew 
how  to  account  for. 

Impressed,  therefore,  with  the  idea  of  a  new 
coalition,  and  determined  this  time  to  pursue 
it  into  the  recesses  of  the  frozen  regions  of 
the  north,  Napoleon  proportioned  his  prepa- 
rations to  the  circumstances  which  he  fore- 


acting  in  the  genuine  spirit  of  French  policy 
much  more  than  in  labouring  to  create  for  iV 
self  establishments  in  Germany. 

Joseph,  favourably  received  by  the  enlight- 
ened and  wealthy  population  which  Queen 
Caroline  had  ill-treated,  applauded  even  for  a 
moment  by  the  people  as  a  novelty,  especially 


saw.  He  provided  not  only  for  the  means  of  I  in  the  Calabrias,  through  which  he  had  made 
attack  upon  his  adversaries — means  which  j  a  progress — Joseph  was  nevertheless  sooii 
were  to  be  found  ready  prepared  in  the  great  aware  of  the  immense  difficulty  of  his  task 


army  collected  in  the  heart  of  Germany — but 
also  for  the  means  of  defence  for  the  vast 
countries  which  he  would  have  to  leave  be- 
hind him  while  he  was  proceeding  to  the  Elbe, 
the  Oder,  perhaps  to  the  Vistula  and  the  Nie- 
men.  As  his  dominion  increased,  he  was 
obliged  to  proportion  his  solicitude  to  the 


Having  neither  stores  in  the  magazines  and 
the  arsenals,  nor  funds  in  the  public  coffers, 
for  the  late  government  had  not  left  a  ducat, 
obliged  to  create  all  that  was  wanting,  and 
fearful  of  loading  with  imposts  a  people  whose 
attachment  he  coveted,  Joseph  was  involved 
in  cruel  embarrassments.  To  ask  a  country 


158 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept.  1806. 


for  its  money,  when  he  had  also  to  solicit  its  ! 
love,  was  perhaps  the  way  to  cause  both  to  be 
refused.  It  was  necessary,  however,  to  pro- 
vide for  the  wants  of  the  French  army,  which 
Napoleon  was  not  accustomed  to  pay  when  it 
was  employed  out  of  France,  and  Joseph  drew 
bills  upon  the  imperial  treasury,  which  he  be- 
sought his  brother  to  honour.  He  was  inces- 
santly soliciting  subsidies  and  troops,  and  Na- 
poleon replied  that  he  had  all  Europe,  secretly 
or  publicly  leagued,  upon  his  hands ;  that  he 
could  not  pay  the  army  of  the  allied  kingdoms 
besides  the  army  of  the  Empire ;  that  it  was 
quite  enough  to  lend  soldiers  to  his  brothers, 
and  that  he  could  not  lend  them  his  finances 
too.  However,  the  events  which  took  place 
in  the  kingdom  of  Naples  had  obliged  Napo- 
leon to  supply  him  with  all  that  he  solicited. 

Gaeta,  the  fortress  of  the  Neapolitan  conti- 
nent, was  the  only  town  in  the  kingdom  that 
had  not  surrendered  to  the  French  army. 
That  fortress,  erected  at  the  extremity  of  a 
promontory  washed  on  three  sides  by  the  sea, 
connected  on  the  fourth  only  with  the  land, 
and  commanding  on  that  side  the  neighbour- 
ing district,  defended,  moreover,  by  regular 
works,  with  three  tier  of  cannon,  was  very 
difficult  to  besiege.  It  kept  before  its  walls 
one  part  of  the  French  army  at  work  upon 
ways  (chemirwments')  which  they  were  fre- 
quently obliged  to  cut  in  the  rock;  while  an- 
other portion  of  that  army  guarded  Naples, 
and  the  rest,  dispersed  in  the  Calabrias,  to 
prevent  revolt  ready  to  break  out,  consisted 
entirely  of  scattered  forces.  The  end  of  the 
summer,  so  fatal  in  Italy  to  foreigners,  had 
decimated  the  French  troops,  so  that  6000 
men  could  not  have  been  collected  at  any  one 
point. 

Napoleon,  whose  correspondence  with  his 
brothers  who  had  become  kings  would  de- 
serve to  be  studied  as  a  series  of  profound 
lessons  in  the  art  of  reigning,  sometimes 
scolded  Joseph  with  a  severity  springing  from 
his  reason,  not  at  all  from  his  heart.  He  re- 
proached him  with  being  weak,  inactive,  ad- 
dicted to  all  the  illusions  of  a  good-natured 
and  vain  disposition.  Joseph  durst  not  levy 
imposts,  and  yet  he  was  desirous  to  raise  a 
.Neapolitan  army;  he  pretended  to  form  a 
body-guard  ;  he  kept  about  him  for  his  per- 
sonal safety  a  great  part  of  the  troops  placed 
at  his  disposal ;  he  misconducted  the  siege  of 
Gaeta ;  and  lastly,  he  made  no  preparations 
for  the  expedition  to  Sicily. 

"  What  you  owe  to  your  people,"  wrote  Na- 
poleon to  him,  "is  order  in  the  finances;  but 
you  cannot  spare  them  the  charges  of  the  war, 
for  there  must  be  taxes  in  order  to  pay  the 
public  force.  Naples  ought  to  furnish  a  hun- 
dred millions,  like  the  vice-royalty  of  Italy, 
and  thirty  of  these  hundred  millions  are  suffi- 
cient to  pay  40,000  men."  (Letter  of  the  6th 
of  March,  1806.)  "Hope  not  to  render  your- 
self beloved  through  weakness,  especially  by 
Neapolitans.  They  tell  you  that  Queen  Caro- 
line is  o>Lous,  and  that  your  good  nature  is 
already  making  you  popular — a  chimera  of 
your  flatterers  !  If  I  were  to  lose  a  battle  to- 
morrow on  the  Izonzo,  you  "vould  soon  learn 
»vhat  was  to  be  thought  of  your  popularity, 


and  of  the  pretended  unpopularity  of  Queen 
Caroline.  Those  men  are  mean,  cringing, 
submissive  to  force  alone.  Suppose  a  reverse, 
(which  is  always  liable  to  befall  me,)  and  you 
would  see  that  people  rise  all  together  and 
shout,.'  Death  to  the  French  !  death  to  Joseph ! 
Caroline  for  ever  !'  You  would  come  to  my 
camp."  (Letter  of  the  9th  of  August,  1806.) 
"  An  exiled  and  vagabond  king  is  a  silly  personage 
You  must  govern  with  justice  and  severity 
suppress  the  abuses  of  the  old  system;  esta- 
blish order  everywhere  ;  prevent  the  dilapida- 
tions of  Frenchmen  as  well  as  of  Neapolitans . 
create  finances,  and  pay  my  army,  by  which 
you  exist."  (Letter  of  the  22d  of  April,  1806.) 
"As  for  a  royal  guard,  it  is  a  luxury,  worthy 
at  most  of  the  vast  empire  which  I  govern, 
and  which  would  appear  too  expensive  even 
to  me,  if  it  were  not  my  duty  to  make  sacri- 
fices to  the  majesty  of  that  empire,  and  to  the 
interests  of  my  old  soldiers,  who  find. a  means 
of  comfortable  subsistence  in  the  institution 
of  a  body  of  elite.  As  for  raising  a  Neapolitan 
army,  don't  think  of  it.  It  would  desert  you 
at  the  first  danger,  and  betray  you  for  another 
master.  Form,  if  you  will,  three  or  four  regi- 
ments, and  send  them  to  me.  I  will  enable 
them  to  acquire  what  is  to  be  acquired  only  in 
war — discipline,  bravery,  the  sentiment  of  ho- 
nour, fidelity — and  I  will  send  them  back  to 
you  worthy  to  form  the  nucleus  of  the  Neapo- 
litan army.  Meanwhile,  take  Swiss,  for  I 
could  not  long  leave  you  fifty  thousand  French, 
even  if  you  were  able  to  pay  them.  The  Swiss 
are  the  only  foreign  soldiers  who  are  brave 
and  faithful."  (Letter  of  the  9th  of  August.) 
"  Have  in  the  Calabrias  some  movable  co- 
lumns composed  of  Corsicans.  They  are  ex- 
cellent for  that  kind  of  warfare,  and  will  carry 
it  on  with  zeal  for  our  family."  (Letter  of 
22d  of  April,  180fi.)  "Do  not  disperse  your 
forces.  You  have  fifty  thousand  men — a  great 
many  more  than  are  needed,  if  you  know  how 
to  make  use  of  them.  With  twenty-five  thou- 
sand only,  I  would  guard  every  part  of  your 
kingdom,  and  on  the  day  of  battle  be  stronger 
than  the  enemy  in  the  field.  The  first  care  of 
a  general  ought  to  be,  so  to  distribute  his 
forces  as  to  be  ready  everywhere.  But,"  add- 
ed Napoleon,  "  therein  lies  the  real  secret  of 
the  art  which  nobody  possesses — nobody — not 
even  Massena,  great  as  he  nevertheless  is  in 
dangers." 

Napoleon  would  have  had  the  guard  of  Na- 
ples confined  to  two  regiments  of  cavalry  and 
a  few  batteries  of  light  artillery;  he  would 
then  have  had  the  rest  of  the  army  posted  en 
echelons  from  Naples  to  the  extremity  of  the  Ca- 
labrias, with  a  strong  detachment  placed  facing 
Sicily,  from  which  side  an  English  army  was 
liable  to  come,  so  that  it  might  at  any  time  be 
possible  to  collect  in  three  marches  a  consi- 
derable body  of  troops  either  at  Naples,  or  in 
the  Calabrias,  or  at  the  presumed  point  of 
landing.  He  wished,  above  all,  that  haste 
should  be  made  to  reduce  Gaeta,  the  siege  of 
which  absorbed  part  of  the  disposable  forces  ; 
that,  on  terminating  this  siege,  attention  should 
be  paid  to  the  creation  of  a  large  fortress, 
which  might  serve  for  a  support  to  the  new 
royalty,  which  should  be  situated  in  the  verj 


Sept.  1806] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


159 


heart  of  the  kingdom,  into  which  a  king  of  Na- ' 
pies  might  throw  himself  with  his  treasure,  his 
archives,  the  Neapolitans  who  adhered  to  his  | 
cause,  and  the  wrecks  of  his  armies,  and  ' 
where  he  might  for  six  months  resist  a  besieg- 
ing force  of  sixty  thousand  Anglo-Russians. 
(Letter  of  2d  September,  1 806.)  Napoleon  was 
of  opinion  that  the  position  of  Naples  was  not 
adapted  to  such  a  destination ;  besides,  accord- 
ing to  him,  a  foreigner  king  could  not,  without 
some  danger,  place  himself  amidst  a  numerous 
and  necessarily  inimical  population.  He  de- 
sired that  this  fortress  should  have  action  upon 
the  capital,  upon  the  sea,  and  upon  the  interior 
of  the  kingdom.  On  due  examination,  after 
discussing  various  points,  particularly  Naples 
and  Capua,  he  had  preferred  Castellamare,  on 
account  of  its  proximity  to  Naples,  its  mari- 
time site,  and  its  central  position.  Having 
made  this  choice  upon  the  map,  he  had  given 
directions  for  surveys  of  the  ground,  in  order 
to  decide  upon  the  nature  of  the  works.  Five  j 
or  six  millions  a  year  ought  to  be  devoted  for 
ten  years  to  this  great  creation,  in  such  a  man- 
ner that,  with  each  expenditure  of  six  millions, 
a  degree  of  strength  should  be  gained ;  and 
that,  so  early  as  the  second  or  third  year,  you 
might  be  able  to  shut  yourself  up  in  this  vast 
fortress ;  for  neither  you  nor  I  know  what  is  to 
befall  us  in  two,  three,  or  four  years.  Centuries 
are  not  for  us.  And  if  you  are  energetic,  you 
may  hold  out  in  such  an  asylum  long  enough 
to  defy  the  rigours  of  Fortune,  and  to  await 
the  return  of  her  favour. 

Lastly,  Napoleon  was  desirous  that  means 
should  gradually  be  prepared  for  crossing  the 
Strait  of  Messina  with  10,000  men,  a  force 
sufficient,  in  his  opinion,  to  conquer  Sicily, 
and  moreover  easily  transportable  in  the  feluc- 
cas with  which  the  sea  of  Italy  abound.  In 
consequenc  he  had  recommended  defensive 
works  to  be  immenced  immediately  either  at 
Scylla  or  at  Messina,  in  order  to  collect  there 
in  safety  the  little  naval  force  which  would  be 
needed.  But  above  all  he  urged  the  siege  of 
Gaeta,  the  reduction  of  which  would  render 
half  the  army  disposable;  he  besought  his 
brother  to  make  a  different  distribution  of  his 
forces,  for,  he  incessantly  repeated  to  him,  you 
will  have  before  long  a  landing  and  an  insur- 
rection, and  you  will  no  more  be  able  to  repel 
the  one  than  to  suppress  the  other. 

Joseph  comprehended  these  wise  counsels, 
complained  sometimes  of  the  language  in 
which  they  were  conveyed,  and  followed  them 
according  to  the  measure  of  his  talents.  Sur- 
rounded by  some  Frenchmen,  his  personal 
friends,  by  M.  Rcederer,  who  was  actively  en- 
gaged in  administrative  and  financial  reforms, 
by  General  Mathieu  Dumas,  who  applied  him- 
self with  intelligence  to  the  organization  of  the 
public  force,  he  did  his  best  to  create  a  govern- 
ment and  to  regenerate  the  fine  country  com- 
mitted to  his  care.  Salicetti,  the  Corsican,  a 
man  of  ability  and  courage,  directed  his  police 
with  the  vigour  which  circumstances  demand- 
ed. But  while  Joseph  was  striving  to  perform 
tus  royal  task,  the  English,  verifying  the  anti- 
cipations of  Napoleon,  took  advantage  of  the 
length  of  the  siege  of  Gaeta,  which  divided  the 
army,  and  of  the  fever  which  decimated  it,  to 


land  in  the  Gulf  of  St.  Euphemia,  and  appeared 
there  to  the  number  of  8000  men,  under  Gen- 
eral Stuart.  General  Reynier,  posted  at  Co- 
senza,  could  scarcely  collect  4000  French,  and 
boldly  proceeded  to  the  point  of  disembarka- 
tion. That  officer,  skilful  and  brave,  but  un 
lucky,  whom  Napoleon  had  consented  to 
employ  in  Naples,  notwithstanding  the  re- 
membrance of  the  faults  committed  in  Egypt. 
was  not  more  favoured  by  fortune  on  this  oc- 
.casion  than  he  had  been  formerly  in  the  plains 
of  Alexandria.  Attacking  General  Stuart 
amidst  a  marshy  ground,  where  it  was  impos- 
sible for  him  to  make  his  4000  men  act  with 
a  unity  which  might  have  compensated  for 
their  numerical  inferiority,  he  was  repulsed 
and  forced  to  retire  into  the  interior  of  the  Ca- 
labrias.  This  miscarriage,  though  it  ought 
not  to  be  considered  as  a  lost  battle,  was 
nevertheless  attended  with  the  consequences 
of  one,  and  excited  a  rising  of  the  Calabrese 
in  the  rear  of  the  French.  General  Reynier 
had  to  fight  obstinate  battles  in  order  to  re- 
unite his  scattered  detachments;  he  beheld 
his  sick  and  his  wounded  basely  murdered 
without  being  able  to  afford  them  assistance ; 
and  he  was  obliged  to  cut  his  way  through  the 
insurgents,  to  burn  villages,  and  to  put  the  in- 
j  habitants  to  the  sword.  For  the  rest  he  con- 
I  ducted  himself  with  energy  and  promptness, 
and  contrived  to  maintain  himself  amidst  a 
frightful  conflagration.  General  Stuart's  con- 
duct on  this  occasion  deserves  to  be  recorded 
with  honour.  The  massacre  of  the  French 
was  so  general  and  so  horrible,  that  he  was 
revolted  at  it.  Striving  to  make  the  love  of 
money  supply  the  place  of  humanity  in  those 
ferocious  mountaineers,  he  promised  ten  du- 
cats for  each  soldier,  and  fifteen  for  each  offi- 
cer, brought  to  him  alive,  and  those  whom  he 
succeeded  in  saving  he  treated  with  the  atten- 
tion due  from  one  civilized  nation  to  another, 
when  they  are  doomed  to  make  war. 

These  events,  which  proved  so  strongly  the 
wisdom  of  Napoleon's  advice,  became  an  ac- 
tive stimulant  to  the  new  Neapolitan  govern- 
ment. Joseph  accelerated  the  siege  of  Gaeta, 
in  order  that  he  might  be  able  to  carry 
back  the  entire  army  to  the  Calabnas.  He 
had  with  him  Massena,  whose  mere  name 
made  the  Neapolitan  populace  tremble.  He 
had  committed  to  him  the  task  of  taking 
Gaeta,  but,  having  delayed  sending  him  till 
the  day  on  which  the  works  of  approach  were 
finished,  it  was  necessary  to  exert  great  vigour. 
Generals  Campredon  and  Vallongue,  of  the 
engineers,  were  charged  with  the  direction  of 
the  operations  of  the  siege.  They  followed  the 
prescriptions  of  Napoleon,  who  desired  that 
the  action  of  the  heavy  artillery  should  be  re- 
served till  the  besiegers  should  have  approached 
quite  close  to  the  body  of  the  place.  Oblige*1, 
to  open  the  trenches  in  ground  where  stone 
was  frequently  met  with,  they  proceeded 
slowly,  and  endured  the  fire  of  an  enormous 
quantity  of  cannon  and  mortars  without  re- 
turning it.  The  besiegers  received  120,000 
balls  and  21,000  bombs  before  they  once  re- 
plied to  this  mass  of  projectiles.  Having  at 
length  approached  within  a  proper  distance 
|  for  establishing  breaching  batteries,  they  com 


160 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Sept.  1806. 


menced  a  destructive  fire.  The  solid  walls  of 
Gaeta,  founded  on  the  rock,  after  having  at 
first  resisted,  at  length  fell  all  at  once,  and  pre- 
sented two  wide  and  practicable  breaches. 
The  soldiers  earnestly  called  for  the  assault  as 
the  reward  of  their  long  exertions,  and  Mas- 
sena,  having  formed  two  columns  of  attack, 
was  about  to  grant  it  to  them,  when  the  be- 
sieged offered  to  capitulate.  The  place  was 
delivered  upon  the  eighteenth  of  July,  with  all 
the  materiel  thai  it  contained.  The  garrison 
embarked  for  Sicily,  after  engaging  not  to 
serve  any  more  against  King  Joseph.  This 
siege  had  cost  the  besiegers  1,000  men,  and 
the  besieged  as  many.  General  Vallongue,  of 
the  engineers,  one  of  the  most  distinguished 
officers  of  his  arm,  lost  his  life  there;  and  the 
prince  of  Hesse-Philippsthal,  governor  of  the 
place,  was  severely  wounded. 

Massena  set  out  immediately  with  the  troops 
which  the  reduction  of  Gatta  rendered  dis- 
posable, passed  through  Naples  on  the  first  of 
August,  and  hastened  to  the  assistance  of 
General  Reynier,  who  maintained  his  ground 
at  Cosenza,  amidst  the  insurgent  Calabrese. 
The  reinforcement  brought  by  Massena  in- 
creased our  principal  corps  to  13  or  14  thou- 
sand men.  It  was  more  than  were  required, 
without  reckoning  the  presence  of  Massena, 
to  throw  the  English  into  the  sea.  Of  this  they 
were  so  well  aware,  that,  on  the  mere  news  of 
the  approach  of  the  illustrious  marshal,  they 
embarked  on  the  5th  of  September.  Massena 
had  then  none  but  the  insurgents  to  fight.  He 
found  them  more  numerous,  more  implacable, 
than  he  had  at  first  expected.  He  was  reduced 
to  the  necessity  of  burning  several  villages  and 
putting  to  the  sword  the  troops  of  banditti 
which  slaughtered  the  French.  He  displayed 
on  this  occasion  his  accustomed  vigour,  and 
succeeded  in  a  few  weeks  in  reducing  very 
considerably  the  flames  of  insurrection.  At 
the  moment  when  the  great  events  which  we 
are  about  to  relate,  commenced  in  Prussia, 
tranquillity  began  to  be  restored  in  the  south 
of  Italy,  and  King  Joseph  might  consider  him- 
self established,  for  some  time  at  least,  in  his 
new  kingdom. 

At  the  same  period,  important  events  were 
passing  in  Dalmatia;  the  Russians  still  re- 
.ained  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro.  Napoleon, 
Jaking  pattern  from  their  conduct  on  this  point, 
and  in  particular  from  the  manner  in  which 
they  had  occupied  Corfu,  and  usurped  the 
sovereignty  of  it,  had  resolved  to  seize  the 
'ittle  republic  of  Ragusa,  which  separated  Cal- 
taro  from  the  rest  of  Dalmatia.  He  had  sent 
thither  his  aide-de-camp  Lauriston,  with  a 
brigade  of  infantry,  for  the  purpose  of  esta- 
blishing himself  there.  Lauriston  was  pre- 
sently surrounded  by  the  insurgent  Montene- 
grins and  by  a  Russian  corps  of  some  thousand 
men.  Blockaded  by  the  English  on  the  sea 
side,  besieged  by  ferocious  mountaineers  and 
a  regular  Russian  force  on  the  land  side,  he 
found  himself  in  real  danger,  which,  however, 
he  faced  with  courage.  Fortunately,  General 
Molitor,  an  equally  faithful  companion  in  arms, 
and  firm  and  skilful  officer  in  presence  of  the 
enemj,  Hew  to  his  relief.  That  general,  not 
following  the  example  too  frequent  in  the  army 


of  the  Rhine,  of  leaving  in  the  lurch  a  neigh- 
bour whom  one  dislikes,  proceeded  sponta- 
neously by  forced  marches  to  Ragusa,  with  a 
corps  of  4000  men,  resolutely  attacked  the  camp 
of  the  Russians  and  the  Montenegrins,  carried 
it  though  -  strongly  intrenched,  and  thus  extri- 
cated the  French  who  were  in  the  place.  He 
put  to  the  sword  a  great  number  of  Montene- 
grins, and  deterred  them  for  a  long  time  from 
their  incursions  into  Dalmatia. 

It  was  not  without  difficulty,  as  we  see,  that 
the  French  sway  was  established  over  these 
distant  countries.  It  had  required  great  bat- 
tles to  obtain  them  from  Europe;  it  required 
daily  fights  to  gain  them  from  the  inhabitants. 
At  the  other  extremfty  of  the  empire,  the  foun- 
dation of  a  second  family  kingdom,  thai  of  Hol- 
land, was  attended  with  difficulties  of  a  different 
kind,  but  quite  as  serious.  The  grave  and 
peaceful  Hollanders  were  not  the  people  to 
raise  an  insurrection  like  the  mountaineers  of 
the  Calabrias  and  of  Illyria;  but  they  opposed 
their  inertness  lo  King  Louis,  and  gave  him 
not  less  embarrassment  than  did  the  Calabrese 
to  Joseph.  The  government  of  the  Stadtholder 
had  left  Holland  many  debts.  The  govern- 
ments which  had  since  followed,  had,  in  turn, 
contracted  others  to  a  very  considerable 
amount,  to  defray  the  expenses  of  the  war,  so 
that  King  Louis,  on  his  arrival  in  Holland,  had 
found  a  budget  composed  of  an  expenditure  of 
78  million  florins  and  a  revenue  of  35.  In  this 
expenditure  of  78  millions,  the  charge  for  the 
interest  of  the  debt  amounted  alone  to  35  mil- 
lions of  florins.  The  surplus  was  allotted  to 
the  service  of  the  army,  the  navy,  and  the 
dikes.  Notwithstanding  this  situation,  the 
Dutch  would  not  hear  either  of  new  taxes  or 
of  any  reduction  whatever  of  the  interest  of  the 
debt;  for  these  lenders  by  profession,  accus- 
tomed to  lend  their  capitals  to  all  governments, 
national  and  foreign,  considered  the  debt  as  the 
most  sacred  of  properties.  The  idea  of  a  con- 
tribution on  the  rentes,  to  which  the  govern- 
ment had  been  led,  because  the  rentes  in  Holland 
were  the  most  widely  diffused  and  important 
of  assets,  and  consequently  formed  the  largest 
basis  for  impost — this  idea  shocked  them.  It 
was  found  necessary  to  give  it  up.  Here,  then, 
the  new  government  was  threatened  not  with 
an  insurrection  as  in  Naples,  but  with  an  in- 
terruption of  all  the  services.  For  the  rest,  the 
Dutch  were  not  inimical  to  the  new  royally, 
from  hatred  to  monarchy,  or  in  consequence 
of  their  attachment  to  the  house  of  Orange ; 
but  they  ardently  longed  for  a  maritime  peace 
and  regretted  that  peace,  the  source  of  all  their 
wealth,  much  more  than  the  republic  or  the 
Stadtholdership.  Linked  to  the  English  by 
strong  bonds  of  interest,  and  not  less  strong 
conformities  of  manners,  they  would  have  been 
attracted  towards  England  had  she  not  noto- 
riously coveted -their  colonies.  To  no  purpose 
they  were  told  that,  but  for  the  difficulty  arising 
from  these  colonies,  peace  would  be  easier  by 
half;  that  their  participation  in  the  expenses 
of  the  war  was  the  just  price  of  the  efforts 
made  by  France  in  all  the  negotiations  to  re- 
cover their  maritime  possessions ;  and  that 
one  would  be  justified  in  abandoning  them  if 
they  would  not  contribute  to  keep  up  the  con- 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


Sept  1806.] 


'est — to  no  purpose  was  all  this  said  to  them ; 
•hey  replied  that  they  were  ready  to  renounce 
their  colonies,  in  order  to  obtain  peace.  They 
spoke  thus,  though  ready  to  raise  just  clamours, 
if  France  had  treated  on  such  a  basis.  From 
the  riches  of  Java  at  this  day,  one  may  judge 
whether  it  was  an  inconsiderable  interest  that 
France  defended  in  defending  their  colonies. 
King  Louis  decided  to  pursue  the  course  that 
seemed  to  him  to  be  the  easiest,  that  is,  to  fall 
in  with  the  views  of  the  Dutch,  and  to  attach 
them  lo  him  by  acceding  to  their  desires.  Most 
assuredly,  when  a  person  accepts  the  govern- 
ment of  a  country,  he  ought  to  espouse  its 
interests ;  but  a  distinction  must  be  made 
between  its  permanent  and  its  temporary  in- 
terests ;  he  must  serve  the  one,  place  himself 
above  the  other;  and  if  he  has  become  king 
of  a  foreign  nation,  through  the  army  of  his 
country,  he  must  renounce  a  part  which  would 
oblige  him  to  betray  the  one  or  the  other. 
King  Louis  was  not  reduced  to  this  hard  ne- 
cessity, for  the  true  policy  of  the  Dutch  ought 
to  have  consisted  in  uniting  themselves  firmly 
with  France,  in  order  to  combat  the  maritime 
supremacy  of  England.  On  the  triumph  of 
that  supremacy,  they  could  not  fail  to  lose  the 
freedom  of  the  seas  on  which  their  lives  were 
passed,  and  their  colonies,  without  which  they 
could  not  subsist.  Striving  rather  to  please 
than  to  serve  them,  King  Louis  accepted  a  sys- 
tem of  finance  conformable  to  their  views  at 
the  moment.  To  the  revenue  of  35  millions 
of  florins  were  added  new  contributions  of 
about  15  millions,  which  made  the  total  amount 
of  the  revenue  50  millions  of  florins,  and,  to 
reduce  the  expenditure  of  78  millions  to  50,  a 
proportionable  reduction  was  made  in  the 
army  and  navy.  The  king  of  Holland  wrote 
to  Paris  that  he  would  abdicate  royalty  if  these 
reductions  were  not  agreed  to.  Napoleon  thus 
had  to  encounter  in  his  own  brothers  the  spirit 
of  resistance  of  the  allied  nations,  which  he 
had  expected  to  attach  more  closely  to  him- 
self by  the  institution  of  family  royalties. 
He  was  deeply  hurt  at  it,  for  under  this  spirit 
of  resistance  lurked  great  ingratitude,  both  on 
the  part  of  the  nations  which  France  had 
emancipated,  and  of  the  kings  whom  she  had 
crowned.  Repressing  his  sentiments,  how- 
ever, he  replied  that  he  assented  to  the  pro- 
posed reductions,  but  that  Holland  ought  not  to 
be  astonished,  if  in  present  or  future  negotia- 
tions, she  were  left  to  her  own  means.  Hol- 
land, he  said,  had  certainly  a  right  to  refuse 
her  resources,  but  France  had  also  a  right  to 
refuse  her  support.  f 

The  closest  secrets  are  soon  penetrated  by 
the  malice  of  enemies.  From  a  certain  alti- 
tude of  King  Louis,  his  resistance  to  Napo- 
leon was  inferred,  and  he  became  extremely 
popular  for  it.  That  monarch,  moreover, 
affected  a  severity  of  manners,  which  coin- 
cided with  the  tastes  of  an  economical  and 
discreet  country,  and  he  became  on  that  ac- 
count still  more  agreeable  to  the  Dutch  peo- 
ple. This  same  king,  while  making  a  show 
of  simplicity,  resolved,  nevertheless,  to  go  to 
the  expense  of  a  coronation  and  of  a  royal 
guard,  hoping  by  these  double  means  to  se- 
cure the  more  firmly  to  himself  the  possession 

VOL.  II.— 21 


1G1 


of  the  throne  of  Holland,  of  which  he  was 
more  tenacious  than  he  chose  to  acknowledge. 
Napoleon  censured  the  institution  of  a  royal 
guard,  for  the  reasons  already  given  to  Jo- 
seph, and  peremptorily  opposed  the  ceremony 
of  a  coronation,  at  a  moment  when  Europe 
was  about  to  be  involved  in  the  flames  of  a 
general  war.  Thus,  from  the  very  first  days, 
the  difficulties  inherent  in  these  family  royal- 
ties, which  Napoleon  had  resolved  to  found 
out  of  affection  or  from  system,  began  to  make 
their  appearance.  Independent  allies,  treated 
according  to  the  services  which  he  might  have 
received  from  them,  would  certainly  have 
proved  much  better  for  his  power  and  for  his 
heart. 

Such  was  the  general  state  of  things  in  the 
vast  extent  of  the  French  Empire  at  the  very 
moment  of  the  rupture  with  Prussia.  Exclu- 
sively of  the  troops  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine  and  of  the  kingdom  of  Italy,  Napoleon 
had  about  500,000  men,  among  whom  must 
be  comprehended  the  Swiss,  serving  in  virtue 
of  capitulations,  besides  some  Valaisans, 
Poles,  and  Germans,  who  had  entered  into 
the  service  of  France.  After  the  usual  de- 
duction of  the  gendarmes,  veterans,  invalids, 
there  remained  active  troops  amounting  to 
450,000  men.  Of  this  number,  130,000  were 
beyond  the  Alps,  including  depots,  170,000  in 
the  grand  army,  cantoned  in  the  Upper  Pala- 
tinate and  Franconia,  5000  left  in  Holland, 
5000  placed  in  garrison  on  board  the  ships, 
and,  lastly,  140,000  dispersed  in  tht  interior. 
These  last  comprehended  the  imperial  guard, 
the  regiments  not  employed  abroad,  and  the 
depots.  Excepting  some  regiments  of  infan- 
try consisting  of  four  battalions,  all  the  others 
had  three,  two  of  which  were  war  battalions 
destined  to  take  the  field,  and  one  a  depot  bat- 
talion,  placed  in  general  on  the  frontier.  The 
depot  battalions  of  the  grand  army  were 
ranged  along  the  Rhine,  from  Huningen  to 
Wesel ;  some  were  at  the  camp  of  Boulogne. 
Those  of  the  army  of  Italy  were  m  Piedmont 
and  Lombardy.  Napoleon  paid  extreme  at- 
tention to  the  organization  of  the  depots.  He 
resolved  to  make  the  conscripts  repair  thither 
a  year  beforehand,  that,  during  this  year,  in- 
structed, trained,  inured  to  fatigue,  they  might 
be  rendered  capable  of  replacing  the  old  sol- 
diers carried  off  by  time  or  war.  The  entire 
conscription  of  1805,  called  out  at  the  end  of 

1805,  and  half  of  that  of  1806,  called  out  at 
the  commencement  of  1806,  had  filled  up  the 
skeletons  with  men  fit  for  service,  and  a  good 
number  of  whom,  already  trained,  had  been 
sent  to  Germany  and  Italy.    Napoleon,  more- 
over, caused  the  second  half  of  the  class  of 

1806,  designated  by  the  name  of  reserve  in 
the  laws  of  that  period,  to  be  called  out.     The 
annual  contingent  then  furnished  60,000  men, 
actually  fit  to  be  embodied;  and  it  is  a  cir- 
cumstance worthy  of  remark,  that  the  govern- 
ment still  refrained  from  enforcing  the  con- 
scription law  in  the  seven  or  eight  departments 
of  Bretagne  and  La  Vendee.     Thirty  thousand 
more   men   would   thus   be   poured   into  the 
skeletons.     But   the   departure   of   the    men 
already   trained   would   produce   a   sufficient 
vacancy  in  them  to  make  room  for  th«  rew 

o  2 


162 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Sept.  1806. 


comers.  Napoleon,  besides,  designed  to  send 
a  great  part  of  these  latter  towards  Italy.  In 
regard  to  the  conscripts  destined  to  pass  the 
Alps,  he  took  particular  precautions.  Even 
before  their  incorporation,  he  despatched 
them  in  large  detachments,  under  the  conduct 
of  officers,  and  cvr'hed  in  military  uniform, 
that  they  might  no*  appear  out  of  the  Empire, 
like  stragglers  travelling  in  the  attire  of  pea- 
sants. 

Having  ptovided  for  the  increase  of  the 
army,  Napoleon  distributed  the  whole  of  his 
resources  with  consummate  skill. 

Austria  protested  her  pacific  intentions. 
Napoleon  replied  by  similar  protestations :  he, 
nevertheless,  resolved  to  take  his  measures 
as  if,  profiting  by  his  absence,  she  should 
think  of  falling  upon  Italy.  General  Marmont 
occupied  Dalmatia  with  20,000  men.  Napo- 
leon directed  him,  after  placing  some  detach- 
ments en  echelon  from  the  centre  of  the  pro- 
vince to  Ragusa,  to  keep  the  bulk  of  his  forces 
in  Zara  itself,  a  fortified  town  and  the  capital 
of  the  country;  to  collect  there  stores  of  pro- 
visions, arms,  ammunition,  in  short,  to  make 
it  the  pivot  of  all  his  operations,  defensive  or 
offensive. 

If  he  should  be  attacked,  Zara  was  to  serve 
him  for  a  point  cTappui,  and  to  enable  him  to 
make  a  long  resistance.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
he  should  be  obliged  to  withdraw  from  it  for 
the  purpose  of  concurring  in  the  operations 
of  the  army  of  Italy,  he  had  in  that  fortress  a 
safe  place  for  depositing  his  materiel,  his 
wounded,  his  sick,  whatever  was  unfit  for 
active  war,  and  every  thing  that  he  could  not 
take  along  with  him. 

Eugene,  viceroy  of  Italy,  who  was  in  the 
secret  of  Napoleon's  intentions,  had  orders  to 
leave  in  Dalmatia  nothing  more,  either  in 
materiel  or  men,  than  was  absolutely  indispen- 
sable there,  and  to  collect  all  the  rest  in  the 
fortresses  of  Italy.  Since  the  conquest  of  the 
Venetian  slates,  these  places  had  been  sub- 
jected to  a  new  ably  calculated  classification, 
and  they  were  covered  with  labourers,  engaged 
in  constructing  works  proposed  by  General 
Chasseloup,  and  ordered  by  Napoleon.  The 
principal  of  them,  and  the  nearest  to  Austria, 
%was  Palma-Nova.  Next  to  the  famous  citadel 
of  Alexandria,  it  was  the  works  of  this  place 
that  Napoleon  pushed  forward  with  most 
activity,  because  it  commanded  the  plain  of 
the  Friuli  Next  came,  a  little  to  the  left, 
closing  the  gorges  of  the  Julian  Alps,  Osopo, 
then  I/egnago,  on  the  Adige,  Mantua,  on  the 
Mincio,  lastly,  on  the  Tanaro,  Alexandria,  the 
essential  base  of  the  French  power  in  Italy. 
Orders  had  been  given  to  shut  up  in  these 
fortresses  the  artillery,  amounting  to  more 
than  800  pieces,  and  not  to  leave  outside  them 
any  article  whatever,  cannon,  musket,  projec- 
tile, likely  to  be  carried  off"  in  case  of  surprise 
from  the  enemy.  Venice,  whose  defences 
were  not  yet  completed,  but  which  had  its 
lagoons  in  its  favour,  was  added  to  this  clas- 
sification. Napoleon  had  selected  General 
Miollis,  an  officer  of  extraordinary  energy,  to 
command  it.  He  had  enjoined  him  to  execute 
in  haste  the  works  necessary  for  turning  to 
account  the  advantages  of  the  situation,  till 


1  the  regular  works,  which  were  to  render  thf 
•  places  impregnable,  could  be  constructed.  It 
i  was  among  these  retreats  of  Osopo,  Palma 
|  Nova,  Legnago,  Venice,  Mantua,  Alexandria 
that  Napoleon  had  distributed  the  depots. 
Such  as  belonged  to  the  armies  in  Dalmatia 
and  Lombardy  were  divided  among  the  for 
tresses  from  Palma-Nova  to  Alexandria,  in 
order  to  keep  garrison  in  them  and  to  be 
trained.  Those  which  belonged  to  the  army 
of  Naples  had  been  assembled  in  the  Lega 
tions.  To  these  depots,  the  fifteen  or  twenty 
thousand  conscripts  destined  for  Italy  were  to 
direct  their  course.  Napoleon,  incessantly 
repeating  that  on  the  attention  paid  to  the 
depot  battalions  depended  the  quality  and  the 
duration  of  an  army,  had  prescribed  the  mea- 
sures necessary  in  order  that  the  health  and 
training  of  the  men  might  be  alike  attended 
to,  and  that  these  battalions  might  at  all  times 
be  able  to  furnish,  not  only  the  regular  recruits 
for  the  war-battalions,  and  the  garrisons  of  the 
fortresses,  but  likewise  one  or  two  divisions 
of  reinforcements,  ready  to  be  despatched  to 
the  points  where  an  unforeseen  want  might 
happen  to  be  felt.  The  defence  of  the  fort- 
resses being  thus  ensured,  the  whole  of  the 
active  army  became  disposable.  It  consisted 
for  Lombardy  of  15,000  men,  scattered  in  the 
Friule,  and  of  25,000  en  echelons  from  Milan 
to  Turin,  both  ready  for  marching.  There 
remained  the  army  of  Naples,  about  50,000 
strong,  a  great  part  of  which  was  fit  for  acting 
immediately.  Massena  was  on  the  spot:  if 
war  broke  out  with  Austria,  he  had  instruc- 
tions to  fall  back  upon  Upper  Italy  with 
30,000  men,  and  to  unite  them  with  the  40,000 
|  who  occupied  Piedmont  and  Lombardy. 
There  was  no  Austrian  army  capable  of 
forcing  the  obstinate  Massena,  having  70,000 
French  at  his  disposal,  having,  moreover, 
such  appms  as  Palma-Nova,  Osopo,  Venice, 
Mantua,  and  Alexandria.  Lastly,  in  this  case, 
General  Marmont  himself  was  to  play  a  use- 
ful part;  for,  if  he  was  blockaded  in  Dalma- 
tia, he  was  sure  to  keep  before  him  30,000 
Austrians  at  least,  and,  if  he  was  not,  he  could 
fall  upon  the  flank  or  the  rear  of  the  enemy. 

Such  were  the  instructions  addressed  to 
Prince  Eugene  for  the  defence  of  Italy.  They 
concluded  with  the  following  recommendation : 
— "  Read  all  these  instructions,  and  at  night 
call  yourself  to  account  for  what  you  have 
done  in  the  day  towards  their  execution,  but 
without  noise,  without  effervescence  of  head, 
and  without  exciting  alarm  in  any  quarter.'' 
($t.  Cloud,  18th  of  September,  1806.) 

Napoleon,  always  thinking  of  what  Austria 
might  attempt  while  he  was  in  Prussia,  ordered 
similar  precautions  in  regard  to  Bavaria.  He 
had  enjoined  Marshal  Soult  to  leave  a  strong 
1  garrison  at  Braunau,  a  fortress  of  some  im- 
portance, on  account  of  its  situation  upon  the 
Inn.  He  had  recommended  that  the  most  ur- 
gent works  should  be  constructed,  and  the 
timber  floated  down  from  the  Alps  by  the  Inn 
collected  there,  saying  that  with  arms  and 
wood  one  might  create  a  fortress  where  no- 
thing whatever  existed.  He  had  placed  the  3d 
!  of  the  line,  a  fine  regiment  of  four  battalions, 
three  of  them  war  battalions,  in  garrison  there, 


1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


163 


besides  500  artillery,  500  cavalry,  a  Bavarian 
detachment,  numerous  engineer  officers,  the 
whole  forming  a  force  of  about  5000  men.  He 
had  amassed  there  provisions  for  eight  months, 
a  great  quantity  of  ammunition,  and  a  consi- 
derable sum  of  money;  to  these  precautions  he 
had  added  the  appointment  of  an  energetic 
commandant,  to  whom  he  gave  instructions 
worthy  to  serve  for  a  lesson  to  all  the  go- 
vernors of  besieged  towns.  These  instructions 
contained  an  order  to  defend  himself  to  the 
last  extremity,  not  to  surrender  unless  in  case 
of  absolute  necessity,  and  after  withstanding 
three  repeated  assaults  on  the  body  of  the 
place. 

Napoleon  had,  moreover,  decided  that  a  part 
« f  the  Bavarian  army,  which  was  at  his  dis- 
posal in  virtue  of  the  treaty  of  the  Confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine,  should  be  assembled  on  the 
banks  of  the  Inn.  He  had  ordered  a  division 
of  15,000  men  of  all  arms  to  be  formed  and 
placed  under  the  guns  of  Braunau.  Such 
forces,  if  they  could  not  keep  the  field,  were, 
nevertheless,  a  first  obstacle  opposed  to  an 
enemy  debouching  unawares,  and  a  ready  pre- 
pared point  (fappui  for  the  army  coming  to  the 
assistance  of  Bavaria.  Napoleon,  in  fact,  how 
advanced  soever  he  might  be  in  Germany, 
would  always  have  it  in  his  power,  after  beat- 
ing off  the  Prussians  and  the  Russians  by 
gaining  a  battle,  to  face  about,  fall  by  Silesia 
or  by  Saxony  upon  Bohemia,  and  severely 
punish  Austria,  if  she  durst  attempt  a  fresh 
aggression.  After  guarding  against  Austria, 
he  thought  of  those  parts  of  the  empire  which 
the  English  threatened  with  a  landing. 

He  directed  his  brother  Louis  to  form  a 
camp  at  Utrecht,  composed  of  twelve  or  fif- 
teen thousand  Dutch,  and  of  the  5000  French 
left  in  Holland.  He  assembled  around  the 
fortress  of  Wesel,  recently  annexed  to  France, 
since  the  assignment  of  the  duchy  of  Berg  to 
Murat,  a  French  division  of  ten  or  twelve 
thousand  men.  King  Louis  was  to  proceed  to 
Wesel,  to  assume  the  command  of  this  divi- 
sion, and,  joining  it  with  the  troops  in  the 
camp  of  Utrecht,  feign,  with  30,000  men,  an 
attack  on  Westphalia.  It  was  even  recom- 
mended to  him  to  spread  a  report  of  an  assem- 
blage of  80,000  men,  and  to  make  some  pre- 
parations in  materiel  calculated  to  accredit  that 
rumour.  For  reasons  which  the  reader  will 
presently  appreciate,  Napoleon  certainly  did 
wish  to  draw  the  attention  of  the  Prussians  to 
that  quarter,  but,  in  reality,  he  desired  that 
King  Louis,  without  removing  too  far  from 
Holland,  should  be  constantly  ready,  either  to 
defend  his  kingdom  against  the  English,  or  to 
connect  his  movements  with  those  of  the 
French  corps  placed  on  the  Rhine  or  at  Bou- 
logne. Besides  the  seven  corps  of  the  grand 
army  destined  to  distant  warfare,  Napoleon 
had  resolved  to  form  an  eighth  under  Marshal 
Mortier,  who  should  be  charged  to  turn  as  upon 
a  pivot  round  Mayence,  to  watch  Hesse,  to  en- 
courage by  his  presence  the  German  Confe- 
derates, and  lastly  to  give  a  hand  to  King  Louis 
about  Wesel.  This  corps,  taken  from  the 
troops  in  the  interior,  was  to  be  20,000  strong. 
It  required  all  Napoleon's  ingenuity  to  raise  it 
to  that  number;  for,  out  of  the  140,000  men 


stationed  in  the  interior,  on  deducting  the  de- 
pots and  the  imperial  guard,  very  few  dispos- 
able troops  were  left.  Besides  this  eighth 
corps,  Marshal  Brune  was  directed  this  year, 
as  the  last,  to  guard  the  Boulogne  flotilla,  by 
employing  in  this  duty  the  seamen  and  some 
depot  battalions  amounting  to  about  18,000 
men.  It  was  only  with  extreme  circumspec- 
tion that  Napoleon  purposed  to  make  use  of 
the  national  guards,  because  he  was  fearful 
of  agitating  the  country,  and  particularly  of 
extending  the  burdens  of  the  war  to  too  large 
a  proportion  of  the  population.  Reckoning, 
nevertheless,  on  the  warlike  spirit  of  certain 
frontier  provinces,  he  had  no  scruple  to  raise 
in  Lorraine,  in  Alsace,  and  in  Flanders,  a  few, 
not  numerous,  select  detachments,  composed 
of  companies  of  elite,  that  is  of  grenadiers  and 
voltigeurs,  and  paid  at  the  moment  of  their  re- 
moval. He  had  fixed  their  number  at  6000  for 
th«  north  and  6000  for  the  east.  The  6000 
national  guards  of  the  north  assembled  under 
General  Rampon,  established  at  St.  Omer,  or- 
ganized with  care  at  but  little  distance  from 
their  homes,  furnished  a  useful  reserve,  al- 
ways ready  to  hasten  to  Marshal  Brune,  and 
to  afford  him  the  aid  of  its  patriotism.  The 
6000  national  guards  of  the  east  were  to  as- 
semble at  Mayence,  to  form  the  garrison  of 
that  place,  and  thus  to  render  Marshal  Mor- 
tier's  troops  more  disposable. 

Marshal  Kellermann,  one  of  the  veterans 
whom  Napoleon  was  accustomed  to  put  at  the 
head  of  the  reserves,  commanded  the  depots 
stationed  along  the  Rhine  ;  and,  while  attend- 
ing to  their  instruction,  he  could,  by  making 
use  of  soldiers  already  trained,  form  a  corps 
of  some  value,  and  if  danger  threatened  the 
Upper  Rhine,  proceed  rapidly  to  that  quarter. 

Thanks  to  this  combination  of  means,  there 
was  wherewithal  to  provide  against  all  con- 
tingencies. Suppose  that  Hesse,  for  example, 
instigated  by  the  Prussians,  excited  uneasi- 
ness, Marshal  Mortier,  starting  from  Mayence, 
was  ready  to  proceed  thither  with  the  eighth 
corps.  King  Louis,  placed  en  echelon,  was  to 
bring  to  him  part  of  the  camp  of  Utrecht  and 
of  Wesel.  If  danger  threatened  Holland,  King 
Louis  and  Marshal  Mortier  had  orders  to  unite 
their  forces.  Marshal  Brune  also  was  to  pro- 
ceed to  that  quarter.  If,  on  the  contrary,  Bou- 
logne was  in  peril,  Marshal  Brune  was  to  re- 
ceive succour  from  King  Louis,  who  was 
directed  by  his  instructions  to  hasten,  in  case 
of  need,  towards  that  part  of  the  frontiers  of 
the  Empire.  By  this  system  of  echelons,  calcu- 
lated with  strict  precision,  all  the  points  ex- 
posed to  any  accident  whatever,  from  the 
Upper  Rhine  to  Holland,  from  Holland  to  Bou- 
logne, could  be  assisted  in  useful  time,  and  as 
promptly  as  the  march  of  the  most  expeditious 
enemy  would  require. 

The  French  coast  from  Normandy  to  Bre- 
tagne  yet  remained  to  be  guarded.  Napoleon 
had  left  several  regiments  in  these  provinces, 
and,  according  to  his  custom,  he  had  assem- 
bled the  companies  of  elite  in  a  flying  camp  at 
Pontivy,  to  the  number  of  2100  grenadiers 
and  voltigeurs.  General  Boyer  was  appointed 
to  command  them.  He  had  at  his  disposal 
secret  funds,  spies,  and  detachments  of  gen 


104 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept.  180& 


darmes.  He  was  to  keep  patroles  in  suspi- 
cious places,  and,  if  a  landing  threatened 
Cherbourg  or  Brest,  to  hasten  thither  with  the 
2400  men  under  his  command.  Napoleon 
kept  in  Paris  only  a  corps  of  8000  men,  com- 
posed of  three  regiments  of  infantry  and  some 
squadrons  of  cavalry.  These  regiments  had 
received  their  contingent  of  conscripts.  Ju- 
not,  governor  of  Paris,  had  special  orders  to 
attend  incessantly  to  their  training,  and  to 
consider  that  as  the  first  of  his  duties.  These 
8000  men  were  a  last  reserve,  ready  to  pro- 
ceed whithersoever  their  presence  might  be 
needed.  Napoleon  had  recently  conceived  the 
idea  of  making  the  troops  travel  post,  and  he 
had  employed  this  method  for  tne  imperial 
guard,  which  was  conveyed  in  six  days  from 
Paris  to  the  Rhine.  The  troops  destined  to 
travel  in  that  way  made,  on  the  day  of  their 
departure,  a  forced  march  on  foot;  they  were 
then  put  into  carts,  each  carrying  ten  men, 
and  which  were  drawn  up  en  echelon  at  ten 
leagues'  distance,  so  as  to  travel  twenty 
leagues  per  day.  The  carts  were  paid  for  at 
the  rate  of  five  francs  per  horse,  and  the  far- 
mers required  for  this  service  were  far  from 
complaining.  Napoleon  had  had  a  carriage 
made  for  the  roads  of  Picardy,  Normandy,  and 
Bretagne,  for  the  purpose  of  conveying  in  four, 
five,  or  six  days,  to  Boulogne,  Cherbourg,  or 
Brest,  the  8000  men  left  in  Paris.  "We 
must,"  said  Napoleon  to  Prince  Cambaceres, 
who  was  expressing  his  uneasiness  on  this 
subject — "  we  must  accustom  Paris  not  to  see 
so  many  sentinels  at  every  corner  of  a  street." 
There  was  to  be  left  in  Paris  nothing  but  the 
municipal  guard,  then  amounting  to  3000 
men.  The  name  of  Napoleon,  the  tranquillity 
of  the  time,  rendered  it  needless  to  devote  a 
greater  force  to  the  guard  of  the  capital. 

As  for  the  ports  of  Toulon  and  Genoa,  Na- 
poleon had  left  sufficient  garrisons  there.  But 
well  he  knew  that  the  English  were  not  so 
silly  as  to  hazard  any  attempt  upon  places  of 
such  strength.  It  was  concerning  Boulogne 
alone  that  he  had  any  serious  apprehensions. 

Thus,  in  the  vast  circle  of  his  foresight,  he 
had  parried  all  possible  dangers.  If  Austria, 
extending  to  Prussia  a  succour  which  she  had 
not  received  from  her,  took  part  in  the  war, 
the  army  of  Italy,  concentrated  under  Massena, 
and  appuyed  upon  fortresses  of  the  first  order, 
°alma-Nova,  Mantua,  Venice,  Alexandria, 
«<vouid  be  able  to  oppose  70.000  men  to  the 
Austrians,  while  General  Marmont,  with 
twelve  or  fifteen  thousand,  would  throw  him- 
self into  their  flank  by  the  Dalmatia  road. 
The  Inn,  Braunau,  and  the  Bavarians,  would 
suffice  in  the  first  moment  for  the  defence  of 
Bavaria.  Marshal  Kellermann  had  the  depots 
for  covering  the  Upper  Rhine.  Marshal  Mor- 
tier,  King  Louis,  Marshal  Brune,  by  a  move- 
ment towards  each  other,  would  be  enabled  to 
assemble  50,000  men  on  any  point  that  might 
be  threatened,  from  Mayence  to  the  Helder, 
from  the  Helder  to  Boulogne.  Lastly,  Paris 
might,  in  urgent  danger,  confine  itself  to  its 
police  troops,  and  despatch  a  corps  of  reserve 
to  the  coasts  of  Normandy  or  Bretagne. 

These  various  combinations,  described  with 
striking  perspicuity,  with  the  most  minute  at- 


tention to  details,  had  been  communicated  to 
Prince  Eugene,  to  King  Joseph,  to  King  Louis, 
to  Marshals  Kellermann,  Mortier,  and  Brune, 
to  all  those,  in  short,  who  were  to  concur  in 
their  execution.  Each  of  them  knew  all  that 
was  necessary  for  the  due  performance  of  his 

\  task.  The  whole  had  been  communicated  to 
the  Archchancellor  Cambaceres  alone,  who, 
placed  at  the  centre,  was  charged  to  give  or- 
ders in  the  name  of  the  Emperor. 

Twenty-four  or  forty-eight  hours  were  suffi- 
cient for  Napoleon  to  form  his  plans  and  to 
arrange  the  details,  when  he  had  once  resolved 
to  act.  He  then  dictated,  for  one  or  two  days, 
almost  without  intermission,  so  many  as  one 
hundred  or  two  hundred  letters,  all  of  which 
have  been  preserved,  all  of  which  will  remain 
everlasting  models  of  the  art  of  administering 
armies  and  empires.  Prince  Berthier,  the 
usual  interpreter  of  his  commands,  having 
had  to  stay  at  Munich  on  business  of  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine,  he  sent  for  General 
Clarke,  and  passed  the  18th  and  19th  of  Sep- 
tember in  dictating  his  orders  to  him.  Napo- 
leon foresaw  that  twenty  days  might  yet  pass 
in  vain  explanations  with  Prussia,  after  which 
war  would  inevitably  commence,  for  explana- 
tions would  thenceforth  be  powerless  for  ter- 
minating such  a  quarrel.  He  resolved  there- 
fore to  employ  those  twenty  days  in  completing 
the  grand  army,  and  in  providing  it  with  every 
thing  that  might  yet  be  necessary  for  it. 

It  is  not  in  twenty  days  that  it  is  possible  to 
place  a  numerous  army  on  the  war  fooling, 
were  even  the  regiments  destined  to  compose 
it  completely  organized  each  for  itself.  To 
collect  it  on  the  principal  point  of  assembly, 
to  distribute  it  into  brigades  and  divisions,  to 
form  a  staff,  to  procure  for  it  parks,  equipages, 
materiel  of  all  sorts,  would  still  require  a  series 
of  long  and  complicated  operations.  But  Na- 
poleon, surprised  in  the  preceding  year  by 
Austria  at  the  moment  of  passing  over  to 
England,  and  this  year  by  Prussia,  on  his 
return  from  Austerlitz,  had  his  army  quite 
ready,  and  this  time  even  transported  to  the 
theatre  of  war,  since  it  was  in  the  Upper  Pa- 
latinate and  Fraconia.  It  left  nothing  to  be 
desired  in  any  respect.  Discipline,  training, 
habit  of  war  recently  renewed  in  an  astound- 
ing campaign,  strength  recruited  by  a  rest  of 
several  months,  perfect  health,  ardour  for  fight- 
ing, love  of  glory,  unbounded  devotedness  to 
its  leader,  nothing  was  wanting.  If  it  had  lost 
somewhat  of  that  regularity  of  manoeuvres 

|  which  distinguished  it  when  leaving  Boulogne, 
it  had  gained,  in  place  of  that  more  showy  than 
solid  quality,  an  assurance  and  freedom  of 

I  movements,  whicn  are  not  to  be  acquired  but 

I  in  fields  of  battle.  The  uniforms,  worn,  but 
neat,  added  to  its  martial  air.  As  we  have 
said  elsewhere,  it  had  refrained  from  taking 
either  its  new  clothes  or  its  pay  from  the  de- 

i  pots,  reserving  the  enjoyment  of  all  this  for 
the  fetes  which  Napoleon  was  preparing  for  il 

I  in  September — superb,  but  chimerical  fetes, 
alas  !  like  the  thousand  millions  formerly  pro- 
mised by  the  Convention.  That  heroic  army, 

!  thenceforth  doomed  to  an  everlasting  war,  was 
no  longer  to  know  any  other  fetes  than  battles, 

i  entries  of  conquered  capitals,  the  admiration 


Sept.  1806.] 


CONSULATE  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


165 


of  the  vanquished.  How  few  of  the  brave 
men  who  composed  it  were  destined  to  behold 
tKeir  homes  again,  and  to  die  in  the  quiet  of 
peace!  And  even  those,  as  they  grew  old, 
were  doomed  to  see  their  country  invaded, 
dismembered,  stripped  of  that  greatness  which 
she  owed  to  the  effusion  of  their  generous 
blood  ! 

Still,  how  well  prepared  soever  an  army 
may  be,  it  never  can  be  prepared  to  such  a 
degree  as  not  to  feel  any  want.  With  his  pro- 
found experience  of  thu  organization  of  the 
troops,  Napoleon  united  a  personal  knowledge 
of  his  army  that  was  truly  extraordinary.  He 
knew  the  residence,  the  state,  the  strength  of 
all  his  regiments.  He  knew  what  each  of 
them  was  deficient  in  men  or  in  materiel;  and, 
if  they  had  left  anywhere  a  detachment  which 
weakened  them,  he  knew  where  to  find  it. 
His  first  care  was  always  for  the  foot-clothing 
of  the  soldier,  and  to  secure  him  from  cold. 
He  ordered  shoes  and  great  coats  to  be  imme- 
diately despatched.  He  required  that  each 
man  should  have  a  pair  of  shoes  on  his  feet 
and  two  pair  in  his  knapsack.  One  of  these 
two  pair  was  given  as  a  gratuity  to  all  the 
corps,  and  the  soldier's  fortune  is  so  slender 
that  even  this  small  donation  had  its  value. 
He  ordered  all  the  saddle  and  draught-horses 
that  could  be  procured  to  be  bought  up  in 
France  and  abroad.  The  army  was  not  in 
actual  need  of  them,  but,  in  his  solicitude  for 
the  depots,  he  desired  that  there  should  not  be 
a  deficiency  of  horses  any  more  than  of  men. 
He  then  ordered  three  or  four  hundred  men 
per  regiment  to  be  despatched  from  the  depots, 
which  were  about  to  be  replenished  with  con- 
scripts, in  order  to  increase  the  war  battalions 
to  an  effective  of  eight  or  nine  hundred  men 
each,  well  knowing  that,  in  two  months'  cam- 
paign, they  would  presently  be  reduced  to  that 
of  six  or  seven  hundred.  The  force  of  the 
grand  army  would  thus  be  increased  by  20,000 
fighting  men,  and  it  would  then  be  possible  to 
discharge,  without  weakening  it  too  much,  the 
soldiers  worn  out  with  fatigue;  for,  with  this 
army  of  the  Revolution,  there  had  hitherto 
been  no  other  term  to  its  devotedness  to  the 
service  than  wounds  or  death.  There  were  to 
be  seen  in  the  ranks  old  soldiers  attached  to 
their  regiment  as  to  a  family,  exempted  from 
all  duty,  but  ever  ready,  in  any  danger,  to  dis- 
play their  ancient  valour,  and  taking  advan- 
tage of  their  leisure  to  relate  to  their  young 
successors  the  marvels  in  which  they  had 
borne  a  part.  In  the  rank  of  captain  in  par- 
ticular, there  were  many  officers  who  were 
incapacitated  for  service.  Napoleon  ordered 
all  the  young  men  whose  age  rendered  them 
fit  for  war  to  be  removed  from  the  military 
schools  and  trained  for  officers.  He  highly 
appreciated  the  materials  furnished  by  those 
schools;  he  found  their  pupils  not  only  well- 
informed  but  brave,  for  education  elevates  the 
heart  as  much  as  the  mind. 

After  taking  the  means  of  infusing  new  vi- 
gour into  the  army,  he  turned  his  attention  to 
the  organization  of  its  equipages.  He  wished 
that  it  should  gain  in  celerity,  and  not  be  too 
much  encumbered  with  baggage.  His  expe- 
rience did  not  incline  him  to  dispense  with 


magazines,  as  it  has  sometimes  been  asserted, 
for  he  disdained  no  kind  of  providence,  and 
j  he  no  more  neglected  the  laying  up  of  stores 
than  the  fortresses.  But  offensive  war,  which 
he  preferred  to  any  other,  scarcely  admitted  of 
the  creation  of  magazines,  since  they  must 
have  been  formed  in  the  enemy's  territory, 
which  it  was  his  custom  to  overrun  at  the 
very  commencement  of  the  operations.  His 

•  system   of  alimentation   consisted    in    living 
every  night   upon    the   country  occupied,   in 
spreading  himself  sufficiently  to  find  subsist- 
ence, but  not  so  much  as  to  be  dispersed,  and 
in  taking  along  with  him  in  caissons  bread  for 
several  days.     This  kind  of  supply,  managed 
with  care,  and  renewed  whenever  the  army 
halted,  served  for  cases  of  extraordinary  con- 
centrations, which  preceded  and  followed  bat- 
tles.    For  its  conveyance  Napoleon  had  cal- 
culated that  two  caissons  per  battalion  were 
required,  and  one  caisson  per  squadron.  Add- 
ing to  these  the    vehicles  necessary  for  the 

!  sick  and  wounded,  four  or  five  hundred  cais- 

j  sons  would  be  sufficient  for  all  the  wants  of 

!  the  army.     He  express!)'  forbade  any  officer, 

|  any  general,  to  appropriate  to  his  use  the  car- 

j  riages  destined  for  the  troops.     The  transport 

'  was  at  that  time  executed  by  a  company  which 

i  let   to    the  State    its  caissons   ready  horsed. 

Having  discovered  that  one  of  the  marshals, 

favoured  by  this  company,  had  several  cais- 

,  sons  at  his  disposal,  Napoleon  repressed  this 

I  infraction  of  the  rules  with  the  utmost  seve- 

|  rity,  and  made  Prince  Berthier  responsible  fcr 

the  fulfilment  of  his  orders.     The  army  was 

then  free  from  the  abuses,  which  time  and  the 

increasing  wealth  of  its  chiefs  soon  afterwards 

introduced. 

Napoleon  then  ordered  large  purchases  of 
I  corn  to  be  made  all  along  the  Rhine,  and  an 
|  immense  quantity  of  biscuit  to  be  made. 
These  provisions  were  to  be  collected  at  May- 
ence,  and  from  Mayence  sent  by  the  navigation 
of  the  Mayn  to  Wiirzburg.  Situated  in  Upper 
Franconia,  quite  close  to  the  defiles  that  lead 
into  Saxony,  and  commanded  by  an  excellent 
citadel,  Wiirzburg  was  to  be  our  base  of  ope- 
ration. Napoleon  wished  to  ascertain  whether 
there  were  not  other  fortified  posts  in  the  en- 
virons. The  officers  secretly  sent  to  recon- 
noitre, having  pointed  out  Forchheim  and 
Kronach,  he  ordered  them  to  be  armed,  and 
the  provisions,  ammunition,  and  tools  col- 
lected by  his  direction,  to  be  deposited  there 
in  safety. 

Wurzburg  had  belonged  for  some  months  to 
the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  the  same  who  had 

•  been    successively   grand-duke   of  Tuscany, 
elector  of  Salzburgh,  and  finally,  since  the 

,  last  peace  with  Austria,  duke  of  Wiirzburg. 
This  prince  solicited  his  admission  into  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  by  the  states  of 
which  his  new  dominion  was  enclosed.  He 
was  mild,  discreet,  and  as  well  disposed  to- 
wards France  as  an  Austrian  prince  could  be, 
and  the  Emperor  was  sure  of  obtaining  from 
him  all  the  facilities  desirable  for  the  prep-—- 
tions  that  he  purposed  to  make.  Wurzbi 
thus  became  the  centre  of  the  assemblages  of 
men  and  materiel  ordered  by  Napoleon. 
There  had  been  no  want  of  money  since  th 


166 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Sept.  1806. 


financial  crisis  of  the  preceding  winter.  In 
the  treasure  of  the  army,  Napoleon  had,  more- 
over, a  precious  resource.  Without  expending 
this  treasure,  exclusively  devoted  to  the  en- 
dowments (dotations')  of  his  soldiers,  he  made 
loans  with  it  which  the  state  was  afterwards 
to  reimburse  by  paying  the  interest  and  the 
principal  of  the  sums  borrowed.  Napoleon 
had  sent  a  great  quantity  of  specie  to  Stras- 
burg,  and  consigned  funds  to  Prince  Berthier, 
in  order  to  conquer  by  the  power  of  ready 
money  the  obstacles  which  might  oppose  the 
execution  of  his  designs. 

The  imperial  guard  had  travelled  post,  as 
we  have  seen,  thanks  to  the  relays  of  carts 
prepared  upon  the  road.  In  this  manner, 
3000  grenadiers  and  dismounted  chasseurs 
had  been  despatched.  As  this  mode  of  con- 
veyance could  not  be  employed  for  the  cavalry 
and  the  artillery,  the  mounted  grenadiers  and 
chasseurs,  forming  nearly  3000  horse,  as  well 
as  the  park  of  artillery  of  the  guard,  amount- 
ing to  forty  pieces,  were  forwarded  by  the 
usual  way.  This  was  a  reserve  of  7000  men, 
fit  for  warding  off  all  unforeseen  accidents. 
Napoleon,  as  prudent  in  the  execution  as  he 
was  bold  in  the  conception  of  his  plans,  set  a 
high  value  upon  reserves,  and  it  was  chiefly 
for  the  purpose  of  creating  one  that  he  had  in- 
stituted the  imperial  guard.  But,  quick  in  dis- 
covering the  inconveniences  attached  to  the 
most  excellent  things,  he  found  the  keeping  up 
of  this  guard  too  expensive,  and  he  was  fear- 
ful that  the  recruiting  of  it  would  drain  the 
army  of  choice  men.  The  velites,  a  sort  of  en- 
listed volunteers,  the  creation  of  which  he  had 
devised,  for  the  purpose  of  augmenting  the 
guard  without  drafting  from  the  army,  had  ap- 
peared too  costly  also,  and  not  numerous 
enough.  He  therefore  ordered  the  formation 
of  a  new  regiment  of  infantry,  under  the  title 
of  fusiliers  of  the  guard,  all  the  soldiers  of  which 
should  be  selected  from  the  annual  contingent, 
and  the  officers  and  subalterns  taken  out  of  the 
guard,  which  should  wear  the  uniform  of  the 
latter,  which  should  serve  with  it,  only  be 
treated  as  young  troops,  that  is  to  say,  less 
spared  under  fire,  have  a  slight  increase  of 
pay,  and  soon  acquire  all  the  qualities  of  the 
guard  itself,  without  costing  as  much,  and  with- 
out depriving  the  army  of  its  best  soldiers. 
While  awaiting  the  result  of  this  ingenious  com- 
bination. Napoleon  had  recourse  to  an  expe- 
dient already  practised,  of  separating  the  com- 
panies of  the  grenadiers  and  those  of  the 
voltigeurs  from  the  corps,  and  to  collect  them 
into  battalions.  In  this  manner  there  had 
been  formed  in  1804  the  grenadiers  of  Arras, 
afterwards  called  Oudinot's  grenadiers.  At 
that  time,  there  had  been  taken  the  grenadier 
companies  of  all  the  regiments  which  were  not 
destined  to  form  part  of  the  Boulogne  expedi- 
tion. After  Austerlitz,  several  of  these  com- 
panies had  been  sent  back  to  their  corps. 
With  those  which  had  continued  together,  Na- 
poleon gave  orders  for  joining  the  grenadiers 
and  voltigeurs  of  the  depots  and  regiments 
stationed  in  the  25th  and  26th  military  divi- 
sions, (the  country  comprised  between  the 
Khine,  the  Meuse,  and  the  Sambre,)  for  orga- 
uizing  them  in  battalions  of  six  companies 


each,  and  for  despatching  them  to  Mayence. 
This  was  a  new  corps  of  7000  men,  which, 
united  with  the  imperial  guard,  would  make 
the  reserve  of  the  army  amount  to  14,000  men. 
He  added  to  it  2400  dragoons  of  elite,  formed 
into  battalions  of  four  companies  or  squadrons, 
and  destined  to  serve,  either  on  foot  or  mount- 
ed, always  by  the  side  of  the  guard.  These 
dragoons,  drawn  from  Champagne,  Burgundy, 
Lorraine,  and  Alsace,  might  be  transported  in 
twenty  days  to  the  Mayn. 

The  reserves,  whose  composition  we  have 
just  described,  added  to  the  conscripts  taken 
from  the  depots,  would  form  a  considerable 
accession  to  the  forces  ready  to  march  for 
Prussia.  The  grand  army  was  composed  of 
seven  corps,  six  only  of  which  were  in  Ger- 
many, the  second,  under  General  Marmont, 

I  having  gone  to  Dalmatia.  These  corps  con- 
tinued to  be  commanded  by  the  same  officers. 
Marshal  Bernadotte  commanded  the  first  corps, 
20,000  strong;  Marshal  Davout,the  third,  27,000 
strong;  Marshal  Soult  was  at  the  head  of  the 

!  fourth,  the  force  of  which  amounted  to  32,000 
men.  Marshal  Lannes,  always  devoted,  but 
always  sensitive  and  irritable,  had  for  a  mo- 
ment quitted  the  fifth  corps,  in  consequence  of 
a  transient  discontent  On  the  first  rumor  of 
war,  he  came  to  resume  the  command  of  it. 
This  corps  amounted  to  22,000  men,  even  after 
Oudinot's  grenadiers  ceased  to  form  part  of  it. 
Marshal  Ney  had  remained  at  the  head  of  the 
sixth,  which  continued  at  an  effective  of  20,000 
men  present  under  colours.  The  seventh,  under 
Marshal  Augereau,  numbered  17,000.  The 
cavalry  reserve,  scattered  through  districts 
abounding  in  forage,  could  assemble  28,000 
horse.  Murat,  still  continued  in  the  command 
cf  it,  had  received  orders  to  quit  the  duchy  of 
Berg :  he  hastened,  overjoyed,  to  recommence 
a  species  of  war  in  which  he  so  eminently 
distinguished  himself,  and  to  gain  a  glimpse, 
not  of  a  duchy  but  of  a  kingdom  as  the  prize 
of  his  exploits. 

These  six  corps,  with  the  reserve  of  cavalry, 
comprehended  no  fewer  than  170,000  fighting 
men.  If  we  add  the  guard,  the  troops  of  elite, 
the  staffs,  the  park  of  reserve,  we  may  say  that 
the  grand  army  amounted  to  about  190,000 
men.  It  was  to  be  presumed  that  in  the  first 
days  it  would  not  be  completely  assembled,  for, 
out  of  the  guard  and  the  companies  of  elite,  the 
foot  guard  only  would  have  arrived.  But 
170,000  men  were  sufficient,  and  more  than 
sufficient,  for  the  commencement  of  that  war. 
The  corps  were  composed  of  the  same  divi- 
sions, the  same  brigades,  the  same  regiments, 
as  in  the  last  campaign — a  very  wise  arrange- 
ment, for  officers  and  soldiers  had  learned  to 
know  and  to  have  confidence  in  each  other. 
As  for  the  general  organization,  it  continued 
to  be  the  same.  It  was  that  which  Napoleon 
had  substituted  for  the  organization  of  the 
army  of  the  Rhine,  and  the  excellence  of  which 
he  had  proved  in  the  Austrian  campaign,  the 
very  first  in  which  200,000  men  had  been  seen 
marching  under  a  single  commander.  The 
army  was  still  divided  into  corps  which  were 
complete  in  infantry  and  artillery,  but  which, 
as  to  eavalry,  had  only  a  few  chasseurs  and 
hussars  to  guard  it  The  bulk  of  the  cavalry 


Sept.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


167 


was  still  concentrated  under  Murat,  and  placed 
directly  under  the  hand  of  Napoleon,  from  mo- 
tives which  we  have  assigned  elsewhere.  The 
guard  and  the  companies  of  elite  formed  a  ge- 
neral reserve  of  all  arms,  never  quitting  Na- 
poleon, and  marching  close  to  him,  not  to 
ensure  the  safety  of  his  person,  but  to  execute 
his  commands  the  more  expeditiously. 

Orders  for  moving  were  given  so  as  to  be 
executed  in  the  first  days  of  October.  Napo- 
leon enjoined  Marshals  Ney  and  Soult  to  unite 
in  the  country  of  Bayreuth,  in  order  to  form 
the  right  of  the  army;  Marshals  Davout  and 
Bernadotte  to  join  about  Bamberg,  to  form  its 
centre;  Marshals  Lannes  and  Augereau  to 
form  a  junction  in  the  environs  of  Coburg,  to 
compose  its  left.  He  thus  concentrated  his 
forces  on  the  frontiers  of  Saxony,  in  military 
views,  the  extent  and  profundity  of  which  the 
reader  will  soon  appreciate.  Murat  had  orders 
to  assemble  the  cavalry  at  Wurzburg.  The 
foot  guard,  conveyed  in  six  days  to  the  Rhine, 
marched  towards  the  same  point.  These  dif- 
ferent corps  were  to  reach  their  posts  by  the 
3d  or  4th  of  October.  It  was  expressly  re- 
commended to  them  not  to  pass  the  frontiers 
of  Saxony. 

Every  thing  being  prepared,  both  for  the  ' 
safety  of  the  Empire  and  for  the  active  war  in  , 
which  Napoleon  was  about  to  engage,  he  left 
Paris.  Nothing  new  had  taken  place  in  the 
relations  with  Prussia.  Laforest,  the  minister, 
had  kept  the  silence  enjoined  by  Napoleon,  but 
he  wrote  that  the  king,  swayed  by  the  passions  | 
of  the  court  and  of  the  young  aristocracy,  hav- 
ing set  out  for  his  army,  no  hope  was  left  of 
preventing  war,  unless  the  two  monarchs,  pre- 
sent in  their  head-quarters,  should  exchange 
some  direct  explanations,  which  should  put  an 
end  to  a  deplorable  misunderstanding,  and  suf- 
fice to  satisfy  the  pride  of  the  two  governments. 
Unfortunately,  such  explanations  were  not  to 
be  expected.  M.  de  Knobelsdorf,  who  continued 
in  Paris,  protested  the  pacific  intentions  of  his 
cabinet.  But  little  initiated  into  the  secret  of 
affairs,  neither  sharing  nor  comprehending  the 
passions  which  ran  away  with  his  court,  he 
performed  at  that  of  Napoleon,  the  part  of  a 
respected  but  useless  personage.  The  news 
from  the  north  represented  Russia  as  anxious 
to  comply  with  the  wishes  of  Prussia,  and  en- 
gaged in  preparing  her  armies.  The  intelli- 
gence from  Austria  described  her  as  exhausted, 
full  of  rancour  against  Prussia,  and  not  to  be 
feared  by  France,  unless  in  case  of  a  great  re- 
verse. As  for  England,  when  once  Mr.  Fox 
was  dead,  the  war  party,  thenceforth  triumph- 
ant, had  resumed  its  pretensions  in  inadmissi- 
ble propositions,  such  as  the  cession  of  the 
Balearic  Islands,  Sicily  and  Dalmatia,  to  the 
Bourbons  of  Naples,  that  is  to  say,  to  the  Eng- 
lish themselves — propositions  which  Lord  Lau- 
derdale,  a  sincere  friend  of  peace,  supported 
methodically,  and  with  a  simple  ignorance  of 
the  real  intentions  of  his  cabinet.  Napoleon 
did  not  choose  to  dismiss  him  abruptly,  but  he 
directed  an  answer  equivalent  to  the  sending 
of  his  passports  to  be  addressed  to  him.  He 
then  prescribed  a  communication  to  the  Senate 
detailing  the  long  negotiations  of  France  with 
Prussia,  and  the  melancholy  conclusion  which 


had  terminated  them.  This  communication, 
however,  he  ordered  to  be  deferred  till  war  was 
irrevocably  declared  between  the  two  courts. 
Nevertheless,  as  it  was  necessary  to  assign  a 
motive  for  his  departure  from  Paris,  he  caused 
it  to  be  intimated  that,  at  a  moment  when  the 
powers  of  the  north  were  assuming  a  threat- 
ening attitude,  he  deemed  it  expedient  to  put 
himself  at  the  head  of  his  army,  to  be  ready 
for  whatever  might  happen.  He  held  a  last 
council,  to  explain  to  the  dignitaries  of  the 
Empire  their  duty,  and  the  part  they  had  to 
act  in  the  various  cases  that  might  occur. 
The  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres,  a  man  for 
whom  he  reserved  all  his  confidence,  even 
when  he  left  his  two  brothers,  Louis  and 
Joseph,  in  Paris,  must  of  course  have  pos- 
sessed it  in  a  still  greater  degree  when  he  left 
not  one  of  the  princes  of  his  family  in  the 
capital.  Napoleon  conferred  on  him  the  most 
extensive  powers  under  the  different  titles  of 
president  of  the  Senate,  president  of  the  Coun- 
cil of  State,  and  president  of  the  Council  of 
the  Empire.  Junot,  one  of  the  men  most  at- 
tached to  the  Emperor,  had  the  command  of 
the  troops  cantoned  in  the  capital.  None  of 
the  imperial  family  but  the  females  were  left 
in  Paris.  Again  Josephine,  terrified  to  see 
Napoleon  exposed  to  new  dangers,  had  soli- 
cited and  obtained  permission  to  accompany 
him  to  the  banks  of  the  Rhine.  She  hoped,  by 
establishing  herself  at  Mayence,  to  be  more 
speedily  and  more  frequently  informed  of  what 
was  passing.  Besides  the  government  of  the 
Empire,  the  arch-chancellor  was  to  have  that 
of  the  imperial  family.  He  was  charged  to 
advise  and  to  restrain  the  individuals  of  that 
family  who  should  in  any  way  offend  against 
the  laws  of  decorum,  or  against  the  rules  pre- 
scribed by  the  Emperor  himself. 

Napoleon  set  out  in  the  night  between  the 
24th  and  25th  of  September,  accompanied  by 
the  empress  and  M.  de  Talleyrand,  stopped  a 
few  hours  at  Metz,  to  see  the  place,  and  then 
directed  his  course  towards  Mayence,  where 
he  arrived  on  the  28th.  In  that  city  he  learned 
that  a  courier  from  Berlin,  with  the  final  ex- 
planations of  the  court  of  Prussia,  had  crossed 
him  in  his  course,  and  continued  his  journey 
to  Paris.  It  was  not,  therefore,  till  he  advanced 
further  into  Germany,  that  he  was  able  to  ob- 
tain the  definitive  explanations  which  he  ex- 
pected. At  Mayence  he  saw  Marshal  Keller- 
mann,  who  superintended  the  organization  of 
the  depots,  and  Marshal  Mortier,  appointed  to 
the  command  of  the  eighth  corps,  and  again 
explained  to  them  how  they  were  to  conduct 
themselves  according  to  circumstances.  He 
directed  the  provisioning  of  Mayence  to  be 
completed;  he  made  some  alterations  in  the 
arming  of  the  place;  he  hastened  the  depart- 
ure of  the  young  soldiers  taken  from  the  de- 
pots, the  transport  of  the  provisions  and  am- 
munition destined  to  pass  out  of  the  Rhine 
into  the  Mayn,  and  then  to  ascend  the  Mayn 
to  Wurzburg.  A  troop  of  orderly  officers,  run- 
ning in  all  directions,  came  every  moment  to 
report  upon  the  missions  which  they  had  ful- 
filled ;  and,  accustomed  not  to  affirm  any  more 
than  they  had  seen  with  their  own  eyes,  they 
went  and  came  incessantlj,  to  acquaint  him 


Ififl 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


with  th»  real  state  of  things,  and  what  progress  ' 
had  bei  u  made  in  the  execution  of  his  orders. ' 
At  Mayence,  Napoleon  sent  back  his  civil  es- 
tablishment, retaining  about  him  his  military 
household  alone.     He  could  not  for  a  moment  i 
control  his  emotion  on  seeing  the  tears  shed  j 
by  the  empress.     Though  full  of  confidence,  I 
he  at  length  gave  way  himself  to  the  general 
uneasiness  excited  around  him  by  the  prospect 
of  a  long  war  in  the  north,  in  distant  regions, ; 
against   new   nations.    He  parted,  therefore,  ' 
with  some  pain  from  Josephine  and  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand, and  advanced  beyond  the  Rhine  :  ab- 
sorbed by  his  vast  thoughts,  by  the  spectacle 
of  immense  preparations,  he  was  soon  diverted 
from  a  species  of  emotion,  which  he  was  glad 
to  banish  from  his  heart,  and  still  more  so  from 
his  calm  and  imperious  countenance. 

A  great  concourse  of  German  generals  and 
princes  were  waiting  at  Wurzburg  to  pay  their 
respects  to  him.  The  new  Duke  of  Wurzburg, 
proprietor  and  sovereign  of  the  place,  had  pre- 
ceded all  the  others.  This  prince,  whom  he 
had  known  in  Italy,  reminded  Napoleon  of  the 
first  days  of  his  glory,  as  well  as  of  the  most 
friendly  relations ;  for  he  was  the  only  one  of 
the  Italian  sovereigns  whom  he  had  not  found 
intent  on  injuring  the  French  army.  Hence 
it  was  not  without  pain  that  he  had  found  him- 
self obliged  to  make  him  bear  his  part  in  the 
general  vicissitudes.  Napoleon  was  received 
in  the  palace  of  the  former  bishops  of  Wurz- 
burg, a  magnificent  palace,  little  inferior  to 
that  of  Versailles,  a  pompous  monument  of 
the  wealth  of  the  Germanic  church,  formerly 
so  powerful  and  so  largely  endowed,  now  so 
poor  and  so  decayed.  He  had  a  long  conver- 
sation with  the  Archduke  Ferdinand,  on  the 
general  state  of  things,  and  particularly  on  the 
dispositions  of  the  court  of  Austria,  to  which 
this  prince  was  most  nearly  allied,  for  he  was 
the  brother  of  the  Emperor  Francis,  and  with 
which  he  was  perfectly  acquainted.  The  Duke 
of  Wurzburg,  a  friend  of  peace,  possessing 
the  intelligence  of  the  German  princes  edu- 
cated in  Tuscany,  was  solicitous,  for  the  sake 
of  his  own  quiet,  for  a  good  understanding  be- 


t  We  quote  the  following  letter  written  to  M.  de  La 
Rochefoucauld  by  Napoleon,  as  a  proof  of  the  disposi- 
tions which  we  attribute  to  him  at  this  moment.  The 
violent  expressions  which  he  uses  in  speaking  of  Prus- 
sia must  be  ascribed  solely  to  the  irritation  excited  by 
the  unexpecied  conduct  of  that  court  towards  him.  It 
was  not  in  these  terms  that  he  usually  expressed  him- 
self, especially  in  regard  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  for 
whom  he  had  never  ceased  to  feel  and  to  profess  a  real 
esteem. 

To  M.  de  /-.a  Rochtfoucaultl.  my  ambassador  to  his 
Majesty,  the  Emperor  of  Austria. 

Wurzburg.  the  6th  of  October.  1906. 
I  have  been  since  yesterday  at  Wiir/.burg.  which  has 
riven  me  occasion  lo  converse  for  a  long  time  with  H. 
R.  H.  I  have  acqua-'nted  him  with  my  firm  resolution 
lo  break  all  the  ties  of  alliance  which  bind  me  to  Prus- 
sia, be  the  result  of  the  present  affairs  what  it  may. 
\ccoid:ngto  my  last  accounts  from  Berlin,  it  is  possible 
mat  war  may  not  take  place;  but  I  am  resolved  not  10 
be  the  ally  of  a  power  so  versatile  and  so  despicable. 
I  shall  be  at  peace  with  her.  no  doubt,  because  I  have 
no  right  to  spill  the  blood  of  my  people  under  vain  pre- 
texts. Still,  the  necessity  for  directing  my  efforts  to- 
wards my  navy  renders  an  alliance  upon  the  continent 
Indispensable  for  me.  Circumstances  had  led  me  to  an 
alliance  with  Prussia,  but  that  power  is  at  ih  s  day  what 
,t  was  in  1740,  and  what  it  has  been  at  all  times,  with- 
out consistency  and  without  honour.  I  have  esteemed 


tween  Austria  and  France.  He  took  occasion 
from  the  late  events  to  speak  to  Napoleon  on 
the  grave  question  of  alliances,  to  decry  that 
of  Prussia,  and  to  extol  that  of  Austria  He 
strove  to  insinuate  some  ideas  which  had  pre- 
vailed in  the  last  century,  when  the  two  cabi- 
nets of  Versailles  and  Vienna,  united  against 
that  of  Berlin,  were  connected  at  once  by  a 
common  war  and  by  marriages.  He  reminded 
him  that  this  alliance  had  been  the  brilliant 
period  of  the  French  navy,  and  took  pains  to 
demonstrate  to  him  that  France,  more  power- 
ful on  the  continent  than  she  had  need  to  be, 
was  at  present  destitute  of  the  maritime  force 
necessary  for  re-establishing  and  protecting 
her  commerce,  destroyed  for  the  last  fifteen 
years.  This  language  had  nothing  new  for 
Napoleon,  for  M.  de  Talleyrand  daily  dinned 
his  ears  with  it.  The  Duke  of  Wurzburg  ap- 
peared to  believe  that  the  court  of  Vienna 
would  gladly  seize  this  occasion  of  courting 
the  friendship  of  France,  and  of  creating  in 
her  a  support  instead  of  an  incessantly  threat- 
ening enemy.  Napoleon,  disposed  by  the  cir- 
cumstances of  the  moment  to  entertain  such 
ideas,  was  so  touched  by  them  that  he  wrote 
himself  to  his  ambassador,  M.  de  La  Roche- 
foucauld, and  ordered  him  to  make  amica- 
;  ble  overtures  at  Vienna — overtures  reserved 
enough  not  to  compromise  his  dignity,  signi- 
ficant enough  for  Austria  to  know  that  it  de- 
1  pended  upon  herself  to  form  a  close  connection 
with  France.1 

Powerful  and  confident  as  he  was,  Napo- 
j  leon  began  to  believe  that,  without  a  great 
continental  alliance,  he  should  always  be 
liable  to  fresh  coalitions,  diverted  from  his 
contest  with  England,  and  obliged  to  expend 
:  upon  land  resources  which  he  ought  to  expend 
exclusively  upon  sea.  The  alliance  of  Prus- 
sia, which  he  had  cultivated,  unfortunately 
with  too  little  care,  having  slipped  through  his 
hands,  he  was  naturally  led  to  the  idea  of  an 
alliance  with  Austria.  But  this  idea,  very 
recent  with  him,  was  the  illusion  of  a  moment, 
unworthy  of  the  firm  perspicacity  of  his  mind. 
No  doubt,  had  he  been  willing  to  pay  with  a 

the  Emperor  of  Austria,  even  amidst  his  reverses  and 
the  events  which  have  divided  us;  I  believe  him  to  be 
constant  and  faithful  to  his  word.  You  must  explain 
yourself  in  this  spirit,  without,  however,  employing  a 
t-jo  misplaced  urgency.  My  position  and  my  forces  are 
such  that  1  need  not  fear  anybody ;  but  all  these  efforts 
press  at  last  upon  my  people  Of  the  three  powers, 
Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria.  I  must  have  one  tor  my 
ally.  In  no  case  can  Prussia  be  trusted:  Russia  and 
Austria  alone  are  left  me.  The  navy  flourished  for- 
merly in  France  through  the  benefit  which  we  derived 
from  the  alliance  of  Austria.  That  power,  hes.des, 
I  feels  a  necessity  for  remaining  quiet, — a  sentiment  in 
winch  I  also  heartily  join.  An  alliance  founded  on  the 
independence  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  on  the  guarantee 
of  our  dominions,  and  on  amicable  arrangements  which 
would  consolidate  the  peace  of  Europe,  and  would 
enable  me  to  throw  my  efforts  upon  my  navy,  would 
suit  me.  The  house  of  Austria  having  frequently  made 
insinuations  to^nu-,  the  present  moment,  if  it  knows  liow 
to  profit  by  it,  is  the  most  favourable  of  all.  1  shall  say 
no  more  to  you.  I  have  explained  my  sentiments  moro 
at  length  to  ihe  Prince  of  ttenevento,  who  will  not  fail 
to  inibrm  you  of  them.  For  the  rest,  your  mission  will 
be  fulfilled  whenever  you  signify  in  the  slightest  possible 
manner  that  1  am  not  averse  from  adhering  to  a  system, 
which  should  knit  more  firmly  my  lies  with  Austria. 
Fail  not  to  keep  an  eye  on  Moldavia  and  Wallach-a, 
and  to  inform  me  of  the  movements  of  the  Russians 
against  the  Ottoman  empire.  Whereupon,  &c.,  Ice. 

NAI'OLEOX. 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


169 


sacrifice  for  this  new  alliance,  and  to  restore  ! 
to  Austria  some  of  the  spoils  which  he  had 
wrested  from  her,  the  agreement  might  have 
been  possible  and  sincere — but  God  knows ! 
But  how  propose  to  Austria,  stripped  in  ten 
years  of  the  Netherlands,  of  Lombardy,  of  the 
duchies  of  Modena  and  Tuscany,  of  Suabia, 
of  the  Tyrol,  of  the  Germanic  crown — how 
propose  to  her  to  ally  herself  to  the  conqueror, 
who  had  wrested  from  her  such  territories  and 
such  power!  One  might,  indeed,  hope  for  her 
neutrality  after  the  word  given  at  the  bivouac 
of  Urschitz,  and  under  the  influence  of  the  re- 
membrance of  Rivoli,  of  Marengo,  of  Auster- 
litz;  but  to  induce  her  to  an  alliance  was  a 
chimera  of  M.  de  Talleyrand  and  of  the  Duke 
of  Wiirzburg,  the  one  giving  way  to  his  per- 
sonal predilections,  the  other  swayed  by  the 
interests  of  his  new  position.  This  tendency 
to  seek  an  impossible  alliance  clearly  proves 
what  a  fault  had  been  committed  in  treating 
lightly  the  alliance  of  Prussia,  which  was  at 
once  possible,  easy,  founded  on  great  common 
interests.  For  the  rest,  this  accommodation 
with  Austria  was  an  experiment  which  Napo- 
leon hazarded  en  passant,  in  order  not  to 
neglect  a  useful  idea,  but  the  success  of  which 
he  did  not  consider  as  indispensable,  in  the 
high  degree  of  power  to  which  he  had  attained. 
He  hoped,  in  fact,  notwithstanding  all  that  was 
said  of  the  Prussian?,  to  beat  them  so  com- 
pletely and  so  quickly,  that  he  should  soon 
have  all  Europe  at  his  feet,  and  for  ally  the 
exhaustion  of  his  enemies,  in  default  of  their 
good-will. 

An  important  member  of  the  Confederation 
of  the  Rhine  arrived  also  at  Wiirzburg:  this 
was  the  king  of  Wirtemberg,  formerly  a  mere 
elector,  now  a  king  of  Napoleon's  creation,  a 
prince  known  for  the  warmth  of  his  temper 
and  the  penetration  of  his  mind.  Napoleon 
had  to  settle  with  him  the  details  of  a  marriage 
already  agreed  upon  between  Prince  Jerome 
Bonaparte  and  the  Princess  Catherine  of  Wir- 
temberg. After  attending  to  this  family  busi- 
ness, Napoleon  arranged  with  the  King  of 
Wirtemberg  concerning  the  meeting  of  the 
Confederates  of  the  Rhine,  who,  among  them, 
were  to  furnish  about  40,000  men,  indepen- 
dently of  the  15,000  Bavarians  concentrated 
around  Braunau.  The  Germans  had  found 
themselves  harshly  used  when  serving  under 
Marshal  Bernadotte  in  the  Austrian  campaign. 
The  Bavarians,  in  particular,  had  solicited  as 
a  special  favour  that  they  might  not  be  again 
placed  under  that  marshal.  It  was  decided 
that  all  the  German  auxiliaries  should  be  col- 
lected into  a  single  corps,  and  that  they  should 
be  placed  in  the  rear,of  the  grand  army  under 
the  command  of  Prince  Jerome,  who  had  quitted 
the  naval  service  for  the  land  service.  This 
prince  being  destined  to  marry  a  German  prin- 
cess, and  probably  to  receive  her  dowry  in  Ger- 
many, it  was  wise  to  familiarize  him  with  the 
Germans,  and  to  familiarize  the  Germans  with 
him. 

The  conversation  of  the  Emperor  of  the 
French  and  the  German  monarch  then  turned 
upon  the  court  of  Prussia.  The  King  of  Wir- 
temberg had  it  in  his  power  to  give  Napoleon 
useful  information,  for  he  had  handfuls  of  let- 
Vox..  IL— 22 


ters  from  Berlin,  which  gave  a  lively  account 
of  the  vertigo  which  had  seized  all  heads,  and 
even  those  which  were  to  be  supposed  the 
soundest.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick,  whose  age 
and  whose  enlightened  reason  ought  to  have 
preserved  him  from  the  general  infatuation, 
lad  himself  given  way  to  it,  and  he  had  writ- 
en  to  the  King  of  Wirtemberg,  threatening 
that  he  would  soon  plant  the  Prussian  eagles 
n  Stuttgard,  if  that  prince  did  not  abandon  the 
Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  The  King  of  Wir- 
temberg, unintiinidated  by  such  threats,  showed 
all  these  letters  to  Napoleon,  who  turned  them 
to  account,  and  felt  redoubled  irritation  against 
the  court  of  Prussia.  Napoleon  made  much 
inquiry  concerning  the  Prussian  army  and  its 
real  merit.  The  King  of  Wirtemberg  extolled 
the  Prussian  cavalry  beyond  measure,  and 
represented  it  as  so  formidable  that  Napoleon, 
struck  with  what  he  was  told,  spoke  upon  the 
subject  himself  to  all  his  officers,  took  good 
care  to  prepare  them  for  this  rencounter,  re- 
minded them  of  the  manner  of  manoeuvring  in 
Egypt,  and  said  to  them  with  that  vivacity  of 
expression  which  was  peculiar  to  him,  that 
they  must  march  to  Berlin  in  a  square  of  two 
hundred  thousand  men. 

Though  Napoleon  received  no  definitive 
declaration  from  the  court  of  Prussia,  he  de- 
cided, upon  the  mere  fact  of  the  invasion  of 
Saxony  by  a  Prussian  army,  to  consider  war 
as  declared.  In  the  preceding  year  he  had 
designated  as  hostility  the  invasion  of  Bavaria 
by  Austria;  this  year,  in  like  manner,  he  de- 
signated as  hostility  the  invasion  of  Saxony 
by  Prussia.  This  was  a  skilful  way  of  stating 
the  question,  for  he  appeared  to  interfere  in 
Germany  solely  for  the  purpose  of  protecting 
the  second-rate  German  princes  against  those 
of  the  first  order.  On  these  conditions,  for  the 
rest,  war  was  completely  declared  at  the  mo- 
ment, for  the  Prussians  had  crossed  the  Elbe 
by  the  bridge  of  Dresden,  and  they  already  lined 
the  extreme  frontier  of  Saxony,  as  the  French 
lined  it  by  occupying  the  Franconian  territory. 

The  reader  would  not  comprehend  Napo- 
leon's plan  of  campaign  against  Prussia,  one 
of  the  finest  and  grandest  that  was  ever  con- 
ceived and  executed,  without  casting  a  look  at 
the  general  configuration  of  Germany. 

Austria  and  Prussia  divide  the  soil  of  Ger- 
many, as  they  divide  its  wealth,  its  dominion, 
and  its  politics,  leaving  between  them  a  cer 
tain  number  of  petty  states,  whose  geograph 
cal  situation,  the  laws  of  the  Empire,  and 
French  influence  have  hitheru  maintained  in 
their  dependence.  Austria  is  in  the  east  ol' 
Germany,  Prussia  in  the  north.  Austria  oc 
cupies  and  fills  almost  entirely  that  beautiful 
valley  of  the  Danube,  long,  winding,  at  firsl 
contracted  by  the  Alps  and  the  mountains  of 
Bohemia,  then  opening  below  Vienna,  and  be- 
coming a  hundred  leagues  wide  between  the 
Carpathians  and  the  mountains  of  Illy ria,  em- 
bracing in  these  vast  slopes  the  superb  king- 
dom of  Hungary.  It  is  to  the  extremity  of  this 
valley  that  you  must  go  to  look  for  Austria, 
crossing  the  Upper  Rhine  between  Strasburg 
and  Basle,  then  traversing  the  defiles  of  Suabia, 
and  descending  by  a  perilous  progress  thr 
course  of  the  Danube,  to  the  basin  amidst 


170 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Oct.  1800. 


which  rises  Vienna,  and  which  it  overlooks — 
Prussia,  on  the  contrary,  has  established  her- 
self in  the  vast  plains  of  the  north,  the  entrance 
of  which  she  occupies — hence  her  old  appella- 
tion of  the  March  or  Mark  of  Brandenburg.  To 
reach  her,  you  must  not  ascend  the  Upper 
Rhine  to  Basle,  but  pass  it  at  about  the  middle 
of  its  course,  at  Mayence.or  descend  to  Wesel, 
and  thus  cross  or  turn  the  mountainous  centre 
of  Germany.  No  sooner  are  you  beyond  the 
moderately  elevated  mountains  of  Franconia, 
Thuringia,  and  Hesse,  than  you  enter  an  im- 
mense plain,  traversed  successively  by  the 
Weser,  the  Elbe,  the  Oder,  the  Vistula,  and  the 
Niemen,  terminating  to  the  north  at  the  North 
Sea,  and  to  the  east  at  the  foot  of  the  Uralian 
mountains.  This  plain  is  called  Westphalia, 
Hanover,  Prussia,  along  the  North  Sea,  Poland, 
in  the  interior  of  the  continent,  Russia  as  far 
as  the  Ural.  On  the  slope  of  the  mountains 
of  Germany,  by  which  you  arrive  at  it,  that  is 
to  say,  in  Saxony,  in  Thuringia,  in  Hesse,  it  is 
covered  with  a  solid,  vegetable  mould,  and  on 
the  banks  of  the  rivers  with  a  rich,  alluvial 
soil.  But,  in  the  intervals  which  separate 
these  rivers,  and  especially  along  the  sea,  it  is 
invariably  sandy;  the  waters,  having  no  drain, 
there  form  innumerable  lakes  and  marshes. 
The  only  feature  that  varies  the  surface  is 
sand-hills ;  the  only  vegetation,  the  fir,  the  birch, 
and  a  few  oaks.  It  is  grave  and  gloomy  like 
the  sea,  of  the  aspect  of  which  it  frequently 
reminds  you,  like  the  slender  and  dark  vegeta- 
tion with  which  it  is  covered,  like  the  sky  of 
the  north.  It  is  extremely  fertile  on  the  banks 
of  the  rivers,  but  in  the  interior  scanty  crops 
are  raised  here  and  there  amidst  the  clearings 
of  the  pine  forests ;  and  if  at  times  it  exhibits 
the  spectacle  of  abundance,  it  is  where  nu- 
merous cattle  have  enriched  the  soil.  But 
such  is  the  power  of  economy,  of  courage,  of] 
perseverance,  that  among  these  sands  has  been 
formed  a  state  of  the  first  order,  if  not  wealthy, 
at  least  in  easy  circumstances — Prussia,  the  | 
bold  and  patient  work  of  a  great  man,  Frede- 
rick II.,  and  of  a  succession  of  princes,  who, 
before  or  after  him,  though  not  possessing  his 
genius,  were  animated  by  the  same  spirit.  And 
such,  too,  is  the  power  of  civilization,  that, 
from  amidst  these  marshes,  surrounded  by 
sand-hills,  the  great  Frederick  caused  the 
royal  mansion  of  Potsdam  to  spring  forth,  that 
Versailles  of  the  north,  where  the  genius  of 
the  arts  has  had  the  skill  to  impress  the  sad- 
ness of  these  cold  and  dreary  regions  with 
grace  and  elegance. 

The  Elbe,  the  first  great  river  which  you 
meet  with  in  this  plain,  when  you  descend 
from  the  mountains  of  Central  Germany,  is 
the  principal  seat  of  the  power  of  Prussia,  the 
bulwark  which  covers  her,  the  vehicle  which 
conveys  her  productions.  In  its  upper  course, 
it  waters  the  plains  of  Saxony,  runs  through 
Dresden,  and  washes  the  foot  of  the  formerly 
Saxon  fortress  of  Torgau.  It  then  proceeds 
into  the  heart  of  Prussia,  runs  round  Magde- 
burg, her  principal  fortress,  protects  Berlin, 
her  capital,  situated  beyond  it,  at  an  equal 
distance  from  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  among 
lakes,  sand-hills,  and  canals.  Lastly,  before 
il  falls  into  the  North  Sea,  it  forms  the  port  of 


the  wealthy  city  of  Hamburg,  which  intro- 
duces into  Germany,  by  the  waters  of  this 
river,  the  productions  of  the  whole  world. 
From  this  brief  sketch  of  the  Elbe,  one  may 
easily  comprehend  the  ambition  of  Prussia  to 
possess  its  entire  course,  and  to  absorb  Sax- 
ony on  the  one  side,  the  Hanseatic  towns  and 
Hanover  on  the  other — an  ambition  which 
slumbers  at  the  present  moment:  for  all  the 
European  ambitions,  glutted  at  the  expense 
of  France  in  1815,  appear  to  be  asleep  for  a 
time.  But,  at  the  period  to  which  this  history 
relates,  the  convulsion  of  states  had  inflamed 
and  made  manifest  all  desires.  Prussia  had 
demanded  of  us  the  Hanseatic  towns;  as  for 
Saxony,  she  had  never  ventured  to  claim 
more  than  its  dependence  under  the  title  of 
Confederation  of  the  North;  and  it  is  natural 
that  Napoleon  should  have  felt  all  that  jea- 
lousy which  he  felt  on  account  of  Bavaria, 
when  he  committed  the  fault  of  being  jealous 
of  Prussia. 

The  Elbe,  then,  is  the  river  which  you  must 
reach  and  cross,  when  you  would  make  war 
upon  Prussia,  as  the  Danube  is  that,  the  course 
of  which  you  must  descend  when  you  want  to 
make  war  upon  Austria.  As  soon  as  you 
have  succeeded  in  forcing  the  Elbe,  the  de- 
fences of  Prussia  fall,  for  you  take  Saxony 
from  her,  you  annul  Magdeburg,  and  Berlin  is 
left  unprotected.  The  channels  of  commerce 
themselves  are  occupied  by  the  assailant,  and 
this  becomes  a  serious  matter  if  the  war  is 
prolonged.  Thus,  while  you  are  obliged,  in 
the  case  of  the  Danube,  after  reaching  its 
sources,  to  descend  its  course  to  Vienna,  in 
the  case  of  the  Elbe,  in  order  to  attain  your 
principal  object,  it  is  sufficient  to  have  crossed 
it;  and  if  you  have  a  conception  of  the  vast 
designs  of  Napoleon,  it  then  becomes  neces- 
sary to  push  on  to  the  Oder,  in  order  to  inter- 
pose between  Prussia  and  Russia,  to  intercept 
succours  from  one  to  the  other.  You  must 
even  advance  to  the  Vistula,  beat  Russia  in 
Poland,  where  so  many  resentments  are 
brooding  against  her,  and  follow  the  example 
of  Hannibal,  who  carried  the  war  into  the 
heart  of  the  Italian  provinces,  trembling  under 
the  insecurely  riveted  yoke  of  ancient  Rome. 
Such  are  the  steps  of  that  immense  march  to 
the  north,  which  has  hitherto  been  attempted 
by  one  man  only,  by  Napoleon.  Will  it  ever 
be  attempted  again  ?  That  the  world  knows 
not.  If  such  be  the  will  of  Providence,  may 
it  be  at  last  a  serious  attempt,  conducive  to 
the  freedom  and  the  independence  of  the  west! 

But,  to  reach  that  northern  plain,  at  the  en- 
trance of  which  Prussia  is  situated,  you  must 
traverse  the  mountainous  country  which  forms 
the  centre  of  Germany,  or  turn  it,  by  proceed- 
ing to  that  level  beach  which,  under  the  name 
of  Westphalia,  extends  from  the  mountains  to 
the  North  Sea. 

This  country,  which  closes  the  entrance  to 
Prussia,  is  composed  of  a  long  and  broad 
group  of  wooded  heights,  connecting  on  the 
one  side  with  Bohemia,  extending  northward 
to  the  plains  of  Westphalia,  amidst  which  it 
terminates,  after  rising  for  a  moment,  to  form 
the  summits  of  the  Harz,  so  rich  in  metals. 
This  mountainous  group,  which  separates 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


1T1 


the  waters  of  the  Rhine  from  those  of  the  Elbe, 
covered  in  its  upper  part  with  forests,  throws 
into  the  Rhine,  the  Mayn,  the  Lahn,  the  Sieg, 
the  Ruhr,  the  Lippe,  into  the  Elbe,  the  Elster, 
the  Saale,  the  Unstrut,  and,  lastly,  directly  into 
the  North  Sea,  the  Ems,  and  the  Weser. 

Various  routes  for  traversing  this  tract 
present  themselves.  In  the  first  place,  setting 
out  from  Mayence,  you  can  proceed  to  the 
right,  and  ascend  the  winding  valley  of  the 
Mayn  to  above  Wurzburg,  and  even  to  its 
sources.  There,  in  the  environs  of  Coburg, 
you  meet  with  wood-covered  heights,  which, 
under  the  name  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia, 
separate  Franconia  from  Saxony,  and  from 
which  flow  the  Mayn  on  the  one  side,  the 
Saale  on  the  other.  They  are  traversed  by 
three  defiles,  those  from  Bayreuth  to  Hof,  from 
Kronach  to  Schleiz,  from  Coburg  to  Saalfeld  ; 
then  you  descend  into  Saxony  through  the 
valley  of  the  Saale.  Such  is  the  first  route. 
The  second  is  to  the  left  of  those  wooded 
heights  which  form  the  forest  of  Thuringia. 
If  you  take  this,  you  ascend  the  Mayn  from 
Mayence  to  Hanau  ;  there  you  leave  it,  throw 
yourself  into  the  valley  of  the  Werra,  or  coun- 
try of  Fulde,  leave  the  forest  of  Thuringia  to 
the  right,  descend  by  Eisenach,  Gotha,  Wei- 
mar, into  the  plain  of  Thuringia  and  Saxony, 
and  arrive  on  the  banks  of  the  Elbe.  The 
latter  has  always  been  the  main  road  of  Ger- 
many, that  from  Frankfurt  to  Leipzig. 

The  third  and  last  route  consists  in  turning 
the  mountainous  centre  of  Germany,  and 
proceeding  northward  till  you  have  reached 
(he  plain  of  Westphalia,  which  you  do  by  fol- 
lowing the  course  of  the  Rhine  to  Wesel, 
crossing  at  Wesel,  then  traversing  Westphalia 
and  Hanover,  having  the  mountains  on  the 
right,  the  sea  on  the  left.  You  meet,  by  the 
•way,  with  the  Ems,  the  Weser,  and  lastly  the 
Elbe,  become,  at  this  extremity  of  its  course, 
one  of  the  most  considerable  rivers  in  Europe. 

Of  these  various  ways  of  penetrating  into 
the  plain  of  the  north,  Napoleon  had  chosen 
the  first,  that  leading  from  the  sources  of  the 
Mayn  to  the  sources  of  the  Saale  by  traversing 
the  defiles  of  Franconia. 

The  motives  for  his  choice  were  profound. 
In  the  first  place,  he  had  his  troops  in  Upper 
Franconia,  and,  if  he  had  marched  them 
northward  to  reach  Westphalia,  he  would 
have  exposed  himself  to  the  inconvenience  of 
travelling  double  or  treble  the  distance,  and  to 
the  risk  of  unmasking  his  movements  by  the 
mere  length  of  his  journey.  Independently 
of  the  length  and  meaning  of  this  journey,  he 
would  have  met  with  the  Ems,  the  Weser,  the 
Elbe,  and  been  obliged  to  cross  those  rivers  in 
the  lower  part  of  their  courses,  when  they 
have  become  formidable  obstacles.  These 
reasons  left  a  choice  between  two  courses 
only:  either  to  take  the  great  central  road  of 
Germany,  which  runs  through  Frankfurt, 
Hanau,  Fulda,  Gotha,  Weimar,  to  Leipzig, 
and  passes  to  the  left  of  the  forest  of  Thu- 
ringia; or  to  ascend  the  Mayn  to  its  source, 
and  to  throw  himself  out  of  the  valley  of  the 
Mayn  into  the  valley  of  the  Saale,  which  con- 
sisted in  passing  to  the  right  of  the  forest  of 
Thuringia.  Of  these  two  routes,  however, 


the  second  was  far  preferable,  for  a  reason 
pertaining  to  the  general  plan  of  Napoleon, 
and  to  his  system  of  warfare.  The  farther 
he  passed  to  the  right,  the  more  chance  he 
had  of  turning  the  Prussians  by  their  left,  to 
reach  the  Elbe  before  them,  to  cut  them  off 
from  Saxony,  to  deprive  them  of  its  resources 
and  its  soldiers,  to  cross  the  Elbe  in  the  part 
of  its  course  where  it  is  easiest  to  cross,  to 
make  himself  master  of  Berlin,  and  lastly, 
after  outstripping  the  Prussians  at  the  Elbe,  to 
get  before  them  to  the  Oder,  on  which  side  the 
Russians  might  be  coming  to  their  assistance. 
If  Napoleon  attained  this  object  he  would  do 
something  like  what  he  had  accomplished  in 
the  preceding  year,  by  turning  the  Austrian 
general,  Mack,  by  separating  him  from  the 
Russian  succours,  and  by  cutting  in  two  the 
forces  of  the  coalition,  and  beating  one  por- 
tion after  the  other.  To  be  first  at  the  Elbe 
and  the  Oder  was  therefore  the  grand  problem 
to  be  resolved  in  this  war.  With  this  object, 
the  defiles  leading  from  Franconia  into  Sax- 
ony, and  passing  through  the  forest  of  Thu- 
ringia, were  the  route  that  Napoleon  must  pre- 
fer, without  taking  into  account  that  his  troops 
were  all  brought  thither,  and  that  they  had 
only  to  set  out  from  the  point  where  they  were 
to  get  into  action. 

But  a  point  in  which  it  behoved  him  to 
take  especial  pains  to  succeed,  was  to  leave 
the  Prussians  in  doubt  respecting  his  real  de- 
sign, to  persuade  them  that  he  should  take  the 
road  through  Fulda,  Eisenach,  and  Weimar, 
that  is  to  say,  the  central  road  of  Germany, 
that  which  runs  to  the  left  of  the  forest  of  Thu- 
ringia. To  this  end,  he  had  placed  part  of  his 
left  wing,  composed  of  the  fifth  and  seventh 
corps,  commanded  by  Marshals  Lannes  and 
Augereau,  about  Konigshoffen  and  Hildburg- 
hausen,  on  the  Werra,  to  induce  a  belief  that 
he  was  going  into  Upper  Hesse.  And,  in  fact, 
there  was  enough  in  this  to  mislead  them. 
Napoleon  had  not  confined  himself  to  this  de- 
monstration ;  with  a  view  to  increase  their 
uncertainty,  he  had  ordered  other  demonstra- 
tions towards  Westphalia.  The  march  of  the 
King  of  Holland,  preceded  by  false  reports, 
had  had  that  object.  Nevertheless,  it  could 
not  deceive  the  Prussians  so  much  as  to  per- 
suade them  that  Napoleon  would  attack  by 
Westphalia.  Besides  the  presence  of  the 
French  army  in  Franconia,  an  accessory  cir- 
cumstance had  been  sufficient  to  enlighten 
them.  Dupont's  division,  always  employed 
separately  since  the  battles  of  Haslach  and 
Albeck,  had  been  sent  to  the  Lower  Rhine 
to  occupy  the  grand-duchy  of  Berg.  On  the 
approach  of  war,  it  had  been  brought  back  s-y 
the  way  of  Mayence  and  Frankfurt.  This 
movement  from  left  to  right  contradicted  th  : 
probability  of  any  offensive  operation  in  the 
quarter  of  Westphalia,  and  led  to  a  belief  "hat 
the  attack  would  take  place  either  frcm  the 
country  of  Fulda  or  from  Franconia,  either  l» 
the  left  or  to  the  right  of  the  forest  of  Thuriu- 
gia.  But  which  of  these  two  passages  wouhl 
be  preferred  by  Napoleon,  there  lay  the  doubt, 
which  that  profound  calculator  took  infinite 
pains  to  keep  up  in  the  minds  of  »he  Prussian 
generals. 


172 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


Nothing  can  give  an  idea  of  the  agitation 
which  prevailed  among  those  unfortunate 
generals.  They  were  all  assembled  at  Erfurt, 
at  the  back  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia,  with 
the  ministers,  the  king,  the  queen,  and  the 
court,  deliberating  in  a  sort  of  confusion  diffi- 
cult to  describe.  The  Prussian  forces,  first 
assembled  in  each  military  district,  had  been 
afterwards  concentrated  in  two  masses,  one  in 
the  environs  of  Magdeburg,  under  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick,  the  other  in  the  environs  of 
Dresden,  under  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe.  The 
principal  army,  moved  from  Magdeburg  to 
Naumburg  on  the  Saale,  then  to  Weimar  and 
Erfurt,  was  at  this  moment  around  the  latter 
town,  ranged  behind  the  forest  of  Thuringia, 
its  front  covered  by  the  length  of  the  forest, 
and  its  left  by  the  steep  banks  of  the  Saale. 
The  Duke  of  Weimar,  with  a  strong  detach- 
ment of  light  troops,  occupied  the  interior  of 
the  forest,  and  pushed  reconnoissances  beyond 
it.  General  Ruchel  formed  the  right  of  this 
army,  with  the  troops  of  Westphalia. 

This  principal  army  might  be  computed  at 
93,000  men,  including  the  corps  of  General  . 
Ruchel.     The  second  army,  organized  in  Sile-  j 
sia,  had  been  marched  to  Saxony  for  the  pur-  : 
pose  of  gaining  over  the  unfortunate  elector,  j 
who  had  neither  interest  in  the  war,  nor  liking  i 
for  it,  partly  by  persuasion,  partly  by  fear. 
Yielding,  at  length,  after  much  hesitation,  he 
had  just  promised  20,000  Saxons,  very  good  j 
troops,  and  to  deliver  the  bridge  of  Dresden  , 
to  the  Prussians,  on  condition  that  they  should  . 
cover  Saxony,  by  placing  one  of  the  two  act-  j 
ing  armies  there.     The  20,000  Saxons  were 
not  ready,  and  detained  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
lohe, who  was  slowly  ascending  the  Saale,  to 
take  a  position  opposite  to  the  defiles  leading 
from  Franconia  into  Saxony,  facing  the  assem-  : 
blage  of  the  French  troops.     The  Prussian 
contingent  of  the  country  of  Beyreuth,  under 
the  command  of  General  Tauenzien,  had  fallen 
back  upon  Schleiz  on  our  approach,  and  thus 
formed  the  advanced  guard  of  Prince  Hohen-  j 
lohe.      The  latter,  with   the   20.000   Saxons, 
whom  he  was  waiting  for,  and  the  thirty  and 
odd  thousand  Prussians  from  Silesia,  would 
have  under  him  a  corps  of  more  than  50,000 
men. 

Such  were  the  two  Prussian  armies.     For 
the  whole  reserve  there  was  at  Magdeburg  a 
corps  of  about  15,000  men,  placed  under  the 
command  of  the  Prince  of  Wirtemberg,  who  j 
had  quarrelled  with  his  family.     To  this  enu- 
meration must  be  added  the  garrisons  of  the  fort-  ' 
reuses  of  the  Oder  and  the  Vistula,  amounting  1 
to  about  25,000  men.   Thus  the  Prussians  had 
not  more    than   180,000  or  185,000    soldiers, 
including  the  Saxons,  at  their  disposal,  and 
numbered  of  their  own  not  more  than  160,000 
vi  165,000.' 

Thus  180,000  Germans  were  about  to  be 

«  The  following  is,  we  believe,  a  most  accurate  state- 
ment of  the  Prussian  forces : 

Men. 
10.000 
66,000 

17,000 


opposed  to  190,000  French,  who  were  soon  to 
be  followed  by  100,000  more,  and  who  were 
so  inured  to  war,  that  they  might  be  pitted  in 
'.  the  proportion  of  one  to  two,  sometimes  even 
of  one  to  three,  against  the  best  troops  in  Eu- 
I  rope.     We  say  nothing  of  the  weight  thrown 
!  into  the  scale  by  the  genius  and  the  presence 
;  of  Napoleon.    The  folly  of  such  a  contest  on 
the  part  of  the  Prussians  was  consequently 
,  very  great,  without  reckoning   the   political 
j  fault  of  a  war  between  Prussia  and  France,  a 
j  fault,  it  is  true,  equal  on  both  sides.     For  the 
i  rest,  the  Prussians  were  brave,  as  the  Ger- 
mans always  have  been;  but,  since  the  Seven 
Years'  War,  that  is  to  say,  ever  since  1763, 
they  had  not  been   engaged  in  any  serious 
|  war;  for  their  intervention  in  1792,  in  the  first 
'.  struggle  of  Europe  against  the  French  Revo- 
lution, had  not  been  either  very  long  or  very 
energetic.     Hence  they  had  taken  no   share 
in  the  changes  introduced  during  the  last  fif- 
teen years  into  the  organization  of  the  Euro- 
;  pean  troops  ;  they  deemed  the  art  of  war  to 
consist  in  a  regularity  of  movements  which 
is  much  more  serviceable  at  a  review  than  in  a 
field  of  battle  ;  they  were  followed  by  a  quan- 
tity of  baggage,  sufficient  of  itself  to  undo  an 
army  by  the  obstacles  which  it  throws  in  the 
way  of  its  march.     For  the  rest,  pride,  which 
is  a  great  moral  force,  was  extreme  in  the 
Prussians,  especially  among  the  officers ;  and 
in  them  it  was  accompanied  by  a  still  nobler 
sentiment,  an  inconsiderate  but  ardent  patriot- 
ism. 

Their  army  was  not  less  to  be  found  fault 
with  for  the  confusion  of  its  councils  than  for 
the  quality  of  the  troops.  The  king  had  com- 
mitted the  direction  of  this  war  to  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick,  out  of  deference  to  the  old  re-" 
nown  of  his  nephew,  this  disciple  of  the  great 
Frederick.  There  are  established  reputations, 
which  are  sometimes  destined  to  ruin  empires; 
the  command,  in  fact,  cannot  be  refused  them; 
and  when  it  has  been  conferred,  the  public, 
which  perceives  the  insufficiency  under  the 
glory,  censures  the  choice  which  it  has  im- 
posed, and  renders  it  still  more  mischievous, 
by  weakening  with  its  animadversions  the 
moral  authority  of  command,  without  which 
material  authority  is  nothing.  Such  was  the 
case  with  the  Duke  of  Brunswick.  This  choice 
was  generally  deplored  among  the  Prussians, 
and  they  expressed  themselves  on  the  subject 
with  a  boldness,  of  which  it  would  be  impos- 
sible to  find  an  example  elsewhere,  for  it 
seemed  that  in  this  nation  freedom  of  mind 
and  language  was  to  spring  from  the  bosom 
of  the  army.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick,  en- 
dowed with  an  enlightened  understanding,  (an 
advantage  not  always  possessed  by  men  whose 
merit  fame  has  exaggerated,)  deemed  himself 
unfit  for  the  so  active  and  so  terrible  wars  of 
the  time.  "He  had  accepted  the  command,  out 


Advanced  guard  under  the  Duke  of  Weimar-  •  •    10,000 
Principal  corps  under  the  Duke  of  Brunswick- 
Hoops  of  Westphalia  under  General  Ruchel, 
'•irming  the  right  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  • 

Total  of  the  principal  army 93,000 


Corps  of  Cie   Prince  of  Hohenlohe,   including 

Saxons    50,000 

Reserve  under  the  Prince  of  Wirtemberg 15,000 

Garrisons  of  the  Oder  and  Vistula 35,000 

Total  of  the  Prussian  forces 183,000 

They  may.  however,  be  set  down  at  185,000:  for  the 
corps  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  wa»  in  general  com- 
puted at  more  than  50,000  men. 


Oct  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


173 


of  an  old  man's  weakness,  thai  he  might  not  j 
have  the  mortification  of  leaving  it  to  rivals, 
and  he  fell  overwhelmed  by  this  burden. 
Judging  of  others  as  justly  as  of  himself,  he 
appreciated  as  it  deserved  the  folly  of  the  court 
and  that  of  the  young  military  nobility,  and  he 
was  not  less  alarmed  at  it  than  at  his  own  in- 
sufficiency. Beside  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
was  another  relic  of  the  reign  of  the  great 
Frederick — old  Marshal  Mollendorf;  he,  too, 
bowed  by  years,  but  modest,  devoted,  exercis- 
ing no  authority,  and  called  solely  to  give  his 
opinion ;  for,  the  king,  uncertain  in  every 
thing,  not  daring  to  assume  the  command,  and 
unable  to  resolve  to  commit  it  entirely  to  an- 
other, wished  to  consult  upon  every  resolution 
of  his  staff,  and  to  judge  of  every  order,  before 
he  permitted  its  execution.  To  the  weakness 
of  the  old  men  were  added  the  pretensions  of 
the  young,  convinced  that  to  them  alone  be- 
longed the  talent  and  the  right  to  command 
armies.  The  principal  of  them  was  the  Prince 
of  Hohenlohe,  commander  of  the  second  army, ' 
and  one  of  the  German  sovereigns  stripped  of 
their  dominions  by  the  new  Confederation  of  j 
the  Rhine.  Full  of  passions  and  pride,  he ' 
owed  to  a  few  daring  acts  in  the  war  of  1792 ' 
the  reputation  of  an  able  and  enterprising  ge- 
neral. That  reputation,  not  very  justly  de- 
served, was  sufficient  to  excite  in  him  an  am- 
bition to  be  independent  of  the  generalissimo, ; 
and  to  act  according  to  his  personal  notions. 
He  had  addressed  an  application  to  the  king, 
who,  not  daring  either  to  accede  to  his  wishes, 
or  to  refuse  them,  had  suffered  a  secondary 
command,  ill-defined,  tending  to  separation 
and  insubordination,  to  spring  up  beside  the 
command-in-chief.  Desirous  to  draw  the  war 
to  himself,  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  strove  to 
establish  the  theatre  of  the  principal  operations 
on  the  Upper  Saale,  where  he  was,  while  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick  endeavoured  to  fix  it  at 
the  back  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia,  where  he 
had  placed  himself.  From  this  deplorable 
squabble,  the  most  mischievous  consequences 
could  not  fail  very  soon  to  arise.  Then  came 
the  declaimers,  General  Rachel,  who  had  not 
scrupled  to  insult  M.  de  Haugwitz ;  Prince 
Louis,  who  had  so  mainly  contributed  to  in- 
fatuate the  court,  alike  decided  to  favour  no 
plan  but  what  tended  to  an  immediate  offen- 
sive, out  of  fear  of  a  return  to  pacific  ideas 
and  of  an  accommodation  between  Frederick 
William  and  Napoleon.  Among  these  gene- ! 
rals,  and  forming  a  contrast  to  them,  Marshal 
Kalkreuth  was  conspicuous.  Not  so  aged  as 
the  one,  not  so  young  as  the  others,  superior  I 
to  all  by  his  talents,  still  adequate  to  fatigue, 
though  he  had  borne  a  glorious  part  in  the 
campaigns  of  the  great  Frederick,  enjoying 
and  deserving  the  confidence  of  the  army,  he 
considered  the  present  war  as  extravagant,  the 
commander  appointed  to  direct  it  incapable;; 
declaring  his  opinion,  moreover,  wilh  a  bold-  j 
ness  which  contributed  to  shake  profoundly 
the  authority  of  the  generalissimo.  It  was  by 
him  that  the  army  would  have  wished  to  be 
commanded ;  though,  in  the  presence  of 
French  soldiers  and  Napoleon,  he  might  have 
done  no  better  than  the  Duke  of  Brunswick 
himself.  To  these  military  personages  were 


added  several  civil  personages — M.  de  Haug- 
witz, first  minister,  M.  Lombard,  the  king's 
secretary,  M.  de  Lacchesini,  minister  of  Prus- 
sia at  Paris,  besides  a  great  number  of  Ger- 
man princes,  among  the  rest,  the  Elector  of 
Hesse,  whom  vain  efforts  were  made  to  drag 
into  the  war ;  and  lastly,  completing  this  med- 
ley, the  queen,  with  some  of  her  ladies,  riding 
on  horseback,  and  showing  herself  to  the 
troops,  who  greeted  her  with  their  acclama- 
tions. When  sensible  people  inquired  what 
that  august  personage  did  there — she,  who  by 
her  position  and  rank  seemed  so  out  of  place 
in  head-quarters  1 — the  reply  was,  that  her  en- 
ergy was  useful — that  she  alone  kept  the  king 
steady — prevented  his  swerving;  and  thus, 
there  was  alleged,  in  excuse  for  her  presence, 
a  reason  not  less  indecorous  that  her  pre- 
sence itself. 

M.  de  Haugwitz,  M.  Lombard,  and  all  the 
old  partisans  of  French  alliance,  strove  to  ob- 
tain their  pardon  by  not  the  most  honourable 
disavowal  of  their  anterior  conduct.  Messrs, 
de  Haugwitz  and  Lombard,  who  had  sufficient 
intelligence  to  judge  of  what  was  passing  be- 
fore their  faces,  and  who  ought  to  have  re- 
tired when  peace  politics  had  become  impossi- 
ble, and  have  left  to  M.  de  Hardenberg  the  con- 
sequences of  war  politics,  affected,  on  the  con- 
trary, the  greatest  warmth  of  sentiments,  in 
order  to  gain  credit  for  the  sincerity  of  their 
change.  They  carried  their  weakness  to  such 
a  length  as  to  calumniate  themselves,  by  in- 
sinuating that  their  attachment  to  French  alli- 
ance had  been  but  a  feint  on  their  part  to  de- 
ceive Napoleon,  and  to  defer  a  rupture,  which 
they  foresaw,  but  which  the  king,  always  a 
friend  to  peace,  had  'imperatively  commanded 
them  to  postpone.  To  give  themselves  the 
character  of  knaves  in  times  past,  in  order  to 
pass  for  honest  men  at  the  present  moment, 
was  neither  very  clever  nor  very  honourable. 
All  that  M.  de  Haugwitz  gained  by  this  sort  of 
conduct  was,  to  lose  in  a  day  the  merit  of  a 
wise  policy  which  belonged  to  him,  to  assume 
the  responsibility  of  a  disastrous  policy  with 
which  he  had  nothing  to  do. 

There  was  at  that  time,  in  Germany,  an  able 
and  eloquent  pamphleteer,  a  bitter  enemy  to 
France,  and  whose  patriotic  passions,  though 
genuine,  were  not  disinterested,  for  he  was 
paid  for  his  attacks  by  the  courts  of  Vienna  and 
London  :  this  pamphleteer  was  M.  de  Gentz. 
It  was  he  who,  for  several  years,  wrote  the 
manifestoes  of  the  coalition,  and  filled  the 
journals  of  Europe  with  virulent  declamations 
against  France.  MM.  de  Haugwitz  and  Lom- 
bard had  invited  him  to  the  Prussian  head- 
quarters, to  beg  him  to  draw  up  the  Prussian 
manifesto;  and  there  were  they,  before  this 
scribbler  of  libels,  imploring,  coaxing,  wheed- 
ling, loading  him  with  attentions  and  marks 
of  distinction,  even  presenting  him  to  the 
queen  herself,  and  procuring  him  interviews 
with  that  princess.  After  they  had  frequently 
denounced  him  to  Fiance  as  a  firebrand  sold 
to  England,  they  besought  him  at  this  moment 
to  inflame  all  German  hearts  against  that  same 
France.  They  had  requested  him,  moreover, 
to  be  surety  to  Austria  for  their  sincerity,  ox- 
cusins;  themselves  for  being  so  late  to  fight  toe 
p  2 


1Y4 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


common  enemy,  by  the  assurance  that  they 
had  always  detested  him. 

It  was  amidst  this  strange  medley  of  mili- 
tary officers,  princes,  ministers,  men,  women, 
all  obtruding  their  opinion,  advice,  approba- 
tion or  censure,  that  politics  and  war  were  dis- 
cussed. M.  de  Haugwitz,  who  had  sought  to 
prolong  his  illusions  as  he  had  sought  to  pro- 
long his  power,  strove  to  persuade  every  body 
that  all  was  going  on  well — very  well,  better 
than  could  have  been  hoped  for.  He  boasted 
of  having  found  very  amicable  dispositions  in 
Austria,  and  even  talked  of  secret  communi- 
cations, which  encouraged  an  expectation  of 
the  speedy  concurrence  of  that  power.  He 
extolled  the  generosity  of  the  emperor  Alexan- 
der, and  published  as  authentic  news  the  im- 
mediate arrival  of  the  Russian  troops  on  the 
Elbe.  He  represented  the  adhesion  of  the 
elector  of  Hesse  as  secured,  and  the  junction 
of  30,000  Hessians,  the  best  soldiers  of  the 
Confederation,  to  the  Prussian  army.  Lastly, 
he  announced  the  sudden  reconciliation  of 
Prussia  with  England,  and  the  departure  of  a 
British  plenipotentiary  for  the  Prussian  head- 
quarters. M.  de  Haugwitz,  however,  could  not 
believe  such  news  to  be  true;  for  he  knew 
that  Austria,  well  remembering  the  conduct 
held  towards  her,  would  not  join  Prussia  till 
the  day  when  Napoleon  should  be  vanquished, 
that  is  to  say,  when  there  would  be  no  further 
need  of  her  assistance;  that  the  Russian 
troops  would  not  reach  the  Elbe  for  three  or 
four  months,  that  is  to  say,  not  till  the  question 
would  be  decided ;  that  the  elector  of  Hesse, 
always  crafty,  awaited  the  issue  of  the  first 
battle  to  declare  himself;  that,  lastly,  England, 
whose  reconciliation  with  Prussia  was  in  fact 
certain,  could  furnish  nothing  but  money, 
whereas  Prussia  wanted  soldiers  to  oppose 
to  the  terrible  soldiers  of  Napoleon.  He  knew 
that  the  question  still  consisted  in  conquering 
with  the  Prussian  army,  limited  to  its  own 
force,  enervated  by  a  long  peace,  commanded 
by  an  old  man,  the  French  army,  constantly 
victorious  for  fifteen  years  past,  and  com- 
manded by  Napoleon.  But,  striving  to  deceive 
himself  for  a  day,  for  an  hour  longer,  he  cir- 
culated reports  which  he  disbelieved,  and  en- 
deavoured to  throw  some  shade  over  the  pre- 
cipice towards  which  all  were  rushing. 

No  better  disposition  of  mind  was  manifest- 
ed in  discussing  the  plans  of  the  campaign.  All 
the  conclusion  drawn  from  the  grand  lessons 
in  the  military  art  given  by  Napoleon  to  Europe 
was,  that  it  was  necessary  to  take  the  offensive 
immediately,  to  beat  the  French  with  their  own 
weapons,  that  is,  with  daring  and  celerity,  and, 
as  Prussia  was  not  capable  of  supporting  for 
any  long  time  the  expense  of  so  great  an  ar- 
mament, to  lose  no  time  in  settling  (he  business 
by  fighting  a  decisive  battle  with  the  whole 
collected  force  of  the  monarchy.  The  Prus- 
sians seriously  persuaded  themselves,  even 
after  Austerlitz,  even  after  Hohenlinden  and  a 
hundred  other  pitched  battles,  that  the  French, 
brisk  and  adroit,  were  chiefly  fit  for  a  war  of 
posts,  but  that,  in  a  general  action,  in  which 
large  masses  are  engaged,  the  solid  and  scien- 
tific tactics  of  the  Prussian  army  would  get 
me  belter  of  their  inconsistent  agility.  What 


was  requisite  above  all  to  please  these  agitated 
people,  to  be  favourably  listened  to  by  them 
was  to  talk  of  offensive  war.  Whoever  had 
brought  a  plan  of  defensive  war,  let  the 
grounds  on  which  that  plan  was  founded  be 
ever  so  sound ;  whoever,  appealing  to  the  ever- 
lasting rules  of  prudence,  had  dared  to  say 
that,  to  an  enemy  profoundly  experienced, 
singularly  impetuous,  till  then  invincible,  it 
was  necessary  to  oppose  time,  space,  natural 
obstacles  judiciously  chosen,  and  to  wait  for 
suitable  occasions,  that  Fortune  yields  neither 
to  the  rash  who  outrun  her,  nor  to  the  timid 
who  flee  from  her,  but  to  the  skilful  who  grasp 
her  when  she  presents  herself — whoever  had 
dared  to  give  such  advice,  would  have  been 
regarded  as  a  coward  or  a  traitor,  sold  to  Na- 
poleon. Still,  as  the  Prussian  army  could  not 
then  make  head  against  the  French  army,  the 
plainest  common  sense  suggested  that  other 
obstacles  than  the  bosoms  of  soldiers  ought  to 
be  opposed  to  Napoleon.  These  obstacles,  such 
as  one  already  had  a  glimpse  of  them,  and 
such  as  experience  soon  revealed  them,  were 
the  distance,  the  climate,  the  junction  of  the 
German  and  Russian  forces  in  the  frost-bound 
recesses  of  the  north.  There  was  no  need, 
then,  by  moving  forward,  to  spare  Napoleon 
half  the  distance,  to  transfer  the  war  to  a  tem- 
perate climate,  and  to  afford  him  the  advantage 
of  fighting  the  Prussians  before  the  arrival  of 
the  Russians.  There  was  no  need,  especially 
in  presence  of  an  enemy  so  prompt,  so  adroit, 
so  skilful  in  profiting  by  a  false  movement, 
for  the  former,  by  taking  a  too  advanced  posi- 
tion, to  run  the  risk  of  being  cut  off  from  their 
line  of  operation,  separated  from  the  Elbe  or 
the  Oder,  enveloped,  annihilated,  at  the  very 
outset  of  the  war.  The  Austrians,  whom  they 
had  so  severely  censured  in  the  preceding 
year,  ought  to  have  served  for  a  lesson,  and  to 
have  prevented  them  by  the  remembrance  of 
their  disasters  from  exhibiting  a  second  time 
the  spectacle  of  Germans,  surprised,  beaten, 
disarmed,  before  the  arrival  of  their  auxiliaries 
from  the  north. 

Thus  prudence  taught  that,  instead  of  ad- 
vancing to  the  woody  mountains  which  sepa- 
rate the  valley  of  the  Elbe  from  that  of  the 
Rhine,  they  ought  merely  to  keep,  en  masse, 
behind  the  Elbe  (the  only  obstacle  capable  of 
stopping  the  French)  to  dispute  the  passage 
of  it  to  the  best  of  their  power;  then,  when 
they  had  crossed  the  Elbe,  to  fall  back  to  the 
Oder,  and  from  the  Oder  to  the  Vistula,  till 
they  had  joined  the  Russians,  avoiding  any 
but  partial  actions,  which,  without  compro- 
mising any  thing,  would  have  renewed  in  the 
Prussians  the  long-lost  habit  of  war.  When 
150,000  Prussians  should  be  joined  by  150,000 
Russians,  in  the  alternately  muddy  or  frozen 
plains  of  Poland,  then  serious  difficulties 
would  commence  for  Napoleon. 

It  required  no  genius,  we  repeat  it,  but  only 
plain  common  sense,  to  conceive  such  a  plan. 
Besides,  a  Frenchman,  a  great  general,  Du- 
mouriez,  who  had  formerly  saved  France 
against  that  same  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and 
who,  corrupted  since  by  exile,  was  taking 
pains  to  advise  our  enemies,  but  without  being 
listened  to  by  them — Dumouriez  sent  memo- 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


175 


rials  upon  memorials  to  the  European  cabinets, 
urging  that  to  fall  back,  and  to  oppose  to  Na- 
poleon distances,  climate,  hunger,  rains,  were 
the  safe  means  of  fighting  him.  Napoleon 
himself  was  so  convinced  of  this,  that,  when 
he  was  informed  that  the  Prussians  were  ad- 
vancing beyond  the  Elbe,  he  refused  at  first 
to  believe  it' 

It  is  true,  that  by  the  adoption  of  such  a 
plan,  they  would  lose  the  concurrence  of  Hesse 
and  Saxony,  the  finest  provinces  of  the  monar- 
chy, abandoned  without  fighting  to  the  enemy, 
the  resources  in  which  those  provinces  abound- 
ed, the  capital,  and,  lastly,  the  honour  of  their 
arms,  compromised  by  so  rapid  a  retreat. 
But  these  objections,  serious,  it  is  true,  were 
more  specious  than  solid.  Hesse,  in  fact, 
would  not  give  herself  up  to  men  who  already 
had  the  stamp  of  defeat  on  their  brow.  Twenty 
thousand  Saxons  were  not  worth  the  sacrifice 
of  a  good  system  of  war.  The  provinces 
which  they  scrupled  to  abandon  were  liable 
to  be  lost,  either  willingly  or  by  force,  by  an 
offensive  movement  of  Napoleon's ;  and,  after 
he  had  been  seen  traversing  Austria  with  giant 
strides,  without  being  stopped  by  mountains  or 
rivers,  it  was  puerile  to  compute  space  with 
him.  Those  lines  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia, 
of  the  Elbe,  of  the  Oder,  which  they  were 
afraid  to  give  up  to  him,  they  were  certain  to 
see  wrested  from  them  by  a  single  manoeuvre 
of  Napoleon's,  without  their  being  able  to  take 
the  successive  steps  of  a  well-calculated  re- 
treat, and  losing  at  the  same  time  not  only 
the  provinces  contained  between  those  lines, 
but  the  army  itself,  that  is  to  say,  the  mo- 
narchy. Lastly,  as  for  the.honour  of  the  arms, 
little  account  must  be  taken  of  appearances: 
a  retreat  which  can  be  imputed  to  calculation 
has  never  compromised  the  reputation  of  an 
army. 

For  the  rest,  none  of  these  ideas  had  been 
discussed  in  the  tumultuous  council,  where 
king,  princes,  ministers,  generals,  deliberated 
upon  the  operations  of  the  impending  war. 
Such  was  the  ardour  prevailing  in  it,  that  no 
discussion  of  any  but  offensive  plans  was 
allowed  ;  and  all  these  plans  tended  to  transfer 
the  Prussian  army  to  Francoma,  amidst  the 
cantonments  of  the  French  army,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  surprising  the  latter,  and  driving  it  to 
the  Rhine,  before  it  had  time  to  concentrate 
itself. 

The  plan  which  would  have  agreed  best 
with  the  prudence  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
would  have  been  to  continue  to  lie  close  at  the 
back  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia,  and  to  wait  in 
this  position  for  Napoleon  to  debouch  by  one 
side  of  that  forest  or  the  other,  by  the  defiles 
of  Franconia  in  Saxony,  or  by  the  central 
route  of  Germany,  which  goes  from  Frankfurt 


to  Weimar  In  the  first  case,  the  Prussians, 
with  their  right  at  that  forest  of  Thuringia, 
their  front  covered  by  the  Saale,  had  only  to 
allow  Napoleon  to  advance.  If  he  purposed 
to  attack  them  before  he  went  further,  they 
would  oppose  to  him  the  banks  of  the  Saale, 
which  it  was  almost  impossible  to  cross  be- 
fore an  army  of  140,000  men.  If  he  were  to 
hasten  to  the  Elbe,  they  would  follow  him, 
still  covered  by  those  same  banks  of  the  Saale. 
If,  on  the  contrary,  what  was  less  probable, 
considering  the  place  chosen  for  the  assem- 
bling of  his  troops,  Napoleon,  traversing  all 
Franconia,  should  gain  the  central  route  of 
Germany,  the  way  was  so  long,  that  they 
would  have  time  to  collect  en  masse,  and 
choose  a  suitable  spot  for  giving  him  battle  at 
the  moment  when  he  should  debouch  from  the 
mountains.  Certainly,  if  the  line  of  the  Elbe 
were  not  adopted  from  the  outset  as  the  first 
theatre  of  defensive  war,  the  next  best  thing 
to  be  done  was  to  place  themselves  behind 
the  forest  of  Thuringia,  as  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
:  wick  was  disposed  to  do. 

But  though  this  was  his  opinion,  he  durst 
not  propose  it.     Giving  way  to  the  general 
impulsion,  he  devised  one   plan  of  offensive 
j  warfare.     The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  usually 
;  in  contradiction  to  him,  devised  another.    To 
!  take  the   position   which    they  occupied,  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick  had  set  out  from  Magde- 
burg, the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  from  Dresden 
— the  first  ascending  the  left  bank,  the  second 
ascending  the  right  bank  of  the  Saale.     In  the 
system   of  offensive   warfare,   the  Prussians 
might  pass,  as  we  have  observed,  on  either 
i  side  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia,  or  ascend  the 
Upper   Saale,   and   traverse   the   defiles   that 
place  Saxony  in   communication   with  Fran- 
conia, before    which   the   French    were  then 
assembling;  or,  taking  the  opposite  side,  tra- 
verse Upper  Hesse,  and  march  from  Eisenach 
upon    Fulda,    Schweinfurt,    and    Wilrzburg. 
,  The    Prince   of  Hohenlohe,  desiring  to  play 
the  principal  part,  proposed  to  leave  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick  where  he  was,  to  ascend  the 
Upper  Saale,  to  pass  through   the  defiles  of 
j  Franconia,  to  throw  himself  upon  the  Upper 
|  Mayn,   to   surprise   the   French    before    they 
were  quite  assembled,  and  to  make  them  fall 
back  upon  the  Upper  Mayn,  upon  WQrzburg, 
Frankfurt,   and   Mayence.     As    soon   as   the 
retreat  commenced,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick 
was  to  join  him,  no  matter  by  what  road,  to 
complete   the   rout  of  the   French,   with  the 
whole  mass  of  the  Prussian  forces. 

The  Duke  of  Brunswick's  plan  for  acting  on 
the  opposite  side  was  to  advance  by  Eisenach, 
Fulda,  Schweinfurt,  WQrzburg,  that  is  to  say, 
by  the  central  route  of  Germany,  to  fall  upon 
Wiirzburg  itself,  and  thus  to  cutoff  from  May- 


i  Here  is  a  fragment  of  a  letter  which  reveals  Napo- 
leou's  way  of  thinking  on  this  point  :— 

To  SI.  the  Marshal  Prince  of  Neu/chatel. 

St.  Cloud.  24th  September,  1S06. 

My  Cousin,  I  send  the  copy  of  the  orders  of  move- 
ment of  the  army,  which  I  addressed  to  you  on  the 
morning  of  the  20th  instant,  and  which  I  am  sorry  not 
to  have  sent  you  twelve  hours  after  the  departure  of  my 
courier  of  the  2()th  of  September,  because  he  was 
liable  to  be  intercepted.  However,  I  have  no  reason  to 
apprehend  it.  You  must  have  received  by  noon  on  the 
94tk  the  first  courier  of  the  20th.  Wheu  this  reaches 


you,  which  will  no  doubt  be  on  the  27th.  orders  will 
have  been  given  to  Marshal  Soult.  who  will  have  set 
out  on  the  26th;  and  as  it  will  take  him  three  or  four 
days'  march  to  get  to  Amberg.  he  would  be  able  to  get 
there  by  the  30th.  though  he  has  orders  not  to  do  so  till 
the  3d.  You  will  receive  the  present  courier  on  the 
27lh,  in  order  that  you  may  accelerate  the  movement  of 
|  Marshal  Soult.  It  is  of  importance  that  he  should 
I  speedily  reach  Amberg,  because  the  enemy  is  at  Hof, 
un  extravagance  of  which  1  did  not  believe  him  to  be 
capable,  conceiving  that  he  wo»>ld  remain  on  the  ilefeil- 
.  give  along  the  Elbe. 

NA.POUW- 


176 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1808 


ence  all  the  French  who  were  in  Franconia. 
This  plan  was  assuredly  the  better  of  the  two; 
for,  while  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  proposing 
to  debouch  upon  the  Upper  Mayn,  would  have 
flung  the  French  back  upon  the  Upper  Mayn, 
from  Coburg  upon  Wurzburg,  and  would  have 
tended  to  rally  them  as  they  fell  back,  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick,  on  the  contrary,  directing  his 
course  upon  Wurzburg  itself,  would  have  cut 
off  the  French  who  were  on  the  Upper  Mayn 
from  those  who  were  on  the  Lower  Mayn,  and 
placed  himself  between  Wurzburg,  which  was 
the  centre  of  their  assemblages,  and  Mayence, 
which  was  their  base  of  operation.  Besides, 
he  would  have  acted  with  a  united  force  of 
140,000  men,  and  have  entered  upon  the  offen- 
sive with  the  mass  of  troops  that  ought  to  be 
devoted  to  the  purpose  when  one  does  venture 
to  take  it.  But,  whichever  plan  were  adopted, 
that  there  might  be  some  chance  of  succeed- 
ing, it  would  have  been  requisite,  in  the  first 
place,  that  the  Prussian  army  should  be,  if  not 
equal  in  quality  to  the  French  army,  at  least 
capable  of  withstanding  its  shock;  in  the  se- 
cond place,  that  it  should  anticipate  Napoleon, 
and  surprise  him  before  he  had  concentrated 
all  his  forces  upon  Wurzburg.  Now  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick  had  given  orders  for  moving  on 
the  10th  of  October,  and  Napoleon  was  at 
Wurzburg  on  the  3d,  at  the  head  of  his  assem- 
bled forces,  and  ready  to  meet  all  events. 

While  the  Prussians  were  thus  disputing 
about  these  offensive  plans,  all  founded  on  the 
ridiculous  datum  of  surprising  the  French  on 
the  10th  of  October,  when  Napoleon  was  so 
early  as  on  the  3d  in  the  midst  of  his  assem- 
bled troops,  they  received  intelligence  of  his 
arrival  at  Wurzburg,  and  began  to  get  a 
glimpse  of  his  dispositions.  They  were  then 
aware  that  they  had  miscalculated  in  measur- 
ing his  activity  by  that  which  they  had  them- 
selves ;  and  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  who, 
without  possessing  the  rapid  comprehension, 
the  resolution,  the  activity  of  a  great  general, 
was  nevertheless  endowed  with  a  practised 
judgment,  was  more  keenly  sensible  of  the 
danger  of  confronting  the  French  army,  al- 
ready formed,  and  having  Napoleon  at  its 
head.  From  that  moment  he  renounced  all 
the  plans  of  offensive  operations  adopted  out 
of  condescension,  and  confined  himself  more 
and  more  to  the  defensive  position  taken  at  the 
back  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia.  He  strove 
to  demonstrate  to  all  around  him  the  advan- 
tages of  this  position  ;  for,  he  incessantly  re- 
peated to  them  that,  if  Napoleon  should  direct 
his  course  by  Kiinigshofen,  Eisenach,  Gotha 
and  Erfurt,  which  would  bring  him  into  Ger- 
many by  the  great  central  road,  they  might 
take  him  in  flank  at  the  moment  when  he 
was  debouching  from  the  mountains;  if,  on 
the  contrary,  passing  through  the  defiles  lead- 
ing from  Franconia  into  Saxony,  he  appeared 
upon  the  Upper  Sa»>.  they  would  occupy  the 
course  of  that  river,  and  await  him  without 
stirring,  behind  its  steep  banks.  Other  rea- 
sons, not  avowed  by  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
inspired  him  with  a  decided  preference  for 
this  position.  At  bottom  he  disapproved  the 
war,  and  he  had  just  discovered  with  joy  a 
chance  of  preventing  it.  According  to  the  re- 


ports of  the  spies,  Napoleon  was  having  great 
defensive  works  executed  towards  Schwein 
furt,  on  the  very  road  from  Wurzburg  to  Ko- 
nigshofen  and  Eisenach.  It  was  true  that 
Napoleon  had  ordered  works  in  different  direc- 
tions, especially  in  the  direction  of  Schweinfurt, 
Konigshofen,  Hildburghausen,  and  Eisenach. 
The  Duke  of  Brunswick  thence  concluded  not 
that  Napoleon  purposed  to  advance  by  the. 
great  central  road  from  Frankfurt  to  Weimar, 
but  that  he  meant  to  establish  himself  about 
Wurzburg,  and  there  take  a  defensive  position 
His  conversations  with  M.  de  Lucchesini  con 
tributed  equally  to  produce  this  persuasion. 
That  ambassador,  who  had  unfortunately  irri- 
tated his  cabinet  two  months  before  by  exag- 
gerated reports,  now  mixing  a  little  truth  with 
much  that  was  false,  affirmed  that,  at  bottom, 
Napoleon  was  not  desirous  of  war;  that  he 
had,  no  doubt,  treated  Prussia  slightingly,  but 
that  he  had  never  harboured  any  design  of 
aggression  against  her ;  and  that  it  was  very 
possible  that  he  had  come  to  post  himself  at 
Wurzburg,  in  order  to  await  there,  behind  good 
intrenchments,  the  final  decision  of  King  Fre- 
derick William. 

It  was  very  late  to  dare  to  bring  forward 
this  truth,  and  it  was  choosing  a  moment  to 
bring  it  forward  when  it  had  ceased  to  be  ac- 
curate. If,  in  fact,  Napoleon,  before  he  left 
Paris,  had  been  disposed  to  settle  matters  with 
Prussia  by  means  of  amicable  explanations, 
now  that  he  was  at  the  head  of  his  army  and 
his  sword  half  unsheathed,  he  was  ready  to 
draw  it  completely,  and  to  act  with  the  prompt- 
ness which  was  natural  to  him.  Nothing  was 
less  in  unison  with  his  character  than  the  plan 
of  establishing  himself  in  a  defensive  position 
before  Wurzburg.  But,  from  this  plan,  falsely 
attributed  to  Napoleon,  and  the  reports  of  M. 
de  Lucchesini,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  con- 
cluded with  secret  joy  that  it  would  be  possi- 
ble to  avoid  war,  especially  if  the  precaution 
were  taken  to  remain  at  the  back  of  the  forest 
of  Thuringia,  and  to  leave  between  the  two 
armies  that  obstacle  to  their  collision. 

The  king,  without  avowing  it,  was  of  the 
same  opinion.  A  last  council  was  therefore 
held  at  Erfurt  on  the  5th  of  October,  at  which 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
lohe, Marshal  Mollendorf,  several  officers  of 
the  staff,  the  commanders  of  corps,  the  king 
himself  and  his  ministers,  were  present.  This 
council  lasted  for  two  whole  days.  The  duke 
proposed  the  following  question :  "  Was  it 
prudent  to  go  and  seek  Napoleon  in  an  unas- 
sailable position,  when  they  no  longer  enter- 
tained, as  according  to  the  first  offensive  plan, 
any  hope  of  surprising  him  ?"  Long  and 
violent  discussions  ensued  on  this  point.  The 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe  again  put  forward,  through 
the  medium  of  the  chief  of  his  staff,  the  idea 
of  operating  by  the  Upper  Saale,  and  of  pass- 
ing through  the  defiles  at  the  outlets  of  which 
Napoleon  had  assembled  his  troops.  This  idea 
was  combatted  on  the  part  of  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick,  and  the  advantages  of  the  position 
taken  behind  the  forest  of  Thuringia  were 
again  expatiated  upon.  Thus  the  two  generals- 
in-chief  kept  up  an  obstinate  contest  by  means 
of  their  staff-officers.  For  the"  rest,  there  was 


Oct  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


177 


no  harmony  anywhere.  While  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick  was  engaged  in  warm  contention 
with  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  M.  de  Haug- 
witz  was  disputing  with  M.  de  Lucchesini,  and 
maintaining,  in  regard  to  the  pacific  disposi- 
tions attributed  to  Napoleon,  that  they  were  no 
longer  to  be  reckoned  upon.  To  the  clash  of 
ideas  was  added  the  clash  of  passions,  and 
General  Ruchel  ventured  to  offer  a  new  affront 
to  M.  de.  Haugwitz.  From  this  debate  each 
carried  away  only  a  greater  confusion  of  mind 
and  a  deeper  bitterness  of  heart.  The  king  in 
particular,  who  earnestly  sought  to  enlighten 
himself,  not  daring  to  trust  to  his  own  judg- 
ment, and  who  was  sensible  of  the  imminence 
of  the  danger — ihe  king  was  grieved  to  the 
very  heart.  As  it  was  impossible  to  come  to 
any  decision,  the  council,  feeling  the  necessity 
for  learning  more  precisely  the  real  resolutions 
of  Napoleon,  adopted  the  plan  of  a  general 
reconnoissance,  to  be  executed  simultaneously 
by  the  three  principal  corps  of  the  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  and  Ge- 
neral Ruchel.  The  king  caused  a  modification 
of  this  singular  resolution  by  reducing  the 
three  reconnoissances  to  one  only,  directed  by 
Colonel  de  Muffling,  an  officer  of  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick's  staff,  on  that  same  road  from 
Eisenach  to  Schweinfurt,  towards  which  Na- 
poleon seemed  to  be  making  some  prepara- 
tions of  defence.  Orders  were  given  to  the 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe  to  continue  the  concen- 
tration of  the  army  of  Silesia  on  the  Upper 
Saale,  leaving  General  Tauenzien,  with  the 
detachment  of  Bayreuth,  in  observation  to- 
wards the  defiles  of  Franconia.  To  this  mili- 
tary measure  was  added  a  political  measure, 
namely,  to  send  a  definite  note  to  Napoleon, 
signifying  the  irrevocable  resolutions  of  the 
court  of  Prussia.  This  note  was  to  set  forth 
the  relations  which  had  existed  between  the 
two  courts,  the  harsh  usage  with  which  France 
had  repaid  the  friendly  conduct  of  Prussia,  the 
obligation  imposed  upon  the  cabinet  of  Berlin 
to  demand  an  explanation  bearing  upon  all  the 
points  at  issue,  and  which  ought  to  be  preceded 
by  a  step  for  the  satisfaction  of  Germany, 
namely,  the  immediate  retreat  of  the  French 
troops  to  the  other  side  of  the  Rhine.  This 
retreat  was  required  to  be  effected  by  a  speci- 
fied day,  and  to  commence  on  the  8th  of  Oc- 
tober. 

Assuredly,  if  Prussia  was  still  desirous  of 
peace,  the  projected  note  was  a  very  ill-con- 
trived expedient  for  maintaining  it;  for  it  was 
mistaking  the  character  of  Napoleon  most 
egregiously  to  send  him  a  summons  to  retire 
by  a  certain  day.  But  while  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick and  the  king  were  striving  to  save  for 
themselves  a  last  chance  of  peace,  by  con- 
tinuing at  the  back  of  the  forest  of  Thuringia, 
they  were  forced,  in  order  to  satisfy  the  furious 
partisans  of  war,  to  make  some  apparent  de- 
monstrations of  haughtiness,  thus  submitting 
to  the  caprices  of  an  army,  which  had  trans- 
formed itself  into  a  popular  multitude,  and 
which  shouted,  dictated,  ordered,  like  the  mob, 
when  the  reins  are  resigned  to  it. 

Such  was  the  way  in  which  the  Prussians 
spent  the  time  that  Napoleon,  on  his  part,  was 
devoting  to  preparations  so  active  and  so  ably 

VOL.  II.— 23 


conceived.  Without  tarrying  at  Wurzburg,  he 
had  proceeded  to  Bamberg,  where  he  deferred 
his  entry  into  Saxony  for  the  final  explanations 
of  Prussia,  with  whom,  and  not  with  him,  lay 
the  wrong  of  the  aggression.  His  right,  com- 
posed of  the  corps  of  Marshals  Soult  and  Ney, 
was  in  advance  of  Bayreuth,  ready  to  debouch, 
by  the  road  from  Bayreuth  to  Hof,  upon  the 
Upper  Saale.  His  centre,  formed  by  the  corps 
of  Marshals  Bernadotte  and  Davout,  preceded 
by  the  reserve  of  cavalry,  and  followed  by  the 
foot-guard,  was  at  Kronach,  waiting  only  for 
orders  to  advance  by  Lobenstein  upon  Saal- 
burg  and  Schleiz.  His  left,  consisting  of  the 
corps  of  Marshals  Lannes  and  Augereau, 
making  deceitful  demonstrations  towards  Hild- 
burghausen,  was,  at  the  first  signal,  to  move 
from  left  to  right,  from  Coburg  towards  Neu- 
stadt,  in  order  to  debouch  by  Grafenthal  upon 
Saalfield.  These  three  columns  had  to  tra- 
verse the  narrow  defiles,  bordered  with  woods 
and  rocks,  which  place  Franconia  in  commu- 
nication with  Saxony,  and  run  to  the  Upper 
Saale.  The  frontier  of  Saxony,  however,  was 
not  yet  passed,  and  they  continued  on  the 
Franconian  territory,  with  one  foot  raised  for 
marching.  The  imperial  guard  was  not,  it  is 
true,  completely  assembled:  the  cavalry  and 
artillery  of  that  guard  were  still  wanting,  be- 
cause they  could  not  travel  post,  like  the  in- 
fantry; the  companies  of  elite  and  the  great 
park  also  were  still  deficient.  But  Napoleon 
had  at  hand  about  170,000  men,  and  those 
were  more  than  he  needed  to  crush  the  Prus- 
sian army. 

When  he  received,  on  the  7th,  the  note  of 
Prussia,  he  was  extremely  exasperated.  Ma- 
jor-general Berthier  was  wilh  him.  "  Prince," 
said  he,  "  we  will  be  punctual  to  the  appoint- 
ment, and  on  the  8th,  instead  of  being  in 
France,  we  shall  be  in  Saxony."  He  immedi- 
ately addressed  to  his  army  the  following  pro- 
clamation : 

"  Soldiers, — 

"The  order  for  your  return  to  France  was 
issued ;  you  had  already  made  several  marches; 
triumphal  festivities  awaited  you  !  But  while 
we  were  indulging  in  this  too  confident  secu- 
rity, fresh  plots  were  hatching  under  the  mask 
of  friendship  and  alliance.  Cries  of  war  were 
raised  in  Berlin.  The  same  spirit  of  infatua- 
tion which,  by  favour  of  our  intestine  dissen- 
sions, led  the  Prussians,  fourteen  years  ago, 
into  the  plains  of  Champagne,  still  pervades 
their  counsels.  If  it  is  not  Paris  that  they 
would  fain  raze  to  its  foundations,  it  is  now 
their  flags  that  they  would  boast  of  planting  in 
the  capitals  of  our  allies;  it  is  our  laurels  that 
they  would  snatch  from  our  brows !  They 
insist  that  we  should  evacuate  Germany  at 

sight  of  their  army Soldiers,  there 

is  not  one  of  you  who  would  wish  to  return  to 
France  by  any  other  way  than  that  of  honour. 
{ It  behoves  us  not  to  enter  it  again,  but  under 
arches  of  triumph.  Should  we  then  have  de- 
fied seasons,  seas,  deserts,  conquered  Europe, 
several  times  leagued  against  us,  carried  our 
1  glory  from  east  to  west,  to  return  this  day  to 
our  country  as  fugitives,  after  deserting  our 
allies,  and  to  hear  it  said  that  the  French 
eagle  had  fled,  affrighted  at  the  sight  of  Ihe 


173 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Oct  180«. 


Prussian  eagles  1  Woe,  then,  be  to  those 
who  provoke  us !  Let  the  Prussians  meet 
with  the  same  fate  which  they  experienced 
fourteen  years  ago !  Let  them  learn  that 
it  is  easy  to  acquire  an  increase  of  terri- 
tory and  of  power,  with  the  friendship  of  the 
great  nation :  its  enmity  is  more  terrible  than 
the  tempests  of  the  ocean." 

On  the  following  day,  the  8th  of  October, 
Napoleon  gave  orders  for  the  whole  army  to 
cross  the  frontier  of  Saxony.  The  three  co- 
lumns of  which  it  was  composed  broke  up 
simultaneously.  Murat,  who  preceded  the  cen- 
tre, entered  first,  at  the  head  of  the  light  cavalry, 
and  of  the  27th  light,  and  pushed  his  squad- 
rons by  the  central  defile,  that  of  Kronach,.to 
Lobenstein.  No  sooner  was  he  past  the  woody 
heights  which  separate  Franconia  from  Sax- 
ony, than  he  despatched  several  detachments 
— upon  the  right  towards  Hof,  upon  the  left 
towards  Saalfeld — to  clear  the  outlet  of  the  de- 
bouches, by  which  tne  otner  columns  of  the 
army  would  nave  10  penetrate.  He  then 
marched  direct  from  Lobenstein  for  Saalburg. 
There  he  found  posted  upon  the  Saale  a  body 
of  infantry  and  cavalry  belonging  to  the  corps 
of  General  Tauenzien.  The  enemy  at  first 
seemed  disposed  to  defend  the  Saale,  which  is 
a  feeble  obstacle  in  this  part  of  its  course,  and 
sent  several  rounds  of  cannon-shot  at  our 
horse.  He  was  answered  by  several  pieces 
of  light  artillery,  usually  attached  to  the  re- 
serve of  the  cavalry ;  he  was  then  shown  some 
companies  of  infantry,  of  the  27th  light.  He 
defended  neither  the  passage  of  the  Saale,  nor 
Saalburg,  and  retreated  towards  Schleiz,  at 
some  distance  from  the  place  of  this  first  ren- 
counter. Towards  Hof,  on  our  right,  the  ca- 
valry discovered  nothing  that  could  impede 
the  inarch  of  Marshals  Soult  and  Ney,  who, 
however,  were  sufficiently  strong  to  clear  a 
way  for  themselves.  On  the  left,  on  the  con- 
trary, towards  Saalfeld,  it  perceived  at  a  dis- 
tance a  considerable  body,  commanded  by 
Prince  Louis.  These  two  corps  of  General 
Tauenzien  and  Prince  Louis  formed  part  of 
the  army  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  who,  in 
spite  of  the  formal  order  which  he  had  re- 
ceived to  cross  to  the  left  bank  of  the  Saale, 
and  to  support  himself  upon  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick,  delayed  obeying,  and  remained 
dispersed  in  the  hilly  country  which  the  Saale 
traverses  at  its  source. 

The  three  columns  of  the  French  army  kept 
advancing  simultaneously  by  the  defiles  al- 
ready specified,  that  of  the  left,  however,  being 
a  little  behind,  because  it  had  to  go  back  from 
Ooburg  towards  Grafenthal,  which  obliged  it 
to  travel  twelve  leagues  upon  roads  scarcely 
passable  for  artillery.  For  the  rest,  no  serious 
obstacle  checked  the  march  of  our  troops. 
The  spirit  of  the  army  was  excellent :  the  sol- 
dier displayed  the  greatest  cheerfulness,  and 
seemed  to  make  light  of  some  hardships,  in- 
evitable in  a  poor  and  difficult  country.  Vic- 
tory, of  which  he  had  no  doubt,  was  for  him  a 
compensation  for  all  sufferings. 

On  tho  next  day,  the  9th  of  October,  the 
centre  left  Saalburg,  and  advanced  upon 
8chl*iz,  after  crossing  the  Saale.  Murat,  with 
two  regiments  of  light  cavalry,  and  Berna- 


dotte,  with  Drouet's  division,  marched  at  the 
head.  They  arrived  before  Schleiz  about  noon. 
Schleiz  is  a  small  town  situated  on  a  stream, 
which  is  called  the  Wiesenthal,  and  which 
discharges  itself  into  the  Saale.  At  the  foot 
of  a  height  beyond  Schleiz  and  the  Wiesen- 
thal was  perceived  General  Tauenzien's  corps, 
drawn  up  in  order  of  battle.  It  was  backed 
upon  the  height,  its  infantry  deployed,  its  ca- 
valry disposed  on  the  wings,  the  artillery  on 
its  front.  It  appeared  to  consist  of  about  8000 
infantry,  and  2000  cavalry.  Napoleon,  who 
had  slept  in  the  environs  of  Saalburg,  hastened 
to  the  spot  in  the  morning,  and,  at  sight  of  the 
enemy,  gave  orders  for  the  attack.  Marshal 
Bernadotte  directed  some  companies  of  the 
27th  light,  commanded  by  General  Maison, 
upon  Schleiz.  General  Tauenzien,  apprized 
that  the  bulk  of  the  French  army  was  follow- 
ing this  advanced  guard,  had  no  idea  of  de- 
fending the  ground  which  he  occupied.  He 
contented  himself  with  reinforcing  the  detach- 
ment which  guarded  Schleiz,  in  order  to  gaia 
time  by  a  petty  action  for  the  rear-guard  to 
retire.  General  Maison  entered  Schleiz  with 
Ihe  27th  light,  and  drove  out  the  Prussians. 
At  that  moment  the  94th  and  95th  regiments 
of  the  line,  of  Drouet's  division,  were  crossing 
the  Weisenthal,  the  one  below  Schleiz,  the 
other  at  Schleiz  itself,  and  contributed  to  hasten 
the  retreat  of  the  enemy,  who  proceeded  to- 
wards the  heights  in  rear  of  Schleiz.  He  was 
briskly  pursued  upon  these  heights,  and,  on 
reaching  their  summit,  followed  down  the  back 
of  them.  Murat,  accompanied  by  the  4th  hus- 
sars and  5th  chasseurs,  (the  latter  being  a  little 
behind,)  closely  pressed  the  enemy's  infantry, 
which  was  escorted  by  2000  horse.  Perceiv- 
ing the  small  number  of  the  force  at  the  dis- 
posal of  Murat,  some  Prussian  squadrons 
rushed  towards  it.  Murat  got  the  start  of  them, 
charged  them,  sword  in  hand,  at  the  head  of 
the  4th  hussars,  and  repulsed  them.  But, 
being  soon  driven  back  by  a  more  numerous 
cavalry,  he  sent  in  all  haste  for  the  5th  chas- 
seurs, as  well  as  General  Maison's  light  infan- 
try, which  had  not  yet  been  able  to  join  him. 
He  had  meanwhile  several  charges  to  sustain, 
and  he  met  them  with  his  accustomed  valour. 
Luckily,  the  5th  chasseurs  came  up  at  a  gal- 
lop, rallied  the  4th  hussars,  and  made  a  vigor- 
ous charge  in  its  turn.  But  General  Tauen- 
zien, wishing  to  rid  himself  of  these  two 
regiments  of  light  cavalry,  sent  the  Saxon  red 
dragoons  and  the  Prussian  hussars  against 
them.  At  this  moment,  five  companies  of  the 
27th  light,  headed  by  General  Maison,  came 
up.  Not  having  time  to  form  them  in  square,  he 
halted  them  on  the  spot  in  such  a  manner  as 
to  cover  the  flank  of  our  cavalry,  and  then 
caused  a  volley  to  be  discharged  within  point 
blank  range  with  such  precision  as  to  extend 
two  hundred  of  the  red  dragoons  upon  the 
pavement.  The  whole  of  the  Prussian  cavalry 
then  betook  itself  to  flight.  Murat,  with  the 
4th  hussars  and  the  5th  chasseurs,  dashed 
after  it,  and  drove  General  Tauenzien's  cavalry 
and  infantry  pell-mell  into  the  woods.  The 
enerny  retreated  in  the  utmost  haste,  throwing 
away  upon  the  roads  a. great  number  of  mus- 
kets and  hats,  and  leaving  in  our  hands  about 


180 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


sioned.  Meanwhile,  Prince  Louis,  impatient 
to  meet  the  French,  and  insisting  at  any  rate 
on  forming  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Prussian 
arm}%  had,  on  his  solicitation,  been  left  at 
Saalfeld,  where  he  still  was  on  the  morning 
of  the  10th  of  October. 

It  was  towards  this  point  that  the  French  left 
column  was  to  march,  as  soon  as  it  should 
have  debouched  from  Grafenthal.  Having 
reached  Grafenthal  on  the  9th,  Lannes,  who 
formed  the  head  of  that  column,  marched  for 
Saalfeld  on  the  morning  of  the  10th.  He  had 
set  out  at  a  very  early  hour.  The  wooded 
heights,  which  generally  skirt  the  Saale,  re- 
ceding at  this  point  from  its  bed,  leave  a 
marshy  plain,  on  which  rises  the  little  town 
of  Saalfeld,  surrounded  by  walls,  and  seated 
on  the  very  margin  of  the  river.  On  reaching 
the  circumference  of  these  heights,  which  over- 
look Saalfeld,  Lannes  perceived,  in  advance 
of  the  town,  the  corps  of  Prince  Louis,  con- 
sisting of  about  7000  foot  and  2000  horse. 
The  prince  had  taken  a  rather  unmilitary  posi- 
tion. His  left,  composed  of  infantry,  was 
appuyed  upon  the  town  and  the  river;  his 
right,  composed  of  cavalry,  extended  into  the 
plain.  Commanded  in  front  by  the  circle  of 
the  heights,  whence  the  French  artillery  could 
pour  its  fire  upon  him,  he  had  in  his  rear  a 
little  marshy  stream,  the  Schwartza,  which 
falls  into  the  Saale  below  Saalfeld,  and  which 
is  rather  difficult  to  cross.  His  retreat  was 
consequently  very  ill  secured.  Had  he  been 
capable  of  any  prudence,  and  less  obliged  by 
his  preceding  bravadoes  to  appear  rash,  he 
should  have  retired  as  speedily  as  possible, 
and  descended  the  Saale  toRudolstadt  or  Jena. 
Unfortunately,  it  was  not  consistent  either 
with  his  character  or  his  part,  to  recoil  from 
the  first  meeting  with  the  French.  Lannes 
had  not  at  hand  either  Augereau's  corps,  form- 
ing with  him  the  left  column,  or  even  his  own 
entire  corps.  He  was  reduced  to  the  mere 
division  of  Suchet,  and  two  regiments  of  light 
cavalry,  the  9th  and  10th  hussars.  He  never- 
theless commenced  the  attack  immediately. 
In  the  first  place,  he  ranged  his  artillery  upon 
the  heights,  which  commanded  the  line  of 
•  battle  of  Prince  Louis,  and  opened  a  brisk  can- 
nonade upon  it.  He  then  threw  part  of  Suchet's 
division  upon  his  left,  with  orders  to  file  along 
the  woods  which  crowned  the  heights,  and  to 
turn  the  right  of  Prince  Louis,  by  descending 
to  the  banks  of  the  Schwartza.  In  a  few  mo- 
ments this  movement  was  executed.  While 
the  artillery,  placed  in  battery  on  the  front  of 
the  Prussians,  occupied  them  by  sweeping  off 
their  men,  our  tirailleurs,  slipping  through  the 
woods,  commenced  an  unexpected  and  destruc- 
tively well-aimed  fire  upon  their  rear.  Lannes 
then  made  his  infantry  descend  en  masse  into 
the  plain  to  overturn  the  enemy's  infantry.  In 
this  position  there  was  no  judicious  course  for 
Prince  Louis  to  adopt,  had  he  even  had  that 
experience  in  war  of  which  he  was  not  pos- 
sessed. He  began  by  moving  towards  his  in- 
fantry, in  order  to  meet  the  shock  of  Suchet's 
division.  Bui,  after  efforts  of  bravery,  worthy 
of  being  better  employed,  he  saw  his  battalions 
broken  and  driven  back  in  confusion  upon  the 
walls  of  Saalfeld.  Not  knowing  what  to  ,do, 


he  hastened  to  his  cavalry,  with  the  intention 
of  charging  the  two  regiments  of  hussars, 
which  had  followed  the  movements  of  our 
tirailleurs.  He  charged  them  with  impetuosity, 
and  at  first  repulsed  them.  But  those  two 
regiments,  having  rallied,  dashed  vigorously 
forward,  broke  his  numerous  cavalry,  and  pur- 
sued it  with  such  ardour,  that,  finding  it  im- 
possible to  form  again,  it  threw  itself  in  dis- 
order into  the  marshes  of  the  Schwartza.  The 
prince,  in  a  brilliant  uniform,  adorned  with  all 
his  decorations,  behaved  during  the  action  with 
the  valour  befitting  his  birth  and  character 
Two  of  his  aides-de-camp  were  killed  by  hit 
side.  Being  soon  surrounded,  he  tried  to 
escape,  but  his  horse  having  entangled  him- 
self in  a  hedge,  he  was  forced  to  stop.  A  quar- 
termaster of  the  10th  hussars,  taking  him  for 
an  officer  of  high  rank,  but  by  no  means  for  a 
prince  of  the  blood-royal,  ran  up  to  him,  cry- 
ing, "General,  surrender!"  To  this  summons 
the  prince  replied  by  a  lunge  with  his  sword. 
The  quartermaster  then  gave  him  a  thrust  in 
the  middle  of  the  chest,  and  he  dropped  dead 
at  the  foot  of  his  horse.  A  concourse  collected 
round  the  body  of  the  prince,  which  was  recog- 
nised and  deposiled,  with  all  the  honours  due 
to  his  rank  and  his  misfortune,  in  the  town  of 
Saalfeld.  The  Prussian  and  Saxon  troops,  for 
there  were  both  at  this  point,  deprived  of  their 
commander,  and  enclosed  in  a  spot  having  no 
outlet,  escaped  as  they  best  could,  leaving 
behind  20  pieces  of  cannon,  400  killed  or 
wounded,  and  about  a  thousand  prisoners. 

Such  was  the  opening  of  the  campaign. 
The  first  blow  of  the  war,  as  Napoleon  ob- 
served next  day  in  the  bulletin  of  the  action, 
had  killed  one  of  its  authors.  So  near  were 
the  two  armies  to  each  other,  that  Napoleon 
at  Schleiz  heard  the  cannon  of  Saalfeld,  that 
the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  heard  them  on  his 
side  upon  the  heights  of  Mitlel-Pollnitz,  and 
that,  towards  Jena,  on  the  line  occupied  by  the 
Prussian  main  army,  their  distant  rolling  was 
distinctly  perceptible.  All  sensible  men  in 
the  Prussian  army  shuddered  at  it  as  a  signal 
which  announced  tragic  events.  Napoleon, 
detecting  the  point  whence  these  reports  pro- 
ceeded, sent  off  a  reinforcement  to  Lannes, 
and  a  great  number  of  officers  in  quest  of 
news.  The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  on  his  part, 
roamed  about  on  horseback,  without  giving 
any  orders,  and  questioning  goers  and  comers 
concerning  what  was  passing.  It  was  a  la- 
mentable sight  to  see  such  incapacity  and  im- 
prudence battling  with  such  vigilance  and 
genius. 

A  few  hours  afterwards,  the  fugitives  in- 
formed both  armies  of  the  result  of  the  first 
encounter,  and  the  tragic  end  of  Prince  Louis, 
an  end  well  worthy  of  his  life,  on  the  double 
score  of  imprudence  and  courage.  The  Prus- 
sians were  enabled  to  judge  what  was  to  be 
expected  from  their  scientific  tactics,  opposed 
to  the  simple,  practical,  and  rapid  mode  of 
acting  pursued  by  the  French  generals. 

The  consternation  spread  from  Saalfeld  to 
Jena  and  Weimar.  The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe, 
already  informed  by  his  own  eyes  of  the  dis- 
couragement which  had  seized  General  Tauen- 
zien's  troops,  his  mind  impressed  with  the  rash 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


181 


adventure  of  Saalfeld,  repaired  in  person  to 
Jena,  and  despatched  orders  in  all  directions 
to  fall  back  upon  the  Saale,  in  order  to  cover 
himself  with  that  river,  if,  however,  after  so 
many  contradictory  movements,  the  Prussians  ' 
could  flatter  themselves  with  the  hope  of  reach-  ; 
ing  it  in  time.  It  was  the  third  counter-order 
given  to  those  unfortunate  men,  who  knew  not  j 
what  was  wanted  of  them,  and  who  were  not 
habituated,  like  the  French,  to  make  several 
marches  in  a  day,  and  to  live  upon  what  they 
procured  for  themselves  on  march.  Some  fu- 
gitives of  the  corps  beaten  at  Saalfeld,  hurry- 
ing towards  Jena,  and  firing  without  motive, 
like  soldiers  going  upon  the  stroll,  were  mis- 
taken for  French  tirailleurs.  At  sight  of  them, 
an  inexpressible  terror  pervaded  the  troops 
marching  towards  Jena,  and  the  numerous 
drivers  of  the  baggage  train.  They  fled  in 
disorder,  rushing  towards  the  bridges  over  the 
Saale,  and  from  those  bridges  into  the  streets 
of  Jena.  In  a  few  moments  all  was  frightful 
confusion — a  luckless  omen  of  the  events  that 
were  about  to  follow. 

Napoleon,  apprized  of  the  action  at  Saalfeld, 
and  anxious  to  bring  his  wings  again  nearer 
to  the  centre,  in  proportion  as  it  issued  from 
the  defiles  by  which  it  had  entered  Saxony, 
directed  Lannes  not  to  ascend  the  Saale,  which 
would  have  removed  him  too  far  from  himself 
and  brought  him  too  near  to  the  enemy,  but  to 
make  a  movement  to  the  right,  and  to  proceed 
by  Posneck  and  Neustadt  to  Auma,  where  the 
head-quarters  were  fixed.  Augereau  was  to 
fill  the  vacancy  left  between  the  Saale  and  the 
corps  of  Lannes.  Ordering  a  like  movement 
of  concentration  on  his  right,  Napoleon  had 
despatched  Marshal  Soult  upon  Weida  and 
Gera,  along  the  Elster,  and  sent  word  for  Mar- 
shal Ney  to  occupy  Auma,  when  the  head- 
quarters should  have  left.  He  would  thus 
have  170,000  men  at  hand,  within  the  distance 
of  seven  or  eight  leagues,  with  the  faculty  of 
collecting  100,000  of  them  in  a  few  hours; 
and,  while  concentrating  himself,  he  kept  ad- 
vancing, ready  to  cross  the  Saale,  if  it  were 
necessary  to  force  the  enemy's  position  there, 
or  to  push  on  to  the  Elbe,  if  he  wanted  to  get 
thither  before  him.  For  the  rest,  he  had  not 
marched  more  than  four  or  five  leagues  a  day, 
in  order  to  give  his  corps  time  to  rejoin  ;  for 
his  reserves  were  still  behind-hand,  especially 
the  artillery  and  the  cavalry  of  the  guard,  as 
well  as  the  battalions  of  elite.  Though  he 
knew  from  the  two  actions  of  the  preceding 
days  what  he  ought  to  think  of  the  Prussian 
troops,  he  marched  with  the  prudence  of 
great  captains,  in  presence  of  an  army  which 
could  have  opposed  to  him  from  130,000  to 
140,000  men,  collected  into  a  single  mass. 
In  the  evening  of  the  12th  he  left  Auma  for 
Gera. 

The  cavalry,  moving  about  in  all  directions 
among  the  baggage  columns  of  the  unfortu- 
nate Saxons,  made  rich  and  numerous  prizes. 
Five  hundred  carriages  were  taken  at  one 
blow.  The  cavalry,  as  Napoleon  wrote,  was 
"  seamed  with  gold"  (cousue  d'or.)  At  length, 
intercepted  letters  and  the  reports  of  spies  be- 
gan to  agree,  and  to  represent  the  Prussian 
grand  army  as  changing  position,  and  advanc- 


ing from  Erfurt  upon  Weimar,  with  a  view  to 
approach  the  banks  of  the  Saale.  It  might  be 
coming  thither  with  one  of  the  two  following 
intentions :  either  to  occupy  the  bridge  ovei 
the  Saale  at  Naumburg,  over  which  passes  the 
great  central  road  of  Germany,  in  order  to  re- 
tire upon  the  Elbe,  while  covering  Leipzig  and 
Dresden  ;  or  to  approach  the  course  of  the 
Saale,  for  the  purpose  of  defending  its  banks 
against  the  French.  To  meet  this  double  con- 
tingency, Napoleon  took  a  first  precaution, 
which  was  to  despatch  Marshal  Davout  imme- 
diately to  Naumburg  with  orders  to  bar  the 
passage  of  the  bridge  there  with  the  26,000 
men  of  the  third  corps.  He  sent  Murat,  with 
the  cavalry,  along  the  banks  of  the  Saale,  to 
watch  its  course,  and  to  push  reconnoissances 
as  far  as  Leipzig.  He  directed  Marshal  Ber- 
nadotte  upon  Naumburg,  with  instructions  to 
support  Marshal  Davout  in  case  of  need.  He 
sent  Marshals  Lannes  and  Augereau  to  Jena 
itself.  His  object  was  to  make  himself  mas- 
ter immediately  of  the  two  principal  passages 
of  the  Saale,  those  at  Naumburg  and  Jena, 
either  to  stop  the  Prussian  army  there,  if  it 
should  design  to  cross  and  to  retire  to  the 
Elbe,  or  to  go  and  seek  it  on  the  heights  bor- 
dering that  river,  if  it  purposed  to  remain 
there  on  the  defensive.  As  for  himself,  he 
continued  with  Marshals  Ney  and  Soult,  with- 
in reach  of  Naumburg  and  Jena,  ready  to 
march  for  either  point  according  to  circum- 
stances. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  he  learned  by 
more  circumstantial  accounts  that  the  enemy 
was  definitively  approaching  the  Saale,  with 
the  yet  uncertain  resolution  of  fighting  a  de- 
fensive battle  on  its  banks,  or  of  crossing  and 
pushing  on  to  the  Elbe.  It  was  in  the  direc- 
tion from  Weimar  to  Jena  that  the  largest  as- 
semblage appeared.  Without  losing  a  moment, 
Napoleon  mounted  his  horse  to  proceed  to  Jena. 
He  gave  himself  his  instructions  to  Marshals 
Soult  and  Ney,  and  enjoined  them  to  be  at  Jena 
in  the  evening,  or  at  latest  in  the  night.  He 
directed  Murat  to  bring  his  cavalry  towards 
Jena,  and  Marshal  Bernadotte  to  take  at  Dorn- 
burg  an  intermediate  position  between  Jena 
and  Naumburg.  He  set  out  immediately,  send- 
ing officers  to  stop  all  troops  on  march  to  Gera, 
and  to  make  them  turn  back  for  Jena. 

In  the  evening  of  the  preceding  day,  Mar- 
shal Davout  had  entered  Naumburg,  occupiel 
the  bridge  of  the  Saale,  and  taken  considera- 
ble magazines,  with  a  fine  bridge  equipage. 
Marshal  Bernadotte  had  joined  him.  Murat 
had  sent  his  light  cavalry  as  far  as  Leipzig, 
and  surprised  the  gates  of  that  great  commer- 
cial city.  Lannes  had  proceeded  towards  Jena, 
a  small  university  town,  seated  on  the  very 
banks  of  the  Saale,  and  had  driven  back  pell- 
mell  the  enemy's  troops  left  beyond  the  river, 
as  well  as  the  baggage,  which  encumbered  the 
road.  He  had  taken  possession  of  Jena,  and 
immediately  pushed  his  advanced  posts  upon 
the  heights  which  command  it.  From  theso 
;  heights  he  had  perceived  the  army  of  the 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  which,  after  recrossing 
the  Saale,  encamped  between  Jena  and  Wei- 
j  mar,  and  he  had  reason  to  suspect  that  a  grea' 
I  assemblage  was  collecting  in  that  place. 


182 


HISTORY    0F    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


The  Prussian   army  was,  in  fact,  concen- 
trated here,  and   ready  to  take  its  final  deter- 
minations.     The   Prince  of  Hohenlohe    had 
decided   to  obey  the  orders  of  the  Duke  of 
Brunswick,  and  to  recross  the  Saale,  for  the 
purpose  of  rejoining  the  Prussian  grand  army. 
He  would  have  reached  that  position  in  better 
order,  and  without  losing  his  baggage,  had  he 
obeyed   sooner.     His  troops  were   assembled 
there  confusedly,  and  without  provisions,  not 
knowing  where  to  procure  any,  applying  for 
them  in  vain  to  the  principal  army,  which  pos- 
sessed only  just  enough  for  itself.     The  Sax- 
ons, whose  conduct  had  been  honourable,  but 
whom  the  chances  of  events  had  put  forward 
conspicuously    in    the   first   two   encounters, 
<ind   who   saw   their   country  delivered   over 
without  defence  to  the  French,  complained  bit- 
lerly  of  being  ill-treated,  ill-fed,  and  dragged 
into  a  war  which  set  out  with  the  most  sinis- 
ter prospects.     Great  pains  were  taken  to  pa- 
cify them ;  and  this  time  they  were  placed  in 
second  line  behind  the  Prussians.     However, 
in  spite  of  this  deplorable  commencement,  the 
Prussians  were  assembled  along  the  forest  of 
Thuringia,  in  advance  of  the  Saale,  to  stop  the 
French,  if  they  attempted  to  cross  it,  or  to 
descend  in  safety  to  the  Elbe,  if  they  were  in 
haste  to  reach  that  river.     This  was  the  case, 
since  they  had  attached  such  value  to  this  po- 
sition as  to  persevere  in  the  idea  that  had  been 
formed  of  it,  and  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
advantages  which  it  offered.     The  Saale,  in 
fact,  though   fordable,  runs   in  a  bed  which 
forms  a  sort  of  continuous  gorge.     The  left 
bank,  on  which  the  Prussians  were  encamped, 
is  covered  by  abrupt  heights,  the  foot  of  which 
is  washed  by  the  river,  and  the  summit  clothed 
with  a  series  of  woods.   Beyond  are  undulated 
plateaux,  well  adapted  to  receive  an  army.   In 
descending  from  Jena  to  Naumburg,  the  diffi- 
culties  become  greater  than   anywhere  else. 
Besides  Jena  and  Naumburg,  there  were  but 
three  avenues  by  which  access  could  be  gained, 
those   of  Lobstedt,  Dornburg,  and  Camburg, 
about  two  leagues  distant  from  each  other,  and 
very  easy  to  defend.     Since,  instead  of  esta- 
blishing themselves  behind  the  Elbe,  the  Prus- 
,sians   had   determined   to   go    and   meet   the 
French,  and  fight  them  en  masse,  there  was  not 
a  more  advantageous  site  than  the  left  bank 
of  the  Saale,  for  a  general  action.     They  had 
deprived  themselves,  it  is  true,  of  10,000  men, 
composing  the  advanced  guard  of  the  Duke 
of  Weimar,  and  sent  to  reconnoitre  beyond 
the  forest  of  Thuringia;  they  had  lost  five  or 
six  thousand  in  killed,  prisoners  and  fugitives, 
in  the  actions  of  Schleiz  and  Saalfeld;  but  the 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe  had  still  50,000  men  left, 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick  66,000,  General  Ru- 
chel  seventeen  or  eighteen  thousand,  that  is  to 
say,  134,000  men — a  very  formidable  army, 
behind  such  a  position  as   that  of  the  Saale 
from  Jena  to  Naumburg.     By  placing   strong 
detachments   before    the   principal   passages, 
and  the  mass  a  little  in  rear,  in  a  central  posi- 
tion, so  as  to  be  able  to  hasten  in  force  to  the 
point  attacked,  they  would  be  capable  of  fight- 
ing a  dangerous  battle  for  the  French  army 
and  if  not  to  wrest  victory  from  it,  to  dispute 


t  with  such  effect  as  to  render  retreat  easy 
and  the  issue  of  the  war  uncertain. 

But  the  perturbation  of  mind  continued  only 
o  increase  in  the  Prussian  staff".     The   Duke 
of  Brunswick,   who   had   hitherto   displayed 
sound   reasoning   powers,  and  who  had   ap- 
jeared  to  appreciate  the  position  occupied  in 
he   different    possible    cases — the    Duke   of 
Brunswick,  now  that  one  of  those  cases,  and 
the  most  foreseen,  was  realized,  seemed  sud- 
denly to  have  lost  his  senses,  and  was  for  de- 
camping  with  the  utmost   expedition.      The 
movement  of  Marshal  Davout  upon  Naum- 
jurg  had  been  a  flash  of  light  for  him.     He 
lad  concluded,  from  the  appearance  of  that 
marshal  on  the  way  to  Naumburg,  that  it  was 
Vapoleon's  intention  not  to  give  battle,  but  to 
lasten  his  march  to  the  Elbe,  to  cut  off  the 
Prussians  from  Saxony,  and  even  from  Prus- 
sia, as  he  had  cut  oft'  General  Mack  from  Ba- 
varia  and  Austria.     The   fear  of  being  sur- 
rounded,  as   General   Mack    had   been,   and 
forced,  like  him,  to  lay  down   his  arms,  dis- 
turbed the  generally  just  judgment  of  this  un- 
fortunate old  man.     He  resolved,  therefore,  to 
set  off  instantly  for  the  Elbe.     In  Prussia  the 
unfortunate  Mack  had  been  jeered  so  merci- 
lessly and  with  so  little  justice,  that  people 
lost  their  reason  at  the  bare  idea  of  finding 
themselves  in  the  same  situation,  and  that,  in 
order  to  avoid  it,  they  ran  the  risk  of  falling 
into  other   positions  which  were  not   better. 
The  present  situation  was,  nevertheless,  far 
from  resembling  that  of  the  Austrian  general. 
The  Duke  of  Brunswick  might,  it  is  true,  be 
turned,  separated   from   Saxony   by /a   rapid 
movement  of  Napoleon's  toward   the   Elbe ; 
perhaps  the  French  might  reach  Berlin  before 
him,  but  it  was  impossible  that  he  could  be 
enveloped  and  obliged  to   capitulate.     Whe- 
ther he  lost  a  battle  on  the  Saale,  whether  Na- 
poleon got  the  start  of  him  on  the  Elbe,  he  had 
a  sure   retreat  to  Magdeburg  and  the  Lower 
Elbe,  and  though  he  was  liable  to  arrive  there 
in  bad  plight,  he  could  not  be  taken  in  the  vast 
plains  of  the  north,  like  the  Austrians  in  that 
close  gorge  of  the  valley  of  the  Danube.     Be- 
sides, while  General  Mack's  army  numbered 
at  most  70,000  men,  that  of  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick would  amount  to  144,000,  if  the  Duke  of 
Weimar  were  called  in ;  and  such  an  army  is 
not  easily  surrounded  so  completely  as  to  be 
obliged  to  lay  down  its  arms.     But,  since  the 
Prussians  had  been  so  intent  on  fighting,  had 
so  earnestly  desired  to  meet  the  French,  even 
thought  of  crossing  the  mountains,  in  order  to 
go  and  seek  them  in  Franconia,  when  they  at 
length  fell  in  with  them  on  a  ground  excellent 
for  themselves,  very  difficult  for  the  enemy, 
wherefore  not  establish  themselves  upon  it  en 
masse,  and  fling  them  into  the  deep  and  rocky 
bed  of  the  Saale,  the  moment  they  should  at- 
tempt to  ascend  its  heights  ?     But  they  had 
lost   all   presence  of  mind,  since  the  enemy 
whom  they  defied  at  a  distance,  was  so  close 
to  them,  since  it  had  been   shown  at  Schleiz 
and  Saalfeld  that  the  quality  of  the  Prussian 
army  was  so  little  superior  to  that  of  the  Aus- 
trian and  Russian  armies. 
Tic  Duke  of  Brunswick,  impatient  to  secure 


Oct  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


1SS 


himself  from  the  so  dreaded  fate  of  General 
Mack,  determined  to  decamp  immediately,  and 
to  push  on  by  forced  marches  for  the  Elbe, 
covering  himself  with  the  Saale,  which  course 
would  entail  the  relinquishment  of  Leipzig, 
of  Dresden,  and  of  all  Saxony,  to  the  French. 
The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  having  tardily  de- 
cided on  recrossing  the  Saale,  encamped  upon 
the  heights  of  Jena.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick 
enjoined  him  to  remain  there,  to  close  that 
debouche,  while  the  principal  army,  filing  behind 
the  army  of  Silesia,  should  join  the  Saale  at 
Naumburg,  and  descend  it  to  the  Elbe. 

He  ordered  general  Ruchel  to  stay  at  Wei- 
mar for  the  time  required  to  rally  the  advanced 
guard,  engaged  in  a  useless  reconnoissance 
beyond  the  forest  of  Thuringia ;  and,  as  for 
himself,  taking  with  him  the  five  divisions  of 
the  principal  army,  he  resolved  to  decamp  on 
the  13th,  to  follow  the  high  road  from  Weimar 
to  Leipzig  as  far  as  the  bridge  of  Naumburg, 
to  leave  three  divisions  at  that  bridge  to  guard 
it,  while  he  should  go  with  the  two  others  to 
secure  the  passage  of  the  Unstrut,  one  of  the 
tributaries  of  the  Saale;  then,  that  obstacle 
overcome,  to  fall  back  upon  the  three  divisions 
posted  at  Naumburg,  to  draw  to  him  the  Prince 
of  Hohenlohe  and  General  Ruchel,  left  in  rear, 
and  to  march  along  the  banks  of  the  Saale  to 
the  junction  of  that  river  with  the  Elbe  in  the 
environs  of  Magdeburg. 

Such  was  the  plan  of  retreat  adopted  by 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick.  It  was  not  worth 
while  to  quit  the  defensive  line  of  the  Elbe, 
which  ought  never  to  have  been  left,  for  the 
purpose  of  regaining  it  so  soon  and  with  such 
great  dangers. 

In  consequence,  the  principal  army  received 
orders  to  break  up  on  the  same  day,  the  13th 
of  October.  The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  was 
directed  to  occupy  the  heights  of  Jena,  and  to 
close  that  passage,  while  the  five  divisions  of 
the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  leaving  Weimar, 
were  to  go  and  pass  the  night  at  Naumburg. 
These  five  divisions  were  to  follow  one  another 
at  the  distance  of  a  league,  and  to  march  six 
leagues  that  day.  It  is  not  thus  that  the 
French  march,  when  they  have  an  important 
end  to  attain.  Weimar  being  evacuated,  Gen- 
eral Ruchel  was  to  proceed  thither  immediate- 
ly. All  these  dispositions  being  settled  and 
communicated  to  those  who  were  appointed  to 
execute  them,  the  army  of  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick commenced  its  march,  having  at  its  head 
the  king,  the  princes,  the  queen  herself,  and 
followed  by  such  a  mass  of  baggage  as  to  ren- 
der any  manoeuvre  impossible.  The  cannon 
were  heard  so  near  that  the  queen  could  not 
be  allowed  to  continue  at  the  head-quarters. 
Her  presence,  after  being  indecorous,  became 
perilous  for  herself  and  a  subject  of  uneasi- 
ness for  the  king.  It  required  a  formal  injunc- 
tion from  the  latter  to  decide  her  to  leave.  At 
length  she  departed,  her  eyes  full  of  tears,  no 
longer  doubting,  since  the  actions  of  Schleiz 
and  Saalfeld,  the  fatal  consequences  of  a 
policy  of  which  she  was  the  hapless  insti- 
gator. 

While  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  was  thus 
marching  towards  Naumburg,  the  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe,  left  upon  the  heights  of  Jena  with 


50,000  men,  and  having  as  rear-guard  General 
Ruchel  with  18,000,  endeavoured  to  restore  a 
little  order  among  his  troops,  sent  out  wagons 
to  scour  the  country  in  quest  of  provisions, 
and  in  particular  to  procure  some  relief  for 
the  Saxons,  whose  discontent  was  extreme. 
Coinciding  in  opinion  with  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick, that  the  French  were  hastening  to  Leip- 
zig and  Dresden,  in  order  to  get  first  to  the 
Elbe,  he  gave  himself  little  concern  about  the 
town  of  Jena,  and  paid  little  attention  to  the 
heights  situated  behind  it. 

During  this  same  afternoon  of  the  13th  of 
October,  Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen,  had 
moved  rapidly  from  Gera  towards  Jena,  fol- 
lowed by  all  his  forces.  He  arrived  there 
himself  about  noon :  Marshal  Lannes,  who 
had  outstripped  him,  was  waiting  for  him  with 
impatience.  Without  losing  a  moment,  both 
mounted  their  horses  to  reconnoitre  the  locali- 
ties. At  Jena  itself,  the  valley  of  the  Saale 
begins  to  widen.  The  right  bank,  on  which 
we  were  marching,  is  low,  damp,  and  covered 
with  meadows.  The  left  bank,  on  the  con- 
trary, that  which  the  Prussians  occupied,  pre- 
sents steep  heights,  whose  peaked  tops  over- 
look the  town  of  Jena,  and  which  are  ascend- 
ed by  narrow,  winding  ravines,  overhung  with 
wood.  On  the  left  of  Jena,  a  gorge  more  open, 
less  abrupt,  called  the  Muhltnal,  has  become 
the  passage  through  which  the  high  road  from 
Jena  to  Weimar  has  been  carried.  This  road 
first  keeps  along  the  bottom  of  the  Miihlthal. 
then  rises  in  form  of  a  spiral  staircase,  and 
opens  upon  the  plateaux  in  rear.  It  would 
have  required  a  fierce  assault  to  force  this  pass; 
more  open,  it  is  true,  but  guarded  by  a  great 
portion  of  the  Prussian  army.  Of  course,  to 
climb  the  plateaux  at  this  point,  in  order  to 
give  battle  there  to  the  Prussians,  was  wholly 
out  of  the  question. 

But  another  resource  presented  itself.  The 
bold  tirailleurs  of  Lannes,  entering  the  ravines 
which  are  met  with  on  going  out  of  Jena,  had 
succeeded  in  ascending  the  principal  height, 
and  all  at  once  perceived  the  Prussian  army 
encamped  on  the  plateaux  of  the  left  bank. 
Followed  presently  by  some  detachments  of 
Suchet's  division,  they  had  made  room  for 
themselves  by  driving  in  General  Tauenzien's 
advanced  posts.  Thus,  thanks  to  the  boldness 
of  our  soldiers,  the  heights  which  command 
the  left  bank  of  the  Saale  were  conquered,  but 
by  a  route  which,  unfortunately,  was  scarcely 
accessible  to  artillery.  Thither  Lannes  con- 
ducted Napoleon,  amidst  an  incessant  fire  of 
tirailleurs  which  rendered  reconnoissances 
extremely  dangerous. 

The  principal  of  the  heights  that  overlook 
the  town  of  Jena  is  called  Landgrafenberg, 
and,  since  the  memorable  events  of  which  it 
!  has  been  the  theatre,  it  has  received  from  the 
inhabitants  the  name  of  Napoleonsberg.  It  is 
|  the  highest  in  these  parts.  Napoleon  and 
Lannes,  surveying  from  that  height  the  sur- 
rounding country,  with  their  backs  tnrned  to 
Jena,  beheld  on  their  right  the  Saale  running 
in  a  deep,  winding,  wooded  gorge,  to  Naum- 
burg, which  is  six  or  seven  leagues  from  Jena. 
Before  them  they  saw  undulated  plateaux,  ex- 
tending to  a  distance,  and  subsiding  by  a 


184 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct  1806. 


gentle  slope  to  the  little  valley  of  the  llm,  at 
the  extremity  of  which  is  situated  the  town  of  , 
Weimar.     They  perceived  on   their  left   the ! 
high  road  from  Jena  to  Weimar,  rising  by  a  j 
series  of  slopes  from  the  gorge  of  the  Muhl- 
thal  to  these  plateaux,  and  running  in  a  straight . 
line  to  Weimar.     These  slopes,  somewhat  re- 
sembling a  sort  of  snail's  shell,  have  thence 
received  in  German   the    appellation   of  the 
Schnecke  (snail).    On  this  same  road  from  Jena  . 
to  Weimar  was  posted  en  echelons  the  Prussian 
army  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  but  it  was 
not  possible  to  judge  precisely  of  its  number. 
As  for  the  corps  of  General  Ruchel  posted  at 
Weimar,  the  distance  did  not  permit  that  to 
be  discerned.     In  the  same  predicament  was 
the  grand  army  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick, 
which,  marching  from  Weimar  to  Naumburg, 
was  hidden  in  the  bottoms  of  the  valley  of  the 
llm. 

Napoleon,  having  before  him  a  mass  of 
troops,  the  force  of  which  could  scarcely  be 
estimated,  supposed  that  the  Prussian  army 
had  chosen  this  ground  for  a  field  of  battle, 
and  immediately  made  his  dispositions,  so  as 
to  debouch  with  his  army  on  the  Landgrafen- 
berg,  before  the  enemy  should  hasten  up,  en 
masse,  to  hurl  him  into  the  precipices  of  the 
Saale.  He  was  obliged  to  make  the  best  use 
of  his  time,  and  to  take  advantage  of  the  space 
gained  by  the  tirailleurs  to  establish  himself 
on  the  height.  He  had,  it  is  true,  no  more  of 
it  than  the  summit,  for,  only  a  few  paces  off, 
there  was  the  corps  of  General  Tauenzien, 
separated  from  our  troops  only  by  a  slight 
ridge  of  ground.  This  corps  was  appuyed  on 
two  villages,  one  on  our  right,  that  of  Close- 
witz,  surrounded  by  a  small  wood,  the  other , 
on  our  left,  that  of  Cospoda,  likewise  sur-  j 
rounded  by  a  wood  of  some  extent.  Napoleon 
purposed  to  leave  the  Prussians  quiet  in  this 
position  till  the  next  day,  and  meanwhile  to 
lead  part  of  his  army  up  the  Landgrafenberg. 
The  space  which  it  occupied  was  capable  of 
containing  the  corps  of  Lanntes  and  the  guard. 
He  ordered  them  to  be  led  up  immediately 
through  the  steep  ravines  which  serve  to  j 
ascend  from  Jena  to  the  Landgrafenberg.  On  j 
the  left  he  placed  Gazan's  division ;  on  the  j 
right,  Suchet's  division  ;  in  the  centre,  and  a  j 
little  in  rear,  the  foot-guard.  He  made  the 
latter  encamp  in  a  square  of  four  thousand  ; 
men,  and  in  the  centre  of  this  square  he  esta- 
blished his  own  bivouac.  Ever  since  that 
lime,  the  people  of  the  country  have  called 
that  height  the  Napoleonsberg,  marking  by  a 
heap  of  rough  stones  the  spot  where  this  per- 
sonage, popular  everywhere,  even  in  places 
where  he  has  only  shown  himself  terrible, 
passed  that  memorable  night. 

But  it  was  not  enough  to  bring  infantry 
upon  the  Landgrafenberg — it  was  necessary 
to  mount  artillery  too  upon  it.  Napoleon, 
riding  about  in  all  directions,  discovered  a 
passage  less  steep  than  the  others,  and  by 
which  the  artillery  might  be  dragged  up  with 
great  exertion.  Unjuckily,  the  way  was  too 
narrow.  Napoleon  sent  forthwith  for  a  detach- 
ment of  the  engineers,  and  had  it  widened  by 
cutting  the  rock ;  he  himself,  in  his  impatience, 
directed  the  works,  torch  in  hand.  He  did  not 


retire  till  the  night  was  far  advanced,  when  he 
had  seen  the  first  pieces  of  cannon  rolled  up. 
It  required  twelve  horses  to  draw  each  gun- 
carriage  to  the  top  of  the  Landgrafenberg. 
Napoleon  proposed  to  attack  General  Tauen- 
zien at  day-break,  and,  by  pushing  him  briskly, 
to  conquer  the  space  necessary  for  deploying 
his  army.  Fearful,  however,  of  debouching 
by  a  single  outlet,  wishing  also  to  divide  the 
attention  of  the  enemy,  he  directed  Augereau 
towards  the  left,  to  enter  the  gorge  of  the 
Muhlthal,  to  march  one  of  his  two  divisions 
upon  the  Weimar  road,  and  to  gain  with  the 
other  the  back  of  the  Landgrafenberg,  in  order 
to  fall  upon  the  rear  of  General  Tauenzien. 
On  the  right,  he  ordered  Marshal  Soult,  whose 
corps,  breaking  up  from  Gera,  was  to  arrive  in 
the  night,  to  ascend  the  other  ravines,  which, 
running  fromLobstedt  and  Dornburg,  debouch 
upon  Closewitz,  likewise  for  the  purpose  of 
falling  upon  the  rear  of  General  Tauenzien. 
With  this  double  diversion,  on  the  right  and 
on  the  left,  Napoleon  had  no  doubt  of  forcing 
the  Prussians  in  their  position,  and  gaining 
for  himself  the  space  needed  by  his  army  for 
deploying.  Marshals  Ney  and  Murat  were  to 
ascend  the  Landgrafenberg  by  the  route  which 
Lannes  and  the  guard  had  followed. 

The  day  of  the  13th  had  closed ;  profound 
darkness  enveloped  the  field  of  battle.  Napo- 
leon had  placed  his  tent  in  the  centre  of  the 
square  formed  by  his  guard,  and  had  suffered 
only  a  few  fires  to  be  lighted;  but  all  those  of 
the  Prussian  army  were  kindled.  The  fires  of 
the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  were  to  be  seen  over 
the  whole  extent  of  the  plateaux,  and  at  the 
horizon  on  the  right,  topped  by  the  old  castle 
of  Eckartsberg,  those  of  the  army  of  the  Duke 
of  Brunswick,  which  had  all  at  once  become 
visible  for  Napoleon;  He  conceived  that,  so 
far  from  retiring,  the  whole  of  the  Prussian 
forces  had  come  to  take  part  in  the  battle.  He 
sent  immediately  fresh  orders  to  Marshals  Da- 
vout  and  Bernadotte.  He  enjoined  Marshal 
Davout  to  guard  strictly  the  bridge  of  Naum- 
burg, even  to  cross  it,  if  possible,  and  to  fall 
upon  the  rear  of  the  Prussians,  while  they  were 
engaged  in  front.  He  ordered  Marshal  Berna- 
dotte, placed  intermediately,  to  concur  in  the 
projected  movement,  either  by  joining  Marshal 
Davout,  if  he  was  near  the  latter,  or  by  throw- 
ing himself  directly  on  the  flank  of  the  Prus- 
sians, if  he  had  already  taken  at  Dornburg  a 
position  nearer  to  Jena.  Lastly,  he  desired 
Murat  to  arrive  as  speedily  as  possible  with 
his  cavalry. 

While  Napoleon  was  making  these  disposi- 
tions, the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  was  in  com- 
plete ignorance  of  the  lot  which  awaited  him. 
Still  persuaded  that  the  bulk  of  the  French 
army,  instead  of  halting  before  Jena,  was 
hurrying  to  Leipzig  and  Dresden,  he  sup- 
posed that  he  should  at  most  have  to  deal  with 
the  corps  of  Marshals  Lannes  and  Augereau, 
which,  having  passed  the  Saale  after  the  action 
at  Saalfeld,  would,  he  imagined,  make  their 
appearance  between  Jena  and  Weimar,  as  if 
they  had  descended  from  the  heights  of  the 
forest  of  Thuringia.  Under  this  idea,  not 
thinking  of  making  front  towards  Jena,  he 
had  on  that  side  opposed  only  the  corps  of 


Oct.  1806.J 


CONSULATE  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


135 


General  Tauenzien,  and  ranged  his  army 
along  the  road  from  Jena  to  Weimar.  His 
left,  composed  of  Saxons,  guarded  the  summit 
of  the  Schnecke ;  his  right  extended  to  Wei- 
mar, and  connected  itself  with  General  Ru- 
chel's  corps.  However,  a  fire  of  tirailleurs, 
which  was  heard  on  the  Landgra fen  berg,  hav- 
ing excited  a  sort  of  alarm,  and  General  Tau- 
enzien applying  for  succour,  the  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe  ordered  the  Saxon  brigade  of  Cer- 
rini,  the  Prussian  brigade  of  Sanitz,  and  seve- 
ral squadrons  of  cavalry,  to  get  under  arms, 
and  despatched  these  forces  to  the  Landgra- 
fenberg,  to  dislodge  from  it  the  French,  whom 
he  conceived  to  be  scarcely  established  on  that 
point.  At  the  moment  when  he  was  about  to 
execute  this  resolution,  Colonel  de  Massenbach 
brought  him  from  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  a 
reiterated  order  not  to  involve  himself  in  any 
serious  action,  to  guard  well  the  passages  of 
the  Saale,  and  particularly  that  of  Dornburg, 
which  excited  uneasiness  because  some  light 
troops  had  been  perceived  there.  The  Prince 
of  Hohenlohe,  who  had  become  one  of  the 
most  obedient  of  lieutenants,  when  he  ought 
not  to  have  been  so,  desisted  at  once,  in  com- 
pliance with  these  injunctions  from  the  head- 
quarters. It  was  singular,  nevertheless,  that, 
in  obeying  the  order  not  to  fight,  he  should 
abandon  the  debouche  by  which,  on  the  morrow, 
a  disastrous  battle  was  to  be  forced  upon  him. 
Be  this  as  it  may,  relinquishing  the  idea  of  re- 
taking the  Landgrafenbcrg,  he  contented  him- 
self with  sending  the  Saxon  brigade  of  Cerrini 
to  General  Tauenzien,  and  with  placing  at 
Nerkwitz,  facing  Dornburg,  the  Prussian  bri- 
gade of  Sanitz,  the  Pelet  fusiliers,  a  battalion 
of  Schemmelpfennig,  lastly  several  detach- 
ments of  cavalry  and  artillery,  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Holzendorf.  He  sent  some 
light  horse  to  Dornburg  itself,  to  learn  what 
was  passing  there.  The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe 
confined  himself  to  these  dispositions :  he  re- 
turned to  his  head-quarters  at  Capellendorf, 
near  Weimar,  saying  that,  with  50,000  men, 
and  even  70,000,  including  Ruchel's  corps, 
kept  towards  Dornburg  by  General  Holzendorf, 
towards  Jena  by  General  Tauenzien,  fronting 
to  the  road  from  Jena  to  Weimar,  he  would 
punish  the  two  Marshals  Lannes  and  Auge- 
reau  for  their  audacity,  if  they  dared  to  attack 
him  with  the  30  or  40  thousand  French  at 
their  disposal,  and  retrieve  the  honour  of  the 
Prussian  arms,  seriously  compromised  at 
Schleiz  and  Saalfeld. 

Napoleon,  stirring  before  daylight,  gave  his 
last  instructions  to  his  lieutenants,  and  orders 
for  his  soldiers  to  get  under  arms.  The  night 
was  cold,  the  country  covered  to  a  distance 
with  a  thick  fog,  like  that  which  for  some 
hours  enveloped  the  field  of  Austerlitz.  Es- 
corted by  men  carrying  torches,  Napoleon 
went  along  the  front  of  the  troops,  talking  to 
the  officers  and  soldiers.  He  explained  the 
position  of  the  two  armies,  demonstrated  to 
them  that  the  Prussians  were  as  deeply  com- 
promised as  the  Austrians  in  the  preceding 
year;  that,  if  vanquished  in  that  engagement, 
they  would  be  cut  off  from  the  Elbe  and  the 
Oder,  separated  from  the  Russians,  and  forced 
to  abandon  to  the  French  the  whole  Prussian 

VOL.  II.— 24 


monarchy;  that,  in  such  a  situation,  the 
French  corps  which  should  suffer  itself  to  be 
beaten  would  frustrate  the  grandest  designs, 
and  disgrace  itself  for  ever.  He  exhorted 
them  to  keep  on  their  guard  against  the  Prus- 
sian cavalry,  and  to  receive  it  in  square  with 
their  usual  firmness.  His  words  everywhere 
drew  forth  shouts  of  "  Forward !  vive  I'Empe- 
reurf"  Though  the  fog  was  thick,  yet  through 
its  veil  the  enemy's  advanced  posts  perceived 
the  glare  of  the  torches,  heard  the  acclama- 
tions of  our  soldiers,  and  went  to  give  the 
alarm  to  General  Tauenzien.  At  that  moment, 
the  corps  of  Lannes  set  itself  in  motion,  on 
a  signal  from  Napoleon.  Suchet's  division, 
formed  into  three  brigades,  advanced  first. 
Claparede's  brigade,  composed  of  the  17th 
light  and  a  battalion  of  elite,  marched  at  the 
head,  deployed  in  a  single  line.  On  the  wings 
of  this  line,  and  to  preserve  it  from  attacks  of 
cavalry,  the  34th  and  40th  regiments,  forming 
the  second  brigade,  were  disposed  in  close  co- 
lumn. Vedel's  brigade,  deployed,  closed  this 
sort  of  square.  On  the  left  of  Suchet's  divi- 
sion, but  a  little  in  rear,  came  Gazan's  divi- 
sion, ranged  in  two  lines  and  preceded  by  its 
artillery.  Thus  they  advanced,  groping  their 
way  through  the  fog.  Suchet's  division  di- 
rected its  course  towards  the  village  of  CJose- 
witz,  which  was  on  the  right,  Gazan's  division 
towards  the  village  of  Cospoda,  which  was  on 
the  left.  The  Saxon  battalions  of  Frederick 
Augustus  and  Rechten,  and  the  Prussian  bat- 
talion of  Zweifel,  perceiving  through  the  fog  a 
mass  in  motion,  fired  all  together.  The  17th 
light  sustained  that  fire,  and  immediately  re- 
turned it. '  This  fire  of  musketry  was  kept  up 
for  a  few  minutes,  the  parties  seeing  the  flash, 
and  hearing  the  report,  but  not  discerning  one 
another.  The  French,  on  approaching,  at 
length  discovered  the  little  wood  which  sur- 
rounded the  village  of  Closewitz.  General 
Claparede  briskly  threw  himself  into  it,  and, 
after  a  fight  hand  to  hand,  had  soon  carried  it, 
as  well  as  the  village  of  Closewitz  itself. 
Having  deprived  General  Tauenzien's  line  of 
this  appui,  the  French  continued  their  march 
amidst  the  balls  that  issued  from  that  thick 
fog.  Gazan's  division,  on  its  part,  took  the 
village  of  Cospoda  and  established  itself  there. 
Between  these  two  villages,  but  a  little  farther 
off,  was  a  small  hamlet,  that  of  Lutzenrode, 
occupied  by  Erichsen's  fusiliers.  Gazan's  di- 
vision carried  that  also,  and  was  then  able  to 
deploy  more  at  its  ease.  At  this  moment  the 
two  divisions  of  Lannes  were  assailed  by 
fresh  discharges  of  artillery  and  musketry. 
These  were  from  the  Saxon  grenadiers  of  the 
Cerrini  brigade,  who,  after  taking  up  the  ad- 
vanced posts  of  General  Tauenzien,  continued 
to  move  forward,  firing  battalion  volleys  with 
as  much  precision  as  if  they  had  been  at  a 
review.  The  17th  light,  which  formed  the 
head  of  Suchet's  division,  having  exhausted 
its  cartridges,  was  sent  to  the  rear.  The  34th 
took  its  place,  kept  up  the  fire  for  some  time, 
then  encountered  the  Saxon  grenadiers  with 
the  bayonet,  and  broke  them.  The  route  hav- 
ing soon  extended  to  the  whole  corps  of  Gene- 
ral Tauenzien,  Gazan's  and  Suchet's  divisions 
picked  up  about  twenty  pieces  of  cannon  and 


i80 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806 


many  fugitives.  From  the  Landgrafenberg, 
the  undulated  plateaux,  on  which  the  French 
had  just  deployed,  gradually  subsided,  as  we 
have  said,  to  the  little  valley  of  the  lira. 
Hence  they  marched  rapidly  upon  sloping 
ground,  at  the  heels  of  a  fleeing  enemy.  In 
this  quick  movement  they  encountered  two 
battalions  of  Cerrini,  and  also  Pelet's  fusiliers, 
which  had  been  left  in  the  environs  of  Close- 
witz.  These  troops  were  flung  back  for  the 
rest  of  the  day  towards  General  Holzendorf, 
commissioned  on  the  preceding  day  to  guard 
the  debouche  of  Dornburg. 

This  action  had  not  lasted  two  hours.  It 
was  nine  o'clock,  and  Napoleon  had  thus  early 
realized  the  first  part  of  his  plan,  which  con- 
sisted in  gaining  the  space  necessary  for  de- 
ploying his  army.  At  the  same  moment  his 
instructions  were  executing  at  all  points  with 
remarkable  punctuality.  Towards  the  left, 
Marshal  Augereau,  having  sent  off  Heudelet's 
division,  and  likewise  his  artillery  and  cavalry, 
to  the  extremity  of  the  Miihlthal,  on  the  high 
road  from  Weimar,  was  climbing,  with  Des- 
jardin's  division,  the  back  of  the  Landgrafen- 
berg,  and  coming  to  form  on  the  plateaux  the 
left  of  Gazan's  division.  Marshal  Soult,  only 
one  of  whose  divisions,  that  of  General  St. 
Hilaire,  had  arrived,  was  ascending  from 
Lobstedt,  in  the  rear  of  Closewitz,  facing  the 
positions  of  Nerkwitz  and  Alten-Krone,  occu- 
pied by  the  relics  of  Tauenzien's  corps  and  by 
the  detachment  of  General  Holzendorf.  Mar- 
shal Ney,  impatient  to  share  in  the  battle,  had 
detached  from  his  corps  a  battalion  of  vol- 
tigeurs,  a  battalion  of  grenadiers,  the  25th 
light,  two  regiments  of  cavalry,  alid'had  gone 
on  before  with  this  body  of  elite.  He  entered 
Jena  at  the  very  hour  when  the  first  act  of  the 
engagement  was  over.  Lastly,  Murat,  return- 
ing at  a  gallop,  with  the  dragoons  and  cuiras- 
siers, from  reconnoissances  executed  on  the 
Lower  Saale,  was  mounting  in  breathless  haste 
towards  Jena.  Napoleon  resolved,  therefore, 
to  halt  for  a  few  moments  on  the  conquered 
ground,  to  afford  his  troops  time  to  get  into 
line. 

Meanwhile,  the  fugitives  belonging  to  Gene- 
ral Tauenzien's  force  had  given  the  alarm  to 
the  whole  camp  of  the  Prussians.  At  the 
sound  of  the  cannon,  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe 
had  hastened  to  the  Weimar  road,  where  the 
Prussian  infantry  was  encamped,  not  yet  be- 
lieving the  action  to  be  general,  and  complain- 
ing that  the  troops  were  harassed  by  being 
obligtd  needlessly  to  get  under  arms.  Being 
soon  undeceived,  he  took  his  measures  for 
giving  battle.  Knowing  that  the  French  had 
passed  the  Saale  at  Saalfeld,  he  had  expected 
to  see  them  make  their  appearance  between 
Jena  and  Weimar,  and  had  drawn  up  his  army 
along  the  road  running  from  one  to  the  other 
of  these  towns.  As  this  conjecture  was  not 
realized,  he  was  obliged  to  change  his  dispo- 
sitions, and  he  did  it  with  promptness  and 
resolution.  He  sent  the  bulk  of  the  Prussian 
infantry,  under  the  command  of  General 
Grawert,  to  occupy  the  positions  abandoned 
by  General  Tauenzien.  Towards  the  Schnecke. 
which  was  to  form  his  right,  he  left  the  Niese- 
xneuVnel  div.'sion,  composed  of  the  two  Sajcon 


brigades  of  Burgsdorf  and  Nehroff,  of  the  Prus- 
sian Boguslawski  battalion,  and  of  a  numerous 
artillery,  with  orders  to  defend  to  the  last  ex- 
tremity the  winding  slopes  by  which  the 
Weimar  road  rises  to  the  plateaux.  To  aid 
them,  he  gave  them  the  Cerrini  brigade,  ral- 
lied and  reinforced  by  four  Saxon  battalions. 
In  rear  of  his  centre,  he  placed  a  reserve  of 
five  battalions  under  General  Dyherrn,  to  sup- 
port General  Grawert.  He  had  the  wrecks  of 
Tauenzien's  corps  rallied  at  some  distance 
from  the  field  of  battle,  and  supplied  with  am- 
munition. As  for  his  left,  he  directed  General 
Holzendorf  to  push  forward,  if  he  could,  and 
to  fall  upon  the  right  of  the  French,  while  he 
would  himself  endeavour  to  stop  them  in  front. 
He  sent  General  Ruchel  information  of  what 
|  was  passing,  and  begged  him  to  hasten  his 
;  march.  Lastly,  he  hurried  off  himself  with 
the  Prussian  cavalry  and  the  artillery  horsed, 
to  meet  the  French,  for  the  purpose  of  keeping 
them  in  check  and  covering  the  formation  of 
General  Grawert's  infantry. 

It  was  about  ten  o'clock,  and  the  action  of 
the  morning,  interrupted  for  an  hour,  was 
about  to  begin  again  with  greater  violence, 
while,  on  the  right,  Marshal  Soult,  debouching 
from  Lobstedt,  was  climbing  the  heights  with 
St.  Hilaire's  division ;  while  in  the  centre, 
Marshal  Lannes,  with  Suchet's  and  Gazan's 
divisions,  was  deploying  on  the  plateaux  won 
in  the  morning ;  and  while,  on  the  left,  Mar- 
shal Augereau,  ascending  from  the  bottom  of 
the  Muhlthal,  had  reached  the  village  of  Iser- 
stedt,  Marshal  Ney,  in  his  ardour  for  fighting, 
had  advanced  with  his  3000  men  of  the  elite, 
concealed  by  the  fog,  and  had  placed  himself 
between  Lannes  and  Augereau,  facing  the  vil- 
lage of  Vierzehn-Heiligen,  which  occupied  the 
centre  of  the  field  of  battle.  He  arrived  at  the 
very  moment  when  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe 
was  hastening  up  at  the  head  of  the  Prussian 
cavalry.  Finding  himself  all  at  once  facing 
the  enemy,  he  engaged  before  the  Emperor 
had  given  orders  for  renewing  the  action.  The 
horse-artillery  of  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe 
having  already  placed  itself  in  battery,  Ney 
pushed  the  10th  chasseurs  upon  this  artillery. 
This  regiment,  taking  advantage  of  a  clump 
of  trees  to  form,  dashed  forward  on  the  gallop, 
ascended  by  its  right  upon  the  flank  of  the 
Prussian  artillery,  cut  down  the  gunners,  and 
took  seven  pieces  of  cannon,  under  the  fire  of 
the  whole  line  of  the  enemy.  But  a  mass  of 
Prussian  cuirassiers  rushed  upon  it,  and  il 
was  obliged  to  retire  with  precipitation.  Ney 
then  despatched  the  3d  hussars.  This  regi- 
ment, manoeuvering  as  the  10th  chasseurs  had 
done,  took  advantage  of  the  clump  of  trees  to 
form,  ascended  upon  the  flank  of  the  cuiras- 
siers, then  fell  upon  them  suddenly,  threw 
them  into  disorder,  and  forced  them  to  retire. 
Two  regiments  of  light  cavalry,  however,  were 
not  enough,  to  make  head  against  thirty  squad- 
rons of  dragoons  and  cuirassiers.  Our  chas- 
seurs and  our  hussars  were  soon  obliged  to 
seek  shelter  behind  our  infantry.  Marshal 
Ney  then  sent  forward  the  battalion  of  grena- 
diers and  the  battalion  of  voltigeurs  which  he 
had  brought,  formed  two  squares,  then  placing 
lutnscii  in  one  of  them,  opposed  the  charges 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


197 


of  the  Prussian  cavalry.  He  allowed  the  ene- 
my's cuirassiers  to  approach  within  twenty 
paces  of  his  bayonets,  and  terrified  them  by 
the  aspect  of  a  motionless  infantry  which  had 
reserved  its  fire.  At  his  signal,  a  discharge 
within  point-blank  range  strewed  the  ground 
with  dead  and  wounded.  Though  several 
times  assailed,  these  two  squares  remained 
unbroken. 

Napoleon,  on  the  top  of  the  Landgrafen- 
berg,  had  been  highly  astonished  to  hear  the 
firing  recommence  without  his  order.  He 
learned  with  still  more  astonishment  that 
Marshal  Ney,  whom  he  had  supposed  to  be  in 
rear,  was  engaged  with  the  Prussians.  He 
hastened  up  greatly  displeased,  and  on  ap- 
proaching Vierzehn-Heiligen,  perceived  from 
the  height  Marshal  Ney  defending  himself,  in 
the  middle  of  two  weak  squares,  against  the 
whole  of  the  Prussian  cavalry.  This  heroic 
countenance  was  enough  to  dispel  all  dis- 
pleasure. Napoleon  sent  General  Bertrand 
with  two  regiments  of  light  cavalry,  all  that 
he  had  at  hand,  in  the  absence  of  Murat,  to 
assist  in  extricating  Ney,  and  ordered  Lannes 
to  advance  with  his  infantry.  During  the  time 
that  elapsed  before  relief  arrived,  the  intrepid 
Ney  was  not  disconcerted.  While,  with  four 
regiments  of  horse,  he  renewed  his  charges 
of  cavalry,  he  moved  the  25th  infantry  to  his 
left,  in  order  to  appuy  himself  on  the  wood  of 
Iserstedt,  which  Augereau,  on  his  part,  was 
striving  to  reach;  he  made  the  battalion  of 
grenadiers  advance  as  far  as  the  little  wood 
which  had  protected  his  chasseurs,  and  de- 
spatched the  battalion  of  voltigeurs  to  gain 
possession  of  the  village  of  Vierzehn-Heiligen. 
But,  at  the  same  instant,  Lannes,  coming  to 
his  assistance,  threw  the  21st  regiment  of 
light-infantry  into  the  village  of  Vierzehn- 
Heiligen,  and,  putting  himself  at  the  head  of 
the  100th,  103d,  34th,  64th,  and  88th  of  the 
line,  debouched  in  the  face  of  the  Prussian 
infantry  of  General  Grawert.  The  latter  de- 
ployed before  the  village  of  Vierzehn-Heiligen, 
with  a  regularity  of  movement  due  to  long  ex- 
ercises. It  drew  up  in  order  of  battle,  and 
opened  a  regular  and  terrible  fire  of  small 
arms.  Ney's  three  little  detachments  suffered 
severely;  but  Lannes,  ascending  on  the  right 
of  General  Grawert's  infantry,  endeavoured  to 
turn  it  in  spite  of  repeated  charges  of  the 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe's  cavalry,  which  came 
to  attack  him  in  his  march. 

The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  bravely  supported 
his  troops  amidst  the  danger.  The  regiment 
of  Sanitz  was  completely  broken ;  he  formed 
it  anew  under  the  fire.  He  then  purposed  that 
the  Zastrow  regiment  should  retake  the  village 
of  Vierzehn-Heiligen  at  the  point  of  the  bayo- 
net, hoping  thereby  to  decide  the  victory. 
Meanwhile,  he  was  informed  that  more  hos- 
tile columns  began  to  appear;  that  General 
Holzendorf,  engaged  with  superior  forces,  was 
incapable  of  seconding  him  ;  that  General  Ru- 
chel,  however,  was  on  the  point  of  joining  him 
with  his  corps.  He  then  judged  it  expedient 
to  wait  for  this  powerful  succour,  and  poured 
a  shower  of  shells  into  the  village  of  Vierzehn- 
Heiligen,  resolved  to  try  the  effect  of  flames 
before  he  attacked  it  with  his  bayonets.  He 


sent  at  the  same  time  officers  a*fter  officers  to 
General  Ruchel,  to  urge  him  to  hasten  up,  and 
to  promise  him  the  victory  if  he  arrived  in 
time ;  for,  according  to  him,  the  French  were 
on  the  point  of  giving  way.  Vain  illusion  of 
an  impetuous  but  blind  courage!  At  that 
very  hour  fortune  was  deciding  otherwise. 
Augereau  debouching  at  last  from  the  wood 
of  Iserstedt  with  Desjardin's  division,  disen- 
gaged Ney's  left,  and  began  to  exchange 
a  fire  of  musketry  with  the  Saxons  who  were 
defending  the  Schnecke,  while  General  Heu- 
delet  attacked  them  in  column  on  the  high 
road  from  Jena  to  Weimar.  On  the  other  side 
of  the  field  of  battle,  the  corps  of  Marshal 
Soult,  after  driving  the  remains  of  the  Cerrini 
brigade,  as  well  as  the  Pelet  fusiliers,  out  of 
the  wood  of  Closewitz,  and  flinging  back  Hol- 
zendorf's  detachment  to  a  distance,  opened  its 
guns  on  the  flank  of  the  Prussians.  Napo- 
leon, seeing  the  progress  of  his  two  wings, 
and  learning  the  arrival  of  the  troops  which 
had  been  left  in  rear,  was  no  longer  afraid  to 
bring  into  action  all  the  forces  present  on  the 
ground,  the  guard  included,  and  gave  orders 
for  advancing.  An  irresistible  impulsion  was 
communicated  to  the  whole  line.  The  Prus- 
sians were  driven  back,  broken,  and  hurled 
down  the  sloping  ground  which  descends  from 
Landgrafenberg  to  the  valley  of  the  lira.  The 
regiments  of  Hohenlohe  and  the  Hahn  grena- 
diers, of  Grawert's  division,  were  almost  en- 
tirely destroyed  by  the  fire  or  by  the  bayonet. 
General  Grawert  himself  was  severely  wound- 
ed, while  directing  his  infantry.  No  corps 
manifested  greater  firmness.  The  Cerrini 
brigade,  assailed  with  grape,  fell  back  upon 
the  Dyherrn  reserve,  which  in  vain  opposed 
its  five  battalions  to  the  movement  of  the 
French.  That  reserve,  being  soon  left  unco- 
vered, found  itself  attacked,  surrounded  on  all 
sides,  and  forced  to  disperse.  Tauenzien's 
corps,  rallied  for  a  moment,  and  brought  back 
into  the  fire  by  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  was 
hurried  away,  like  the  others,  in  the  general 
rout.  The  Prussian  cavalry,  taking  advantage 
of  the  absence  of  the  heavy  French  cavalry, 
made  charges  to  cover  its  broken  infantry ; 
but  our  chasseurs  and  hussars  kept  it  in 
check;  and,  though  driven  back  several 
times,  returned  incessantly  to  the  charge, 
upheld,  intoxicated,  by  victory.  A  terrible 
carnage  followed  this  disorderly  retreat.  At 
every  step  prisoners  were  made ;  artillery  was 
taken  by  whole  batteries. 

In  this  great  danger,  General  Ruchel  at 
length  made  his  appearance,  but  too  late.  He 
marched  in  two  lines  of  infantry,  having  on 
the  left  the  cavalry  belonging  to  his  corps,  and 
on  the  right  the  Saxon  cavalry,  commanded  by 
the  brave  General  Zeschwitz,  whe  had  come 
of  his  own  accord  and  taken  that  position. 
He  ascended  at  a  foot  pace  those  plateaux, 
sloping  from  the  Landgrafenberg  to  the  Ilm. 
While  mounting,  Prussians  and  French  poured 
down  around  him  like  a  torrent,  the  one  pur- 
sued by  the  other.  He  was  thus  met  by  a  son 
of  tempest,  at  the  moment  of  his  appearance 
on  the  field  of  battle.  While  he  was  advance 
ing,  his  heart  rent  with  grief  at  the  sight  of 
this  disaster,  the  French  rushed  upon  him  with 


188 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


the  impetuosity  of  victory.  The  cavalry 
which  covered  his  left  flank  was  first  dispersed. 
That  unfortunate  general,  an  unwise  but  ar- 
dent friend  of  his  country,  was  the  first  to 
oppose  the  shock  in  person.  A  ball  entered 
his  chest,  and  he  was  borne  off  dying  in  the 
arms  of  his  soldiers.  His  infantry,  deprived 
of  the  cavalry  which  covered  it,  found  itself 
attacked  in  flank  by  the  troops  of  Marshal 
Soult,  and  threatened  in  front  by  those  of  Mar- 
shals Lannes  and  Ney.  The  battalions  placed 
at  the  left  extremity  of  the  line,  seized  with 
terror,  dispersed,  and  hurried  along  the  rest 
of  the  corps  in  their  flight.  To  aggravate  the 
disaster,  the  French  dragoons  and  cuirassiers 
came  up  at  a  gallop,  under  the  conduct  of  Mu- 
rat,  impatient  to  take  a  share  in  the  battle. 
They  surrounded  those  hapless  dispersed  bat- 
talions, cut  in  pieces  all  who  attempted  to  re- 
sist, and  pursued  the  others  to  the  banks  of  the 
Ilm,  where  they  made  a  great  number  of  pri- 
soners. 

On  the  field  of  battle  were  left  only  the  two 
Saxon  brigades  of  Burgsdorf  and  Nehroff, 
which,after  honourably  defending  the  Schnecke 
against  Heudelet's  and  Desjardin's  divisions 
of  Augereau's  corps,  had  been  forced  in  their 
position  by  the  address  of  the  French  tirail- 
leurs, and  effected  their  retreat  formed  into 
two  squares.  These  squares  presented  three 
sides  of  infantry  and  one  of  artillery,  the  latter 
being  the  rear  side.  The  two  Saxon  brigades 
retired,  halting  alternately,  firing  their  guns, 
and  then  resuming  their  march.  Augereau's 
artillery  followed,  sending  balls  after  them:  a 
swarm  of  French  tirailleurs  ran  after  them, 
harassing  them  with  their  small  arms.  Mu- 
rat,  who  had  just  overthrown  the  relics  of  Ru- 
chel's  corps,  fell  upon  the  two  Saxon  brigades, 
and  ordered  them  to  be  charged  to  the  utmost 
extremity  by  his  dragoons  and  cuirassiers. 
The  dragoons  attacked  first  without  forcing  an 
entrance ;  but  they  returned  to  the  charge, 
penetrated  and  broke  the  square.  General 
d'Hatpoul,  with  \he  cuirassiers,  attacked  the 
second,  broke  it,  and  made  that  havoc  which 
a  victorious  cavalry  inflicts  on  a  broken  in- 
fan'.ry.  Those  unfortunate  men  had  no  other 
resource  but  to  surrender.  The  Prussian  bat- 
talion of  Boguslawski  was  forced  in  its  turn, 
and  treated  like  the  others.  The  brave  Gen- 
eral Zeschwitz,  who  had  hastened  with  the 
Saxon  cavalry  to  the  assistance  of  its  infantry, 
made  vain  efforts  to  support  it,  and  was  driven 
back,  and  forced  to  give  way  to  the  general 
rout. 

Murat  rallied  his  squadrons,  and  hastened 
to  Weimar,  to  collect  fresh  trophies.  At  some 
distance  from  that  town  were  crowded  to- 
gether, pell-mell,  detachments  of  infantry,  cav- 
alry, artillery,  at  the  top  of  a  long  and  steep 
slope,  formed  by  the  high  road  leading  down 
lo  the  bottom  of  the  valley  of  the  Ilm.  These 
troops,  confusedly  huddled  together,  were  sup- 
ported upon  a  small  wood,  called  the  wood  of 
Webicht.  All  at  once,  the  bright  helmets  of 
the  French  cavalry  made  their  appearance. 
A  few  musket-shots  were  instinctively  fired  by 
this  affrighted  crowd.  At  this  signal/the  mass, 
seized  with  terror,  rushed  down  the  hill,  at  the 
foo  of  which  Weimar  is  situated :  foot,  horse, 


artillerymen,  all  tumbled  one  over  another  into 
this  gulf — a  new  disaster,  and  well  worthy  of 
pity.  Murat  sent  after  them  a  part  of  his 
dragoons,  who  goaded  on  this  mob  with  the 
points  of  their  swords,  and  pursued  it  into  the 
streets  of  Weimar.  'With  the  others  he  made 
a  circuit  to  jhe  other  side  of  Weimar,  and  cut 
off  the  retreat  of  the  fugitives,  who  surrendered 
by  thousands. 

Out  of  the  70,000  Prussians  who  had  ap- 
peared on  the  field  of  battle,  not  a  single  corps 
remained  entire,  not  one  retreated  in  order. 
Out  of  100,000  French,  composed  of  the  corps 
of  Marshals  Soult,  Lannes,  Augereau,  Ney, 
Murat,  and  the  guard,  not  more  than  50,000 
had  fought,  and  they  had  been  sufficient  to 
overthrow  the  Prussian  army.  The  greater 
part  of  that  army,  seized  with  a  sort  of  vertigo, 
throwing  away  its  arms,  ceasing  to  know 
|  either  its  colours  or  its  officers,  covered  all 
the  roads  of  Thuringia.  About  12,000  Prus- 
sians and  Saxons,  killed  and  wounded,  about 
4000  French  killed  and  wounded  also,  strewed 
the  ground  from  Jena  to  Weimar.  On  that 
|  ground  were  seen  stretched  a  great  number 
— a  greater  number,  indeed,  than  usual — of 
Prussian  officers,  who  had  nobly  paid  for 
their  silly  passions  with  their  lives.  Fifteen 
thousand  prisoners,  200  pieces  of  cannon,  were 
in  the  hands  of  our  soldiers,  intoxicated  with 
joy.  The  shells  of  the  Prussians  had  set  fire 
to  the  town  of  Jena,  and  from  the  plateaux 
where  the  battle  was  fought,  columns  of  flame 
were  seen  bursting  from  the  dark  bosom  of 
night.  French  shells  ploughed  up  the  city  of 
Weimar,  and  threatened  it  with  a  similar 
fate.  The  shrieks  of  fugitives  while  running 
through  the  streets,  the  tramp  of  Murat's  ca- 
valry, dashing  through  them  at  a  gallop, 
slaughtering  without  mercy  all  who  were  not 
quick  enough  in  flinging  down  their  arms,  had 
filled  with  horror  that  charming  city — the  noble 
asylum  of  letters,  the  peaceful  theatre  of  the 
most  exquisite  intercourse  of  mind  that  was 
then  to  be  found  in  the  world.  At  Weimar,  as 
at  Jena,  part  of  the  inhabitants  had  fled.  The 
conquerors,  disposing  like  masters  of  these 
almost  deserted  towns,  established  their  maga- 
zines and  their  hospitals  in  the  churches  and 
public  buildings.  Napoleon,  on  returning 
from  Jena,  directed  his  attention,  according  to 
his  custom,  to  the  collecting  of  the  wounded, 
and  heard  shouts  of  Vive  I'JLmpereur!  mingled 
with  the  moans  of  the  dying.  Terrible  scenes, 
the  sight  of  which  would  be  intolerable,  did 
not  the  genius  and  heroism  displayed  redeem 
their  horror,  and  did  not  glory,  that  light  which 
embellishes  every  thing,  throw  over  them  its 
dazzling  rays ! 

But,  great  as  were  the  results  already  ob- 
tained, Napoleon  knew  not  yet  the  full  extent 
of  his  victory,  nor  the  Prussians  the  full  ex- 
tent of  their  disaster.  While  the  cannon  were 
heard  rolling  at  Jena,  they  were  also  heard  in 
the  distance,  on  the  right  towards  Naumburg. 
Napoleon  had  often  looked  that  way,  saying 
that  Marshals  Davout  and  Bernadotte,  who  had 
around  them  250,000  men,  had  not  much  to 
fear  from  the  remnant  of  the  Prussian  army, 
the  greater  part  of  which  he  had  had,  as  he 
conceived,  upon  his  hands.  He  had  several 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


189 


limes  repeated  the  order  to  hold  out  to  the  last 
man,  rather  than  abandon  the  bridge  of  Nautn- 
burg. 

The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  who  retired  with 
a  spirit  racked  by  grief,  had  also  heard  the 
cannon  towards  Naumburg,  and  was  inclined 
to  proceed  thither,  alternately  attracted  and 
repelled  by  news  brought  from  Auerstadt,  the 
place  where  the  army  of  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick was  encamped.  Scouts  declared  that  this 
army  had  gained  a  complete  victory ;  others 
said,  on  the  contrary,  that  it  had  sustained  a 
more  signal  disaster  than  the  army  of  the 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe.  The  Prince  soon 
learned  the  truth.  Here  follows  what  passed 
on  that  same  memorable  day,  marked  by  two 
sanguinary  battles,  fought  at  the  distance  of 
four  leagues  from  one  another. 

The  royal  army  had  marched  on  the  preced- 
ing day  in  five  divisions  on  the  high  road  from 
Weimar  to  Naumburg.  Crossing  those  pla- 
teaux, undulated  like  the  waves  of  the  sea, 
which  form  the  surface  of  Thuringia,  and  ter- 
minate in  abrupt  hills  towards  the  banks  of  the 
Saale,  it  had  halted  at  Auerstudt,  a  little  in  ad- 
vance of  the  defile  of  Kosen,  a  well-known 
military  position.  It  had  marched  five  or  six 
leagues,  and  this  was  considered  much  for 
troops  not  accustomed  to  the  fatigues  of  war. 
If  had  therefore  bivouacked  in  the  evening  of 
the  13th  of  October,  in  front  and  rear  of  the 
village  of  Auerstlidt,  and  fared  very  ill,  from 
not  knowing  how  to  subsist  without  maga- 
zines. Like  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick  appeared  to  pay  little  at- 
tention to  the  outlets  by  which  it  was  possible 
for  the  French  to  come  upon  him.  Beyond 
Auerstldt,  and  before  you  reach  the  bridge  of 
Naumburg,  over  the  Saale,  you  come  to  a  sort 
of  basin  of  considerable  magnitude,  inter- 
sected by  a  rivulet,  which  after  a  few  wind- 
ings runs  to  join  the  lira  and  the  Saale.  This 
basin,  the  two  sides  of  which  incline  towards 
each  other,  seems  to  be  a  field  of  battle  ready 
formed  to  receive  two  armies,  opposing  no- 
thing to  their  meeting  but  the  slender  obstacle 
of  a  brook  easy  to  cross.  The  road  from 
Weimar  to  Naumburg  runs  all  through  it,  at 
first  descending  towards  the  stream,  crossing 
it  by  a  bridge,  then  ascending  on  the  opposite 
side,  passing  through  a  village  called  Hassen- 
haus.en,  and  which  is  the  only  paint  d'appui 
that  there  is  on  this  clear  spot  Beyond  Has- 
senhausen,  the  road,  having  reached  the  outer 
margin  of  the  basin  in  question,  stops  all  at 
once,  and  descends  by  rapid  windings  to  the 
banks  of  the  Saale.  Here  is  what  is  called 
the  defile  of  Kiisen.  Below,  there  is  a  bridge 
which  has  been  named  the  bridge  of  Kosen  or 
of  Naumburg. 

As  it  was  known  that  the  French  were  on 
the  other  side  of  the  Saale,  at  Naumburg,  it 
was  natural  to  take  a  position  with  at  least 
one  division  on  the  top  of  the  winding  descent 
of  Kiisen,  not  for  the  purpose  of  cleaning  the 
pass,  which  there  was  merely  an  idea  of  mask- 
ing, but  to  bar  the  access  against  the  French, 
while  the  other  divisions  should  prosecute 
their  movement  of  retreat,  covered  by  the 
Saale. 

Not   an   individual   of  the  Prussian    stafl' 


'  thought  of  this.  They  Contented  themselves 
with  sending  a  few  cavalry  patroles  to  recon- 
noitre, and  these  retired  after  exchanging  pis- 
tol-shots with  the  advanced  posts  of  Marshal 
Davout.  From  these  patroles  it  was  learned 
that  the  French  had  not  established  themselves 
in  the  defile  of  Kosen,  and  it  was  concluded 
that  all  was  safe.  On  the  following  day,  three 
divisions  were  to  pass  through  the  basin  that 
I  we  have  just  described,  to  occupy  the  winding 
I  slopes  which  lead  down  to  the  banks  of  the 
Saale,  and  the  two  other  divisions  under  Mar- 
shal Kalkreuth,  marching  after  the  first  three, 
had  orders  to  possess  themselves  of  the  bridge 
of  Freyburg  ovt  the  Unstrut,  in  order  to  se- 
cure to  the  army  the  passage  of  that  tributary 
of  the  Saale. 

In  war,  it  is  in  vain  to  think  of  many  things, 
if  one  does  not  think  of  all:  the  forgotten  point 
is  precisely  the  one  by  which  the  enemy  sur- 
prises you.  It  was  as  gross  a  fault  at  this 
moment  to  neglect  the  defile  of  Kiisen  as  to 
relinquish  the  Landgrafenberg  to  Napoleon. 

Marshal  Davout,  whom  Napoleon  had  placed 
at  Naumburg,  united  with  the  soundest  sense, 
extraordinary  firmness  and  inflexible  severity. 
He  was  stimulated  to  vigilance  as  much  by 
love  of  duty  as  by  the  feeling  of  a  natural  in- 
firmity— very  weak  sight  Thus  this  illus- 
trious warrior  was  indebted  to  a  physical 
defect  for  a  moral  quality.  Being  scarcely 
able  to  discern  objects,  he  took  the  pains  to 
observe  them  very  closely :  when  he  had  seen 
them  himself  he  made  others  look  at  them:  he 
incessantly  overwhelmed  all  about  him  with 
questions,  and  neither  took  any  rest  himself, 
nor  allowed  them  any,  till  he  thought  himself 
sufficiently  informed;  never  being  content  to 
live  in  that  uncertainty  in  which  so  many 
generals  go  to  sleep,  and  risk  their  own  glory 
and  the  lives  of  their  soldiers.  In  the  evening, 
he  had  gone  himself  to  ascertain  what  was 
passing  in  the  defile  of  Kosen.  Some  pri- 
soners, taken  in  a  skirmish,  had  informed  him 
that  the  Prussian  grand  army  was  approach- 
ing, headed  by  the  king,  the  princes,  and  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick.  He  had  immediately  de- 
spatched a  battalion  to  the  bridge  of  Kiisen, 
and  enjoined  these  troops  to  be  stirring  hy 
midnight,  for  the  purpose  of  occupying  tl  ? 
heights  commanding  the  Saale  before  the 
enemy. 

Marshal  Bernadotte  was  at  the  moment  at 
Naumburg,  with  orders  to  go  to  any  point 
where  he  conceived  that  he  should  be  most 
useful,   and    especially    to    second    Marshal 
Davout,   if  he   had   need    of   him.     Marshal 
Davout  proceeded   to   Naumburg,  communi- 
cated to  Marshal  Bernadotte  what  he  had  just 
learned,  proposed  to  him  that  they  should  give 
battle  together,  offered   even   to  put  himself 
under  his  command;  for  46,000  men,  which 
they  had  between  them,  were  not  too  many 
to  cope  with  the  80,000  that  rumour  assigned 
j  to  the  Prussian  army.     Marshal  Davout  urged 
i  this  proposal  for  the  sake  of  the  most  import- 
|  ant  considerations.     Had  Marshal  Lannes,  or 
any  other,  been  in  the  place  of  Marshal  Ber- 
,  nadotte,  so  much  time  would  not  have  been 
j  lost   in  useless  explanations.     The  generous 
i  Lannes   would,   on    the    appearance   of    the 


190 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


enemy,  have  ei^oraced  even  a  hated  rival,  anr 
have  fought  with  the  utmost  devotedness.  Bu 
Marshal  Bernadotte,  interpreting  the  Empe 
ror's  orders  in  the  falsest  manner,  absolutely 
persisted  in  leaving  Naumburg  and  proceed 
.ng  to  Dornburg,  where  the  enemy  was  no 
stated  to  be.1  Whence  could  so  strange  a 
resolution  proceed?  It  proceeded  from  tha 
detestable  sentiment,  which  often  causes  the 
blood  of  men,  the  welfare  of  the  state,  to  be 
sacrificed  to  envy,  to  hatred,  to  revenge.  Mar 
shal  Bernadotte  felt  a  deep  aversion,  conceived 
on  the  most  frivolous  motives,  for  Marsha 
Davout.  The  latter  was  left  with  three  divi- 
sions of  infantry,  and  three  regiments  of  ligh 
cavalry.  Marshal  Bernadotte  took  with  him 
a  division  of  dragoons,  which  had  been  de- 
tached from  the  cavalry  reserve,  to  second  the 
first  and  the  third  corps,  and  which  he  had  no 
right  to  dispose  of  exclusively. 

Marshal  Davout,  however,  was  under  no 
hesitation  concerning  the  resolution  which  he 
had  to  take.  He  determined  to  bar  the  enemy's 
way,  and  to  perish  with  the  last  men  of  his 
corps,  rather  than  leave  open  a  road  which 
Napoleon  made  it  such  an  important  point  to 
close.  In  the  night  between  the  13th  and  14th, 
he  was  on  march  for  the  bridge,  of  Kiisen,  with 
the  three  divisions  of  Gudin,  Friant,  and  Mo- 
rand,  forming  26,000  men  present  under  arms, 
the  greater  part  infantry,  luckily  the  best  in 
the  army,  for  the  discipline  was  iron  under 
that  inflexible  marshal.  With  these  26,000 
men,  he  expected  to  have  to  fight  70,000,  ac- 
cording to  some,  80,000  according  to  others, 
in  reality  66,000.  As  for  the  soldiers,  they 
were  not  accustomed  to  count  their  enemies, 
how  numerous  soever  they  might  be.  Under 
all  circumstances,  they  held  themselves  bound 
and  certain  to  conquer. 

The  marshal,  having  his  troops  under  arms 
long  before  it  was  light,  crossed  the  bridge  of 
Kosen,  which  he  had  occupied  the  preceding 
evening,  ascended  with  Friant's  division  the 
winding  slopes  of  Kosen,  and  debouched, 
about  six  in  the  morning,  on  the  heights  form- 
ing one  side  of  the  basin  of  Hassenhausen.  In 
a  few  moments,  the  Prussians  appeared  on  the 
opposite  side,  so  that  the  armies  might  have 
perceived  each  other  at  the  two  extremities  of 
this  kind  of  amphitheatre,  if  the  fog  which  at 
that  hour  enveloped  the  field  of  battle  of  Jena 
had  not* covered  that  of  Auerstlidt  also.  The 
Prussian  division  of  Schmettau  marched  at 
the  head,  preceded  by  an  advanced  guard  of 
600  horse,  under  the  command  of  General 
Bkicher.  A  little  in  the  rear  came  the  king, 
with  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  and  Marshal 
Mollendorf.  General  Blucher  had  descended 
to  the  muddy  stream  which  runs  through  the 


1  We  quote  a  letter  from  the  Emperor  to  the  Prince 
of  Ponte  Corvo,  written  alter  the  baitle  of  AuersiUdt, 
which  confirms  all  our  assertions.  It  manhests  a  dis- 
satisfaction which  Napoleon  feit  sail  more  stixmgiy  than 
be  expressed 

"To  the  Prince  of  Ponte  Corvo. 

"Wittenberg,  23d  October,  1806. 

"I  have  received  your  letter.  lam  not  in  the  habit 
»f  recriminating  upon  the  past,  since  it  is  without 
remedy.  Your  corps  tParmie  was  not  on  the  field  of 
baltle,  and  that  might  have  been  extremely  disastrous 
fcir  me.  Still,  agreeably  to  a  very  precise  order,  you 


basin,  crossed  the  little  bridge,  and  was  ascend- 
ing the  high  road  at  a  foot  pace,  when  he  met 
a  French  detachment  of  cavalry  commanded 
by  Colonel  Bourke  and  Captain  Hulot.  Pistol- 
shots  were  exchanged  amidst  the  fog,  and  on 
our  side  some  prisoners  were  taken  from  the 
Prussians.  The  French  detachment,  after  this 
bold  reconnoissance,  executed  in  a  dense  fog, 
went  and  placed  itself  under  the  protection  of 
the  25th  of  the  line,  headed  by  Marshal  Davout. 
The  marshal  ordered  some  pieces  of  artillery 
to  be  placed  on  the  road  itself,  and  fired  with 
grape  at  General  Blucher's  600  horse,  who 
were  soon  thrown  into  great  disorder.  A  horsed 
battery,  which  followed  this  detachment  of 
cavalry,  was  taken  by  two  companies  of  the 
25th,  and  conveyed  to  Hassenhausen.  This 
first  encounter  revealed  the  extremely  critical 
nature  of  the  situation.  We  should  have  a 
great  battle  to  fight.  At  any  rate  the  fog  must 
retard  the  engagement,  for  neither  party  could 
attempt  any  serious  movement  in  the  presence 
of  an  enemy  who  might  be  said  to  be  invisible. 
Marshal  Davout,  coming  from  Naumburg  to 
cut  off  the  retreat  of  the  Prussians,  turned  his 
back  on  the  Elbe  and  on  Germany.  He  had 
the  Saale  on  his  left,  wooded  heights  on  his 
right ;  the  Prussians,  coming  from  Weimar, 
had  the  contrary  position.  Marshal  Davout, 
thanks  to  the  delay  caused  by  the  fog,  had 
time  to  post  in  a  suitable  manner  Gudin's 
division,  the  first  that  arrived,  and  composed 
of  the  25th,  85th,  12th,  and  21st  of  the  line, 
and  six  squadrons  of  chasseurs.  He  placed 
the  85th  in  the  village  of  Hassenhausen,  and 
as  on  the  right  of  Hassenhausen  (the  right  of 
the  French)  there  was  a  small  wood  of  wil- 
lows, he  dispersed  in  this  wood  a  great  num- 
ber of  tirailleurs,  who  opened  a  destructive 
fire  upon  the  Prussian  line,  which  began  to  be 
discernible.  The  three  other  regiments  were 
posted  on  the  right  of  the  village,  two  of  them 
deployed,  and  ranged  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
present  a  double  line,  the  third  in  column, 
ready  to  form  into  square  on  the  flank  of  the 
division.  The  ground  on  the  left  of  Hassen- 
hausen was  reserved  for  the  troops  of  General 
Morand.  As  for  those  of  General  Friant,  their 
position  would  be  determined  by  the  circum- 
stances of  the  battle. 

The  King  of  Prussia,  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick, and  Marshal  MoJlendorf,  who  had  crossed 
the  rivulet  with  Schmettau's  division,  delibe- 
rated, at  sight  of  the  dispositions  which  they 
perceived  in  front  of  Hassenhausen,  whether 
;hey  should  attack  immediately.  The  Duke 
of  Brunswick  advised  waiting  for  Wartensle- 
Sen's  division,  that  they  might  act  with  greater 
unity;  but  the  king  and  Marshal  Mollendorf 
were  of  opinion  that  the  combat  should  not  be 


ought  to  have  been  at  Dornburg,  which  is  one  of  the 
irincipal  debouehls  of  the  Saale,  on  the  same  day  thai 
Marshal  Lannes  was  at  Jena,  Marshal  Augert-au  al 
iula,  and  Marshal  Davout  at  Naumburg.  In  default 
of  having  executed  these  dispositions,  1  had  let  you 
tnow  in  the  night,  that,  if  you  were  still  at  Naumburg, 
.on  were  to  march  towards  Marshal  Davout  lor  the 
>urpose  of  supporting  him.  When  this  order  arrived, 
,-ou  were  at  Naumburg;  and  yet  you  preferred  making 
a  false  march  and  returning  to  Dornburg,  and  in  conse- 
quence you  were  not  at  the  battle,  and  Marshal  Davout 
d  principally  to  bear  the  brunt  of  the  euemy's  effort*. 
All  this  is  certainly  very  unfortunate.  &c. 

'•  NA.POLEOH." 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


191 


deferred.     Besides,  the  fire  of  musketry  be- 
came so  brisk  that  it  was  necessary  to  reply 
to  it,  and  to  engage  immediately.    They  de- 
ployed, therefore,  with  Schmettau's  division, 
facing  the  ground  occupied  by  the  French, 
having  before  them  Hassenhausen,  which,  sit- 
uated amidst  this  open  ground,  was  soon  to 
become  the  pivot  of  the  battle.     They  tried  to 
repulse  the  French  tirailleurs  in  ambush,  be- 
hind the  willows,  but  with  no  effect,  and  then 
they  moved  a  little  to  the  right  of  Hassenhau- 
sen, (right  for  the  French,  left  for  the  Prus- 
sians,) to  secure  themselves  from  a  downward 
and   destructive   fire.      Schmettau's   division 
approached  the  lines  of  our  infantry  to  fire  at 
it,  and,  the  fog  beginning  to  clear  off",  it  disco- 
vered the  infantry  of  Gudin's  division  drawn 
up  to  the  right  of  Hassenhausen.      At  this 
sight,  General  Blucher  collected  his  numerous 
cavalry,  and,  making  a  circuit,  advanced  to 
charge  Gudin's  division  in  flank.     The  latter, 
however,  did  nol  allow  him  time  to  do  so.    The 
25th,  which   was   in   first   line,   immediately 
formed  its  right  battalion  into  square ;  the  21st, 
which  was  in  second  line,  followed  that  exam- 
ple;  lastly,  the  12th  regiment,  which  was  in 
rear-guard,  formed  a  single  square  of  its  two 
battalions,  and  these  three  masses,  bristling 
with  bayonets,  waited  with  calm  assurance  for 
General  Blucher' s  squadrons.    Generals  Petit, 
Gudin,  Gauthier,  had  each  placed  themselves 
in  a  square.     The  marshal  went  from  one  to 
another.     General  Blucher,  who  was  distin- 
guished for  impetuous  courage,  made  a  first 
charge,  which  he  took  care  to  direct  in  person. 
But  his  squadrons  failed  to  reach  our  bayo- 
nets, a  shower  of  balls  stopping  them  short,  and 
obliging  them  to  turn  about  precipitately.    Ge- 
neral Blucher  had  his  horse  killed  ;    he  took 
that  of  a  trumpeter,  made  three  more  attempts 
to  charge,  but  always  unsuccessfully,  and  was 
soon   himself  borne  away  in  the  rout  of  his 
cavalry.     Our  squadrons  of  chasseurs,  care- 
fully kept  in  reserve,  under  the  protection  of  a 
small   wood,  dashed  away  in  pursuit  of  that 
fugitive  cavalry,  and  obliged  it  to  scamper  off 
still  more  speedily,  by  killing  several  men. 

Thus  far  the  third  corps  maintained  its 
ground  without  any  wavering.  Friant's  divi- 
sion, which  had  behaved  so  well  at  Austerlitz, 
appeared  at  this  moment  on  the  field  of  battle. 
Marshal  Davout,  perceiving  that  the  enemy's 
efforts  were  directed  upon  the  right  of  Has- 
senhausen, sent  Frianl's  division  to  that  point, 
and  concentrated  Gudin's  division  around  Has- 
senhausen, which,  according  to  all  appearance, 
was  about  to  be  violently  attacked.  He  sent 
orders  at  the  same  time  to  General  Morand  to 
hasten  his  coming,  and  to  place  himself  on  the 
left  of  the  village. 

On  the  side  of  the  Prussians,  the  second  di- 
vision, that  of  Wartensleben,  arrived  quite  out 
of  breath,  delayed  as  it  had  been  by  an  encum- 
brance of  the  baggage,  which  had  taken  place 
on  its  rear.  Orange's  division  also  arrrived 
breathless,  having  been  long  detained  by  the 
same  cause.  From  a  deficiency  of  the  habit 
of  war,  the  movements  of  that  army  were 
slow,  unconnected,  awkward. 

The  moment  had  arrived  when  the  combat 
began  to  be  furious ;  Warlensleben's  division  1 


moved    to   the    left   of  Hassenhausen,    while 
Schmettau's  division,  led  with  vigour  Ly  the 
Prussian  officers,  advanced  in  front  of  Has- 
senhausen itself,  then  drew  back  its  two  wings 
above   that  village,  in  order  to  surround  it. 
Fortunately,  three  of  General  Gudin's  regi- 
ments had  thrown  themselves  into  it.     The 
85th,  which  occupied  the  front  of  it,  behaved, 
in  this  engagement,  with  heroic  valour.     Dri- 
ven back  into  the  interior  of  the  village,  it 
barred  the  passage  into  it  with  invincible  firm- 
ness, replying  by  a  continued  and  well-directed 
fire  to  the  tremendous  mass  of  the  Prussian 
fire.    That  regiment  had  lost  more  than  half 
of  its   effective;    still  it  stood  firm   and  un- 
shaken.   Meanwhile,  Wartensleben's  division, 
taking   advantage  of  the   circumstance   that 
Morand's  division  had  nol  yet  occupied  the 
left  of  Hassenhausen,  threatened  to  turn  the 
village,  having  an  immense  cavalry  to  precede 
it.     At  this  sight,  General  Gudin  had  deployed 
the  fourth  of  his  regiments,  the   12th,  to  the 
left  of  Hassenhausen,  to  prevent   his    being 
turned.     It  was  evident  to  all  eyes,  that,  on 
this  open  ground,  the  village  of  Hassenhausen 
being  the  only  appui  of  the  one,  the  only  ob- 
stacle to  the  other,  the  possession  of  it  must 
be  obstinately  disputed.     The  brave  General 
Schmettau,  at  the  head  of  his  infantry,  received 
a  shot  which  obliged  him  to  retire.    The  Duke 
of  Brunswick,  witnessing  the  determined  re- 
sistance of  the  French,  felf  a  secret  despair, 
and  believed  that  the  catastrophe,  a  presenti- 
ment of  which  had  for  a  month  past  oppressed 
his  dejected  spirit,  was  near  at  hand.     This 
aged   warrior,   hesitating    in    council,   never 
under  fire,  resolved  to  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  Prussian  grenadiers,  and  to  lead  them 
to  the  assault  of  Hassenhausen,  along  a  ridge 
of  ground  running  by  the  side  of  the  road,  and 
by  which  the  village  might  be  more  surely 
reached.     While   encouraging  and   showing 
them  the  way,  a  rifle  ball  struck  him  in  the 
face,  and  gave  him  a  mortal  wound.    He  was 
borne  away  with  a  handkerchief  over  his  face, 
that  the  army  might  not  recognise  the  illustri- 
ous sufferer.     On  the  news  of  this  event,  a 
noble  rage  seized  the   Prussian  staff.      The 
worthy  Mollendorf  determined  not  to  survive 
that  day ;  he  advanced,  and  was,  in  his  turn, 
mortally  wounded.     The  king  and  the  princes 
exposed  themselves  to  danger,  like  the  lowest 
of  the  soldiers.     The  king  had  a  horse  killed, 
but  would  not  move  out  of  the  fire.    At  length 
the  division  of  Orange  arrived.    It  was  parted 
into  two  brigades ;  one  went  to  support  War- 
tensleben's division  on  the  left  of  Hassenhau- 
sen, (left  of  the  French,)  to  try  to  reduce  that 
position  by  turning  it;  the  other  to  occupy  the 
space  left  vacant  by  Schmettau's  division,  and 
to  throw  itself  upon  Hassenhausen.     This  se- 
cond brigade  was  especially  destined  to  curb 
Friant's  division,  which  began  to  gain  ground 
on  the  flank  of  the  Prussian  army. 

Marshal  Davout,  ever  present  in  the  greatest 
danger,  pushed  to  the  right  Frianl's  division, 
which  was  exchanging  a  brisk  fire  of  musketry 
with  a  brigade  of  the  Orange  division  op- 
josed  to  it.  At  the  centre,  at  Hassenhausen 
itself,  he  cheered  all  hearts  by  announcing  the 
arrival  of  Morand.  At  length  Morand  ap- 


192 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


peared  on  the  left,  and  he  hastened  thither  to  ] 
range  that  division,  not  the  bravest  of  the ' 
three,  for  all  were  equally  brave,  but  the  most 
numerous.  The  intrepid  Morand  brought  five 
regiments,  the  13th  light,  and  the  61st,  51st, 
30th,  and  17th  of  the  line.  These  five  regi- 
ments furnished  nine  battalions,  the  10th  hav- 
ing been  left  to  guard  the  bridge  of  Kosen. 
They  came  to  occupy  the  level  ground  which 
is  on  the  left  of  Hassenhausen.  The  Prus- 
sians had  planted  upon  this  ground  a  numer- 
ous artillery,  ready  to  play  upon  any  troops 
that  might  appear.  Each  of  the  nine  batta- 
lions, after  ascending  the  winding  slopes  of 
Kosen,  would  have  to  debouch  upon  the  pla- 
teau, amidst  the  grape-shot  of  the  enemy. 
They  deployed,  however,  one  after  another, 
forming  at  the  very  moment  when  they  got 
into  line,  in  spite  of  the  repeated  discharges 
of  the  Prussian  artillery.  The  13th  light  ap- 
peared first,  formed,  and  moved  rapidly  for- 
ward ;  but,  having  advanced  too  far,  it  was 
obliged  to  fall  back  upon  the  other  regiments. 
The  61st,  which  came  next,  received  in  the 
same  manner  as  the  31st,  was  not  staggered 
by  it.  A  soldier,  whom  his  comrades  had 
nicknamed  the  Emperor,  on  account  of  a  cer- 
tain resemblance  to  Napoleon,  perceiving  some 
vavering  in  his  company,  ran  forward,  drew 
himself  up  erect,  and  cried,  "My  lads,  follow 
your  Emperor!"  All  followed  him,  keeping 
close  to  each  other,  amidst  that  shower  of 
grape-shot.  The  nine  battalions  finished  de- 
ploying, and  marched  in  columns,  with  their 
artillery  in  the  interval  between  one  battalion 
and  the  next.  Marshal  Davout,  while  conduct- 
ing his  battalions,  was  struck  on  the  head  by 
a  rifle  ball,  which  pierced  his  hat  at  the  height 
of  the  cockade,  and  carried  away  some  hair, 
without  touching  the  skull.  The  nine  batta- 
lions placed  themselves  facing  the  enemy's 
line,  and  obliged  Wartensleben's  division  to 
fall  back,  as  well  as  the  brigade  of  Orange, 
which  came  to  its  support.  By  gaining  ground, 
they  disengaged  the  flank  of  Hassenhausen, 
and  obliged  Schmettau's  division  to  draw  back 
its  wings,  which  it  had  extended  around  the 
village.  After  a  long  firing  of  musketry,  Mo- 
rand's  division  perceived  a  fresh  storm  gather- 
ing over  its  head:  an  enormous  mass  of  ca- 
.  valry  was  seen  collecting  behind  the  ranks  of 
Wartensleben's  division.  The  royal  army  had 
with  it  the  better  and  more  numerous  portion 
of  the  Prussian  cavalry.  It  could  produce 
fourteen  or  fifteen  thousand  horse,  excellently 
mounted,  and  trained  to  manoeuvres  by  long 
exercises.  With  this  mass  of  cavalry,  the 
Prussians  intended  to  make  a  desperate  effort 
against  Morand's  division.  They  flattered 
themselves  that,  on  the  level  ground  between 
Hassenhausen  and  the  Saale,  they  should 
trample  it  under  their  horses'  feet,  or  hurl  it 
from  top  to  bottom  of  the  spiral  slopes  of  Ko- 
sen. If  they  succeeded,  the  left  of  the  French 
army  being  overthrown,  Hassenhausen  sur- 
rounded, Gudin  taken  in  the  village,  Friant's 
division  could  do  no  other  than  beat  a  running 
reireat.  But  General  Morand,  on  perceiving 
this  assemblage,  disposed  seven  of  his  batta- 
lions it  squares,  and  left  two  deployed,  to  con- 
nect him  with  Hassenhausen.  He  placed  him- 


self in  one  of  these  squares,  Marshal  Davout 
placed  himself  in  another,  and  they  prepared 
to  receive  with  firmness  the  mass  of  enemies 
ready  to  rush  upon  them.  All  at  once,  the 
ranks  of  Wartensleben's  infantry  opened,  and 
vomited  forth  torrents  of  Prussian  cavalry, 
which  at  this  point  numbered  not  fewer  than 
10,000  horse,  led  by  Prince  William.  It  at- 
tempted a  series  of  charges,  which  were  seve- 
ral times  renewed.  Every  time,  our  intrepid 
foot  soldiers,  coolly  awaiting  the  order  of  their 
officers,  allowed  the  enemy's  squadrons  to 
come  within  thirty  or  forty  paces  of  their  lines, 
and  then  poured  into  them  volleys,  so  well 
aimed,  and  so  destructive,  as  to  strike  down 
hundreds  of  men  and  horses,  and  thus  to  form 
for  themselves  a  rampart  of  carcasses.  In  the 
interval  between  these  charges,  General  Mo- 
rand and  Marshal  Davout  passed  from  one 
square  to  another,  to  give  to  each  of  them  the 
encouragement  of  their  presence.  The  Prus- 
sian horse  repeated  these  fierce  assaults,  but 
never  advanced  even  so  far  as  our  bayonets. 
At  length,  after  a  frequent  repetition  of  this 
tumultuous  scene,  the  disheartened  Prussian 
cavalry  retired  behind  its  infantry.  Then  Ge- 
neral Morand,  breaking  his  squares,  deployed 
his  battalions,  formed  them  into  columns  of 
attack,  and  pushed  them  upon  Wartensleben's 
division.  The  Prussian  infantry,  assailed  with 
vigour,  gave  way  before  our  soldiers,  and  de- 
scended, while  falling  back,  to  the  bank  of  the 
rivulet.  At  the  same  time.  General  Friant,  on 
the  right,  forced  the  first  brigade  of  the  divi- 
sion of  Orange  to  retire ;  and,  in  consequence 
of  this  double  movement,  Schmettau's  divi- 
sion, left  exposed  on  both  its  wings,  horribly 
decimated,  was  compelled  to  give  way,  and  to 
move  off  from  that  village  of  Hassenhausen, 
so  violently  contested  with  Gudin's  division. 

The   three    Prussian   divisions   were   thus 
:  driven  beyond  the  marshy  brook  which  runs 
j  through  the  field  of  battle.     There  the  French 
army  halted  for  a  moment  to  take  breath,  for 
that  unequal  combat  had  lasted  for  six  hours, 
and  our  soldiers  were  fatigued  to  death.     Gu- 
din's division,  charged  to  defend  Hassenhau- 
sen, had  sustained  prodigious  loss;  but  Friant's 
division   had  suffered   moderately;  Morand's 
I  division,  not  much  hurt  by  the  cavalry,  like  all 
infantry  that  has  not  been  broken,  but  worse 
treated   by  the  artillery,  was  nevertheless  in 
fighting  condition,  and  all  three  were  ready  to 
I  begin  again,  if  necessary,  in  order  to  make 
'  head  against  the  two  Prussian  divisions  of  re- 
serve,  which  had  remained  spectators  of  the 
engagement,  on  the  opposite  side  of  the  basin 
!  where  the  battle  took  place.     These  two  divi- 
1  sions    of  reserve,  Kiihnheim's  and   Arnim's, 
under  Marshal  Kalkreuth,  awaited  the  signal 
i  for  entering  into  line  in  their  turn,  and  renew- 
ing the  conflict. 

Meanwhile,  those  around  the  King  of  Prussia 
were  engage'd  in  deliberation.  General  Blu- 
cher  was  for  uniting  the  entire  mass  of  cav- 
alry with  the  two  divisions  of  reserve,  and 
dashing  with  fury  upon  the  enemy.  The  king 
had  at  first  been  of  the  same  opinion,  but  it 
was  represented  to  him  that,  if  they  waited  but 
for  a  single  day,  they  should  be  joined  by 
Prince  Hohenlohe's  and  General  Ruchel's 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


193 


corps,  and  that  they  should  crush  the  French 
by  means  of  this  union  of  forces.  The  sup- 
position was  not  well  founded;  for,  if  they 
were  authorized  to  reckon  upon  the  junction 
of  the  corps  of  Hohenlohe  and  Ruchel,  the 
French  whom  they  had  before  them  were 
likely  to  be  joined  also  by  the  grand  army. 
No  chance,  therefore,  could  be  better  than  that 
which  might  be  found  in  a  last  effort,  made 
immediately,  and  with  the  determination  to 
conquer  or  die,  though  that  chance  was  not 
great,  considering  the  state  of  Friant's  and 
Morand's  divisions.  Orders,  however,  were 
given  for  retreat.  The  king  had  shown  re- 
markable bravery,  but  bravery  is  not  firmness. 
Besides,  the  minds  of  those  about  him  were 
overwhelmed  with  despondency. 

The  movement  of  retreat  was  commenced 
in  the  afternoon.  Marshal  Kalkreuth  went 
forward  to  cover  it  with  his  two  fresh  divi- 
sions. General  Morand  had  taken  advantage 
of  an  elevation  called  the  Sonnenberg,  to  place 
batteries  which  poured  a  most  incommodious 
fire  upon  the  right  of  the  Prussians.  Marshal 
Davout  set  in  motion  his  three  divisions,  and 
carried  them  briskly  beyond  the  brook.  They 
marched  in  spite  of  the  fire  of  the  divisions 
of  reserve,  came  up  within  musket-shot  of 
them,  and  forced  them  to  retreat  without  dis- 
order, it  is  true,  but  precipitately.  If  Marsha) 
Davout  had  had  the  regiment  of  dragoons  car- 
ried away  with  him  by  Marshal  Bernadotte  on 
the  preceding  day,  he  might  have  taken  thou- 
sands of  prisoners.  He  did  nevertheless  take 
3000.  besides  115  pieces  of  cannon — an  enor- 
mous capture  for  a  corps  which  had  itself  only 
44.  On  reaching  the  other,  side  of  the  basin, 
where  the  battle  had  been  fought,  he  halted 
his  infantry,  and,  perceiving  the  troops  of  Mar- 
shal Bernadotte  in  the  environs  of  Apolda,  he 
requested  him  to  fall  upon  the  enemy,  and  to 
pick  up  the  vanquished  whom  his  corps,  ex- 
hausted with  fatigue,  could  not  pursue  much 
longer.  The  soldiers  of  Marshal  Bernadotte 
were  indignant,  and  asked  one  another  what 
could  be  thought  of  their  courage  at  such  a 
moment. 

The  Prussian  army  had  lost  3000  prisoners, 
nine  or  ten  thousand  men  killed  and  wounded, 
besides  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  Marshal  Mol- 
lendorf,  and  General  Schmettau,  mortally,  and 
a  prodigious  number  of  other  officers,  who  had 
bravely  done  their  duty.  The  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Davout  had  sustained  a  heavy  loss. 
Out  of  26,000  men,  there  were  7000  hors  de 
combat.  Generals  Morand  and  Gudin  were 
wounded;  General  de  Billy  was  killed;  half 
the  generals  of  brigade  and  colonels  were  dead 
or  severely  wounded.  Never,  since  Marengo, 
had  there  been  so  bloody  a  day  for  the  arms 
of  France,  and  never  had  a  grander  example 
of  heroic  firmness  been  given  by  a  general 
and  his  soldiers. 

The  royal  army  retired,  under  the  protec- 
tion of  the  two  divisions  of  reserve,  commanded 
by  Marshal  Kalkreuth.  The  rendezvous  ap- 
pointed for  all  the  corps  disorganized  by  the 
battle  was  Weimar,  behind  Prince  Hohenlohe, 
who  was  supposed  to  be  still  safe  and  sound. 
The  king  marched  thither,  deeply  grieved,  no 
doubt,  but  yet  calculating,  if  not  on  a  turn  of 

VOL.  11^-25 


fortune,  at  least  on  a  retreat  in  good  order 
thanks  to  the  70,000  men  under  the  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe  and  General  Ruchel.  He  was  pro 
ceeding,  accompanied  by  a  strong  detachment 
of  cavalry,  when  the  troops  of  Marshal  Berna- 
dotte were  descried  on  the  rear  of  the  field  of 
battle  of  Jena.  At  sight  of  them,  no  doubt  was 
entertained  that  some  accident  had  befallen 
the  army  of  Prince  Hohenlohe.  Precipitately 
leaving  the  Weimar  road,  the  Prussians  turned 
off  to  the  right  into  that  of  Sommerda.  But 
the  whole  truth  was  soon  known,  for  the  army 
of  Prince  Hohenlohe  sought  at  that  moment 
from  the  king's  army  that  support  which  the 
king's  army  was  seeking  from  it.  They  met 
in  a  thousand  detached  parties,  running  in  all 
directions,  and  each  learned  that  the  other  had 
been  beaten.  At  this  intelligence,  the  disorder, 
not  so  great  at  first  in  the  king's  army,  be- 
cause it  was  not  pursued,  rose  to  the  highest 
pitch.  A  sudden  panic  seized  the  minds  of 
all :  they  set  off,  running  confusedly  along  the 
high  roads  and  the  by-roads,  seeing  the  enemy 
everywhere,  and  taking  the  affrighted  fugitives 
themselves  for  the  victorious  French.  To  ag- 
gravate their  disaster,  they  found  upon  the 
roads  that  enormous  mass  of  baggage  which 
the  Prussian  army,  softened  by  a  long  peace, 
carried  with  it,  and  among  the  rest  a  quantity 
of  royal  baggage  not  in  accordance  with  the 
personal  simplicity  of  King  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, but  which  the  presence  of  the  court  had 
rendered  necessary.  Impatient  to  withdraw 
from  the  danger,  the  two  Prussian  armies  re- 
garded these  obstacles  to  the  rapidity  of  their 
flight  as  a  calamity.  The  cavalry  turned  off, 
crossing  the  country,  and  escaping  in  detached 
squadrons.  The  infantry  broke  their  ranks, 
ransacking  and  overturning  this  incommodious 
baggage,  and  leaving  to  the  conqueror  the 
trouble  of  pillaging  it,  because  they  were 
anxious  above  all  things  to  get  away.  The 
two  divisions  of  Marshal  Kalkreuth,  which 
alone  had  hitherto  continued  in  good  order, 
were  soon  infected  with  the  general  despair; 
and,  in  spite  of  the  energy  of  their  commander, 
they  began  to  disband  themselves.  The  ranks 
thinned  from  hour  to  hour,  and  the  soldiers, 
who  had  not  shared  the  passions  of  their 
officers,  thought  that  the  simplest  way  to  escape 
the  consequences  of  the  defeat  was  to  fling 
away  their  arms  and  hide  themselves  in  the 
woods.  The  roads  were  strewed  with  knap- 
sacks, muskets,  cannon.  Thus  it  was  that  the 
Prussian  army  retired  across  the  plains  of 
Thuringia,  and  towards  the  mountains  of  the 
Harz,  presenting  a  very  different  spectacle 
from  that  which  it  had  a  few  days  before  ex- 
hibited, when  it  promised  to  behave  before  the 
French  far  otherwise  than  the  Austrian^  and 
the  Russians  had  done.1 

The  army- of  Hohenlohe  fled  partly  to  the 
right  towards  Sommerda,  partly  to  the  left 
towards  Erfurt,  beyond  Weimar.  Half  of  the 
royal  army,  that  which  had  first  quitted  the 
field  of  battle,  with  orders  to  proceed  to  Wei- 
mar, finding  that  town  in  the  hands  of  the 
enemy,  went  to  Erfurt,  carrying  its  mortally 


»  We  merely  repeat  here  the  statements  made  by 
Prutaian  officers  themselves,  in  the  various  narrative* 
which  they  have  published. 

R 


194 

wounded  chiefs,  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  Mar- 
shal Mollendorf,  and  General  Schmetlau,  along 
with  it  The  rest  of  the  royal  army  marched 
towards  Sommerda,  not  that  this  was  ordered, 
but  because  Sommerda  and  Erfurt  were  towns 
situated  on  the  rear  of  the  country  in  which 
they  had  fought.  Since  that  delirium  of  terror 
which  had  seized  all  heads,  no  person  was 
capable  of  giving  an  order.  The  king,  sur- 
rounded by  some  cavalry,  marched  towards 
Sommerda.  The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  who 
had  retired  with  twelve  or  fifteen  hundred 
horse,  had  not  200  when  he  arrived  next  morn- 
;'ig,  the  15th,  at  Tennstiidt  He  made  inquiries 
al'Uit  the  king,  who,  on  his  part,  inquired 
ai'out  him.  No  chief  knew  where  the  others 
were. 

During  that  terrible  night,  the  victors  suf- 
fered not  less  than  the  vanquished.  They  lay 
upon  the  ground,  bivouacking  in  an  intensely 
cold  night,  having  scarcely  any  thing  to  eat, 
after  a  day  of  battle,  naturally  unproductive 
of  provisions.  Many  of  them,  wounded  more 
or  less  severely,  were  stretched  on  the  bare 
earth,  beside  wounded  enemies,  mingling  their 
groans;  for  it  is  not  in  so  short  a  time  that 
the  best  organized  medical  establishment  could 
have  picked  up  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand 
wounded.  Napoleon,  from  feeling  as  much 
as  from  calculation,  had  for  several  hours  per- 
sonally superintended  their  removal ;  and  he 
had  then  returned  to  Jena,  where  he,  too,  had 
found  an  accession  of  news,  namely,  the  ac- 
count of  a  second  victory,  still  more  glorious 
than  that  which  had  been  gained  before  his 
own  eyes.  He  refused  at  first  to  believe  all 
that  was  told  him;  because  a  letter  from  Mar- 
shal Bernadotte,  in  order  to  excuse  by  a  lie  his 
unpardonable  conduct,  asserted  that  Marshal 
Davout  had  not  more  than  nine  or  ten  thou- 
sand men  before  him.  Captain  Trobriant,  an 
officer  of  Marshal  Davout,  having  come  to  ap- 
prize him  that  he  had  70,000  men  to  fight,  he 
could  not  believe  this  statement,  and  replied, 
"Your  marshal  must  see  double."  But,  when 
he  was  made  acquainted  witl.  all  the  details, 
his  joy  was  extreme,  and  he  lavished  praises 
and  soon  after  recompenses,  upon  the  admira- 
ble conduct  Gi  the  third  corps.  He  was  indig- 
nant with  Marshal  Bernadotte,  but  not  much 
surprised.  In  the  first  moment,  he  intended 
to  use  the  utmost  rigour,  and  even  thought  of 
ordering  a  trial  before  a  council  of  war.  But 
relationship,  and  a  sort  of  weakness  which 
would  not  allow  him  to  vent  spleen  otherwise 
than  in  vehement  words,  softened  down  his 
resolution  of  severity  into  a  dissatisfaction, 
which,  for  the  rest,  he  took  no  pains  to  con- 
ceal. Marshal  Bernadotte  got  off  with  letters 
from  Prince  Berthier  and  Napoleon  himself — 
letters  which  must  have  made  him  profoundly 
wretched,  if  he  had  possessed  the  heart  of  a 
citizen  and  a  soldier. 

Next  morning  Marshal  Duroc  was  sent  to 
Natimburg.  He  was  the  bearer  of  a  letter 
from  the  Emperor  to  Marshal  Davout,  and 
signal  testimonies  of  satisfaction  for  the  whole 
iorps  d'annee.  "Your  soldiers  and  yourself, 
monsieur  le  marechal,"  said  Napoleon,  "have 
gained  an  ev«rlasting  right  to  my  esteem  and 
gratitude."  Duroc  was  to  go  tn  the  hospitals, 


[Oct.  1806. 


I  to  visit  the  wounded,  to  convey  to  them  the 
promise  of  magnificent  rewards,  and  to  distri- 
bute money  among  all  those  who  were  in  need 
of  it  The  Emperor's  letter  was  read  in  the 
chambers  where  the  wounded  were  crowded 
together,  and  these  unfortunate  men,  shouting 
"Vive  I' Empereur.'"  amid  their  sufferings,  ex- 
pressed a  desire  for  the  recovery  of  their 
health,  that  they  might  again  devote  their 
lives  to  him. 

On  the  very  next  day,  the  15th  of  October, 
Napoleon  took  measures  for  following  up  the 
victory  with  that  activity  which  no  captain, 
ancient  or  modern,  has  ever  equalled.  In  the 
first  place,  he  enjoined  Marshals  Davout,  Lan- 
nes,  and  Augereau,  whose  corps  had  suffered 
much  on  the  14th,  to  rest  for  two  or  three  days 
at  Naumburg,  Jena,  and  Weimar,  but  Marshal 
Bernadotte,  whose  soldiers  had  not  fired  a  shot, 
Marshals  Soult  and  Ney,  part  only  of  whose 
troops  had  been  engaged,  Murat,  whose  ca- 
valry had  suffered  nothing  but  fatigue,  were 
ordered  forward  to  harass  the  Prussian  army, 
to  pick  up  its  wrecks,  easy  to  capture  in  the 
state  of  disorganization  into  which  it  had  fall- 
en. Murat,  who  had  slept  at  Weimar,  had 
orders  to  hasten  with  his  dragoons  to  Erfurt 
on  the  morning  of  the  15th,  and  Ney  to  follow 
him  immediately.  Marshal  Soult  was  to  march 
by  Sommerda,  Greussen,  Sondershausen,  Nord- 
hausen,  after  the  enemy's  army,  to  pursue  it 
through  Thuringia,  towards  the  mountains  of 
the  Harz,  where  it  seemed  in  its  disorder  to 
purpose  seeking  refuge.  Marshal  Bernadotte 
was  enjoined  to  direct  his  course  that  very 
day  towards  the  Elbe,  by  proceeding  towards 
the  right  of  the  army  through  Halle  and  Des- 
sau. It  will  be  remarked  that  Napoleon,  care- 
ful to  concentrate  himself  on  the  eve  of  a 
great  battle,  next  day  when  he  had  struck  the 
enemy,  spread  his  corps,  like  a  vast  net,  to 
catch  all  that  fled,  skilful  in  thus  modifying 
the  application  of  the  principles  of  war  ac- 
cording to  circumstances,  and  always  with 
^?.t  accuracy  and  fitness  which  ensures  suc- 
cess. 

Having  given  these  orders,  Napoleon  be- 
stowed some  attention  on  politics.  The  direc- 
tion which  the  Prussians  were  following  in 
their  retreat  removed  them  to  a  distance  from 
Saxony.  Napoleon  held,  moreover,  in  his 
power  a  considerable  number  of  Saxon  troops, 
who  had  fought  honourably,  though  far  from 
pleased  either  at  the  war  into  which  their 
country  had  been  dragged,  or  with  the  ill- 
usage  of  which  they  conceived  that  they  had 
reason  to  complain  on  the  part  of  the  Prus- 
sians. Napoleon  assembled  the  officers  of  the 
Saxon  troops  at  Jena,  in  one  of  the  halls  of 
the  University.  Making  use  of  an  employ^  of 
the  foreign  affairs,  called  to  be  about  him,  he 
addressed  them  in  words  which  were  imme- 
diately translated.  He  said  that  he  knew  not 
why  he  was  at  war  with  their  sovereign,  a 
wise,  pacific  prince,  and  deserving  of  respect; 
that  he  had  even  drawn  the  sword  to  rescue 
their  country  from  the  humiliating  dependence 
in  which  it  was  held  by  Prussia,  and  that  he 
could  not  see  why  the  Saxons  and  the  French, 
with  so  few  motives  for  hating  each  other, 

i  should  persist  in  fighting  together:    that  he 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


was  ready,  for  his  part,  to  give  a  first  pledge 
of  his  amicable  dispositions  by  setting  them 
at  liberty,  and  by  sparing  Saxony,  provided 
that  they  would  promise  on  their  part  never 
more  to  bear  arms  against  France  ;  and  that 
the  principal  of  them  should  go  to  Dresden  to 
propose  peace,  and  to  induce  its  acceptance. 
The  Saxon  officers,  seized  with  admiration  on 
beholding  the  extraordinary  personage  who 
was  speaking  to  them,  touched  by  the  gene- 
rosity of  his  proposals,  replied  by  a  unani- 
mous oath,  not  to  serve,  either  themselves  or 
their  soldiers,  during  that  war.  Some  of  them 
offered  to  set  out  immediately  for  Dresden,  de- 
claring that  before  the  end  of  three  days  they 
would  be  back,  bringing  the  consent  of  their 
sovereign. 

By  this  politic  act  Napoleon  purposed  to 
disarm  German  patriotism,  so  strongly  excited 
through  the  efforts  of  Prussia,  and,  by  treating 
a  prince  justly  respected  with  this  kindness, 
to  acquire  a  right  to  treat  with  severity  a  prince 
whom  nobody  esteemed.  This  latter  was  the 
Elector  of  Hesse,  who  had  contributed  by  his 
falsehoods  to  provoke  the  war,  and  who,  since 
the  war,  sought  to  traffic  with  his  adhesion, 
resolved  to  give  himself  up  to  that  power  of 
the  two  which  victory  should  favour.  He  was 
a  secret  enemy,  devoted  to  the  English,  with 
whom  he  had  deposited  his  wealth.  Napo- 
leon, on  advancing  into  Prussia,  did  not  care 
to  leave  such  an  enemy  on  his  rear.  The 
principles  of  war  commanded  him  to  be  got 
rid  of,  and  those  of  an  upright  policy  did  not 
defend  him,  for  this  prince  had  been  a  faith- 
less neighbour  both  to  Prussia  and  France. 
Immediately,  before  he  proceeded  further,  Na- 
poleon ordered  the  eighth  corps  to  leave  May- 
ence  and  to  march  to  Cassel,  though  that 
corps  could  not  yet  number  more  than  ten  or 
twelve  thousand  men.  He  directed  his  brother 
Louis  to  march  by  Westphalia  for  Hesse,  and 
to  join  Marshal  Mortier  with  twelve  or  fifteen 
thousand  men,  in  order  to  concur  in  the  exe- 
cution of  the  decrees  of  victory.  However, 
deeming  it  inexpedient  to  charge  one  of  his 
brothers  with  so  rigorous  a  commission,  he 
advised  King  Louis  to  send  his  troops  to  Mar- 
shal Mortier,  and  to  relinquish  to  the  latter  the 
execution  of  the  task  of  dispossessing  the 
House  of  Hesse,  with  the  obedience  and  the 
probity  that  distinguished  him.  Marshal  Mor- 
tier was  to  declare  that  the  Elector  of  Hesse 
had  ceased  to  reign,  (a  form  already  adopted 
in  regard  to  the  House  of  Naples,)  to  take 
possession  of  his  dominions  in  the  name  of 
France,  and  to  disband  his  army,  giving  to 
such  of  the  Hessian  soldiers  as  chose  to  con- 
tinue to  serve,  the  offer  of  going  to  Italy.  They 
were  mostly  robust  men,  well-disciplined,  ac- 
customed to  bear  arms  out  of  their  own  coun- 
try in  behalf  of  those  who  paid  them,  espe- 
cially in  behalf  of  the  English,  who  employed 
them  in  India  with  great  advantage.  The 
Hessian  army  was  composed  of  32,000  of  all 
arms.  It  was  an  important  point  not  to  leave 
behind  one  this  formidable  force,  especially 
when  expecting  to  proceed  so  far  northward 
as  Napoleon  intended  to  do. 

With  these  different  orders  Napoleon  sent 
tidings  of  his  brilliant  successes,  tidings  which 


could  not  fail  to  dispel  the  hopes  of  his  ene- 
mies and  the  fears  of  his  friends,  and  to  in- 
crease in  his  soldiers  left  in  the  interior  a  zeal 
to  join  the  grand  army.  According  to  custom, 
he  added  a  multitude  of  instructions  for  the 
calling  out  of  the  conscripts,  for  the  organiza- 
tion of  the  depots,  for  the  departure  of  the  de- 
tachments destined  to  recruit  incomplete  regi- 
ments, and  for  the  regulation  of  civil  affairs, 
which,  during  his  reign,  never  suffered  from 
the  preoccupations  of  war. 

From  Jena,  Napoleon  proceeded  to  Weimar. 
He  found  there  the  whole  court  of  the  grand- 
duke,  including  the  grand-duchess,  sister  of 
the  Emperor  Alexander.  The  grand-duke 
alone  was  absent,  having  command  of  a 
Prussian  division.  This  polished  and  learned 
court  had  made  Weimar  the  Athens  of  mod- 
ern Germany,  and,  under  its  protection,  Goethe, 
Schiller,  Wieland,  lived  honoured,  rich,  and 
happy.  The  grand-duchess,  who  was  accused 
of  having  contributed  to  the  war,  went  to  meet 
Napoleon,  and,  agitated  at  the  tumult  which 
prevailed  around  her,  she  said,  on  approach- 
ing him,  "  Sire,  I  recommend  my  subjects  to 
you."  "  You  see,  madam,  what  war  is,"  re- 
plied Napoleon,  coldly.  For  the  rest,  he  con- 
fined himself  to  this  vengeance,  and  treated 
this  inimical  but  lettered  court  as  Alexander 
would  have  treated  a  city  of  Greece,  showed 
himself  full  of  courtesy  towards  the  grand- 
duchess,  expressed  to  her  no  displeasure  at  the 
conduct  of  her  husband,  caused  the  town  of 
Weimar  to  be  respected,  and  ordered  due  atten- 
tion to  be  paid  to  the  wounded  generals,of  whom 
it  was  full.  From  Weimar  he  bore  to  the  right, 
directing  his  course  to  Naumburg,  to  congra- 
tulate in  person  the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout, 
while  his  lieutenants  were  pursuing  the  Prus- 
sian army  to  the  last  extremity. 

In  this  interval,  the  indefatigable  Murat  had 
galloped  with  his  squadrons  to  Erfurt,  and  in- 
vested the  place,  which,  though  of  but  mo- 
derate strength,  was  surrounded  with  very  good 
walls  and  provided  with  a  considerable  materiel. 
It  was  crowded  with  wounded  and  fugitives. 
Thither  had  been  conveyed  Marshal  Mollen- 
dorf,  to  whom  Napoleon  had  ordered  the  ut- 
most attention  to  be  paid.  Murat  summoned 
Erfurt,  and  employed  Marshal  Ney's  infantry 
to  enforce  the  summons.  Among  the  Prussian 
fugitives  there  was  not  one  capable  of  making 
head  against  the  French,  and  of  replying  by 
any  energetic  resistance  against  the  impetu- 
osity of  their  pursuit.  Besides,  fourteen  or 
fifteen  thousand  fugitives,  6000  of  whom 
were  wounded,  most  of  them  dying,  were  any 
thing  but  elements  of  defence.  The  place 
capitulated  in  the  evening  of  the  15th.  Here 
were  picked  up,  exclusively  of  the  6000 
wounded  Prussians,  9000  prisoners  and  an 
immense  booty.  Murat  and  Ney  left  the  town 
immediately,  to  pursue  the  main  body  of  the 
Prussian  army. 

Murat  had  sent  Klein's  dragoons  to  Weis- 
sensee,  to  intercept  the  corps  that  were  fleeing 
separately.  That  town  was  between  Som- 
merda,  where  the  King  of  Prussia  had  passed 
the  first  night,  and  Sondershausen,  where  he 
•was  to  pass  the  second.  General  Klein  reached 
it  before  the  Prussians.  General  Blucher,  on 


196 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


arriving  with  his  cavalry,  was  quite  aston- 
ished to  find  Murat's  dragoons  already  in  his 
way.  Having  desired  to  parley,  he  entered 
into  a  sort  of  negotiation  with  General  Klein, 
founded  on  a  letter  alleged  to  have  been  writ- 
ten by  Napoleon  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  a  let- 
ter containing,  it  was  said,  offers  of  peace :  he 
affirmed  upon  his  word  that  an  armistice  had 
just  been  signed.  General  Klein  believed 
General  Blucher,  and  opposed  no  obtacle  to 
his  retreat  This  stratagem  saved  the  relics 
of  the  Prussian  army.  General  Blucher  and 
Marshal  Kalkreuth  were  thus  enabled  to  re- 
pair to  Greussen.  But  Marshal  Soult  was  fol- 
lowing these  corps  upon  the  same  road.  Next 
morning,  the  16th,  he  overtook  at  Greussen 
the  rear-guard  of  Marshal  Kalkreuth,  who, 
wishing  to  gain  time,  had  recourse  in  his  turn 
to  the  fable  of  an  armistice.  Marshal  Soult 
was  not  to  be  duped:  he  declared  that  he  dis- 
believed the  existence  of  an  armistice;  and, 
after  passing  a  few  moments  in  parley,  in  or- 
der to  allow  his  infantry  time  to  rejoin,  he  at-  ] 
tacked  Greussen,  carried  it  by  main  force,  and  j 
picked  up  many  more  prisoners,  horses,  and 
cannon. 

On  the  following  day,  the  17th,  pursued  and  ! 
pursuers  continued  their  course  for  Sonders- 
hausen  and  Nordhausen,  the  one  abandoning 
to  the  other  baggage, cannon,  entire  battalions. 
More  than  200  pieces  of  artillery  had  already 
been  picked  up  on  all  the  roads,  and  several 
thousand  prisoners. 

The  King  of  Prussia,  on  arriving  at  Nord- 
hausen, found  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  there. 
Still  believing  in  the  talents  of  that  general, 
who  had  been  beaten  like  the  Duke  of  Bruns- 
wick, but  who  had  in  the  eyes  of  the  army  the 
merit  of  having  censured  the  plan  of  the  gene- 
ralissimo, he  conferred  upon  him  the  com- 
mand in  chief.  At  the  same  time  he  left  the 
command  of  the  two  divisions  of  the  reserve 
to  old  Kalkreuth,  who  had  also  the  merit  of 
having  found  great  fault  with  all  that  had  been 
done.  This  was  the  only  measure  taken  by  j 
the  king  after  that  great  disaster.  Dejected, 
reserved,  showing  a  stern  countenance  to  those 
senseless  persons  who  had  been  partizans  of 
war,  but  sparing  them  reproaches,  which  they 
might  have  returned — for,  if  they  had  been 
silly,  he  had  been  weak — he  proceeded  towards 
Berlin,  at  a  moment  when  his  presence  with 
the  army  was  most  needed  to  restore  the  tem- 
per of  downcast,  divided,  soured  minds,  to 
mould  all  those  wrecks  into  a  corps,  which 
should  retard  the  passage  of  the  Elbe,  cover 
Berlin  for  some  time,  and,  on  retiring  to  the 
Oder,  bring  to  the  Russians  a  contingent  of  a 
certain  value.  This  departure  was  a  serious 
fault,  and  unworthy  of  the  personal  courage 
shown  by  Frederick  William  during  the  battle. 
That  monarch  added  but  one  act  to  the  nomi- 
nation of  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  and  that 
was  to  write  to  Napoleon,  to  express  his  re- 
gret at  being  at  war  with  France,  and  to  pro- 
pose to  open  a  negotiation  immediately. 

The  king  having  left  the  head-quarters  with- 
out giving  any  military  instructions  to  his 
generals,  these  acie-1  without  the  slightest  con- 
cert. The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  collected  the 
wrecks  of  the  two  armies,  excepting  the  reserve 


committed  to  Marshal  Kalkreuth,  and  formed 
it  into  three  detachments,  two  of  troops  retain- 
ing some  organization,  the  third  containing 
the  mass  of  the  runaways.  He  directed  them 
all,  by  a  movement  to  the  right,  towards  the 
Elbe,  making  them  march  by  three  different 
lines  of  route,  but  all  running  in  the  same 
direction,  from  Nordhausen  to  Magdeburg. 
There  would  have  been  little  advantage  in 
throwing  himself  into  the  Harz,  for  besides 
the  deficiency  of  resources  in  the  way  of  pro- 
vision, that  mountainous  chain  was  neither 
sufficiently  distant,  nor  had  it  depth  enough  to 
serve  for  an  asylum  for  the  fugitive  army.  It 
would  have  been  pursued  thither  by  the 
French,  who  are  very  alert  in  mountains,  and 
perhaps  in  crossing  the  chain,  it  would  have 
found  them  beyond  it,  barring  the  way  to  the 
Elbe.  It  was  therefore  a  judicious  determina- 
tion to  turn  off  to  the  right,  with  a  view  to 
proceed  directly  to  the  Elbe  and  Magdeburg. 
It  dragged  along  with  it,  nevertheless,  a  train 
of  heavy  artillery,  which  greatly  retarded  its 
march.  The  idea  was  conceived  of  consign- 
ing it  to  the  care  of  General  Blucher,  who, 
turning  the  mountains  of  the  Harz  on  the  op- 
posite side  by  Osterode,  Seesen,  and  Bruns- 
wick, was  likely  to  descend  into  the  plains 
of  Hanover,  without  being  followed  by  the 
French  ;  for  it  was  to  be  presumed  that  these 
would  throw  themselves  en  masse  into  the 
track  of  the  Prussian  main  arm}-,  and  not  run 
alter  a  detachment  along  the  difficult  roads 
of  Hesse.  In  consequence,  General  Blucher, 
with  two  battalions  and  a  considerable  corps 
of  cavalry,  undertook  to  escort  the  great  park. 
The  Duke  of  Weimar,  who  had  plunged  with 
the  advanced  guard  into  the  forest  of  Thurin- 
gia,  soon  left  it  on  hearing  of  the  two  lost 
battles.  Keeping  along  the  foot  of  the  moun- 
tains, he  skirted  at  as  great  a  distance  as 
possible  the  two  armies,  French  and  Prus- 
sian. He  received  timely  information  of  the 
movement  which  General  Blucher  was  to  exe- 
cute, and  resolved  to  join  him  by  way  of 
Osterode  and  Seesen.  Marshal  Kalkreuth, 
after  halting  a  few  hours  at  Nordhausen  to 
cover  the  retreat,  proceeded  directly  for  the 
Elbe,  below  Magdeburg,  choosing  to  march 
alone,  dissatisfied  at  having  passed  under  the 
command  of  two  successive  generals,  whom 
he  held  in  little  estimation,  while  he  con- 
ceived, and  not  without  reason,  that  he  had 
himself  deserved  the  chief  command. 

Marshals  Ney,  Soult,  and  Murat,  started  in 
pursuit  of  the  main  Prussian  army,  making 
forced  marches  to  overtake  it,  and  taking 
prisoners  and  materiel  at  every  step.  But  the 
route  from  Nordhausen  to  Magdeburg  was  not 
long  enough  to  allow  them  time  to  get  up 
with  the  Prussians.  They  attained,  however, 
the  principal  object,  by  leaving  them  not  a 
day's  rest,  and  thus  depriving  thrm  of  all 
means  of  reorganizing  themselves,  and  still 
forming  a  force  of  some  consistency  upon  the 
Elbe. 

Meanwhile,  Marshal  Bernadotl/.  had  march- 
ed for  Halle,  intending  to  pass  the  Saal«* 
there,  and  to  reach  the  Elbe  towards  Barby  or 
Dessau.  Halle  is  on  the  Lower  Saale,  below 
the  point  where  that  river  receives  the  Elsti.-r, 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


197 


and  above  the  point  where  it  falls  into  the 
Elbe.  The  Duke  of  Brunswick,  on  his  de- 
parture for  Weimar,  for  the  purpose  of  re- 
tiring to  the  Elbe  under  cover  of  the  Saale, 
had  ordered  Prince  Eugene  of  Wirtemberg  to 
proceed  to  Halle  to  meet  the  Prussian  main 
army.  That  prince  had  come  thither  with  a 
corps  of  about  seventeen  or  eighteen  thou- 
sand men,  forming  the  last  resource  of  the 
monarchy.  He  had  established  himself  there, 
as  in  a  good  post  for  collecting  the  beaten 
army.  But,  having  taken  the  Magdeburg 
road,  it  never  came  near  him,  and  instead  of 
it  a  detachment  of  French  troops  made  its  ap- 
pearance on  the  morning  of  the  17th  of  Oc- 
tober. It  was  Dupont's  division,  which,  for 
the  moment,  accompanied  Marshal  Berna- 
dotte's  corps.  No  sooner  was  General  Dupont 
in  sight  of  Halle  than,  having  orders  to  attack, 
he  hastened  to  reconnoitre  himself  the  posi- 
tion of  the  enemy.  Before  the  city  of  Halle, 
the  Saale  divides  into  several  branches.  It  is 
passed  by  a  bridge  of  great  length,  which  at 
the  same  time  crosses  overflowed  meadows 
and  several  arms  of  the  river.  This  bridge 
was  provided  with  artillery,  and  in  advance 
of  it  there  was  a  body  of  infantry.  On  the 
islands  which  separate  the  river  in  several 
branches  had  been  formed  batteries,  enfilad- 
ing the  road  by  which  the  French  were  ap- 
proaching. At  the  extremity  of  the  bridge 
stands  the  city,  the  gates  of  which  were 
barricaded.  Lastly,  beyond  it,  upon  the 
heights  which  command  the  course  of  the 
Saale,  was  perceived  the  corps  of  the  Prince 
of  Wirtemberg,  drawn  up  in  order  of  battle. 
Thus  the  French  would  have  to  cross  the 
bridge,  to  force  the  gates  of  Halle,  to  pene- 
trate into  the  city,  to  pass  through  it,  and  to 
take  the  heights  in  the  rear.  These  were  a 
series  of  difficulties  almost  insurmountable. 
At  this  sight  General  Dupont,  who  had  com- 
manded in  the  brilliant  actions  of  Hanslach 
and  Dirnstein,  instantly  formed  his  resolution. 
He  determined  to  dislodge  the  troops  posted 
at  the  avenues  to  the  bridge,  then  to  carry  the 
bridge,  the  town,  and  the  heights.  He  went 
back,  withdrew  his  division  out  of  the  hands 
of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  who  had  most  unsea- 
sonably scattered  it,1  and  disposed  it  in  the 
following  manner.  He  placed  the  9th  light  in 
column  upon  the  road,  on  the  right  the  32nd, 
(which  had  made  itself  so  famous  in  Italy, 
and  was  still  commanded  by  Colonel  Darri- 
cau,)  and  then  the  9th  in  rear  to  support  the 
whole  movement.  This  done,  he  gave  the 
signal,  and,  heading  the  troops  in  person,  he 
advanced  with  them  at  a  run  upon  the  post  of 
infantry  placed  at  the  head  of  the  bridge. 
They  had  to  sustain  tremendous  discharges  of 
musketry  and  grape,  but  darted  to  the  bridge 
with  the  rapidity  of  lightning,  drove  back  upon 
it  the  troops  which  guarded  it,  and  pursued 
them,  in  spite  of  the  fire  poured  from  all  sides, 
and  striking  French  and  Prussians.  After  a 
conflict  of  a  few  minutes,  the  former  forced 
their  way  to  the  further  end  of  the  bridge,  and 
entered  the  city  pell-mell  with  the  fugitives. 

«  We  here  repeat  an  assertion  contained  in  the  Me- 
moirs of  General  Dupont.  We  can  affirm  that  in  those 
Memoirs,  still  in  manuscript  and  very  interesting,  Gene- 


There  a  vehement  fire  of  musketry  took  plac< 
in  the  streets  with  the  Prussians ;  however, 
they  were  soon  expelled  from  the  town  and 
the  gates  closed  upon  them. 

General  Dupont  had  sustained  some  loss,  but 
he  had  taken  almost  all  the  troops  that  de- 
fended the  bridge,  and  likewise  their  numerous 
artillery.  Still,  the  operation  was  not  finished. 
The  corps  of  the  Prince  of  Wirtemberg  was 
posted  on  the  other  side  of  the  town  upon  the 
heights  in  rear.  It  was  necessary  for  General 
Dupont  to  dislodge  him  from  them  if  he  would 
remain  master  of  Halle  and  of  the  bridge  over 
the  Saale.  Having  left  his  troops  time  to  re- 
cover breath,  he  ordered  the  city  gates  to  be 
thrown  open,  and  directed  his  division  towards 
the  foot  of  the  heights.  The  three  French 
regiments,  now  numbering  not  more  than 
5000  combatants,  were  received  with  the  fire 
of  12,000  men  well  posted.  They  advanced, 
nevertheless,  in  several  columns,  with  the 
j  vigour  of  troops  not  accustomed  to  shrink 
;  from  any  obstacle.  At  the  same  time,  Gene- 
!  ral  Dupont  sent  one  of  his  battalions  upon  the 
flank  of  the  position,  turned  it,  and,  perceiving 
]  the  effect  produced  by  this  manoeuvre,  pushed 
j  forward  his  columns  of  attack.  His  three 
;  regiments  dashed  on  in  spite  of  the  enemy's 
fire,  scaled  the  heights,  and,  reaching  the  sum- 
mit, dislodged  the  Prussians.  A  new  action 
ensued  with  the  whole  corps  of  the  Prince  of 
Wirtemberg,  on  the  ground  situated  beyond. 
But  Drouet's  division  arrived  at  the  moment, 
and  its  presence,  extinguishing  all  the  enemy's 
hopes,  put  an  end  to  his  efforts. 

This  brilliant  action  cost  the  French  about 
600  killed  and  wounded,  and  the  Prussians 
about  1000.  Four  thousand  more  were  made 
prisoners.  The  Duke  of  Wirtemberg  retired 
in  disorder  towards  the  Elbe,  by  Dessau  and 
Wittenberg,  destroying  all  the  bridges  without 
loss  of  time.  One  of  his  regiments,  that  of 
Trescow,  which  was  coming  from  Magdeburg, 
along  the  left  bank  of  the  Saale,  to  join  him, 
was  surprised,  and  almost  the  whole  of  it 
taken.  Thus  the  reserve  even  of  the  Prus- 
sians was  in  flight,  and  as  disorganized  as  the 
rest  of  their  army. 

Napoleon,  having  come  to  Naumburg  to  see 
the  field  of  battle  of  Auerst^dt,  and  to  compli- 
ment the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout  on  its  bril- 
liant conduct,  had  stopped  there  a  very  short 
time  and  proceeded  to  Merseburg.  On  his 
way  was  the  spot  where  the  battle  of  Rosbach 
was  fought.  Perfectly  versed  in  military  his- 
tory, he  was  accurately  acquainted  with  the 
minutest  details  of  that  celebrated  action,  and 
he  sent  General  Savary  to  seek  the  monument 
which  had  been  erected  in  memory  of  the 
battle.  General  Savary  discovered  it  in  a 
stubble  field.  It  was  a  small  column,  only  a 
few  feet  high.  The  inscriptions  were  effaced. 
Troops  belonging  to  Lannes'  corps,  passing 
the  spot,  carried  it  away,  and  put  the  pieces 
into  a  caisson,  which  was  sent  oft"  to  France. 

Napoleon  then  proceeded  to  Halle.  He  could 
not  help  admiring  the  exploit  of  Dupont's 
division.  Upon  the  ground  lay  the  dead  of 


ral  Dupoiil  is  no  detractor  of  Marshal  Bernadotte'*.    H« 
treats  him  like  a  friend,  as  well  as  all  those  who  tri- 
umphed in  1815,  when  France  was  overcome 
it  2 


198 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Oct.  1806, 


that  division,  whom  there  had  not  been  time 
K>  bury,  dressed  in  the  uniform  of  the  32d  regi- 
ment. "What!"  exclaimed  Napoleon,  "the 
32d  again  !  So  many  of  it  were  killed  in  Italy, 
that  I  thought  there  could  be  none  left."  He 
tvas  lavish  of  his  praises  upon  the  troops  of 
General  Dupont. 

The  movements  of  the  enemy's  army  began 
to  become  clear.  Napoleon  directed  the  pur- 
suit, conformably  to  his  general  plan,  which 
consisted  in  turning  the  Prussians,  getting  be- 
fore them  to  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  and  pass- 
ing that  river  by  means  of  a  bridge  of  boats 
near  Barby,  not  far  from  the  confluence  of  the 
Saale  and  the  Elbe.  He  enjoined  Marshals 
Lannes  and  Augereau,  who  had  had  two  or 
three  days  for  recruiting  themselves,  to  cross 
the  Saale  by  the  bridge  of  Halle,  and  the  Elbe 
by  the  bridge  of  Dessau,  replacing  the  latter 
if  it  were  destroyed.  He  had  already  directed 
Marshal  Davout  to  leave  all  his  wounded  at 
Naumburg,  to  proceed  with  his  corps  to  Leip- 
zig, and  from  Leipzig  to  Wittenberg,  to  make 
himself  master  of  the  passage  of  the  Elbe  at 
this  latter  point.  If  he  could  gain  timely  pos- 
session of  the  course  of  the  Elbe  from  Witten- 
berg to  Barby,  he  had  the  greatest  chance  of 
arriving  first  at  Berlin  and  upon  the  Oder. 

On  his  way,  although  Leipzig  belonged  to 
the  elector  of  Saxony,  Napoleon  prescribed  to 
Marshal  Davout  a  rigorous  measure  against 
the  merchants  of  that  city,  who  were  the  prin- 
cipal traders  in  English  commodities  in  Ger- 
many. Napoleon,  to  revenge  himself  on  the 
commerce  of  Great  Britain  for  the  war  which 
she  made  upon  France,  strove  to  intimi- 
date the  commercial  cities  of  the  north,  such 
as  Bremen,  Hamburg,  Liibeck,  Leipzig,  Dant- 
zig,  which  strove  to  open  the  continent  to  the 
English,  while  he  was  striving  to  close  it 
against  them.  He  required,  therefore,  every 
merchant  to  declare  what  English  goods  he 
possessed,  adding,  that  if  the  declarations  ap- 
peared false,  their  accuracy  would  be  tested 
by  ocular  inspection,  and  false  allegations 
punished  by  heavy  penalties.  All  the  goods 
declared  were  to  be  confiscated  for  the  benefit 
of  the  French  army. 

Mean  while,  ovr  troops  continued  their  march 
Jlowards  the  J?lb«.  Marshal  Bernadotte  passed 
that  river  a'  Barby,  but  less  promptly  than  he 
had  orders  to  do.  Napoleon,  who  had  re- 
strained Mmsuf  after  the  affair  of  Auerstadt. 
gave  vent  tin:,  '.ime  to  his  displeasure,  and 


>  We  quote  this  Idler,  which  is  at  the  Depdt  de  la 
Guerre: — 

Marshal  Btrthier  to  Marshal  Bernadottt. 

Halle,  21st  October,  1806. 

The  Emperor,  monriwir  le  mare'chal,  desires  me  to 
inform  you  that  he  is  highly  displeased,  because  you 
have  not  executed  the  order  which  you  received,  to 
proceed  yesterday  to  Calbe,  for  the  purpose  of  throwing 
a  bridge  over  the  mouth  of  the  Saale,  at  Barby.  Yet 
vou  must  be  aware  that  all  the  Emperor's  dispositions 
,vere  combined. 

His  majesty,  who  is  extremely  angry  that  you  have 
not  executed  his  orders,  reminds  you,  in  reference  to 
tU:s  su!  ject,  that  you  were  not  at  the  battle  of  Jena; 
tlmt  this  m  ght  have  been  sufficient  to  endanger  the 
safety  of  the  army,  and  to  thwart  the  grand  combina- 
tions of  His  majesty  ;  and  that  it  rendered  that  battle 
doubtful  and  very  sanguinary,  when  otherwise  it  would 
have  been  much  less  so.  Deeply  mortified  as  the  Em- 
peror was,  he  refrained  from  speaking  to  you  on  the 
•ubje  it,  because  he  was  fearful  lest,  in  calling  to  mind 


made  Prince  Berthier  address  a  letter  to  Mar- 
shal Bernadotte,  in  which,  in  reference  to  his 
tardy  passage  of  the  Elbe,  he  was  bitterly  re- 
minded of  his  precipitate  departure  from 
Naumburg  on  the  day  of  the  two  battles  of 
Jena  and  Auerstlidt.1  However,  as  it  is  the 
case,  when  we  follow  the  rules  of  cold  justice 
less  than  the  impulses  of  the  heart,  Napoleon, 
too  indulgent  the  first  time,  was  almost  too 
rigorous  the  second,  because  the  tardiness  of 
Marshal  Bernadotte  in  passing  the  Elbe  was 
the  fault  of  the  elements  much  more  than  his. 
Lannes  threw  himself  upon  Dessau,  and  thence 
upon  the  bridge  over  the  Elbe,  which  the  Prus- 
sians had  half  destroyed.  He  lost  no  time  in 
repairing  it.  Marshal  Davout,  on  reaching 
Wittenberg,  found  the  Prussians  there  also 
employed  in  destroying  the  bridge  over  the 
Elbe,  and  ready  to  blow  up  a  powder  magazine 
not  far  from  the  town.  The  inhabitants,  who 
were  Saxons,  and  who  already  knew  that  Na- 
poleon wished  to  spare  Saxony  the  conse- 
quences of  the  war,  hastened  to  save  the  bridge 
of  Wittenberg  themselves,  to  remove  the 
matches,  and  to  assist  the  French  to  prevent 
an  explosion.  It  was  on  the  20th  of  October, 
that  Marshals  Davout,  Lannes  and  Bernadotte, 
crossed  the  Elbe,  six  days  after  the  battles  of 
Jena  and  Auerstadt.  As  we  see,  there  had  not 
been  an  hour  lost.  Two  great  battles,  and  a 
very  smart  action  at  Halle,  had  taken  up  only 
the  time  spent  in  fighting,  and  the  march  of 
our  columns  had  not  been  suspended  for  a 
moment.  The  Prussians  themselves,  though 
their  flight  was  rapid,  did  not  reach  the  Elbe 
till  the  20th  of  October,  and  they  passed  it  at 
Magdeburg,  on  the  same  day  that  Marshals 
Lannes  and  Davout  passed  it  at  Dessau  and 
Wittenberg.  But  they  arrived  there  in  a  state 
of  increasing  disorganization,  incapable  of 
defending  the  lower  course  of  the  river,  and 
not  even  having  any  hope  of  reaching  the 
Oder  before  the  French — a  condition  upon 
which  their  safety  depended. 

Napoleon,  notwithstanding  his  impatience 
to  get  to  Berlin,  in  orden  to  direct  his  troops  to 
the  Oder,  stopped  a  day  at  Wittenberg  to  take 
there  marching  precautions,  which  he  was 
careful  to  multiply  in  proportion  as  he  carried 
the  war  to  greater  distances.  We  have  already 
seen  him,  when  penetrating  into  Austria,  se- 
curing points  of  support  at  Augsburg,  at  Brau- 
nau,  at  Linz.  In  the  expedition  of  far  greater 
length  which  he  was  now  undertaking,  he 


your  former  services,  he  should  hurt  your  feelings,  and 
because  the  consideration  which  he  has  for  you  induced 
him  to  be  silent;  but,  on  this  occasion,  when  you  have 
not  gone  to  Calbe,  and  when  you  have  not  tried  to  pass 
the  Elbe,  eilher  at  Barby  or  at  the  mouth  of  the  Saale, 
the  Emperor  is  determined  to  speak  his  mind,  because 
he  is  not  accustomed  to  see  his  operations  sacrificed  to 
mere  etiquettes  of  command. 

The  Emperor,  monsieur  le  mare'chal,  directs  me  also 
to  speak  to  you  about  a  matter  of  less  consequence, 
namely,  that,  in  spite  of  the  order  which  you  received 
yesterday,  you  have  not  yet  sent  hither  three  companies 
to  escort  your  prisoners.  There  remain  in  Halle  3500 
without  any  escort.  The  Emperor,  monsieur  le  mare'- 
chal, orders  you  to  send  immediately  a  staff  officer  at 
the  head  of  three  complete  companies,  forming  300  m'n, 
to  take  all  the  prisoners  that  are  at  Halle,  and  to  contact 
them  to  Erfurt.  There  are  no  troops  left  here  but  the 
imperial  guard,  and  the  Emperor  does  not  choo»e  that 
it  should  escort  the  prisoners  taken  by  your  co/ps.  It 
is  nine  o'clock,  and  there  are  no  signs  of  the  thre«  com- 
panies for  which  1  applied  to  you  yesterday. 


Oct   1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


199 


purposed  to  create  upon  his  route  places  of 
safety  for  his  sick  or  fatigued  men,  for  the  re- 
cruits sent  from  France,  for  the  stores  of  am- 
munition and  provisions  that  he  intended  to 
collect.  Erfurt  being  taken,  he  had  changed 
his  line  of  stations,  and,  instead  of  making  it 
pass  through  Franconia,  the  province  through 
which  he  had  entered  Prussia,  he  had  given  it 
again  irs  natural  direction,  and  made  it  pass 
along  the  ordinary  and  central  high  road  of 
Germany,  by  Mayence,  Frankfurt,  Eisenach, 
Erfurt,  Weimar,  Naumburg,  Halle,  and  Wit- 
tenberg. Erfurt  was  provided  with  very  good 
defences,  and  stored  with  a  considerable  mate- 
riel. Napoleon  made  it  the  first  station  on  the 
military  road  which  he  was  resolved  to  mark 
out  across  Germany.  Wittenberg  possessed 
ancient  half-destroyed  fortifications.  On  this 
account,  but  chiefly  for  the  sake  of  the  bridge 
existing  there  over  the  Elbe,  Napoleon  ordered 
this  place  to  be  put  into  condition,  as  far  as 
that  could  be  done  in  the  space  of  two  or  three 
weeks.  He  put  into  the  hands  of  General 
Chasseloup  a  large  sum  of  money,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  employing  six  or  seven  thousand  na- 
tive labourers,  and,  in  default  of  regular  works, 
for  constructing  field-works  of  great  solidity. 
He  ordered  the  old  scarps  to  be  bared  at  the 
foot,  those  which  wanted  height  to  be  raised, 
and  where  time  would  not  permit  the  employ- 
ment of  masonry,  he  directed  wood,  which  was 
very  abundant  in  the  neighbouring  forests,  to 
be  substituted  for  stone.  Immense  palisades 
were  set  up,  a  Roman  camp  was  in  some  sort 
constructed,  such  as  the  ancient  conquerors 
of  the  world  constructed  against  Gaul  and 
Germany.  In  the  same  town  of  Wittenberg, 
Napoleon  had  ovens  built,  corn  collected,  bis- 
cuit made.  He  determined  also  that  the  great 
park  of  artillery  should  be  collected  in  this 
place,  and  that  workshops  for  repairs  should 
be  established  there.  He  took  possession  of 
the  public  edifices  and  places,  to  turn  them 
into  hospitals  capable  of  containing  the  sick 
and  wounded  of  a  numerous  army.  Lastly, 
on  the  suddenly  raised  ramparts  of  this  vast 
depot  he  ordered  more  than  a  hundred  pieces 
of  heavy  artillery,  collected  in  his  victorious 
march,  to  be  placed  in  battery.  He  had  ap- 
pointed General  Clarke  governor  of  Erfurt; 
he  nominated  General  Lemarrois,  one  of  his 
aides-de-camp,  governor  of  Wittenberg.  The 
wounded,  separated  into  two  classes,  great  and 
little  wounded,  that  is  to  say,  such  as  would  be 
able  to  return  to  the  ranks  in  a  few  days,  and 
those  whose  recovery  would  require  a  long 
t:me,  were  divided  between  Wittenberg  and 
Erfurt.  The  little  wounded  remained  at  Wit- 
tenberg, so  that  they  could  rejoin  their  corps 
immediately;  the  others  were  sent  to  Erfurt. 
Each  regiment,  besides  the  principal  depot 
which  it  had  in  France,  had  also  a  field  depot 
at  Wittenberg.  In  the  latter  could  be  left  men 
who  were  fatigued  or  slightly  indisposed,  that, 
by  means  of  the  attentions  of  a  few  days,  they 
might  be  enabled  to  march  afresh,  without  en- 
cumbering the  roads,  without  exhibiting  there 
the  spectacle  of  the  tail  of  an  army,  sick,  im- 
potent, increasing  in  length  in  proportion  to 
the  rapidity  of  the  movements  and  the  dura- 
tion i>f  the  war.  The  detachments  of  con- 


scripts, when  leaving  France  in  bodies,  had 
orders  to  halt  at  Erfurt  and  Wittenberg,  to  be 
there  reviewed,  provided  with  what  they  needed, 
augmented  by  convalescents,  and  directed  to 
their  regiments.  Lastly,  to  the  same  depots, 
but  especially  to  that  of  Wittenberg,  Napoleon 
ordered  the  immense  quantity  of  fine  horses 
picked  up  in  all  parts  of  Germany,  to  be  sent. 
He  directed  all  the  regiments  of  cavalry  to 
pass  through  them  in  their  turn,  in  order  to  be 
remounted.  The  same  order  was  given  to 
dragoons  coming  from  France  on  foot.  There 
they  would  find  horses,  which  they  could  not 
procure  in  France.  Thus  Napoleon  concen- 
trated at  these  points,  in  a  well-defended  asy- 
lum, all  the  resources  of  the  conquered  country, 
which  he  had  the  art  to  take  from  the  enemy 
and  apply  to  his  own  use.  Victorious,  and 
marching  forward,  he  had  in  them  relays  abun- 
dantly furnished  with  every  thing,  provisions, 
ammunition, materiel,  and  situated  on  the  route 
of  the  corps  coming  to  reinforce  the  army.  If 
obliged  to  retire,  they  would  be  supports  and 
means  of  refitting,  placed  on  the  lines  of  retreat 

After  inspecting  and  ordering  every  thing 
himself.  Napoleon  left  Wittenberg,  and  took 
the  road  for  Berlin.  Fate  decreed  that,  in  the 
space  of  a  year,  he  should  visit  Berlin  and 
Vienna  as  a  conqueror.  The  King  of  Prussia, 
who  had  written  to  solict  peace,  sent  to  him 
M.  de  Lucchesini,  to  negotiate  an  armistice. 
Napoleon  would  not  see  M.  de  Lucchesini, 
and  charged  Marshal  Duroc  to  deliver  to  the 
minister  of  King  Frederick  William  the  an- 
swer commanded  by  circumstances.  It  would 
in  fact  have  been  giving  the  Russians  time  to 
succour  the  Prussians,  to  grant  an  armistice. 
This  military  reason  admitted  jf  no  reply ;  un- 
less the  formal  powers  of  Russia  and  Prussia 
were  produced  for  treating  immediately  for 
peace  on  the  conditions  which  Napoleon  had 
a  right  to  impose  after  the  late  victories. 

He  despatched  orders,  therefore,  to  all  his 
corps  to  march  to  Berlin.  Marshal  Davout 
was  to  start  from  Wittenberg,  taking  the  direct 
rout  from  Wittenberg  to  Berlin,  that  of  Juter- 
bock;  Lannes  and  Augereau  were  to  follow 
that  from  Treuenbrietzen  to  Potsdam.  Napo- 
leon, with  the  guard,  horse  and  foot,  now 
united  and  reinforced  by  seven  thousand  gren- 
adiers and  voltigeurs,  marched  between  these 
two  columns.  He  purposed  that,  in  recom- 
pense for  the  victor}'  of  Auerstudt,  Marshal 
Davout  should  be  the  first  to  enter  Berlin,  and 
receive  the  keys  of  the  capital  from  the  hands 
of  the  magistrates.  As  for  himself,  before  he 
went  to  Berlin,  he  intended  to  stay  awhile  at 
Potsdam,  in  the  retreat  of  the  great  Frederick. 
Marshals  Soult  and  Ney  had  orders  to  invest 
Magdeburg,  Murat  to  remain  in  ambush  for  a 
few  days  about  that  great  fortress,  to  intercept 
the  bands  of  fugitives  crowding  thither.  "It 
is  a  trap,"  wrote  Napoleon  to  him,  "  in  which, 
with  your  cavalry,  you  will  catch  all  the  de- 
tached parties  that  are  seeking  a  safe  place 
for  crossing  the  Elbe."  Murat  was  afterwards 
to  join  the  grand  army  at  Berlin,  and  thenc« 
post  off  to  the  Oder. 

Having  waited  to  allow  his  corps  farmee  to 
get  the  start  of  him  a  little,  Napoleon  set  out 
on  the  24th  of  October,  and  passed  through 


200 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


Kropstadt  on  his  way  to  Potsdam.  Perform- 
ing the  journey  on  horseback,  he  was  caught 
in  a  violent  storm,  though  the  weather  had 
continued  very  fine  ever  since  the  opening  of 
the  campaign.  It  was  not  his  custom  to  stop 
for  such  a  reason.  However,  he  was  offered 
shelter  in  a  house  situated  amid  woods,  and 
belonging  to  an  officer  of  the  hunting  esta- 
blishment of  the  court  of  Saxony.  He  accepted 
the  offer.  Some  females,  who  seemed  from 
their  language  and  dress  to  be  of  e'evated 
rank,  received,  around  a  great  fire,  this  group 
of  French  officers,  whom,  from  fear  as  much 
as  out  of  politeness,  they  treated  with  much 
civility.  They  seemed  not  to  be  aware  who 
was  the  principal  of  these  officers,  around 
whom  the  others  respectfully  ranged  them- 
selves, when  one  of  them,  still  young,  seized 
with  a  strong  emotion,  exclaimed,  "That  is  the 
Emperor!"  "How  came  you  to  know  me 7" 
asked  Napoleon,  drily.  "  Sire,"  she  answered, 
"I  was  with  your  majesty  in  Egypt."  "And 
what  were  you  doing  in  Egypt!"  "I  was  the 
wife  of  an  officer,  who  has  since  died  in  your 
service.  I  have  solicited  a  pension  for  myself 
and  my  son,  but  I  was  a  foreigner,  and  could 
not  obtain  it ;  and  1  am  come  to  live  with  the 
mistress  of  this  house,  who  has  kindly  re- 
ceived me,  and  intrusted  me  with  the  educa- 
tion of  her  children."  The  countenance  of 
Napoleon,  who  was  displeased  at  being  recog- 
nised, stern  at  first,  all  at  once  assumed  a  soft 
expression  :  "  Madam,"  said  he,  "  you  shall 
have  a  pension  ;  and  as  for  your  son,  I  charge 
myself  with  his  education." 

The  same  evening  he  took  care  to  affix  his 
signature  to  both  these  resolutions,  and  said, 
smiling,  "  I  never  yet  met  with  an  adventure 
in  a  forest,  in  consequence  of  a  storm :  here 
is  one,  however,  and  a  most  agreeable  one." 

He  arrived  in  the  evening  of  the  25th  of 
October  at  Potsdam.  He  immediately  went 
to  visit  the  retreat  of  the  great  captain,  the 
great  king,  who  called  himself"  The  Philoso- 
pher of  Sans-Souci,"  and  with  some  reason, 
who  seemed  to  wield  sword  and  sceptre  with 
a  jeering  indifference,  as  if  in  mockery  of  all 
the  courts  of  Europe,  one  might  venture  to 
add,  of  his  own  people,  if  he  had  not  taken  so 
much  pains  to  govern  them  well.  Napoleon 
went  through  the  great  and  little  palace  of 
Potsdam,  desired  to  be  shown  Frederick's 
works,  crowded  with  Voltaire's  notes,  sought 
to  discover  in  his  library  on  what  books1  he 
•was  accustomed  to  feast  his  great  mind,  and 
then  went  to  the  church  of  Potsdam,  to  inspect 
the  modest  tomb  where  rests  the  founder  of 
Prussia.  At  Potsdam  were  kept  the  sword  of 
Frederick,  his  belt,  his  order  of  the  Black 
Eagle.  Napoleon  seized  them,  exclaiming, 
"  What  a  capital  present  for  the  Invalides, 
especially  for  those  who  have  formed  part  of 
the  army  of  Hanover  !  They  will  be  delighted, 
no  doubt,  when  they  see  in  our  possession  the 
sword  of  him  who  beat  them  at  Rosbach." 
Napoleon,  in  seizing  these  precious  relics  with 
so  much  respect,  most  assuredly  offered  no 
affront  either  to  Frederick  or  the  Prussian  na- 
tion. But  how  extraordinary,  how  worthy  of 
meditation  is  that  mysterious  concatenation 
which  binds,  blends,  separates,  or  brings  to- 


gether, the  things  of  this  wor.d !  Frederick 
and  Napoleon  met  here  in  a  very  strange  man- 
ner. That  philosopher  king,  who,  unknown 
to  himself,  had  been  from  his  elevated  throne 
one  of  the  promoters  of  the  French  Revolution, 
now  lying  in  his  coffin,  received  a  visit  from 
the  general  of  that  Revolution,  become  em- 
peror and  conqueror  of  Brrlin  and  Potsdam  ! 
The  victor  at  Rosbach  received  a  visit  from 
the  victor  at  Jena!  What  a  sight !  Unfortu- 
nately, these  reverses  of  fortune  were  not  the 
last. 

While  the  head-quarters  were  at  Potsdam, 
Marshal  Davout  entered  Berlin  with  his  corps 
on  the  25th  of  October.  King  Frederick  Wil- 
liam, when  he  withdrew,  had  left  Berlin  to  the 
government  of  the  citizens,  under  the  presi- 
dency of  a  considerable  personage,  the  Prince 
de  Hatzfeld.  The  representatives  of  the  civic 
body  offered  to  Marshal  Davout  the  keys  of 
the  capital,  which  he  gave  back  to  them,  say- 
ing, that  they  belonged  to  one  greater  than  he 
— to  Napoleon.  He  left  a  single  regiment  in 
the  city,  to  do  the  police  duty  jointly  with  the 
city  militia.  He  then  went  and  established 
himself  at  Friedrichsfeld,  a  league  distant, 
with  his  right  to  the  Spree,  and  his  left  to  the 
woods.  By  order  of  Napoleon,  he  encamped 
militarily,  with  the  artillery  pointed,  and  part 
of  the  soldiers  on  duty  as  sentinels  at  the 
camp,  while  the  others  went  alternately  to 
visit  the  capital  conquered  through  their  ex- 
ploits. He  ordered  hovels  to  be  made  with 
straw  and  fir,  that  the  troops  might  be  shel- 
tered from  the  inclemency  of  the  season.  It 
was  not  necessary  to  recommend  discipline  to 
Marshal  Davout :  there  was  no  need  to  watch 
him,  unless  to  render  him  less  severe.  Mar- 
shal Davout  promised  to  respect  persons  and 
property,  as  civilized  conquerors  ought  to  do, 
on  condition  that  they  would  obtain  from  the 
inhabitants  complete  submission  and  provi- 
sions, during  the  short  time  that  the  army  had 
to  spend  within  their  walls,  which,  for  such  a 
city  as  Berlin,  could  not  constitute  a  very 
heavy  burden. 

The  day  after  the  entry  of  the  French  into 
Berlin,  the  shops  were  open.  The  inhabitants 
were  walking  peaceably  in  the  wide  streets  of 
that  capital,  and  even  in  greater  numbers  than 
usual.  They  seemed  to  be  at  once  mortified 
and  curious,  natural  impressions  among  a 
people  patriotic  but  passionate,  enlightened, 
struck  with  all  that  is  great,  eager  to  know 
the  most  renowned  generals  and  soldiers  then 
in  the  world.  They  disapproved,  moreover, 
of  their  government  having  undertaken  a 
senseless  war;  and  that  disapprobation  could 
not  but  diminish  the  hatred  which  they  bore 
to  the  provoked  conquerors.  Marshal  Lannes 
was  sent  to  Potsdam  and  Spondau.  Marshal 
Augereau  passed  through  Berlin  at  the  heels 
of  Marshal  .Davout ;  and  Napoleon,  having 
staid  the  25th  and  26th  at  Potsdam,  and  the 
27th  at  Charlottenburg,  fixed  on  the  28th  for 
his  entry  into  Berlin. 

It  was  the  first  time  that  he  had  ever  made 
a  triumphant  entry,  like  Alexander  or  Caesar, 
into  a  conquered  capital.  He  had  not  entered 
Vienna  in  that  manner:  indeed  he  had  scarcely 
visited  the  Austrian  capital  at  all,  living  con- 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


201 


stantly  at-  Schonbrunn,  out  of  the  sight  of  its 
inhabitants.  But,  on  this  day,  whether  from 
pride  at  having  demolished  an  army  reputed 
to  be  invincible,  or  from  a  desire  to  awe  Eu- 
rope by  a  striking  spectacle,  or  perhaps  from 
the  intoxication  of  victory  mounting  higher 
than  usual  into  his  head,  he  chose  the  morn- 
ing of  the  28th  for  his  triumphant  entry  into 
Berlin. 

The  whole  population  of  the  city  was 
abroad  to  witness  this  grand  scene.  Napo- 
leon entered,  surrounded  by  his  guard,  and 
followed  by  the  fine  cuirassiers  of  Generals 
d'Hautpoul  and  Nansouty.  The  imperial 
guard,  in  rich  uniform,  was  on  this  day  more 
imposing  than  ever.  In  front  the  grenadiers 
and  dismounted  chasseurs,  in  rear  the  horse 
grenadiers  and  chasseurs,  in  the  middle  Mar- 
shals Berthier,  Duroc,  Davout,  Augereau,  and, 
in  the  centre  of  this  group,  left  by  himself  out 
of  respect,  Napoleon,  in  the  simple  dress 
which  he  wore  in  the  Tuilleries,  and  in  fields 
of  battle.  Napoleon,  the  object  of  all  eyes  in 
that  immense  concourse,  silent,  impressed  at 
once  with  sorrow  and  admiration.  Such  was 
the  spectacle  exhibited  in  that  long  and  spa- 
cious street  of  Berlin  leading  from  the  gate  of 
Charlottenburg  to  the  palace  of  the  kings  of 
Prussia.  The  populace  were  in  the  streets, 
the  wealthy  citizens  at  the  windows.  As  for 
the  nobility,  it  had  fled,  full  of  fear  and  with 
confusion.  The  wives  of  the  Prussian  burgh- 
ers seemed  to  devour  the  spectacle  that  was 
before  their  eyes  :  some  shed  tears,  but  none 
uttered  either  cries  of  haired,  or  cries  of  flat- 
tery for  the  conqueror.  Happy  Prussia,  not 
to  be  divided,  and  to  keep  up  her  dignity  in 
her  disaster !  The  entry  of  the  enemy  was 
not  with  her  the  ruin  of  one  party,  the  triumph 
of  another,  and  she  had  not  in  her  bosom  an 
unworthy  faction,  feeling  an  odious  joy,  ap- 
plauding the  presence  of  foreign  soldiers.  We 
French,  mofe  unfortunate  in  our  reverses, 
have  witnessed  that  execrable  joy,  for  we  have 
seen  every  thing  in  this  century,  the  extremes 
of  victory  and  defeat,  of  greatness  and  abase- 
ment, of  the  purest  devotedness  and  the  black- 
est treachery ! 

Napoleon  received  the  keys  of  Berlin  from 
the  magistrates,  then  proceeded  to  the  palace, 
where  he  gave  audience  to  all  the  public  au- 
thorities, used  mild,  cheering  language,  pro- 
mised order  on  the  part  of  the  soldiers,  on 
condition  of  order  on  the  part  of  the  inhabit- 
ants, showed  no  severity  in  his  expressions 
but  towards  the  German  aristocracy,  which 
was,  he  said,  the  sole  author  of  all  the  calami- 
ties of  Germany,  which  had  dared  to  provoke 
him  to  the  fight,  and  which  he  would  chastise 
by  obliging  it  to  beg  its  bread  in  England.  He 
established  himself  in  the  king's  palace,  re- 
ceived the  foreign  ministers  representing 
friendly  courts,  and  summoned  M.  de  Talley- 
rand to  Berlin. 

His  bulletins,  narratives  of  all  that  the  army 
accomplished  daily,  often,  too,  violent  answers 
to  his  enemies,  series  of  political  reflections, 
lessons  to  kings  and  nations,  were  rapidly 
dictated  by  him,  and  usually  revised  by  M.  de 
Talleyrand  before  they  were  published.  He 
there  recorded  each  of  the  progresses  which 

VOL.  II.— 26 


he  had  made  in  the  enemy's  country;  he  even 
related  what  he  heard  concerning  the  political 
causes  of  the  war.  In  those  which  he  pub- 
lished in  Prussia,  he  affected  to  lavish  homage 
to  the  memory  of  the  great  Frederick,  tokens 
of  esteem  on  his  unfortunate  successor,  taking 
good  care  indeed  that  some  pity  for  his  weak- 
ness should  peep  through,  and  the  most  viru- 
lent sarcasms  on  queens  who  meddle  in  affairs 
of  state,  who  expose  their  husbands  and  their 
country  to  frightful  disasters ;  treatment  most 
ungenerous  towards  the  Queen  of  Prussia, 
who  was  sufficiently  racked  by  the  sense  of 
her  faults  and  her  misfortunes,  to  be  spared 
the  addition  of  outrage  to  adversity.  These 
bulletins,  which  betrayed  with  too  little  reserve 
the  licentiousness  of  the  victorious  soldier, 
exposed  Napoleon  to  more  than  one  censure 
amidst  the  shouts  of  admiration  which  his  tri- 
umphs drew  from  his  enemies  themselves. 

In  his  irritation  against  the  Prussian  party 
which  promoted  the  war,  he  received  sternly 
the  envoys  of  the  Duke  of  Brunswick,  who 
had  been  mortally  wounded  at  the  battle  of 
Auerstadt,  and  who,  before  he  expired,  recom- 
mended his  family  and  his  subjects  to  the  con- 
queror. "  What  would  he  who  sent  you  have 
to  say,"  replied  Napoleon — "  what  would  he 
have  to  say,  if  I  were  to  inflict  on  the  city  of 
Brunswick  that  subversion  with  which,  fifteen 
years  ago,  he  threatened  the  capital  of  the 
great  nation  which  I  command  1  The  Duke 
of  Brunswick  had  disavowed  the  insensate 
manifesto  of  1792;  one  would  have  thought 
that  with  age  reason  had  begun  to  get  the 
better  of  his  passions,  and  yet  he  has  again 
lent  the  authority  of  his  name  to  the  follies  of 
hot-headed  youth,  which  have  brought  ruin 
upon  Prussia.  To  him  it  belonged  to  put 
women,  courtiers,  young  officers,  into  their 
proper  places,  and  to  make  all  feel  the  au- 
thority of  his  age,  of  his  understanding,  and 
of  his  position.  But  he  had  not  the  force  to 
do  so,  and  the  Prussian  monarchy  is  demo- 
lished and  the  States  of  Brunswick  are  in  my 
power.  Tell  the  Duke  of  Brunswick  that  I 
shall  show  him  that  consideration  which  is  due 
to  an  unfortunate  general,  justly  celebrated, 
struck  by  that  fate  which  may  reach  us  all, 
but  that  I  cannot  recognise  a  sovereign  prince 
in  a  general  of  the  Prussian  army." 

These  words,  published  through  the  usual 
channel  of  the  bulletins,  intimated  that  Napo- 
leon would  not  treat  the  sovereignty  of  the 
Duke  of  Brunswick  any  better  than  that  of  the 
Elector  of  Hesse.  If,  however,  he  showed 
asperity  to  some,  he  showed  himself  kind  and 
generous  to  others,  taking  care  to  vary  his 
treatment  according  to  the  known  participa- 
tion of  each  in  the  war.  His  expressions  in 
regard  to  old  Marshal  Mollendorf  were  per- 
fectly decorous.  There  was  in  Berlin  Prince 
Ferdinand,  brother  of  the  great  Frederick,  and 
father  of  Prince  Louis,  as  well  as  the  princess 
his  wife.  There  were  also  the  widow  of  Prince 
Henry,  and  two  sisters  of  the  king,  one  lying 
in,  the  other  ill.  Napoleon  went  to  visit  all 
these  members  of  the  royal  family,  with  all 
the  signs  of  profound  respect,  and  touched 
them  by  testimonies  coming  from  so  high  a 
personage,  for  there  was  not  then  a  sovereign 


202 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


whose  attentions  had  so  great  a  value  as  his. 
In  the  situation  to  which  he  had  attained,  he 
knew  how  to  calculate  his  slightest  tokens  of 
kindness  or  severity.  Exercising  at  this  mo- 
ment the  right  belonging  to  all  generals  in 
time  of  war,  that  of  intercepting  correspond- 
ence, to  discover  the  movements  of  the  enemy, 
he  seized  a  letter  from  the  Prince  de  Hatzfeld, 
in  which  he  appeared  to  inform  Prince  Hohen- 
lohe  of  the  position  of  the  French  army  around 
Berlin.  The  Prince  de  Hatzfeld,  as  head  of 
the  municipal  government  established  in  Ber- 
lin, had  promised  upon  oath  not  to  attempt 
any  thing  against  the  French  army,  and  to 
attend  solely  to  the  quiet,  safety,  and  welfare 
of  the  capital.  It  was  an  engagement  of  loy- 
alty towards  the  conqueror,  who  suffered  an 
authority  which  he  could  have  abolished  to 
subsist  for  the  benefit  of  the  conquered  coun- 
try. The  fault,  however,  was  very  excusable, 
since  it  proceeded  from  the  most  honourable 
of  sentiments,  patriotism.  Napoleon,  who  was 
apprehensive  that  other  burgomasters  would 
imitate  this  example,  and  that,  in  this  case,  all 
his  movements  would  be  revealed  from  hour 
to  hour  to  the  enemy — Napoleon  resolved  to 
intimidate  the  Prussian  authorities  by  an  act 
of  signal  severity,  and  was  not  sorry  that  this 
severity  should  fall  upon  one  of  the  principal 
members  of  the  nobility,  accused  of  having 
been  a  warm  partisan  of  war,  but  accused 
falsely,  for  the  Prince  de  Hatzfeld  was  of  the 
number  of  the  Prussian  nobles  who  had  mode- 
ration because  they  had  understanding.  Na- 
poleon sent  for  Prince  Berthier,  and  ordered 
Marshal  Davout,  on  whose  severity  he  could 
reckon,  to  form  a  military  commission,  which 
should  apply  to  the  conduct  of  the  Prince  de 
Hatzfeld  the  laws  of  war  against  espvmnage. 
Prince  Berthier,  on  learning  the  resolution 
adopted  by  Napoleon,  endeavoured  in  vain  to 
dissuade  him  from  it.  Generals  Rapp,  Caulain- 
court,  Savary,  not  presuming  to  hazard  remon- 
strances which  seemed  misplaced  from  any 
other  lips  than  those  of  the  major-general, 
were  alarmed.  Not  knowing  to  what  means 
to  resort,  they  hid  the  prince  in  the  very 
palace,  upon  pretext  of  having  him  arrested, 
and  then  informed  the  Princess  de  Hatzfeld, 
an  interesting  person,  and  who  was  then  preg- 
nant, of  the  danger  which  threatened  her  hus- 
band. She  hastened  to  the  palace.  It  was 
high  time ;  for  the  commission,  having  assem- 
bled, was  applying  for  the  evidence.  Napo- 
leon, returning  from  a  ride  in  Berlin,  had  just 
alighted  from  his  horse,  the  guard  beating  the 
march ;  and,  as  he  crossed  the  threshold  of  the 
palace,  the  Princess  de  Hatzfeld,  conducted  by 
Duroc,  appeared  all  in  tears  before  him.  Thus 
taken  by  surprise,  he  could  not  refuse  to  re- 
ceive her :  he  granted  her  an  audience  in  his 
cabinet.  She  was  seized  with  terror.  Napo- 
leon, touched  by  her  distress,  desired  her  to 
approach,  and  handed  her  the  intercepted 
letter  to  read.  «  Well,  madam,"  said  he,  "  do 
you  recognise  the  handwriting  of  your  hus- 
band 1"  The  princess,  trembling,  knew  not 
what  to  reply.  Presently,  however,  taking 
care  to  cheer  her,  Napoleon  added, "  Throw 
that  paper  in  to  the  fire,  and  the  military  com- 


'  mission  will  have  no  evidence  to  convict 
upon." 

This  act  of  clemency,  which  Napoleon  could 
not  refuse  after  he  had  seen  the  Princess  de 
Hatzfeld,  was,  nevertheless,  a  sacrifice  for 
him,  because  it  was  part  of  his  design  to  inti- 
midate the  German  nobility,  particularly  the 
magistrates  of  the  towns,  who  revealed  to  the 
enemy  the  secrets  of  his  operations.  He 
learned  subsequently  to  know  the  Prince  de 
Hatzfeld,  appreciated  his  character  and  his 
understanding,  and  was  glad  that  he  had  not 
given  him  up  to  military  justice.  Happy  the 
governments  that  have  discreet  friends,  who 
contrive  to  delay  their  severities !  It  is  not 

i  necessary  that  this  delay  should  be  long,  be- 
fore they  have  ceased  to  purpose  acts  upon 
which,  at  first,  they  were  most  resolutely  bent. 
Napoleon,  in  this  interval,  had  incessantly 
directed  the  movements  of  his  lieutenants 
against  the  wrecks  of  the  Prussian  army. 
Placed  at  Berlin  with  his  principal  forces,  he 
cut  off  the  Prussians  from  the  direct  route 
from  the  Elbe  to  the  Oder,  and  left  them  no 
roads  for  reaching  the  latter  river,  but  such  as 
were  long,  almost  impassable,  and  easy  to  in- 
tercept. Berlin,  in  fact,  is  situated  between 
the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  at  an  equal  distance 
from  the  two  rivers.  The  plains  of  sand  which 
we  have  already  described,  as  they  approach 
the  Baltic  towards  Mecklenburg,  rise  into  sand- 
hills, and  present  a  series  of  lakes  of  all  di- 
mensions, parallel  to  the  sea.  These  lakes, 
being  prevented  by  the  chain  of  sand-hills 
from  discharging  themselves  directly  into  the 
sea,  find  a  channel  towards  the  interior  of  the 
country,  in  an  inconsiderable  and  rather  slug- 
gish stream,  the  Havel,  which  runs  towards 
Berlin,  where  it  falls  in  with  the  Spree,  com- 
ing from  an  opposite  direction,  that  is  to  say, 

|  from  Lusatia,  a  province  which  separates  Sax- 
ony from  Silesia.  The  Havel  and  Spree,  united 
near  Berlin,  expand  about  Spandau  and  Pots- 
dam, and  there  form  new  lakes,  which  the 
hand  of  the  great  Frederick  took  pains  to  em- 
bellish, and,  turning  to  the  left,  proceed  to  the 

!  Elbe.  They  thus  describe  a  transverse  line, 
which,  on  one  side,  unites  Berlin  to  the  Elbe, 
and,  continued  by  the  Finow  canal  on  the  other, 
joins  that  capital  to  the  Oder.  It  was  through 

,  this  tract,  intersected  by  natural  or  artificial 
streams,  covered  with  lakes,  forests,  and  sand, 

1  that  the  vagrant  relics  of  the  Prussian  army 
had  to  take  their  flight. 

Napoleon,  established  since  the  25th  of  Oc- 
tober at  Potsdam  and  Berlin,  had  it  in  his 
power  to  anticipate  them  in  all  directions. 
He  kept  Lannes'  corps  at  Spandau,  the  corps 
of  Augereau  and  Davout  in  Berlin  itself,  lastly, 
Bernadotte's  corps  beyond  Berlin — all  of  them 
ready  to  march  on  the  first  indication  they 
should  have  of  the  direction  taken  by  the  ene- 

1  my.  Napoleon  had  spread  the  cavalry  around 
Berlin  and  Potsdam,  and  upon  the  banks  of 
the  Havel  and  the  Elbe,  to  pick  up  intelligence. 
Spandau  had  already  surrendered.  That 
fortress,  situated  very  near  Berlin,  amidst  the 
waters  of  the  Spree  and  the  Havel,  strong  by 
its  situation  and  its  works,  was  capable  of 

|  making  a  long  resistance.  But  such  had  been 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


203 


the  presumption  and  the  carelessness  of  the 
Prussian  government,  that  it  had  not  even 
armed  the  place,  though  the  magazines  which 
it  contained  were  provided  with  a  considerable 
materiel.  On  the  25th,  the  day  of  Marshal  Da- 
vout's  entry  into  Berlin,  Lannes  had  appeared 
under  the  walls  of  Spandau,  and  threatened 
the  governor  with  the  severest  treatment  if  he 
refused  to  surrender.  The  guns  were  not  upon 
the  walls  ;  the  garrison,  participating  in  the 
terror  which  had  seized  all  hearts,  desired  to 
capitulate.  The  governor  was  an  old  soldier, 
whom  age  had  bereft  of  all  energy.  Lannes 
saw  him,  frightened  him  by  the  account  of  the 
disasters^  of  the  Prussian  army,  and  wrung 
from  him  a  capitulation,  by  virtue  of  which 
the  place  was  immediately  delivered  up  to  the 
French,  and  the  garrison  declared  prisoners 
of  war.  It  would  require  at  once  the  impro- 
ridence  of  the  government,  which  hadneglect- 
-d  to  arm  the  fortress,  and  the  demoralization 
tvhich  everywhere  prevailed,  to  account  for  so 
strange  a  capitulation. 

The  Emperor  hastened  in  person  to  Span- 
dau, and  resolved  to  make  it  his  third  depot  in 
Germany.  This  new  refuge  offered  the  more 
advantages,  inasmuch  as  it  was  situated  with- 
in three  or  four  leagues  of  Berlin,  surrounded 
by  water,  perfectly  fortified,  and  contained  an 
immense  quantity  of  corn.  Napoleon  ordered 
it  to  be  armed  forthwith,  ovens  built  there, 
ammunition  amassed,  hospitals  organized — in 
short,  the  same  establishments  created  as  at 
Wittenberg  and  Erfurt.  He  sent  thither  im- 
mediately all  the  artillery,  muskets,  and  muni- 
tions of  war  taken  at  Berlin.  In  that  capital 
had  been  found  300  pieces  of  cannon,  100,000 
muskets,  and  a  great  quantity  of  powder  and 
projectiles.  This  vast  materiel,  added  to  con- 
siderable stores  of  grain,  was  a  sort  of  gua- 
rantee against  any  attempt  of  the  people  of 
Berlin,  now  very  quiet  and  docile,  but  whose 
submission  any  reverse  which  we  might  sus- 
tain would  be  liable  to  change  into  revolt. 

While  the  Emperor  was  occupied  with  these 
provident  measures,  the  uninterrupted  expedi- 
tions of  the  light  cavalry  had  revealed  the 
march  of  the  Prussian  army.  The  eleven 
days  which  had  elapsed  since  the  battle  of 
Jena,  those  eleven  days  employed  by  the 
French  in  gaining  the  Elbe,  in  crossing  it,  in 
occupying  Berlin,  had  been  employed  by  the 
Prussians  also  in  gaining  the  Elbe,  in  there 
collecting  their  scattered  wrecks,  in  then  pro- 
ceeding towards  Mecklenburg,  in  order  to  reach 
the  line  of  the  Oder  by  means  of  a  circuit  to 
the  north.  This  movement  towards  Mecklen- 
burg being  unmasked,  Napoleon  despatched 
Murat,  by  way  of  Oranienburg  and  Zehdenick, 
to  follow  the  banks  of  the  Havel  and  the  Finow 
canal.  It  was  along  these  military  lines,  and 
protected  by  Ihem,  that  the  Prince  of  Hohen- 
lohe would  march.  Napoleon  ordered  them 
to  proceed  along  these  lines  in  such  a  manner 
as  to  keep  constantly  between  the  enemy  and 
the  Oder,  and  then,  when  they  had  turned  the 
Prussians,  to  endeavour  to  envelope  them,  and 
take  them  to  the  last  man.  Marshal  Lannes 
had  set  out  with  Murat,  and  with  the  recom- 
mendation to  march  as  rapidly  as  the  cavalry. 
Marshal  Bernadotte  had  orders  to  follow 


Lannes.  Marshal  Davout,  after  the  three  or 
four  days'  rest  which  he  needed,  was  to  pro- 
ceed to  Frankfurt  on  the  Oder;  Marshal  Au- 
gereau  and  the  guard  were  to  remain  at  Ber 
lin.  Marshals  Ney  and  Soult  had  been  sent, 
as  we  have  said,  to  invest  Magdeburg. 

The  unfortunate  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  had 
actually  taken  the  resolution  that  was  attri- 
buted to  him.  Pursued  most  perseveringly  by 
the  French,  he  had  arrived  at  Magdeburg, 
hoping  to  find  there  rest,  provisions,  materiel, 
and,  above  all,  the  time  necessary  for  the  re- 
organization of  his  army.  Vain  hope  !  The 
want  of  precautions  against  a  retreat  so  easy 
to  be  foreseen  prevailed  everywhere.  At 
Magdeburg  there  were  no  supplies  but  what 
were  indispensable  for  the  garrison.  The  old 
governor,  M.  de  Kleist,  having  provided  for 
the  first  wants  of  the  fugitives,  and  given  them 
a  small  quantity  of  bread,  refused  to  feed  them 
any  longer,  fearful  of  diminishing  his  own  re- 
sources, if  he  should  be  besieged.  The  inte- 
rior of  Magdeburg  was  so  encumbered  with 
baggage,  that  the  army  could  not  be  lodged 
there :  the  cavalry  was  established,  as  a  matter 
of  necessity,  on  the  glacis ;  the  infantry  in  the 
covered  ways.  Very  soon  the  Prussian  troops, 
continually  harassed  by  the  French  cavalry, 
which  came  and  carried  off  whole  detachments 
under  the  cannon  of  the  place,  were  obliged  to 
pass  to  the  other  side  of  the  Elbe.  At  length 
M.  de  Kleist,  terrified  at  the  disorder  prevailing 
within  and  without  Magdeburg,  earnestly  re- 
quested the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  to  continue 
his  retreat  towards  the  Oder,  and  to  leave  him 
the  liberty  which  he  so  much  needed  to  put 
himself  into  a  slate  of  defence.  The  Prince 
of  Hohenlohe  had,  therefore,  but  two  days  to 
reorganize  an  army  composed  of  nothing  but 
wrecks,  and  in  which  several  battalions  had 
to  be  united  in  order  to  form  one.  Moreover, 
Marshal  Kalkreuth  having  been  sent  for  by  the 
king,  who  was  in  East  Prussia,  the  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe  was  ordered  to  pick  up  the  two  di- 
visions of  reserve,  and  obliged  to  go  to  the 
Lower  Elbe,  far  below  Magdeburg,  to  join 
them. 

Amidst  these  embarrassments,  the  Prince 
of  Hohenlohe  commenced  his  march  in  three 
columns.  On  his  right,  General  Schimmel- 
pfennig,  with  a  detachment  of  cavalry  and  in- 
fantry, was  to  cover  the  army  towards  Pots- 
dam, Spandau,  and  Berlin,  to  keep  at  first 
along  the  Havel,  then,  when  he  had  ascended 
high  enough  to  turn  Berlin,  to  proceed  along 
the  Finow  canal,  and  thus  flank  the  retreat  as 
far  as  Prenzlau  and  Stettin,  for,  owing  to  the 
position  of  the  French,  it  was  only  towards 
the  mouth  of  the  Oder  that  the  Prussians  could 
reach  that  river.  The  bulk  of  the  infantry, 
marching  at  the  centre,  at  an  equal  distance 
from  the  corps  of  Schimmelpfennig  and  the 
Elbe,  was  to  proceed  through  Genthin,  Rathe- 
nau,  Gransee,  and  Prenzlau.  The  cavalry, 
which  was  already  on  the  banks  of  the  Elbe, 
where  it  profited  by  the  abundance  of  forage, 
was  to  follow  the  banks  of  that  river  by  Jeri- 
chow  and  Havelberg,  then  leave  them  to  pro- 
ceed northward,  and,  passing  through  Witt- 
stock,  Mirow,  Strelitz,  Prenzlau,  arrive  a'  tb* 
common  point,  Stettin. 


204 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


The  corps  of  the  Duke  of  Weimar  and  the 
grand  park,  under  the  conduct  of  General  Blu- 
cher,  had  fortunately  turned  the  Harz  by  Hesse 
and  Hanover,  without  being  annoyed  by  the 
French,  who  were  hastening  to  reach  the 
Elbe.  The  Duke  of  Weimar,  by  means  of  a 
very  clever  manoeuvre,  had  continued  to  de- 
ceive Marshal  Soult.  Feigning  at  first  to  at- 
tack the  line  of  investment  around  Magde- 
burg, and  then  slipping  oft'  all  at  once,  he  had 
suddenly  crossed  the  Elbe  at  Tangermunde, 
and  thus  gained  the  right  bank.  He  had  with 
him  twelve  or  fourteen  thousand  men.  Gene- 
ral Blucher  had  passed  the  river  below.  The 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe  assigned  to  the  Duke 
of  Weimar  the  concerted  rendezvous  of  Stettin, 
which  he  was  to  reach  by  crossing  Mecklen- 
burg, and  gave  General  Blucher  the  command 
of  the  troops  beaten  before  Halle,  troops  which 
had  passed  out  of  the  hands  of  the  Duke  of 
Wirtemberg  into,  those  of  General  Natzrner. 
General  Blucher  was  directed  to  form  with 
these  troops  the  rear-guard  of  the  Prussian 
army. 

If  these  forces  had  contrived  to  escape  the 
French  and  to  reach  Stettin,  they  might,  after 
being  reorganized  and  joined  by  the  contingent 
of  East  Prussia,  have  composed  behind  the 
Oder  an  army  of  some  value,  and  lent  a  useful 
hand  to  the  Russians.  The  Prince  of  Hohen- 
lohe had  kept  together  25,000  men  at  least. 
Natzmer's  corps,  with  the  other  wrecks  of 
General  Blucher's,  numbered  nine  or  ten  thou- 
sand. The  troops  of  the  Duke  of  Weimar 
amounted  to  thirteen  or  fourteen  thousand. 
There  was  consequently  a  total  force  of  about 
50,000  men,  which,  joined  to  about  20,000,  left 
in  East  Prussia,  could  still  have  presented 
70,000  fighting  men,  and,  combined  with  the 
Russians,  have  played  an  important  part. 
There  were  left  22,000  men  to  defend  Magde- 
burg. The  Saxons,  hastening  to  avail  them- 
selves of  the  clemency  of  Napoleon  towards 
them,  had  returned  to  their  homes. 

The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  had  to  effect  his 
retreat  through  a  poor  country,  difficult  to 
traverse,  and  amidst  numerous  squadrons  of 
French  cavalry.  The  latter,  which  was  at  first 
cautious  in  presence  of  the  Prussian  cavalry, 
the  excellence  of  which  was  highly  extolled  to 
it,  now,  intoxicated  with  its  successes,  had  be- 
come so  daring  that  mere  chasseurs  were  no 
longer  afraid  to  encounter  cuirassiers. 

The  prince  set  out  then  on  the  22d  of  Octo- 
ber, by  the  roads  specified,  Shimmelpfennig's 
corps  of  flankers  proceeding  for  Plauen,  the 
infantry  for  Genchin,  the  cavalry  for  Jerichow. 
They  marched  slowly,  on  account  of  the  sands, 
the  exhausted  state  of  men  and  horses,  and 
their  being  unused  to  fatigue.  Seven  or  eight 
leagues  a  day  were  as  much  as  these  troops 
could  perform,  while  the  French  infantry,  in 
case  of  need,  would  clear  fifteen.  Moreover,  a 
very  great  indiscipline  had  crept  into  the  corps. 
Disaster,  which  sours  men's  minds,  had  dimi- 
nished the  respect  due  to  officers.  The  cavalry, 
in  particular,  marched  in  a  confused  manner, 
without  obeying  any  orders.  The  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe  was  obliged  to  halt  the  army,  and 
to  address  it  in  very  sharp  terms  to  bring  it 
back  to  a  sense  of  its  duty.  He  even  caused 


[Oct.  1806. 


a  horse-soldier,  who  had  wounded  an  officer, 
to  be  shot.  For  the  rest,  it  must  be  confessed 
that  such  is  the  usual  effect  of  great  reverses, 
and  sometimes,  too,  of  great  successes,  lor  vic- 
tory has  its  disorder  as  well  as  defeat.  The 
French,  eager  after  booty,  ran,  like  the  Prus- 
sians, in  all  directions,  without  heeding  the 
commands  of  their  officers  ;  and  Marshal  Ney 
wrote  to  the  Emperor,  that,  unless  he  were 
authorized  to  make  some  examples,  the  lives 
of  the  officers  would  be  no  longer  safe.  Sin- 
gular consequences  of  the  dissolution  of  states ! 
The  precipitate  movements  caused  by  this  dis- 
solution disorganize  the  conquered  and  the 
conqueror.  We  had  arrived  at  the  perfection 
of  the  highest  department  of  war,  and  were 
already  approaching  the  limit  where  it  be- 
comes an  immense  confusion. 

On  the  23d  the  Prussians  were,  the  infantry 
at  Rathenau,  the  cavalry  at  Havelberg.  Bui 
the  pains  which  they  took  to  break  down  the 
bridges  impeded  the  march  of  the  corps  on  the 
right,  that  of  Schimmelpfennig,  and  they  were 
obliged  to  approach  the  Elbe  by  a  wheel  to  the 
left,  in  order  to  avoid  the  numerous  streams 
which  are  met  with  between  the  Havel  and 
the  Elbe.  They  turned  off  as  far  as  Rhino w. 
On  the  24th,  they  were,  the  cavalry  at  Kiritz, 
the  infantry  at  Neustadt,  the  corps  of  Schim- 
melpfennig at  Fehrbellin.  Natzmer's  corps, 
transferred  here  to  General  Blucher,  took  near 
Rhinow  the  place  of  the  principal  corps,  the 
rear-guard  of  which  it  formed. 

Having  reached  this  point,  the  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe  had  to  deliberate  on  the  further 
course  to  be  pursued.  They  had  ascended  to 
the  north  far  beyond  Berlin,  Spandau,  and 
Potsdam.  At  every  step  the  army  became 
more  and  more  disorganized.  The  colonel  of 
the  staff,  De  Massenbach,  advised  that  the 
troops  should  be  allowed  a  day  of  rest,  in  order 
to  reorganize  them,  and  to  be  at  least  in  a  con- 
dition for  fighting,  if  they  should  chance  to 
meet  with  the  French.  The  Prince  of  Hohen- 
lohe replied,  very  justly,  that  neither  one,  two, 
nor  even  three  days  would  be  sufficient  to  re- 
organize the  army,  and  it  might  give  the 
French  time  to  cut  it  off  from  Stettin  and  the 
Oder.  As  usual, a  middle  course  was  adopted; 
a  common  rendezvous  was  fixed  at  Gransee, 
where  a  general  review  was  to  be  held,  and 
addresses  delivered  to  the  troops  to  recall  them 
to  their  duty.  They  then  continued  their 
march  without  stopping.  The  rendezvous  at 
Gransee  was  fixed  for  the  26th. 

But,  the  French  being  already  apprized, 
Murat's  cavalry  hurried  to  Fehrbellin  on  the 
one  side,  to  Zehdenick  on  the  other.  Lannes, 
having  entered  Spandau  on  the  25th,  marched 
in  the  evening  of  the  26th  with  his  infantry  to 
support  Murat.  Marshal  Soult  was  pursuing 
the  Duke  of  Weimar  while  Marshal  Ney  in- 
vested Magdeburg.  Thus  three  French  corps 
d'.armee,  besides  Murat's  cavalry,  with  the  ex- 
ception, it  is  true,  of  the  cuirassiers,  kept  in 
Berlin,  were  at  this  moment  pursuing  the 
Prussians.  On  the  26th,  the  infantry  of  the 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe  was  at  Gransee,  at  the 
appointed  rendezvous,  listening  to  his  exhorta- 
tions, imbibing  hopes  of  being  soon  at  Stettin, 
and  resting  behind  the  Oder.  But,  at  that  mo- 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


205 


ment,  Mufat's  dragoons  surprised  Schimmel- 
pfennig's  corps  at  Zehdenick,  overturned  his 
cavalry,  killed  300,  and  took  seven  or  eight 
hundred  horse,  and  obliged  the  infantry  of 
that  corps  of  flankers  to  disperse  in  the 
woods. 

This  intelligence,  brought  by  peasants  and 
fugitives  to  Gransee,  induced  the  Prince  of 
Hohenlohe  to  decamp  immediately,  and  to  turn 
off  once  more  to  the  left  towards  Furstenberg, 
instead  of  marching  to  Templin,  which  was 
the  direct  route  for  Stettin.  He  was  thus  in 
hopes  of  rallying  his  cavalry  to  him,  and  of 
getting  at  the  same  time  further  from  the 
French.  But,  while  he  was  making  this  cir- 
cuit, Murat  proceeded  by  the  shortest  road  to 
Templin,  and  Lannes,  halting  neither  day  nor 
night,  kept  constantly  in  sight  of  Murat's 
squadrons.  The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  slept  at 
Furstenberg,  and  made  his  infantry  pass  the 
night  there,  while  Lannes  spent  that  same 
night  in  marching.  French  and  Prussians 
continued  to  pursue  a  northward  course  to- 
wards Templin  and  Prenzlau,  the  common 
point  of  the  Stettin  road,  moving  at  the  dis- 
tance of  a  few  leagues  from  each  other,  and 
separated  merely  by  a  curtain  of  woods  and 
lakes.  They  were  still  twelve  leagues  (seven 
German  miles)  from  Prenzlau.  On  the  morn- 
ing of  the  27th,  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  start- 
ed for  Boitzenburg,  sending  word  to  the  ca- 
valry to  join  him,  and  to  the  rear-guard, 
commanded  by  General  Blucher,  to  quicken 
its  pace. 

He  marched  all  day,  having  no  other  re- 
freshment for  his  troops  than  what  was  fur- 
nished them  by  the  patriotism  of  the  villagers, 
who  placed  upon  the  road  piles  of  bread  and 
caldrons  full  of  potatoes.  Towards  evening 
they  approached  Boitzenburg,  and  the  owner 
of  that  place,  M.  d'Arnim,  came  to  intimate 
that  he  had  had  bivouacs  prepared  around  his 
mansion,  and  abundantly  provided  with  vic- 
tuals and  drink.  This  was  welcome  news  to 
men  dying  from  fatigue  and  hunger.  But,  on 
approaching  Boitzenburg,  reports  of  fire-arms 
destroyed  that  hope  of  rest  and  food.  Murat's 
light-horse,  having  already  reached  Boitzen- 
burg, were  regaling  on  the  provisions  destined 
for  the  Prussians.  Too  few,  however,  to  make 
head  against  the  latter,  they  left  Boitzenburg. 
The  unfortunate  soldiers  of  Prince  Hohenlohe 
devoured  what  was  left,  but  the  presence  of 
French  horse  warned  them  that  they  had  no 
time  to  lose.  They  started  again  that  same 
night,  making  another  circuit  to  the  left  to 
avoid  the  French,  and  to  reach  Prenzlau  be- 
fore them.  They  marched  the  whole  night, 
flattering  themselves  that  they  should  outstrip 
them.  At  daybreak,  they  began  to  discern 
Prenzlau  ;  but,  on  the  right,  across  the  woods 
and  lakes  which  lined  the  route,  they  had 
caught  a  glimpse  of  horsemen  riding  at  a  ra- 
pid rate.  The  fog  prevented  them  from  dis- 
tinguishing the  colour  of  their  uniform.  Were 
they  French  7  were  they  Prussians  1  Such 
were  the  questions  which  they  asked  each 
other.  Some  imagined  that  they  perceived  the 
white  plume  of  a  Prussian  regiment;  others, 
on  the  contrary,  fancied  that  they  could  distin- 
guish the  helmet  of  Murat's  dragoons.  At 


length,  amidst  these  conjectures  of  fear  and 
hope,  they  arrived  in  sight  of  Prenzlau,  the 
French  as  they  were  assured,  not  having  yet 
been  seen.  They  pushed  on  into  a  suburb,  a 
quarter  of  a  league  in  length.  Half  of  the 
Prussian  army  had  already  entered,  then  all 
at  once,  the  cry,  "  To  arms  !"  was  raised. 
The  French  dragoons  coming  up  at  the  mo- 
ment when  part  of  the  Prussian  army  was  in 
Prenzlau,  attacked  the  tail  of  it,  drove  it  into 
the  town  itself,  charged  it  in  all  directions, 
and  then  dashed  into  the  streets.  The  Prit- 
witz  dragoons,  pushed  by  the  French  dra- 
goons, fell  back  upon  the  Prussian  infantry 
and  overturned  it.  Horrible  was  the  fray  that 
followed,  terror  aggravating  the  tumult  and 
the  danger.  The  Prussian  army,  cut  in  seve- 
ral pieces,  fled  beyond  Prenzlau,  and  took  po- 
sition as  well  as  it  could  on  the  Stettin  road. 
It  was  soon  surrounded,  and  Murat  sent  to 
summon  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  to  surren- 
der. He  conceived  that  Murat  had  brought 
nothing  but  cavalry  with  him ;  but  the  in- 
fantry of  Lannes,  which,  after  leaving  Span- 
dau,  had  marched  day  and  night,  halting  only 
to  eat,  arrived  at  the  same  moment.  The  co- 
lonel of  the  stan",  de  Massenbach,  affirmed  that 
he  had  seen  it.  There  was  no  chance  of  es- 
caping. Murat  desired  to  speak  with  the 
Prince  of  Hohenlohe.  The  soldier  who  had 
become  prince,  and  continued  as  generous  as 
he  was  intrepid,  consoled  the  Prussian  gene- 
ral, promised  him  an  honourable  capitulation, 
the  most  honourable  that  he  could  grant  within 
the  limit  prescribed  by  the  instructions  of  Na- 
poleon. Murat  required  that  all  the  soldiers 
should  be  prisoners,  but  consented  that  the 
officers  should  remain  free  and  be  allowed  to 
carry  away  whatever  they  possessed,  on  con- 
dition, however,  of  not  serving  again  during 
the  war.  He  consented  also  that  the  soldiers 
should  be  exempted  from  the  humiliating  for- 
mality of  laying  down  their  arms  when  filing 
before  the  French.  This  was  a  deference 
which,  under  their  misfortune,  would  distin- 
guish them  from  the  troops  of  the  Austrian 
Mack.  The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe,  seeing  that 
he  could  not  obtain  better  terms,  feeling  eveu 
that  Murat  could  not  grant  more,  returned  to 
his  officers,  made  them  form  a  circle  around 
him,  and,  his  eyes  filled  with  tears,  explained 
to  them  the  state  of  things.  He  was  one  of 
those  who  had  declaimed  most  vehemently 
against  every  kind  of  capitulation.  But  he 
was  aware  that  there  was  no  other  resource, 
not  even  that  of  an  honourable  combat,  for 
the  ammunition  was  exhausted,  and  the  spirits 
of  the  troops  had  arrived  at  the  lowest  degree 
of  dejection.  As  no  officer  proposed  an  expe- 
dient, the  circle  separated,  uttering  maledic- 
tions, and  breaking  their  arms. 

The  capitulation  was,  therefore,  signed  by 
the  prince,  and,  in  the  course  of  the  same  tfay, 
the  28th  of  October,  a  year  after  the  catastro- 
phe of  General  Mack,  14,000  infantry  ana 
2000  cavalry  surrendered  themselves  prisrn- 
ers  of  war.  The  conquerors  were  intoxicated 
with  joy,  and  what  joy  was  ever  bettei  found- 
ed !  Such  boldness  in  maneuvering,  such  pa- 
tience in  enduring  privations,  equal  a'  least 
to  those  which  the  conquered  had  er.dured 
S 


200 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Oct.  1806. 


such  ardour  in  making  still  more  rapid 
marches  than  theirs,  well  deserved  such  a 
prize.  Disorders  were  unfortunately  commit- 
ted at  Prenzlau,  caused  by  the  eagerness  of 
the  soldiers  to  secure  the  booty,  which  they 
considered  as  the  legitimate  fruit  of  victory. 
But  the  French  officers  displayed  the  greatest 
firmness  in  protecting  the  Prussian  officers. 
German  writers  themselves  have  done  them 
this  justice.  In  1815,  the  departments  of  the 
north  of  France  had  not  the  same  justice  to 
render  to  the  Prussians. 

But  the  French  had  more  trophies  to  collect. 
A  number  of  Prussian  squadrons  and  batta- 
lions, which  had  not  entered  Prenzlau,  had 
marched  further  north  towards  Passewalck. 
General  Milhaud's  light  cavalry  overtook  them. 
Six  regiments  of  cavalry,  several  battalions  of 
infantry,  a  park  of  horse  artillery,  laid  down 
their  arms.  Lasalle,  with  the  hussars  and 
chasseurs,  hastened  to  Stettin,  followed  by  the 
infantry  of  Lannes.  Wonderful  to  relate,  an 
officer  of  light  cavalry  dared  to  summon  Stet- 
tin, a  fortress  having  a  numerous  garrison  and 
an  immense  artillery.  General  Lasalle  had 
an  interview  with  the  governor,  and  expatiated 
with  such  conviction  on  the  complete  annihi- 
lation of  the  Prussian  army,  that  the  governor 
surrendered  the  place  with  all  that  it  contained, 
and  a  garrison  of  6000  men  prisoners  of  war. 
Lannes  entered  the  place  on  the  following  day. 
Nothing  assuredly  could  better  serve  to  con- 
vey an  idea  of  the  demoralization  of  the  Prus- 
sians, and  of  the  terror  excited  by  the  French, 
than  a  fact  so  strange  and  so  new  in  the  annals 
of  war. 

All  now  left  to  be  taken  of  the  Prussian 
army  were  General  Blucher  and  the  Duke  of 
Weimar,  with  about  20,000  men.  When  this 
last  remnant  should  be  taken,  one  might  say 
that  160,000  men  had  been  destroyed  or  made 
prisoners  in  a  fortnight,  without  one  of  them 
having  recrossed  the  Oder.  General  Blucher 
and  the  corps  of  the  Duke  of  Weimar  had 
Marshals  Soult  and  Bernadotte  in  pursuit  of 
them.  They  would  soon  be  overtaken  by  Mu- 
rat  himself,  and  would  find  themselves  cut  off 
from  the  Oder,  since  Lannes  occupied  Stettin. 
They  had,  therefore,  very  little  chance  of  es- 
caping. 

Napoleon,  on  receiving  these  tidings,  was 
extremely  delighted.  "Since  your  chasseurs," 
he  wrote  to  Murat,  "  take  fortresses,  I  may  dis- 

«  We  quote  some  of  the  letters  of  Marshal  Lannes, 
•which  show  the  spirit  of  the  French  troops  at  this 
period,  and  may  serve  to  impart  their  true  character  to 
those  prodigious  events. 

Marshal  Lannes  to  his  Majesty  the  'Emperor. 

SIRE, — I  have  received  the  letter  which  your  majesty 
has  done  me  the  honour  to  write  me:  it  is  impossible 
for  me  to  express  the  pleasure  that  it  has  given  me. 
There  is  nothing  in  the  world  that  I  desire  so  much,  as 
to  be  sure  that  your  majesty  knows  that  I  do  all  that 
lies  in  my  nower  for  your  glory. 

I  have  communicated  to  my  corps  d'armee  what  your 
maiesty  has  been  pleased  to  say  to  me  for  it.  It  would 
be  impossible  to  describe  lo  your  majesty  the  gratifica- 
tion wn.iiii  it  afforded  them.  A  single  word  from  you 
is  sufficient  to  make  the  soldiers  happy. 

Three  hussars,  having  lost  their  way  towards  Gam, 
found  themselves  in  the  midst  of  an  enemy's  squadron. 
They  ran  up  to  it,  levelling  their  pieces,  saying  that  it 
was  surrounded  by  a  regiment,  and  must  dismount  im- 
mediately. The  commander  of  this  squadron  ordered 


band  my  corps  of  engineers,  aud  melt  dowr 
my  heavy  artillery."  In  the  bulletin  he  made 
mention  of  the  cavalry  only,  and  omitted  the 
infantry  of  Lannes,  which  had  nevertheless 
contributed  to  the  capitulation  of  Prenzlau  as 
much  as  the  cavalry  itself.  This  omission 
was  owing  to  the  circumstance  that  Murat,  in 
haste  to  report  the  exploits  of  his  cavalry,  had 
not  thought  of  noticing  the  corps  of  Lannes. 
When  that  marshal  received  the  bulletin,  he 
durst  not  read  it  to  his  soldiers  for  fear  of  mor- 
tifying them.  "  My  attachment  to  your  per- 
son," he  wrote  to  Napoleon,  "  will  always  set 
me  above  every  kind  of  injustice,  but  what 
am  I  to  say  to  those  brave  soldiers,  who  march 
day  and  night,  without  rest,  without  food'! 
What  reward  can  they  hope  for,  unless  to 
have  their  deeds  proclaimed  by  the  hundred 
voices  of  Fame,  which  you  alone  have  at  your 
disposal  7"  That  admirable  emulation,  that 
ardent  jealousy  of  glory,  which,  however,  mani- 
fested themselves  here  in  a  noble  pensiveness 
alone,  was  not  one  of  the  least  remarkable 
signs  of  that  heroic  enthusiasm  which  then 
warmed  all  minds. 

Napoleon,  singularly  kind  to  Lannes,  replied : 
" Art.  you  and  your  soldiers  children?  Can  you 
suppose  me  to  be  unacquainted  with  all  that 
you  have  done  to  second  the  cavalry  1  There 
is  glory  for  all.  Auother  time  it  will  be  your 
turn  to  fill  with  your  name  the  bulletins  of  the 
grand  army." 

Lannes,  transported,  assembled  his  infantry 
in  one  of  the  public  places  of  Stettin,  and  or- 
dered Napoleon's  letter  to  be  read  in  the  ranks. 
Overjoyed  as  himself,  his  soldiers  greeted  that 
letter  with  repeated  shouts  of  "  Vive  I'Empereur 
d' Occident.'"  (Long  live  the  Emperor  of  the 
west !)  This  singular  appellation,  which  cor- 
responded so  perfectly  with  the  secret  ambition 
of  Napoleon,  proceeded  therefore  from  the  en- 
thusiasm of  the  army,  and  it  proved  that  in 
the  estimation  of  all  he  already  filled  the  west 
with  his  power  and  his  glory. 

Lannes,  in  the  effusion,  not  of  his  flattery, 
but  of  his  joy — for,  pleased  himself,  he  wished 
his  master  to  be  pleased  loo — Lannes  wrote, 
"  Sire,  your  soldiers  shout '  Vive  VEmpereur  <? Oc- 
cident.1' are  we  henceforth  to  address  our  letters 
to  you  by  that  title  7"i 

Napoleon  made  no  reply,  and  that  title  which 
gushed,  as  it  were,  from  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
soldiers,  was  not  assumed.  As  Napoleon  con- 
it  1o  dismount,  and  it  surrendered  its  arms  to  those 
three  hussars,  who  brought  the  men  thither  prisoners 
of  war. 

J  should  be  glad  to  learn  your  majesty's  intentions, 
that  I  may  know  whether  I  ought  to  have  sent  Suchet's 
division  to  Stargard,  and  the  cavalry  on  further.  By 
these  means,  we  should  have  spared  the  provisions  of 
the  fortress  of  Stettin,  which,  however,  I  have  not  yet 
touched.  The  soldiers  are  cantoned  in  the  environs, 
and  live  with  the  inhabitants. 

I  have  been  over  the  fortress  with  General  Chasse- 
loup  :  he  thinks  it  bad  ;  and  my  opinion  is,  that  a  great 
deal  of  money  must  be  spent  to  put  it  into  a  stale  of  de- 
fence. AVe  have  been  to  Damm :  it  is  a  superb  natural 
position;  you  cannot  get  to  it  but  by  a  causeway  of  a 
league  and  a  half,  on  which  there  are  at  least  forty 
bridges.  I  think  that,  if  your  majesty  purposes  to  ad- 
vance further,  you  will  render  that  position  impreg- 
nable. 

1  have  just  been  assured  that  the  king  has  shown  great 
displeasure  with  those  gentlemen  about  him  who  ad- 
vised him  to  the  war ;  that  he  was  never  seen  in  such 
u  passion  j  that  he  told  them  that- they  w<  re  scoundrels, 


Oct.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


207 


ceived,  it  "was  only  deferred.  Of  all  the  gran- 
deurs that  he  ever  dreamt  of,  this  is  the  only 
one  that  was  not  realized  even  for  a  moment 
If,  however,  he  had  not  the  title,  he  had  the 
vast  dominion  of  the  Emperor  of  the  West. 
But  human  pride  is  as  fond  of  the  title  of 
power  as  of  power  itself. 

The  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  being  taken,  there 
was  nothing  left  to  take  but  General  Blucher 
with  the  rear-guard  and  the  corps  of  the  Duke 
of  Weimar.  The  latter  had  come  under  the 
command  of  General  de  Vinning,  since  the 
Duke  of  Weimar,  accepting  the  treatment 
granted  by  Napoleon  to  the  whole  house  of 
Saxony,  had  left  the  army.  There  were  still 
22,000  men  to  take  prisoners,  after  which 
there  would  not  exist  a  single  detachment  of 
Prussian  troops  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Oder. 
Napoleon  ordered  them  to  be  pursued  without 
intermission,  that  they  might  be  picked  up  to 
the  last  man. 

Lannes  established  himself  at  Stettin,  with 
the  intention  of  occupying  that  important 
place,  and  affording  his  infantry  a  rest  which 
it  greatly  needed.  Murat  and  Marshals  Ber- 
nadotte  and  Soult  were  sufficient  to  complete 
the  destruction  of  22,000  Prussians,  worn  out 
with  fatigue.  It  was  enough  to  march  in  order 
to  take  them,  unless,  indeed,  they  had  the  luck 
to  reach  the  sea,  and  to  find  sufficient  shipping 
to  carry  them  to  East  Prussia.  Murat,  there- 
fore, directed  his  course,  in  great  haste,  along 
the  coast,  to  prevent  their  approach  to  it.  He 
pushed  as  far  as  Stralsund,  while  Marshal 
Bernadotte,  setting  out  from  the  environs  of 
Berlin,  and  Marshal  Soult  from  the  banks  of 
the  Elbe,  proceeded  northward,  to  drive  the 
enemy  into  the  net  of  the  French  cavalry. 

General  Blucher  had  assumed  the  command 
of  the  two  Prussian  corps  at  Waren  near  the 
lake  of  Muritz.  To  retreat  to  East  Prussia 
across  the  Oder  was  impossible,  since  that 
river  was  guarded  in  every  part  of  its  course  by 
the  French  army.  The  access  to  the  coast  and 
to  Stralsund  was  already  intercepted  by  Murat's 
horse.  There  was  no  other  resource  but  to 
turn  about  and  go  back  to  the  Elbe.  General 

that  they  had  made  him  lose  his  crown,  that  he  had  no 
hope  lett  but  to  go  and  see  the  great  Napoleon,  and  that 
he  reckoned  upon  his  generosity. 

I  am,  with  the  most  profound  respect,  &c., 
LANNES. 

Passewalck,  November  1,  1800. 

SraE. — I  had  the  honour  to  announce  yesterday  to 
your  majesty  30  pieces  of  cannon,  60  caissons,  as  many 
carts  laden  with  ammunition,  drawn  by  eight  or  ten 
horses  each  vehicle,  and  1500  light-artillery  men.  In- 
deed, sire,  I  never  saw  finer  men.  It  is  a  superb  park. 
I  shall  send  it  off  this  morning,  for  Spandau.  Almost 
all  the  men  are  mounted,  and  march  in  the  greatest 
order.  Your  majesty  could,  if  you  pleased,  have  them 
taken  to  Italy.  I  am  certain  that  if  a  few  officers  who 
could  speak  German  were  to  be  placed  with  them,  these 
men  would  serve  most  cheerfully.  I  wish  your  majesty 
were  to  see  this  convoy  ;  that  would  decide  you  to  send 
them  to  the  kingdom  of  Italy. 

The  Grand-duke  of  Berg  writes  to  me  that  he  calcu- 
lates upon  coining  up  with  the  enemy,  that  is,  the  grand 
corps  of  the  Duke  of  Weimar  and  Blucher,  with  the 
I'rince  of  1'onte  Corvo,  in  the  course  of  to-morrow. 
He  has  already  taken  some  prisoners  from  the  tail  of 
the  column.  In  consequence  of  this  information,  I  am 
recalling  all  the  light  cavalry,  which  I  had  sent  off  for 
Boitzenburg,  and  am  going  to  assemble  my  whole  corps 
f  armtt  at  Stettin. 

There  have  been  found  in  this  place  more  than  200 
pieces  of  cannon  on  their  carriages,  and  many  spare 


Blucher  formed  this  design,  hopaig  to  throw 
himself  into  Magdeburg,  to  increase  the  force 
there  to  such  a  degree  as  to  convert  the  garri- 
son into  a  real  corps  d'armde,  and,  supported  by 
that  great  fortress,  to  make  a  brilliant  resist- 
ance. He  directed  his  course,  therefore, 
towards  the  Elbe,  with  a  view  to  attempt  to 
pass  it  in  the  environs  of  Lauenburg. 

His  illusions  were  of  short  duration.  Pa- 
troles  of  the  enemy  informed  him  that  he  was 
surrounded  on  all  sides ;  that,  on  his  right, 
Murat  was  already  advancing  along  the  coast; 
that,  on  his  left,  Marshals  Bernadotte  and 
Soult  barred  the  approach  to  Magdeburg.  Not 
knowing  what  plan  to  pursue,  he  marched  for 
some  days  straight  forward  towards  the  Lower 
Elbe,  as  a  French  corps  returning  to  France, 
through  Mecklenburg  and  Hanover,  might 
have  done.  His  ranks  grew  thinner  every 
moment,  because  his  soldiers  fled  into  the 
woods,  or  chose  rather  to  surrender  than 
longer  to  endure  hardships  which  had  become 
intolerable.  He  also  lost  a  considerable  num- 
ber in  rear-guard  actions,  which,  owing  to  the 
difficult  nature  of  the  country,  did  not  always 
turn  out  complete  defeats,  but  which  invaria- 
bly ended  with  the  relinquishment  of  the  dis- 
puted ground,  and  in  the  sacrifice  of  many 
men  taken  or  hors  de  combat. 

In  this  manner  he  marched  from  the  30th 
of  October  to  the  5th  of  November.  Not 
knowing  which  way  to  direct  his  course,  he 
conceived  a  violent  act,  which,  however,  ne- 
!  cessity  might  justify.  In  his  road  lay  the  city 
of  Liibeck,  one  of  the  last  free  cities  preserved 
by  the  Germanic  constitution.  Neutral  by 
right,  it  ought  to  have  been  safe  from  all  hos- 
tility. General  Blucher  resolved  to  throw  him- 
self into  it  by  main  force,  to  possess  himself 
of  the  great  resources  which  it  contained  in 
provisions  as  well  as  money,  and,  if  he  could 
not  defend  himself  there,  to  seize  all  the  mer- 
chant vessels  he  should  find  in  its  waters,  to 
embark  his  troops,  and  to  transport  them  to 
East  Prussia. 

In  consequence,  on  the  6th  of  November 
he  entered  Liibeck  by  force,  in  spite  of  the 


ones ;  an  infinite  quantity  of  powder,  ammunition,  and 
magazines. 

1  shall  throw  all  my  light  cavalry  upon  the  right  bank 
of  the  Oder.  I  shall  have  all  the  corn  and  flour  I  can 
collect,  to  increase  our  stores ;  I  shall  have  ovens  built, 
and  as  much  biscuit  made  as  possible. 

The  garrison  of  Stettin  amounted  to  6000  men :  a  regi- 
ment of  Gazan's  division  .shall  escort  it  to  Spandau. 
That  general  has  but  one  regiment  left.  Souchet's  divi- 
sion, also,  has  furnished  a  great  number  of  men  for  the 
escort  of  troops,  so  that  my  corps  d'  armee  is  reduced 
very  low. 

If  Stettin  affords  sufficient  means  for  clothing  the  sol- 
diers, I  shall  do  it,  for  they  are  quite  naked.  An  in- 
ventory of  what  there  is  in  the  place  is  preparing.  I 
shall  have  the  honour  to  send  it  to  your  majesty. 

Meanwhile,  I  request  your  imperial'majesty  to  let  me 
know  your  intentions  as  speedily  as  possible.  My  head- 
quarters will  be,  to-night,  at  Stettin. 

Yesterday  I  had  your  majesty's  proclamation  read  at 
the  head  of  the  troops.  The  concluding  words  deeply 
touched  the  hearts  of  the  soldiers.  They  all  set  up 
shouts  of  Vive  P  Empereur  <f  Occident!  It  is  impossible 
for  me  to  tell  your  majesty  how  much  you  are  beloved 
by  these  brave  fellows,  and,  in  truth,  never  was  lover 
j  so  fond  of  his  mistress  as  they  are  of  your  person.  I 
beg  your  majesty  to  let  me  know  if  you  will  be  pleased 
to  nave  my  despatches  addressed  in  future  to  the  Em- 
peror of  the  West,  and  I  make  this  inquiry  in  the  namo 
of  my  corps  <F  armee.  I  am,  with  the  most  profound,  &«., 


203 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Nov.  1868. 


protest  of  the  magistrates.  The  ramparts  of 
the  city,  imprudently  converted  into  a  public 
promenade,  had  lost  their  principal  strength. 
Besides,  the  city  was  so  unprovided  with  gar- 
rison that  General  Blucher  had  no  difficulty  to 
penetrate  into  it.  He  quartered  his  soldiers 
upon  the  inhabitants,  from  whom  they  took 
whatever  they  wanted,  and,  besides,  required 
a  large  contribution  from  the  magistrates. 
Lubeck,  as  everybody  knows,  is  situated  on 
the  frontier  of  Denmark.  A  corps  of  Danish 
troops  guarded  that  frontier.  General  Blucher 
signified  to  the  Danish  general  that,  if  he 
suffered  it  to  be  violated  by  the  French,  he 
would  violate  it  in  turn  and  take  refuge  in 
Holstein.  The  Danish  general  having  de- 
clared that  he  would  perish  with  the  whole  of 
his  corps  rather  than  suffer  any  violation  of 
territory,  General  Blucher  shut  himself  up  in 
Lubeck,  confident  that  he  should  not  be  turned 
out  by  the  French,  if  the  neutrality  of  Den- 
mark were  respected.  But  while  he  conceived 
that  he  should  enjoy  some  safety  in  Lubeck, 
protected  by  the  remains  of  the  fortification, 
and  find  compensation  in  the  abundance  of  a 
commercial  city  for  the  privations  of  an  ar- 
duous retreat,  the  French  made  their  appear- 
ance. The  neutrality  of  Lubeck  had  ceased 
to  exist  for  them,  and  they  had  a  right  to  pur- 
sue the  Prussians  thither.  Arriving  on  the 
7th,  they  attacked  on  the  same  day  the  works 
which  covered  the  gates  called  the  Burg-Thor 
and  the  Miihlen-Thor.  The  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Bernadotte  carried  the  one,  that  of  Mar- 
shal Soult  the  other,  by  escalading,  under  a 
fire  of  grape,  and  with  unparalleled  hardihood, 
works  which,  though  weakened,  still  present- 
ed obstacles  difficult  to  overcome.  An  obsti- 
nate conflict  ensued  in  the  street.  The  unfor- 
tunate inhabitants  of  Lubeck  beheld  their  opu- 
lent city  converted  into  a  scene  of  carnage. 
The  Prussians,  cut  in  pieces  or  surrounded, 
were  obliged  to  flee,  leaving  more  than  a 
thousand  dead  on  the  spot,  about  6000  prison- 
ers, and  all  their  artillery.  General  Blucher, 
sallying  from  Lubeck,  took  a  position  between 
the  half  inundated  territory  in  the  environs  of 
Lubeck  and  the  Danish  frontier.  There  he 
halted,  having  neither  provisions  nor  ammu- 
nition left.  This  time  he  was  compelled  to 
.surrender,  and,  after  so  severely  censuring 
Mack  a  year,  and  the  Prince  of  Hohenlohe  a 
week  before,  to  follow  their  example.  He 
wished  to  add  a  few  words  to  the  capitulation. 
Murat  allowed  him,  out  of  respect  for  his  mis- 
fortune. The  words  added  were,  that  he  sur- 
rendered for  want  of  ammunition.  This  ca- 
pitulation gave  the  French  14,000  prisoners, 
who,  with  those  already  taken  in  Lubeck, 
formed  a  total  of  20,000. 

From  this  day  there  was  not  a  single  Prus- 
sian corps  between  the  Rhine  and  the  Oder: 
the  70,000  men  who  had  endeavoured  to  gain 
the  Oder  were  dispersed,  killed,  or  prisoners. 

While  these  events  were  occurring  in  Meck- 
lenburg, the  important  fortress  of  Ciistrin,  on 
the  Oder,  submitted  to  a  few  companies  of  in- 
fantry, commanded  by  General  Petit.  Four 
thousand  prisoners,  considerable  magazines, 
the  second  position  of  the  lower  Oder,  were 
the  prize  of  this  new  capitulation.  Thus  the 


French  occupied  on  the  Oder  the  fortresses  of 
Stettin  and  Custrin.  Marshal  Lannes  was 
established  at  Stettin,  Marshal  Davout  at  Cus- 
trin. 

On  the  Elbe  there  was  still  left  the  great 
fortress  of  Magdeburg,  which  contained  a 
garrison  of  22,000  men  and  a  vast  materiel. 
Marshal  Ney  had  undertaken  the  investment 
of  it.  Having  procured  a  few  mortars  for 
want  of  siege  artillery,  he  several  times 
threatened  the  place  with  a  bombardment — a 
threat  which  he  took  good  care  not  to  put  in 
execution.  Two  or  three  bombs,  thrown  into 
the  air,  frightened  the  population,  who  sur- 
rounded the  governor's  residence,  begging  with 
loud  cries  that  they  might  not  be  exposed  to 
useless  ravages,  since  the  Prussian  monarchy 
was  now  too  much  reduced  to  be  capable  of 
defending  itself.  So  complete  was  the  de- 
moralization among  the  Prussian  generals,  that 
these  reasons  were  held  to  be  good,  and  that, 
the  day  after  the  capitulation  of  Lubeck, 
General  Kleist  surrendered  with  22,000  pri- 
soners. 

Thus,  since  the  opening  of  the  campaign, 
the  Prussians  had  done  four  times,  at  Erfurt, 
at  Prenzlau,  at  Lubeck,  and  at  Magdeburg, 
what  they  had  so  grievously  reproached  the 
Austrians  with  having  done  once  at  Ulm. 
This  remark  is  not  designed  to  wound  their 
feelings  under  a  misfortune  which  has  since 
been  so  fully  repaired,  but  to  prove  that  it  had 
been  better  a  year  before  to  respect  the  mis- 
fortune of  another,  and  not  to  declare  the 
Austrians  such  cowards,  from  the  paltry  mo- 
tive of  making  the  French  appear  less  brave 
and  less  clever. 

Of  the  160,000  men,  who  had  composed  the 
active  army  of  the  Prussians,  there  was  not 
then  a  fraction  left.  Setting  aside  these  ex- 
aggerations, which,  in  the  surprise  of  such 
successes,  were  circulated  in  Europe,  it  is 
certain  that  about  25,000  men  had  been  killed 
or  wounded,  and  100,000  made  prisoners.  Of 
the  35,000  others,  not  one  had  recrossed  the 
Oder.  Those  who  were  Saxons  had  returned 
to  Saxony;  those  who  were  Prussians  had 
flung  away  their  arms  and  fled  across  the 
country.  One  might  say  with  perfect  truth, 
that  there  was  no  longer  a  Prussian  army. 
Napoleon  was  absolute  master  of  the  mo- 
narchy of  the  great  Frederick,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  a  few  places  in  Silesia,  incapable  of 
resistance,  and  East  Prussia,  protected  by  the 
distance  and  by  the  vicinity  of  Russia.  Na- 
poleon had  carried  off  all  the  materiel  of  Prus- 
sia in  cannon,  muskets,  warlike  stores ;  he  had 
acquired  provisions  to  subsist  his  army  during 
a  campaign,  20,000  horses  to  remount  his 
cavalry,  and  colours  sufficient  to  cover  the  edi- 
fices of  his  capital.  All  this  had  been  accom- 
plished in  a  month,  for  Napoleon  had  entered 
on  the  8th  of  October,  and  received  the  capitu- 
lation of  Magdeburg,  which  was  the  last,  on 
the  8th  of  November.  And  it  is  this  rapid 
annihilation  of  the  Prussian  power,  that  ren- 
ders the  campaign,  the  history  of  which  we 
have  been  relating,  so  marvellous.  That 
160,000  French,  who  had  arrived  at  military 
perfection  by  fifteen  years  of  war,  should  have 
vanquished  160,000  Prussians  enervated  by  a 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


209 


long  pea.ce,  is  no  great  miracle.  But  it  is  an 
astonishing  event,  this  oblique  march  of  the 
French  army,  combined  in  such  a  manner 
that  the  Prussian  army,  constantly  turned 
during  a  retreat  of  two  hundred  leagues,  from 
Hof  to  Stettin,  should  not  reach  the  Oder  till 
the  very  day  that  this  river  was  occupied,  that 
it  should  be  destroyed  or  taken  to  the  last  man, 
and  that,  in  a  month,  the  sovereign  of  a  great 
monarchy,  the  second  in  succession  from  the 
great  Frederick,  should  find  himself  without 
soldiers  and  without  dominions !  It  is,  we 
say,  an  astonishing  event,  when  we  consider 
that  this  was  not  the  case  of  Macedonians 
beating  cowardly  and  ignorant  Persians,  but 
a  European  army  beating  a  European  army, 
both  intelligent  and  brave. 

As  for  the  Prussians,  if  you  must  know  the 
secret  of  that  unparalleled  rout,  after  which 
fortresses  surrendered  at  the  summons  of  a 
few  hussars,  or  of  a  few  companies  of  light 
infantry,  you  will  find  it  in  the  demoraliza- 
tion which  usually  follows  overweening  pre- 


sumption. After  having  denied,  not  the  vic- 
tories of  the  French — they  were  undeniable — 
but  the  military  superiority,  the  Prussians  were 
so  struck  with  it  in  the  first  encounter,  that 
they  considered  resistance  as  no  longer  possi- 
ble, flung  away  their  arms  and  fled.  They 
were  laid  prostrate,  and  Europe  with  them. 
She  trembled  all  over  after  Jena,  much  more 
than  Austerlitz ;  for,  after  Austerlitz,  a  confi- 
dence in  the  Prussian  army  was  retained,  at 
least  by  the  enemies  of  France.  After  Jena, 
the  entire  continent  seemed  to  belong  to  the 
French  army.  The  soldiers  of  the  great  Fre- 
derick had  been  the  last  resource  of  envy: 
those  soldiers  vanquished,  but  one  other  re- 
source was  left  to  Envy,  the  only  one,  alas ! 
that  never  fails  her — to  predict  the  faults  of  a 
genius  thenceforth  irresistible;  to  pretend  that 
no  human  reason  could  bear  up  under  euch 
successes :  and  it  is  unfortunately  true  that 
Genius,  after  tormenting  Envy  by  its  suc- 
cesses, takes  upon  itself  to  console  her  by  its 
faults. 


VOL.  II.— 27 


g  2 


S10 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Nor.  1806. 


BOOK  XXVI. 


EYLAU. 

Effect  produced  in  Europe  by  the  Victories  of  Napoleon  over  Prussia — Cause  to  which  the  Exploits  of  the  Frencl 
are  attributed — Ordinance  of  King  Frederick  William  tending  to  efface  the  Distinctions  of  Birth  in  the  Prussian 
Army — Napoleon  decrees  the  Building  of  the  Temple  of  La  Madeleine,  and  gives  the  Name  of  Jena  to  the 
Bridge  erected  opposite  to  the  Military  School — Schemes  which  he  conceives  in  Berlin  in  the  Intoxication  of 
his  Triumphs — The  Idea  of  CONQUERING  THE  SEA  BY  THE  LAND  becomes  systematized  in  his  Mind,  and  he 
replies  to  the  maritime  Blockade  by  the  continental  Blockade — Decrees  of  Berlin — Resolution  to  push  the  War  to 
the  North  till  the  Subjection  of  the  whole  Continent — Plan  of  marching  to  the  Vistula,  and  exciting  Insurrec- 
tion in  Poland — Affluence  of  the  Poles  to  Napoleon — Umbrage  taken  in  Vienna  at  the  Idea  of  reconstituting 
Poland — Napoleon  offers  Austria  Silesia  in  exchange  for  Gallicia — Refusal  and  secret  Hate  of  the  Court  of 
Vienna — Precautions  of  Napoleon  against  that  Court — The  East  interferes  in  the  Quarrel  of  the  West — Turkey 
and  Sultan  Selim — Napoleon  sends  General  Sebastian!  to  Constantinople,  to  induce  the  Turks  to  go  to  war  witn 
Russia — Deposition  of  the  Hospodars,  Ipsilanti,  and  Maruz/.i — The  Russian  General  Michelson  marches  for  tha 
Provinces  of  the  Danube — Napoleon  proportions  his  Means  to  the  magnitude  of  his  Plans — The  Conscription 
of  1807  called  out — Employment  of  the  new  Levies — Organization  of  the  Reinforcements  destined  for  the 
Grand  Army  in  marching  Regiments — New  Corps  drawn  from  France  and  Italy — Development  given  to  the 
Cavalry — Financial  Means  created  -with  the  Resources  of  Prussia — Napoleon,  having  been  unable  to  agree 
with  King  Frederick  William  upon  ihe  Conditions  of  an  Armistice,  directs  his  Army  upon  Poland — Murat, 
Davout,  Augereau,  Lannes,  march  for  the  Vistula  at  the  Head  of  eighty  thousand  Men — Napoleon  follows  with 
an  Army  of  the  same  Force,  composed  of  the  Corps  of  Marshals  Soult,  Bernadotte.  Ney.  the  Guard,  and  the 
Reserves — Entry  of  the  French  into  Poland — Appearance  of  the  Soil  and  Sky — Enthusiasm  of  the  Poles  for 
the  French — Conditions  attached  by  Napoleon  lo  the  Reconstitution  of  Poland — Spirit  of  the  high  Polish  No- 
bility— Knlry  of  Murat  and  Davout  into  Posen  and  Warsaw — Napoleon  establishes  himself  in  Posen — Occu- 
pation of  the  Vistula,  from  Warsaw  to  Thorn — The  Russians,  united  with  the  Wrecks  of  the  Prussian  Army, 
occupy  the  Banks  of  the  Narew — Napoleon  resolves  to  make  them  fall  back  to  the  Pregel,  that  he  may  winter 
more  quietly  on  the  Vistula — Admirable  Combinations  for  crushing  the  Prussians  and  the  Russians — Actions 
at  Czarnowo,  Golymin,  and  Soldau — Baltic  of  Pultusk — The  Russians,  driven  beyond  the  Narew  with  great 
Loss,  cannot  be  pursued  on  Account  of  the  State  of  the  Roads — Embarrassment  of  Conquerors  and  Conquered 
amidst  the  Sloughs  of  Poland — Napoleon  establishes  himself  in  advance  of  the  Vistula,  between  the  Bug,  the 
Narew,  the  Orezyc,  and  the  Ukra — He  places  the  Corps  of  Marshal  Bernadotte  at  Elbing,  in  advance  of  the 
Lower  Vistula,  and  forms  a  tenth  Corps  under  Marshal  Lefebvre.  to  commence  the  Siege  of  Dantzig — Admi- 
rable Forecast  for  provisioning  and  the  safety  of  his  Winter  Quarters— Works  of  Praga,  Modlin,  Sierock — 
Material  and  moral  State  of  the  French  Army — Gayety  of  the  Soldiers  in  a  Country  new  to  them — Prince  Je- 
rome and  General  Vandamme,  at  the  head  of  the  German  Auxiliaries,  besiege  the  Fortresses  in  Silesia — Brief 
Joy  at  Vienna,  where  it  is  believed  for  a  Moment  that  the  Russians  are  successful — A  more  accurate  Appre- 
ciation of  Facts  brings  back  the  Court  of  Vienna  to  its  usual  Reserve — General  Benninpsen.  appointed 
General-in-chief  of  the  Russian  Army,  resolves  to  resume  Hostilities  in  the  Depth  of  Winter,  and  marches 
upon  the  Cantonments  of  the  French  Army,  following  the  Coast  of  the  Baltic — lie  is  discovered  by  Marshal 
Ney,  who  gives  the  Alarm  to  all  the  other  Corps — Brilliant  Action  fought  by  Marshal  Bernadotte  at  Mohrungen — 
Scientific  Combination  of  Napoleon's,  to  fling  the  Russians  into  the  Sea — This  Combination  is  revealed  to  the 
Enemy,  through  the  Fault  of  an  Officer,  who  suffers  his  Despatches  to  be  stolen — The  Russiansjretire  in  time — 
Napoleon  pursues  them  to  extremity — Actions  of  Waltersdorf  and  Hof— The  Russians,  incapable  of  further 
flight,  halt  at  Eylau,  resolved  to  give  battle — The  French  Army,  dying  of  hunger  and  reduced  one-third  by 
narching,  meets  the  Russian  Army,  and  a  sanguinary  Battle  takes  place  at  Eylau — Coolness  and  Energy-  of 
Vapoleou — Heroic  Conduct  of  the  French  Cavalry — The  Russian  Army  retires  almost  destroyed  :  the  French 
\riay  also  has  sustained  severe  Loss — The  Corps  of  Augereau  so  cut  up  that  it  must  be  dissolved — Napoleon 
mrsuee  the  Russians  to  KSnigsberg,  and  when  he  has  assured  himself  of  their  Retreat  beyond  the  Pregel,  re- 
•umei  his  Position  on  the  Vistula — Change  in  the  Site  of  his  Quarters — He  leaves  the  Upper  Vistula,  to  esta- 
•lisli  himself  in  advance  of  the  Lower  Vistula  and  behind  the  Passarge,  in  order  to  cpver  the  better  the  Siege 
•f  Dantzig — Increased  Attention  to  the  Victualling  of  his  Winter  Quarters — Napoleon,  established  atOsterode. 
n  a  sort  of  Barn,  where  he  employs  his  Winter  in  feeding  and  recruiting  his  Army,  administering  the  Empire, 
nnd  awing  Europe — Tranquillity  of  i»Iind  &nd  incredible  Variety  of  Occupations  of  Napoleon  at  Osterode  and 
tfiikenstem. 


NAPOLEOX  had  in  a  month  overturned  the 
Prussian  monarchy,  destroyed  its  armies,  con- 
quered the  greater  part  of  its  territory.  Fre- 
derick William  had  nothing  left  but  a  province 
and  25,000  men.  It  is  true  that  the  Russians, 
who  had  taken  refuge  at  Konigsberg,  hastened, 
at  the  earnest  solicitation  of  the  court  of  Ber- 
lin, as  fast  as  the  distance,  the  season,  and  the 
unskilfulness  of  a  semi-barbarous  administra- 
tion permitted  them.  But  the  Russians  had 
been  seen  at  Austerlitz,  and,  notwithstanding 
their  bravery,  it  could  not  be  expected  of  them 
that  they  should  change  the  fortune  of  the  war. 
The  cabinets  and  the  aristocracies  of  Europe 
were  overwhelmed  with  consternation.  The 
conquered  people,  divided  between  patriotism 
and  admiration,  could  not  help  recognising  in 
Napoleon  the  child  of  the  French  Revolution, 
the  propagator  of  its  ideas,  the  glorious  applier 
of  the  most  popular  of  them  all — equality. 
They  beheld  a  striking  example  of  this  equality 
in  our  generals,  who  were  no  longer  designated 
by  their  names,  so  well  known,  of  Berthier, 
Murat,  Bernadotte,  but  by  the  titles  of  Prince 


of  Neufchatel,  Grand-duke  of  Berg,  Prince  of 
Ponte  Corvo !  Striving  to  account  for  the  un- 
equal triumphs  which  we  had  gained  over  the 
Prussian  army,  they  attributed  them  not  only 
to  our  courage,  to  our  experience  in  war,  but 
to  the  principles  on  which  the  new  French  so- 
ciety rested.  They  accounted  for  the  incredi- 
ble ardour  of  our  soldiers  by  the  extraordinary 
ambition  which  the  government  had  contrived 
to  excite  in  them,  by  throwing  open  to  them 
that  immense  career,  upon,which  a  man  mighi 
enter  a  peasant,  like  the  Sforzas,  and  leave  it 
marshal,  prince,  king,  emperor.  It  is  true  that 
the  last  prize  was  the  only  one  of  its  kind  in  the 
urn  of  Fortune;  but  if  there  was  only  one 
emperor  who  had  earned  that  distinction  by  a 
prodigious  genius, ho w  many  dukes  and  princes 
were  there  whose  superiority  to  their  comrades 
was  not  of  a  nature  to  make  any  person  despair! 
The  intercepted  letters  of  the  Prussian  offi- 
cers were  full  of  strange  reflections  on  this 
subject.  One  of  them,  writing  to  his  family, 
said,  "  if  nothing  more  was  necessary  than  to 
use  our  strength  against  the  French,  we  should 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


211 


very  soon  be  conquerors.  They  are  short, 
puny :  one  of  our  Germans  would  beat  four  of 
them.  But  in  the  fire  they  become  superna- 
tural beibS3  They  are  hurried  away  by  an 
inexpressible  ardour,  not  a  trace  of  which  is 

to  be  discovered  in  our  soldiers What 

would  you  do  with  peasants,  led  into  fire  by 
nobles  whose  dangers  they  share,  without  ever 
sharing  their  passions  and  their  rewards  !"* 

Thus  there  was  mingled  in  the  mouths  of 
the  vanquished,  with  the  glorification  of  our 
bravery,  the  glorification  of  the  principles  of 
our  revolution.  The  King  of  Prussia,  in  fact, 
when  a  fugitive  on  the  confines  of  his  king- 
dom, was  preparing  an  ordnance  for  introduc- 
ing equality  into  the  ranks  of  his  army,  and 
for  effacing  in  it  all  the  distinctions  of  class 
and  birth.  Singular  example  of  the  propaga- 
tion of  the  liberal  ideas,  carried  to  the  extre- 
mity of  Europe  by  a  conqueror,  who  is  fre- 
quently represented  as  a  giant  who  would  fain 
have  stifled  those  ideas !  He  had  quashed 
some  of  them,  it  is  true,  but  the  most  social 
of  them  travelled  with  him  as  far  as  his  glory. 
Always  inclined  to  give  to  things  the  bril- 
liancy of  his  imagination,  Napoleon,  who  had 
projected,  on  the  morrow  of  Austerlitz,  the 
column  in  the  Place  Vendome,  the  Triumphal 
Arch  of  1'Etoile,  the  grand  Rue  Imperiale,  de- 
creed, in  the  heart  of  conquered  Prussia,  the 
erection  of  a  monument,  which  is  since  be- 
come one  of  the  grandest  in  the  capital,  the 
Temple  of  La  Madeleine. 

On  the  spot  now  occupied  by  the  church  of 
that  name,  which  forms  with  the  Place  de  la 
Concorde  so  magnificent  a  whole,  was  to  have 
stood  the  new  exchange.  Napoleon  thought 
the  site  too  fine  for  the  temple  of  wealth  to  be 
erected  upon  it,  and  he  resolved  to  raise  there 
the  temple  of  glory.  He  decided  that  some 
other  quarter  should  be  sought  out  for  the  new 
exchange,  and  that  on  one  of  the  four  points 
seen  from  the  middle  of  the  Place  de  la  Con- 
corde should  be  erected  a  monument  conse- 
crated to  the  glory  of  our  arms.  He  intended 
the  front  of  this  edifice  to  bear  this  inscription 
— L'EMPEREUR  NAPOLEON  ATJX  SOLUATS  DE  LA 


GRANDE  ARMEK — (The  Emperor  Napoleon  tc 
the  Soldiers  of  the  Grand  Army).  On  marble 
tablets  were  to  be  inscribed  the  names  of  all 
the  officers  and  soldiers  who  had  been  present 
at  the  great  events  of  Ulm,  Austerlitz  and  Jena; 
and  on  tablets  of  gold  the  names  of  those  who 
had  fallen  in  those  battles.  Immense  basso- 
relievos  were  to  represent  the  superior  officers 
and  the  generals  grouped  beside  each  other. 
Statues  were  granted  to  the  marshals  who  had 
commanded  corps  of  the  army.  The  colours 
taken  from  the  enemy  were  to  be  suspended 
from  the  roof  of  the  building.  Lastly,  Napo- 
leon decided  that  every  year  a  festival  of  an- 
tique character,  like  the  edifice  itself,  should 
be  held  on  the  2d  of  December,  in  honour  of 
the  martial  virtues.  He  gave  orders  for  a 
competition,  reserving  for  himself  the  right  to 
choose,  from  among  the  plans  presented,  that 
which  should  seem  to  him  the  most  suitable ; 
but  he  determined  beforehand  the  style  of  ar- 
chitecture which  he  intended  to  give  to  the 
new  fabric.  He  wanted,  he  said,  a  temple  of 
Grecian  or  Roman  form.  We  have  churches, 
he  wrote  to  the  minister  of  the  interior,  but  we 
have  not  a  temple,  like  the  Parthenon,  for  in- 
stance :  Paris  must  have  one  of  that  kind. 
France  was  then  fond  of  the  arts  of  Greece, 
as  formerly  she  was  fond  of  the  arts  of  the 
middle  ages ;  and  an  imitation  of  the  Parthe- 
non was  an  absolutely  new  present  to  offer  to 
the  capital.  At  the  present  day,  this  Grecian 
temple,  turned  into  a  Christian  church,  (which 
cannot  be  a  subject  for  regret,)  contrasts  with 
its  new  destination,  and  with  the  arts  of  the 
present  period.  Thus  our  tastes,  our  passions, 
our  ideas,  are  as  transient  as  the  caprices  of 
that  Fortune  which  has  devoted  this  edifice  to 
purposes  so  different  from  those  to  which  it 
was  originally  destined.  At  any  rate  it  fills 
majestically  the  spot  which  was  at  first  as- 
signed to  it,  and  the  people  have  not  forgotten 
that  this  temple  was  to  have  been  the  temple 
of  glory.2 

The  flatterers  of  the  time,  acquainted  with 
the  weaknesses  of  Napoleon,  and  even  exag- 
gerating them  to  themselves  in  their  mean  ness, 


»  In  this  passage  we  adhere  faithfully  to  the  sense  of  a 
great  quantity  of  letters,  the  originals  of  which  are  pre- 
served among  the  innumerable  papers  of  Napoleon's  in 
the  Louvre. 

»  We  quote  seme  letters  or  Napoleon's  on  this  subject, 
which  seem  to  us  worthy  of  being  introduced : — 

To  the  Minister  of  tfu  Interior. 

Posen,  6th  December,  1S06. 

Literature  has  need  of  encouragement :  you  are  its 
minister.  Propose  to  me  some  means  for  giving  a  shock 
to  all  the  different  branches  of  the  belles  lettres;  which 
have  in  all  times  shed  a  lustre  on  the  nation. 

You  will  have  received  the  decree  which  I  have  is- 
sued respecting  the  building  of  La  Madeleine,  and  that 
•which  repeals  the  establishment  of  the  exchange  on 
that  spot.  It  is,  however,  necessary  to  have  an  ex- 
change in  Paris.  My  intention  is  to  have  an  exchange 
huilt  corresponding  with  the  grandeur  of  the  capital 
.  irt  the  quantity  of  business  which  is  some  day  to  be 
transacted  there.  It  must  be  spacious,  in  order  to  have 
walks  around  it.  I  should  like  a  detached  site. 

In  assigning  a  fund  of  three  millions  for  the  erection 
of  the  edifice  of  La  Madeleine,  I  destined  that  sum  for 
the  building  only  ;  not  for  the  ornaments,  upon  which, 
in  time,  I  purpose  to  expend  a  much  larger  sum.  I  de- 
tire  that  the  surrounding  timber-yards  be  previously 
purchased,  in  order  to  form  a  large  circular  place,  in 
the  centre  of  which  the  structure  shall  stand,  and  around 
which  I  will  have  houses  built  on  a  uniform  plan. 

It  would  not  be  unsuitable  to  call  the  bridge  of  the 


military  school  the  Bridge  of  Jena.    Propose  to  me  a 
decree  for  giving  the  names  of  the  generals  and  colonels 
who  were   killed  in  that  battle   to  the   different  new 
streets. 
Whereupon,  &c.  NAPOLEON. 

To  tht  Minister  of  the  Interior. 

Finkenstein,  30th  May,  1807. 

After  having  examined  attentively  the  different  plans 
for  a  monument  dedicated  to  the  Grand  Army,  I  have 
not  been  for  a  moment  doubtful.  That  of  M.  Vignon  is 
the  only  one  which  fulfils  my  intentions.  It  is  a  temple 
that  I  asked  for,  and  not  a  church.  What  could  one  do 
in  the  style  of  churches  that  would  be  fit  to  compete 
with  Si.  Genevieve,  or  Notre  Dame,  and  above  all  with 
St.  Peter's  at  Rome?  M.  Vignon's  plan  unites,  with 
many  other  advantages,  that  ofharmonifcing  much  better 
with  the  palace  of  the  Legislative  Body,  and  of  not 
crushing  the  Tuileries. 

I  will  not  have  any  thing  of  wood.  The  spectators 
must  be  placed,  as  I  have  said,  upon  seats  of  marble, 
forming  the  amphitheatres  destined  for  the  public. — 
Nothing  in  this  temple  must  be  movable  and  changing; 
every  thing,  on  the  contrary,  must  be  fixed  in  its  place. 
If  it  were  possible  to  place  at  the  entrance  of  the  temple 
the  Nile  and  the  Tiber,  which  have  been  brought  from 
Rome,  that  would  produce  a  very  good  effect.  M.  Vig- 
non must  endeavour  to  introduce  them  into  his  definitive 
plan,  as  well  as  equestrian  statues  to  be  placed  outside, 
since  they  would  really  be  out  of  place  in  the  interior. 
It  is  necessary,  also,  to  fix  the  situations  where  the 


SIS 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Nov.  180(5. 


proposed  to  him  to  change  the  revolutionary 
name  of  Place  de  la  Concorde  into  another 
name  more  monarchical,  taken  from  the  impe- 
rial monarchy.  He  replied  to  M.  de  Cham- 
pagny  in  this  very  short  letter:  "The  Place  de 
la  Concorde  must  keep  the  name  it  has.  COS- 
CORD — 'tis  that  which  renders  France  invin- 
cible." (January,  1807.)  But  a  magnifi- 
cent stone  bridge,  recently  decreed,  and  erected 
opposite  to  the  Military  School,  had  not  yet 
received  a  name.  Napoleon  ordered  it  to  be 
called  by  the  glorious  name  of  Jena,  which 
that  bridge  has  retained,  and  which  at  a  later 
period  would  have  become  fatal  to  it,  if  an 
honourable  act  of  Louis  XVIII.  had  not  saved 
it  in  1814  from  the  brutal  rage  of  the  Prus- 
sians. 

These  projects  for  monuments  of  art  formed 
in  the  midst  of  conquered  capitals,  were  only 
accessory  ideas  to  those  vast  ideas  which  oc- 
cupied his  mind.  The  glorious  event  of  Aus- 
terlitz  had  already  impressed  him  with  the 
highest  notion  of  his  strength,  and  applied  new 
stimulants  to  his  gigantic  ambition.  That  of 
Jena  raised  his  confidence  and  his  desires  to 
the  highest  pitch.  After  that  so  complete  and 
so  speedy  destruction  of  the  military  power  in 
highest  repute  in  Europe,  there  was  nothing 
but  what  he  deemed  possible,  nothing  but  what 
he  desired.  His  enemies,  to  depreciate  his  an- 
terior triumphs,  having  incessantly  repeated 
that  the  Prussian  army  was  the  only  one  to 
be  made  any  account  of,  the  only  one  that  it 
was  difficult  to  conquer,  he  had  taken  them  at 
the  word,  and  having  conquered,  more  than 
conquered,  annihilated  it  in  a  month,  he  per- 
ceived thenceforward  no  bound  to  his  power, 
and  admitted  of  no  limitation  to  his  will.  Eu- 
rope appeared  to  him  a  field  without  owner,  in 
which  he  could  build  up  whatever  he  pleased, 
whatever  he  considered  as  great,  wise,  useful, 
and  brilliant.  Where  then  was  he  to  discern 
a  symptom  of  resistance  7  Austria,  disarmed 
by  a  single  manoeuvre,  that  of  Ulm,  was  trem- 
bling, exhausted,  incapable  of  resuming  arms. 
The  Russians,  though  deemed  brave,  had  been 
driven  with  the  bayonet  at  their  loins  from 
Munich  to  Olmiitz,  and  if  they  had  made  a 
stand  at  Hollabrunn,  at  Austerlitz,  it  was  to 
sustain  overwhelming  defeats.  Lastly,  the 


Prussian  monarchy  had  just  been  destroyed  in 
thirty  days.  What  obstacle,  we  repeat  it,  could 
he  discover  to  his  projects  ?  The  wrecks  of 
the  Russian  armies,  united  in  the  north  to 
25,000  Prussians,  afforded  no  prospect  of  a 
danger  that  he  needed  to  be  alarmed  at.  Hence 
he  wrote  to  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres, 
"All  here  is  child's  play,  to  which  an  end  must 
be  put;  and  this  time  I  will  take  such  a  course 
with  my  enemies  as  to  settle  them  all."  He 
decided,  therefore,  to  push  the  war  till  he  had 
wrung  peace  from  all  the  powers,  and  such  a 
peace  as  should  be  equally  brilliant  and  du- 
rable. Not  indeed  that  it  would  be  difficult  to 
wring  it  from  the  courts  of  the  continent,  but, 
from  England,  which,  protected  by  the  ocean, 
was  the  only  country  that  had  escaped  the 
yoke  with  which  Europe  saw  herself  threat- 
ened. Napoleon  had  already  said  that  he 
would  gain  the  dominion  of  the  sea  by  means 
of  the  land ;  and  that,  if  the  English  were  de- 
termined to  close  the  ocean  against  him,  he 
would  close  the  continent  against  them.  Hav- 
ing reached  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  he  con- 
firmed himself  in  this  idea  more  than  ever,  he 
systematized  it  in  his  head,  and  he  wrote  to 
his  brother  Louis  in  Holland,  I  am  going  tore- 
conquer  the  colonies  by  means  of  the  land.  In  the 
fermentation  of  mind  produced  in  him  by  the 
extraordinary  success  of  the  war  with  Prussia, 
he  conceived  the  most  gigantic  ideas  that  he 
ever  brought  forth  in  his  life.  In  the  first 
place,  he  resolved  to  keep  in  deposite  all  that 
he  had  conquered,  and  all  that  he  should  yet 
conquer,  till  England  had  restored  to  France, 
to  Holland,  to  Spain,  the  colonies  which  she 
had  taken  from  them.  The  continental  powers 
being,  in  reality,  but  subsidized  auxiliaries  of 
England,  he  determined  to  hold  them  all  re- 
sponsible for  the  British  policy,  and  to  lay  down 
as  the  essential  principle  of  negotiation,  that 
he  would  not  restore  to  one  of  them  any  thing 
that  he  had  taken,  till  England  should  give  up 
the  whole  or  part  of  her  maritime  conquests. 
Two  Prussian  negotiators,  M.  de  Lucchesini 
and  M.  de  Zastrow,  were  at  Charlottenburg, 
soliciting  an  armistice  and  peace.  He  replied 
to  them  through  Duroc,  who  had  continued  the 
friend  of  the  court  of  Berlin,  that,  as  for  peace, 
it  was  not  to  be  thought  of  till  England  was 


armour  of  Francis  I.,  taken  at  Vienna,  and  the  great 
quadriga  of  Berlin,  are  to  be  placed. 

No  timber  must  be  used  in  the  construction  of  this 

temple Granite  and  iron — such  must  be  the 

materials  of  this  monument.  It  may  be  objected  that 
Hie  present  columns  are  not  of  granite;  but  that  objec- 
tion would  not  be  good,  since,  in  time,  those  columns 
might  be  renewed  without  injuring  the  monument. 
However,  if  it  should  be  proved  that  the  use  of  granite 
would  occasion  loo  great  an  expense  and  too  long  delay, 
it  must  be  given  up ;  for  the  principal  condition  of  the 
project  is  tliat  it  be  executed  in  three  or  four  years,  and 
at  furthest  five  years.  This  monument  is  connected  in 
some  measure  with  politics ;  of  course,  it  is  one  of  those 
which  ought  to  be  speedily  finished.  It  would,  never- 
theless, not  be  amiss  to  seek  after  granite  for  other 
structures  wh'ch  I  shall  order,  and  which,  from  their 
nature,  may  allow  thirty,  forty,  or  fifty  years  to  be  given 
to  their  completion. 

I  presuppose  that  all  the  sculptures  in  the  interior 
shall  be  of  marble,  and  that  no  sculptures  fit  for  the 
drawing-rooms  and  dining-rooms  of  the  wives  of  Paris 
bankers  shall  be  proposed  to  me :  whatever  is  not  of 
long  duration  ought  not  to  be  employed  in  this  edifice. 
I  repeat  that  there  must  be  no  sort  of  furniture,  not  even 
curtains. 


As  for  the  plan  which  has  obtained  the  prize,  it  ha* 
not  come  up  to  my  views ;  it  was  the  first  that  I  threw 
aside.  It  is  true  that  I  made  it  a  fundamental  point  to 
retain  that  portion  of  the  build  ing  of  La  Madeleine  which 
is  still  standing;  but  that  expression  is  an  ellipsis.  It 
meant  that  as  much  as  possible  of  that  building  should 
be  preserved;  otherwise  there  would  have  been  no 
need  of  programme,  and  nothing  more  to  do  thiin  to 
follow  the  original  plan.  My  intention  was  not  to  have 
a  church,  but  a  temple;  and  I  desired  neither  that  all 
should  be  demolished,  nor  that  all  should  be  retained. 
If  these  two  propositions  were  incompatible,  namely, 
that  of  having  a  temple  and  that  of  retaining  the  present 
buildings  of  La  Madeleine,  it  was  plain  that  the  defini- 
tion of  a  temple-ought  to  have  been  adhered  to;  by  tem- 
ple, I  meant  such  a  monument  as  existed  at  Athens,  but 
exists  not  in  Paris.  There  are  plenty  of  churches  in 
Paris ;  there  are  churches  in  all  the  villages.  I  should 
most  assuredly  not  have  taken  it  amiss  if  the  architects 
had  pointed  out  that  there  was  a  contradiction  between 
the  idea  of  having  a  temple  and  the  intention  of  retain- 
ing buildings  erected  for  a  church.  The  first  was  tha 
principal  idea,  the  second  was  an  accessory  idea.  M. 
Vignon  has  therefore  divined  what  I  wanted. 

NA  POLEON. 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


213 


brought  into  more  moderate  views ;  and  that 
Prussia  and  Germany  should  remain  in  his 
hands  in  pledge  for  what  England  had  taken 
from  the  maritime  powers  ;  but  that,  as  for  an 
armistice,  he  was  ready  to  grant  one,  on  con- 
dition of  the  immediate  delivery  to  him  of  the 
line  on  which  he  intended  to  winter,  and  which 
he  meant  to  make  the  starting  post  of  his  future 
operations — the  line  of  the  Vistula.  In  con- 
sequence, he  required  all  the  fortresses  in  Si- 
lesia, such  as  Breslau,  Glogau,  Schweidnitz, 
Glatz,  and  all  those  on  the  Vistula,  such  as 
Dantzig,  Graudenz,  Thorn,  Warsaw,  to  be  de- 
livered up  to  him  immediately  ;  for,  if  they 
were  not  given  up,  he  should  go  and  reduce 
them  in  a  few  days. 

With  this  intention  to  COXQ.UER  THE  SEA 
BT  THE  LAND,  by  depriving  Great  Britain  of 
all  her  allies,  and  closing  all  the  ports  of  the 
continent  against  her,  the  first  thing  to  be  done 
was  to  interdict  to  her  without  delay  access  to 
the  vast  coasts  occupied  by  the  French  armies. 
Napoleon  had  already  himself,  or  by  means 
of  Prussia,  closed  the  mouths  of  the  Ems,  the 
Weser  and  the  Elbe.  This  was  a  natural  and 
legitimate  exercise  of  the  right  of  conquest, 
for  conquest  confers  all  the  rights  of  the  sove- 
reign, and  especially  the  right  of  closing  the 
ports,  or  intercepting  the  roads  of  the  con- 
quered country,  without  such  rigour  being  held 
to  be  a  violation  of  the  right  of  nations  to- 
wards any  person  whatever.  But  to  forbid 
the  entry  of  the  Ems,  the  Elbe,  and  the  We- 
ser, was  a  measure  very  inadequate  for  attain- 
ing the  end  proposed  to  himself  by  Napoleon  ; 
for,  in  spite  of  the  strictest  watch  on  the 
coasts,  English  goods  were  introduced  by 
smuggling  not  only  into  Hanover  but  into  Hol- 
land, the  government  of  which  was  under  our 
direct  influence,  and  in  Belgium,  which  had 
become  a  French  province.  Besides,  when 
the  Ems,  the  Weser,  and  the  Elbe  were  closed, 
these  goods  entered  by  the  Oder,  by  the  Vis- 
tula, and  descended  again  from  north  to  south. 
They  grew  dear,  it  is  true,  but  the  English, 
necessitated  to  dispose  of  them,  sold  them  at 
a  price  which  compensated  the  expenses  of 
smuggling  and  freight.  It  was  necessary, 
therefore,  to  resort  to  more  rigorous  measures 
against  English  merchandise,  and  Napoleon 
was  not  the  man  to  suffer  himself  to  be  de- 
terred from  them. 

England  herself  had  just  authorized  all  sorts 
of  excesses  against  her  commerce  by  taking 
an  extraordinary  measure,  and  one  of  the 
most  outrageous  that  can  be  imagined  against 
the  most  generally  admitted  rights  of  nations, 
and  which  is  called  a  paper  blockade.  As  we 
have  already  explained  several  times,  it  is  a 
principle  with  most  of  the  maritime  nations 
that  every  neutral,  that  is  to  say,  every  flag, 
not  a  party  in  a  war  between  two  powers,  has 
a  right  to  sail  from  the  ports  of  one  to  the  ports 
of  the  other,  to  carry  any  merchandise  what- 
ever, even  that  of  the  enemy,  excepting  con- 
traband of  war,  which  consists  in  arms,  mu- 
nitions of  war,  and  provisions  cured  for  the 
use  of  the  armies.  This  liberty  ceases  only  in 
the  case  of  a  seaport  blockaded  by  a  naval 
force,  so  that  the  blockade  be  efficacious.  In 
this  case,  the  blockade  being  notified,  the  facul- 


ty of  entering  the  blockaded  place  is  suspended 
for  neutrals.  But  if,  in  the  restrictions  imposed 
upon  the  freedom  of  navigation,  we  do  not 
stop  at  this  certain  limit  of  the  presence  of  an 
effective  force,  there  is  no  reason  why  we 
should  not  lay  an  interdict  upon  whole  tracts 
of  coast,  upon  pretext  of  blockade.  England 
had  already  sought  to  overstep  the  limits  of 
the  real  blockade,  by  alleging  that,  with  a  few 
sail,  insufficient  in  number  to  close  the  ap- 
proaches to  a  seaport,  she  had  a  right  to  de- 
clare the  blockade.  But  at  last  she  had  ad- 
mitted the  necessity  of  a  force  of  some  sort 
against  the  blockaded  port.  Now  she  did  not 
stop  at  this  limit  already  so  vague,  and  at  the 
time  of  her  momentary  rupture  with  Prussia, 
occasioned  by  the  occupation  of  Hanover,  she 
had  ventured  to  forbid  all  commerce  to  neu- 
trals on  the  coasts  of  France  and  Germany, 
from  Brest  to  the  mouths  of  the  Elbe.  This 
was  the  abuse  of  strength  carried  to  the  utmost 
excess,  and  thenceforward  a  mere  British  de- 
cree was  sufficient  to  lay  under  interdict  all 
the  parts  of  the  globe  which  England  was 
pleased  to  deprive  of  commerce. 

This  incredible  violation  of  the  right  of  na- 
tions furnished  Napoleon  with  a  just  pretext 
for  authorizing  the  most  rigorous  measures  in 
regard  to  English  commerce.  He  devised  a 
formidable  decree,  which,  however  excessive 
it  might  appear,  was  but  a  just  reprisal  of 
the  violences  of  England,  and  which  had, 
moreover,  the  advantage  of  completely  an- 
swering the  views  which  he  had  recently  con- 
ceived. This  decree,  dated  Berlin,  the  21st  of 
|  November,  applicable  not  only  to  France,  but 
to  the  countries  occupied  by  her  armies  or  in 
alliance  with  her,  that  is  to  say,  to  France, 
Holland,  Spain,  Italy,  and  all  Germany,  de- 
clared the  British  Islands  in  a  state  of  blockade. 
The  consequences  of  the  state  of  blockade 
were  the  following: 

All  commerce  with  England  was  absolutely 
prohibited; 

All  goods,  the  produce  of  English  manufac- 
tures, or  of  English  colonies,  were  to  be  con- 
fiscated not  only  on  the  coast,  but  in  the  inte- 
rior, in  the  houses  of  the  merchants  by  whom 
they  should  be  harboured  ; 

All  letters  coming  from  or  going  to  England, 
addressed  to  an  Englishman,  or  written  in 
English,  were  to  be  stopped  at  the  post-offices 
and  destroyed ; 

Every  Englishman,  whatsoever,  seized  in 
France,  or  in  the  countries  under  subjection 
to  her  arms,  was  to  be  declared  a  prisoner  of 
war; 

Every  vessel  having  only  touched  at  the 
English  colonies  or  at  any  of  the  ports  of  the 
three  kingdoms,  was  forbidden  to  enter  French 
ports,  or  ports  under  subjection  to  France ;  and, 
in  case  of  a  false  declaration  being  made  on 
this  subject,  she  became  a  lawful  prize  ; 

Half  of  the  produce  of  the  confiscation  was 
destined  to  indemnify  French  and  allied  mer- 
chants who  had  suffered  by  the  spoliations  of 
England ; 

Lastly,  the  English  who  fell  into  our  power 
were  to  serve  for  the  exchange  of  the  French 
or  their  allies  who  were  taken  prisoners. 

Such  were  these  measures,  assuredly  inex 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1806. 


cusable  if  England  had  not  taken  pains  to 
justify  them  beforehand  by  her  own  excesses. 
Napoleon  was  fully  sensible  of  their  severity ; 
but,  in  order  to  induce  England  to  relinquish 
her  tyranny  at  sea,  he  had  recourse  to  a  like 
tyranny  upon  land.  He  wished  most  especially 
to  intimidate  the  agents  of  the  English  com- 
merce, and  principally  the  merchants  of  the 
Hanseatic  towns,  who,  laughing  at  the  orders 
issued  respecting  the  Elbe  and  the  Weser,  dis- 
tributed the  prohibited  goods  throughout  all 
parts  of  the  continent.  The  threat  of  confis- 
cation, a  threat  soon  followed  up,  would  make 
them  tremble,  and,  if  not  close  the  outlets 
opened  clandestinely  to  British  commerce,  at 
least  render  them  very  narrow. 

Napoleon,  saying  to  himself  that  all  the 
commercial  nations  were  interested  in  the  re- 
sistance which  he  was  opposing  to  the  unjust 
pretensions  of  England,  concluded  that  they 
would  submit  to  the  inconveniences  of  a  strug- 
gle which  had  become  necessary;  he  thought 
that,  these  inconveniences  falling  particularly 
upon  the  speculators  of  Hamburg,  Bremen, 
Leipzig,  Amsterdam,  and  on  smugglers  by 
profession,  it  was  not  worth  while  to  limit  his 
means  of  reprisal,  out  of  regard  for  such  in- 
terests. 

The  effect  of  this  decree  on  the  opinion  of 
Europe  was  immense.  Some  regarded  it  as 
a  revolting  excess  of  despotism,  others  as  a 
stroke  of  profound  policy,  all  as  an  extraordi- 
nary act,  proportioned  to  the  conflict  of  giants 
maintained  by  England  and  France  against 
each  other,  the  one  daring  to  seize  the  domi- 
nion of  the  sea,  hitherto  the  common  route  of 
nations,  and  to  interdict  all  commerce  to  her 
enemies,  the  other  aiming  at  the  entire  occu- 
pation of  the  continent  by  force  of  arms,  to 
reply  to  the  closing  of  the  sea  by  the  closing 
of  the  land.  Unheard-of  spectacle,  without 
example  in  the  past  and  probably  in  the  fu- 
ture, exhibited  at  this  moment  by  the  un- 
chained passions  of  the  two  greatest  nations 
of  the  earth ! 

No  sooner  was  this  decree  conceived  and 
drawn  up  by  Napoleon  himself,  and  by  him 
alone,  without  the  participation  of  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand— no  sooner  was  this  decree  signed, 
than  it  was  sent  by  extraordinary  couriers  to 
.the  governments  of  Holland,  Spain,  and  Italy, 
with  orders  to  some,  summonses  to  others,  to 
put  it  into  immediate  execution.  Marshal 
Mortier,  who  had  already  taken  possession  of 
Hesse,  was  directed  to  proceed  with  the  ut- 
most expedition  to  the  Hanseatic  towns,  Bre- 
men, Hamburg,  Lubeck,  and  to  make  himself 
master  not  only  of  those  towns,  but  of  (he  ports 
of  Mecklenburg  and  Swedish  Pomerania  as 
far  as  the  mouths  of  the  Oder.  He  was  en- 
joined to  occupy  the  rich  warehouses  of  the 
Hanseatic  towns,  to  seize  the  merchandise  of 
English  origin  there,  to  arrest  the  English 
merchants,  and  to  do  all  this  with  punctuality, 
exactness,  and  probity.  It  was  because  Na- 
poleon expected  a  more  rigorous,  and,  at  the 
same  time,  honest  execution  from  Marshal 
Mortier  than  from  any  other,  that  he  had  given 
him  such  a  commission.  He  ordered  him  to 
lake  with  him  into  Germany  a  certain  number 
»f  seamen,  drafted  from  the  Boulogne  flotilla, 


to  make  them  cruise  in  vessels  at  the  mouths 
of  the  Elbe  and  Weser,  to  arm  all  the  passes 
with  cannon,  and  to  sink  every  suspicious  ship 
that  should  attempt  to  force  the  blockade. 

Such  was  the  continental  blockade,  by  which 
Napoleon  replied  to  the  blockade  upon  paper  de- 
vised by  England. 

But,  to  subject  the  continent  to  his  policy,  iv 
was  requisite  that  Napoleon  should  push  the 
war  further  than  he  had  done.  Austria  was, 
six  months  before,  in  his  mighty  hands,  and 
might  be  so  again  whenever  he  pleased. 
Prussia  was  there  at  that  moment.  But  Rus- 
sia, always  repulsed  when  she  appeared  in  the 
regions  of  the  West,  nevertheless,  escaped  his 
blows  by  retiring  beyond  the  Vistula  and  the 
Niemen.  She  was  the  only  ally  that  England 
had  left,  and  he  must  beat  her  as  completely 
as  he  had  beaten  Austria  and  Prussia,  to  real- 
ize, in  its  full  extent,  the  policy  of  CONQ.CTRR- 

IXG    THE    SEA    BY    THE     LAND.        Napoleon    W3S 

therefore  resolved  to  proceed  northward,  and 
to  hasten  to  meet  the  Russians  in  the  plains 
of  Poland,  where  the  people  were  ready  to  rise 
at  his  appearance.  Never  had  warrior  setting 
out  from  the  Rhine  reached  the  Vistula,  much 
less  the  Niemen.  But  he,  who  had  carried 
the  tri-coloured  flag  to  float  on  the  banks  of 
the  Adige,  the  Nile,  the  Jordan,  the  Po,  the 
Danube,  and  the  Elbe,  could  and  must  perform 
this  daring  march !  At  any  rate,  his  presence 
in  the  regions  of  the  north  would  instantly 
raise  an  immense  European  question — that  of 
the  re-establishment  of  Poland.  The  Poles 
had  always  said,  "France  is  our  friend;  but 
she  is  at  a  great  distance."  When  France 
I  approached  Poland  so  near  as  the  Oder,  must 
not  the  idea  of  a  great  reparation  become  with 
one  the  subject  of  well-founded  hope,  with  the 
other  the  subject,  of  a  matured  project  1  Those 
unfortunate  Poles,  so  unsteady  in  their  con- 
duct, so  serious  in  their  sentiments,  uttered 
shouts  of  enthusiasm  on  hearing  of  our  victo- 
ries ;  and  a  crowd  of  emissaries,  hastening  to 
Berlin,  besought  Napoleon  to  proceed  to  the 
Vistula,  promising  him  their  property,  their 
arms,  their  lives,  to  assist  him  in  le-constitut- 
mg  Poland.  This  scheme,  so  seductive,  so 
generous,  so  politic  if  it  had  been  more  prac- 
ticable, was  one  of  those  enterprises  with, 
which  the  smitten  imagination  could  not  fail 
to  be  captivated  at  that  moment,  and  one  of 
those  imposing  spectacles  which  it  befitted  his 
greatness  to  give  to  the  world.  In  penetrating 
into  the  heart  of  Poland,  he  was  adding,  it  is 
true,  to  the  difficulties  of  the  present  war  the 
most  important  of  all  difficulties — that  of  dis- 
tance and  of  climate;  but  he  was  depriving 
Prussia  and  Russia  of  the  resources  of  the 
Polish  provinces — considerable  resources  in 
men  and  alimentary  substances ;  he  was  sap- 
ping the  foundation  of  Russian  power;  he 
was  striving  to  render  Europe  the  most  signal 
service  that  had  ever  been  done  for  it ;  he  was 
adding  fresh  pledges  to  those  which  he  had 
already  in  his  hands,  and  which  were  to  serve 
him,  to  obtain  from  England  maritime  resti- 
tutions by  means  of  continental  restitutions. 
The  vast  countries  situated  upon  the  route 
from  the  Rhine  to  the  Vistula,  causes  of 
weakness  for  an  ordinary  general,  would  be 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


215 


converted,  under  the  greatest  of  captains,  into 
abundant  sources  of  things  necessary  for  war; 
he  should  draw  from  them,  thanks  to  a  skilful 
administration,  provisions,  ammunition,  arms, 
horses,  money.  As  for  the  climate,  so  formi- 
dable in  these  countries  in  November  and 
December,  he  took  it  into  account,  no  doubt ; 
but  he  was  resolved,  in  this  campaign,  to  halt 
at  the  Vistula.  If  it  were  given  up  to  him  by 
the  proposed  armistice,  he  purposed  to  esta- 
blish himself  there  ;  if,  on  the  contrary,  it  were 
disputed,  he  would  conquer  it  in  a  few  marches, 
make  the  troops  encamp  there  till  the  winter 
was  over,  feed  them  there  upon  the  corn  of 
Poland,  warm  them  with  the  wood  of  its  fo- 
rests, recruit  them  with  fresh  soldiers  brought 
from  the  Rhine,  and,  next  spring,  start  from 
the  Vistula  to  penetrate  much  farther  north 
than  any  man  had  yet  dared  to  do. 

Excited  by  success,  impelled  by  his  genius 
and  his  good  fortune  to  a  greatness  of  ideas  to 
which  no  head  of  empire  or  army  had  yet  at- 
tained, he  hesitated  not  a  moment  what  course 
to  pursue,  and  made  dispositions  for  advanc-  ! 
ing  into  Poland.      When  passing  the  Rhine, 
he  had  certainly  embraced  in  his  designs  the 
idea  of  a   daring   march   to   the    north,   but 
vaguely.    It  was  in  Berlin,  and  after  the  rapid  j 
and  signal  successes  obtained  over  Prussia, : 
that  he  formed  the  serious  plan  of  its  execu- 
tion. 

Still,  in  addition  to  the  perils  inherent  in 
the  enterprise  itself,  there  was  a   particular 
danger  which  Napoleon  did  not  disguise  from 
himself;  that  is,  the  impression  which  might ; 
be  produced  upon  Austria,  which,  though  con- 
quered, and  conquered   even   to   exhaustion,  | 
might,  nevertheless,  be  tempted  to  seize  the 
opportunity  to  fall  upon  our  rear. 

The  present  conduct  of  that  court  was  of 
such  a  nature  as  to  excite  more  than  one  fear. 
To  the  offers  of  alliance,  which  Napoleon  had 
directed  to  be  made,  in  consequence  of  his 
conversations  with  the  Duke  of  Wurzburg,  she 
had  replied  by  affected  demonstrations  of  good- 
will, feigning  not  to  understand  our  ambassa- 
dor; and,  when  he  had  explained  himself  in 
a  clearer  manner,  alleging  that  too  close  a 
connection  with  France  would  draw  upon  her 
a  rupture  with  Russia  and  Prussia,  and  that, 
so  soon  after  a  long  struggle  thrice  renewed  in 
the  last  fifteen  years,  she  was  no  longer  ca- 
pable of  waging  war  either  for  or  against  any 
power. 

To  these  evasive  words  she  had  recently 
added  the  most  significant  acts.  She  had  as- 
sembled in  Bohemia  60,000  men,  who,  placed 
at  first  along  Bavaria  and  Saxony,  were  at  this 
moment  marching  towards  Gallicia,  following, 
in  some  measure,  behind  their  own  frontiers, 
the  movement  of  the  belligerent  armies.  In- 
dependently of  these  60,000  men,  she  had  de- 
spatched fresh  troops  towards  Poland,  and  she 
was  exerting  herself  with  extreme  activity  to 
form  magazines  in  Bohemia  and  Gallicia. 
When  questioned  concerning  her  armaments, 
she  assigned  common-place  reasons,  grounded 
on  her  personal  safety,  saying  that,  exposed  on 
all  sides  to  the  contact  of  hostile  armies  which 
were  warring  with  each  other,  she  must  n»t 
allow  any  of  them  to  violate  her  territory,  and 


that  the  measures  she  was  called  to  account 
for  were  but  measures  of  pure  precaution. 

Napoleon  was  not  to  be  duped  by  language 
so  insincere.  The  need  of  an  alliance,  since 
he  had  lost  that  of  Prussia,  had  for  a  moment 
directed  his  mind  towards  the  court  of  Vienna ; 
but  it  was  now  easy  to  perceive  that  the  power 
from  which  he  had  wrested,  in  fifteen  years, 
the  Netherlands,  Suabia,  the  Milanese,  the  Ve- 
netian States,  Tuscany,  the  Tyrol,  Dalmatia, 
and  lastly  the  Germanic  crown,  could  never  be 
any  other  than  an  irreconcilable  enemy,  dis- 
sembling, out  of  policy,  her  deep  resentment, 
but  ready  to  let  it  burst  forth  on  the  "irst  occa- 
sion. He  clearly  perceived  that  the  fears  of 
Austria  were  feigned,  for  none  of  the  bellige- 
rent parties  had  an  interest  in  provoking  her  by 
a  violation  of  territory ;  and  he  knew  that,  if 
she  armed,  it  could  only  be  with  the  perfidious 
intention  of  falling  upon  the  rear  of  the  French 
army.  Attaching  no  more  importance  than 
was  necessary  to  the  word  of  a  man  and  a 
sovereign,  by  which  Francis  II.  had  engaged 
not  to  make  war  again  upon  France,  he 
thought,  nevertheless,  that  the  recollection  of 
that  word  solemnly  given  must  embarrass  that 
prince  ;  that  he  would  need  a  very  specious 
pretext  for  breaking  it ;  and  he  had  formed 
two  maturely  weighed  resolutions:  the  first  not 
to  afford  Austria  any  pretext  for  interfering  in 
the  present  war;  and  the  second,  to  take  such 
precautions  as  if  she  were  certain  to  interfere, 
and  to  take  them  in  an  ostensible  manner. 
His  language  was  conformable  to  these  reso- 
lutions. He  first  complained  with  the  utmost 
frankness  of  the  armaments  going  forward  iu 
Bohemia  and  Gallicia,  and  in  such  a  way  as 
to  prove  that  he  comprehended  their  object. 
Then,  with  the  same  frankness,  he  intimated 
the  precautions  which  he  thought  himself 
obliged  to  take,  and  which  were  likely  to  deter 
the  cabinet  of  Vienna.  He  affirmed  anew  that 
he  would  not  give  any  provocation  to  war,  but 
it  should  be  prompt  and  terrible,  if  Austria 
had  the  imprudence  to  recommence  it.  He  de- 
clared that,  determined  not  to  afford  any  pretext 
for  a  rupture,  he  would  not  countenance  a  ris- 
ing in  the  provinces  of  Poland  belonging  to 
Austria;  that  the  rising  in  Prussian  and  Rus- 
sian Poland  was  imputable  exclusively  to  those 
who  had  been  bent  on  war ;  that  he  did  not 
disguise  from  himself  the  difficulty  of  repress- 
ing the  Poles  dependent  on  Austria,  when  the 
Poles  dependent  on  Russia  and  Prussia  were 
stirring;  but  that,  if  the  people  at  Vienna 
thought  on  that  point  as  he  did,  and  if,  like 
him,  they  were  convinced  of  the  enormous 
fault  committed  in  the  last  century,  in  destroy- 
ing a  monarchy  which  was  the  bulwark  of  the 
West,  he  suggested  a  very  simple  expedient 
for  repairing  that  loss  in  reconstituting  Poland, 
and  offering  to  the  house  of  Austria  an  ample 
indemnification  for  the  provinces,  to  the  sacri- 
fice of  which  she  would  have  to  submit.  This 
indemnification  was  the  restitution  of  Silesia, 
wrested  from  Maria  Theresa  by  Frederick  the 
Great.  Silesia  was  certainly  as  valuable  as 
the  Gallicias,  and  this  would  be  a  signal  repa- 
ration of  the  disasters,  the  outrages,  which  the 
founder  of  the  Prussian  monarchy  had  inflict 
ed  on  the  house  of  Austria. 


216 


HIST< 


OF  THE 


[Nov.  1806, 


Assuredly  in  the  situation  in  which  Napo- 
leon was  placed,  nothing  was  better  calculated 
than  such  a  proposal.  Led,  in  fact,  by  the 
course  of  events  to  destroy  the  work  of  the 
great  Frederick  by  humbling  Prussia,  he  could 
not  do  better  than  to  destroy  that  work  com- 
pletely, by  restoring  to  Austria  what  Frederick 
had  taken  away,  and  by  taking  from  her  what 
Frederick  had  given  her.  For  the  rest,  he  of- 
fered this  exchange,  without  intending  to  im- 
pose it  upon  her.  If  such  a  proposal,  which 
formerly  would  have  filled  Austria  with  joy, 
should  awaken  her  old  sentiments  in  regard  to 
Silesia,  he  was  quite  ready,  he  said,  to  carry  it 
into  effect;  if  not,  it  must  be  considered  as  not 
having  been  made ;  and  he  reserved  himself  to 
act  in  Prussian  and  Russian  Poland  as  events 
should  suggest  to  him,  engaging  only  not  to 
undertake  any  thing  injurious  to  the  rights  of 
Austria.  While  taking  care  to  furnish  no  pre- 
text for  complaint  to  the  court  of  Vienna,  Na- 
poleon nevertheless  repeated  that  he  was  quite 
prepared,  and  that,  if  she  was  bent  on  war, 
she  would  not  take  him  at  unawares.  Though 
satisfied  with  the  services  of  his  ambassador, 
M.  de  la  Rochefoucauld,  he  appointed  in  his 
stead  General  Andreossy,  who,  as  a  military 
man,  and  perfectly  acquainted  with  Austria, 
was  capable  of  observing  with  a  more  correct 
eye  the  nature  and  extent  of  the  preparations 
of  that  power. 

Napoleon,  at  this  extraordinary  moment  of 
his  reign,  conceived  the  idea  of  making  the 
east  subservient  to  his  projects  in  the  west. 
Turkey  was  in  a  state  of  crisis,  by  which  he 
hoped  to  benefit.  That  unfortunate  empire, 
threatened  ever  since  the  reign  of  Catharine, 
even  by  its  friends,  who,  seeing  its  provinces 
on  the  point  of  being  rent  from  it,  hastened  to 
prevent  their  rivals  from  seizing  them — wit- 
ness the  conduct  of  France  in  Egypt — that 
unfortunate  empire  had  sometimes  been  at- 
tracted towards  Napoleon  by  the  instinct  of  a 
common  interest,  sometimes  drawn  away  from 
him  by  the  intrigues  of  England  and  Russia, 
working  up  the  Divan  by  the  recollections  of 
the  Pyramids  and  Aboukir.  Having  made 
peace  at  the  time  of  the  Consulate,  relapsed 
into  coldness  at  the  creation  of  the  Empire, 
which  he  had  refused  to  recognise,  Sultan  Se- 
lim  had  been  definitively  brought  by  the  battle 
of  Austerlitz  to  a  reconciliation,  which  had 
soon  become  intimacy.  He  had  not  only  con- 
ceded to  Napoleon  the  title  of  Padishah,  at 
first  denied,  but  had  sent  to  Paris  an  ambas- 
sador extraordinary,  to  carry  him  congratula- 
tions and  presents  along  with  the  act  of  recog- 
nitnn.  Sultan  Selim,  in  acting  thus,  had 
indulged  the  real  inclination  of  his  heart, 
which  drew  him  towards  France,  in  spite  of 
the  intrigues  with  which  he  was  beset,  and 
the  redoubling  of  which  attested  the  deplor- 
able decline  of  the  empire.  This  prince,  mild, 
•liscreet,  enlightened  as  a  European,  fond  of 
the  civilization  of  the  west,  not  from  the  whim 
of  a  despot,  but  from  a  strong  sense  of  the  su- 
periority of  that  civilization  to  the  civilization 
of  the  east,  had,  from  his  youth,  when  he  was 
buried  in  the  voluptuous  obscurity  of  the  Se- 
raglio, kept  up,  through  M.  Ruffin,  personal 
and  secret  correspondence  with  Louis  XVI. 


Having  since  ascended  the  throne,  he  had  re- 
tained a  marked  preference  for  France,  and 
he  was  glad  to  find  in  her  victories  a  decisive 
reason  for  giving  himself  up  to  her.  The 
Russians  and  English  would  fain  have  com- 
bated this  inclination  even  by  force  of  arms. 
An  opportunity  offered  for  trying  their  influ- 
ence at  Constantinople ;  this  was  the  choice 
to  be  made  of  the  two  hospodars  of  Wallachia 
and  Moldavia.  The  hospodars  Ipsilanti  and 
Maruzzi,  devoted  to  England,  to  Russia,  to 
whomsoever  desired  the  ruin  of  the  Turkish 
empire,  for  they  were  the  real  precursors  of 
the  Greek  insurrection,  showed  themselves  in 
their  administration  the  declared  accomplices 
of  the  enemies  of  the  Porte.  Things  had  ar- 
rived at  such  a  point  that  the  latter  was  com- 
pelled to  recall  unfaithful  and  dangerous 
agents.  Russia  had  immediately  ordered 
General  Michelson  to  march  for  the  Dniester, 
with  an  army  of  60,000  men,  and  England  had 
sent  a  fleet  to  the  Dardanelles,  to  effect  by  this 
junction  of  forces  the  reinstatement  of  the  de- 
posed hospodars.  The  young  Emperor  Alex- 
ander, who  had  appeared  upon  the  stage  of 
the  world  only  to  sustain  the  memorable  de- 
feat of  Austerlitz,  said  to  himself  that,  amidst 
this  sanguinary  fray  of  all  the  European  na- 
tions, it  behooved  him  to  take  advantage  of 
circumstances,  and  to  advance  towards  Tur- 
key, that,  whatever  might  be  the  chances  of 
fortune  between  the  Rhine  and  the  Niemen, 
what  he  should  take  in  the  east  would  par- 
haps  be  left  him  to  compensate  what  others 
should  take  in  the  west. 

This  calculation  was  plausible  enough  : 
but,  having  Napoleon  on  his  hands,  he  acted 
with  little  prudence  in  depriving  himself  of 
60,000  men,  and  sending  them  upon  the  Pruth. 
The  proof  of  this  fault  is  manifested  in  the 
joy  which  Napoleon  feh  when  informed  that 
a  rupture  was  likely  to  take  place  between 
Russia  and  the  Porte.  It  was  in  this  antici- 
pation that  he  had  attached  such  importance 
to  the  occupation  of  Dalmatia,  which  permit- 
ted him  to  keep  an  army  on  the  frontier  of 
Bosnia,  and  afforded  him  facility  to  succour 
or  to  annoy  the  Porte,  according  to  the  cir- 
cumstances of  his  policy.  On  perceiving  the 
approach  of  that  crisis,  which  he  desired  the 
more  ardently  the  more  serious  the  aspect  of 
events  became,  he  had  chosen  for  his  ambas- 
sador at  Constantinople  a  soldier,  a  native  of 
Corsica,  like  himself,  who  united  remarkable 
political  sagacity  to  military  experience :  this 
was  General  Sebastiani,  who  had  already  been 
employed  on  a  mission  in  Turkey,  of  which 
he  had  most  satisfactorily  acquitted  himself. 
Napoleon  had  given  him  express  instructions 
to  excite  the  Turks  against  the  Russians,  and 
to  exert  all  his  efforts  to  provoke  a  war  in  the 
east  He  had  authorized  him  to  draw  from 
Dalmatia  officers  of  artillery  and  engineers, 
and  even  General  Marmont's  25,000  men,  if 
the  Porte,  driven  to  extremities,  should  desire 
the  presence  of  a  French  army.  The  battle 
of  Austerlitz  having  reconciled  Sultan  Selim 
with  Napoleon,  the  battle  of  Jena  was,  in  fact, 
likely  enough  to  embolden  him  to  go  to  war. 
Napoleon  wrote  to  that  prince,  offering  him 
an  alliance  defensive  and  offensive,  to  induce 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


217 


him  to  seize  this  opportunity  of  raising  the 
Crescent  again,  and  informing  him  that  he 
was  about  to  render  the  Turks  the  greatest 
service  that  it  was  possible  to  do  them,  t»  re- 
pair the  greatest  disaster  which  they  had  ever 
sustained,  by  endeavouring  to  re-establish 
Poland.  Orders  were  given  to  General  Mar- 
mont  to  hold  in  readiness  all  the  succours 
that  should  be  applied  for  by  the  Porte,  and  to 
General  Sebastiani  to  neglect  nothing  to  kin- 
dle a  conflagration  which  should  extend  from 
the  Dardanelles  to  the  mouths  of  the  Danube. 
In  thus  setting  the  Russians  and  Turks  toge- 
ther by  the  ears,  Napoleon  proposed  to  himself 
a  twofold  object,  that  of  dividing  the  Russian 
forces,  and  that  of  throwing  Austria  into  cruel 
perplexities.  Austria,  no  doubt,  hated  France, 
but,  when  she  should  see  the  Russians  over- 
running the  shores  of  the  Black  Sea,  she 
would  necessarily  feel  apprehensions  that 
would  be  a  very  powerful  diversion  to  her 
hatred. 

That  immense  quarrel,  kept  up  for  the  last 
fifteen  years  between  Europe  and  the  French 
Revolution,  was  thus  about  to  spread  from  the 
Rhine  to  the  Vistula,  from  Berlin  to  Constan- 
tinople. Involved  in  a  war  of  extermination, 
Napoleon  had  recourse  to  means  proportioned 
to  the  magnitude  of  his  designs.  His  first  care 
was  to  levy  a  new  conscription.  At  the  end 
of  1805,  he  had  called  out  the  first  half  of  the 
conscription  of  1806,  and  had  just  called  out 
the  second  half  at  the  moment  of  his  entry 
into  Prussia.  He  resolved  to  act  in  the  same 
manner  in  regard  to  the  conscription  of  1807, 
and  in  calling  it  out  immediately,  though  it 
was  not  yet  the  end  of  1806,  to  spare  the  young 
men  of  that  class  for  training,  for  gaining 
their  full  strength,  for  breaking  themselves  to 
the  fatigues  of  war.  With  the  spirit  that  per- 
vaded the  skeletons,  this  was  more  than  was 
needed  to  form  excellent  soldiers.  This  new 
levy  of  men  would,  moreover,  make  a  consi- 
derable addition  to  the  general  effective  of  the 
army.  That  effective,  which  in  1805,  at  the 
time  of  leaving  Boulogne,  amounted  to  450,000, 
which  was  raised  by  the  conscription  of 
1806  to  503,000,  would  be  further  augmented 
by  the  conscription  of  1807  to  580,000.  An- 
nual liberations  being  forbidden  during  the 
war,  the  army  was  thus  augmented  by  every 
conscription ;  for  battle  and  disease  did  not 
diminish  the  effective  by  a  number  of  men 
equal  to  that  called  out.  The  campaign  of 
Austria  had  not  cost  more  than  20,000  men  ; 
that  of  Prussia  had  not  yet  cost  any.  It  is 
true  that,  the  war  being  carried  every  day  to  a 
greater  distance  and  under  severer  climates, 
the  quality  of  the  troops  being  lowered  in  pro- 
portion as  young  recruits  stepped  into  the 
place  of  the  veteran  soldiers  of  the  Revolu- 
tion, the  losses  would  soon  be  more  sensibly 
felt.  But  they  were  as  yet  of  little  import- 
ance, and  the  army,  composed  of  tried  sol- 
diers, made  young  rather  than  weakened  by 
the  addition  of  a  certain  number  of  conscripts 
to  the  war  battalions,  had  attained  its  state  of 
perfection. 

Napoleon  wrote,  therefore,  to  M.  de  Lacuee, 
ordering  him  to  call  out  the  class  of  1807.  M. 
de  Lacuee  was  the  person  in  the  ministry  of 

VOL.  II.— 28 


war  officially  charged  with  these  calls.  He 
was  an  able  functionary,  devoted  to  the  Em 
peror,  and  determined  to  overcome  the  difficul- 
ties of  a  very  ungrateful  task,  under  a  govern- 
ment under  which  there  was  so  great  a  con- 
sumption of  men.  Though  he  was  not 
minister  of  war,  Napoleon  corresponded  im- 
mediately with  him,  feeling  it  necessary  to 
guide,  to  support,  to  excite  him  by  direct  com- 
munications. "  You  will  see,"  he  wrote  to 
him,  "  by  a  message  addressed  to  the  Senate, 
that  I  am  calling  out  the  conscription  of  1807, 
and  that  I  will  not  lay  down  arms  till  I  have 
peace  with  England  and  Russia.  I  see  by  the 
statements  that  the  whole  of  the  conscription 

of  1806  will   have   marched You  shall 

have  no  need  to  await  my  orders  for  the  dis- 
tribution among  the  different  corps.  I  have 
not  yet  lost  any  men,  but  the  project  which  I 
have  formed  is  more  vast  than  any  that  I  ever 
conceived;  and  from  this  lime,  I  must  find 
myself  in  a  position  to  cope  with  all  events." 
(Berlin,  November  22nd,  1806 — Depot  of  the 
Secretary  of  State's  Office.) 

Napoleon,  following  the  practice  which  he 
had  adopted  in  the  preceding  year,  of  reserv- 
ing for  the  Senate  the  vote  of  the  contingent, 
sent  a  message  to  that  body  to  demand  of  it 
the  conscription  of  1807,  and  to  acquaint  it 
with  the  extension  given  to  his  policy  since  he 
had  annihilated  Prussia.  In  this  message,  in 
which  the  energy  of  the  style  equalled  that  of 
the  ideas,  he  said  that  till  then  the  monarchs 
of  Europe  had  played  with  the  generosity  of 
France ;  that,  when  one  coalition  was  conquer- 
ed, another  immediately  sprang  up;  that  no 
sooner  was  that  of  1805  dissolved  than  he  had 
to  fight  that  of  1806;  that  it  behooved  France 
to  be  less  generous  in  future;  that  the  con- 
quered states  should  be  retained  till  the  gene- 
ral peace  oft  land  and  sea ;  that  England,  re- 
gardless of  all  the  rights  of  nations,  launching 
a  commercial  interdict  against  one  quarter  of 
the  globe,  must  be  struck  with  the  same  inter- 
dict, and  it  must  be  rendered  as  rigorous  as 
the  nature  of  the  things  permitted  ;  that,  finally, 
it  would  be  better,  since  they  were  doomed  to 
war,  to  plunge  in  wholly  than  to  go  but  half- 
way into  it;  that  this  was  the  way  to  termi- 
nate it  more  completely  and  more  solidly  by  a 
general  and  durable  peace.  His  style  expressed 
with  the  utmost  vigour  those  ideas  of  which 
he  was  full.  Pride,  exasperation,  confidence, 
were  alike  conspicuous.  He  then  claimed 
means  proportioned  to  his  ends,  and  these  con- 
sisted, as  we  have  just  mentioned,  in  the  con- 
scription of  1807  levied  at  the  end  of  1806. 

We  have  already  explained  the  precautions 
taken  by  Napoleon,  in  the  twofold  hypothesis 
of  a  long  war  in  the  north,  and  of  an  unfore- 
seen attack  on  any  part  whatever' of  his  vast 
empire.  The  third  battalions  of  the  regiments 
of  the  grand  army,  forming  depots,  were,  as 
we  have  seen,  ranged  along  the  Rhine,  undet 
Marshal  Kellermann,  or  in  the  camp  of  Bou 
logne,  under  Marshal  Brune.  These  third  bat- 
talions, already  filled  by  conscripts  of  1806, 
soon  to  be  by  those  of  1807,  carefully  trained 
and  equipped,  under  Marshal  Kellermaan, 
might,  if  wanted,  join  the  eighth  corps,  com- 
manded by  Marshal  Mortier  to  cover  the  Rhinn; 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Nov.  1806. 


or  those  under  Marshal  Brune  might  join  the 
King  of  Holland,  to  cover  either  Holland,  or 
the  coast  of  France  as  far  as  the  Seine.  Such 
of  these  regiments  as  were  neither  in  Ger- 
many nor  Italy,  assembled  in  the  interior,  at 
St.  Lo,  at  Pontivy,  at  Napoleonville,  formed 
into  small  camps,  were  destined  to  proceed  to 
Cherbourg,  Brest,  La  Rochelle,  or  Bordeaux. 
Detachments  of  national  guards,  not  nume- 
rous, but  well  chosen,  one  at  St.  Omer,  one  in 
the  Lower  Seine,  a  third  in  the  environs  of 
Bordeaux,  were  to  concur  in  defence  of  threat- 
ened points.  Some  corps  concentrated  in 
Paris  were  to  travel  thither  by  post. 

The  same  system  had  been  adopted,  as  we 
have  already  seen,  for  the  army  of  Italy.  The 
third  battalions  of  the  army,  spread  over  Up- 
per Italy,  were  dedicated  to  the  instruction  of 
the  conscripts,  and  furnished  at  the  same  time 
the  garrisons  of  the  fortresses.  The  war  bat- 
talions were  with  the  three  active  armies  of 
Naples,  the  Frioul,  and  Dalmatia. 

Napoleon  resolved,  in  the  first  place,  to  draw 
from  the  depots  the  reinforcements  necessary 
for  the  grand  army,  and  to  fill  the  vacancy 
which  he  should  leave  in  them  with  the  new 
conscription ;  and  as  that  vacancy  would  be 
filled,  and  much  more  than  filled,  by  the  con- 
tingent of  1807,  to  avail  himself  of  the  sur- 
plus to  raise  the  battalions  to  1000  or  1200 
men,  and  the  cavalry  regiments  to  an  effective 
of  700  men,  instead  of  500.  He  resolved  also 
to  augment  the  effective  of  the  companies  of 
artillery,  having  perceived  that  the  enemy,  to 
compensate  for  the  quality  of  his  troops,  was 
greatly  increasing  the  number  of  his  guns. 
The  depot  battalions,  being  augmented  to  1000 
or  1200  men,  there  might  always  be  drafted 
from  them,  besides  the  recruiting  of  the  active 
army,  the  best  trained  300  or  400  men,  to  be 
sent  to  any  quarter  where  an  unforeseen  want 
of  them  might  arise. 

Napoleon  had  already  drawn  from  the  de- 
p6ts  about  12,000  men,  who  had  been  conducted 
in  large  detachments  from  Alsace  into  Fran- 
conia,  from  Franconia  into  Saxony,  to  fill  the 
vacancies  produced  in  his  ranks  by  the  war. 
Seven  or  eight  thousand  had  just  arrived,  four 
or  five  thousand  were  still  on  the  march.  This 
was  not  a  full  equivalent  for  what  he  had  lost, 
much  more,  however,  from  fatigue  than  by 
battle.  Bearing  in  mind,  above  all,  the  dis- 
tance to  which  the  war  was  about  to  be  car- 
ried, he  devised  a  system,  profoundly  conceived, 
for  bringing  the  conscripts  from  the  Rhine  to 
the  Vistula — for  bringing  them  thither  in  such 
a  manner,  that  they  should  incur  no  danger 
during  the  long  journey,  that  they  should  not 
disperse  upon  the  road,  and  that  they  should 
have  it  in  their  power  to  render  services  by 
the  way  upon  the  rear  of  the  army.  These 
detachments,  drawn  from  each  depot  battalion, 
were  to  form  several  companies,  according  to 
their  number;  these  companies  were  to  be  then 
united  into  battalions,  and  these  battalions  into 
provisional  regiments,  of  twelve  or  fifteen  hun- 
dred men.  Officers,  taken  temporarily  from 
tlie  depots,  were  to  be  given  them  for  the  route, 
and  they  were  to  be  organized,  as  if  they  were 
o  form  definitive  regiments.  Setting  out  with 


this  organization,  and  with  their  complete 
equipment,  they  had  orders  to  stop  at  the  fort- 
resses situated  on  our  line  of  operation,  such 
as  Erfurt,  Halle,  Magdeburg,  Wittenberg,  Span- 
dau.  Ciistrin,  Frankfurt  on  the  Oder;  to  rest 
if  they  had  need  of  rest,  and  to  keep  garrison 
there,  if  it  were  necessary  for  the  safety  of  our 
rear;  and,  wherever  they  made  a  halt,  they 
were  to  resume  the  military  exercises,  that  the 
instruction  of  the  men  might  not  be  neglected 
during  a  journey  of  several  months.  They 
would  thus  cover  the  communications  of  the 
army,  and  obviate  the  necessity  of  weakening 
it  by  too  great  a  number  of  garrisons  left  in 
rear,  and  therefore  in  some  measure  augment 
its  effective  before  they  could  actually  join  it. 

Having  arrived  at  the  theatre  of  war,  they 
were  to  be  dissolved  by  the  despatch  of  each 
detachment  to  its  corps,  and  the  officers  were 
to  return  by  post  to  their  depots,  to  fetch  other 
recruits. 

The  same  organization  was  adopted  for  the 
cavalry,  with  some  particular  precautions 
commanded  by  the  nature  of  that  arm. 

In  all  the  fortresses  converted  into  grand  de- 
pots, such  as  Wurzburg,  Erfurt,  Wittenberg, 
Spandau,  orders  were  given  for  collecting 
there,  by  means  of  the  resources  which  the 
country  afforded,  clothing,  shoes,  arms,  in 
abundance.  The  commandants  of  those  places 
were  enjoined  to  inspect  every  provisional  re- 
j  giment  that  passed,  to  supply  clothing  and 
arms  for  such  men  as  were  in  want  of  them, 
and  to  detain  those  who  had  need  of  rest. 
The  next  corps  that  passed  were  to  pick  up 
|  the  men  left  on  the  way  by  those  which  had 
preceded  them,  and,  finding  as  many  men  and 
horses  to  take  as  they  left  behind,  they  were 
always  sure  to  arrive  complete  at  the  theatre  of 
war.  Napoleon,  reading  assiduously  the  report? 
of  the  commandants  of  the  fortresses  through 
which  the  provisional  regiments  passed,  in- 
cessantly comparing  them  together,  repri- 
manded the  slightest  negligence,  and  thus  in- 
sured punctual  attention  from  all.  It  required 
nothing  short  of  such  combinations,  supported 
by  such  vigilance,  to  keep  entire  so  large  an 
army  at  so  vast  a  distance. 

Napoleon  not  only  purposed  to  keep  up  ihe 
corps  at  the  effective  which  they  had  at  the 
time  of  entering  upon  the  campaign,  he  de- 
signed also  to  draw  new  corps  to  the  grand 
army.  He  had  left,  as  we  have  seen,  three 
regiments  in  Paris,  to  form  a  reserve,  which 
could  be  despatched  to  the  coasts  of  France, 
if  they  were  threatened.  He  conceived  that 
he  could  dispose  of  two  of  these  regiments, 
the  58th  of  the  line,  and  the  15th  light,  in  coa 
sequence  of  the  considerable  increase  of  the 
conscripts  in  the  depots.  There  were  in  Paris 
six  third  battalions  belonging  to  regiments 
which  had  four  battalions.  The  conscription 
was  to  raise  each  of  them  to  1000  men.  Ju- 
not,  governor  of  Paris,  had  orders  to  review 
them  several  times  a  week,  and  to  make  them 
manoeuvre  in  his  presence.  It  was  a  reserve 
of  6000  men,  always  ready  to  set  out  post  for 
Boulogne,  Cherbourg,  or  Brest,  and  which  al- 
lowed the  58th  of  the  line  and  the  15th  light 
to  be  removed  without  inconvenience.  These 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


219 


two  regiments,  considered  as  among  the  finest 
in  the  army,  were  marched  off  for  the  Elbe,  by 
Wesel  and  Westphalia, 

It  will  be  recollected  that  Napoleon  had  re- 
solved to  convert  the  velites  into  fusileers  of  the 
guard.  Thanks  to  the  prompt  execution  of 
what  he  ordered,  a  regiment  of  two  battalions, 
amounting  to  1400  men,  the  soldiers  of  which 
had  been  carefully  selected  from  the  annual 
contingent,  and  the  officers  and  subalterns 
taken  from  the  guard,  was  already  completely 
formed.  Napoleon  directed  it  to  be  kept  for 
the  time  strictly  necessary  for  its  instruction, 
and  then  sent  by  post  from  Paris  to  Mayence. 

The  guard  of  the  capital  was  then,  as  now, 
committed  to  a  municipal  force,  consisting  of 
two  regiments,  and  called  regiments  of  the  Paris 
guard.  Napoleon  had  recommended  that  the 
effective  of  these  two  regiments  should  be 
augmented  as  much  as  possible  by  men  taken 
from  the  last  conscription.  Reaping  the  bene- 
fit of  his  foresight,  he  could,  without  stripping 
Paris  too  much,  take  from  them  two  battalions, 
which  would  furnish  a  regiment  of  twelve  or 
thirteen  hundred  men,  of  excellent  quality  and 
appearance.  He  ordered  them  to  be  sent  off 
for  the  army,  thinking  that  a  body  of  troops 
which  had  been  employed  in  keeping  order  at 
home  ought  not  to  be  deprived  of  the  honour 
of  contributing  abroad  to  the  greatness  of  the 
country,  to  which  it  would  return  better  and 
more  respected. 

The  workmen  at  the  ports  were  without  em- 
ployment and  without  bread,  because  naval 
operations  languished  amidst  the  immense 
development  given  to  the  continental  war. 
Napoleon  found  useful  occupation  and  wages 
for  them.  He  composed  out  of  them  batta- 
lions of  infantry,  which  were  charged  to  guard 
the  ports  to  which  they  belonged,  with  a  pro- 
mise that  they  should  never  be  required  to 
leave  them.  They  might  be  relied  on,  for 
they  were  attached  to  the  establishments  in- 
trusted to  their  vigilance,  and  they  partook, 
besides,  of  the  martial  spirit  of  the  navy. 
Thanks  to  this  idea,  Napoleon  was  enabled 
to  take  from  the  coast  service  three  fine  regi- 
ments, the  19th,  15th,  and  31st  of  the  line, 
which  were  at  Boulogne,  Brest  and  St.  Lo. 
They  were,  like  the  others,  increased  to  2000 
men  for  the  two  battalions,  and  sent  off  for 
the  grand  army. 

Thus  there  were  seven  new  regiments  of  in- 
fantry, capable  of  forming  the  nucleus  of  a  fine 
corps  d'armee,  that  Napoleon  had  the  art  to  draw 
from  France,  without  weakening  the  interior 
too  much.  To  these  regiments  was  to  be 
joined  the  Legion  of  the  North,  filled  with 
Poles,  and  which  was  already  on  march  for 
Germany. 

That  which  seemed  particularly  desirable 
to  Napoleon,  and  the  utility  of  which  he  ap- 
preciated, perhaps,  to  exaggeration,  at  a  mo- 
ment when  he  was  leaving  the  plains  of 
Prussia  and  entering  those  of  Poland,  was 
the  cavalry.  He  had  recently  drawn  from 
Mayence,  and  marched  off  on  foot,  partly  to- 
wards Hesse,  partly  towards  Prussia,  all  the 
trained  horse-soldiers  that  were  at  the  depots. 
He  had  ordered  that  their  horses  should  be  left 
in  France,  and  that  they  should  be  supplied 


from  those  which  had  been  collected  in  Ger- 
many.  Marshal  Mortier,  on  entering  the  states 
of  the  elector  of  Hesse,  had  disbanded  the 
army  of  that  prince.  This  had  furnished  four 
or  five  thousand  excellent  horses,  part  of 
which  had  served  for  mounting  immediately 
a  thousand  French  horse-soldiers,  and  the 
others  had  been  sent  to  Potsdam.  There  were 
at  Potsdam  vast  stables,  built  by  the  great 
Frederick,  who  frequently  took  delight  in  see- 
ing a  great  number  of  squadrons  maneuvering 
at  once,  in  the  delightful  retreat  where  he 
lived  as  king,  philosopher,  and  warrior.  Na- 
poleon there  created,  under  the  cannon  of 
Spandau,  an  immense  establishment  for  the 
accommodation  of  his  cavalry.  Here  he  col- 
lected all  the  horses  taken  from  the  enemy, 
besides  a  great  quantity  of  others  bought  in 
the  different  provinces  of  Prussia.  General 
Bourcier,  who  had  quitted  the  active  army 
after  honourable  services,  was  placed  at  the 
head  of  this  depot,  with  the  recommendation 
i  not  to  leave  it  for  a  moment ;  to  see,  with  his 
|  own  eyes,  that  due  attention  was  paid  to  the 
;  numerous  horses  collected  there ;  to  mount 
with  them  the  cavalry  regiments  coming  on 
foot  from  France ;  to  stop  those  which  passed 
through  Prussia,  to  review  them,  to  furnish 
them  with  horses  in  place  of  those  that  were 
knocked  up  or  scarcely  capable  of  service ;  to 
detain,  also,  such  men  as  were  sick,  and  to 
send  them  off  with  regiments  coming  after 
them.  The  workmen  of  Berlin,  having  no- 
thing to  do  in  consequence  of  the  departure 
of  the  court  and  the  nobility,  were  to  be  em- 
ployed in.  this  depot,  for  wages,  in  saddlers', 
harness-makers',  shoe-makers'  and  wheel- 
wrights' work. 

It  was  to  Italy  that  Napoleon  thought  to 
have  recourse  for  procuring  cavalry.  No- 
where was  it  of  less  use.  In  Naples,  they 
never  had  to  encounter  any  but  Calabrese 
mountaineers  or  English,  landing  from  their 
ships  without  horse-soldiers.  There  were  at 
Naples  sixteen  regiments  of  cavalry;  some  of 
them  cuirassiers,  and  among  the  finest  in  the 
army.  Napoleon  directed  ten  of  them  to  be 
marched  towards  Upper  Italy — leaving  only 
six,  all  of  which  were  light  cavalry,  and  the 
effective  of  which  he  was  enabled  to  increase 
to  a  thousand  men  each, in  consequence  of 
the  great  number  of  the  conscripts  sent  be- 
yond the  Alps.  They  would  thus  form  a  force  . 
of  6000  men,  furnishing  4000  horse-soldiers, 
always  ready  to  mount,  and  fully  adequate  to 
the  service  of  observation,  which  they  had  to 
perform  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples. 

Neither  were  the  intersected  plains  of  Lom- 
bardy,  in  which  canals,  rivers,  long  screens 
of  trees,  render  the  movements  of  cavalry  so 
difficult,  a  country  where  it  was  very  neces- 
sary. Besides,  ten  regiments  of  that  army, 
transferred  from  the  south  to  the  north  of  Ita- 
ly, would  allow  some  to  be  detached  and  sent 
off  to  the  grand  army.  Napoleon  drew  from 
this  source  a  division  of  cuirassiers,  formed 
of  four  superb  regiments,  which  afterwards 
distinguished  themselves  under  the  command 
of  General  d'Espagne.  He  drew  from  it  light 
cavalry,  also,  and  gave  orders  for  despatching 
successively  to  Germany  the  19th,  24fn,  ICth, 


220 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1806. 


3d,  and  24th  regiments  of  chasseurs,  which 
made,  with  the  four  of  cuirassiers,  nine  regi- 
ments of  cavalry  borrowed  from  Italy.  This 
was  a  force  of  5000  horse  at  least,  travelling 
partly  with  iheir  horses,  partly  on  foot — the 
latter  being  destined  to  be  mounted  in  Ger- 
many. 

Napoleon  was  occupied,  at  the  same  time, 
in  placing  the  army  of  Italy  on  the  war  foot- 
ing. He  had  taken  care  to  send  it  20,000  men 
of  the  conscription  of  1806,  and  he  had  recom- 
mended to  Prince  Eugene  to  pay  continual 
attention  to  their  training.  When  ready  to 
penetrate  iuto  the  north — leaving  upon  his 
rear  Austria,  more  terrified,  but  more  hostile, 
since  Jena — he  gave  orders  to  proceed  with- 
out delay  to  the  formation  of  the  active  divi- 
sions, so  that  they  might  be  fit  to  take  the 
field  immediately.  In  Frioul,  there  were  al- 
ready two  divisions  fully  organized.  He  or- 
dered their  artillery  to  be  completed  to  twelve 
pieces  for  each  division.  He  gave  directions 
to  form  forthwith,  on  the  war  footing,  one  divi- 
sion at  Venice,  one  at  Brescia,  a  third  at  Alex- 
andria, each  nine  or  ten  battalions  strong,  to 
prepare  their  artillery,  to  compose  their  equi- 
pages, and  to  appoint  their  staff".  He  followed 
the  same  course  in  regard  to  the  cavalry.  He 
directed  the  regiments  of  dragoons  drawn  from 
Naples  to  be  raised  to  their  complement,  both 
of  men  and  horses,  and  to  be  provided,  more- 
over, with  a  division  of  light  artillery.  These 
five  divisions  amounted  together  to  45,000 
infantry  and  7000  cavalry,  making  a  total  of 
52,000  present  under  arms.  This  force,  aug- 
mented, in  case  of  need,  by  Marmont's  corps 
and  by  part  of  the  army  of  Naples,  would  be 
sufficient,  in  the  hands  of  a  man  like  Massena, 
to  keep  the  Austrians  in  check,  especially  if 
it  supported  itself  upon  such  fortresses  as 
Palma-Nova,  Legnago,  Venice,  Mantua,  and 
Alexandria.  Napoleon  ordered  the  eight  depot 
battalions  of  the  army  of  Dal  mat ia  to  be  esta- 
blished in  Venice,  the  seven  of  the  corps  of 
the  Frioul  in  Osopo  and  Palma-Nova,  the 
fourteen  of  the  army  of  Naples,  in  Peschiera, 
Legnago,  and  Mantua.  Each  of  these  batta- 
lions contained  already  more  than  1000  men, 
since  the  contingent  of  1806,  and  would  soon 
have  1 100  or  1200  on  the  arrival  of  the  contin- 
gent of  1807.  It  would  then  become  easy  to 
extract  from  them  the  companies  of  voltigeurs 
and  grenadiers,  and  with  these  to  compose 
excellent  active  divisions.  Such  was  the  fruit 
of  a  vigilance  that  was  never  relaxed.  Napo- 
leon, moreover,  ordered  the  provisioning  of 
the  fortresses  to  be  completed  without  delay. 

Thus  wholly  engrossed  in  developing  the  vast 
plan  of  precautions  adopted  on  his  departure 
from  Paris,  Napoleon  screened  France  from 
all  insult  on  the  part  of  the  English,  secured 
Italy  from  all  sudden  hostility  on  the  part  of 
the  Austrians,  and  without  disorganizing  the 
means  of  defence  of  either,  he  drew  from  the 
first  seven  regiments  of  infantry,  from  the 
second  nine  regiments  of  cavalry,  indepen-  | 
dently  of  the  provisional  regiments  which, 
setting  out  incessantly  from  the  Rhine,  would 
ensure  the  recruiting  of  the  grand  army,  and 
tht  safety  of  his  rear. 
The  reinforcements  which,  within  a  month, 


were  likely  to  augment  the  grand  army,  may 
be  computed  at  about  50.000  men.  With  the 
corps  which  had  already  joined  it,  since  its 
entry  into  Prussia,  and  which  had  raised  it  to 
about  190,000  men,  with  those  which  were 
preparing  to  join,  with  the  German,  Dutch, 
and  Italian  auxiliaries,  it  would  amount  to 
near  300,000  men  :  and,  such  is  the  inevitable 
scattering  of  the  forces,  even  under  the  direc- 
tion of  the  ablest  general,  that,  after  deducting 
from  these  300,000  men  the  wounded,  the 
sick,  who  became  more  numerous  in  winter 
and  in  severe  climates,  the  detachments  on 
march,  the  corps  placed  in  observation,  you 
could  not  flatter  yourself  to  bring  more  than 
150,000  men  into  fire.  So  necessary  is  it  that 
the  resources  should  exceed  the  foreseen 
wants,  in  order  that  they  may  merely  supply 
the  real  wants !  And  if  we  extend  this  ob- 
servation to  the  whole  of  the  forces  of  France 
in  1806,  we  shall  see  that,  with  a  total  army 
amounting  for  the  entire  empire  to  580,000 — 
to  650,000,  including  the  auxiliaries — 300,000 
at  most  could  be  present  on  the  theatre  of  war, 
between  the  Rhine  and  the  Vistula,  150,000 
upon  the  Vistula  itself,  and  perhaps  80,000 
upon  the  fields  of  battle,  where  the  fate  of  the 
world  was  to  be  decided.  And  yet  never  had 
so  many  men  and  horses  marched,  never  had 
so  many  cannon  rolled  with  that  force  of  ag- 
gregation towards  one  and  the  same  goal. 

It  was  not  enough  to  bring  the  soldiers 
together;  financial  resources  were  required  for 
supplying  all  that  they  needed.  Napoleon, 
having  succeeded  in  raising  his  budget  in  war 
time  to  700  millions,  (820  with  the  cost  of  col- 
lection,) had  the  means  of  keeping  an  army 
of  450,000  men.  But  he  would  soon  have 
600,000  to  pay.  He  resolved  to  draw  from  the 
conquered  countries  the  resources  necessary 
for  paying  his  new  armaments.  Possessed  of 
Hesse,  Westphalia,  Hanover,  the  Hanseatic 
towns,  Mecklenburg,  lastly  Prussia,  he  could, 
without  inhumanity,  lay  contributions  on  these 
different  countries.  He  had  suffered  the  Prus- 
sian authorities  to  remain  everywhere,  and 
placed  at  their  head  General  Clarke  for  the 
political  administration  of  the  country,  M. 
Daru  for  the  financial  administration.  The 
latter,  able,  assiduous,  upright,  had  made  him- 
self master  of  all  the  financial  affairs,  and 
was  as  well  acquainted  with  them  as  the  best 
Prussian  employes, 

The  monarchy  of  Frederick  William,  com- 
posed at  this  period  of  East  Prussia,  extend- 
ing from  Konigsberg  to  Stettin,  Polish  Prussia, 
Silesia,  Brandenburg,  the  provinces  to  the  left 
of  the  Elbe,  Westphalia,  the  enclosed  districts 
situated  in  Franconia,  might  yield  its  govern- 
ment about  120  millions  of  francs,  the  costs 
of  collection  being  paid  upon  the  produce  it- 
self, most  part  of  the  wants  of  the  army  being 
supplied  by  local  taxes,  the  repair  of  the  roads 
ensured  by"  certain  rates  imposed  upon  the 
farmers  of  the  domains  of  the  Crown.  In 
these  120  millions  of  revenue,  the  land-tax 
furnished  35  or  36  millions,  the  farming  of  the 
domains  of  the  Crown  18,  the  produce  of  the 
excise,  which  consisted  of  duties  on  liquors, 
and  on  the  transit  of  merchandise,  50,  the 
monopoly  of  salt  9  or  10.  Various  accessory 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


221 


imposts  made  up  the  remainder  of  the  120 
millions.  Functionaries,  collected  into  provin- 
cial commissions,  under  the  appellation  of 
Chambers  of  Domains  and  War,  superintended 
their  assessment,  their  collection,  and  the  farm- 
ing of  the  domains  of  the  Crown. 

Napoleon  decided  that  this  administration 
should  be  suffered  to  exist,  even  with  its 
abuses,  which  M.  Daru  had  soon  discovered, 
and  he  notified  to  the  Prussian  government 
itself  to  assist  it  in  correcting  them,  that,  at- 
tached to  each  provincial  administration,  there 
should  be  a  French  agent  to  keep  an  eye 
upon  the  collection  of  the  revenues,  and  upon 
their  payment  into  the  central  chest  of  the 
French  army.  Daru  was  to  superintend  these 
agents,  and  to  centralize  their  operations. 
Thus  the  finances  of  Prussia  were  about  to  be 
administered  on  the  account  of  Napoleon  and 
for  his  profit.  It  was  foreseen,  however,  that 
the  annual  produce  of  120  millions  would  sink 
to  70  or  80  in  consequence  of  existing  circum- 
stances. Napoleon,  exercising  his  right  of 
conquest,  was  not  content  with  the  ordinary 
imposts,  and  decreed  in  addition  a  war  con- 
tribution, which,  for  all  Prussia,  might  amount 
to  200  millions.  It  was  to  be  levied  gradually, 
in  the  course  of  the  occupation,  over  and 
above  the  ordinary  taxes.  Napoleon  also 
levied  a  war  contribution  on  Hesse,  Bruns- 
wick, Hanover,  and  the  Hanseatic  towns,  in- 
dependently of  the  seizure  of  English  merchan- 
dise. 

At  this  rate  the  army  was  to  subsist  itself, 
and  to  consume  nothing  without  paying  for  it. 
Numerous  purchases  of  horses,  immense  or- 
ders for  clothing,  shoes,  harness,  gun-carriages, 
given  in  all  the  towns,  but  more  particularly 
in  Berlin,  with  the  view  to  occupy  the  work- 
men, and  to  provide  for  the  wants  of  the 
French  army,  were  paid  for  out  of  the  produce 
of  the  contributions,  ordinary  and  extraordi- 
nary. 

The  contributions,  heavy,  no  doubt,  were 
still  the  least  vexatious  mode  of  exercising 
the  right  of  war,  which  authorizes  the  con- 
queror to  live  upon  the  conquered  country; 
for  it  substituted  the  regular  collection  of  the 
tax  to  the  wasteful  extravagance  of  the  sol- 
diers. For  the  rest,  the  most  rigid  discipline, 
the  most  complete  respect  for  private  property, 
excepting  the  ravages  of  the  field  of  battle, 
happily  confined  to  very  few  localities,  com- 
pensated these  inevitable  hardships  of  the 
war.  And,  assuredly,  if  we  go  back  to  the 
past,  we  shall  find  that  never  did  armies  be- 
have with  less  barbarity  and  with  so  much 
humanity. 

Napoleon,  disposed  by  policy  to  spare  the 
court  of  Saxony,  had  offered  it  an  armistice 
and  a  peace  after  Jena.  That  court,  honest 
and  timid,  had  joyfully  accepted  such  an  act 
of  clemency,  and  submitted  to  the  discretion 
of  the  conqueror.  Napoleon  agreed  to  admit 
it  into  the  New  Confederation  of  the  Rhine, 
and  to  change  the  title  of  elector,  borne  by 
the  sovereign,  into  the  title  of  king,  on  con- 
dition of  a  military  contingent  of  20,000  men, 
reduced  for  this  time  to  6000,  in  consideration 
of  circumstances.  This  extension  of  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine  afforded  great  advan- 


tages, for  it  insured  to  our  armies  a  free  pas- 
sage through  Germany,  and  the  possession  at 
all  times  of  the  line  of  the  Elbe.  To  compen- 
sate the  charges  of  military  occupation,  which 
were  spared  Saxony  by  this  treaty,  she  agreed 
to  pay  a  contribution  of  twenty-five  millions, 
in  specie,  or  in  bills  of  exchange  at  a  short 
date. 

Napoleon,  therefore,  could,  while  the  war 
lasted,  dispose  of  three  hundred  millions  at 
least.  Carrying  foresight  to  the  utmost  length, 
he  did  not  suffer  his  minister  of  the  treasury 
to  lull  hjmself  to  sleep  in  confidence  on  the 
resources  found  in  Germany.  The  sum  of 
twenty-four  millions  was  due  to  the  grand 
army  for  arrears  of  pay.  Napoleon  required 
that  this  sum  should  be  deposited  partly  in 
Slrasburg,  partly  at  Paris,  in  metallic  specie, 
because  he  would  not  submit  to  the  necessity 
of  running  in  a  pressing  emergency  after  pa- 
per for  the  payment  of  which  there  would  be 
a  longer  or  shorter  time  to  wait.  Accordingly, 
he  left  the  money  in  deposit  at  Paris  and  on 
the  Rhine,  intending  to  use  it  at  a  future  time, 
and  meanwhile  caused  the  arrears  to  be  dis- 
charged out  of  the  revenues  of  the  conquered 
country,  that  his  soldiers  might  have  their  pay 
to  spend  while  they  were  yet  in  the  towns  of 
Prussia,  and  be  able  to  procure  for  themselves 
those  comforts  which  are  to  be  found  only 
amidst  large  populations. 

All  these  dispositions  being  completed,  Ge- 
neral Clarke  being  left  in  Berlin  to  assume  the 
political  government  of  Prussia,  and  M.  Daru 
to  adihiriister  it  financially,  Napoleon  broke  up 
with  his  columns  to  enter  Poland. 

The  King  of  Prussia  had  not  accepted  the 
proposed  armistice,  because  the  terms  were  too 
rigorous,  and  also  because  he  had  been  made 
to  wait  too  long.  Rejoined  by  Duroc  at  Oste- 
rode  in  old  Prussia,  he  replied  that,  notwith- 
standing his  most  sincere  desire  to  suspend 
the  course  of  a  disastrous  war,  he  could  not 
consent  to  the  sacrifices  required  of  him  ;  that, 
in  demanding  not  only  the  part  of  his  domi- 
nions already  overrun,  but  also  the  province 
of  Posen  and  the  line  of  the  Vistula,  they 
would  leave  him  without  territory  and  without 
resources,  and,  above  all,  give  up  Poland  to 
inevitable  insurrection ;  that  he  had  therefore 
made  up  his  mind  to  continue  the  war;  that 
he  acted  thus  from  necessity,  and  also  from 
fidelity  to  his  engagements,  for,  having  called 
the  Russians,  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  send 
them  back  after  the  appeal  which  he  had  made 
to  them,  and  which  they  had  answered  with 
the  utmost  cordiality. 

In  vain  did  MM.  de  Haugwitz  and  de  Luc- 
chesini,  who,  after  participating  for  a  moment 
in  the  general  infatuation  of  the  Prussian  na- 
tion, had  been  brought  back  to  reason  by  ca- 
lamity— in  vain  did  they  unite  their  efforts  to 
induce  the  acceptance  of  the  armistice,  such  as 
it  was,  saying  that  whatever  was  refused  tc 
Napoleon  he  would  conquer  in  a  fortnight 
that  they  should  let  slip  the  opportunity  for  put- 
ting a  stop  to  the  war  and  its  ravages ;  that,  if 
they  were  to  treat  at  that  moment,  they  should 
no  doubt  lose  the  provinces  situated  on  the 
left  of  the  Elbe,  but  that,  if  they  treated  later 
they  should  lose  Poland  itself  along  with  those 

T  2 


222 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  180& 


pi.-vvinces:  in  vain  MM.  de  Haugwitz  and  de ' 
Lucchesini  gave  this  advice;  their  tardy  pru- 
dence obtained  no  credit.  The  court,  in  go- 
ing lo  Konigsberg,  had  placed  itself  under, 
Russian  influences :  adversity,  which  had 
calmed  discreet  minds,  had,  on  the  contrary, 
heightened  the  exaltation  of  those  destitute  of 
reason ;  and  the  war  party,  instead  of  imput- 
ing to  itself  the  reverses  of  Prussia,  imputed 
them  to  alleged  treasons  of  the  peace-party. 
The  queen,  irritated  by  mortification,  insisted 
more  strongly  than  ever  that  the  fortune  of 
arms  should  be  once  more  tried,  with  the  re- 
mains of  the  Prussian  forces,  with  the  support 
of  the  Russians,  and  under  favour  of  distance, 
which  was  a  great  advantage  to  the  van- 
quished, a  great  disadvantage  to  the  victor. 
MM.  de  Haugwitz  and  de  Lucchesini,  deprived 
of  all  authority,  assailed  by  unjust  accusations, 
sometimes  overwhelmed  with  insults,  solicited 
and  obtained  their  dismissal.  The  king,  more 
equitable  than  the  court,  granted  it  to  them  j 
with  demonstrations  of  infinite  regard,  espe-  j 
cially  for  M.  de  Haugwitz,  having  never  ceased 
to  appreciate  his  intelligence,  to  acknowledge 
his  long  services,  and  to  lament  that  he  had 
not  always  followed  his  counsels. 

The  Russians  had  actually  arrived  on  the 
Niemen.  A  first  corps  of  50,000  men,  com-  j 
manded  by  General  Benningsen,  had  passed; 
the  Niemen  on  the  1st  of  November,  and  was  | 
advancing  towards  the  Vistula.  A  second,  of  i 
the  like  force,  headed  by  General  Buxhiivden, ' 
followed  the  first.  A  reserve  was  organized 
under  General  Essen.  Part  of  General  Mi- 
chelson's  troops  were  ascending  the  Dniester 
and  hastening  to  Poland.  The  imperial  guard, 
however,  had  not  yet  left  Petersburg.  A  swarm 
of  Cossacks,  issuing  from  their  deserts,  pre- 
ceded the  regular  troops.  Such  were  the  then 
disposable  forces  of  that  vast  empire,  which 
showed  for  the  second  time  that  its  resources 
were  not  equal  to  its  pretensions.  Joined  to 
the  Prussians,  and  while  awaiting  the  reserve 
of  General  Essen,  the  Russians  could  present 
themselves  upon  the  Vistula  to  the  number  of 
120,000  men.  In  this  there  was  nothing  to 
embarrass  Napoleon,  if  the  climate  did  not 
happen  to  bring  a  powerful  auxiliary  to  the 
soldiers  of  the  north  ;  and  by  the  climate  we 
mean  not  merely  the  cold,  but  the  soil,  the 
difficulty  of  marching  and  subsisting  in  those 
immense  plains,  alternately  muddy  and  sandy, 
and  where  woods  exceed  in  extent  the  part 
under  cultivation. 

The  English,  it  is  true,  promised  a  powerful 
co-operation  in  money,  in  materiel,  and  even  in 
men.  They  announced  landings  on  different 
points  of  the  coasts  of  France  and  Germany, 
and  particularly  an  expedition  to  Swedish 
Pomerania,  on  the  rear  of  the  French  army. 
They  had,  indeed,  a  very  convenient  landing- 
place  in  the  inundated  fortress  of  Stralsund, 
situated  upon  the  last  tongues  of  the  German 
continent.  This  point  was  guarded  by  the 
Swedes,  and  every  thing  prepared  to  receive 
the  English  troops  in  an  almost  inviolable  re- 
treat. But  it  was  probable  that  eagerness  to 
seize  the  rich  colonies  of  Holland  and  Spain, 
ill-defended  at  this  moment  on  account  of  the 
wreoccuDauous  of  the  continental  war,  would 


absorb  the  attention  of  the  English  forces.  A 
last  resource,  more  vain  than  that  expected 
from  the  English,  formed  the  complement  of 
the  means  of  the  coalition — that  was  the  sup- 
posed interference  of  Austria. 

The  Prussians  and  Russians  flattered  them- 
selves that,  if  a  single  success  crowned  their 
efforts,  Austria  would  declare  in  their  favour, 
and  they  almost  included  in  the  effective  of  the 
belligerent  troops  the  80,000  Austrians  at  that 
moment  assembled  in  Bohemia  and  Gallicia. 

All  this  gave  little  uneasiness  to  Napoleon, 
who  never  was  fuller  of  confidence  and  pride. 
The  refusal  of  the  armistice  had  neither  sur- 
prised nor  nettled  him.  "  Your  majesty,"  he 
wrote  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  "  has  sent  me 
word  that  you  have  thrown  yourself  into  the 
arms  of  Russia;  ....  time  will  show  whether 
you  have  chosen  the  better  and  more  effica- 
cious part.  You  have  taken  up  the  dice-box 
to  play:  the  dice  will  decide." 

The  military  dispositions  of  Napoleon  /or 
penetrating  into  Poland  were  these.  He  had 
nothing  to  fear  from  the  Austrians  ;  his  gene- 
ral preparations  in  France  as  well  as  in  Italy, 
and  his  diplomacy  in  the  East,  having  provided 
against  all  that  he  could  have  to  apprehend  on 
their  part.  The  landings  of  the  English  and 
Swedes  in  Pomerania,  tending  to  excite  insur- 
rection on  his  rear  in  suffering  and  humbled 
Prussia,  presented  a  more  real  danger.  To 
this  danger  he  attached,  however,  but  little  im- 
portance, for  he  wrote  to  his  brother  Louis, 
who  importuned  him  with  his  alarms,  "  The 
English  have  something  else  to  do  than  to 
land  in  France,  Holland,  or  Pomerania.  They 
had  rather  pillage  the  colonies  of  all  nations 
than  attempt  landings:  the  only  advantage 
which  they  reap  from  them  is  to  be  disgrace- 
fully flung  back  to  the  sea."  Napoleon  be- 
lieved one  point  at  most — that  relating  to  the 
Swedes,  who  had  twelve  or  fifteen  thousand 
men  at  Stralsund.  At  any  rate,  the  8th  corps 
under  Marshal  Mortier,  was  charged  to  provide 
against  these  contingencies.  This  corps,  which 
had  for  its  3rst  mission  to  occupy  Hesse  and 
to  re-unite  the  grand  army  with  the  Rhine,  was, 
now  that  Hesse  was  disarmed,  to  awe  Prussia 
and  to  guard  the  coast  of  Garmany.  It  was 
composed  of  four  divisions:  one  Dutch,  which 
had  become  vacant  by  the  return  of  King  Louis 
to  Holland;  one  Italian,  despatched  through 
Hesse  to  Hanover;  two  French,  which  were 
about  to  be  increased  to  the  full  complement 
with  part  of  the  regiments  recently  drawn  from 
France.  One  portion  of  these  troops  was  to 
be.siege  the  Hanoverian  fortress  of  Hameln, 
which  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  Prussians, 
another  to  occupy  the  Hanseatic  towns.  The 
remainder,  established  towards  Stralsund  and 
Anklam,  was  destined  to  drive  the  Swedes 
back  into  Stralsund,  if  they  should  sally  from 
it,  or  to  proceed  to  Berlin,  if  a  fit  of  despair 
should  seize -the  people  of  that  capital. 

General  Clarke  had  orders  to  concert  with 
Marshal  Mortier  how  to  parry  all  accidents. 
Not  a  musket  had  been  left  in  Berlin ;  and  all 
the  materiel  had  been  removed  to  Spandau. 
Sixteen  hundred  citizens  formed  the  guard  of 
Berlin,  with  800  muskets,  which  they  passed 
from  one  to  another,  only  800  being  en  duty  at 


\iv.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


223 


once.  If  a  movement  of  any  importance  took 
place,  General  Clarke  was  to  retire  toSpandau, 
and  to  wait  there  for  Marshal  Mortier.  The 
vast  cavalry  depot  established  at  Potsdam 
would  always  be  capable  of  furnishing  a  thou- 
sand horses  for  patrole  duty  and  for  securing 
stragglers,  who  roved  about  the  country  since 
the  dispersion  of  the  Prussian  army.  To  such 
a  length  had  wariness  been  carried,  as  to  search 
the  woods,  in  order  to  collect  the  cannon  which 
the  Prussians  had  concealed  in  their  flight,  and 
to  shut  them  up  in  the  fortresses. 

The  corps  of  Marshal  Davout,  which  had 
entered  Berlin  before  any  of  the  others,  had 
had  time  to  rest  there.  Napoleon  marched  it 
off  the  first  for  Ciistrin,  and  from  Ciistrin  for 
the  capital  of  the  grand-duchy  of  Posen.  The 
corps  of  Marshal  Augereau,  having  reached 
Berlin  the  second,  and  sufficiently  rested  also, 
was  sent  by  Ciistrin  and  Landsburg,  on  the 
Netze,  the  road  to  the  Vistula,  with  instruc- 
tions to  march  to  the  left  of  Marshal  Davout. 
Further  to  the  left  still,  Marshal  Lannes,  esta- 
blished at  Stettin  ever  since  the  capitulation  of 
Prenzlau,  having  while  residing  there  some- 
what recruited  his  troops,  reinforced  by  the 
28th  light,  and  supplied  with  great  coats  and 
shoes,  had  orders  to  take  with  him  provisions 
for  eight  days,  to  cross  the  Oder,  to  pass 
through  Stargard  and  Schneidmiihl,  and  to 
join  Augereau  on  the  Netze.  It  is  superfluous 
to  add  that,  before  he  left  Stettin,  he  was  to  put 
that  fortress  into  a  stale  of  defence.  Lastly, 
the  indefatigable  Murat,  leaving  his  cavalry  to 
return  by  short  marches  from  Liibeck,  had 
orders  to  repair  himself  to  Berlin,  to  take  the 
command  of  the  cuirassiers  there,  who  had 
been  resting  themselves  while  the  dragoons 
were  running  after  the  Prussians,  to  join  with 
the  cuirassiers  Beaumont's  and  Klein's  dra- 
goons, who  had  not  advanced  so  far  as  the 
others  in  pursuit  of  the  enemy,  and  remounted 
moreover  with  fresh  horses  in  the  depot  of 
Potsdam.  With  this  cavalry,  Murat  was  to 
join  Marshal  Davout  at  Posen,  to  precede  him 
to  Warsaw,  and  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of 
all  the  troops  sent  to  Poland,  till  Napoleon 
should  come  to  command  them  himself.  The 
Russians  were  still  at  a  great  distance  from 
the  Vistula.  Napoleon  afforded  himself  time 
for  the  despatch  of  his  numerous  affairs  in 
Berlin,  and  left  his  brother-in-law  to  commence 
the  movement  upon  Poland,  and  to  sound  the 
disposition  of  the  Poles  in  regard  to  insurrec- 
tion. No  person  was  fitter  than  Murat  to  ex- 
cite their  enthusiasm,  by  participating  in  it 
himself. 

While  the  French  army,  crossing  the  Oder, 
was  about  to  advance  to  the  Vistula,  Prince 
Jerome,  having  under  his  command  the  Wir- 
tembergers  and  the  Bavarians,  seconded  by  an 
able  and  vigorous  officer,  General  Vandamme, 
was  to  take  possession  of  Silesia,  to  besiege 
the  fortresses  in  that  province,  to  push  part 
of  his  troops  as  far  as  Kalisch,  and  thus  to 
cover  against  Austria  the  right  of  the  corps 
that  was  to  march  upon  Posen. 

The  troops  despatched  to  Poland  might 
amount  to  about  80,000  men — the  corps  of 
Marshal  Davout  consisting  of  23,000,  that  of 
Marshal  Augereau  of  17,000,  that  of  Marshal 


Lannes  of  18,000,  the  detachment  of  Prince 
Jerome  sent  to  Kalisch  of  14,000,  lastly,  Mu- 
rat's  reserve  cavalry,  of  nine  or  ten  thousand. 
This  was  more  than  would  be  required  to 
make  head  against  the  Russian  and  Prussian 
forces  which  they  were  likely  to  meet  with  at 
the  first  moment 

Meanwhile,  the  corps  of  Marshals  Soult  and 
Bernadotte  were  marching  from  Liibeck  to 
Berlin.  They  were  to  stay  some  time  in  that 
capital,  to  recruit  themselves  there,  and  to  get 
supplied  with  all  that  they  wanted.  Marshal 
Nev  had  repaired  thither  after  the  capitulation 
of  Magdeburg,  and  was  preparing  to  march 
for  the  Oder.  Napoleon,  with  the  imperial 
guard,  with  General  Oudinot's  division  of 
grenadiers  and  voltigeurs,  with  the  remainder 
of  the  reserve  cavalry,  which  was  resting  it- 
self at  Berlin,  with  the  three  corps  of  Marshals 
Soult,  Bernadotte,  and  Ney,  would  have  at  his 
disposal  a  second  army  of  80,000  men,  at  the 
head  of  which  he  was  to  proceed  to  Poland, 
to  support  the  movement  of  the  first. 

Marshal  Davimt,  the  first  despatched  for 
Posen,  was  a  firm  and  reflective  man,  of  whom 
no  imprudence  was  to  be  apprehended.  He 
had  been  initiated  into  the  real  ideas  of  Napo- 
leon relative  to  Poland.  Napoleon  was  frankly 
resolved  to  repair  the  serious  injury  done  to 
Europe  by  the  abolition  of  that  ancient  king- 
dom ;  but  he  did  not  disguise  from  himself 
the  immense  difficulty  of  reconstituting  a  de- 
stroyed State,  especially  with  a  people  whose 
anarchical  spirit  was  as  famous  as  its  valour. 

He  intended,  therefore,  not  to  involve  him- 
self in  such  an  enterprise,  unless  upon  con- 
ditions which  should  render  its  success,  if  not 
certain,  at  least  sufficiently  probable.  It  was 
requisite,  in  the  first  place,  that  he  should  gain 
signal  triumphs  while  advancing  into  those 
plains  of  the  north,  where  Charles  XII.  had 
found  his  ruin;  there  was  lequisite,  ia  the 
next  place,  a  unanimous  rising  of  the  Poles, 
to  concur  in  those  triumphs,  and  to  satisfy 
him  respecting  the  solidity  ol  he  new  State 
that  was  to  be  founded  amidst  three  hostile 
i  powers,  Russia,  Prussia,  and  Austria.  When 
I  see  all  the  Poles  afoot,  said  he  to  Marshal 
Davout,  then  will  I  proclaim  their  indepen- 
dence, but  not  till  then.  He  ordered  a  convoy 
of  arms  of  all  kinds  to  accompany  the  French 
troops,  for  the  purpose  of  arming  the  insurrec- 
tion, in  case  of  its  becoming  general,  as  he 
was  assured  that  it  would. 

Marshal  Davout,  preceding  the  corps  d'armee 
which  were  to  start  from  the  Oder,  had  set 
himself  in  motion  in  the  first  days  of  Novem- 
ber. He  marched  with  that  order  and  that 
strict  discipline  which  he  was  accustomed  to 
maintain  among  his  troops.  He  had  notified 
to  his  soldiers  that,  in  entering  Poland,  they 
would  enter  a  friendly  country,  and  that  it 
,  must  be  treated  as  such.  \s  we  have  oh- 
j  served,  a  certain  indiscipline  had  crept  into 
;  the  ranks  of  the  light  cavalry,  which  has  a 
greater  share  in  the  disorders  of  the  war,  and 
contributes  more  to  them.  Two  soldiers  of 
that  arm  having  committed  some  etcesses, 
Marshal  Davout  ordered  them  to  be  shot,  in 
presence  of  the  third  corps. 

He  advanced  upon  Posen  in  three  divisions 


224 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1806. 


The  country  between  the  Oder  and  the  Vistula 
is  very  much  like  that  which  extends  from  the 
Elbe  to  the  Oder.  Most  generally  you  have 
to  traverse  sandy  plains,  upon  which  wood 
readily  thrives,  especially  the  resinous  woods, 
and  in  particular  the  fir;  and  there  is  found 
feeneath  the  bed  of  sand  a  marl  fit  for  culture, 
sometimes  drowned  by  the  sand  itself,  some- 
times rising  to  the  surface:  amidst  the  fir  for- 
ests you  meet  with  vast  clearings  tolerably 
well  cultivated,  and  in  these  clearings,  with  a 
scanty,  poor,  but  robust  population,  dwelling 
under  wood  and  thatch.  On  this  soil,  the 
transport  of  every  thing  is  a  matter  of  un- 
paralleled difficulty,  for  moving  sands  are  suc- 
ceeded by  clay,  in  which,  when  it  is  soaked 
with  water,  you  sink  to  a  great  depth,  so  that, 
after  a  few  days'  rain,  it  is  convened  into  a 
vast  sea  of  mud.  Men  perish  in  it  if  assist- 
ance does  not  come  to  extricate  them.  As  for 
horses,  cannon,  baggage,  they  are  absorbed, 
and  not  the  strength  of  a  whole  army  could 
save  them.  Hence  war  is  impracticable  in 
this  portion  of  the  plain  of  the  north,  unless 
in  summer  when  the  ground  is  completely 
dry,  or  in  winter  when  a  cold  of  several  de- 
grees has  given  to  it  the  consistence  of  stone. 
But  every  intermediate  season  is  fatal  to  mili- 
tary combinations,  especially  to  the  most  in- 
genious, which  depend,  as  everybody  knows, 
upon  the  rapidity  of  the  movements. 

These  physical  characters  do  not  appear  all 
together  till  you  approach  the  Vistula,  and  es- 
pecially further  on,  between  the  Vistula  and 
the  Niemen.  They  begin,  indeed,  to  be  ob- 
served after  crossing  the  Oder.  A  phenomenon 
peculiar  to  these  vast  plains,  which  we  have  al- 
ready noticed,  and  which  occurs  here,  is  that 
the  sand  raised  into  hills  along  the  sea  repels 
the  waters  towards  the  interior  of  the  country, 
where  they  form  numerous  lakes,  discharge 
themselves  into  petty  rivers,  then  unite  into 
larger,  till,  gradually  increasing  in  magnitude, 
they  become  vast  streams,  like  the  Elbe,  the 
Oder,  the  Vistula ;  capable  of  opening  them- 
selves a  passage  through  the  barrier  of  sand. 
In  Brandenburg  and  Mecklenburg,that  is  to  say, 
between  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder,  the  country 
which  was  the  theatre  of  the  pursuit  of  the 
Prussians  by  our  army,  the  reader  has  already 
had  occasion  to  remark  these  peculiarities  of 
nature.  They  become  more  striking  between 
the  Oder  and  the  Vistula.  The  sands  rise,  re- 
tain the  waters,  which  seek  through  the  Netze 
and  Warta  an  outlet  towards  the  Oder.  The 
Netze  comes  from  the  left,  the  Warta  from  the 
right,  for  any  person  proceeding  from  Berlin 
to  Warsaw,  and,  after  they  have  both  circu- 
lated between  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder,  they 
unite  in  a  single  bed,  and  throw  themselves  to- 
gether into  the  Oder  near  Ciistrin.  The  coun- 
try along  the  sea  forms  what  is  called  Prus- 
sian Pomerania.  It  is  German  by  the  inhabit- 
ants and  by  spirit.  The  interior,  watered  by 
the  Netze  and  the  Warta,  is  marshy,  clayey, 
and  Slavonian  by  the  race  of  people  which  in- 
nabiu  it.  It  is  called  Posnania,  or  grand-duchy 
of  Posen,  the  capital  of  which  is  Posen,  a  town 
of  son; ;  importance,  situated  on  the  Warta 
•tself. 

This  orovince   was  the  one  in  which  the 


Polish  spirit  burst  forth  with  the  greatest  ar- 
dour. The  Poles,  who  became  Prussians, 
seemed  to  endure  the  foreign  yoke  more  impa- 
tiently than  the  others.  In  the  first  place,  the 
German  and  the  Slavonian  races,  meeting  on 
this  frontier  of  Pomerania  and  the  duchy  of  Po- 
sen, had  an  instinctive  aversion  for  each  other, 
naturally  stronger  on  the  border  where  they  ad- 
joined. Independently  of  this  aversion,  the 
usual  consequence  of  neighbourhood,  th& 
Poles  did  not  forget  that  the  Prussians  had 
been,  under  the  great  Frederick,  the  first  au- 
thors of  the  partition  of  Poland,  that  they  have 
since  acted  with  black  perfidy,  and  completed 
the  ruin  of  their  country,  after  favouring  its  in- 
surrection. Lastly,  the  sight  of  Warsaw  in  the 
hands  of  the  Prussians  rendered  them  the  most 
odious  of  the  partitioning  powers.  These 
feelings  of  hatred  were  carried  to  such  a  length, 
that  the  Poles  would  almost  have  considered 
it  as  a  deliverance  to  escape  from  the  King 
of  Prussia,  and  to  belong  to  an  Emperor  of 
Russia,  who,  uniting  all  the  Polish  provinces 
under  the  same  sceptre,  should  have  proclaimed 
himself  King  of  Poland.  There  was,  there- 
fore, a  stronger  disposition  to  insurrection  in 
the  duchy  of  Posen  than  in  any  other  part  of 
Poland. 

Such  was,  in  physical  and  moral  respects, 
the  country  through  which  the  French  were 
inarching  at  this  moment.  Transported  into 
a  climate  so  different  from  their  native  climate, 
so  different  in  particular  from  the  climates 
of  Egypt  and  Italy,  where  they  had  lived 
so  long,  they  were,  as  ever,  merry,  confident, 
and  found,  in  the  very  novelty  of  the  country 
which  they  were  traversing,  a  subject  of  hu- 
morous pleasantry  rather  than  of  bitter  com- 
plaints. Besides,  the  favourable  reception  of 
the  inhabitants  compensated  their  hardships  ; 
for,  on  the  roads  and  in  the  villages,  the  pea- 
sants ran  to  meet  them,  offering  them  victuals 
and  the  liquors  of  their  country. 

But  it  is  not  in  the  country,  it  is  among  con- 
glomerate populations,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  bo- 
som of  cities,  that  the  patriotic  enthusiasm  of 
nations  bursts  forth  with  the  greatest  energy. 
At  Posen,  the  moral  dispositions  of  the  Poles 
manifested  themselves  more  strongly  than  else- 
where. That  city,  which  usually  contained 
15,000  souls,  soon  contained  double  the  num- 
ber, from  the  affluence  of  the  inhabitants  of 
the  neighbouring  provinces  thronging  to  meet 
their  deliverers.  It  was  on  the  9th,  10th,  and 
llth  of  November  that  the  three  divisions  of 
Davout's  corps  entered  Posen.  They  were  re- 
ceived there  with  such  transports  of  enthusi- 
asm, that  the  grave  marshal  was  touched  by 
them,  and  that  he  himself  indulged  the  idea 
of  the  re-establishment  of  Poland,  an  idea  very 
popular  in  the  mass  of  the  French  army,  but 
not  at  all  among  its  chiefs.  Accordingly,  he 
wrote  to  the  Emperor  letters  strongly  impreg- 
nated with  the  sentiment  which  had  just  broken 
forth  around- him. 

He  told  the  Poles  that  in  order  to  reconsti- 
tute their  country,  Napoleon  must  have  the 
certainty  of  an  immense  effort  on  their  part  in 
the  first  place  to  gain  great  successes,  without 
which  he  could  not  impose  upon  Europe  the 
re-establishment  of  Poland,  and,  in  the  next 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


225 


place,  to  inspire  him  with  some  confidence  in 
the  duration  of  the  work  which  he  was  about 
to  undertake — a  very  difficult  work,  since  its 
object  was  to  restore  a  state  destroyed  forty 
years  ago,  and  which  had  been  degenerating 
for  more  than  a  century.  The  Poles  of  Posen, 
more  enthusiastic  than  those  of  Warsaw,  pro- 
mised, with  the  utmost  cheerfulness,  all  that 
seemed  to  be  desired  of  them.  Nobles,  priests, 
people,  ardently  wished  to  be  delivered  from 
the  German  yoke,  antipathic  to  their  religion, 
to  their  manners,  to  their  race ;  and  at  this 
price  there  was  nothing  which  they  were  not 
ready  to  do.  Marshal  Davout  had  as  yet  but 
3000  muskets  to  give  them  ;  they  distributed 
them  among  themselves  immediately,  begging 
to  have  thousands  of  them,  and  affirming  that, 
whatever  the  number,  they  would  find  arms  to 
carry  them.  The  people  formed  battalions  of 
infantry,  the  nobles  and  their  vassals  squad- 
rons of  cavalry.  In  all  the  villages  situated 
between  the  Upper  Warta  and  the  Upper  Oder, 
on  the  approach  of  the  troops  of  Prince  Je- 
rome, the  population  expelled  the  Prussian 
troops,  and  only  spared  their  lives  because  the 
French  troops  everywhere  prevented  violence 
and  excesses.  From  Glogau  to  Kalisch,  Prince 
Jerome's  route,  the  insurrection  was  general. 

At  Posen  there  was  established  a  provisional 
authority,  with  which  were  concerted  the  mea- 
sures necessary  for  subsisting  the  French 
army  on  its  passage.  There  could  not  be  a  ques- 
tion about  imposing  war  contributions  on  Po- 
land. It  was  understood  that  she  should  be 
held  exempt  from  the  charges  laid  upon  con- 
quered countries,  on  condition,  however,  that 
her  strength  should  be  joined  to  ours,  and  that 
she  should  give  up  to  us  some  of  the  corn  with 
which  she  was  so  abundantly  provided.  The 
new  Polish  authority  concerted  with  Marshal 
Davout  for  the  erection  of  ovens,  the  collec- 
tion of  corn,  forage  and  cattle.  The  zeal  of  the 
country  and  some  funds  seized  in  the  Prussian 
chests  were  sufficient  for  these  first  prepara- 
tions. Thus  every  thing  was  arranged  for  re- 
ceiving the  bulk  of  the  French  army,  and  par- 
ticularly its  commander,  who  was  awaited  with 
keen  curiosity  and  ardent  hopes. 

Nearly  about  the  same  time  Marshal  Auge- 
reau  had  reached  the  boundary  which  sepa- 
rates Posnania  and  Pomerania,  leaving  the 
Warta  to  the  right,  and  bearing  to  the  left, 
along  the  Netze.  He  had  passed  by  Lands- 
berg,  Driesen,  Schneidmuhl,  through  a  dreary, 
poor,  moderately  populated  country,  which 
could  not  give  very  expressive  signs  of  life. 
Marshal  Augereau  met  with  nothing  that  could 
warm  and  exalt  his  imagination;  he  had  great 
difficulty  to  march,  and  would  have  had  still 
greater  difficulty  to  subsist,  but  for  a  convoy 
of  caissons  laden  with  the  bread  for  his  troops. 
In  the  environs  of  Nackel,  the  streams  cease 
to  flow  towards  the  Oder,  and  begin  to  run  to- 
wards the  Vistula.  A  canal  joining  the  Netze 
with  the  Vistula  commences  at  Nackel,  and 
terminates  at  the  town  of  Bromberg,  which  is 
the  entrepot  of  the  commerce  of  the  country. 
Augereau's  corps  found  there  some  relief  from 
its  fatigues. 

Marshal  Lannes  had  advanced  by  Stettin, 
VOL.  II.— 29 


Stargard,  Deutsch-K  rone,  Schneidmuhl,  Nackel 
and  Bromberg,  flanking  the  march  of  Auge- 
reau's  corps,  as  the  latter  flanked  the  march 
of  Davout's  corps.    He,  too,  skirted  the  bound- 
ary of  the  German  and   Polish  country,  and 
traversed  a  tract  more  difficult,  more  dreary 
still,  than  that  which  Marshal  Augereau  had 
passed  through.     He  found  the  Germans  hos- 
tile, the  Poles  timid,  and,  swayed  by  the  im- 
pressions which  he  received  from  the  wild  and 
desert  country,  from  the  information  which  he 
collected   respecting  the  Poles,  in  a  country 
which  was  not  favourable  to  them,  he  was  led 
to  consider  the  re-establishment  of  Poland  as 
a  rash  and  even  foolish  undertaking.   We  have 
already  made  mention   of  this  extraordinary 
man,  of  his  qualities,  of  his  defects;  we  shall 
have  frequent  occasion  to  mention  him  here- 
after, in  the  history  of  a  period  during  which 
he  was  so  lavish  of  his  noble  life.     Lannes, 
impetuous   in    his   sentiments,   consequently 
unequal  in  character,  inclined  to  ill-temper, 
even  towards  his  master  to  whom  he  was  at- 
tached, was  one  of  those  whom  the  sun,  hid- 
ing or  showing  his  face,  by  turns  depressed 
and  cheered.     But,  never   losing   his   heroic 
temper,  he  recovered   in   dangers   that  calm 
force  of  which   sufferings   and   crosses   had 
robbed  him  for  a  moment.     We  should  not  do 
justice  to  this  superior  warrior,  were  we  not 
to  add  here  that  in  him  a  great  fund  of  good 
sense  was  so  joined  to  unevenness  of  temper 
as  to  influence  him  to  censure  a  spirit  of  im- 
moderate enterprise  in  Napoleon,  and  to  draw 
'•  from  him  sinister  predictions  amidst  our  most 
glorious  triumphs.     After  the  success  of  the 
war  with  Prussia,  he  was  for  stopping  short 
|  at  the  Oder,  and  imposed  not  the  least  restraint 
upon  himself  in  the  expression  of  this  opinion. 
On  reaching  Bromberg,  after  a  toilsome  march, 
he  wrote  to  Napoleon,  that  he  had  been  tra- 
j  versing  a  sandy,  barren  country,  without  in- 
i  habitants   Comparable,  with  the  exception  of 
climate,  to  i^e  desert  which  must  be  traversed 
in  going  from  Egypt  to  Syria; that  the  soldiers 
were  dull,  and  attacked  by  fever,  owing  to  the 
wetness  of  the  soil  and  season  ;  that  the  Poles 
j  were  not  at  all  disposed  to  rise,  but  trembled 
under  the  yoke  of  their  masters;  that  a  judg- 
ment of  their  dispositions  must  not  be  formed 
from  the  counterfeit  enthusiasm  of  a  few  no- 
bles attracted  to  Posen  by  a  fondness  for  noise 
and  novelty;  that,  at  bottom,  they  were  always 
fickle,  divided,  given  up  to  anarchy;  and  that, 
by  attempting  to  reconstitute  them  into  one  na- 
tion, we  should  uselessly  expend  the  blood  of 
France  for  a  work  without  solidity  and  without 
permanence. 

Napoleon,  having  remained  in  Berlin  till 
the  last  days  of  November,  received  without 
surprise  the  contradictory  reports  of  his  lieu- 
tenants, and  waited  till  the  movement  produced 
by  the  presence  of  the  French  should  have 
spread  to  all  the  Polish  provinces,  in  order  to 
form  an  opinion  in  regard  to  the  re-eslabash- 
ment  of  Poland,  and  to  res<  Ive  whether  to  pass 
through  that  country  as  a  field  of  battle,  or  to 
erect  a  grand  political  edifice  upon  its  soil. 
He  made  Murat  set  out,  after  having  again 
specified  to  him  the  conditions  which  h*1  in- 


226 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Nov.  180«. 


tended  to  attach  to  the  restoration  of  Poland, ' 
and  the  instructions  which  he  wished  to  be 
followed  in  marching  for  Warsaw. 

The  Russians  had  arrived  on  the  Vistula, 
and  taken  possession  of  Warsaw.    The  last 
Prussian  corps  that  King  Frederick  William 
had  left,  placed  under  the  command  of  General 
Leslocq,  an  officer  equally  discreet  and  brave,  | 
was  established  at  Thorn,  having  garrisons  at  i 
Graudenz  and  Dantzig. 

Napoleon  desired  that,  on  approaching  War- 
saw, the  different  corps  of  the  French  army 
should  keep  close  to  each  other,  in  order  that, 
with  a  mass  of  80,000  men,  a  force  far  supe- 
rior to  what  the  Russians  could  bring  together 
on  one  point,  his  lieutenants  should  be  screened 
from  any  check.  He  recommended  to  them 
neither  to  seek  nor  to  accept  battle,  unles's  they 
were  very  superior  in  number  to  the  enemy,  to 
advance  with  great  caution,  and  all  of  them 
appuying  to  the  right,  to  cover  themselves 
from  the  Austrian  frontier.  At  this  period,  the 
Piiica  on  the  left  side  of  the  Vistula,  the  Na- 
rew  on  the  right,  both  falling  into  the  Vistula 
near  Warsaw,  formed  the  Austrian  frontier. 
By  appuying  therefore  to  the  right,  on  leaving 
Posen,  they  would  beNdrawing  nearer  to'  the  '. 
Piiica  and  Narew;  they  would  be  covered  on  , 
all  sides  by  the  neutrality  of  Austria.  If  the 
Russians  designed  to  take  the  offensive,  they 
could  not  do  so  without  passing  the  Vistula  on 
our  left,  in  the  environs  of  Thorn,  and  then, 
by  dropping  down  on  the  left,  the  French  would 
obtain  one  of  these  three  results — they  should 
eirher  fling  them  into  the  Vistula,  or  drive  them 
back  to  the  sea,  or  thrust  them  upon  the  bayo- 
nets of  the  second  French  army  marching  to 
Posen.  For  the  rest,  it  should  be  added  that, 
if  Napoleon,  contrary  to  his  custom,  did  not 
on  this  occasion  oppose  a  single  mass  to  the 
enemy,  which  would  have  cut  short  all  diffi- 
culties, it  was  because  he  knew  that  the  Rus- 
sians were  not  50,000  all  together,  and  because 
the  extreme  fatigue  of  part  of  his  troops,  hav- 
ing run  as  far  as  Prenzlau  and  Liibeck,  obliged 
him  to  form  two  armies,  one  composed  of  those 
who  could  march  immediately,  the  other  of 
those  who  had  need  of  a  few  days'  rest  before 
they  started  again.  Thus  it  is  that  circum- 
stances occasion  variations  in  the  appl.cation 
of  the  most  invariable  principles.  It  is  for 
the  tact  of  the  great  general  to  modify  this 
application  safely  and  fitly. 

Napoleon  therefore  enjoined  Marshal  Da- 
vout  to  bear  to  the  right,  as  the  route  from 
Posen  to  Warsaw  required,  to  pass  through 
Sempolno,  Klodawa,  Kutno,  Sochaczew,  and 
Blonie,  and  to  send  his  dragoons  direct  to  the 
Vistula  at  Kowal,  to  give  a  hand  to  Marshals 
Lannes  and  Augereau.  Lannes,  after  indem- 
nifying himself  amidst  the  abundance  of  Brom- 
berg  for  the  privations  of  a  long  route  through 
the  sands,  had  taken  the  precedence  of  Auge- 
reau. He  had  orders  to  ascend  the  Vistula, 
and  by  his  right  to  proceed  from  Bromberg  to 
luowraclaw,  Blezesc,  Kowal,  filing  away  un- 
der the  cannon  of  Thorn,  and  connecting  him- 
self with  the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout,  the  left 
of  which  he  was  to  form.  Marshal  Augereau 
soon  followed  him,  and  pursuing  the  same 
route,  came  to  form  the  lel't  of  Lannes. 


On  the  16th  of  November,  and  the  follow* 
ing  days,  Marshal  Davout,  pieceded  by  Mural, 
marched  from  Posen,  where  he  left  every  thing 
in  the  best  order,  for  Sempolno,  Klodawa, 
and  Kutno.  Lannes,  after  leaving  Bromberg, 
and  filing  away  in  sight  of  Thorn,  while  cov- 
ering himself  with  the  Vistula,  found  that  he 
was  again  surrounded  by  the  sands,  which 
are  met  with  almost  universally  in  this  part 
of  the  course  of  the  Vistula,  encountered  for 
a  second  time  sterility,  dearth,  the  desert,  and 
was  not  on  that  account  the  more  favourably 
disposed  to  the  war  which  was  about  to  be 
undertaken.  He  proceeded  by  Kowal  and 
Kutno  to  appuy  himself  on  the  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Davout.  Augereau  followed  at  his  heels, 
participating  in  his  impressions,  as  it  fre- 
quently happened,  for  he  had  more  than  one 
resemblance  in  character  to  Lannes,  though 
far  inferior  in  talents  and  energy. 

Murat  and  Davout,  not  at  all  tempted  to 
give  battle  without  the  Emperor,  having  or- 
ders moreover  to  avoid  it,  advanced  with  great 
caution  to  the  environs  of  Warsaw.  On  the 
27th  of  November,  their  light  cavalry  drove  a 
detachment  of  the  enemy's  out  of  Blonie,  and 
advanced  to  the  very  gates  of  the  capital. 
The  Russians  had  been  everywhere  found  re- 
treating, or  occupied  in  destroying  provisions, 
or  in  removing  them  from  the  left  bank  to  the 
right  bank  of  the  Vistula.  In  retreating,  they 
merely  passed  through  Warsaw,  which  no 
longer  seemed  to  them  a  place  of  safety,  in 
proportion  as  the  approach  of  the  French 
thrilled  all  hearts  there.  They  therefore  re- 
crossed  the  Vistula,  to  shut  themselves  up  in 
a  suburb  of  Praga,  situated,  as  it  is  well 
known,  on  the  other  bank  of  the  river.  On 
repassing  it,  they  destroyed  the  bridge  of  Pra- 
ga, and  sunk  or  took  away  with  them  all  the 
craft  that  could  serve  for  means  of  crossing. 

Next  day  Murat,  at  the  head  of  a  regiment 
of  chasseurs  and  dragoons  of  Beaumont's  di- 
vision, entered  Warsaw.  After  leaving  Po- 
sen, the  people  of  the  small  towns  and  in  the 
country  had  shown  less  cordiality  than  the  in- 
habitants of  that  city,  because  they  were  re- 
strained by  the  presence  of  the  Russians. 
But,  in  a  great  population,  the  expression  of 
its  sentiments  is  proportionate  to  the  feeling 
of  its  strength.  All  the  inhabitants  of  War- 
saw had  hastened  beyond  the  walls  of  the  city 
to  meet  the  French.  The  Poles  had,  from  a 
secret  instinct,  long  regarded  the  victories  of 
France  as  the  victories  of  Poland  itself.  They 
had  been  thrilled  by  the  news  of  the  battle  of 
Austerlitz,  fought  so  near  the  frontiers  of  Gal- 
licia,  and  that  of  Jena,  which  seemed  gained 
on  the  very  road  to  Warsaw.  The  entry  of 
the  French  into  Berlin,  and  the  appearance  of 
Davout  on  the  Oder,  had  filled  them  with  hope. 
They  beheld  at  last  those  French  so  renowned, 
so  eagerly  expected,  and  at  their  head  that 
brilliant  general  of  cavalry,  a  prince  to-day, 
to-morrow  a  king,  who  conducted  their  ad- 
vanced guard  with  equal  hardihood  and  glory. 
They  extolled  with  transport  his  noble  look,  his 
heroic  appearance  on  horseback,  and  greeted 
him  with  a  thousand  times  repeated  shouts  of 
"  Vive  U  Empereur!  vive*U  les  Franqxis"  A 
general  delirium  seized  all  classes  of  the  popu 


Nov.  1806.] 


CONSULATE  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


227 


lation.  This  time,  the  resurrection  of  Poland 
might  be  considered  as  rather  less  chimerical 
on  witnessing  the  appearance  of  the  grand  ar- 
my, which,  under  the  great  captain,  had  van- 
quished all  the  armies  of  Europe.  Joy,  ve- 
hement, profound,  without  reserve,  pervaded 
that  unfortunate  people,  so  long  the  victim  of 
the  ambition  of  the  courts  of  the  north,  of  the 
effeminacy  of  the  courts  of  the  south,  feast- 
ing itself  with  the  idea  that  the  hour  had  at  last 
arrived  when  the  Emperor  of  the  French  would 
make  amends  for  the  weaknesses  of  the  kings 
of  France.  The  Austrians  had  everywhere  de- 
stroyed the  provisions,  but  the  cordiality  of  the 
Poles  supplied  the  deficiency.  People  quar- 
relled which  should  have  French  soldiers  to 
lodge  and  to  board. 

Two  days  afterwards,  Marshal  Davout's  in- 
fantry, which  had  not  been  able  to  keep  pace 
with  the  cavalry,  entered  Warsaw.  There 
was  the  same  intoxication,  there  were  the 
same  demonstrations,  at  sight  of  these  veteran 
warriors  of  AuersUldt,  Austerlitz,  and  Ma- 
rengo.  All  looked  bright  at  this  first  moment, 
when  the  prospect  of  difficulties  was  veiled, 
as  it  were,  by  joy  and  hope. 

Napoleon  sincerely  designed,  as  we  have 
already  said,  to  restore  Poland.  It  was,  ac- 
cording to  his  ideas,  one  of  the  most  useful 
and  most  approved  ways  of  renewing  that 
Europe,  the  face  of  which  he  purposed  to 
change.  When,  in  fact,  he  created  new  king- 
doms, to  form  supports  for  his  young  empire, 
nothing  was  more  natural  than  to  raise  again 
the  most  brilliant  and  the  most  to  be  regretted 
of  the  destroyed  kingdoms.  But,  besides  the 
difficulty  of  wringing  great  sacrifices  of  terri- 
tory from  Russia  and  Prussia — sacrifices  which 
it  was  not  possible  to  wring  from  them  with- 
out fighting  to  the  last  extremity,  there  was 
another  difficulty,  that  of  taking  the  Gallicias 
from  Austria ;  and  if  those  provinces  were  to 
be  left  out,  if  he  were  to  content  himself  with 
recompensing  new  Poland  with  two-thirds  of 
the  old,  he  should  run  the  very  serious  risk 
of  exciting  in  the  cabinet  of  Vienna  a  re- 
doubled distrust,  hatred,  ill-will,  and  perhaps 
of  bringing  an  Austrian  army  upon  the  rear 
of  the  French  army.  Napoleon  therefore 
would  not  make  any  but  conditional  engage- 
ments with  the  Poles,  and  he  decided  not  to 
proclaim  their  independence  till  they  should 
have  deserved  it  by  a  unanimous  outburst,  by 
a  warm  zeal  to  second  him,  by  the  energetic 
resolution  to  defend  the  new  country  which 
he  had  recovered  for  them.  Unfortunately, 
the  high  Polish  nobility,  not  so  easily  wrought 
upon  as  the  people,  discouraged  by  the  differ- 
ent insurrections  which  had  been  attempted, 
fearful  of  being  deserted  after  they  had  com- 
mitted themselves,  hesitated  to  throw  them- 
selves into  the  arms  of  Napoleon,  and  found, 
in  their  actual  situation,  something  better  to 
do  than  to  rise  in  insurrection  to  receive  from 
the  French  an  existence,  independent  but  des- 
titute of  support,  exposed  to  all  dangers,  be- 
tween Prussia,  Austria,  and  Russia.  This 
high  nobility,  fallen,  like  Warsaw  itself,  under 
the  yoke  of  Prussia,  entertained  for  that  court 
the  same  aversion  which  was  felt  by  all  the 
Poles  who  had  become  Prussians.  Most  of 


the  members  of  the  Warsaw  nobility  would 
have  considered  it  as  a  happy  change  of  for- 
tune to  become  subjects  of  Alexander,  upon 
condition  of  being  remoulded  into  one  nation, 
and  acting  under  the  Emperor  of  Russia  the 
same  part  as  the  Hungarians  act  under  the 
Emperor  of  Austria.  To  be  united  into  one 
and  the  same  nation,  and  transferred  from  a 
German  master  to  a  Slavonian  master,  seemed 
to  them  an  almost  desirable  lot,  the  only  one, 
at  least,  to  which  they  ought  to  aspire  in  the 
present  circumstances.  It  was,  in  the  estima- 
tion of  many  of  them,  secretly  influenced  by 
Russian  intrigue,  the  only  reconstitution  of 
Poland  that  was  practicable;  for  Russia,  they 
said,  was  near  at  hand,  and  capable  of  sup- 
porting her  work  when  once  undertaken ; 
whereas  the  existence  which  they  should  re- 
ceive from  France  would  be  precarious,  ephe- 
meral, and  vanish  as  soon  as  the  French 
army  had  withdrawn.  It  is  true  that  there 
were  some  reasons  of  prudence  to  be  alle'ged 
in  favour  of  that  idea  of  a  demi-reconstitution 
of  Poland,  the  offspring  of  a  demi-patriotism: 
but  those  who  formed  this  wish  forgot  that,  if 
the  existence  which  Poland  could  receive  from 
France  was  liable  to  perish  when  the  French 
had  recrossed  the  Rhine,  that  which  the  Rus- 
sians should  give  it  was  exposed  to  another 
certain  and  speedy  danger — to  the  danger  of 
being  absorbed  in  the  rest  of  the  empire,  of 
being  subjected,  in  short,  to  a  complete  assimi- 
lation— a  result  to  which  Russia  must  inces- 
santly tend,  and  which  she  would  not  fail  to 
realize  on  the  first  occasion,  as  events  have 
since  proved.  It  was  therefore  necessary 
either  that  the  Poles  should  renounce  their 
nationality,  or  that  they  should  devote  them- 
selves to  Napoleon,  at  any  cost,  at  any  risk, 
with  all  the  uncertainties  attached  to  such  an 
enterprise,  on  the  day  that  this  mighty  reformer 
of  Europe  should  appear  at  Warsaw.  Cer- 
tain motives,  less  exalted,  operated  upon  that 
portion  of  the  nobility  which  gave  a  cold  re- 
ception to  the  deliverance  of  Poland  by  the 
hand  of  the  French  ;  this  was  the  jealousy 
excited  by  the  Polish  generals  trained  in  our 
armies,  returning  with  reputation,  pretensions, 
an  exaggerated  sense  of  their  own  merit. 
These  various  motives,  however,  did  not  pre- 
vent the  generality  of  the  nobles  from  feeling 
a  lively  joy  at  sight  of  the  French,  but  they 
rendered  them  more  prudent,  and  induced 
them  to  make  conditions  with  a  man,  to  whom 
patriotism  would  then  have  advised  them  not 
to  propose  any.  But  the  masses,  more  unani- 
mous, less  restrained  by  reflection,  at  that  mo- 
ment better — for  there  is  a  moment,  a  single 
moment,  when  reason  is  of  less  worth  than 
the  impulsion  of  the  passions;  it  is  when 
that  devotedness,  even  if  blind, -is  the  neces- 
sary condition  of  the  salvation  of  a  people — 
the  masses,  we  say,  insisted  on  throwing 
themselves  into  the  arms  of  the  French,  and 
thrust  all  into  them  without  distinction,  peo- 
ple, nobles,  and  priests. 

Divided  between  these  contrary  sentiments, 
the  grandees  of  Warsaw  thronged  around  Mu- 
rat,  and  came  to  submit  to  him  their  wishes, 
not  in  the  form  of  demands  but  of  advice, 
and  with  the  aim,  as  they  said,  of  producing 


228 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  18C6. 


a  universal  rising  of  the  Polish  people.  These 
wishes  consisted  in  soliciting  that  Napoleon 
would  immediately  proclaim  the  independence 
of  Poland,  not  confine  himself  to  this  act,  but 
select  a  king  from  his  own  family,  and  so- 
lemnly place  him  on  the  throne  of  the  Sobies- 
kis.  This  double  guarantee  given  them,  they 
added,  the  Poles,  no  longer  doubting  the  in- 
tentions of  Napoleon  and  his  firm  resolution 
to  uphold  his  work,  would  give  themselves  up 
to  him,  body  and  possessions.  The  king  to 
be  chosen  out  of  the  imperial  family  was 
already  designated — it  was  that  valiant  gene- 
ral of  cavalry,  so  well  fitted  to  be  the  king  of 
a  nation  of  horsemen — it  was  Murat  himself, 
who  actually  cherished  in  his  heart  the  ardent 
desire  of  a  crown,  and  particularly  of  that 
which  was  offered  to  him  at  this  moment,  for 
it  corresponded  alike  with  his  heroic  propensi- 
ties and  with  his  frivolous  and  ostentatious 
taste.  He  had  already  accommodated  his  cos- 
tume to  this  new  character,  and  brought  from 
Paris  gorgeous  habiliments,  calculated  to  give 
his  French  uniform  some  resemblance  to  the 
Polish  uniform. 

Murat,  ever  since  his  marriage  to  a  sister 
of  Napoleon's,  was  consumed  by  the  passion 
for  reigning.  This  passion,  which  ultimately 
proved  fatal  to  his  glory  and  his  life,  had  been 
strengthened  by  the  incitements  of  his  wife, 
still  more  ambitious  than  himself,  and  capable, 
in  order  to  accomplish  her  wishes,  of  drawing 
her  husband  into  the  most  culpable  actions. 
At  the  sight  of  this  vacant  throne  of  Poland, 
Murat  could  no  longer  curb  his  impatience. 
He  had  therefore  no  difficulty  to  adopt  the 
ideas  of  the  Polish  nobility,  and  undertook  to 
communicate  them  to  Napoleon.  The  com- 
mission, however,  was  a  difficult  one  to  exe- 
cute ;  for  Napoleon,  though  fully  sensible  of 
the  brilliant  and  generous  qualities  of  his 
brother-in-law,  had  nevertheless  an  extreme 
distrust  of  the  levity  of  his  character,  and 
frequently  proved  himself  a  harsh  and  severe 
master  to  him. 

Murat  guessed  full  well  what  reception  Na- 
poleon would  give  to  ideas  which  ran  counter 
to  his  politics,  and  which  would  moreover 
have  the  appearance  of  an  interested  proposal. 
He  took  good  care,  therefore,  not  to  name  the 
king  fixed  upon  by  the  Poles :  he  went  no  fur- 
ther than  to  state  their  ideas  in  a  general  man- 
ner, and  to  express  their  desire  that  the  inde- 
pendence of  Poland  should  be  immediately 
proclaimed  and  guarantied  by  a  French  king 
oi'  the  Bonaparte  family. 

Napoleon  had  himself  left  Berlin  during  the 
march  of  his  corps  d'armee  to  Warsaw,  and  ar- 
rived on  the  25th  of  November  at  Posen. 
There  it  was  that  he  received  Murat's  letter. 
He  needed  not  to  be  told  what  he  wished  to 
know.  Even  under  the  most  artful  dissimu- 
lation, he  detected  the  secrets  of  rninds,  and 
Murat's  dissimulation  was  not  of  such  a  na- 
ture as  to  be  very  difficult  to  penetrate.  He 
soon  discovered  the  ambition  which  swayed 
that  heart,  at  once  so  valiant  and  so  weak. 
It  excited  equal  dissatisfaction  with  him  and 
with  the  Poles.  He  viewed  the  proposals 
made  to  him  as  calculations,  reserves,  condi- 
tions, a  demi-euthusiasm,  and  those  of  them 


that  related  to  himself  as  dangerous  engajrp- 
ments  without  the  equivalent  of  a  powerful 
co-operation.  By  a  singular  concurrence  of 
circumstances,  he  received  on  the  same  d:iy 
despatches  from  Paris  relative  to  the  cele- 
brated Kosciusko,  whom  he  had  purposed  to 
draw  from  France,  and  to  put  at  the  head  of 
new  Poland.  This  Polish  patriot,  whom  mis- 
taken notices  prevented  at  this  period  from 
doing  useful  service  to  his  country,  lived  in 
Paris  amidst  the  small  number  of  discontented 
men  who  had  not  yet  forgiven  Napoleon  the 
18th  Brumaire,  the  Concordat,  the  re-establish- 
ment of  the  monarchy.  A  few  senators,  a  few 
members  of  the  old  Tribunate,  composed  this 
honest  and  vain  society.  Kosciusko  was 
wrong  to  oppose  unseasonable  contradictions 
to  the  only  man  who  then  had  it  in  his  power 
to  save  his  country,  and  who  seriously  intend- 
ed to  save  it.  Besides  the  preliminary  en- 
gagements proposed  by  the  nobles  of  Warsaw, 
and  impossible  to  be  taken  in  the  face  of  Aus- 
tria, Kosciusko  required  other  political  condi- 
tions, absolutely  puerile,  at  a  moment  when 
the  only  question  was  about  raising  Poland 
again,  before  discussing  what  constitution 
should  be  given  her.  Finding  himself  thwart- 
ed at  once  by  the  Poles  who  had  become  ideo- 
logues in  Paris,  and  the  Poles  who  had  become 
Russians  in  Petersburg,  he  conceived  a  dis- 
trust and  coldness  for  the  matter. 

As  for  what  related  to  Kosciusko,  he  replied 
to  Fouche,  the  minister  whom  he  had  com- 
missioned to  make  proposals  to  him  :  "Kosci- 
usko is  a  fool,  who  has  not  in  his  own  country 
all  the  importance  that  he  fancies  he  has,  and 
whom  I  shall  well  do  without  for  re-establish- 
ing Poland,  if  the  fortune  of  arms  seconds 
me."  He  addressed  a  dry  and  severe  letter 
to  Murat.  «  Tell  the  Poles,"  he  wrote,  "  that 
it  is  not  with  these  calculations,  with  these 
personal  precautions,  that  men  emancipate 
their  country  which  has  fallen  under  a  foreign 
yoke;  that  it  is,  on  the  contrary,  by  rising  all 
at  once,  blindly,  without  reserve,  and  with  the 
resolution  to  sacrifice  fortune  and  life,  that 
one  may  have  not  the  certainty  but  the  mere 
hope  to  deliver  it.  I  am  not  come  hither,"  he 
added,  "  to  beg  a  throne  for  my  family,  for  I  am 
not  in  want  of  thrones  to  give  away  ;  I  am  come 
in  behalf  of  the  European  equilibrium,  to  at-' 
tempt  the  most  difficult  of  enterprises,  by 
which  the  Poles  have  more  to  gain  than  any- 
body else,  since  it  is  their  national  existence 
that  is  at  stake,  as  well  as  the  interests  of 
Europe.  If,  by  dint  of  devotedness,  they  se- 
cond me  so  far  as  that  I  succeed,  I  will  grant 
them  independence.  If  not,  I  will  do  nothing, 
and  I  will  leave  them  under  their  Prussian 
and  Russian  masters.  I  do  not  find  here  in 
Posen,  in  the  provincial  nobility,  all  the  jea- 
lous notions  of  the  nobility  of  the  capital.  I 
find  in  them  frankness,  zeal,  patriotism,  what 
is  requisite,  jn  short,  for  saving  Poland,  and 
what  I  seek  in  vain  among  the  great  person- 
ages of  Warsaw." 

Napoleon,  dissatisfied,  but  not  renouncing 
on  that  account  the  plan  of  changing  the  face 
of  the  north  of  Europe  by  the  re-establishment 
of  Poland,  resolved  not  to  go  to  Warsaw,  but 
to  remain  at  Posen,  where  he  was  the  object 


Nov. 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


229 


of  an  extraordinary  enthusiasm.  He  contented 
himself  with  sending  to  Warsaw  M.  Wibiski, 
a  Pole,  whose  understanding  he  highly  appre- 
ciated, a  gentleman  more  versed  in  the  science 
of  law  and  politics  than  in  that  of  war,  but  hav- 
ing a  thorough  knowledge  of  his  country,  and 
animated  with  the  sincerest  patriotism.  Na- 
poleon explained  to  him  the  difficulties  of  his 
situation,  in  presence  of  the  three  old  copart- 
ners in  the  partition  of  Poland,  two  of  whom 
were  in  arms  against  him,  and  the  third  ready 
to  declare  himself,  the  necessity  he  was  under 
of  using  great  delicacy,  an<?  of  finding  in  a 
spontaneous  and  unanimous  movement  of  the 
Poles  at  once  a  pretext  for  proc.aiming  their 
independence,  and  a  support  sufficient  to  up- 
hold it.  His  language,  perfectly  sensible  and 
sincere,  persuaded  M.  Wibiski,  who  repaired 
lo  Warsaw  for  the  purpose  of  endeavouring 
to  impart  his  convictions  to  those  of  his  coun- 
trymen most  distinguished  by  their  position 
and  their  talents. 

This  singular  contest  between  the  Poles, 
who  expected  Napoleon  to  begin  with  pro- 
claiming their  independence,  and  Napoleon 
insisting  that  they  ought  to  set  out  by  deserv- 
ing it,  should  not  be  a  motive  of  censure  either 
for  them  or  him,  but  a  proof  of  the  very  diffi- 
culty of  the  enterprise.  The  Poles  thereby 
acknowledged  that  they  deemed  an  existence 
placed  at  so  great  a  distance  from  the  pro- 
tector who  had  restored  it  to  them  extremely 
precarious,  and  required  of  him,  for  their 
satisfaction,  not  only  a  solemn  engagement, 
but  also  the  ties  of  blood. 

Napoleon,  on  his  part,  acknowledged  that, 
though  powerful  enough  to  pretend  to  change 
the  face  of  Europe,  bold  enough  to  dare  to 
carry  the  war  to  the  Vistula,  still  he  hesitated 
to  proclaim  the  independence  of  Poland,  hav- 
ing two  of  the  three  copartitioners  in  front  and 
the  third  on  his  rear.  If,  however,  it  is  abso- 
lutely necessary  to  find  here  matter  for  cen- 
sure against  some  one,  it  must  be  against  the 
Poles,  at  least  against  those  who  calculated  in 
that  manner.  Napoleon,  in  fact,  owed  nothing  • 
to  the  Poles,  except  on  account  of  what  they  | 
should  do  for  Europe,  whose  representative  ; 
he  was,  while  they  owed  every  thing  to  their 
country,  even  an  imprudent  confidence,  were 
that  confidence  to  entail  an  aggravation  of 
their  evils.  When  Napoleon  was  prudent  he 
did  his  duty  ;  when  the  Poles  pretended  to  be 
so,  they  failed  in  theirs;  for,  in  the  situation 
in  which  they  were,  their  duty  was  not  to  be 
prudent,  but  devoted  even  though  they  per- 
ished.' 

Napoleon,  established  at  Posen  among  the 
nobility  of  the  grand-duchy,  all  of  whom 
flocked  around  him,  employed  himself  in  cre- 
ating there  one  of  those  military  establish- 
ments with  which  he  was  accustomed  to  mark 
his  route,  in  proportion  as  the  war  was  car- 
ried to  a  greater  distance.  He  bought  up  corn, 
forage,  in  particular,  cloth,  for  there  was  at 


Posen  a  considerable  cloth  manufactory ;  he 
organized  the  preserving  of  provisions,  hos- 
pitals, all  that  was  requisite,  in  short,  for  form- 
ing a  vast  depot  in  the  heart  of  Poland.  This 
place,  it  is  true,  was  not  fortified,  like  Witten- 
berg and  Spandau;  it  was  as  open  as  Berlin, 
but  it  had  for  its  defence  the  affection  of  the 
inhabitants,  heartily  devoted  to  the  cause  of 
the  French. 

Napoleon  then  directed  the  movements  of 
the  artillery,  conformably  to  his  plan  of  inva- 
sion. Marshal  Ney  had  arrived  at  Posen. 
Marshal  Soult  and  Bernadotte  were  proceeding 
thither  by  short  marches,  after  taking  in  Ber- 
lin all  the  rest  that  their  troops  had  need  of. 
The  guard  and  the  grenadiers,  repairing  to 
Posen,  surrounded  the  Emperor  there.  Prince 
Jerome  had  sent  off  the  Bavarians  for  Kalisch, 
and  with  the  Wirtembergers  commenced  with 
Glogau  the  investment  of  the  fortresses  of  Si- 
lesia. 

Napoleon  sent  Marshal  Ney  from  Posen  to 
Thorn,  to  endeavour  to  gain  possession  of  this 
latter  place,  and  to  secure  by  surprise  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Vistula.  He  directed  Marshal 
Lannes,  who  had  already  executed  that  same 
movement,  to  enter  Warsaw,  to  take  the  place 
of  Marshal  Davout,  as  soon  as  the  latter  should 
have  re-established  the  bridges  of  the  Vistula, 
which  connect  the  city  of  Warsaw  with  the 
suburb  of  Praga.  In  ordering  Marshals  Ney 
and  Davout  to  cross  the  Vistula  as  soon  as 
possible  at  the  two  points.  Thorn  and  Warsaw, 
he  recommended  to  them  to  secure  the  pas- 
sage in  a  permanent  manner  by  constructing 
strong  tetes  du  von'.  He  deferred  his  ulterior 
movements  till  the  moment  when  these  two 
bases  of  operation  should  be  solidly  established; 
and  meanwhile  he  occupied  himself  in  bring- 
ing forward,  without  haste  and  without  fatigue, 
the  two  corps  of  Marshals  Soult  and  Berna- 
dotte, that  they  might  enter  into  line  at  the 
head  of  all  his  collected  forces. 

During  this  interval,  Marshal  Davout,  with 
his  corps  d'armee,  Murat,  with  the  cavalry  re- 
serve, had  installed  themselves  in  Warsaw, 
and  were  endeavouring  to  execute  the  Empe- 
ror's orders  there.  The  Russians  had  employed 
the  time  of  their  stay  in  that  city  in  carrying 
off  or  destroying  the  provisions,  in  sinking  all 
the  craft,  in  short,  in  leaving  no  means  of  sub- 
sistence and  no  means  of  passage.  Thanks  to 
the  zeal  of  the  Poles,  they  were  supplied  with 
great  part  of  what  was  wanting.  Authorized 
by  Napoleon,  who  never  spared  the  money  with 
which  he  was  provided,  bargains  were  made 
with  Jew  dealers,  who  proved  themselves  very 
expert  and  very  clever  at  extracting  from  these 
extensive  countries  the  corn  in  which  they 
abounded.  An  Austrian  cordon  stationed 
along  Gallicia  prevented  the  exportation  of 
alimentary  commodities.  But  the  Jews  were 
commissioned  to  remove  the  difficulty  by  hand- 
some bribes  to  the  officers  of  the  customs,  and 
by  means  of  the  money  that  was  paid  them, 


•  Marshal  Davout,  a  warm  partisan  of  the  re-esla-  I  which  is  general  in  the  middle  classes.    The  uncertainly 
blishmen.  of  Poland,  wrote  under  date  of  the  4th  of    of  the  future  alarms  them,  and  they  give  us  pluinly  to 
December : — "  The  levies  of  men  are  very  easily  raised,     understand  that  they  will  not  declare  themselves  openly 
but  they  are  in  want  of  persons  capable  of  directing    till,  by   declaring  their   independence,  we  shall  huv» 
their  organization   and   training.     Muskets,  also,  are    entered  into  a  tacit  engagement  to  guaranty  it. 
wanting.    The  public  spirit  is  excellent  at  Warsaw;  j      " Warsaw,  1st  December,  1806." 
but  the  great  exert  their  influence  to  cool  the  ardour  I 


230 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Nov.  1806. 


and  by  means  of  all  the  salt  found  in  the  Prus- 
sian magazines  that  was  given  up  to  them, 
they  were  induced  to  promise  to  send  down  the 
Pilica  into  the  Vistula,  by  the  Vistula  into 
Warsaw,  the  wheat  and  the  oats,  and  to  bring, 
besides,  a  considerable  quantity  of  meat 

The  next  thing  thought  of  was  the  passage 
of  the  great  river,  which  cut  the  capital  in  two. 
The  weather,  alternately  rainy  and  frosty,  con- 
tinued unsettled,  which  was  the  worst  of  at- 
mospheric conditions  in  such  a  country,  for 
the  Vistula,  without  being  frozen  over,  floating 
down  enormous  flakes  of  ice,  admitted  neither 
of  a  bridge  being  thrown  over,  nor  of  crossing 
upon  the  ice.  Detachments  of  light  cavalry 
had  been  sent  along  the  banks  of  the  river,  to 
sei7»  the  barks  which  the  enemy  had  not  had 
time  to  sink,  and  in  this  manner  a  certain  num- 
ber had  been  collected  at  Warsaw.  Not  yet 
able  to  throw  a  bridge,  on  account  of  the  ice 
which  the  current  carried  down  with  violence, 
the  French  tried  to  put  some  detachments  over 
in  boats.  It  required  the  boldness  which  the 
habit  of  success  had  imparted  to  our  soldiers 
and  to  our  generals  to  venture  upon  such  ope- 
rations ;  for  these  detachments,  being  conveyed 
over  one  after  another,  might  have  been  car- 
ried off  before  they  were  sufficiently  nume- 
rous to  'iefend  themselves.  But  the  Russian 
general  who  commanded  the  advanced  guard, 
seeing  this  commencement  to  pass,  took  the 
alarm,  abandoned  the  suburb  of  Praga,  and 
retire^  upon  the  Narew,  a  military  line,  the 
direction  of  which  we  shall  presently  describe, 
and  which  is  a  few  leagues  from  Warsaw. 
The  French  lost  no  time  in  taking  advantage 
of  this  circumstance;  a  whole  division  of  Da- 
voui's  corps  was  carried  across  the  Vistula, 
took  possession  of  Praga  and  advanced  to  Ja- 
blona.  The  Vistula  appearing  somewhat  less 
encumbered  with  ice,  the  bridges  of  boats  were 
rf-established,  thanks  to  the  seamen  of  the 
g'lard  and  to  the  zeal  of  the  Polish  boatmen,  j 
li  a  few  days,  the  construction  of  bridges  of  | 
Duals  being  finished,  Marshal  Davout  was  en-  j 
abled  to  pass  with  his  whole  corps  to  the  right 
bank,  to  establish  himself  at  Praga,  and  even 
oe/ond,  in  a  strong  position  on  the  Narew. 
The  corps  of  Lannes  came  to  make  itself 
amends  in  Warsaw  for  the  privations  which 
it  had  suffered  in  ascending  the  Vistula.  Mar- 
'  shal  Augereau  replaced  him,  and  took  his  po- 
sition below  Warsaw,  at  Utrata,  opposite  to  | 
Modlin,  that  is  to  say,  opposite  to  the  conflux  j 
of  the  Narew  and  the  Vistula.  His  corps  suf-  ' 
fered  much  there,  and  had  nothing  but  the 
bread  which  Lannes  and  Murat  sent  from  War- 
saw, with  the  zeal  of  good  comrades. 

While  the  passage  of  the  Vistula  was  taking 
place  at  Warsaw,  Marshal  Ney  had  marched 
for  Thorn,  through  Griesen  and  Inowraclaw. 
The  Prussian  corps  of  Lestocq,  which  was  ! 
still  15,000  strong,  after  furnishing  garrisons  j 
for  Graudenz  and  Dantzig,  occupied  Thorn  by  I 
a  detachment.     Marshal  Ney  approached  that 
:own,  which,  by  a  situation  quite  contrary  to 
that  of  Warsaw,  is  on  the  right  bank  of  the 
Vistula,  and  has  only  a  mere  suburb  on  the 
/eft  bank.    A  vast  bridge,  resting  upon  wooden 
arches,  and  supported  upon  an  island,  united 
the  two  banks;   but  the  enemy  had  almost  de- 


stroyed it.  Marshal  Ney,  having  advanced 
with  merely  the  head  of  a  column,  made  a  re- 
connoissance  of  the  banks  of  the  Vistula,  in 
company  with  Colonel  Savary,  commandant 
of  the  14th  of  the  line.  Thorn  stands  upon 
the  boundary  separating  the  Slavonian  country 
from  the  German  country.  The  two  popula- 
tions, ever  inimical  to  each  other,  and  never 
more  so  than  then,  were  ready  to  come  to 
blows  before  the  arrival  of  the  French.  Some 
Polish  boatmen  assisted  the  troops  of  Marshal 
Ney,  and  brought  him  a  sufficient  number  of 
boats  to  carry  over  a  few  hundred  men.  Co- 
lonel Savary,  with  a  detachment  of  his  regi- 
ment, and  some  companies  of  the  69th  of  the 
line  and  of  the  6th  light,  embarked  in  these 
boats,  and  ventured  across  the  wide  bed  of  the 
Vistula,  navigating  through  the  midst  of  enor- 
mous ice-flakes.  When  he  approached,  a  fire 
of  musketry  commenced,  and  was  the  more 
annoying,  because  the  ice-flakes,  more  com- 
pact on  the  banks  than  in  the  middle  of  the 
river,  scarcely  allowed  the  boats  to  land.  The 
German  boatmen  prepared  to  join  their  efforts 
to  this  local  obstacle,  for  the  purpose  of  pre- 
venting the  landing  of  the  French.  At  this 
sight,  the  Polish  boatmen,  bolder  and  more 
numerous  than  the  German,  fell  upon  the  lat- 
ter, drove  them  away,  and,  wading  into  the 
water  up  to  their  waists,  dragged  the  boats  to 
the  shore  under  the  fire  of  the  Prussians.  The 
400  French,  leaping  ashore,  immediately  darted 
upon  the  enemy.  Presently,  boats,  sent  from 
the  other  side  of  the  Vistula,  brought  fresh  de- 
tachments, and  Ney's  troops  were  sufficiently 
numerous  in  Thorn  to  make  themselves  mas- 
ters of  the  place. 

After  this  daring  act,  so  happily  accom- 
plished, Marshal  Ney  set  about  making  an 
establishment  in  Thorn  for  himself  and  for 
the  corps  which  were  coming  to  join  him. 
The  first  thing  he  did  was  to  repair  the  bridge, 
which  was  no  difficult  matter,  as  the  destruc- 
tion had  been  very  incomplete.  He  discovered 
boats  in  great  numbers,  because  the  traffic  on 
the  Lower  Vistula  is  more  active ;  indeed,  it  is 
so  extensive,  as  to  send  craft  to  Warsaw,  and 
to  the  intermediate  points,  particularly  tc 
Utrata,  where  they  were  very  necessary  to 
Marshal  Augereau,  for  the  conveyance  of  his 
provisions.  He  then  turned  his  attention  to 
the  conversion  of  Thorn  to  the  purposes  to 
which  Posen  and  Warsaw  had  already  been 
applied — that  is  to  say,  to  the  creation  of  hos- 
pitals, of  manufactories  for  preserving  provi- 
sions, of  establishments  of  all  kinds.  13rom- 
berg,  which  is  situated  on  the  Nackel  canal,  at 
a  little  distance  from  Thorn,  might  there  pour 
in  part  of  its  vast  resources,  and  which  could 
be  done  without  delay,  by  means  of  the  navi- 
gation. Ney  then  ranged  the  seven  regiments 
of  his  corps  d'arwie'e  around  Thorn,  disposing 
them  like  radii  about  a  centre,  and  placing  his 
light  cavalry  at  the  circumference,  to  secure 
himself  from  the  Cossacks — very  nimble  run- 
ners, and  very  annoying,  too. 

When  Napoleon  learned  that,  through  th« 
zeal  and  boldness  of  his  lieutenants,  he  was 
master  of  the  course  of  the  Vistula  at  the  two 
principal  points,  Thorn  and  Warsaw,  he  im- 
mediately suspended  his  plan  of  operations  till 


Dec.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


231 


the  end  of  autumn.  He  was  sufficiently  ac- 
quainted" with  the  state  of  the  country,  and  the 
action  of  the  rain  on  its  clayey  soil,  to  decide 
on  taking  his  winter  quarters.  But  he  intend- 
ed first  to  strike  the  Russians  a  blow,  which, 
if  not  decisive,  should  at  least  be  effective 
enough  to  throw  them  back  to  the  Niemen, 
and  allow  him  to  take  his  winter  quarters  qui- 
etly along  the  Vistula.  In  order  to  compre- 
hend clearly  the  movements  which  he  medi- 
tated, we  must  form  an  accurate  idea  of  the 
localities,  and  of  the  position  which  the  enemy 
had  occupied  there. 

The  King  of  Prussia,  driven  from  the  Oder, 
had  retired  upon  the  Vistula.  Driven  from 
the  Vistula,  he  had  fallen  back  upon  the  Pre- 
gel,  at  Konigsberg.  Having  arrived  at  this 
extremity  of  his  kingdom,  there  was  left  for 
him  to  defend,  in  concert  with  the  Russians, 
the  space  comprised  between  the  Vistula  and 
the  Pregel.  The  soil  here  exhibits  the  same 
characters  as  between  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder, 
between  the  Oder  and  the  Vistula,  that  is  to 
say,  a  long  chain  of  sand-hills,  parallel  to  the 
sea,  retaining  the  waters,  and  forming  a  series 
of  lakes  extending  from  the  Vistula  to  the  Pre- 
gel. These  lakes  frequently  find  a  channel  to 
flow  off,  some  directly  to  the  sea,  by  small 
rivers  which  throw  themselves  into  it,  and  the  ! 
principal  of  which  is  the  Passarge — the  others 
into  the  interior  of  the  country  by  a  multitude 
of  streams,  such  as  the  Omulew,  the  Orezyc, 
the  Ukra,  which  run  into  the  Narew,  and,  by 
the  Narew,  into  the  Vistula.  This  singular 
country,  comprised  between  the  Vistula  and 
the  Pregel,  has,  therefore,  two  slopes,  one 
towards  the  sea,  which  is  German,  formerly 
colonized  by  the  Teutonic  Order,  and  highly 
cultivated ;  the  other  turned  towards  the  in- 
terior, thinly  inhabited,  scantily  cultivated, 
covered  with  thick  forests,  and  almost  im- 
penetrable in  winter.  You  find  nothing  but 
resources  in  approaching  the  sea ;  nothing 
but  obstacles,  difficulty  to  subsist,  when  you 
penetrate  into  the  interior.  At  the  mouth  of 
the  Vistula,  and  at  that  of  the  Pregel,  are 
seated  two  great  commercial  cities,  Dantzig 
on  the  first,  Konigsberg  on  the  second — full, 
at  the  period  of  which  we  are  treating,  of  im- 
mense resources,  not  only  the  produce  of  the 
country,  but  such  as  the  English  had  brought, 
and  were  daily  bringing  thither.  Danlzig, 
strongly  fortified,  provided  with  a  numerous  I 
garrison,  could  not  be  reduced  without  a  long 
siege.  It  was  a  point  d'appui  for  the  Russians 
and  Prussians,  of  great  importance,  on  the  ' 
Lower  Vistula,  and  rendered  our  position  on  j 
the  Upper  Vistula  precarious,  by  enabling  the 
enemy,  at  all  times,  to  pass  that  river  on  our 
left,  and  to  threaten  our  rear.  Konigsberg,  ill- 
fortified,  but  defended  by  the  distance,  con- 
taining the  last  resources  of  Prussia  in  matt~ 
riel,  military  stores,  money,  soldiers,  officers, 
was  the  principal  depot  of  the  enemy,  and  his 
medium  of  communication  with  the  English. 
Between  Dantzig  and  Konigsberg  extends  the 
Frische  Haff,  a  vast  lagoon,  like  the  lagoons 
of  Venice  and  Holland,  owing  to  the  cause 
•which  has  produced  all  the  phenomena  of  this 
soil,  and  to  the  accumulation  of  the  sand, 
which,  thrown  up  in  a  long  bank  parallel  to 


the  shore,  separates  the  waters  of  the  rivers 
from  the  maritime  waters,  and  thus  forms  an 
intermediate  sea.  It  is  the  same  phenomenon 
that  is  remarked  at  the  mouth  of  the  Oder,  by 
the  name  of  the  Great  HafT;  and,  at  the  mouth 
of  the  Niemen,  by  the  name  of  the  Curische 
Haff.  Besides  Dantzig  and  Konigsberg,  other 
commercial  towns,Marienburg,Elbing,Brauns- 
berg,  situated  along  the  Frische  Haff,  form  a 
belt  of  wealthy  and  populous  cities.  These 
were  the  last  wrecks  of  the  Prussian  mo- 
narchy left  to  Frederick  William.  That  mo- 
narch, himself  fixed  at  Konigsberg,  had  his 
troops  scattered  between  Dantzig  and  Konigs- 
berg, trusting  to  the  Russians  on  the  side  to- 
wards Thorn.  He  thus  defended  the  maritime 
slope  with  30,000  men,  including  garrisons. 
The  Russians,  with  100,000,  occupied  the  in- 
land slope,  backed  upon  thick  forests,  and 
covered  by  the  Ukra  and  the  Narew,  rivers 
which,  uniting  before  they  fall  into  the  Vis- 
tula, describe  an  angle,  the  apex  of  which 
supports  itself  upon  that  great  river  a  little 
below  Warsaw. 

Two  combinations  were  possible  on  the  part 
of  the  allies.  They  could  unite  in  one  mass 
towards  the  sea,  in  order  to  avail  themselves 
of  the  numerous  points  of  support  which  they 
possessed  upon  the  coast,  particularly  Dantzig, 
and,  passing  the  Lower  Vistula,  oblige  us  to 
repass  the  Upper,  if  we  did  not  choose  to  be 
turned.  They  could  also,  leaving  to  the  Prus- 
sians the  charge  of  guarding  the  sea,  and 
communicating  together  by  means  of  a  few 
detachments  placed  on  the  line  of  the  lakes, 
push  forward  the  Russians 'in  advance  of  the 
region  of  the  forests,  into  the  angle  described 
by  the  Ukra  and  the  Narew,  thus  forming  a 
sort  of  wedge,  and  driving  the  point  of  it  to- 
wards Warsaw.  Napoleon  was  ready  for 
either  of  these  cases.  If  the  Prussians  and 
Russians  operated  in  one  mass  toward  the  sea, 
his  intention  was  to  ascend  the  Narew  by  the 
roads  running  through  the  inland  country,  and 
then,  dropping  down  to  the  left,  throw  the  ene- 
my into  the  sea  or  into  the  Lower  Vistula.  If, 
on  the  contrary,  leaving  the  Prussians  towards 
the  sea,  between  Dantzig  and  Konigsberg,  the 
Russians  advanced  along  the  Narew  and  the 
Ukra  upon  Warsaw,  then,  breaking  in  between 
the  two  by  Thorn,  he  had  determined  to  wheel 
about  on  his  right,  the  extremity  of  which 
would  rest  upon  Warsaw,  to  bear  up  with  his 
left,  so  as  to  separate  the  Prussians  from  the 
Russians  by  this  rotatory  movement,  and  to 
fling  back  the  latter  into  the  chaos  of  the  woods 
and  marshes  of  the  interior.  He  should  thus 
cut  them  off  from  the  resources  of  the  sea, 
from  the  succours  of  England,  and  force  them 
to  flee  in  disorder  through  a  horrible  labyrinth. 
This  separation  affected,  the  maritime  region, 
defended  by  a  few  thousand  Prussians,  would 
be  easy  to  conquer,  and  with  it  he  should  take 
all  the  material  riches  of  the  coalition. 

Of  the  two  combinations  which  we  have  de- 
scribed, the  allies  seemed  to  have  adopted  the 
second.  The  Prussians  occupied  the  maritime 
region,  connecting  themselves  with  the  Rus- 
sians by  a  detachment  placed  in  the  environs 
of  Thorn.  The  Russians  were  ranged  in 
masses  in  the  inland  region,  upon  the  Narew 


232 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Dec.  1806. 


and  its  tributaries.  General  Benningsen,  who 
commanded  the  first  Russian  army,  had  fallen 
back  from  the  Vistula  upon  the  Narew,  on  the 
approach  of  the  French,  and  had  taken  posi- 
tion in  the  interior  of  the  angle  formed  by  the 
Ukra  and  the  Narew.  General  Buxhovden, 
with  the  second  army,  composed  also  of  four 
divisions,  was  in  rear  upon  the  Upper  Narew 
and  the  Omulew,  in  the  environs  of  Ostrolenka. 
General  Essen,  with  the  two  divisions  of  re- 
serve, had  not  yet  arrived  on  the  theatre  of 
war.  With  a  view  to  flatter  the  passions  of 
the  veteran  Russian  soldiers,  there  had  been 
given  them  for  commander-in-chief  General 
Kamenski,  an  old  lieutenant  of  Suwarrow's, 
having  the  energetic  roughness  of  the  illus- 
trious Muscovite  warrior,  but  none  of  his  ta- 
lents. Having  at  first  fallen  back  before  the 
French,  the  Russians,  regretting  the  ground 
lost,  were  moving  forward  to  recover  it;  but, 
at  sight  of  our  army,  fully  prepared  to  receive 
them,  they  had  resumed  their  position  behind 
the  Ukra  and  the  Narew. 

Informed  of  the  situation  of  the  Prussians 
and  Russians,  the  former  established  along  the 
sea,  the  latter  crowded  together  in  the  inland 
region,  and  weakly  connected  towards  Thorn, 
Napoleon  resolved  to  oppose  to  them  the  ma- 
noeuvre contrived  for  this  case,  that  is  to  say, 
to  debouch  from  Thorn  with  his  left  reinforced, 
to  separate  the  Prussians  from  the  Russians, 
and  to  throw  the  latter  into  the  inextricable 
difficulties  of  the  interior.  He  had  already 
directed  Marshal  Ney  upon  Thorn;  he  also 
sent  thither  Marshal  Bernadotte,  with  the  first 
corps  and  Dupont's  division.  He  pushed  for- 
ward the  corps  of  Marshal  Soult  intermediately, 
by  Sempolno  upon  Plock,  ordering  him  to  pass 
the  Vistula  between  Warsaw  and  Thorn,  and 
recommended  to  him  to  connect  himself  by 
his  left  with  Marshals  Ney  and  Bernadotte,  by 
his  right  with  Marshal  Augereau.  The  dra- 
goons mounted  at  Potsdam  having  joined  the 
army,  Napoleon  united  them  with  the  portion 
of  the  heavy  cavalry  which  had  rested  itself 
in  Berlin,  and  thus  composed  a  second  reserve 
of  horse,  which  he  consigned  to  Marshal  Bes- 
sieres,  removed  for  a  time  from  the  command 
of  the  imperial  guard.  This  second  reserve 
he  sent  to  Thorn.  It  formed  a  body  of  seven 
or  eight  thousand  horse,  which,  added  to  the 
corps  of  Marshals  Ney  and  Bernadotte,  would 
compose  at  the  extreme  left  of  the  French 
army  a  column  of  from  forty  to  forty-five  thou- 
sand men,  quite  sufficient  to  effect  the  pro- 
jected rotatory  movement.  Marshal  Soult,  at 
the  head  of  25,000  men,  formed  the  centre; 
Marshals  Augereau,  Davout,  and  Lannes, 
formed  the  right,  destined  to  appuy  itself  upon 
Warsaw.  All  these  corps  were  near  enough 
10  co-operate  with  each  other,  and  to  present 
in  a  few  hours  70,000  men  assembled  on  one 
point,  wherever  it  might  be,  at  which  the  ene- 
my should  be  found  in  force.  Napoleon  sup- 
posed, therefore,  that,  his  left  advancing  by 
rapid  marches  while  his  right  wheeled  round 
.slowly,  he  might  take  the  Russians  in  hand  by 
the  wav,  and,  after  he  had  separated  them  from 
the  Prussians,  drive  them  from  the  Ukra  to 
the  Narew,  from  the  Narew  to  the  Bug,  far 
from  the  sea,  and  bury  them  in  the  interior  of  I 


Poland.  If  the  weather,  favouring  such  de- 
signs, should  facilitate  marches,  it  was  possi- 
ble that  the  Russians  might  be  forced  back  so 
far  from  their  base  of  operation,  and  from  the 
country  on  which  they  subsisted,  that  their 
rout  would  become  a  signal  disaster. 

Being  desirous  to  wheel  round  upon  War- 
saw, but  also  to  be  able  to  move  away  from  it 
if  necessary,  in  case  he  should  be  obliged  to 
follow  the  movement  of  his  left,  and  to  ascend 
with  it,  Napoleon  had  considerable  works 
constructed  in  the  suburb  of  Praga.  He 
ordered  it  to  be  fortified  by  means  of  earth- 
works, provided  with  a  revetement  in  wood, 
which  was  equal  to  a  scarp  in  masonry.  This 
suburb,  thus  fortified,  would  serve  for  a  te!e  du 
pont  to  Warsaw.  Napoleon  enjoined  Marshal 
Davout,  who  had  proceeded  from  the  Vistula 
to  the  Narew,  to  throw  a  bridge  over  the  latter 
river,  and  to  put  it  into  a  state  of  defence. 
He  directed  Marshal  Augereau,  who  was  pre- 
paring to  pass  the  Vistula  at  Modliu,  to  esta- 
blish there  also  a  permanent  bridge,  and  to 
render  it  unassailable  on  both  banks.  He 
charged  General  Chasseloup  to  mark  out  the 
works  ordered.  He  recommended  to  him  to 
employ  earth  and  timber  exclusively  for  them, 
to  mount  upon  them  the  heavy  artillery  taken 
from  the  enemy,  and  to  draw  thither,  by  good 
wages,  Polish  workmen  in  great  number. 
Napoleon  was  desirous  that  these  fortifica- 
tions of  earth  and  wood,  raised  to  an  equality 
with  a  permanent  fortification,  should,  on  his 
leaving  there  the  Poles  of  the  new  levy  and 
a  few  French  detachments,  suffice  for  their 
own  defence,  while  the  army  was  pushing 
onward,  if  the  course  of  the  operations  under- 
taken should  require  it  to  do  so. 

The  orders  of  Napoleon  were  always  punc- 
tually executed,  unless  absolute  impossibility 
prevented,  because  he  paid  incessant  attention 
to  their  execution,  and  urged  it  on  most  per- 
severingly.  General  Chasseloup  pushed  for- 
ward the  prescribed  works  with  activity,  but 
he  had  difficulty  to  procure  workmen.  The 
violences  committed  by  the  Russians,  and  the 
dread  of  similar  violence^  on  the  part  of  the 
French,  had  induced  the  peasants  to  betake 
themselves,  with  their  families,  their  cattle, 
and  their  means  of  conveyance,  to  the  terri- 
tory of  Austrian  Poland,  the  frontier  of  which, 
being  extremely  near,  and  closed  against  both 
the  belligerent  armies,  offered  a  ready  and  a 
safe  asylum.  The  inhabitants  of  whole  vil- 
lages had  fled,  headed  by  their  priests,  to 
escape  the  horrors  of  war.  Hands  were  not 
to  be  procured,  even  at  very  high  prices. 
There  were  some,  it  is  true,  at  Warsaw,  but 
the  construction  of-ovens,  the  organization  of 
the  military  establishments,  which  required  to 
be  proportioned  to  an  army  of  200,000  men, 
absorbed  almost  all  of  them.  None  at  all 
were  left  to  be  employed  elsewhere.  Soldiers 
had  to  supply  their  place.  Unfortunately,  the 
latter  begin  to  flag,  and  to  feel  the  influences 
of  the  season,  which  was  hitherto  rather  wet 
than  cold.  They  had  also  to  suffer  privations. 
The  provisions  ordered  in  Gallicia  were  long 
in  coming,  and  even  at  Warsaw  there  was 
found  some  difficulty  to  subsist.  Marshal 
Lannes  was  encamped  there  with  his  two 


Dec.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


233 


divisions.  Marshal  Davout  was  encamped 
beyond ;  that  is  to  say,  on  the  bank  of  the 
Narew,  which  falls  into  the  Vistula  a  little 
below  Warsaw.  It  was  about  eight  leagues 
from  Warsaw  to  the  Narew,  and  in  that  space 
there  were  abundance  of  heaths,  little  culti- 
vated land,  and  few  dwelling-houses.  Sol- 
diers of  Davout's  corps,  being  obliged  to  eat 
pork  for  want  of  beef  and  mutton,  were  at- 
tacked with  dysentery.  They  had  no  bread 
but  what  was  sent  them  from  day  to  day. 
Marshal  Davout  had  his  head-quarters  at  Jab- 
lona,  and  his  column-head  on  the  very  bank 
of  the  Narew,  towards  Okunin,  opposite  to 
the  conflux  of  the  Ukra  and  the  Narew.  Mar- 
shal Davout,  in  spite  of  the  Russian  advanced 
guards,  had  passed  the  Narew,  thrown  a  bridge 
over  that  river,  with  the  aid  of  some  boats 
which  had  been  collected,  and  had  labourers 
engaged  upon  defensive  works  at  both  ex- 
tremities of  this  bridge.  He  had  it  in  his 
power,  therefore,  to  manoeuvre  on  either  bank 
of  the  Narew.  Still,  having  crossed  it  below 
the  point  where  it  is  joined  by  the  Ukra,  he 
had  yet  to  cross  it  higher  up,  or  to  cross  the 
Ukra  itself,  in  order  to  penetrate  into  the  angle 
occupied  by  the  Russians.  But  they  were 
numerous  there,  and  solidly  intrenched  on 
weody,  elevated  ground,  and  armed  with 
artillery.  It  was  impossible  to  attack  them 
without  passing  the  Ukra  by  main  force. 
Such  an  attempt  must  necessarily  bring  on  a 
battle,  which  was  not  to  be  sought  but  in  the 
presence  of  Napoleon. 

Marshal  Davout's  labourers  almost  gave 
the  hand  to  those  of  Marshal  Augereau,  who 
was  actively  engaged  in  establishing  himself 
upon  the  Vistula,  near  Modlin,  at  the  point 
where  the  Vistula  and  Narew  join.  But  he 
was  destitute  of  the  necessary  means,  for  the 
Russians  had  destroyed  every  thing  in  retir- 
ing. Twelve  boats,  picked  up  above  and  be- 
low Modlin,  had  served  him  to  put  one  detach- 
ment after  another  across  the  river.  He  set 
about  building  a  spacious  bridge  at  Modlin, 
with  defensive  works  on  both  banks.  His 
troops,  amidst  the  sands  which  prevail  in  this 
part  of  the  country,  fared  still  worse  than 
those  of  Marshal  Davout.  He  was  impatient 
to  remove  to  Plonsk,  beyond  the  Vistula,  oppo- 
site to  the  Ukra,  in  a  more  fertile  country. 
Marshal  Soult  had  performed  the  marches 
ordered  by  the  Emperor,  and  had  begun  to 
pass  at  Plock,  whence  he  could  either  join 
Marshal  Augereau  at  Plonsk,  or  Marshals 
Ney  and  Bernadotte  at  Biezun,  according  to 
circumstances.  As  for  the  corps  which  had 
Thorn  for  their  base  of  operations,  these  were 
in  want  of  nothing. 

These  rapid  conquerors,  who  had  so  speed- 


ily overrun  Austria  last  year,  and  Prussia  last 
month,  found  their  triumphal  march  slack- 
ened by  a  damp  and  dreary  climate,  by  a  mov- 
ing soil,  alternately  sandy  and  muddy,  by  the 
want  of  provisions,  becoming  scarcer  in  pro- 
portion as  population  and  cultivation  dimi- 
nished. They  were  surprised  at  this,  not  cast 
down  ;  indulged  in  a  thousand  sarcastic  sal- 
lies on  the  attachment  of  the  Poles  to  such  a 
country,  and  desired  nothing  better  than  to 
fall  in  with  the  enemy  of  Austerlitz,  that  they 
might  revenge  upon  him  the  annoyances  of  soil 
and  climate. 

On  seeing  the  Russians  by  turns  advance 
and  fall  back,  then   retire  for  the  last  time, 
with  all  the  appearances  of  a  definitive  retreat, 
Napoleon  conceived  that  they  were  retiring  to 
the  Pregel,  with  the  intention  of  taking  up 
their  winter  quarters  there.     He  therefore  or- 
dered Mural  and  Bessieres  to  pursue  them  at 
the  head  of  25,000  horse,  the  one  debouching 
from  Warsaw  with  the  first  reserve  of  cavalry, 
the  other  debouching  from  Thorn  with  the  se- 
!  cond.     But  the  more  accurate  reports  of  Mar- 
i  shal  Davout,  who,  placed  at  the  conflux  of  the 
Narew  and  Ukra,  beheld  the  Russians  solidly 
established  on  both  rivers,  the  corresponding 
i  reports  of  Marshal  Augereau,  and,  in  particu- 
lar, of  Marshal  Ney,  who  was  in  the  habit  of 
observing  the  enemy  very  closely,  soon  unde- 
ceived  him,  and  proved  to  him  that  it  was 
high  time  to  march  against  the  Russians,  that 
I  it  was  even  necessary  to  do  so,  if  he  was  not 
disposed  to  let  them  winter  in  a  position  too 
i  near  to  that  of  the  French  army.     Besides, 
I  the  bridges  over  the  Vistula,  which  he  pur- 
!  posed  to  make  his  points  d'appui,  were  finished, 
i  provided  with  a  commencement  of  defensive 
I  works,  and  capable  of  a  sufficient  resistance, 
if  some  troops  were  placed  in  them. 

Napoleon  therefore  left  Posen  in  the  night, 
between  the  15th  and  16th  of  December,  after 
a  stay  of  nineteen  days,  passed  through  Kutno 
and  Lowicz,  gave  orders  everywhere  for  pro- 
visions, and  for  medical  and  surgical  stores, 
in  case  of  a  retrograde  movement,  not  very 
probable,  but  always  kept  sight  of  by  his  pru- 
dence ;  and  lastly  superintended  the  march  of 
his  columns  for  Warsaw,  and  was  particularly 
attentive  to  the  despatch  of  the  guard  and 
Oudinot's  grenadiers  for  that  city.1 

He  entered  the  capital  of  Poland  at  night 
to  avoid  noisy  demonstrations,  for  it  did  not 
suit  him  to  pay  for  a  few  popular  acclamations 
by  imprudent  engagements.  Wibiski.  the  Pole, 
had  preceded  him,  and  exerted  all  his  powers 
to  persuade  his  countrymen  that  they  ought  to 
devote  themselves  to  him.  Many  of  them  had 
been  won  by  the  reasons  which  he  gave  them. 
Prince  Poniatowski,  nephew  of  the  last  king, 


«  We  quote  the  following  letter,  as  it  clearly  indicates 
the  state  of  things  at  the  moment  to  which  the  above 
particulars  relate  :— 

To  General  Clarke. 

Lowitz,  18th  December,  1806,  7  P.  M. 
I  have  arrived  at  Lowicz.    I  write  to  you  to  relieve 
you  from  every  kind  of  uneasiness.    There  is  no  news 
here.    The  armies  are  in  presence.    The  Russians  are 
on  the  right  bank  of  the  Narew,  and  we  on  the  left. 
Besides  Praga,  we  have  two  titet  du  pont,  one  at  Mod- 
tin,  the  other  on  the  Narew.  at  the  mouth  of  the  Ukra. 
VOL.  II.— 30 


We  have  Thorn,  and  an  army  twenty  leagues  in  ad- 
vance, maneuvering  upon  the  enemy.    All  this  news  is 
for  yourself.    It  is  possible  that,  before  the  end  of  eight 
days,  there  may  be  an  affair  that  will  put  an  end  to  the 
campaign.    Take  your  precautions,  that  there  may  not 
;  be  a  musket  left  either  in  Berlin  or  in  the  country,  that 
i  Spandau  and  Custrin  are  in  a  good  state,  and  that  every 
|  body  does  good  service. 

Write  to  Mayence  and  to  Paris,  merely  to  say  thuc 


you  are  writing,  that  there  is  no  news, 
done  in  general  every  day,  when  I  ha 


passing :  that  baffles  unfavourable  reports. 


ive  no  couriers 


NAPOLXOK. 


334 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Dec.  1806. 


young,  brilliant,  and  brave,  a  kind  of  hero 
lulled  to  sleep  in  the  lap  of  voluptuousness, 
but  ready  to  awake  at  the  first  clash  of  arms, 
was  one  of  those  who  had  offered  themselves 
to  second  the  plans  of  Napoleon.  Count  Po- 
tocki,  old  Malakouski,  marshal  of  one  of  the 
last  Diets,  and  others  who  had  come  to  War- 
saw, had  collected  around  the  French  authori- 
ties, tc  concur  in  forming  a  government.  A 
provisi.  -nal  administration  had  been  composed, 
and  all  began  to  go  on  well,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  inevitable  skirmishes  between  per- 
sons of  little  experience  and  strongly  inclined 
to  jealousy.  Men  were  raised  and  battalions 
organized,  either  at  Warsaw  or  at  Posen.  Na- 
poleon, in  order  to  assist  the  new  Polish  go- 
vernment, had  exempted  it  from  all  contribu- 
tion, on  condition  of  its  furnishing  provisions 
in  case  of  emergency.  For  the  rest  the  high 
society  of  Warsaw  paid  him  extraordinary 
homage.  All  the  Polish  nobility  had  left  their 
country  seats,  impatient  to  see  him,  to  meet 
the  great  man,  as  well  as  the  deliverer  of  Po- 
land. 

Having  arrived  in  the  night  between  the 
18th  and  19th,  Napoleon  mounted  his  horse  in 
the  morning,  in  order  to  reconnoitre  himself 
the  position  of  Marshal  Davouton  the  Narew. 
A  thick  fog  prevented  him.  He  made  his  dis- 
positions for  attacking  the  enemy  on  the  22d 
or  23d  of  December.  It  is  high  time,  he  wrote 
to  Marshal  Davout,  to  take  our  winter  quarters; 
but  this  cannot  be  done  till  we  have  driven 
back  the  Russians. 

The  four  divisions  of  General  Benningsen 
first  presented  themselves.  Count  Tolstoy's 
division,  posted  at  Czarnowo,  occupied  the 
apex  of  the  angle  formed  by  the  junction  of 
the  Ukra  and  the  Narew.  That  of  General 
Sacken,  also  placed  in.  rear  towards  Lopaczym, 
guarded  the  banks  of  the  Ukra.  The  division 
of  Prince  Gallitzin  was  in  reserve  at  Pultusk. 
The  four  divisions  of  General  Buxhovden  were 
at  a  great  distance  from  those  of  General  Ben- 
ningsen, and  not  calculated  to  render  support 
to  him.  Two  detachments  at  Popowo  observed 
the  country  between  the  Narew  and  the  Bug. 
Two  others  were  encamped  still  further  off,  at 
Makow  and  Ostrolenka.  The  Prussians,  driven 
out  of  Thorn,  were  on  the  upper  course  of  the 
Ukra,  towards  Soldau,  connecting  the  Russians 
with  the  sea.  As  we  have  said,  General  Es- 
sen's two  divisions  of  reserve  had  not  yet  ar- 
rived. The  total  mass  of  the  allies  destined 
to  enter  into  action  was  about  115,000  men. 

It  is  easy  to  perceive  that  the  distribution  of 
the  Russian  corps  was  not  judiciously  com- 
bined in  the  angle  of  the  Ukra  and  the  Narew, 
and  that  they  had  not  sufficiently  concentrated 
their  forces.  If,  instead  of  having  a  single 
division  at  the  point  of  the  angle,  and  one  on 
each  side  at  too  great  a  distance  from  the  first, 
lastly,  five  out  of  reach,  they  had  distributed 
themselves  with  intelligence  over  ground  so 
favourable  for  the  defensive;  if  they  had 
strongly  occupied,  first  the  conflux,  then  the 
two  rivers,  the  Narew  from  Czarnowo  to  Pul- 
tusk, the  Ukra  from  Pomichowo  to  Kolozomb; 
if  they  had  placed  in  reserve  in  a  central  po- 
sition, at  Nasielsk,  for  example,  a  principal 
mass,  ready  to  run  to  any  threatened  point, 


they  might  have  disputed  the  ground  with  ad 
vantage.  But  Generals  Benningsen  and  Bux- 
hovden were  on  bad  terms :  they  disliked  to  be 
near  each  other:  and  old  Kamenski,  who  had 
arrived  only  on  the  preceding  day,  had  neither 
the  necessary  intelligence  nor  spirit  for  pre- 
scribing other  dispositions  than  they  had 
adopted  in  following  each  of  them  their  own 
whim. 

Napoleon,  who  saw  the  position  of  the  Rus- 
sians from  without  only,  certainly  concluded 
that  they  were  intrenched  behind  the  Narew 
and  the  Ukra,  for  the  purpose  of  guarding  the 
banks,  but  without  knowing  how  they  were 
established  and  distributed  there.  He  thought 
that  it  would  be  advisable  to  take,  in  the  first 
place,  the  conflux,  where,  it  was  probable,  they 
would  defend  themselves  with  energy,  and, 
having  carried  that  point,  to  proceed  to  the 
execution  of  his  plan,  which  consisted  in 
throwing  the  Russians,  by  a  wheel  from  right 
to  left,  into  the  marshy  and  woody  country  in 
the  interior  of  Poland.  In  consequence,  hav- 
ing repeated  the  order  to  Marshals  Ney,  Ber- 
nadotte  and  Bessieres,  forming  his  left,  to  pro- 
ceed rapidly  from  Thorn  to  Biezun  on  the 
upper  course  of  the  Ukra,  to  Marshals  Soult 
and  Ausereau,  forming  his  centre,  to  set  out 
from  Plock  and  Modlin,  and  form  a  junction 
at  Plonsk  on  the  Ukra,  he  put  himself  at  the 
head  of  his  right,  composed  of  Davout's  corps, 
Lannes'  corps,  of  the  guard,  and  the  reserves, 
resolved  to  force  immediately  the  position  of 
the  Russians  at  the  conflux  of  the  Ukra  and 
the  Narew.  He  left  in  the  works  of  Praga  the 
Poles  of  the  new  levy,  with  a  division  of  dra- 
goons, a  force  sufficient  to  ward  off  all  acci- 
dents, as  the  army  was  not  to  remove  far  from 
Warsaw. 

Having  arrived  on  the  morning  of  the  23d 
of  December  at  Okunin  on  the  Narew,  in  wet 
weather,  by  muddy  and  almost  impassable 
roads,  Napoleon  alighted  to  superintend  in 
person  the  dispositions  of  attack.  This  gene- 
ral, who,  according  to  some  critics,  while  di- 
recting armies  of  300,000  men,  knew  not  how 
to  lead  a  brigade  into  fire,  went  himself  to  re- 
connoitre the  enemy's  positions  and  to  place 
his  forces  on  the  ground,  down  to  the  very 
companies  of  the  voltigeurs. 

The  Narew  had  been  already  crossed  at 
Okunin,  below  the  conflux  of  the  Ukra  and 
the  Narew.  To  penetrate  into  the  angle  formed 
by  those  two  rivers,  it  was  necessary  to  pass 
either  the  Narew  or  the  Ukra  above  their  point 
of  junction.  The  Ukra,  being  the  narrower 
of  the  two,  was  deemed  preferable  for  attempt- 
ing a  passage.  Advantage  had  been  taken  of 
an  island  which  divided  it  into  two  arms,  near 
its  mouth,  in  order  to  diminish  the  difficulty. 
On  this  island,  the  French  had  established 
themselves,  and  they  had  yet  to  pass  the  se- 
cond arm  to  reach  the  point  of  land  occupied 
by  the  Russians  between  the  Ukra  and  the  Na- 
rew. This  point  of  land,  covered  with  woods, 
coppices,  marshes,  looked  like  one  very  dense 
thicket.  Further  off,  the  ground  became  some- 
what clearer,  then  rose  and  formed  a  stsep 
declivity,  which  extended  from  the  Narew  to 
the  Ukra.  To  the  right  of  this  natural  in- 
trenchment  appeared  the  village  of  Czarriowo 


Dec.  1806.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


235 


on  the  Narew,  to  the  left  the  village  of  Pomi- 
chowo  on  the  Ukra.  The  Russians  had  ad- 
vanced guards  of  tirailleurs  in  the  thicket, 
seven  battalions  and  a  numerous  artillery  on 
the  elevated  part  of  the  ground,  two  battalions 
in  reserve,  and  all  their  cavalry  in  the  rear. 
Napoleon  repaired  to  the  island,  mounted  the 
roof  of  a  barn  by  means  of  a  ladder,  studied 
the  position  of  the  Russians  with  a  telescope, 
and  immediately  made  the  following  disposi- 
tions. He  scattered  a  great  quantity  of  tirail- 
leurs all  along  the  Ukra,  and  to  a  considerable 
distance  above  the  point  of  passage.  He  or- 
dered them  to  keep  up  a  brisk  firing,  and  to 
kindle  large  fires  with  damp  straw,  so  as  to 
cover  the  bed  of  the  river  with  a  cloud  of 
smoke,  and  to  cause  the  Russians  to  apprehend 
an  attack  above  the  conflux,  towards  Pomi- 
chowo.  He  even  directed  to  that  quarter 
Gauthier's  brigade,  belonging  to  Davout's 
corps,  in  order  the  more  effectually  to  draw  the 
enemy's  attention  thither.  During  the  execu- 
tion of  these  orders,  he  collected  at  dusk  all 
the  companies  of  voltigeurs  of  Morand's  divi- 
sion on  the  intended  point  of  passage,  and 
ordered  them  to  fire  from  one  bank  to  the  other, 
through  the  clumps  of  wood,  to  drive  off  the 
enemy's  posts,  while  the  seamen  of  the  guard 
were  equipping  the  craft  collected  on  the  Na- 
rew. The  17th  of  the  line  and  the  13th  light 
were  in  column  ready  to  embark  by  detach- 
ments, and  the  rest  of  Morand's  division  was 
assembled  in  the  rear,  in  order  to  pass  as  soon 
as  the  bridge  was  established.  The  other  di- 
yisions  of  Davout's  corps  were  at  the  bridge 
of  Okunin,  awaiting  the  moment  for  acting. 
Lannes  was  advancing  at  a  rapid  pace  from 
Warsaw  to  Okunin. 

The  seamen  of  the  guard  soon  brought  some 
boats,  by  means  of  which  several  detachments 
of  voltigeurs  were  conveyed  from  one  bank  to 
the  other.  These  penetrated  into  the  thicket, 
while  the  officers  of  the  pontoniers  and  the 
seamen  of  the  guard  were  occupied  in  forming 
a  bridge  of  boats  with  the  utmost  expedition. 
At  seven  in  the  evening,  the  bridge  being 
passable,  Morand's  division  crossed  in  close 
column,  and  marched  forward,  preceded  by 
the  17th  of  the  line  and  the  13th  light,  and  by 
a  swarm  of  tirailleurs.  They  advanced  un- 
der cover  of  the  darkness  and  the  wood.  The 
sappers  of  the  regiments  cleared  a  passage 
through  the  thicket  for  the  infantry.  No 
sooner  had  they  overcome  these  first  obstacles, 
than  they  found  themselves  unsheltered,  op- 
posite to  the  elevated  plateau  which  runs  from 
the  Narew  to  the  Ukra,  and  which  was  de- 
fended either  by  abattis  or  by  a  numerous  ar- 
tillery. The  Russians,  amidst  the  darkness 
of  the  night,  opened  upon  our  columns  a  con- 
tinuous fire  of  grape  and  musketry,  which  did 
us  some  mischief.  While  the  voltiguers  of 
Morand's  division  and  the  13th  light  ap- 
proached as  tirailleurs,  Colonel  Lanusse,  at 
the  head  of  the  17th  of  the  line,  formed  in 
column  of  attack  on  the  right,  to  storm  the 
Russian  batteries.  He  had  already  carried 
one  of  them,  when  the  Russians  advancing  in 
mass  upon  his  left  flank,  obliged  him  to  fall 
back.  The  rest  of  Morand's  division  came 
up  to  the  support  of  the  first  two  regiments. 


The  13th  light,  having  exhausted  its  cartridges, 
was  replaced  by  the  30th,  and  again  they 
marched  by  the  right  to  attack  the  village  of 
Czarnowo,  while,  on  the  left,  General  Petit 
proceeded  with  400  picked  men  to  the  attack 
of  the  Russian  intrenchments  facing  the  Ukra, 
opposite  to  Pomichowo.  In  spite  of  the  dark- 
ness, they  manffiuvred  with  the  utmost  order. 
Two  battalions  of  the  30th  and  one  of  the  17th 
attacked  Czarnowo,  one  by  going  along  the 
bank  of  the  Narew,  the  two  others  by  directly 
climbing  the  plateau  on  which  that  village  is 
seated.  These  three  battalions  carried  Czar- 
nowo, and,  followed  by  the  51st  and  the  61st 
regiments,  debouched  on  the  plateau,  driving 
back  the  Russians  into  the  plain  beyond  it. 
At  the  same  moment  General  Petit  had  as- 
saulted the  extremity  of  the  enemy's  intrench- 
ments towards  the  Ukra,  and,  seconded  by  the 
fire  of  artillery,  kept  up  by  Gauthier's  brigade 
from  the  other  side  of  the  river,  had  carried 
them.  At  midnight,  the  assailants  were  mas- 
ters of  the  position  of  the  Russians  from  the 
Narew  to  the  Ukra,  but,  from  the  tardiness  of 
their  retreat,  which  could  be  discerned  in  the 
dark,  it  was  to  be  inferred  that  they  would  re- 
turn to  the  charge,  and,  for  this  reason,  Mar- 
shal Davout  sent  the  second  brigade  of  Gu- 
din's  division  to  the  assistance  of  General 
Petit,  who  was  most  exposed.  During  the 
night,  the  Russians,  as  it  had  been  foreseen, 
returned  three  times  to  the  charge,  with  the 
intention  of  retaking  the  position  which  they 
had  lost,  and  hurling  down  the  French  from 
the  plateau  towards  that  point  of  woody  and 
marshy  ground  on  which  they  had  landed. 
[  Thrice  were  they  suffered  to  approach  within 
|  thirty  paces,  and  each  time  the  French,  re- 
plying to  their  attack  by  a  point-blank  fire, 
brought  them  to  a  dead  stand,  and  then,  meet- 
ing them  with  the  bayonet,  repulsed  them. 
At  length,  the  night  being  far  advanced,  they 
betook  themselves  in  full  retreat,  towards  Na- 
sielsk.  Never  was  night  action  fought  with 
greater  order,  precision,  and  hardihood.  The 
Russians  left  us  killed,  wounded,  and  prison- 
ers, about  1800  men,  and  a  great  quantity  of 
artillery.  We  had  on  our  side  600  wounded, 
and  about  one  hundred  killed. 

Napoleon,  who  had  not  quitted  the  site  of  ac- 
tion, congratulated  General  Morand  and  Mar- 
shal Davout  on  their  gallant  conduct,  and 
hastened  to  reap  the  consequences  of  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Ukra,  and  to  give  such  orders  as 
the  circumstances  required.  The  Russians, 
deprived  of  the  paint  d'appui  which  they  pos- 
sessed at  the  conflux  of  the  Ukra  and  the  Na- 
rew, were  not  likely  to  be  tempted  to  defend 
the  Ukra,  the  line  of  which  had  just  been, 
forced  at  its  mouth.  But,  ignorant  as  the 
French  were  of  their  real  situation,  it  was  to 
be  apprehended  that  they  were  in  force  at  the 
bridge  of  Kolozomb,  on  the  Ukra,  opposite  to 
Plonsk,  the  point  at  which  the  corps  of  Mar- 
shals Soult  and  Augereau  were  to  meet  Na 
poleon  directed  the  cavalry  reserve,  com 
manded  by  General  Nansouty  in  the  absence 
of  Murat,  who  had  been  taken  ill  at  Warsaw, 
to  ascend  the  Ukra  on  both  shores,  to  beat  the 
banks  as  far  as  Kolozomb,  to  give  a  hand  tc 
Marshals  Augereau  and  Soult,  to  pssist  them 


236 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Dec.  1806 


to  pass  the  Ukra  if  they  met  with  any  diffi- 
culties, to  connect  them,  in  short,  with  Marshal 
Davout,  who  was  to  march  on  before  and 
cross,  at  about  the  middle,  the  country  com- 
prised between  the  Ukra  and  the  Narew. 
He  ordered  Marshal  Davout  to  proceed  direct 
for  Nasielsk,  and  despatched  the  guard  and 
the  reserve  to  support  him.  Lastly,  he  grave 
Marshal  Lannes  instructions  to  cross  the  Ukra, 
at  the  same  place  where  the  passage  had  just 
been  forced,  and  to  ascend,  on  the  right  of 
Davout's  corps,  along  the  Narew  to  Pultusk. 
This  town  became  a  point  of  great  importance, 
for  the  Russians,  flung  back  from  the  Ukra 
upon  Narew,  had  no  bridges,  but  those  of 
Pultusk,  for  crossing  the  latter  river.  The 
order  already  despatched  to  Marshals  Soult 
and  Augereau  to  march  for  Plonsk  and  cross 
the  Ukra  there,  and  to  Marshals  Ney,  Berna- 
dotte,  and  Bessieres  to  advance  rapidly  to 
Biezun,  was  of  course  confirmed. 

Napoleon,  continuing  to  keep  with  Marshal 
Davout,  resolved  to  march  the  same  morning 
of  the  24th  for  Nasielsk,  notwithstanding  the 
fatigues  of  the  night.  The  precaution  was, 
however,  taken  to  place  Friant's  division  at 
the  head,  in  order  to  afford  a  few  hours'  rest  to 
Morand's  division,  fatigued  with  the  action  of 
Czarnowo.  About  dusk  they  arrived  at  Na- 
sielsk, and  there  found  in  position  Tolstoy's 
division,  the  same  that  had  been  driven  from 
Czarnowo.  It  manifested  an  intention  of  mak- 
ing some  resistance,  for  the  purpose  of  giving 
the  detachments  sent  to  the  Ukra  time  to 
join  it. 

We  have  already  said  that  General  Ben- 
ningsen's  four  divisions  were :  Tolstoy's  divi- 
sion at  Czarnowo,  to  defend  the  conflux  of  the 
two  rivers ;  Sacken's  division  at  Lopaczym, 
to  watch  the  Ukra ;  Sedmaratzki's  division  at 
Zebroszki,  to  guard  the  Narew ;  lastly,  Gallit- 
zin's  division  at  Pultusk,  to  act  as  reserve, 
the  latter,  though  at  a  great  distance  from  the 
Ukra,  having  a  strong  advanced  guard  on  that 
river,  commanded  by  General  Barklay  de 
Tolly — a  confused  and  complicated  disposi- 
tion, which  bespoke  a  very  feeble  direction  in 
the  operations  of  the  Russian  army.  The 
natural  movement  of  these  divisions,  sur- 
prised by  a  vigorous  attack  on  the  Ukra,  would 
have  been  to  withdraw  their  detachments,  in 
order  to  their  retreating  upon  the  Narew. 
This  was  in  fact  the  movement  which  they  did 
adopt,  and  which  their  general-in-chief  al- 
lowed to  be  executed  rather  than  enjoined. 

Count  Tolstoy,  commandant  of  the  division 
which  had  fallen  back  upon  Nasielsk,  had 
maintained  his  ground  there,  till  the  moment 
when  he  saw  the  detachment  charged  to  guard 
the  Ukra  towards  Borkowa  coming  back  pur- 
sued by  the  reserve  cavalry.  However,  Gene- 
ral Friant,  having  deployed  his  division  facing 
the  Russians,  and  marched  up  to  them,  obliged 

»  Those  readers  who  recollect  having  seen  the  14th 
of  the  line,  with  its  colonel.  Savary,  distinguishing  it- 
•elf  in  the  passage  of  the  Vistula  at  Thorn,  will  find  it 
difficult  to  comprehend  how  that  same  regiment  could 
be,  on  the  24th  of  December,  under  Marshal  Augereau 
at  the  passage  of  the  Ukra  at  Kolozomb.  The  explana- 
tion is  easy  :  that  regiment,  leit  at  Bromberg  by  Mar- 
•hal  Augereau  when  he  ascended  the  left  bank  of  the 
V'j'.ula  from  Thorn  to  Modi  in.  remained  for  a  moment 


them  to  retire  in  the  greatest  haste.  The  dra 
goons  dashed  after  them ;  some  hundred  men 
were  killed  or  taken,  and  cannon  and  baggage 
picked  up. 

On  this  same  24th,  Marshal  Augereau,  hav 
ing  arrived  on  the  banks  of  the  Ukra,  resolved 
to  force  the  passage.  He  had  the  bridges  of 
Kolozomb  and  Sochoczyn  attacked  simultane- 
ously. The  14th  of  the  line,  under  Colonel 
Savary,  who  had  passed  the  Vistula  at  Thorn 
on  the  6th  of  December,1  threw  itself  upon 
the  scarcely  repaired  relics  of  the  bridge  of 
Kolozomb,  and  heroically  passed  it  amidst  a 
tremendous  fire  of  musketry.  This  brave  colo- 
nel fell  on  the  other  bank,  having  received 
several  lance  wounds.  At  Sochoczyn,  the  at- 
tack on  the  bridge  having  miscarried,  the 
French  proceeded  to  a  neighbouring  ford,  and 
effected  the  passage.  Thus  Augereau's  corps 
crossed  on  the  24th  to  the  other  bank  of  the 
Ukra,  and  advanced,  pushing  before  it  the  de- 
tachments of  the  different  Russian  divisions 
left  to  guard  that  river.  They  were  likewise 
pursued  by  the  reserve  cavalry,  under  the  com- 
mand of  General  Nansouty.  The  French 
marched  towards  Nowomiasto,  in  the  direction 
from  the  Ukra  to  the  Narew,  so  as  to  connect 
themselves  with  the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout 
To  the  left  of  Augereau's  corps,  Marshal  Soult 
was  preparing  to  pass  the  Ukra,  near  Sochoc- 
zyn. The  left,  under  Ney,  Bernadotte,  and 
Bessieres,  continued  to  ascend  by  a  rapid 
movement  from  Thorn  towards  Biezun  and 
Soldau. 

On  the  morning  of  the  25th,  Napoleon  di- 
rected his  columns  upon  Strezegocin.  The 
weather  had  become  frightful  for  an  army  which 
had  to  manoeuvre,  and  above  all  to  execute 
several  reconnoissances,  in  order  to  discover 
the  plans  of  the  enemy.  A  complete  thaw, 
accompanied  with  melting  snow  and  rain,  had 
soaked  the  ground  to  such  a  degree,  that  in 
certain  places  the  men  sank  up  to  the  knees; 
and  some  of  them  were  even  found  half  bu- 
ried in  this  soil,  suddenly  changed  into  a  quag- 
mire. They  were  obliged  to  double  the  teams 
of  the  artillery,  before  they  could  move  for- 
ward a  few  paces.  They  were  gainers  by  this 
state  of  things,  it  is  true,  as  they  captured  at 
every  step  the  cannon  and  the  baggage  of  the 
Russians,  many  laggards  and  wounded,  and 
lastly,  a  considerable  number  of  Polish  de- 
serters, who  voluntarily  stayed  behind  to  give 
themselves  up  to  the  French  army.  But  they 
lost,  on  the  other  hand,  the  inestimable  advan- 
tage of  celerity,  the  benefit  of  the  artillery, 
which  they  could  no  longer  take  with  them, 
and  the  means  of  information,  which  are  al- 
ways proportionate  to  the  facility  of  commu- 
nication. Figure  to  yourself  immense  plains 
covered  alternately  with  mud  and  thick  forests, 
for  the  most  part  thinly  peopled,  and  still  more 
scantily  since  the  general  emigration  of  the 


at  the  disposal  of  Marshal  Ney,  and  effected  under  hi* 
orders  the  passage  of  the  Vistula  at  Thorn. 

We  should  not  have  added  this  note,  which  may  ap- 
pear useless,  if  some  inattentive  and  ignorant  critics 
had  not  accused  us  of  making  corps  figure  in  different 
actions  in  which  they  had  no  share.  There  are  attack* 
about  which  one  ought  uot  to  care ;  yet,  out  of  respect 
for  the  impartial  reader,  we  are  anxious  10  prove  to 
him  that  we  have  spared  no  pains  to  arrive  at  the  strict- 
est accuracy. 


Dec.  1806.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


237 


inhabitants  armies  in  pursuit  or  in  flight 
through  th'is  miry  desert,  and  you  will  have  an 
idea,  though  inadequate,  of  the  spectacle  ex- 
hibited at  this  moment  by  the  French  and 
Russians  in  this  part  of  Poland. 

Napoleon  discerning  imperfectly  the  enemy's 
movements  in  this  flat  and  woody  country,  and 
unable  to  make  amends  by  repeated  reconnois- 
sances  for  what  he  could  not  see,  was  plunged 
into  the  most  perplexing  uncertainty.  It 
seemed  indeed  to  him  that  the  retreating  Rus- 
sian columns  were  proceeding  from  his  left  to 
his  right,  from  the  Ukra  towards  the  Narew. 
Accordingly,  he  had  sent  Lannes  towards  Pul- 
tusk,  and  thinking  that  he  could  perceive  a 
body  of  the  enemy  following  Lannes,  he  had 
detached  Gudin's  division  from  Davout's  corps 
to  follow  the  pursuers,  and  to  prevent  them  from 
attacking  Lannes  in  rear.  But  a  large  assem- 
blage appeared  in  front  of  him,  in  the  direction 
of  Golymin.  Reports  were  received  of  the  pre- 
sence of  numerous  forces,  which  had  arrived 
upon  the  rear  of  the  Russian  army  at  this 
point.  It  was  said  that  a  corps  of  20,000  men 
was  retiring  from  the  Ukra  towards  Ciechanow 
and  Golymin.  Amidst  this  chaos,  Napoleon, 
resolving  to  fall  forthwith  upon  the  nearest 
enemy,  towards  whom,  besides,  all  the  others 
seemed  to  converge,  left  Lannes,  escorted  by 
Gudin's  division,  to  proceed  to  the  right  upon 
Pultusk,  and,  as  for  himself,  he  advanced  direct 
towards  Golymin,  with  two  of  Davout's  three 
divisions,  with  Augereau's  entire  corps,  with 
the  guard  and  the  reserve  cavalry.  He,  more- 
over, ordered  Marshal  Soult,  who  had  passed 
the  Ukra,  to  go  to  Ciechanow  itself.  He  en- 
joined Marshals  Ney,  Bernadotte,  and  Bessi- 
eres,  who  had  left  Thorn,  to  continue  their  ro- 
tatory movement  by  Biezun.  Soldau,  and  Mlawa, 
which  would  bring  them  upon  the  flank  and 
nearly  upon  the  rear  of  the  Russians. 

In  this  manner,  the  troops  marched,  with 
the  greatest  difficulty,  the  whole  of  the  25th 
and  the  morning  of  the  26th,  taking  two  hours, 
sometimes  three,  to  advance  a  league. 

Meanwhile,  the  different  corps  of  the  Russian 
army  had  not  taken  precisely  the  direction 
which  Napoleon  had  conjectured.  Nearly  the 
whole  of  General  Benningsen's  four  divisions 
had  fallen  back  upon  Pultusk.  Tolstoy's  di- 
vision, driven  from  Czarnowo  to  Nasielsk,  from 
Nasielsk  to  Strezegocin,  had  followed  the  road 
which  runs  across  the  middle  of  the  tract  be- 
tween the  Ukra  and  the  Narew.  On  its  arrival 
at  Strezegocin,  it  had  borne  to  the  right  to- 
wards Pultusk,  as  soon  as  it  was  able  to  rally 
its  scattered  detachments.  Sedmaratzki's  di- 
vision, posted  in  the  preceding  days  at  Ze- 
broszki,  on  the  bank  of  the  Narew,  having  but 
a  few  steps  to  go  to  reach  Pultusk,  had  repair- 
ed thither  immediately.  Gallitzin's  division, 
which,  though  its  head-quarters  were  at  Pul- 
tusk, had  posts  on  the  Ukra,  had  concentrated 
itself  upon  Pultusk.  But  the  detachments  of 
that  division  which  guarded  the  Ukra,  cut  off 
by  our  cavalry,  had  sought  refuge  at  Golymin. 
Lastly,  Sacken's  division,  which  particularly 
guarded  the  Ukra,  and  had  its  head-quarters  at 
Lopaczym,  being  annoyed  by  the  French  ca- 
valry, had  retired,  partly  to  Golymin,  partly  to 
Pultusk.  Thus  Tolstov's  and  Sedmaratzki's 


two  entire  divisions,  and  part  of  Gallitzin's 
and  Sacken's  two  divisions,  were  on  the  26th 
at  Pultusk.  The  other  part  of  Gallitzin's  and 
Sacken's  divisions,  which  had  taken  refuge  in 
Golymin,  had  fallen  in  with  one  of  BuxhOv- 
den's  divisions,  Doctorow's  division,  which 
had  moved  forward,  and  thus  given  rise  to  the 
report  of  an  assemblage  of  troops  on  the  rear 
of  the  Russian  army.  Lastly,  the  Prussians, 
in  flight  before  Marshals  Ney,  Bernadotte, 
and  Bessieres,  had  quitted  the  Ukra,  and  were 
retiring  by  Soldau  upon  Mlawa,  incessantly 
striving  in  their  retreat  to  connect  themselves 
with  the  Russians. 

On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  Lannes  came 
in  sight  of  Pultusk.  He  there  discovered  a 
mass  of  forces  far  superior  to  that  which  he 
had  at  his  disposal.  The  four  Russian  divi- 
sions, though  two  of  them  were  incomplete, 
numbered  no  fewer  than  43,000  men.'  Lan- 
nes, with  General  Becker's  dragoons,  had  no 
more  than  17  or  18  thousand.  Five  or  six 
thousand  were  coming  on  his  left  with  Gudin's 
division.  Lannes,  however,  was  but  very 
vaguely  apprized  of  this  circumstance,  and, 
in  the  state  of  the  roads,  this  reinforcement, 
though  at  an  inconsiderable  distance  from 
Pultusk,  could  not  reach  the  field  of  battle  till 
very  late.  Lannes  was  not  a  man  to  be 
daunted.  Neither  he  nor  his  soldiers  feared 
to  meet  the  Russians,  whatever  might  be  their 
number,  however  tried  their  bravery.  Lannes 
drew  up  his  little  army  in  order  of  battle, 
having  taken  care  to  send  a  messenger  to 
Marshal  Davout  to  inform  him  of  the  unex- 
pected force  which  he  had  just  met  with  at 
Pultusk,  and  which  placed  him  in  a  most 
critical  situation. 

A  vast  forest  covered  the  environs  of  Pul- 
tusk. On  issuing  from  this  forest,  you  found 
yourself  on  open  ground,  dotted  here  and 
there  with  clumps  of  trees,  drenched  with 
rain,  like  all  the  rest  of  the  country,  rising 
gradually  in  form  of  a  plateau,  and  then  ter- 
minating abruptly  in  a  steep  declivity  towards 
Pultusk  and  the  Narew.  On  this  ground 
General  Benningsen  had  drawn  up  his  army, 
having  its  back  turned  to  the  town,  one  of  its 
wings  appuyed  on  the  river  and  the  bridge 
which  crosses  it,  the  other  on  a  patch  of  wood. 
A  strong  reserve  formed  a  support  to  its  cen- 
tre. His  cavalry  was  placed  in  the  intervals 
of  his  line  of  battle  and  a  little  in  advance. 
Though  they  had  lost  part  of  their  artillery, 
the  Russians  took  with  them  so  great  a  quan- 
tity ever  since  the  campaign  of  Austerlitz,  that 
they  had  sufficient  left  to  cover  their  front  with 
a  line  of  guns,  and  to  render  the  approach  to 
that  front  extremely  formidable. 

Lannes  had  to  oppose  to  them  only  a  few 
pieces  of  small  calibre,  which  had  been 
dragged  through  the  mud  with-  the  greatest 
exertions  and  by  the  united  efforts  of  all  the 
teams  of  the  artillery.  He  placed  Suchet's 
division  in  first  line,  and  kept  Gudin's  divi>  ion 
in  reserve  on  the  skirt  of  (he  forest,  to  have 
wherewithal  to  meet  any  events  which  might 
threaten  to  become  serious,  in  the  uncertainty 


i  Piotho,  the  narrator,  an  officer  of  the  .Russian  army, 
ami  an  eye-witness,  likewise  sets  down  the  number  at 
43.000. 


233 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


m  which  every  one  was  plunged.  A  few  men, 
well  directed,  might  suffice  to  carry  this  posi- 
tion, and  had  the  advantage  of  affording  less 
scope  to  the  formidable  artillery  of  the  Rus- 
sians. Lannes  debouched,  therefore,  from  the 
forest  with  Suchet's  single  division,  formed 
into  three  columns  ;  one  on  the  right,  under 
General  Claparede,  composed  of  the  17th  light, 
and  of  General  Treilhard's  light  cavalry ;  one 
on  the  left,  under  General  Reille,  composed  of 
the  second  battalion  of  the  88th,  of  the  34th  of 
the  line,  and  of  General  Becker's  dragoons. 
The  plan  of  Lannes  was  to  attack  by  his  right, 
and  towards  the  Narew,  for,  if  he  could  but 
penetrate  to  the  town,  he  should  at  once  de- 
prive the  position  of  the  Russians  of  all  its 
advantages,  and  even  place  them  in  a  disas- 
trous situation. 

He  moved  forward  his  three  little  columns, 
sallying  boldly  from  the  woods,  and  climbing 
the  plateau  under  a  shower  of  grape.  Unfor- 
tunately the  ground,  soaked  with  rain  and  ren- 
dered slippery,  scarcely  admitted  of  that  im- 
petuosity of  attack  which  might  have  made 
amends  for  the  disadvantage  of  number  and 
position.  Nevertheless,  advancing  with  diffi- 
culty, they  came  up  to  the  enemy,  and  drove 
him  back  towards  the  abrupt  declivities  ter- 
minating the  ground  in  a  kind  of  fall  towards 
the  Narew  and  Pultusk.  The  French  marched 
with  ardour,  and  were  about  to  throw  the  Rus- 
sian troops  of  General  Bagowout  from  the 
plateau  into  the  river,  when  the  general-in- 
chief,  Benningsen,  sent  in  the  utmost  haste  to 
the  aid  of  General  Bagowout  part  of  his  re- 
serve, which  took  in  flank  Claparede's  brigade, 
forming  the  head  of  our  attack.  Lannes,  who 
was  in  the  thick  of  the  fray,  answered  this 
manoeuvre  by  moving  from  his  centre  towards 
his  right  Vedel's  brigade,  composed,  as  we 
have  just  said,  of  the  64th  and  the  first  batta-  ; 
lion  ot'  the  88th.  He  himself  took  in  flank  the  • 
Russians  who  had  come  to  succour  General  I 
Bagowout,  and  driving  them  one  upon  the  ] 
other  towards  the  Narew,  he  would  have  put 
an  end  to  the  struggle  at  this  point,  and  per-  ; 
haps  to  the  battle,  if,  amidst  a  violent  squall 
of  snow,  the  battalion  of  the  88th,  surprised 
by  the  Russian  cavalry  before  it  could  form 
into  square,  had  not  been  broken  and  over- 
turned. But  this  brave  battalion  was  presently 
rallied  by  one  of  those  officers  whose  charac- 
ter is  rendered  conspicuous  by  danger.  This 
officer,  named  Voisin,  recovering  himself  im- 
mediately, and  taking  advantage,  in  his  turn, 
of  the  embarrassments  of  the  Russian  cavalry, ! 
despatched  with  the  bayonet  those  horsemen  i 
floundering,  like  our  fool-soldiers,  in  a  sea  of  j 
mud. 

Thus,  on  the  right  and  at  the  centre,  the 
action,  though  less  decisive  than  it  might  have 
been,  turned,  nevertheless,  to  the  advantage  of 
the  French,  who  left  the  Russians  backed  to 
the  margin  of  the  plateau,  and  liable  to  a  dan- 
gerous fall  towards  the  town  and  the  river. 
On  the  left,  our  third  column,  composed  of  the 
34th  of  the  line,  the  second  battalion  of  the 
88th,  and  General  Becker's  dragoons,  had  to 
contend  with  the  enemy  for  the  patch  of  trees 
upon  which  the  centre  of  the  Russians  ap- 
puyed  itself.  The  34th,  directed  by  General  i 


[Dec.  1806 


Reille,  and  saluted  unawares  by  unmasked 
batteries,  suffered  severely.  Seconded  by  the 
j  charges  of  General  Becker's  dragoons,  it  cap 
j  ried  the  patch  of  wood ;  but  some  battalions 
of  General  Barklay  de  Tolly's  retook  it. 
Again  the  French  made  themselves  masters 
of  it,  and  maintained,  for  three  hours,  an  ob- 
stinate and  unequal  fight  At  length,  on  this 
point,  as  on  the  others,  the  Russians,  forced 
to  give  way,  were  obliged  to  back  as  closely 
as  possible  to  the  town.  Lannes,  having  got 
rid  of  the  combat  on  the  right,  had  moved  to 
the  left  to  encourage  the  troops  by  his  pre- 
j  sence.  If,  at  this  moment,  he  had  been  less 
uncertain  what  was  passing  elsewhere,  and 
more  assured  of  being  supported,  he  might 
have  brought  Gazan's  division  into  action, 
and  then  it  would  have  been  all  up  with  the 
Russians,  who  would  have  been  hurled  down 
the  back  of  the  plateau,  and  drowned  in  the 
Narew.  But  Lannes  saw,  beyond  his  right, 
and  at  the  extreme  right  of  the  Russians,  Tol- 
stoy's division,  bordering  the  ravine  of  Moc- 
zyn,  and  forming  a  hook  in  rear  to  cover  the 
;  extremity  of  the  position.  He  deemed  it  more 
[  prudent  not  to  engage  all  his  troops,  and,  by 
his  orders,  Gazan's  brave  division  remained 
motionless  on  the  skirt  of  the  forest,  exposed, 
at  the  distance  of  three  hundred  paces,  to  the 
balls  of  the  enemy,  but  rendering  the  service 
of  awing  the  Russians,  and  deterring  them 
also  from  fighting  with  the  whole  of  their 
j  forces. 

The  day  was  closing,  when  Gudin's  division 
i  at  length  arrived  upon  our  left,  hidden,  by  the 
j  woods,  from  our  army,  but  perceived  by  the 
Cossacks,  who  immediately  apprized  General 
Benningsen  of  the  circumstance.  Of  all  its 
artillery,  Gudin's  division  brought  but  two 
pieces,  which  were  dragged  with  great  labour 
;  to  the  field  of  battle.  It  faced  the  extreme 
right  of  the  Russians,  and  the  point  of  the 
I  angle  formed  by  the  bending  back  of  their 
line.  General  Daultanne,  who,  on  that  day, 
commanded  Gudin's  division,  after  a  few 
rounds  of  cannon-shot,  formed  en  echelons  by 
his  left,  and  marched  resolutely  up  to  the 
enemy — previously  apprizing  Marshal  Lannes 
of  his  entering  into  action.  His  attack  pro- 
duced a  decisive  effect,  and  forced  the  Rus- 
sians to  fall  back.  But  this  division,  already 
separated,  by  the  woods,  from  Lannes's  corps, 
increased,  by  advancing,  the  interval  which 
parted  them*  At  this  instant,  a  squall  of  wind 
drove  rain  and  snow  into  the  faces  of  our  sol- 
diers.  The  Russians,  from  a  superstitious  no- 
tion of  northern  people,  which  caused  them  to 
consider  tempest  as  a  favourable  omen,  ran 
forward,  with  wild  shouts.  They  threw  them- 
selves into  the  interval  left  between  Gudin's 
division  and  the  corps  of  Lannes,  forced  back 
the  one,  and  turned  the  other.  Their  cavalry 
rushed  into  the  gap;  but  the  34th,  on  the  side 
next  to  Suchet's  division,  the  85th,  on  the  side 
next  to  Gudin's  division,  formed  into  square, 
and  cut  short  that  charge — which  was  rather  a 
demonstration  on  the  part  of  the  Russians  to 
cover  their  retreat,  than  a  serious  attack. 

The  French,  then,  had,  on  all  points,  con- 
quered  the  ground  which  commands  Pultusk, 
and  they  had  but  a  last  effort  to  make  to  throw 


Dec.  1806.,; 


CONSULATE   AND    THE   EMPIRE. 


239 


the  Russians  into  the  Narew,  when  General 
Benningsen,  taking  advantage  of  the  darkness, 
withdrew  his  army,  making  it  pass  over  the 
bridges  of  Pultusk.  While  he  was  giving  his 
orders  for  retreat,  Lannes,  full  of  ardour,  in 
high  spirits  on  account  of  the  arrival  of  Gu- 
din's  division,  was  deliberating  whether  he 
should  immediately  make  a  second  attack,  or 
defer  it  till  the  next  day.  The  lateness  of  the 
hour,  and  the  difficulty  of  communicating  in 
this  chaos  of  mud,  rain  and  darkness,  decided 
him  to  postpone  the  combat.  Next  morning, 
the  sudden  retreat  of  the  Russians  deprived 
the  Fronch  of  the  prize  earned  by  their  daring 
and  obstinate  conduct. 

This  hard-fought  action,  in  which  18,000 
men  had  been  for  a  whole  day  in  presence  of 
43,000,  might  certainly  be  called  a  victory. 
Owing  to  their  small  number,  and  to  the  supe- 
riority of  their  tactics,  the  French  had  lost 
scarcely  1500  men,  killed  and  wounded.  We 
speak  from  authentic  statements.  The  loss 
of  the  Russians,  on  the  other  hand,  in  killed 
and  wouuded,  exceeded  3000  men.  They  left 
us  2000  prisoners,  and  an  immense  quantity 
of  artillery. 

Meanwhile,  General  Benningsen,  having  re- 
turned to  Pultusk,  wrote  to  his  sovereign  that 
he  had  just  gained  a  signal  victory  over  the 
Emperor  Napoleon,  commanding,  in  person, 
three  corps  d'armee,  those  of  Marshals  Davout, 
Lannes,  and  Suchet,  besides  the  cavalry  of 
Prince  Murat.  Now  there  was  not,  as  the 
reader  may  have  seen,  any  corps  d'armee  of 
Marshal  Suchet's,  since  General  Suchet  mere- 
ly commanded  a  division  of  the  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Lannes;  there  were  on  the  ground,  at 
Pultusk,  two  divisions  of  Marshal  Lannes's 
corps,  and  one  only  of  Marshal  Davoul's,  no 
cavalry  of  Prince  Murat's,  and,  still  less,  any 
Emperor  Napoleon  commanding  in  person. 

A  great  deal  has  been  said  about  the  lying 
bulletins  of  the  Empire — still  they  were  more 
true  than  any  of  the  European  publications 
of  that  period — but  what  are  we  to  think  of 
such  a  way  of  relating  one's  own  acts !  The 
Russians,  assuredly,  were  brave  enough  to  be 
veracious. 

On  that  same  day,  the  26th,  the  two  divisions 
of  Marshal  Davout's  that  were  left  him,  and, 
likewise,  the  two  divisions  composing  Marshal 
Augereau's  corps,  arrived  opposite  to  Goly- 
min.  This  village  was  surrounded  by  a  belt 
of  woods  and  marshes,  studded  with  a  few 
hamlets,  and,  beyond  this  belt,  the  Russians 
were  established,  with  a  strong  reserve,  at  the 
village  of  Golymin  itself. 

Marshal  Davout,  debouching  by  the  right, 
that  is  to  say  by  the  Pultusk  road,  ordered  an 
attack  of  the  woods,  which  formed,  on  his 
part,  an  obstacle  to  be  overcome  before  he 
could  penetrate  into  Golymin.  Marshal  Au- 
gereau,  debouching  by  the  left,  that  is  to  say 
by  the  Lopaczym  road,  had  to  cross  the 
marshes,  dotted  with  a  few  clumps  of  wood, 
and  among  these  marshes  to  carry  a  vil- 
lage, that  of  Ruskovo,  through  which  ran 
the  only  practicable  road.  Marshal  Davout's 
brave  infantry  repulsed,  not  without  loss,  the 
Russian  infantry  of  the  detached  corps  of  Sac- 
ken  and  Gallitzin.  After  a  brisk  fire  of  small 


arms,  the  former  engaged  the  latter  with  the 
bayonet,  and  compelled  it  by  haud-to-hand 
fights  to  abandon  to  it  the  woods  on  which  it 
supported  itself.  On  the  right  of  these  warmly 
disputed  woods,  Marshal  Davout  forced  the 
road  from  Pultusk  to  Golymin,  and  threw  upon 
the .  Russians  part  of  the  cavalry  reserve  in- 
trusted to  Rapp,  one  of  those  intrepid  aides-de- 
camp, whom  Napoleon  kept  at  hand,  to  em- 
ploy them  on  difficult  occasions.  Rapp  upset 
the  Russian  infantry,  turned  the  woods,  and 
thus  did  away  with  the  obstacle  which  co- 
vered Golymin.  But,  being  exposed  to  an  ex- 
tremely brisk  fire,  he  had  an  arm  broken. 
On  the  left,  Augereau,  crossing  the  marshes 
in  spite  of  the  hostile  force  placed  at  that 
point,  took  the  village  of  Ruskovo,  and 
marched,  on  his  part,  for  Golymin,  the  com- 
mon object  of  our  concentric  attacks.  The 
French  penetrated  into  it  towards  the  close  of 
the  day,  and  made  themselves  masters  of  it, 
after  a  very  hot  action  with  the  reserve  of 
Doctorow's  division.  As  at  Pultusk,  a  great 
quantity  of  artillery  and  some  prisoners  were 
taken,  and  the  ground  was  strewed  with  Rus- 
sian corpses.  In  fight  with  them  fewer  ene- 
mies were  taken,  but  more  killed. 

On  this  day,  the  26th,  our  columns  were 
everywhere  engaged  with  the  Russian  co- 
lumns, over  a  space  of  twenty-five  leagues. 
From  an  effect  of  chance,  impossible  to  be 
prevented  when  the  communications  are  diffi- 
cult, while  Lannes  had  found  before  him  twice 
or  thriqe  as  many  Russians  as  he  had  French, 
the  other  corps  met  with  scarcely  their  equiva- 
lent, as  Marshals  Augereau  and  Davout,  at 
Golymin,  or  no  enemy  to  fight,  as  Marshal 
Soult  in  his  march  for  Ciechanow,  and  Mar- 
shal Bernadotle  in  his  march  for  Biezun. 
Marshal  Bessieres,  it  is  true,  serving  for  scout 
to  our  left  wing,  with  the  second  cavalry  re- 
serve, had  come  up  with  the  Prussians  at  Bie- 
zun, and  taken  a  good  number  of  prisoners. 
Marshal  Ney,  who  formed  the  extreme  left  of 
the  army,  had  marched  from  Strasburg  to  Sol- 
dau  and  Mlawa,  driving  Lestocq's  corps  be- 
fore him.  Arriving  on  the  26th  at  Soldau,  at 
the  very  moment  when  Lannes  was  engaged 
at  Pultusk,  when  Marshals  Davout  and  Auge- 
reau were  engaged  at  Golymin,  he  had  directed 
Marchand's  division  upon  Mlawa,  in  order  to 
turn  the  position  of  Soldau,  a  necessary  pre- 
caution, for  insurmountable  difficulties  might 
have  been  found  there.  In  fact,  the  village  of 
Soldau  was  situated  amidst  a  marsh  impassa- 
ble except  by  a  single  causeway,  from  seven 
to  eight  hundred  fathoms  in  length,  resting 
sometimes  upon  the  ground,  sometimes  upon 
bridges,  which  the  enemy  had  taken  care  to 
break  down.  Six  thousand  Prussians,  with 
cannon,  guarded  this  causeway.  A  first  battery 
enfiladed  it  longitudinally ;  a  -second,  esta- 
blished on  a  spot  judiciously  chosen  in  the 
marsh,  took  it  obliquely.  Ney,  with  the  69th, 
and  the  76th,  advanced  impetuously  along  it. 
They  threw  planks  over  the  broken  bridges , 
they  carried  the  batteries  at  a  run ;  they  over- 
turned with  the  bayonet  the  infantry  drawn  up 
in  column  on  ihe  causeway,  and  entered  the 
village  of  Soldau  pellmell  with  the  fugitives. 
A  most  obstinate  conflict  with  the  Prussians 


240 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Dec.  1806. 


took  place  there.  The  French  had  to  storm 
Soldau  house  by  house.  This  was  not  accom- 
plished without  unparalleled  efforts,  and  not  till 
nightfall.  But,  at  this  moment,  the  gallant  ge- 
neral, Lestocq,  rallying  his  columns  in  rear  of 
Soldau,  made  his  soldiers  swear  to  recover  the 
lost  post.  The  Prussians,  treated  by  the  Rus- 


in  men  and  cannon  occasioned  to  the  en  em}', 
and  safe  winter  quarters  in  the  heart  of  Poland, 
formed  a  worthy  termination  to  that  extraordi- 
nary campaign,  begun  on  the  Rhine,  finished 
on  the  Vistula.  The  state  of  the  weather  and 
of  the  ground,  sufficiently  accounted  for  the 
circumstance  that  the  results  obtained  in  these 


sians  since  Jena  as  the  Austrians  had  been    last  days  had  neither  the  greatness  nor  the 
treated  since  Ulm,  determined  to  avenge  their !  suddenness  to  which    Napoleon    had  accus- 


honour,  and  to  prove  that  they  were  not  infe- 
rior in  bravery  to  any  nation.  And  so  they 
did.  Four  times,  from  seven  in  the  evening 
till  midnight,  they  attacked  Soldau  with  the 
bayonet,  and  four  times  they  were  repulsed. 


tomed  the  world.  The  Russians,  no  doubt 
surprised  at  not  having  been  disposed  of  so 
speedily  as  the  Prussians  at  Jena,  the  Austri- 
ans at  Ulm,  and  themselves  at  Austerlitz,  went 
off  to  pride  themselves  on  a  defeat  less  prompt 


At  last,  they  retired,  having  sustained  an  im- !  than  usual,  and  to  circulate  fables  respecting 


mense  loss  in  killed  and  wounded,  and  pri- 
soners. 

Thus,  on  this  day,  over  a  space  of  twenty- 


their  pretended  successes :  this  there  was  no 
preventing.  This  time  they  would  not  have 
been  more  fortunate,  if  we  had  met  with  frozeu 


five  leagues,  from  the  Pultusk  to  Soldau,  there  lakes  instead  of  bottomless  quagmires.  But 
had  been  obstinate  fighting,  and  the  Russians,  the  season,  a  very  unusual  one,  which  brought 
defeated  wherever  they  had  attempted  to  resist  with  it  a  muddy  soil  instead  of  a  frozen  soil, 
us,  had  not  escaped  without  abandoning  their  had  saved  them  from  a  disaster.  It  was  a 
artillery  and  baggage.  Their  army  was  dimi-  freak  of  Fortune,  who  had  hitherto  favoured 
nished  by  nearly  20,000  men  out  of  115,000.  Napoleon  too  much  for  him  not  to  forgive  this 
Great  numbers  of  them  were  hors  de  combat  or  slight  inconstancy :  only  he  ought  to  have 
prisoners.  Great  numbers  more,  of  Polish  borne  this  in  mind,  and  to  have  learned  to 
origin,  had  deserted.  We  had  picked  up  more  know  her.  For  the  rest,  his  soldiers  encamped 
than  eighty  pieces  of  cannon,  of  large  calibre,  on  the  Vistula,  his  eagles  planted  in  Warsaw, 
and  a  considerable  quantity  of  baggage.  We  were  a  sight  extraordinary  enough  for  him  to 
had  not  lost  a  single  prisoner  or  a  single  de-  feel  gratified,  for  Europe  to  remain  quiet,  Aus- 
serter,  but  the  fire  of  the  enemy  had  deprived  tria  awed  and  affrighted,  France  confident. 
us  of  four  or  five  thousand  men,  killed  or  He  halted  two  or  three  days  at  Golymin, 
wounded.  |  with  the  intention  of  allowing  his  army  a  little 

The  plan  of  Napoleon,  tending  to  separate  rest,  and,  on  the  1st  of  January,  1807,  he  re- 
the  Russians  from  the  sea,  and  to  throw  them  turned  to  Warsaw,  lo  arrange  there  the  esta- 
by  a  rotatory  movement,  from  the  Ukra  upon  blishment  of  his  winter  quarters, 
the  Narew,  from  the  rich  coast  of  old  Prussia  Whoever  desires  to  have  an  accurate  notion 
into  the  woody,  marshy,  uncultivated  interior  of  the  district  which  he  chose  for  cantoning 
of  Poland,  had  succeeded  on  all  points,  though  his  troops,  must  figure  to  himself  the  confor- 
at  none  had  it  led  to  one  of  those  great  battles  mation  of  the  country  beyond  the  Vistula, 
which  always  marked  conspicuously  the  sci- !  That  series  of  lakes  to  which  we  have  already 
entific  mancBuvres  of  that  immortal  captain. ;  several  times  adverted,  and  which  here  sepa- 
The  heroic  action  of  Lannes  at  Pultusk  was  a  '  rate  old  Prussia  from  Poland,  the  German 
defeat  for  the  Russians,  but  a  defeat  without  country  from  the  Slavonic  country,  the  mari- 
disaster,  which  was  as  great  a  novelty  for  time  and  rich  region  from  the  inland  and  poor 
them  as  for  us.  If,  however,  it  had  been  pos-  (  region,  pour  the  greater  part  of  their  waters 
sible  to  march  on  the  next  and  the  following  into  the  interior  by  a  series  of  rivers,  as  the 
day,  the  Russians  would  have  been  obliged  to  Omulew,  the  Orezyc,  the  Ukra,  which  throw 
deliver  to  us  the  trophies  which  they  could  themselves  into  the  Narew,  and  by  the  Narew 
not  long  withhold  from  our  bravery  and  our  into  the  Vistula.  And  while,  by  means  of  the 
skill.  Thrown  beyond  the  Ukra;  the  Orezyc,  Omulew,  the  Orezyc,  and  the  Ukra,  the  Narew 


and  the  Narew,  into  an  impenetrable  forest, 
above  fifteen  or  twenty  leagues  in  extent,  com- 
prised between  Pultusk,  Ostrolenka,  and  Or- 
telsburg,  their  complete  destruction  would 


receives  the  waters  of  the  lakes  which  cannot 
find  an  outlet  to  the  sea,  and  which  descend 
from  the  west,  it  receives,  by  means  of  the 


Bug,  the  waters  descending 


have  been  the  inevitable  effect  of  the  profound    from  the  heart  of  Poland. 


from  the  east  and 
Uniting  with  the 


combinations  of  Napoleon,  and  of  the  futile  |  Bug  at  Sierock,  and  increased  by  all  these  tri- 


or  unfortunate  combinations   of  their   gene- 
rals. 

But  it  was  impossible  to  take  a  step  without 
falling  into  inextricable  embarrassments.  Men 
sank  up  to  the  waist  in  those  horrible  quag- 


butaries,  it  carries  them  in  a  single  bed  to  the 
Vistula,  into  which  it  falls  at  Modlin. 

The  Narew,  then,  presents  one  common 
trunk,  which  supports  itself  on  the  Vistula, 
around  which  the  Bug  on  the  right,  the  Ukra, 


mires,  and  there  stuck  fast  till  assistance  came    the  Orezyc  and  the  Omulew  on  the  left,  run  to 
to  drag  them  out.     Many  had  expired  in  this    attach  themselves  to  it  like  so  many  ramifica- 


situation,  for  want  of  timely  aid. 

Napoleon,  whose  plans  had  never  been  bet- 
ter conceived,  whose  soldiers  had  never  been 
more  valiant,  was  obliged  to  halt,  after  march- 
ing on  for  two  or  three  days,  to  assure  himself 
thoroughly  of  the  rout  of  the  Russians  and  of 
their  flight  towards  the  Pregel.  A  great  loss 


tions.  It  was  between  these  ramifications,  and 
appuying  himself  upon  the  principal  trunk 
towards  Sierock  aud  Modlin,  that  Napoleon 
distributed  his  corps  (Tarmce. 

He  made  Lannes  take  cantonments  between 
the  Vistula,  the  Narew,  and  the  Bug,  in  the 
angle  formed  by  these  streams,  guarding  at 


Jan.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


241 


one  and-  the  same  time  Warsaw  by  Suchet's 
division,  Jablona,  the  bridge  of  Okunin,  and 
Sierock,  by  Gazan's  division.  The  head-quar- 
ters of  Lannes  were  at  Sierock,  at  the  conflux 
of  the  Bug  and  the  Narew.  Marshal  Davout's 
corps  was  to  be  cantoned  in  the  angle  formed 
by  the  Bug  and  the  Narew,  his  head-quarters 
adjoining  to  Pultusk,  his  posts  extending  to 
Brok,  on  the  Bug,  to  Ostrolenka,  on  the  Narew. 
The  corps  of  Marshal  Soult  was  established 
behind  the  Orezyc,  having  his  head-quarters 
at  Golymin,  uniting  the  cavalry  reserve  with 
his  corps  d'armee,  and  thus  having  the  means 
of  covering  the  vast  extent  of  his  front  by  the 
numerous  squadrons  placed  at  his  disposal. 
The  corps  of  Marshal  Augereau  was  cantoned 
at  Plonsk,  behind  Marshal  Soult,  occupying 
the  open  angle  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Ukra,  the  head-quarters  being  at  Plonsk.  Mar- 
shal Ney's  corps  was  placed  on  the  extreme 
left  of  Marshal  Augereau,  turned  towards 
Mlawa,  about  the  sources  of  the  Orezyc  and 
the  Ukra,  near  the  lakes,  protecting  the  flank 
of  the  four  corps  d'armee,  which  formed  radii 
around  Warsaw,  and  connected  themselves 
with  the  corps  of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  who  de- 
fended the  Lower  Vistula.  The  latter,  canton- 
ed close  to  the  sea,  was  commissioned  to  guard 
the  Lower  Vistula,  and  to  cover  the  siege  of 
Dantzig,  which  it  was  indispensably  necessary 
to  reduce,  in  order  to  render  the  position  of 
the  army  secure.  This  siege,  moreover,  was 
destined  to  form  the  interlude  between  the  cam- 
paign which  was  just  over,  and  that  which 
was  to  be  opened  in  the  spring. 

Each  corps  had  orders,  on  the  first  appear- 
ance of  the  enemy,  to  concentrate  itself,  that 
of  Marshal  Lannes  at  Sierock,  Marshal  Da- 
rout's  at  Pultusk,  Marshal  Soult's  at  Golymin, 
Marshal  Augereau's  at  Plonsk,  Marshal  Ney's 
at  Mlawa,  Marshal  Bernadotte's  between  Grau- 
denz  and  Elbing,  towards  Osterode ;  the  first 
four  charged  to  defend  Warsaw,  the  fifth  to 
connect  the  quarters  of  the  Narew  with  those 
of  the  coast,  the  last  to  protect  the  Lower  Vis- 
tula and  the  siege  of  Dantzig. 

With  this  able  disposition  of  the  canton- 
ments, were  united  precautions  of  admirable 
forecast.  The  soldiers,  having  bivouacked  in- 
cessantly since  the  commencement  of  the  cam- 
paign, that  is  to  say,  ever  since  the  month  of 
October,  were  at  length  to  be  lodged  in  the 
villages  and  be  subsisted  there,  but  so  that 
they  could  assemble  at  any  time  on  the  first 
danger.  The  light  cavalry,  the  cavalry  of  the 
line,  the  heavy  cavalry,  ranged  one  behind 
another,  and  appuyed  on  some  detachments  of 
light  infantry,  formed  a  long  screen  before  the 
cantonments,  to  keep  off  the  Cossacks,  and  to 
prevent  surprises  by  means  of  frequent  recon- 
noissances.  The  troops  engaged  in  this  very 
hard  service  were  sheltered  by  hovels,  the  ma- 
terials for  which  were  furnished  by  the  woods 
so  abundant  in  Poland. 

Orders  were  issued  to  scour  the  country  in 
qnest  of  the  corn  and  the  potatoes  hidden  under 
ground  by  the  inhabitants  before  their  flight, 
to  collect  the  dispersed  cattle,  and  to  form  with 
what  should  be  thus  got  together  magazines 
which,  established  for  each  corps,  and  regu- 
larly administered,  would  be  secured  from  all 
VOL.  II.— 31 


waste.  The  corps  which  were  not  advanta- 
geously placed  in  regard  to  alimentary  re- 
sources, were  to  receive  supplies  of  corn, 
forage,  and  butchers'  meat  from  Warsaw. 
What  was  to  be  sent  them,  embarked  on  the 
Vistula,  was  to  descend  the  river  to  the  near- 
est point  to  each  corps,  to  be  there  landed  and 
carried  away  by  the  army  equipages,  or  by 
vehicles  organized  in  the  country.  Napoleon 
had  ordered  all  services  to  be  paid  in  money, 
either  on  account  of  the  Poles,  whom  he  wished 
to  conciliate,  or  on  account  of  the  inhabitants, 
whom  he  hoped  to  attract  by  the  prospect  of 
gain. 

It  should  be  remarked  that  each  corps,  though 
cantoned  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  able  to 
proceed  rapidly  to  any  point  that  might  be  in 
danger,  had  a  base  on  the  Vistula  or  on  the 
Narew,  in  order  to  turn  the  water  transport  to 
account.  Thus,  Marshal  Lannes  had  at  War- 
saw, Marshal  Davout  at  Pultusk,  Marshal  Au- 
gereau at  Wyszogrod,  Marshal  Soult  at  Plock, 
Marshal  Ney  at  Thorn,  Marshal  Bernadotte  at 
Marienburg  and  Elbing,  a  base  on  that  vast 
line  of  navigation.  At  these  different  points 
were  to  be  placed  their  depots,  their  hospitals, 
their  establishments  for  preserving  provisions, 
their  shops  for  repairs,  because  to  these  places 
the  articles  necessary  for  those  departments 
could  be  brought  with  the  greatest  facility. 

In  the  ordinary  histories  of  war,  we  see  only 
armies  completely  formed  and  ready  to  enter 
into  action ;  but  it  can  scarcely  be  imagined 
what  efforts  it  costs  to  bring  the  armed  man  to 
his  post,  equipped,  fed,  trained,  lastly  cured,  if 
he  has  been  sick  or  wounded.  All  these  diffi- 
culties are  increased  in  proportion  to  the 
change  of-  climate,  or  to  the  distance  which 
the  army  removes  from  the  point  of  departure. 
Most  generals  or  governments  neglect  this 
kind  of  attentions,  and  their  armies  melt  away 
visibly.  Those  only  who  practise  them  with 
perseverance  and  skill  find  means  to  keep  their 
troops  numerous  and  well-disposed.  The  ope- 
ration which  we  are  describing  is  the  most 
admirable  example  of  this  sort  of  difficulties 
completely  overcome  and  surmounted. 

Napoleon  desired  that,  as  soon  as  situations 
adapted  to  each  cantonment  were  chosen,  and 
necessaries  collected,  or  such  as  were  deficient 
brought  from  Warsaw,  ovens  should  be  built, 
and  destroyed  mills  repaired.  He  required 
that,  when  the  regular  supply  of  the  troops  was 
insured,  and  when,  in  preparing  provisions,  a 
larger  stock  had  accumulated  than  the  quan- 
tity indispensable  for  the  daily  consumption, 
there  should  be  formed  a  reserve  store  of  bread, 
biscuit,  spirits,  not  at  the  place  where  the  de- 
pot was  fixed,  but  at  the  spot  appointed  for  the 
assembling  of  each  corps  d'armee  in  case  of  at- 
tack. No  doubt  the  reader  guesses  his  motive. 
He  wished  that,  if  a  sudden  appearance  of  the 
enemy  called  the  troops  to  arms,  each  corps 
might  have  sufficient  provisions  for  seven  or 
eight  days'  march.  He  took  in  genera)  no 
more  time  than  that  to  accomplish  a  great  op^ 
ration  and  to  decide  a  campaign. 

With  the  money  arising  from  the  contribu- 
tions levied  in  Prussia,  which  was  first  col- 
lected on  the  Oder,  and  then  conveyed  to  the 
Vistula  in  artillery  wagons,  b»  caused  the 


242 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Jan.  1807. 


troops  to  be  punctually  paid,  and  moreover 
granted  extraordinary  aids  to  the  masses  of  the 
regiments.  By  masses  are  meant  the  portions 
of  the  pay  thrown  into  a  common  fund,  to  feed, 
clothe,  and  warm  the  soldier.  It  was  a  method 
of  increasing  the  comforts  of  the  troops  in 
proportion  to  the  difficulty  of  subsisting,  or  to 
the  more  rapid  consumption  of  articles  of 
equipment. 

The  first  days  of  this  establishment  amidst 
the  marshes  and  forests  of  Poland,  and  during 
the  inclemencies  of  winter,  were  most  irksome. 
If  the  cold  had  been  intense,  the  soldier,  warmed 
at  the  expense  of  the  forests  of  Poland,  would 
have  suffered  less  from  the  frost  than  from  that 
soaking  wet  which  drenched  the  ground,  ren- 
dered it  almost  impossible  to  stir  abroad,  in- 
creased the  fatigues  of  the  service,  saddened 
the  eye,  relaxed  the  muscles,  depressed  the 
spirits.  In  that  country  they  could  not  have  a 
worse  winter  than  a  rainy  winter.  The  tem- 
perature varied  incessantly  from  frost  to  thaw, 
never  reaching  below  one  or  two  degrees  of 
cold,  and  returning  to  the  moist,  soft  tempera- 
ture of  autumn.  In  consequence,  the  men 
longed  for  frost,  as  in  the  fine  climates  people 
long  for  the  sunshine  and  the  verdure  of  spring. 

In  a  few  days,  however,  their  situation  be- 
gan to  improve.  The  corps  made  their  abode 
in  the  deserted  villages ;  the  advanced  guards 
built  themselves  hovels  with  branches  of  fir. 
A  great  quantity  of  potatoes  and  cattle  enough 
were  found.  But  the  soldiers  grew  tired  of 
potatoes,  and  sighed  after  bread.  By  and  by, 
they  discovered  corn  hidden  in  the  woods,  and 
collected  it  in  magazines.  They  also  received 
some  by  the  Vistula  and  the  Narew,  part  of 
that  which  the  ingenuity  of  the  Jews  contrived 
to  send  down  to  Warsaw,  through  the  military 
cordons  of  Austria.  A  system  of  bribery, 
adroitly  practised  by  these  clever  traders,  had 
lulled  the  vigilance  of  the  guardians  of  the 
Austrian  frontier.  Being  paid  a  good  price 
either  in  salt  taken  in  the  Prussian  magazines 
or  in  ready  money,  the  supplies  were  furnishec 
with  tolerable  regularity.  The  ovens  were 
built,  and  the  damaged  mills  repaired.  The 
reserve  magazines  began  to  be  organized.  The 
wines  necessary  for  the  health  of  the  soldier 
and  for  his  good  humour,  drawn  from  all  the 
cities  of  the  north,  to  which  commerce  carrie 
them  in  abundance,  and  conveyed  by  the 
Oder,  the  Warta,  and  the  Netze,  to  the  Vis 
tula,  arrived  also,  though  with  more  difficul- 
ty. All  the  corps,  indeed,  did  not  enjoy  the 
same  advantages.  Those  of  Marshals  Davou 
and  Soult,  pushed  forwarder  into  the  woody 
region,  and  far  from  the  navigation  of  the 
Vistula,  were  most  exposed  to  privations 
The  corps  of  Marshals  Lannes  and  Augereau 
placed  nearer  to  the  great  river  of  Poland,  had 
less  to  suffer.  The  indefatigable  Ney  had  by 
his  industry  and  boldness  opened  a  source  of 
abundance  for  himself.  He  had  approachec 
very  near  to  'the  German  country,  which  is 
extremely  rich ;  nay,  he  had  even  ventured  to 
the  banks  of  the  Pregel.  Sallying  forth  or 
daring  expeditions,  he  placed  his  soldiers  on 
sledges  when  it  froze,  and  went  marauding  to 
the  very  gates  of  KOnigsberg,  which  indeed 
*ie  had  once  wellnigh  surprised  and  carried. 


The  corps  of  Bernadotte  was  very  favour- 
ably situated  for  subsisting  on  the  Lower  Vis- 
ula.  But  the  proximity  of  the  Prussian  gar- 
risons of  Graudenz,  Dantzig.  Elbing,  annoyed 
lim  severely,  and  prevented  him  from  enjoying 
.he  resources  of  that  country  so  much  as  he 
might  have  done. 

After  several  skirmishes  with  the  Cossacks, 
they  had  been  obliged  to  leave  the  cantonments 
quiet.  It  was  perceived  that  the  light  cavalry 
was  a  sufficient  guard,  and  that  the  heavy  ca 
valry  suffered  much  in  the  advanced  canton- 
ments.  Accordingly,  Napoleon,  enlightened 
by  the  experience  of  a  few  days,  made  a  change 
in  his  dispositions.  He  brought  back  the  heavy 
cavalry  towards  the  Vistula.  General  d'Haut- 
poul's  cuirassiers  were  cantoned  around  Thorn; 
the  dragoons  of  all  the  divisions  from  Thorn 
to  Warsaw;  General  Nansouty's  cuirassiers 
behind  the  Vistula,  between  the  Vistula  and 
the  Pilica.  The  light  cavalry,  reinforced  by 
some  brigades  of  dragoons,  remained  at  the 
advanced  posts,  but  came  by  turns,  two  regi- 
ments at  a  time,  to  recruit  itself  on  the  Vistula 
where  forage  abounded.  Gudin's  division  of 
Davout's  corps,  which  had  suffered  more  than 
any  other  in  the  whole  army,  because  it  had 
borne  a  part  in  two  of  the  hottest  actions  dur- 
ing the  war,  Auerstadt  and  Pultusk,  was  sent 
to  Warsaw,  to  indemnify  itself  there  for  its  fa- 
tigues and  its  combats. 

The  army,  it  is  true,  did  not  fare  so  well  in 
the  recesses  of  Poland  as  in  the  camp  of  Boo- 
logne,  where  all  the  means  of  France  and  the 
space  of  two  years  had  been  devoted  to  pro- 
viding for  its  wants.  But  it  had  necessaries, 
and  sometimes  more.  Napoleon,  in  reply  to 
Fouche,  the  minister,  who  communicated  to 
him  the  rumours  circulated  by  disaffected  per- 
sons respecting  the  hardships  endured  by  our 
soldiers,  wrote  as  follows : 

"  It  is  true  that  the  magazines  of  Warsaw 
not  being  largely  stored,  and  the  impossibility 
of  collecting  there  in  a  short  lime  a  great 
quantity  of  corn,  have  rendered  provisions 
scarce;  but  it  is  as  absurd  to  imagine  that 
there  is  no  corn,  no  wine,  no  butcher's  meat, 
no  potatoes,  to  be  found  in  Poland,  as  to  say 
that  they  are  not  to  be  got  in  Egypt. 

"  I  have  at  Warsaw  an  establishment  which 
furnishes  me  with  100,000  rations  of  biscuit 
per  day;  I  have  one  at  Thorn;  I  have  maga- 
zines at  Posen,  at  Lowicz,  along  the  whole  line  : 
I  have  sufficient  to  feed  an  army  for  more  than 
a  year.  You  must  recollect  that,  at  the  time 
of  the  expedition  to  Egypt,  letters  from  the 
army  asserted  that  we  were  dying  there  of  hun- 
ger. Let  articles  be  written  in  this  spirit.  It 
is  natural  that  we  should  be  short  of  something 
when  we  were  driving  the  Russians  from  War- 
saw; but  the  productions  of  the  country  are 
such,  that  it  is  impossible  to  feel  any  alarm/' 
(Warsaw,  18th  January,  1807.) 

There  was,  however,  a  considerable  number 
of  sick,  indeed  more  than  usual,  in  that  valiant 
army.  They  were  seized  with  fevers  and  pains, 
in  consequence  of  the  continual  bivouacs,  be- 
neath a  cold  sky,  upon  the  wet  ground.  This 
was  no  more  than  what  might  be  expected  from 
what  befei  the  chiefs  themselves.  Several 
i  marshals,  those,  in  particular,  who  were  called 


Jan.  1807.] 


<  ONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


243 


Italians  and  Egyptr  ins,  because  they  had  served 
in  Italy  and  Egypt,  were  seriously  indisposed. 
Murat  had  not  been  able  to  take  part  in  the 
last  operations  on  the  Narew.  Augereau,  suf- 
fering from  rheumatism,  was  obliged  to  with- 
draw himself  from  the  contact  with  the  cold 
damp  air.  Lannes,  taken  ill  at  Warsaw,  had 
been  forced  to  leave  the  5th  corps,  which  he 
could  no  longer  command. 

Napoleon  crowned  the  attentions  paid  to  his 
soldiers  by  attentions  not  less  assiduous  to  his 
sick  and  wounded.  He  had  caused  six  thou- 
sand beds  to  be  prepared  at  Warsaw,  and  an 
equally  considerable  number  to  be  provided  at 
Thorn,  at  Posen,  and  on  the  rear,  between  the 
Vistula  and  the  Oder.  There  had  been  seized 
in  Berlin,  wool  coming  from  the  domains  of 
the  Crown,  and  tent-cloth;  out  of  these,  mat- 
tresses were  made  for  the  hospitals.  Having 
at  his  disposal  Silesia,  which  Prince  Jerome 
had  occupied,  and  which  abounds  in  linen  of 
all  kinds,  Napoleon  ordered  a  great  quantity  to 
be  bought  and  to  be  made  into  shirts.  He  es- 
pecially committed  the  direction  of  the  hos- 
pitals to  M.  Daru,  and  prescribed  a  peculiar 
organization  for  those  establishments.  He  de- 
termined that  in  each  hospital  there  should  be 
a  chief  overseer,  always  provided  with  ready 
money,  charged,  upon  his  responsibility,  to 
procure  for  the  sick  whatever  they  needed, 
under  the  superintendence  of  a  Catholic  priest. 
This  priest,  while  exercising  the  spiritual  min- 
istry, was  also  to  exercise  a  sort  of  paternal 
vigilance,  to  make  reports  to  the  Emperor,  to 
acquaint  him  with  the  slightest  negligence  to- 
wards the  sick,  whose  protector  he  was  thus 
constituted.  Napoleon  had  intended  that  this 
priest  should  have  a  salary;  and  that  each  hos- 
pital should  become,  in  some  sort,  an  itinerant 
cure  in  the  train  of  the  army. 

Such  were  the  infinite  pains  taken  by  this 
great  captain,  whom  party  hatred  represented, 
on  the  day  of  his  fall,  as  a  barbarous  con- 
queror, driving  men  to  the  slaughter,  without 
giving  himself  any  concern  about  feeding  them 
when  he  made  them  march,  or  about  their  cure 
when  he  had  made  cripples  of  them,  and  car- 
ing no  more  about  them  than  about  the  beasts 
which  drew  his  cannon  and  his  baggage. 

After  attending  to  the  men  with  a  zeal 
which  is  not  the  less  noble  because  it  was  in- 
terested— for  there  are  generals,  sovereigns, 
who  suffer  the  soldiers,  the  instruments  of 
their  power  and  their  glory,  to  perish  for  want 
— Napoleon  directed  his  attention  to  the  works 
undertaken  on  the  Vistula,  and  to  the  punc- 
tual arrival  of  his  reinforcements,  so  that  in 
spring  his  army  might  present  itself  to  the 
enemy  more  formidable  than  ever.  He  had 
given  orders,  as  we  have  seen,  for  works  at 
Praga,  purposing  that  Warsaw  should  be  able 
to  support  itself  unaided,  with  a  mere  garri- 
son, in  case  he  should  move  forward.  Hav- 
ing examined  every  thing  with  his  own  eyes, 
he  resolved  upon  the  construction  of  eight  re- 
doubts, closed  at  the  gorge,  with  scarp  and 
counterscarp,  lined  with  wood — a  species  of 
revetement,  the  value  of  which  the  siege  of 
Dantzig  soon  afforded  occasion  for  appreciat- 
ing— and  embracing  in  their  circle  the  exten- 
sive suburb  of  Praga.  He  resolved  to  add  to 


them  a  work  which,  placed  in  rear  of  these 
eight  redoubts,  and  opposite  to  the  bridge  of 
boats  connecting  Warsaw  with  Praga,  should 
serve  at  once  for  an  appendage  to  that  species 
of  fortress,  and  for  te'e  du  pont  to  the  bridge  of 
Warsaw.  At  Okunin,  where  bridges  were 
thrown  across  the  Narew  and  the  Ukra,  he 
ordered  a  mass  of  works,  to  cover  them  and 
to  secure  the  exclusive  possession  of  them  to 
the  French  army.  The  same  thing  was  pre- 
scribed at  the  bridge  of  Modlin,  which  had 
been  thrown  at  the  conflux  of  the  Vistula  and 
the  Narew,  and  where  advantage  had  been 
taken  of  an  island  to  ground  upon  it  the 
means  of  passage,  and  to  construct  a  defen- 
sive work  of  the  greatest  strength.  Thus  be- 
tween the  three  points  of  Warsaw,  Okunin, 
and  Modlin,  where  so  many  and  so  large 
streams  meet,  Napoleon  secured  all  the  pas- 
sages to  himself,  and  interdicted  them  all  to 
the  Russians  ;  so  that  these  great  natural  ob- 
stacles, converted  into  facilities  for  him,  into 
insurmountable  difficulties  for  the  enemy,  be- 
came in  his  hands  powerful  means  of  manoeu- 
vre, and  could,  above  all,  be  left  to  themselves, 
if  circumstances  obliged  him  to  advance  far- 
ther north  than  he  had  yet  done.  Napoleon 
completed  this  system  by  a  work  of  the  same 
kind  at  Sierock,  at  the  conflux  of  the  Narew 
and  the  Bug.  With  timber,  which  abounded 
on  the  spot,  with  money,  which  he  had  at  his 
disposal,  he  was  certain  to  have  both  mate- 
rials and  hands  to  set  to  work  upon  them. 

Napoleon  had  drawn  from  Paris  two  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  the  15th  light,  and  the  58th 
of  the  line,  a  regiment  of  fusiliers  of  the  guard, 
and  a  regiment  of  the  municipal  guard.  He 
had  also  drawn  one  regiment  from  Brest,  one 
from  St.  Lo,  and  one  from  Boulogne.  These 
seven  regiments  were  on  march,  as  well  as 
the  provisional  regiments  destined  to  conduct 
the  recruits  of  the  depot  battalions  to  the  war 
battalions.  Two  of  them,  the  15th  light,  and 
the  58th,  had  outstripped  the  others  and  joined 
Marshal  Mortier's  corps,  which  was  thus  in- 
creased to  eight  French  regiments,  besides 
the  Dutch  or  Italian  regiments,  which  were  to 
complete  its  effective.  Napoleon,  taking  ad- 
tage  of  this  reinforcement,  which  at  the  mo- 
ment exceeded  the  wants  of  the  eighth  corps, 
for  thus  far  no  enterprise  seemed  to  threaten 
the  shores  of  the  Baltic,  detached  from  it  the 
2d  and  15th  light,  forming  4000  men,  good 
French  infantry.  He  joined  to  them  the  Ba- 
den troops,  the  eight  Polish  battalions  raised 
at  Posen,  the  legion  of  the  north,  full  of  vete- 
ran Poles  who  had  long  been  in  the  service 
of  France,  the  four  fine  regiments  of  cuiras- 
siers which  had  come  from  Italy,  lastly,  two 
of  the  four  fine  regiments  of  cavalry,  which 
I  had  likewise  come  from  Italy, -the  19th  and 
|  23d  chasseurs.  With  these  troops  ho  com- 
posed a  new  corps  d'  armee,  to  which  he  gave 
|  the  title  of  French  corps;  the  Germans,  who 
i  were  in  Silesia  under  Prince  Jerome,  having 
already  received  the  title  of  ninth.  He  in- 
trusted the  command  of  this  corps  to  old  Mar- 
shal Lefebvre,  whom  he  had  brought  with  him 
to  the  grand  army,  and  placed  temporarily  at 
the  head  of  the  infantry  of  the  guard.  He 
charged  him  to  invest  Colberg,  and  to  com- 


244 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Jan.  1807. 


mence  the  siege  of  Dantzig.  The  latter  fort- 
ress had  a  particular  importance,  on  account 
of  the  position  which  it  occupied  on  the  thea- 
tre of  the  war.  It  commanded  the  Lower  Vis- 
tula, protected  the  arrivals  of  the  enemy  by 
sea,  and  contained  immense  resources,  which 
would  place  the  army  in  abundance,  if  we 
could  make  ourselves  masters  of  it.  Besides, 
so  long  as  it  was  not  taken,  an  offensive 
movement  of  the  enemy  towards  the  sea, 
pushed  beyond  the  Lower  Vistula,  might 
oblige  us  to  leave  the  Upper  Vistula,  and  to 
fall  back  towards  the  Oder.  Napoleon  was 
therefore  resolved  to  make  the  siege  of  Dant- 
zig the  grand  operation  of  the  winter. 

Napoleon,  thus  devoting  the  bad  season  to 
the  reduction  of  fortresses,  purposed  to  besiege 
not  only  those  of  the  Lower  Vistula,  which 
were  on  his  left,  but  also  those  of  the  Upper 
Oder,  which  were  on  his  right.  His  brother 
Jerome,  seconded  by  General  Vandamme,  was, 
as  we  have  seen,  to  complete  the  subjection 
of  Silesia  by  the  successive  reduction  of  the 
fortresses  of  the  Oder.  '  These  fortresses,  con- 
structed with  care  by  the  great  Frederick,  to 
render  definitive  the  valuable  conquest  which 
constituted  the  glory  of  his  reign,  presented 
serious  difficulties  to  surmount,  not  only  in 
the  magnitude  and  excellence  of  the  works, 
but  also  in  the  garrisons  which  were  charged 
to  defend  them.  The  surrender  of  Magdeburg, 
Custrin,  Stettin,  had  covered  with  disgrace  the 
commandants  who  had  given  them  up,  under 
the  empire  of  a  general  demoralization.  A 
reaction  had  soon  taken  place  in  the  Prussian 
army,  at  first  so  deeply  discouraged  after  Jena. 
Indignant  honour  had  spoken  to  the  hearts  of 
all  the  military  men,  and  they  were  deter- 
mined to  die  honourably,  even  without  anv 
hope  of  conquering.  The  king  had  threat- 
ened with  terrible  punishments  those  com- 
mandants who  should  surrender  fortresses 
committed  to  their  keeping,  till  they  had  done 
all  that  constitutes,  according  to  the  rules  of 
the  art,  an  honourable  defence.  It  began 
moreover  to  be  understood,  that  the  fortresses 
remaining  on  Napoleon's  left  and  right  would 
soon  acquire  a  special  importance,  for  they 
were  so  many  points  d'appui  needed  by  his  dar- 
ing march,and  which  must  second  the  resistance 
of  his  enemies.  The  resolution  to  defend  them 
energetically  was  therefore  firmly  taken  by  all 
the  commandants  of  the  Prussian  garrisons. 

Prince  Jerome  had  with  him  only  Wirtem- 
bergers  and  Bavarians,  and,  with  these  aux- 
iliary troops,  a  single  French  regiment,  the 
13th  of  the  line,  and  a  few  squadrons  of  French 
light  cavalry.  These  German  auxiliaries  had 
not  yet  acquired  that  military  valour  which  they 
subsequently  displayed  on  more  than  one  oc- 
casion. But  General  Vandamme,  who  com- 
manded the  ninth  corps  under  Prince  Jerome, 
and  General  Montbrun,  commanding  the  caval- 
ry, assisted  by  a  young  French  staff,  full  of 
irdour,  infused  into  them,  in  a  short  time,  the 
spirit  which  then  animated  our  army,  and 
which  it  communicated  to  all  the  troops  in 
contact  with  it.  Vandamme,  who  had  never 
directed  a  siege,  and  possessed  none  of  the 
qualifications  of  the  engineer,  but  who  made 
amends  for  all  by  a  happy  instinct  for  war, 


had  undertaken  to  proceed  in  a  summary  man- 
ner with  the  fortresses  of  Silesia,  though  he 
knew  that  the  governors  of  those  places  were 
resolved  to  defend  them  stoutly.  He  intended 
to  employ  the  means  which  had  been  used  at 
Magdeburg,  and  to  intimidate  the  inhabitants, 
in  order  to  impel  them  to  surrender  in  spite  of 
the  garrisons.  He  began  with  Glogau,  the 
place  nearest  to  the  Lower  Oder  and  to  the 
military  routes  followed  by  our  troops.  The 
garrison  was  not  numerous,  and  demoraliza- 
tion still  prevailed  in  its  ranks.  Vandamme 
had  several  mortars  and  pieces  of  heavy  artil- 
lery placed  in  battery,  and,  after  some  threats, 
followed  up  with  effect,  induced  the  place  to 
capitulate  on  the  2d  of  December.  Here 
were  found  great  resources  in  artillery  and 
stores  of  all  kinds.  Vandamme  then  ascended 
the  Oder,  and  commenced  the  investment  of 
Breslau,  situated  on  that  river,  about  twenty 
leagues  above  Glogau. 

It  was  with  the  Wirtembergers  that  Glogau 
had  been  taken.  They  were  not  enough  to 
besiege  Breslau,  a  city  containing  60,000  souls, 
provided  with  a  garrison  of  6000  men,  nume- 
rous and  solid  works,  and  a  good  commandant. 
Prince  Jerome,  who  had  pushed  on  to  the  en- 
virons of  Kalisch,  while  the  French  army  was 
making  its  first  entry  into  Poland,  had  returned 
to  the  Oder,  since  Napoleon,  solidly  established 
on  the  Vistula,  had  no  further  occasion  for 
the  presence  of  the  ninth  corps  towards  his 
right.  Vandamme  therefore  had,  for  under- 
taking the  siege  of  Breslau,  the  Wirtember- 
gers, two  Bavarian  divisions,  with  some  French 
artillerymen  and  engineers,  and  likewise  the 
13th  of  the  line.  To  carry  on  a  regular  siege 
of  so  extensive  a  place,  appeared  to  him  a  long 
and  difficult  business.  In  consequence,  he  en- 
deavoured, as  at  Glogau,  to  intimidate  the  popu- 
lation. He  chose  in  a  suburb,  that  of  St. 
Nicholas,  a  site  for  establishing  batteries  for 
red-hot  shot.  A  brisk  fire,  directed  upon  the 
interior  of  the  city,  failed  of  producing  the  in- 
tended result,  owing  to  the  vigour  of  the  com- 
mandant. Vandamme  then  turned  his  thoughts 
to  a  more  serious  attack.  Breslau  had  fur  its 
principal  defence  a  bastioned  enclosure,  bor- 
dered by  a  deep  ditch,  full  of  the  water  of  the 
Oder.  But  the  French  engineers  perceived 
that  this  enclosure  was  not  everywhere  lined, 
and  that,  at  certain  points,  there  was  nothing 
but  a  scarp  of  earth.  Vandamme  resolved  to 
attempt  the  assault  of  the  enclosure,  which, 
consisting  not  in  a  wall  of  masonry  but  a  mere 
turf  slope,  might  be  scaled  by  enterprising  sol- 
diers. It  would  first  be  necessary  to  cro<=s 
upon  rafts  the  ditch  which  was  supplied  by  the 
Oder.  Vandamme  caused  whatever  was  re- 
quisite for  this  daring  enterprise,  to  be  pre- 
pared. Unluckily,  the  preparations  were  dis- 
covered by  the  enemy ;  the  moon  shone  brightly 
during  the  night  of  the  execution;  and  from 
these  variou-s  causes  the  attempt  miscarried. 
Meanwhile,  the  Prince  of  Anhalt-Pless,  who 
was  governor  of  the  province,  having  collected 
detachments  from  all  the  fortresses,  and  raised 
a  levy  of  peasants,  which  had  procured  him  a 
corps  of  12,000  men,  gave  the  garrison  hopes 
of  succour  from  without  Nothing  could  have 
happened  more  fortunately  for  the  besiegers 


Jan.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


215 


than  to  have  solved  in  open  field  the  question 
of  the  capture  of  Breslau.  Vandamme  has- 
tened to  meet  the  Prince  of  Anhalt  with  the 
Bavarians  and  the  French  13th  of  the  line, 
beat  him  twice,  put  him  completely  to  the  rout, 
and  appeared  again  before  the  place  now  de- 
prived of  all  hope  of  relief.  At  the  same  time, 
a  sharp  frost  having  set  in,  he  resolved  to  cross 
the  ditches  upon  the  ice,  and  to  scale  the  earth 
works.  The  commandant,  finding  himself  in 
danger  of  being  taken  by  assault,  a  danger 
most  alarming  for  a  wealthy  and  populous  city, 
consented  to  parley,  and  surrendered  'the  place 
on  the  7th  of  January,  after  a  month's  resist- 
ance, on  the  conditions  granted  to  Magdeburg, 
Ciistrin,  and  the  other  fortresses  of  Prussia. 

This  conquest  was  not  only  brilliant,  but 
singularly  useful  for  the  resources  which  it 
afforded  to  the  French  army,  by  the  command, 
in  particular,  which  it  gave  us  over  Silesia,  the 
richest  province  in  Prussia,  and  one  of  the 
richest  in  Europe.  Napoleon  congratulated 
Vandamme  upon  it,  and  after  Vandamme  his 
brother  Jerome,  who  had  shown  the  intelli- 
gence of  a  good  officer  and  the  courage  of  a 
brave  soldier. 

A  few  days  afterwards,  the  ninth  corps  made 
a  further  conquest,  that  of  Brieg,  situated  above 
Breslau,  on  the  Oder.  The  whole  centre  of 
Silesia  being  reduced,  there  yet  remained  to 
be  taken  Schweidnitz,  Glatz  and  Neisse,  which 
shut  the  door  of  Silesia  on  the  side  next  to  Bo- 
hemia. Napoleon  ordered  them  to  be  besieged 
one  after  another,  and  determined,  in  as  far  as 
he  was  concerned,  upon  a  rigorous  act,  but  yet 
conformable  to  the  law  of  war,  namely,  to  de- 
stroy them.  In  consequence,  he  ordered  the 
works  of  those  which  were  already  in  his 
power  to  be  blown  up.  He  had  a  two-fold  rea- 
son for  acting  thus ;  one  of  the  moment,  the 
other  prospective.  At  the  moment,  he  wished 
to  avoid  scattering  his  troops  by  multiplying 
around  him  the  posts  to  be  guarded:  for  the 
future,  not  reckoning  upon  Prussia  as  an  ally, 
perceiving  every  day  that  he  must  not  flatter 
himself  to  make  a  friend  of  Austria,  he  had 
henceforth  nothing  to  hope  but  from  the  mis- 
understanding which  had  always  divided  those 
two  courts.  Silesia,  dismantled  on  the  side 
towards  Austria,  would  become  for  Prussia  an 
object  of  uneasiness,  an  occasion  for  expenses, 
and  a  cause  of  weakness. 

Thus  on  the  rear  of  the  army,  on  the  left  as 
on  the  right,  the  visible  progress  of  our  opera- 
tions attested  that  the  enemy  could  not  derange 
them,  since  he  suffered  them  to  be  accom- 
plished. A  few  partisans,  indeed,  sallying 
from  the  fortresses  of  Colberg  and  Dantzig, 
recruited  by  Prussian  prisoners  who  had  es- 
caped, infested  the  roads.  Several  detachments 
were  employed  in  pursuing  them.  A  slight 
accident,  of  little  consequence,  did,  however, 
excite  a  momentary  alarm  for  the  tranquillity 
of  Germany.  Hesse,  whose  sovereign  Napo- 
leon had  recently  dethroned,  whose  fortresses 
he  had  demolished,  whose  army  he  had  dis- 
solved, was  naturally  the  worst  disposed  pro- 
vince of  Germany  towards  the  French.  Thirty 
thousand  disbanded  men,  without  employ,  de- 
prived of  pay  and  of  the  means  of  subsistence, 
were,  though  disarmed,  a  dangerous  leaven, 


which  prudence  cautioned  against  leaving  in 
the  country.  Part  of  them  had  been  induced 
to  enrol  themselves,  without  being  informed 
where  they  would  be  expected  to  serve.  The 
intention  was  to  employ  them  in  Naples.  The 
secret  having  transpired,  through  some  indis- 
cretions committed  at  Mayence,  the  enrolled 
men  broke  into  insurrection,  saying  that  the 
Hessians  were  about  to  be  sent  to  perish  in 
the  Calabrias.  General  Lagrange,  who  com- 
manded in  Hesse,  had  but  very  few  troops  at 
his  disposal.  The  insurgents  disarmed  a 
French  detachment,  and  threatened  to  raise 
all  Hesse.  But  the  forecast  of  Napoleon  had 
furnished  beforehand  the  means  of  parrying 
this  unlucky  circumstance.  Provisional  regi- 
ments which  had  set  out  from  the  Rhine,  and 
an  Italian  regiment  on  march  for  Marshal 
Mortier's  corps,  the  fusiliers  of  the  guard 
drawn  from  Paris,  and  one  of  the  regiments 
of  chasseurs  coming  from  Italy,  were  not  far 
off.  They  were  despatched  in  the  utmost  haste 
to  Cassel,  and  the  insurrection  was  quelled 
immediately. 

Then  the  immense  country  extending  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  Vistula,  from  the  mountains 
of  Bohemia  to  the  sea,  was  brought  under 
subjection.  The  fortresses  surrendered  one 
after  another  to  our  troops,  and  our  reinforce- 
ments passed  quietly  through  them,  performing 
the  police  duty  there,  while  marching  toward 
the  theatre  of  war  to  recruit  the  grand  army. 

Meanwhile,  the  Russian  general,  Benning 
sen,  had  so  boldly  proclaimed  himself  victo- 
rious, that  the  King  of  Prussia,  at  Ko'nigsberg, 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  at  Petersburg,  had 
received  and  accepted  congratulations.  And 
though  the  material  results,  such  as  the  retreat 
of  the  Russians  upon  the  Pregel,  our  tranquil 
establishment  on  the  Vistula,  the  sieges  under- 
taken and  finished  on  the  Oder,  must  have 
answered  all  these  bombasts  of  an  enemy,  who 
fancied  himself  victorious  when  he  had  not 
sustained  a  disaster  so  complete  as  that  of 
Austerlitz  or  Jena ;  people  affected,  neverthe- 
less, to  show  a  certain  joy.  That  joy  was 
manifested  more  particularly  at  Vienna,  and 
in  the  bosom  of  the  imperial  court.  Emperor, 
archdukes,  ministers,  high  personages,  alike 
congratulated  one  another.  Nothing  was  more 
natural  and  more  legitimate.  There  was  no 
fault  to  be  found  but  with  the  language  held  by 
the  cabinet  of  Vienna  in  its  most  recent  com- 
munications with  Napoleon — language  which 
perhaps  passed  the  bounds  of  the  dissimula- 
tion allowable  in  such  cases.  At  any  rate,  the 
error  which  caused  the  joy  of  our  enemies  was 
not  of  long  duration.  M.  de  Lucchesini,  who 
had  left  the  court  of  Prussia  at  the  same  time 
as  M.  de  Haugwitz,  was  just  then  passing 
through  Vienna,  on  his  way  to  Lucca,  his  na- 
tive city.  He  was  no  longer  tinder  illusion 
himself,  he  had  no  interest  in  palming  illusion 
upon  others,  and,  in  consequence,  he  told  the 
truth  relative  to  the  sanguinary  encounters  of 
which  the  Vistula  had  just  been  the  theatre. 
The  quagmires  of  Poland,  he  said,  had  para- 
lyzed vanquished  and  victors,  and  enabled  the 
Russians  to  withdraw  themselves  from  the 
pursuit  of  the  French.  But  the  Russians, 
beaten  most  soundly  everywhere,  had  no 
x  2 


248 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Jan.  1807. 


chance  to  make  head  against  the  formidable 
soldiers  of  Napoleon.  They  need  but  wait 
till  spring,  perhaps  only  till  the  first  frost,  to 
see  the  latter  make  an  irruption  upon  the  Pre- 
gel  or  the  Niemen,  and  put  an  end  to  the  war 
by  some  signal  stroke.  The  French  army, 
added  M.  de  Lucchesini,  was  neither  demoral- 
ized nor  destitute  of  resources,  as  it  was  al- 
leged :  it  lived  well,  accommodated  itself  to 
the  damp,  cold  climate  of  Poland,  as  it  had 
formerly  accommodated  itself  to  the  dry, 
scorching  climate  of  Egypt:  it  had,  in  short, 
implicit  faith  in  the  genius  and  good  fortune 
of  its  leader. 

This  intelligence,  from  a  calm  and  disinte- 
rested observer,  dispelled  the  false  joy  of  the 
Austrians.  The  court  of  Vienna,  as  well  to 
make  Napoleon  easy  by  a  friendly  proceeding, 
as  to  have  at  the  French  head-quarters  an  ac- 
curate informant,  solicited  an  authorization  to 
send  the  Baron  de  Vincent  to  Warsaw.  The 
ministers  of  the  foreign  courts  who  had  wished 
to  follow  M.  de  Talleyrand  to  Berlin,  some  of 
them  even  to  Warsaw,  had  been  politely  shuf- 
fled off,  as  inconvenient  and  frequently  very 
slanderous  witnesses.  The  mission  of  M.  de 
Vincent,  however,  was  assented  to  out  of  in- 
dulgence for  Austria,  and  also  to  furnish  her 
with  a  direct  medium  for  being  informed  of 
the  truth,  which  it  was  much  more  the  interest 
of  Napoleon  to  make  him  acquainted  with  than 
to  conceal  from  him.  Accordingly,  M.  de  Vin- 
cent arrived  towards  the  end  of  January  at 
Warsaw. 

While  Napoleon  was  employing  the  month 
of  January,  1807,  either  in  consolidating  his 
position  on  the  Vistula,  or  in  augmenting  his 
army  by  reinforcements  from  France  and  Italy, 
or,  lastly,  in  exciting  the  east  against  Russia, 
holding  himself  in  readiness  to  meet  any  im- 
mediate attack,  though  believing  that  there 
would  be  none,  the  Russians,  notwithstanding 
the  severity  of  the  season,  were  preparing  one 
for  him,  and  a  most  formidable  one.  After  the 
affair  at  Pultusk,  General  Benningsen  being 
beaten,  whatever  he  might  choose  to  say — for 
what  general  retires  in  the  greatest  haste  when 
he  is  victorious  1 — had  passed  the  Narew, 
and  found  himself  in  the  region  of  heaths, 
marshes,  and  woods,  extending  between  the 
Narew  and  the  Bug.  He  had  there  picked  up 
two  divisions  of  General  Buxhovden's,  most 
uselessly  left  by  the  latter  at  Popowo,  on  the 
Bug,  during  the  late  engagements.  He  as- 
cended the  Narew  with  these  two  divisions 
and  those  of  his  army  which  had  fought  at 
Pultusk.  At  this  same  moment,  the  two  demi- 
divisions  of  General  Benningsen's,  which  had 
been  unable  to  join  him,  rallied  to  the  two  di- 
visions of  General  Buxhovden's,  which  were 
at  Golymin  and  Makow,  and  remained  on  the 
other  bank  of  the  Narew,  the  bridges  of  which 
had  just  been  carried  away  by  the  ice.  The 
two  portions  of  the  Russian  army,  deprived 
of  the  possibility  of  communicating  with  each 
other,  ascended  the  banks  of  the  Narew,  the 
separation  of  which  might  have  been  easily 
overcome,  if  one  could  have  been  informed  of 
their  situation,  and  if,  moreover,  the  state  of 
the  roads  had  allowed  us  to  get  at  them.  But 
who  can  know  every  thing  in  war  1  The  ablest 


of  generals  is  he  who,  by  dint  of  application 
and  sagacity,  contrives  to  be  a  little  less  igno- 
rant of  the  enemy's  plans  than  the  generality. 
Under  any  other  circumstances,  Napoleon, 
with  his  prodigious  activity,  with  his  art  in 
following  up  victory,  would  soon  have  disco- 
vered the  perilous  situation  of  the  Russian 
army,  and  infallibly  destroyed  that  portion  of 
it  which  he  should  have  chosen  to  pursue. 
But  buried  in  mud,  deprived  of  artillery  and 
bread,  he  had  found  it  utterly  impossible  to 
stir;  besides,  having  led  his  soldiers  from  the 
extremity  of  Europe,  he  had  considered  it  as 
a  sort  of  cruelty  to  put  their  attachment  to  a 
longer  trial. 

General  Benningsen  and  General  Buxhov- 
den  made  some  attempts  to  join,  but  the 
bridges,  several  times  repaired,  were  as  often 
broken  down  again,  and  they  found  them- 
selves obliged  slowly  to  ascend  the  Narew, 
living  as  they  could,  and  endeavouring  to 
reach  places  where  a  junction  would  be  prac- 
ticable. They  contrived,  however,  to  meet 
personally,  and  they  had  an  interview  at  No- 
wogrod.  Though  by  no  means  disposed  to 
come  to  a  better  understanding,  they  agreed  to 
a  plan,  tending  to  nothing  less  than  the  prose- 
cution of  hostilities,  in  spite  of  the  state  of  the 
country  and  of  the  season.  General  Benning- 
sen, who,  by  dint  of  asserting  that  he  was  vic- 
torious at  Pultusk,  at  length  believed  that  he 
was  so,  absolutely  insisted  on  resuming  the 
offensive,  and  decided  the  immediate  continu- 
ation of  the  military  operations,  by  pursuing 
a  totally  different  course  from  that  which  had 
at  first  been  adopted.  Instead  of  keeping 
along  the  Narew  and  its  tributaries,  and  thus 
backing  upon  the  woody  country,  which  fixed 
the  point  of  attack  on  Warsaw,  it  was  re- 
solved to  make  an  extensive  circuit,  to  turn 
by  a  movement  in  rear  the  vast  mass  of  fo- 
rest, then  to  traverse  the  line  of  the  lakes,  and 
to  bear  away  towards  the  maritime  region  of 
Braunsberg,  Elbing,  Marienburg,  and  Dantzig. 
In  operating  on  this  side  they  were  sure  of 
provisions,  owing  to  the  richness  of  the  soil 
along  the  coast.  They  flattered  themselves, 
moreover,  that  they  should  surprise  the  ex- 
treme left  of  the  French  cantonments,  perhaps 
carry  off  Marshal  Bernadotte,  established  on 
the  Lower  Vistula,  easily  pass  that  river  on 
which  they  had  retained  several  appuis,  and, 
by  pushing  beyond  Dantzig,  annul  at  a  single 
stroke  the  position  of  Napoleon  in  advance 
of  Warsaw. 

In  fact,  if  you  cast  your  eye  on  the  line  de 
scribed  by  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder  to  dis- 
charge themselves  into  the  Baltic,  you  will  re- 
mark that  they  run  at  first  to  the  north-west, 
the  Vistula  as  far  as  the  environs  of  Thorn, 
the  Oder  to  the  environs  of  Ciistrin ;  that 
they  then  turn  abruptly  to  proceed  to  the 
north-east,  thus  forming  a  considerable  elbow, 
the  Vistula  towards  Thorn,  the  Oder  towards 
Ciistrin.  It  results  from  this  direction,  parti- 
cularly as  far  as  the  Vistula  is  concerned, 
that  the  Russian  corps,  passing  that  river  be- 
tween Graudenz  and  Thorn,  would  be  much 
nearer  to  Posen,  the  base  of  our  operations  in 
Poland,  than  the  French  army  encamped  at 
Warsaw.  The  difference  was  nearly  half.  I* 


Jan.  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


247 


was,  therefore,  in  itself  a  well-conceived  plan 
to  cross  the  Vistula  between  Thorn  and  Mari- 
enburg,  saving  the  able  execution,  on  which  i 
the  result  of  the  best  plans  always  depends.! 
We  have,  in  fact,  already  demonstrated  more  j 
than  once  that,  without  precision  in  the  calcu- 
lation of  distance  and  time,  without  prompt- 
ness in  marches,  vigour  in  encounters,  perse- 
verance in  following  up  an  idea  to  its  com- 
plete accomplishment,  every  bold  manoauvre 
becomes  as  mischievous  as  it  might  have  been 
fortunate.  And  here,  in  particular,  if  one  failed, 
one  would  be  sure  to  be  turned  by  Napoleon, 
cut  off  from  Kb'nigsberg,  driven  back  to  the  sea, 
and  exposed  to  a  real  disaster;  for,  to  repeat 
another  truth,  already  expressed  elsewhere,  in 
every  great  combination,  you  run  as  much 
risk  as  you  cause  your  adversary  to  incur. 

Scarcely  had  the  two  Russian  generals 
agreed  upon  the  plan  to  be  adopted,  when  a 
resolution  taken  at  St.  Petersburg,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  false  statements  of  General  Ben- 
ningsen,  conferred  on  him  the  order  of  St. 
George,  appointed  him  general-in-chief,  and 
relieved  him  from  the  military  supremacy 
of  old  Kamenski,  and  from  the  rivalry  of 
General  Buxhovden.  These  two  latter  were 
by  the  same  resolution  recalled  from  the  army. 

General  Benningsen,  left  alone  at  the  head 
of  the  Russian  troops,  naturally  persisted  in  a 
plan  which  was  his  own,  and  hastened  to 
carry  it  into  execution.  He  ascended  the 
Narew  to  Tykoczyn,  passed  the  Bober  near 
Goniondz,  at  the  very  spot  where  Charles  XII. 
had  crossed  it  a  century  before,  and  proceeded 
to  traverse  the  line  of  the  lakes  near  Lake 
Spirding,  by  Arys,  Rhein,  Rastenburg,  and 
Brischoffstein.  The  names  of  the  places  show 
that  he  had  reached  the  German  country,  that 
is  to  say,  East  Prussia.  On  the  22d  of  Janu- 
ary, a  month  after  the  last  actions  of  Pultusk, 
Golymin,  and  Soldau,  he  arrived  at  Heilsberg 
on  the  Alle.  It  is  not  thus  that  he  must 
march  who  hopes  to  surprise  a  vigilant  ene- 
my. However,  concealed  by  that  impenetra- 
ble curtain  of  forests  and  lakes,  which  sepa- 
rated the  two  armies,  the  movement  of  the 
Russians  was  entirely  unperceived  by  the 
French. 

At  this  period,  General  Essen  had,  at  last, 
brought  the  two  divisions  of  reserve,  so  long, 
announced,  which  increased  the  number  of 
the  divisions  of  the  Russian  army  to  ten,  ex- 
clusively of  the  Prussian  corps  of  General 
Lestocq.  These  two  new  divisions,  composed 
of  recruits,  were  destined  to  guard  not  only 
the  Bug  and  the  Narew,  but  also  the  position 
previously  occupied  by  the  two  divisions  of 
General  Buxhovden,  which  had  no  share  in 
the  operations  of  the  month  of  December. 
Sedmaratski's  division  was  posted  at  Goni- 
ondz, on  the  Bober,  to  watch  the  line  of  the 
lakes,  to  keep  up  the  communications  with 
the  copps  of  General  Essen,  and  to  give  um- 
brage to  the  French  on  their  right.  Of  the 
ten  divisions  then,  General  Benningsen  re- 
tained but  seven,  to  proceed  with  him  to  the 


coast  and  to  the  Lower  Vistula.  After  the 
losses  sustained  in  December,  the^  might 
form  a  force  of  80,000  men,  and  of  90,000, » 
at  least,  with  the  Prussian  corps  of  Lestocq. 

We  have  already  explained  that  the  waters 
of  the  lakes  run  off,  some  inland  by  the  Omu- 
lew,  the  Orezyc,  the  Ukra,  into  the  Narew  and 
the  Vistula;  others  through  small  rivers  di- 
rectly to  the  sea;  and  that  the  principal  of 
these  is  the  Passarge,  which  falls  perpendicu- 
larly into  the  Frische  Haff.  The  French  corps, 
scattered  on  the  right  about  the  Narew  and  its 
tributaries,  on  the  left  about  the  Passarge,  co- 
vered the  line  of  the  Vistula  from  Warsaw  to 
Elbing.  Marshals  Lannes  and  Davout  had 
their  cantonments,  as  we  have  said,  along  the 
Narew,  from  its  fall  into  the  Vistula  to  Pul- 
tusk and  above  it,  forming  the  right  of  the 
French  army,  and  covering  Warsaw.  The 
corps  of  Marshal  Soult  was  established  be- 
tween the  Omulew  and  the  Orezyc,  from  Os- 
trolenka  to  Willenberg  and  Chorzellen,  giving 
the  hand  on  one  side  to  the  troops  of  Marshal 
Davout,  on  the  other  to  those  of  Marshal  Ney, 
and  thus  forming  the  centre  of  the  French 
army.  Marshal  Ney,  placed  more  forward  at 
Hohenstein,on  the  Upper  Passarge,  connected 
himself  with  the  position  of  Marshal  Soult,  at 
the  sources  of  the  Omulew,  and  with  that  of 
Marshal  Bernaclotte,  behind  the  Passarge. 
The  latter,  protected  by  the  Passarge,  occu- 
pying Osterode,  Mohrungen,  Preuss-Holland, 
Elbing,  formed  the  left  of  the  French  army 
toward  the  Frische  Haff,  and  covered  the 
Lower  Vistula  as  well  as  Dantzig. 

Marshal  Ney,  who  had  the  most  advanced 
position,  added  still  more  to  the  distances 
which  separated  him  from  the  bulk  of  the 
army,  by  the  boldness  of  his  excursions.  As 
soon  as  the  frost  began  to  give  some  consist- 
ence to  the  ground,  he  put  his  light  troops 
into  sledges,  and  scampered  to  the  very  envi- 
rons of  Konigsberg,  in  quest  of  provisions  for 
his  soldiers.  In  this  manner  he  had  made 
some  lucky  captures,  which  had  singularly 
contributed  to  the  comfort  of  his  corps  d'urmee. 
The  Alle,  whose  banks  he  scoured,  has  its 
sources  near  those  of  the  Passarge,  in  a  group 
of  lakes,  between  Hohenstein  and  Allenstein, 
then  separates  from  it  at  a  right  angle,  and 
while  the  Passarge  runs  to  the  left  towards 
the  sea,  (or  Frische  Haff,)  it  proceeds  straight 
towards  the  Pregel,  so  that  the  Alle  and  the 
Passarge,  the  Pregel  and  the  sea,  form,  as  it 
were,  the  four  sides  of  an  oblong  square. 
Marshal  Ney,  placed  at  Hohenstein,  at  the 
apex  of  the  angle  described  by  the  Passarge 
and  the  Alle,  before  they  separate,  having,  on 
his  right,  in  rear,  the  cantonments  of  Marshal 
Soult,  on  his  left,  in  rear,  those  of  Marshal 
Bernadotte,  by  turns  ascending  and  descend- 
ing the  Alle  in  its  course  to  the  Pregel,  could 
not  fail  to  fall  in  with  the  Russian  army  in 
movement. 

Napoleon,  fearful  that  he  would  involve 
himself  in  danger,  had  reprimanded  him  seve- 
ral times.  But  the  bold  marshal,  persisting 


I  Such  is  the  assertion  of  Plotho,  the  narrator  himself,    was  strange  indeed  not  to  be  acm,  on  their  own  fron- 
vrho,  to  enhance  the  merit  of  the  Russian  army,  lowers  i  tier,  to  present  to  an  enemy  who  came  from  such  a  ew»- 
that  of  his  own  government,  by  always  making  a  point  j  tance  more  than  90,000  men  capable  of  fighting. 
of  reducing  the  sum  total  of  the  forces  employed.    It 


248 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[Jan.  1807 


in  running  further  than  he  was  authorized, ' 
fell  in  with  the  Russian  array  which  had 
passed  the  Alle,  and  was  about  to  cross  ihe 
Passarge,  in  the  environs  of  Deppen.  It  ad- 
vanced in  two  columns.  That  which  was  to 
cross  the  Passarge  at  Deppen  was  charged  to 
make  a  digression  towards  Liebstadt,  in  or- 
der to  approach  the  Lower  Vistula,  and  to 
surprise  the  cantonments  of  Marshal  Ber- 
uadotte. 

Marshal  Ney,  whose  indocile  temerity  had 
at  least  had  the  advantage  of  giving  us  timely 
notice,  (an  advantage  which  ought  not  to  en- 
courage to  disobedience,  for  it  rarely  has  such 
beneficial  effects,)  Marshal  Ney  hastened  to 
fall  back  himself,  to  apprize  Marshal  Berna- 
dotte,  on  his  left,  Marshal  Soult,  on  his  right, 
of  the  danger  which  threatened  them,  and  to 
send  intelligence  of  the  sudden  appearance 
of  the  enemy  to  the  head-quarters  at  Warsaw. 
He  took  a  well-chosen  post  at  Hohenstein, 
whence  he  could  proceed  either  to  the  assist- 
ance of  Marshal  Soult's  cantonments  on  the 
Omulew,  or  10  the  assistance  of  Marshal  Ber- 
nadotte's  cantonments  behind  the  Passarge. 
He  pointed  out  to  the  latter  the  position  of 
Osterode,  a  capital  position  on  plateaux,  where 
the  first  and  the  sixth  corps,  united,  would  be 
able  to  present  thirty  and  odd  thousand  men 
to  the  Russians  in  an  almost  impregnable 
situation. 

But  the  troops  of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  scat- 
tered as  far  as  Elbing,  near  the  Frische  Haff, 
had  great  distances  to  go  in  order  to  rally  ; 
and  if  General  Benningsen  had  marched  ra- 
pidly, he  might  have  surprised  and  destroyed 
them  before  their  concentration  was  effected. 
Marshal  Bernadotte  sent  orders  to  the  troops 
of  his  right  to  proceed  direct  to  Osterode,  and 
to  the  troops  of  his  left,  to  assemble  at  the 
common  point  of  Mohrungen,  which  is  situ- 
ated on  the  route  to  Osterode,  a  little  in  rear 
of  Liebstadt,  that  is  to  say,  very  near  to  the 
Russian  advanced  guards.  The  danger  was 
pressing,  for,  on  the  preceding  day,  the  ene- 
my's advanced  guard  had  very  roughly  han- 
dled a  French  detachment  left  at  Liebstadt. 
General  Markoff,  with  about  fifteen  or  sixteen 
thousand  men,  formed  the  head  of  the  Russian 
right  column.  He  was,  on  the  morning  of  the 
25th  of  January,  at  Pfarrers-Feldchen,  having 
three  battalions  in  that  village,  and  in  rear  a 
strong  mass  of  infantry  and  cavalry.  About 
noon,  Marshal  Bernadotte  arrived  at  that  place, 
at  but  a  short  distance  from  Mohrungen,  with 
troops  which,  having  set  out  in  the  night,  had 
already  marched  ten  or  twelve  leagues.  He 
decided  upon  his  dispositions  immediately, 
and  threw  a  battalion  of  the  9th  light  into  the 
village  of  Pfarrers-Feldchen,  to  take  that  first 
point  d'appui  from  the  enemy.  That  brave  bat- 
talion entered  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet,  un- 
der a  brisk  fire  of  musketry  from  the  Russians, 
and  maintained  an  obstinate  combat  in  the 
interior  of  the  village.  Its  eagle  was  taken  in 
the  fray,  but  soon  recovered.  Other  Russian 
battalions  having  come  and  joined  those  which 
"vere  engaged  with  it,  Marshal  Bernadotte  sent 
to  its  assistance  two  French  battalions,  which, 
after  an  extremely  violent  conflict,  remained 
masters  of  Pfarrers-Feldchen.  Beyond,  upon 


a  rising  ground,  was  seen  the  bulk  of  the  ene- 
my's column,  appuyed  on  one  side  upon  woods, 
on  the  other  upon  lakes,  and  protected  in  front 
by  a  numerous  artillery.  Marshal  Bernadotte, 
having  formed  the  8th,  the  94th  of  the  line, 
and  the  27th  light  in  line  of  battle,  marched 
direct  towards  the  Russian  position,  under 
a  most  murderous  fire.  He  attacked  it  bold- 
ly ;  the  Russians  defended  it  with  obstinacy. 
As  good  luck  would  have  it,  General  Dupont, 
arriving  from  the  shore  of  the  Frische  Haff, 
by  way  of  Preuss-Holland,  made  his  appear- 
ance beyond  the  village  of  Georgenthal,  on 
the  right  of  the  Russians.  The  latter,  un- 
able to  withstand  this  double  attack,  aban- 
doned the  field  of  battle,  covered  with  slain. 
This  action  cost  them  fifteen  or  sixteen  hun- 
dred killed  or  taken.  It  cost  the  French  about 
six  or  seven  hundred  killed  and  wounded. 
The  dispersion  of  the  troops,  and  the  great 
number  of  sick,  had  prevented  Marshal  Ber- 
nadotte from  collecting  at  Mohrungen  more 
than  eight  or  nine  thousand  men,  to  fight  fif- 
teen or  sixteen  thousand. 

The  results  of  this  first  encounter  were  to 
render  the  Russians  extremely  circumspect, 
and  to  give  the  troops  of  Marshal  Bernadotte 
time  to  assemble  at  Osterode,  a  position  in 
which,  when  united  with  those  of  Marshal 
Ney,  they  would  have  nothing  to  fear.  Ac- 
cordingly, Marshal  Bernadotte.having  proceed- 
ed to  Osterode  on  the  26th  and  27th  of  Janu- 
ary, kept  close  to  Marshal  Ney,  firmly  await- 
ing the  ulterior  enterprises  of  the  enemy. 
General  Benningsen,  whether  surprised  by  the 
opposition  made  to  his  march,  or  desirous  to 
concentrate  his  army,  assembled  the  whole  of 
it  at  Liebstadt,  and  there  halted. 

It  was  on  the  26th  and  27th  of  January,  that 
Napoleon,  successively  informed  by  intelli- 
gence from  different  quarters  of  the  movement 
of  the  Russians,  was  completely  fixed  respect- 
ing their  intentions.  He  had  conceived  at  first 
that  it  was  the  excursions  of  Marshal  Ney, 
which  had  brought  reprisals  upon  him,  and  in 
the  first  moment  he  had  felt  and  expressed  very 
great  displeasure.  But  he  was  soon  enlight- 
ened concerning  the  real  cause  of  the  appear- 
ance of  the  Russians,  and  he  could  not  but 
discover  that  they  meditated  a  serious  enter- 
prise, having  a  totally  different  aim  from  that 
of  contending  for  the  cantonments. 

Though  this  new  winter  campaign  inter- 
rupted the  rest  which  the  troops  had  need  of, 
his  regret  soon  gave  place  to  satisfaction,  es- 
pecially when  he  considered  the  new  state  of 
the  temperature.  A  sharp  frost  had  set  in. 
The  great  rivers  were  not  yet  frozen,  but  the 
stagnant  waters  were  completely ;  and  Poland 
appeared  one  vast  plain  of  ice,  in  which  nei- 
ther guns,  nor  horses,  nor  men,  ran  any  risk 
of  being  engulfed  in  mud.  Napoleon,  reco- 
vering the  freedom  of  manoeuvering,  conceived 
a  hope  of  putting  an  end  to  the  war  by  some 
signal  stroke. 

His  plan  was  instantly  determined,  and  con- 
formably to  the  new  direction  taken  by  the 
enemy.  When  the  Russians,  threatening  War- 
saw, followed  the  banks  of  the  Narew,  he  had 
designed  to  debouch  by  Thorn  with  his  left  re- 
inforced, in  order  to  separate  them  from  the 


Jan.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


249 


Prussians,  and  to  fling  them  into  the  chaos  of 
woods  and  marshes  which  the  interior  of  the 
country  exhibits.  This  time,  on  the  contrary, 
perceiving  them  to  be  decided  to  skirt  the  coast 
for  the  purpose  of  passing  the  Lower  Vistula, 
it  was  proper  for  him  to  adopt  the  contrary 
course,  that  is  to  say,  to  ascend  the  Narew 
himself,  which  they  were  leaving,  and,  pro- 
ceeding high  enough  to  turn  them,  then  drop 
down  suddenly  upon  them,  in  order  to  drive 
them  to  the  sea.  This  manoauvre,  in  case  of 
success,  would  be  decisive  ;  for  if,  by  the  first 
plan,  the  Russians,  thrust  back  towards  the 
interior  of  Poland,  were  liable  to  be  placed  in 
a  difficult  and  dangerous  situation,  by  the 
second,  backed  upon  the  sea,  they  would  find 
themselves,  like  the  Prussians  at  Prenzlau  and 
Liibeck,  obliged  to  capitulate. 

In  consequence,  Napoleon  resolved  to  as- 
semble his  whole  army  to  the  corps  of  Marshal 
Soult,  taking  that  corps  for  the  centre  of  his 
movements.  While  Marshal  Soult,  collecting 
his  divisions  to  that  of  his  left,  was  to  march 
by  Willenberg  to  Passenheim  and  Allenstein, 
Marshal  Davout,  forming  the  extreme  right  of 
the  army,  was  to  proceed  to  the  same  place  by 
Pultusk,  Myszniec,  and  Ortelsburg;  Marshal 
Augereau,  forming  the  rear-guard,  was  to  come 
thither  from  Plonsk  by  Neidenburg  and  Hohen- 
stein ;  Marshal  Ney,  forming  the  left,  was  to 
come  from  Osterode.  It  is  at  this  village  of 
Allenstein,  chosen  by  Napoleon  for  the  general 
rallying  point,  that  the  Passarge  and  the  Alle, 
after  approaching  each  other  for  a  moment, 
begin  to  separate.  Having  once  reached  this 
point,  if  the  Russians  persisted  in  crossing  the 
Passarge,  we  should  be  already  on  their  flank, 
and  have  almost  turned  them.  It  was  there- 
fore of  importance  that  to  this  village  of  Al- 
lenstein the  four  corps  of  Marshals  Davout, 
Soult,  Augereau,  and  Ney,  should  be  timely 
brought. 

Murat  had  scarcely  recovered  from  his  in- 
disposition, but  his  ardour  made  amends  for 
deficient  strength:  he  mounted  his  horse  the 
same  day,  and,  having  received  the  verbal  in- 
structions of  the  emperor,  he  immediately  as- 
sembled the  light  cavalry  and  the  dragoons,  to 
head  with  them  the  corps  of  Marshal  Soult. 
The  heavy  cavalry,  cantoned  on  the  Vistula 
towards  Thorn,  was  to  join  him  as  speedily  as 
possible. 

Napoleon,  apprized  of  the  presence  of  Gene- 
ral Essen  between  the  Bug  and  the  Narew, 
consented  to  dispense  with  the  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Lannes,  which  was  the  fifth,  and  he  or- 
dered it  to  place  itself  at  Sierock,  to  keep  in 
check  the  two  Russian  divisions  posted  on  that 
side,  and  to  fall  upon  them  at  the  first  move- 
ment they  should  attempt  towards  Warsaw. 
Marshal  Lannes  being  absolutely  incapable 
of  taking  the  command  of  the  fifth  corps, 
owing  to  the  state  of  his  health,  Napoleon 
gave  it  to  his  aide-de-camp,  Savary,  on  whose 
intelligence  and  resolution  he  placed  entire 
reliance. 

He  directed  his  guard,  foot  and  horse,  to  the 
rear  of  Marshal  Soult,  and  as  for  the  reserve 
of  grenadiers  and  voltigeurs,  which  had  taken 
its  quarters  behind  the  Vistula,  between  War- 
saw and  Posen,  he  deprived  himself  of  it  on 

VOL.  II.— 82 


this  occasion  to  make  it  occupy  the  environs 
of  Ostrolenka,  and  to  form  with  it  an  inter- 
mediate echelon  between  the  grand  army  and 
the  fifth  corps  left  upon  the  Narew.  This  re- 
serve was  charged  to  succour  the  fifth  corps, 
if  General  Essen's  divisions  should  threaten 
Warsaw :  in  the  contrary  case,  it  was  to  rejoin 
the  head-quarters.  These  dispositions  towards 
his  right  being  settled,  Napoleon  took  towards 
his  left  precautions  still  more  profoundly  cal- 
culated, and  which  showed  how  vast  an  ex- 
tent he  hoped  to  give  to  his  movement  He 
directed  Marshal  Bernadotte,  who  was  at  Os- 
terode, to  fall  back  slowly  upon  the  Vistula, 
in  case  of  emergency  even  as  far  as  Thorn,  to 
draw  the  enemy  thither,  then  to  slip  away, 
covering  himself  with  an  advanced  guard  as 
with  a  curtain,  and  to  come,  by  a  forced 
march,  to  connect  himself  with  the  left  of  the 
grand  army,  in  order  to  render  the  mano2uvre 
by  which  he  meant  to  thrust  back  the  Rus- 
sians to  the  sea  and  to  the  Lower  Vistula  the 
more  decisive. 

Napoleon,  however,  did  not  stop  there. 
Fearing  lest  the  Russians,  if  he  succeeded  in 
j  turning  them,  might  imitate  the  example  of 
I  General  Blucher,  who,  when  separated  from 
Stettin,  ran  off"  to  Lubeck,  and  lest  they  might 
post  away  from  the  Vistula  to  the  Oder,  he 
I  provided  against  this  danger  by  a  skilful  em- 
ployment of  the  tenth  corps.  That  corps,  des- 
tined to  carry  on  under  Marshal  Lefebvre  the 
siege  of  Dantzig,  was  not  yet  completely  as- 
sembled. Marshal  Lefebvre  had  only  the  15th 
of  the  line,  the  2d  light,  General  d'Espagne's 
cuirassiers,  and  the  eight  Polish  battalions  of 
Posen.  Napoleon  ordered  him  to  remain  with 
these  troops  along  the  Vistula  and  above 
Graudenz.  The  fusiliers  of  the  guard,  the 
regiment  of  the  municipal  guard  of  Paris,  the 
legion  of  the  North,  two  of  the  five  regiments 
of  chasseurs  of  Italy,  who  had  already  pro- 
ceeded to  Germany,  lastly,  the  Baden  troops, 
were  to  assemble  at  Stettin,  under  General 
Menard,  and,  ascending  toward  Posen,  endea- 
vour to  join  Marshal  Lefebvre,  who  would 
come  to  them  or  let  them  come  to  him,  ac- 
cording to  circumstances,  so  as  to  fall  all  to- 
gether upon  any  Russian  corps  that  should  at- 
tempt to  go  from  the  Vistula  to  the  Oder. 
Lastly.  Marshal  Mortier  had  orders  to  relin- 
quish the  blockade  of  Stralsund,  to  place  the 
troops  indispensable  for  that  blockade  in  good 
lines  of  circumvallation,  then  to  join  himself 
with  the  others  to  the  assemblage  under  Gene- 
ral Menard,  to  take  the  direction  of  it,  if  that 
assemblage,  instead  of  ascending  to  the  Vistula 
to  reinforce  Marshal  Lefebvre,  should,  by  the 
circumstances  of  the  pursuit,  be  brought  back 
towards  the  Oder. 

Napoleon  left  Duroc  at  Warsaw,  that  he 
might  have  a  trusty  person  there.  .  Prince  Po- 
niatowski  had  organized  some  Polish  batta- 
lions. Those  which  were  most  advanced  in 
their  organization  were,  with  the  provisional 
regiments  arriving  from  France,  to  guard,  un- 
der the  command  of  General  Lemarrois,  the 
works  of  Praga.  Napoleon  caused  all  the  ve- 
hicles which  he  had  at  his  disposal  to  be  de- 
spatched from  Warsaw  laden  with  biscuit  and 
bread,  hoping  that,  the  frost  facilitating  con- 


250 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Feb.  1807. 


veyance,  nis  soldiers  might  not  fall  short  of 
any  thins  In  consequence  of  these  orders, 
issued  on  the  27th,  28th,  and  29th  of  January, 
the  army  was  to  be  assembled  at  Allenstein 
on  the  3d  or  4th  of  February.  It  should  be  re- 
marked, that  the  reinforcements  brought  with 
such  foresight  from  France  and  Italy  were  still 
on  march  ;  that  the  2d  light,  the  15th  of  the  line, 
the  four  regiments  of  cuirassiers  borrowed 
from  the  army  at  Naples,  had  alone  arrived  on 
the  Vistula;  that  the  other  corps  had  not  yet 
reached  the  line  of  the  Elbe ;  that  Napoleon 
had  scarcely  received  the  first  detachment  of 
recruits  drawn  from  the  depots  the  day  after 
the  battle  of  Jena,  which  had  procured  him  a 
dozen  thousand  men  at  most,  a  very  inade- 
quate supply  to  fill  the  gaps  produced  either  by 
battle  or  by  the  diseases  of  the  season ;  that 
most  of  the  corps  were  reduced  to  a  third  or  a 
fourth ;  that  those  of  Lannes,  Davout,  Soult, 
Augereau,  Ney,  Bernadotte,  with  the  addition 
of  the  guard,  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  and  Murat's 
cavalry,  no  longer  formed  one  hundred  and 
odd  thousand  men ;'  and  that,  leaving  Lannes 
and  Oudinot  on  his  right,  having  but  a 
very  uncertain  chance  of  bringing  Bernadotte 
towards  his  left,  he  would  have  75,000  men, 
at  most,  left  to  give  battle  16  General  Ben  n  ing- 
sen,  who  had  90,000,  including  the  Prussians. 

Notwithstanding  this  numerical  inferiority, 
Napoleon,  reckoning  upon  his  soldiers  and  the 
roads,  which  seemed  to  admit  of  rapid  concen- 
trations, took  the  field  with  a  heart  full  of  hope. 
He  wrote  to  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres 
and  to  M.  de  Talleyrand,  that  he  had  broken 
up  his  cantonments,  to  take  advantage  of  a  fine 
frost  and  fair  weather:  that  the  roads  were  su- 
perb ;  that  they  must  not  say  a  word  to  the 
empress,  in  order  not  to  give  her  useless  uneasi- 
ness, but  that  he  was  in  full  movement,  and  that 
it  would  cost  the  Russians  dear,  if  they  did  not  think 
better  of  it. 

Leaving  Warsaw  on  the  30th,  he  was  in  the 
evening  of  that  day  at  Prasnitz,  and  on  the 
31st  at  Willenberg.  Murat,  having  outstripped 
him,  had  collected  in  all  haste  the  regiments 
of  cavalry,  except  the  cuirassiers  scattered 
along  the  Vistula,  and  formed  the  advanced 
guard  of  Marshal  Soult,  already  concentrated 
upon  Willenberg.  Marshal  Davout  had  made 
forced  marches  to  reach  Myszniec,  Marshal 
Augereau  to  reach  Neidenburg.  Meanwhile, 
Marshal  Ney  had  collected  his  divisions  at 
Hohenstein,  ready  to  press  forward  as  soon  as 


»  Here  is  the  real  force  of  the  corps,  deduced  from  a 
eomparison  of  numerous  authentic  documents  : 

Marsha!  Lannes 12.000  men. 

Marshal  Davout 18,000  ' 

Marshal  Soult 20,000  « 

Marshal  Augereau 10,000  «• 

MarshalNey 10.000  « 

Marshal  Bernadotte 12,000  " 

General  Oudinot   6,000  ' 

Theguard 6.000  « 

Murat's  cavalry 10,000  " 

Total 104,000 

Dedact  from  this  total  of  104,000  men — 


12.000  Bernadotte,  to  be  left  between  Thorn   and 

— '• Graudenz. 

30,000 

There  will  remain  74,000  men,  actire  troops,  capable 
•f  being  united  under  the  hand  of  Napoleon. 


the  bulk  of  the  army  had  passed  his  right 
Marshal  Bernadotte,  falling  back  slowly,  had 
come  to  place  himself  in  rear  of  the  left  of 
Ney,  at  Lobau,  then  at  Strasburg,  and  lastly 
in  the  environs  of  Thorn.  Thus  far,  every 
thing  turned  out  according  to  wish.  The 
enemy  had,  with  his  right  column,  followed 
step  by  step  the  movement  of  Marshal  Berna- 
dotte, and  with  the  left  had  scarcely  advanced 
towards  Allenstein.  An  incomprehensible 
inaction  kept  him  for  some  days  in  that  posi- 
tion. General  Benningsen,  full  of  boldness 
when  he  had  to  plan  a  great  manoeuvre  on  the 
Lower  Vistula,  now  hesitated,  when  it  was 
time  to  engage  in  that  daring  manreuvre, 
which  was  far  above  his  faculties  and  those 
of  his  army.  In  order  to  venture  upon  such 
enterprises,  one  needs  the  confidence  derived 
from  the  habit  of  victory,  and  likewise  the  ex- 
perience of  the  sudden  turns  of  fortune  through 
which  one  is  doomed  to  pass  before  one  ar- 
rives at  success.  General  Benningsen,  who 
had  neither  that  confidence  nor  that  experi- 
ence, floated  amidst  a  thousand  uncertainties, 
giving  others  and  himself  the  false  pretexts 
with  which  irresolution  covers  itself,  some- 
times alleging  that  he  was  waiting  for  provi- 
sions and  ammunition — sometimes  affecting 
to  believe,  or  really  believing,  that  the  retro- 
grade movement  of  Bernadotte's  corps  was 
common  to  the  whole  French  army,  and  that 
he  had  obtained  the  desired  result,  since  Na- 
poleon was  preparing  to  leave  the  Vistula, 
For  the  rest,  his  hesitation,  though  ridiculous 
enough  after  the  pompous  announcement  of 
a  vast  offensive  operation,  insured  his  safety; 
for,  the  farther  he  had  ventured  upon  the 
Lower  Vistula,  the  deeper  would  have  been 
the  abyss  into  which  he  would  have  fallen. 
This  very  hesitation,  it  is  true,  if  continued 
for  two  or  three  days  longer,  was  just  as  likely 
to  ruin  him  as  a  more  decisive  movement,  for, 
during  that  interval,  Napoleon  was  continuing 
to  ascend  upon  the  left  flank  of  the  Russian 
army. 

On  the  1st  of  February,  Murat  and  Marshal 
Soult  were  at  Passenheim,  Marshal  Davout 
was  advancing  upon  Ortelsburg,  Augereau 
and  Ney  were  drawing  nearer  by  Hohenstein 
to  the  bulk  of  the  army,  Napoleon  was  with 
the  guard  at  Willenberg.  In  twenty-four  or 
forty-eight  hours  more,  the  French  would  be, 
to  the  number  of  75,000  men,  on  the  left  flank 
of  the  Russians.  Napoleon,  always  careful 
to  guide  his  lieutenants  step  by  step,  had  sent 
a  fresh  despatch  to  Marshal  Bernadolte,  to  ex- 
plain to  him  for  the  last  time  the  part  which 
he  was  to  act  in  this  grand  manoeuvre,  to 
point  out  to  him  the  manner  of  stealing  away 
quickly  from  the  enemy,  and  of  rejoining  the 
army,  which  must  render  the  effect  of  the 
present  combination  more  certain  and  more 
decisive.  This  despatch  had  been  consigned 
to  a  young  officer  recently  attached  to  the 
staff,  who  had  orders  to  carry  it  with  the  ut- 
most expedition  to  the  Lower  Vistula. 

The  troops  continued  marching  on  the  2d 
and  3d  of  February.  In  the  evening  of  the 
3d,  having  got  past  Allenstein,  they  debouched 
before  an  elevated  position,  which  extends 
from  the  Alle  to  the  Passarge,  well  flanked  on 


Feb.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


251 


the  right  and  left  by  those  two  rivers  and  by 
woods.  This  was  the  position  of  Jonkowo. 
Napoleon,  who  had  pushed  forward  on  the  3d 
to  Gettkendorf,  not  far  from  Jonkowo,  hast- 
ened to  the  advanced  guard,  in  order  to  recon- 
noitre the  enemy.  He  found  him  in  greater 
force  than  he  should  have  supposed,  and 
drawn  up  on  the  ground  as  if  he  intended  to ' 
give  battle  there.  Napoleon  immediately 
made  his  dispositions  for  a  general  engage- ! 
ment  on  the  following  day,  if  the  enemy 
should  persist  in  waiting  for  him  at  Jon- 
kowo. 

He  urged  the  arrival  of  Marshals  Augereau 
and  Ney,  who  were  ready  to  join  him.     He 
had  already  at  hand,  at  Gettkendorf,  Marshal 
Soult,  the  guard,  Murat,  and,  at  some  distance 
on  the  right,  Marshal  Davout,  who  quickened 
his  pace  in  order  to  reach  the  banks  of  the 
Alle.     Anxious  to  insure  the  success  of  the 
morrow,  Napoleon  ordered  Marshal  Soult  to 
file  to  the  right,  along  the  course  of  the  Alle, 
to  follow  the  windings  of  that  river,  to  pene- 
trate into  a  re-entering  angle,  which  it  formed 
behind  the  position  of  the  Russians,  and  to 
pass  it  by  main  force  at  the  bridge  of  Berg- 
fried,  whatever  resistance  he    should    meet! 
with.     This  bridge  carried,  we  should  possess  ; 
on  the  rear  of  the  enemy  a  debouche  by  which  , 
we  should  have  it  in  our  power  to  place  him  ! 
in  the  greatest  danger.     Two  of  Marshal  Da-  ! 
vout's  divisions  were  directed  to  this  point,  in 
order  to  render  the  result  infallible. 

On  the  evening  of  that  same  day,  Marshal 
Soult  executed  the  Emperor's  order;  the  vil- ! 
lage  of  Bergfried  was  carried  by  Luval's  divi-  j 
sion,  and  then  the  bridge  over  the  Alle,  lastly  | 
the  heights  beyond.  The  action  was  short,  j 
but  brisk  and  bloody.  The  Russians  lost 
1200  men,  the  French  five  or  six  hundred. 
The  importance  of  the  post  was  worth  such  a 
sacrifice.  In  the  course  of  the  evening,  Mu- 
rat's  cavalry  and  Marshal  Soult's  corps  gave 
each  other  the  hand  along  the  Alle.  We  were 
in  presence  of  the  Russians,  deprived  of  appuy 
towards  their  left,  threatened  even  on  their 
rear,  and  separated  from  us  merely  by  a  small 
brook,  a  tributary  of  the  Alle.  It  was  expect- 
ed that  the  morrow  would  be  an  important 
day,  and  Napoleon  asked  himself  how  it  could 
be  that  the  Russians  were  already  assembled 
in  such  great  number,  and  concentrated  so  op-  j 
portunely  on  that  point.  He  was  puzzled  to 
account  for  this,  since,  according  to  all  calcu- 
lations of  distance  and  time,  they  could  not 
have  been  informed  of  the  movements  of  the 
French  army  soon  enough  to  take  a  determi- 
nation so  prompt,  so  discordant  with  their 
first  plan  of  offensive  march  on  the  Upper 
Vistula.  At  any  rate,  be  the  motive  that  had 
brought  them  together  what  it  might,  they 
were  in  danger  of  losing  a  battle,  and  losing 
it  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  cut  off  from  the 
Pregel,  if  they  waited  only  till  the  morrow. 
On  the  morrow,  in  fact,  our  troops,  full  of  ar- 
dour, advanced  upon  the  position.  They  con- 
ceived for  a  moment  the  hope  that  they  should 
come  at  the  Russians,  but  they  beheld  their 
lines  gradually  move  off  and  vanish.  Pre- 
sently, they  even  perceived  that  they  had  be- 
fore them  nothing  but  advanced  guards,  placed 


as  a  curtain  to  deceive  them.  Napoleon,  at 
this  moment,  would  have  had  reason  to  regret 
not  having  attacked  ihe  Russians  on  the  pre- 
ceding day,  if  on  the  preceding  day  his  army 
had  been  assembled  and  early  in  possession 
of  the  bridge  of  Bergfried.  But  the  concen- 
tration, which  was  complete  on  the  morning 
of  the  4th,  was  not  so  on  the  evening  of  the 
3d ;  he  had  therefore  no  delay  to  reproach 
himself  with.  All  that  he  could  do  was  to 
march,  and  to  penetrate  the  secret  of  the  ene- 
my's resolutions. 

This  secret  he  soon  learned,  for  the  Rus- 
sians, in  their  joy  at  having  miraculously  es- 
caped certain  ruin,  proclaimed  it  themselves 
upon  the  roads.  The  young  officer,  sent  to 
Marshal  Bernadotte,  had  been  taken  by  the 
Cossacks  with  his  despatches,  which  he  had 
not  had  the  presence  of  mind  to  destroy.  Ge- 
neral Benningsen, apprized  by  these  despatches 
forty-eight  hours  earlier  than  he  should  have 
been  by  the  movement  of  the  French  army, 
had  had  time  to  concentrate  himself  in  rear 
of  Allenstein,  and,  on  seeing  Napoleon's  pre- 
parations at  Jonkowo,  he  had  decamped  in  the 
night  between  the  3d  and  4th,  either  deeming 
it  imprudent  to  fight  in  a  position  where  he  ran 
the  risk  of  being  turned,  or  because  it  was  not 
consistent  with  his  views  to  accept  a  decisive 
battle.  Thus  this  enterprising  general,  who 
was  to  take  Warsaw  and  Poland  from  us  by  a 
single  manoeuvre,  was  already  retreating  upon 
Konigsberg.  He  hurried  back  towards  the 
Pregel  by  the  road  to  Arensdorf  and  Eylau, 
parallel  to  the  course  of  the  Alle. 

But  Napoleon,  whom  Fortune,  twice  incon- 
stant in  so  short  a  time,  had  deprived  of  the 
fruit  of  the  most  admirable  combinations,  was 
not  best  pleased  with  having  left  his  canton- 
ments for  nothing,  and  with  not  having  an 
opportunity  to  pay  those  who  had  disturbed  his 
rest  for  their  rash  enterprise.  The  frost,  though 
not  very  intense,  was  nevertheless  sharp  enough 
to  make  the  roads  firm  without  rendering  the 
temperature  insupportable.  He  determined, 
therefore,  to  put  the  speed  of  his  soldiers  again 
to  the  test,  and  to  endeavour  still  to  turn  the 
flank  of  the  Russians,  for  the  purpose  of  giv- 
ing them  battle  in  a  well-chosen  position,  and 
such  a  battle  as  should  put  an  end  to  the  war. 

He  took,  in  the  utmost  haste,  the  way  to 
Arensdorf,  marching  at  the  centre  and  on  the 
principal  road,  with  Murat,  Marshal  Soult, 
Marshal  Augereau,  and  the  guard,  having  Mar- 
shal Davout's  corps  on  his  right  toward  the 
Alle,  Marshal  Ney's  corps  on  his  left  toward 
the  Passarge.  Judging  with  wonderful  saga- 
city that  the  Russians,  though  opportunely 
rallied  through  a  caprice  of  Fortune,  had  been 
taken  too  much  unawares  not  to  have  left  de- 
tachments in  rear,  he  sent  off  Marshal  Ney  a 
little  to  the  left  toward  the  Passarge,  and  or- 
dered him  to  break  down  the  bridge  of  Deppen, 
predicting  that  he  should  there  make  some 
good  prize  if  he  could  intercept  the  routes 
leading  from  the  Passarge  to  the  Alle.  Lastly, 
he  enjoined  Marshal  Bernadotte  to  leave  th« 
banks  of  the  Vistula  immediately,  and,  since 
there  was  now  no  enemy  to  trick,  to  rejoin  tha 
grand  army  as  speedily  as  possible. 

The  troops  advanced,  following  the  ord«» 


252 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Feb.  1807. 


indicated.  On  this  same  day,  the  4th  of  Feb- 
ruary, the  Russians  halted  for  a  moment  at 
Wolfsdorf,  at  an  equal  distance  from  the  Alle 
and  the  Passarge,  to  take  some  rest,  and  to  see 
whether  the  Prussian  corps  of  General  Les- 
tocq,  which  was  behind,  would  find  means  to 
rejoin  them.  But  that  corps  was  still  so  far 
off  that  they  could  not  wait  for  it,  and,  pressed 
by  the  French,  they  continued  their  march, 
abandoning  Gnttstadt,the  resources  which  they 
had  collected  there,  the  wounded,  the  sick,  and 
500  men,  who  were  made  prisoners. 

Though  the  magazines  of  Guttstadt  were  not 
very  considerable,  they  were  valuable  to  the 
French,  who,  outstripping  their  convoys,  had 
no  means  of  subsistence  but  what  they  pro- 
cured for  themselves  by  the  way. 

Next  day,  the  5th  of  February,  they  conti- 
nued to  march  in  the  same  order,  the  French 
having  their  right  to  the  Alle,  the  Russians 
their  left,  each  striving  to  surpass  the  other  in 
speed.  During  this  time,  Ney,  having  advanced 
by  the  bridge  of  Deppen  beyond  the  Passarge, 
in  order  to  cut  off  the  retreat  of  such  of  the 
enemy's  troops  as  were  belated,  actually  fell 
in  with  the  Prussians  on  the  Liebstadt  road. 
General  Lestocq,  having  no  hope  of  opening 
a  passage  for  himself  through  Ney's  corps, 
made  up  his  mind  to  a  sacrifice  which  had  be- 
come necessary.  He  presented  to  the  French 
a  strong  rear-guard  of  three  or  four  thousand 
men,  and,  leaving  it  to  their  attack,  he  sought 
to  steal  away  by  descending  the  course  of  the 
Passarge,  with  the  intention  of  crossing  it 
lower  down.  This  calculation,  which  is  fre- 
quently one  of  the  most  cruel  necessities  of 
war,  saved  seven  or  eight  thousand  Prussians 
by  the  sacrifice  of  three  or  four  thousand.  Ney 
rushed  upon  those*  who  were  opposed  to  him 
at  Waltersdorf,  cut  part  of  them  in  pieces  and 
took  the  rest  At  the  conclusion  of  the  fight 
he  had  2500  prisoners.  The  ground  was  co- 
vered with  1000  dead  and  wonnde  d,  a  nume- 
rous artillery,  and  an  immense  quantity  of 
baggage.  Napoleon,  who  attached  more  value 
to  beating  the  Russians  by  the  wh'ole  of  his 
collected  forces  than  to  picking  up  prisoners 
on  the  roads,  recommended  to  Marshal  Ney 
not  to  persevere  too  much  in  the  pursuit  of 
General  Lestocq,  and  not  to  separate  himself 
from  the  grand  army.  In  consequence  of  these 
instructions,  Ney  relinquished  the  pursuit  of 
the  Prussians,  striving,  however,  not  to  lose 
sight  of  them,  in  order  to  prevent  their  junc- 
tion with  the  Russians. 

On  the  6th  of  February,  the  Russians,  hasten- 
ing their  march,  reached  Landsberg,  inces- 
santly harassed  by  the  French,  and  abandon- 
ing the  little  town  of  Heilsburg  on  the  Alle, 
where  they  had  more  magazines,  sick,  and  lag- 
gards. Their  rear-guard  having  endeavoured 
to  maintain  its  ground  there,  Marshal  Davont 
caused  it  to  be  briskly  pushed,  and,  as  he  ad- 
vanced, occupying  both  banks  of  the  Alle,  F ri- 
ant's  division  encountered  this  advanced  guard, 
which  was  running  off  on  the  right  bank,  dis- 
persed it,  and  killed  and  took  some  hundred 
men. 

The  Russians  purposed  to  stop  for  the  night 
oetween  the  6th  and  7th  at  Landsberg.  In  con- 
sequence, they  covered  'hemselves  by  a  large 


detachment  placed  at  Hoff.  In  the  midst  of  a 
diversified  country,  a  strong  mass  of  infantry 
having  a  village  on  its  right,  woods  on  its  left 
protected,  moreover,  by  a  numerous  cavalry 
barred  the  way.  Murat,  coming  up  first 
pushed  his  hussars  and  his  chasseurs,  after- 
wards his  dragoons,  on  the  cavalry  of  the 
Russians,  upset  it,  but  could  not  make  an  im- 
pression upon  their  solid  infantry.  General 
d'Hautpoul's  cuirassiers,  arriving  at  the  mo- 
ment, were  set  on  in  their  turn.  The  first  re- 
giment charged  first,  but  in  vain,  damped  as 
it  was  in  its  ardour  by  a  charge  of  the  enemy's 
cavalry.  Murat,  then  rallying  the  division  of 
cuirassiers,  flung  it  entire  upon  the  Russian 
infantry.  A  shout  of  Vne  CEmpereur  !  issuing 
from  the  ranks,  accompanied  and  excited  the 
movement  of  those  gallant  horse-soldiers. 
They  broke  the  enemy's  line,  and  cut  in 
pieces  a  great  number  of  foot,  trampled  down 
by  the  horses.  At  that  instant,  Legrand's  di- 
vision, belonging  to  Soull's  corps,  made  its 
appearance.  One  of  his  regiments  marched 
to  the  village  on  the  left  and  carried  it.  The 
Russians,  who  attached  great  value  to  this  po- 
sition, which  insured  their  tranquillity  for  the 
night,  made  another  attempt  upon  the  village. 
Surprised  in  the  heat  of  their  conflict  with  the 
French  infantry  by  a  fresh  charge  of  our  cui- 
rassiers, they  were  definitively  overthrown, 
and  beat  a  retreat  after  losing  two  thousand 
men,  sacrificed  in  this  rear-guard  action. 

General  Benningsen,  pursued  in  this  man- 
ner, conceived  that  it  would  not  be  safe  for  him 
to  pass  the  night  in  the  town  of  Landsberg, 
and  retired  upon  Eylau,  which  he  entered  in 
the  daytime  on  the  7th  of  February. 

He  placed  a  numerous  rear-guard  on  a  pla- 
teau called  the  plateau  of  Ziegelhoff,  and  be- 
fore which  you  arrive  on  issuing  from  the 
woods  that  cover  the  road  from  Landsberg  to 
Eylan.  Generals  Bagowont  and  Barklay  de 
Tolly  were  in  position  on  this  plateau,  ready 
to  renew  the  action  of  the  preceding  day. 
General  Benningsen,  fully  sensible  that  he 
was  too  closely  pressed  not  to  be  obliged  to 
fight,  made  it  a  particular  point  to  occupy  this 
plateau,  on  which  the  French  army,  debouch- 
ing from  the  woody  country,  might  be  received 
with  advantage.  He  was  likewise  solicitous 
to  protect  the  arrival  of  his  heavy  artillery, 
which  he  had  ordered  to  make  a  circuit.  From 
all  these  motives  his  resistance  at  this  point 
could  not  fail  to  be  obstinate. 

Murat' s  cavalry,  seconded  by  Marshal  Soult's 
infantry,  debouched  from  the  woods  with  its 
usual  boldness,  and  advanced  towards  the 
plateau  of  Ziegelhoff.  Levasseur*s  brigade, 
composed  of  the  46th  and  28th  regiments  of 
the  line,  followed  it  resolutely,  while  Vivies's 
brigade,  filing  off  to  the  right,  tried  to  turn  the 
position  by  crossing  the  frozen  lakes.  Levas- 
sear's  brigade,  urged  by  the  fire  of  a  nume- 
rous artillery,  to  hasten  the  attack,  qnickened 
its  pace.  "  A  first  line  of  the  enemy's  infantry 
was  first  repulsed  with  the  bayonet.  But  the 
Russian  cavalry,  charging  opportunely  on  the 
left  of  the  brigade,  overturned  the  28th  before 
it  had  time  to  form  in  square.  It  cut  down 
many  of  our  foot,  and  took  an  eagle. 

The  combat,  being  soon  renewed,  was  kept 


Feb.  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


253 


np  on  both  sides  with  great  obstinacy.  Mean- 
while, Vivws's  brigade  having  turned  the  posi- 
tion of  the  Russians,  the  latter  left  it  and  re- 
tired to  the  town  of  Eylau  itself.  Marshal 
Soult  forced  his  way  into  it  at  the  same  time 
with  them.  Napoleon  was  unwilling  that  the 
town  of  Eylau  should  be  left  in  their  posses- 
sion, in  the  uncertain  but  probable  case  of  a 
great  battle.  The  French,  therefore,  entered 
Eylau  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  The  Rus- 
sians there  defended  themselves  obstinately 
from  street  to  street.  The  town  was  turned, 
and  one  of  their  columns  was  found  esta- 
blished in  a  church-yard,  which  has  since  be- 
come famous  for  the  terrible  recollections  at- 
tached to  it,  and  which  was  situated  outside 
the  town  on  the  right  Vivies's  brigade  carried 
this  cemetery  after  the  severest  struggle. 
The  Russians  fell  back  beyond  Eylau.  Of  all 
rear-guard  actions,  this  had  been  the  most 
sanguinary,  and  it  had  caused  Marshal  Soult's 
corps  considerable  loss.  The  French  threw 
themselves  in  some  disorder  into  the  town  of 
Eylau,  the  soldiers  dispersing  in  quest  of  pro- 
visions, and  surprising  in  the  houses  a  great 
number  of  Russians,  who  had  not  had  time  to 
escape. 

The  first  opinion  conceived  by  Murat,  and 
which  he  transmitted  to  Napoleon,  was  that 
the  Russians,  having  lost  the  point  cTappui  of 
Eylau.  would  go  and  seek  a  more  distant  one. 
Meanwhile,  some  officers,  who  had  lost  them- 
selves in  the  fray,  perceived  the  Russians  es- 
tablished a  little  beyond  Eylau  and  lighting 
their  bivouac  fires,  in  order  to  pass  the  night 
there.  This  observation,  confirmed  by  fresh 
reports,  left  no  doubt  respecting  the  importance 
of  the  fight  reserved  for  the  following  day,  the 
8th  of  February,  and  such  indeed  is  that 
which  it  has  acquired,  that  the  memory  of  it 
must  endure  for  ages. 

It  became  evident  that  the  Russians,  halting 
this  time  after  the  action  in  the  evening,  and 
not  employing  the  night  in  marching,  were  re- 
solved on  fighting  a  general  battle  on  the  mor- 
row. The  French  army  was  harassed  with 
fatigue,  greatly  reduced  in  number  by  rapid 
marches,  pinched  by  hunger,  and  suffering 
from  cold.  But  it  was  necessary  for  them  to 
give  battle,  and  it  was  not  on  such  an  occasion 
that  soldiers,  officers,  generals,  were  accus- 
tomed to  feel  their  hardships. 

Napoleon,  losing  no  time,  despatched  the 
same  evening  several  officers  to  Marshals  Da- 
vout  and  Ney,  to  bring  them  back,  the  one  to 
his  right,  the  other  to  his  left.  Marshal  Davont 
had  continued  to  follow  the  Alle  to  Bartenstein, 
and  he  was  not  more  than  three  or  four  leagues 
ofl.  He  replied  that  he  should  arrive  at  day- 
break upon  the  right  of  Eylau,  (the  right  of 
the  French  army,)  ready  to  fall  upon  the  flank 
of  the  Russians.  Marshal  Ney,  who  had  been 
directed  upon  the  left,  so  as  to  keep  the  Prus- 
sians at  a  distance,  and  to  be  able  to  rush  upon 
Kdnigsberg,  in  case  the  Russians  should  throw 
themselves  behind  the  Pregel — Marshal  Ney 
was  inarching  for  Kreutzburg.  Messengers 
were  despatched  after  him,  though  it  was  not 
so  sure  that  he  could  be  brought  back  in  time 
to  the  field  of  battle,  as  it  was  that  Marshal 
Davout  would  make  bis  appearance  there. 


Deprived  of  Ney's  corps,  the  French  army 
amounted  at  most  to  fifty  and  some  thousand 
men,  though  the  Russians  raise  the  number  to 
80,000  in  their  relations,  and  a  French  histo- 
rian, in  general  worthy  of  credit,  to  68,000.' 
The  corps  of  Marshal  Davout,  whose  effective 
presented  26,000  men  at  Auerstadt,  considera- 
bly diminished  by  the  battles  fought  since,  by 
disease,  by  the  last  march  from  the  Vistula  to 
Eylau,  by  the  detachments  left  on  the  Narew, 
was  about  15,000  strong.  The  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Soult,  the  most  numerous  of  the  whole 
army,  likewise  greatly  reduced  by  dysentery, 
marching,  rear-guard  actions.could  not  be  com- 
puted at  more  than  sixteen  or  seventeen  thou- 
sand men.  That  of  Marshal  Augereau,  weak- 
ened by  a  great  number  of  stragglers  and 
marauders,  who  had  dispersed  in  search  of 
provisions,  numbered  only  six  or  seven  thou- 
sand at  the  bivouac  of  Eylau,  in  the  evening 
of  the  7th  of  February.  The  guard,  better 
treated,  more  restrained  by  discipline,  had  not 
left  any  laggards  behind.  Still  it  amounted  to 
no  more  than  6000  men.  Lastly,  Mural's  ca- 
valry, composed  of  one  division  of  cuirassiers 
and  three  divisions  of  dragoons,  presented 
scarcely  10,000  men  in  the  ranks.  It  formed, 
therefore,  a  total  force  of  fifty-three  or  fifty-four 
thousand  men,  capable  of  any  thing,  it  is  true, 
but  worn  down  with  fatigue  and  exhausted  by 
hunger.  If  Marshal  Ney  were  to  arrive  in 
time,  it  would  be  possible  to  oppose  63,000 
men  to  the  enemy,  all  present  under  fire.  No 
expectation  could  be  entertained  of  the  arri- 
val of  Bernadotte's  corps,  which  was  thirty 
leagues  off. 

Napoleon,  who  slept  that  night  but  three  or 
four  hours  in  a  chair  in  the  house  of  the  post- 
master, placed  the  corps  of  Marshal  Soult  at 
Eylau  itself,  partly  within  the  town,  partly  on 
the  right  and  left  of  it,  Augereau's  corps  and  the 
imperial  guard  a  little  in  rear,  and  all  the  ca- 
valry upon  the  wings,  till  daylight  should  en- 
i  able  him  to  make  his  dispositions. 

General  Benningsen  had  at  last  determined 
to  give  battle.  He  was  on  level  ground,  or 
nearly  so,  excellent  ground  for  his  infantry,  not 
much  versed  in  manoeuvres,  but  solid,  and  for 
his  cavalry,  which  was  numerous.  His  heavy 
artillery,  which  he  had  directed  to  make  a  cir- 
cuit, that  it  might  not  cramp  his  movements, 
had  just  rejoined  him.  It  was  a  valuable  re- 
inforcement. Besides,  he  was  so  closely  pur- 
sued, that  he  was  obliged  to  interrupt  his  march 
in  order  to  make  head  against  the  French.  A 
retreating  army  must  have  some  start,  that  it 
may  be  able  to  sleep  and  eat  It  ought  also 
not  to  have  the  enemy  too  close  to  it;  for,  to 
suffer  an  attack  by  the  way,  with  the  back 
turned,  is  the  most  dangerous  manner  of  re- 
ceiving battle.  There  is  then  a  moment  when 
the  wisest  thing  that  can  be  done  is  to  choose 
one's  ground,  and  there  halt  to  fight  Such 
was  the  resolution  adopted  by  General  Ben- 
ningsen  on  the  evening  of  the  7th.  He  halted 
beyond  Eylau,  determined  to  fight  desperately. 
His  army,  amounting  to  seventy-eight  or  eighty 

>  We  should  not  venture,  in  the  teeth  of  the  falw  •*- 
«*-rl:oii»  of  historian*,  foreign  and  French,  to  advance 
f ucb  a  truth,  if  it  were  not  based  01.  the  most 
document*. 

y 


23-1 


HISTOKY    OF    THE 


(Feb.  1807 


thousand  men,  and  to  ninety  thousand  with  the 
Prussians,  had  sustained  considerable  losses 
in  the  late  battles,  but  scarcely  any  in  marches, 
for  an  army  in  retreat,  without  being  in  disor- 
der, is  rallied  by  the  enemy  that  pursues  it, 
whereas  the  pursuing  army,  not  having  the 
same  motives  for  keeping  close  together,  al- 
ways leaves  part  of  its  effective  behind.  De- 
ducting the  losses  sustained  at  Mohrungen, 
Bergfried,  Waltersdorf,  Hoff,  Heilsberg,  and  at 
Eylau  itself,1  one  may  say  that  General  Ben- 
uingsen's  army  was  reduced  to  about  80,000 
men,  72,000  of  whom  were  Russians  and 
8000  Prussians.  Thus,  in  case  General  Les- 
tocq  and  Marshal  Ney  should  not  arrive,  54,000 
French  would  have  to  fight  72,000  Russians. 
The  Russians  had,  moreover,  a  formidable  ar- 
tillery, computed  at  four  or  five  hundred  pieces. 
Ours  amounted  to  two  hundred  at  most,  includ- 
ing the  guard.  It  is  true  that  it  was  superior 
to  all  the  artilleries  of  Europe,  even  to  that  of 
the  Austrians.  General  Benningsen,  therefore, 
determined  to  attack  at  daybreak.  The  cha- 
racter of  his  soldiers  was  energetic,  like  that 
of  the  French  soldiers,  but  governed  by  other 
motives.  The  Russians  had  neither  that  con- 
fidence of  success  nor  that  love  of  glory  which 
the  French  exhibited,  but  a  certain  fanaticism 
of  obedience,  which  induced  them  to  brave 
death  blindly.  As  for  the  quantum  of  intelli- 
gence possessed  by  the  one  and  by  the  other, 
it  is  superfluous  to  make  any  remark  on  the 
difference. 

Since  debouching  upon  Eylau,  the  country 
appeared  level  and  open.  The  little  town  of 
Eylau,  situated  on  a  slight  eminence,  and 
topped  by  a  Gothic  spire,  was  the  only  conspi- 
cuous point.  The  ground  gently  sloping,  on 
the  right  of  the  church,  presented  a  cemetery. 
In  front  it  rose  perceptibly,  and  on  this  rise, 
marked  by  some  hillocks,  appeared  the  Rus- 
sians in  a  deep  mass.  Several  lakes,  full  of 
water  in  spring,  frozen  in  winter,  at  this  time 
covered  with  snow,  were  not  distinguishable 
in  any  way  from  the  rest  of  the  plain.  Scarcely 
did  a  few  barns  united  into  hamlets,  and  lines  of 
barriers  for  folding  cattle,  ft»rm  a  point  dCappui, 
or  an  obstacle  on  this  dreary  field  of  battle. 
A  gray  sky,  dissolving  at  times  into  thick 
snow,  added  its  dreariness  to  that  of  the  coun- 
try, a  dreariness  which  seized  eye  and  heart, 
as  soon  as  daylight,  which  comes  very  late  in 
this  season,  had  rendered  objects  perceptible. 

The  Russians  were  drawn  up  in  two  lines, 
very  near  to  each  other,  their  front  covered  by 
three  hundred  pieces  of  cannon  planted  on  the 
salient  points  of  the  ground.  In  rear,  two 
close  columns,  appuying,  like  two  flying  but- 
tresses, this  double  line  of  battle,  seemed  de- 
signed to  support  it  and  to  prevent  its  bending 
under  the  shock  of  the  French.  A  strong  re- 
serve of  artillery  was  placed  at  some  distance. 
The  cavalry  was  partly  in  rear,  partly  ou  the 
wings.  The  Cossacks,  in  general  scattered, 


»  The  Russians  bad  lost  1500  men  at  Mohrungen 
1000     "    at  Bergfried. 
3000     «    at  Waltersdorf. 
2000     «'    at  Hof. 
1000     «    at  Heilsberg. 
500     «    at  Eylau. 


Total 


9000  men. 


kept  on  this  occasion  with  the  body  of  the 
army.  It  was  evident  that,  to  the  energy  and 
dexterity  of  the  French,  the  Russians  had  de- 
signed to  oppose  on  this  open  ground  a  com- 
pact mass,  defended  in  front  by  a  numerous 
artillery,  strongly  supported  in  rear,  in  short  a 
real  wall,  pouring  forth  a  shower  of  fire.  Na 
poleon,  on  horseback  by  daybreak,  had  sta 
tioned  himself  in  the  cemetery,  to  the  right  of 
Eylau.  There,  scarcely  protected  by  a  few 
trees,  he  had  a  perfect  view  of  the  position  of 
the  Russians,  who,  already  in  battle,  had 
opened  their  fire  by  a  cannonade  which  be- 
came brisker  every  moment.  It  might  be  fore- 
seen that  cannon  would  be  the  weapon  of  that 
terrible  fight. 

Owing  to  the  position  of  Eylau,  which 
stretched  itself  out  facing  the  Russians,  Na- 
poleon could  give  the  less  depth  to  his  line  of 
battle,  and  consequently  the  less  scope  to  the 
balls  of  the  artillery.  Two  of  Marshal  Soult's 
divisions  were  placed  at  Eylau,  Legrand's  di- 
vision in  advance  and  a  little  to  the  left,  Le- 
val's  division,  partly  on  the  left  of  the  town, 
upon  an  eminence  topped  by  a  mill,  partly  on 
the  right,  at  the  cemetery  itself.  The  third 
division  of  Marshal  Soult's,  St.  Hilaire's  di- 
vision, was  established  still  further  to  the 
right,  at  a  considerable  distance  from  the  ceme- 
tery, in  the  village  of  Rothenen,  which  formed 
the  prolongation  of  the  position  of  Eylau.  In 
the  interval  between  the  village  of  Rothenen, 
and  the  town  of  Eylau,  an  interval  left  vacant 
for  the  purpose  of  making  the  rest  of  the  army 
debouch  there,  was  posted  a  little  in  rear,  Au- 
gereau's  corps,  drawn  up  in  two  lines,  and 
formed  of  Desjardins's  and  Heudelet's  divi- 
sions. Augereau,  tormented  with  fever,  his 
eyes  red  and  swollen,  but  forgetting  his  com- 
plaints at  the  sound  of  the  cannon,  had  mount- 
ed his  horse  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  his 
troops.  Further  in  rear  of  that  same  debouche 
came  the  infantry  and  cavalry  of  the  imperial 
guard,  the  divisions  of  cuirassiers  and  dra- 
goons, both  ready  to  present  themselves  to  the 
enemy  by  the  same  outlet,  and  meanwhile 
somewhat  sheltered  from  the  cannon  by  a  hol- 
low of  the  ground.  Lastly,  at  ihe  extreme 
right  of  this  field  of  battle,  beyond  and  in  ad- 
vance of  Rothenen,  at  the  hamlet  of  Serpallen, 
the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout  was  to  enter  into 
action  in  such  a  manner  as  to  fall  upon  the 
flank  of  the  Russians. 

Thus  Napoleon  was  in  open  order,  and  his 
line  having  the  advantage  of  being  covered 
on  the  left  by  the  buildings  of  Eylau,  on  the 
right  by  those  of  Rothenen,  the  combat  of  ar- 
tillery, by  which  he  designed  to  demolish  the 
kind  of  wall  opposed  to  him  by  the  Russians, 
would  be  much  les«  formidable  for  him  than 
for  them.  He  had  caused  all  the  cannon  of 
the  army  to  be  removed  from  the  corps,  and 
placed  in  order  of  battle.  To  these  he  had 
added  the  forty  pieces  belonging  to  the  guard, 
and  he  was  thus  about  to  reply  to  the  formi- 
dable artillery  of  the  Russians  by  an  artillery 
far  inferior  in  number,  but  far  superior  in, 
skill. 

The  Russians  had  commenced  the  firing. 
The  French  had  answered  it  immediately  by  a 
violent  cannonade  at  half  cannon-shot.  The 


Feb.  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


256 


earth  shook  under  this  tremendous  detonation. ' 
The  French  artillerymen,  not  only  more  ex- 1 
pert,  but  firing  at  a  living  mass,  which  served  ' 
them  for  a  butt,  made  dreadful  havoc.  Our 
balls  swept  down  whole  files.  Those  of  the 
Russians,  on  the  contrary,  directed  with  less 
precision,  and  striking  against  buildings,  in- 
flicted loss  mischief  upon  us  than  that  sus- 
tained by  the  enemy.  The  town  of  Eylau  and 
the  village  of  Rothenen  were  soon  set  on  fire. 
The  glare  of  the  conflagration  added  its  hor- 
rors to  the  horrors  of  the  carnage.  Though 
there  fell  far  fewer  French  than  Russians,  still 
there  fell  a  great  many,  especially  in  the  ranks 
of  the  imperial  guard,  motionless  in  the  ceme- 
tery. The  projectiles,  passing  over  the  head 
of  Napoleon,  and  sometimes  very  close  to  him, 
penetrated  the  walls  of  the  church,  or  broke 
bpanches  from  the  trees  at  the  foot  of  which 
he  had  placed  himself  to  direct  the  battle. 

This  cannonade  lasted  for  a  long  time,  and 
both  armies  bore  it  with  heroic  tranquillity, 
never  stirring,  and  merely  closing  their  ranks 
as  fast  as  the  cannon  made  gaps  in  them. 
The  Russians  seemed  first  to  feel  a  sort  of  im- 
patience.1 Desirous  to  accelerate  the  result 
by  the  taking  of  Eylau,  they  moved  off  to  carry 
the  position  of  the  mill,  situated  on  the  left  of 
the  town.  Part  of  their  right  formed  in  column, 
and  came  to  attack  us.  Leval's  division,  com- 
posed of  Ferey's  and  Vivies's  brigades,  gal- 
lantly repulsed  il,  and  by  their  firmness  left 
the  Russians  no  hope  of  success,  if  they  re- 
newed their  efforts. 

As  for  Napoleon,  he  attempted  nothing  de- 
cisive, for  he  would  not  endanger,  by  sending 
it  forward,  the  corps  of  Marshal  Soult,  which 
had  done  so  well  to  keep  Eylau  under  such  a 
tremendous  cannonade;  nor  would  he  risk 
either  St.  Hilaire's  division  or  Augereau's 
corps  against  the  centre  of  the  enemy;  it 
would  have  been  exposing  them  to  dash  them- 
selves against  a  burning  rock.  He  waited  for 
acting  till  the  presence  of  Marshal  Davout's 
corps,  which  was  coming  on  the  right,  should 
begin  to  be  felt  on  the  flank  of  the  Russians. 

This  lieutenant,  punctual  as  he  was  intrepid, 
had  actually  arrived  at  the  village  of  Serpallen. 
Friant's  division  marched  at  the  head.  It  de- 
bouched the  first,  encountered  the  Cossacks, 
whom  it  had  soon  driven  back,  and  occupied 
the  village  of  Serpallen  with  some  companies 
of  light  infantry.  No  sooner  was  it  established 
in  the  village  and  in  the  grounds  on  the  right, 
than  one  of  the  masses  of  cavalry  posted  on 
the  wings  of  the  Russian  army  detached  itself, 
and  advanced  towards  it.  General  Friant, 
availing  himself  with  intelligence  and  coolness 
of  the  advantages  afforded  by  the  accidents  of 
the  locality,  drew  up  the  three  regiments  of 
which  his  division  was  then  composed  behind 
the  long  and  solid  wooden  barrier,  which  served 
for  folding  cattle.  Sheltered  behind  this  natu- 
idl  intrenchment,  he  kept  up  a  fire  within 
point-blank  range  upon  the  Russian  squad- 
rons, and  forced  them  to  retire.  They  fell 
back,  but  soon  returned,  accompanied  by  a 
column  of  nine  or  ten  thousand  infantry.  It 
was  one  of  the  two  close  columns,  which 

«  An  expression  of  Napoleon's,  in  an  account  which 
he  gave  himself  of  the  battle 


served  for  flying  buttresses  to  the  Russian  line 
of  battle,  and  which  now  bore  to  the  left  of 
that  line,  to  retake  Serpallen.  Generel  Friant 
had  not  more  than  5000  men  to  oppose  to  it. 
Still,  sheltered  behind  the  wooden  barrier  with 
which  he  had  covered  himself,  and  able  to  de- 
ploy without  apprehension  of  being  charged 
by  the  cavalry,  he  saluted  the  Russians  with  a 
fire  so  continuous  and  so  well-directed,  as  to 
occasion  them  considerable  loss.  Their  squad- 
rons having  shown  an  intention  to  turn  him, 
he  formed  the  33d  into  square  on  his  right,  and 
stopped  them  by  the  imperturbable  hearing  of 
his  foot-soldiers.  As  he  could  not  make  use 
of  his  cavalry,  which  consisted  of  some  horse 
chasseurs,  he  made  amends  for  it  by  a  swarm 
of  tirailleurs,  who  kept  up  such  a  fire  upon 
the  flanks  of  the  Russians,  as  to  oblige  them 
to  retire  towards  the  heights  in  rear  of  Ser- 
pallen, between  Serpallen  and  Klein-Sausgar- 
ten.  On  retiring  to  these  heights,  ihe  Russians 
covered  themselves  by  a  numerous  artillery, 
the  downward  fire  of  which  was  unfortunately 
very  destructive.  Morand's  division  had  ar- 
rived in  its  turn  on  the  field  of  battle.  Mar- 
shal Davout,  taking  the  first  brigade,  that  of 
General  Ricard,  went  and  placed  it  beyond  and 
on  the  left  of  Serpallen;  he  then  posted  the 
second,  composed  of  the  51st  and  the  61st,  on 
the  right  of  the  villages,  so  as  to  support  either 
Ricard's  brigade  or  Friant's  division.  The 
latter  had  proceeded  to  the  right  of  Serpallen, 
towards  Klein-Sausgarten.  At  this  very  mo- 
ment, Gudin's  division  was  accelerating  its 
speed  to  get  into  line.  Thus  the  Russians  had 
been  obliged  by  the  movement  of  our  right  to 
draw  back  their  left  from  Serpallen  towards 
Klein-Sausgarten. 

The  expected  effect  on  the  flank  of  the  ene- 
my's army  was  therefore  produced.  Napoleon, 
from  the  position  which  he  occupied,  had  dis- 
tinctly seen  the  Russian  reserves  directed 
towards  the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout.  The 
hour  for  acting  had  arrived;  for,  unless  he 
interfered,  the  Russians  might  fall  in  mass 
upon  Marshal  Davout  and  crush  him.  Napo- 
leon immediately  gave  his  orders.  He  directed 
St.  Hilaire's  division,  which  was  at  Rothenen, 
to  push  forward  and  to  give  a  hand  to  Morand's 
division  about  Serpallen.  He  commanded  the 
two  divisions  of  Augereau's  corps,  Desjardins's 
and  Heudelet's,  to  debouch  by' the  interval  be- 
tween Rothenen  and  Eylau,  to  connect  them- 
selves with  St.  Hilaire's  division,  and  to  /orm 
all  together  an  oblique  line  from  the  cemetery 
of  Eylau  to  Serpallen.  The  result  expected 
from  this  movement  was  to  overturn  the  Rus- 
sians, by  throwing  their  right  upon  their  centre, 
and  thus  break  down,  beginning  at  its  extre- 
mity, the  long  wall  which  he  had  before  him. 
It  was  ten  in  the  morning.  General  St.  Hi- 
laire  moved  off,  left  Rothenen,  and  deployed 
obliquely  in  the  plain,  under  a  terrible  fire  of 
artillery,  his  right  at  Serpallen,  his  left  towards 
the  cemetery.  Augereau  moved  nearly  at  the 
same  time,  not  without  a  melancholy  forebod- 
ing of  the  fate  reserved  for  his  corps  d  armtr, 
which  he  saw  exposed  to  the  danger  of  being 
dashed  to  pieces  against  the  centre  of  the  Rus- 
sians, solidly  appuyed  upon  several  hillocks. 
While  General  Corbineau  was  delivering  the 


256 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Feb.  1807 


orders  of  the  Emperor  to  him,  a  ball  pierced 
Ihe  side  of  that  gallant  officer,  the  senior  of  an 
heroic  family.  Marshal  Augereau  marched 
immediately.  The  two  divisions  of  Desjardins 
and  Heudelet  debouched  between  Rothenen  and 
the  cemetery,  in  close  columns,  then,  having 
cleared  the  defile,  formed  in  order  of  battle,  the 
first  brigade  of  each  division  deployed,  the  se- 
cond in  square.  While  they  were  advancing, 
a  squall  of  wind  and  snow,  beating  all  at  once 
into  the  faces  of  the  soldiers,  prevented  them 
from  seeing  the  field  of  battle.  The  two  divi- 
sions, enveloped  in  this  kind  of  cloud,  mistook 
their  direction,  and  bore  a  little  to  the  left, 
leaving  on  their  right  a  considerable  space 
between  them  and  St.  Hilaire's  division.  The 
Russians,  but  little  incommoded  by  the  snow, 
which  they  had  at  their  backs,  seeing  Auge- 
reau's  two  divisions  advancing  towards  the 
hillocks  on  which  they  appuyed  their  centre, 
suddenly  unmasked  a  battery  of  seventy-two 
pieces,  which  they  kept  in  reserve.  So  thick 
was  the  grape  poured  forth  by  this  formidable 
battery,  that  in  a  quarter  of  an  hour  half  of 
Augereau's  corps  was  swept  down.  General 
Desjardins,  commanding  the  first  division,  was 
killed;  General  Heudelet, commanding  the  se- 
cond, received  a  wound  that  was  nearly  mortal. 
The  staff  of  the  two  divisions  was  soon  hors  de 
combat.  While  they  were  sustaining  this  tre- 
mendous fire,  being  obliged  to  re-form  while 
marching,  so  much  were  their  ranks  thinned, 
the  Russian  cavalry,  throwing  itself  into  the 
space  which  separated  them  from  Morand's 
division,  rushed  upon  them  en  masse.  Those 
brave  divisions,  however,  resisted,  but  they 
were  obliged  to  fall  back  towards  the  cemetery 
of  Eylau,  giving  ground  without  breaking,  un- 
der the  repeated  assaults  of  numerous  squad- 
rons. The  snow  having  suddenly  ceased,  they 
could  then  perceive  the  melancholy  spectacle. 
Out  of  six  or  seven  thousand  combatants, 
about  four  thousand  killed  or  wounded  strewed 
the  ground.  Augereau,  wounded  himself,  but 
more  affected  by  the  disaster,  of  his  corps  rf'ar- 
mee  than  by  his  personal  danger,  was  carried 
into  the  cemetery  of  Eylau  to  the  feet  of  Na- 
poleon, to  whom  he  complained,  not  without 
bitterness,  of  not  having  been  timely  succoured. 
Silent  grief  pervaded  every  face  in  the  impe- 
rial staff.  Napoleon,  calm  and  firm,  imposing 
on  others  the  impassibility  which  he  imposed 
on  himself,  addressed  a  few  soothing  words  to 
Augereau,  then  sent  him  to  the  rear,  and  took 
his  measures  for  repairing  the  mischief.  De- 
spatching, in  the  first  place,  the  chasseurs  of 
his  guard  and  some  squadrons  of  dragoons 
which  were  at  hand,  to  drive  back  the  ene- 
my's cavalry,  he  sent  for  Murat,  and  ordered 
him  to  make  a  decisive  effort  on  the  line  of 
infantry  which  formed  the  centre  of  the  Rus- 
sian army,  and  which,  taking  advantage  of 
Augereau's  disaster,  began  to  press  forward. 
At  the  first  summons,  Murat  came  up  at  a  gal- 
lop. "  Well,"  said  Napoleon,  "  are  you  going 
to  let  those  fellows  eat  us  up?"  He  then  ordered 
that  heroic  chief  of  his  cavalry  to  collect  the 
chasseurs,  the  dragoons,  the  cuirassiers,  and  to 
fall  upon  the  Russians  with  eighty  squadrons, 
to  try  what  effect  the  shock  of  such  a  mass  of 
horse,  charging  furiously,  would  have  on  an 


infantry  reputed  not  to  be  shaken.  The  ca- 
valry of  the  guard  was  brought  forward,  ready 
to  add  its  shock  to  the  cavalry  of  the  army. 
The  moment  was  critical,  for,  if  the  Russian 
infantry  were  not  stopped,  it  would  go  and  at- 
tack the  cemetery,  the  centre  of  the  position, 
and  Napoleon  had  only  six  foot  battalions  of 
the  imperial  guard  to  defend  it. 

Murat  galloped  off,  collected  his  squadrons, 
made  them  pass  between  the  cemetery  and 
Rothenen,  through  the  same  debonche  by 
which  Augereau's  corps  had  already  marched 
to  almost  certain  destruction.  General  Grou- 
chy's  dragoons  charged  first,  to  sweep  the 
ground,  and  clear  it  of  the  enemy's  cavalry. 
That  brave  officer,  whose  horse  fell  with  him, 
put  himself,  on  rising,  at  the  head  of  a  second 
brigade,  and  effected  his  purpose  of  dispersing 
the  groups  of  cavalry  which  preceded  the  Rus- 
sian infantry.  But,  for  overturning  the  latter, 
nothing  short  of  the  heavy  iron-clad  squadrons 
of  General  d'Hautpoul  was  required.  That  of- 
ficer, who  distinguished  himself  by  consum- 
mate skill  in  the  art  of  managing  a  nume- 
rous cavalry,  came  forward  with  twenty-four 
squadrons  of  cuirassiers,  followed  by  the  whole 
1  mass  of  dragoons.  These  cuirassiers,  ranged 
in  several  lines,  started  off  and  threw  them- 
selves upon  the  Russian  bayonets.  The  first 
lines,  stopped  by  the  fire,  could  not  penetrate, 
and  falling  back  to  right  and  left,  went  to  form 
afresh  behind  those  who  followed  them,  in  or- 
der to  charge  anew.  At  length,  one  of  them, 
rushing  on  with  more  violence,  broke  the  ene- 
my's infantry  at  one  point,  and  opened  a 
breach,  through,  which  cuirassiers  and  dra- 
goons strove  which  should  penetrate  first.  As 
a  river,  which  has  begun  to  break  down  a  dike, 
soon  carries  it  away  entirely,  so  the  masses  of 
the  squadrons,  having  once  penetrated  the  in- 
fantry of  the  Russians,  finished  in  a  few  mo- 
ments the  overthrow  of  their  first  line.  Our 
horse  then  dispersed  to  slaughter.  A  horri- 
ble fray  ensued  between  them  and  the  Russian 
foot  soldiers.  They  went,  and  came,  and 
struck  on  all  sides  those  obstinate  antagonists. 
While  the  first  line  of  infantry  was  thus  over- 
turned and  cut  in  pieces,  the  second  fell  back 
to  a  wood  that  bounded  the  field  of  battle.  A 
last  reserve  of  artillery  had  been  left  there. 
The  Russians  placed  it  in  battery  and  fired  con- 
fusedly at  their  own  soldiers  and  at  ours,  not 
caring  whether  they  slaughtered  friends  or 
foes,  if  they  only  got  rid  of  our  formidable 
"horse.  General  d'Hautpoul  was  mortally 
wounded  by  a  rifle  ball.  While  our  caval- 
ry was  thus  engaged  with  the  second  line  of 
the  Russian  infantry,  some  parties  of  the  first 
rallied  and  renewed  their  fire.  At  this  sight, 
the  horse  grenadiers  of  the  guard,  headed 
by  General  Lepic,  one  of  the  heroes  of  the 
army,  came  forward  in  their  turn  to  second 
Murat's  efforts.  Dashing  off  at  a  gallop,  they 
charged  the  groups  of  infantry  which  they 
perceived  to  be  still  on  their  legs,  and  crossing 
the  ground  in  all  directions,  completed  the 
destruction  of  the  centre  of  the  Russian  army, 
the  wrecks  of  which  at  last  fled  for  refuge  to 
the  patches  of  wood  which  had  served  them 
for  an  asylum. 

During  this  scene  of  confusion,  a  fragment 


Feb.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


257 


of  that  vast  line  of  infantry  had  advanced  to  . 
that  same  cemetery.  Three  or  four  thousand 
Russian  grenadiers  marching  straight  forward 
with  the  blind  courage  of  braver  and  more  in- 
telligent troops,  came  to  throw  themselves  on 
the  church  of  Eylau,  and  threatened  the  ceme- 
wry  occupied  by  the  imperial  staff.  The  foot 
guard,  motionless  till  then,  had  endured  the 
cannonade  without  firing  a  piece.  With  joy 
it  beheld  an  occasion  for  fighting  arrive.  A 
battalion  was  called  for:  two  disputed  the 
honour  of  marching.  The  first  in  order,  led 
by  General  Dorsenne,  obtained  the  advantage 
of  measuring  its  strength  with  the  Russian 
grenadiers,  went  up  to  them  without  firing  a 
shot,  attacked  them  with  the  bayonet,  and 
threw  one  upon  another,  while  Mural  de- 
spatched against  them  two  battalions  of  chas- 
seurs under  General  Bruyere.  The  unfortu- 
nate Russian  grenadiers,  hemmed  in  between 
the  bayonets  of  the  grenadiers  of  the  guard 
and  the  swords  of  our  chasseurs,  were  almost 
all  taken  or  killed,  before  the  face  of  Napoleon, 
and  only  a  few  paces  from  him. 

This  cavalry  action,  the  most  extraordinary 
perhaps,  of  any  in  our  great  wars,  had  for 
its  result  to  overthrow  the  centre  of  the  Rus- 
sians, and  to  drive  it  back  to  a  considerable 
distance.  It  would  have  been  requisite  to 
have  at  hand  a  reserve  of  infanlry,  in  order  to 
complete  the  defeat  of  troops  which,  aAer 
being  laid  on  the  ground,  rose  again  to  fire. 
But  Napoleon  durst  not  venture  to  dispose  of 
Marshal  Sonlt's  corps,  reduced  to  half  of  its 
effective,  and  necessary  for  keeping  Eylau. 
Augereau's  corps  was  almost  destroyed.  The 
six  battalions  of  the  foot  guard  were  alone  left 
for  reserve,  and  amidst  the  so  various  chances 
of  that  day,  still  far  from  its  close,  it  was  a  re- 
source which  it  behoved  Napoleon  to  preserve 
with  the  utmost  care.  On  the  left,  Marshal  Ney, 
march' r^  for  several  days  side  by  side  with 
the  ?'UJ?ians,  might  reach  the  field  of  battle 
befo>-*  /hem  or  they  before  him,  and  eight 
it  *en  -.ho u sand  men,  arriving  unexpectedly, 
might  bring  to  one  of  the  two  armies  a  rein- 
forcement which  would  perhaps  be  decisive. 
On  the  right,  Marshal  Davout  was  engaged  in 
an  obstinate  combat  with  the  left  of  the  Rus- 
sians, the  result  of  which  was  as  yet  unknown. 

Napoleon,  motionless  in  the  cemetery,  in 
which  were  heaped  the  bodies  of  a  great  num- 
ber of  his  officers,  graver  than  usual,  but  com- 
manding his  countenance  as  well  as  his  soul, 
having  his  guard  behind  him,  and  before  him 
the  chasseurs,  the  dragoons,  the  cuirassiers, 
formed  and  ready  to  devote  themselves  afresh 
— Napoleon  awaited  the  event  ffefore  taking  a 
definitive  determination.  Never  had  he  or  his 
soldiers  been  engaged  in  so  holly-contested  a 
fight. 

But  the  time  for  defeat  had  not  yet  arrived, 
and  Fortune,  frowning  for  a  moment  on  that 
extraordinary  man,  still  treated  him  as  a  fa- 
vourite. At  that  juncture,  General  St.  Hilaire 
with  his  division,  Marshal  Davout  with  his 
corps,  justified  the  confidence  which  Napoleon 
had  placed  in  them.  St.  Hilaire's  division,  re- 
ceived, like  Augereau's  corps  and  at  the  same 
moment,  with  a  murderous  fire  of  grape  and 
musketry,  had  suffered  cruelly.  Blinded  also 

VOL.  II.— 33 


by  the  snow,  it  had  not  perceived  a  mass  of 
cavalry  hurrying  towards  it  at  a  gallop,  and  a 
battalion  of  the  10th  light  had  been  overturned 
under  the  horses'  heels.  Morand's  division, 
the  extreme  left  of  Davout,  uncovered  from  the 
accident  which  had  befallen  the  10th  light,  had 
been  obliged  to  fall  back  two  or  three  hundred 
paces.  But  Davout  and  Morand  had  soon 
moved  it  forward  again.  During  this  interval, 
General  Friant  was  maintaining  an  heroic 
struggle  at  Klein-Sausgarten,  and,  seconded 
by  Gudin's  division,  it  definitively  occupied 
that  advanced  position  on  the  flank  of  the 
Russians.  He  had  even  pushed  detachments 
to  the  village  of  Kuschitten,  situated  on  their 
rear.  It  was  the  moment  when.it  being  near- 
ly dark,  and  the  Russian  army  almost  half 
destroyed,  it  seemed  that  the  battle  must  ter- 
minate in  our  favour. 

But  the  event,  which  Napoleon  dreaded,  had 
occurred.  General  Lestocq,  perseveringly  pur- 
sued by  Marshal  Ney,  appeared  on  that  field 
of  carnage,  with  seven  or  eight  thousand 
Prussians,  eager  to  revenge  themselves  for 
the  disdain  of  the  Russians.  General  Lestocq, 
only  an  hour  or  two  ahead  of  Marshal  Ney's 
corps,  had  merely  time  to  strike  one  blow  be- 
fore he  was  struck  himself.  He  debouched 
upon  the  field  of  battle  at  Schmoditten,  passed 
behind  the  double  line  of  the  Russians,  now 
broken  by  the  fire  of  our  artillery,  by  the 
swords  of  our  horse,  and  presented  himself  at 
Kuschitten,  in  front  of  Friant's  division,  which, 
passing  beyond  Klein-Sausgarten,  had  already 
driven  back  the  left  of  the  enemy  upon  its 
centre.  The  village  of  Kuschitten  was  occu- 
pied by  four  companies  of  the  108th,  and  by 
the  51st,  which  had  been  detached  from  Mo- 
rand's  division  to  go  to  the  support  of  Friant's 
division.  The  Prussians,  rallying  the  Rus- 
sians around  them,  rushed  impetuously  on  the 
51st,  and  on  the  four  companies  of  the  108th, 
without  being  able  to  break  them,  though  they 
obliged  them  to  fall  back  to  a  considerable 
distance,  in  rear  of  Kuschitten.  The  Prus- 
sians, after  this  first  advantage,  pushed  on 
beyond  Kuschitten,  in  order  to  recover  the 
positions  of  the  morning.  They  marched,  de- 
ployed in  two  lines.  The  Russian  reserves, 
being  rallied,  formed  two  close  columns  on 
their  wings.  A  numerous  artillery  preceded 
them.  In  this  manner  they  advanced  across 
the  rear  of  the  field  of  battle,  to  regain  the  lost 
ground,  and  to  beat  back  Marshal  Davout  up- 
on Klein-Sausgarten,  and  from  Klein-Sausgar- 
ten to  Serpallen.  But  Generals  Friant  and 
Gudin,  having  Marshal  Davout  at  their  head, 
hastened  up.  Friant's  entire  division,  and 
the  12th,  21st  and  25th  regiments,  belonging 
to  Gudiu's  division,  placed  themselves  fore- 
most, covered  by  the  whole  of  -the  artillery  of 
the  third  corps.  To  no  purpose  did  the  Rus- 
sians and  Prussians  exert  themselves  to  over- 
come that  formidable  obstacle :  they  were 
!  unsuccessful.  The  French,  appuyed  on  woods, 
marshes  and  hillocks,  here  deployed  in  line, 
there  dispersed  as  tirailleurs,  opposed  an  in- 
vincible obstinacy  to  this  last  effort  of  the 
allies.  Marshal  Davout,  passing  through  the 
ranks  till  dark,  kept  up  the  firmness  of  his 
soldiers,  saving,  "  Cowards  will  be  sent  to  die 


258 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1807. 


in  Siberia;  the  brave  will  die  here  like  men 
of  honour."  The  Prussians  and  the  rallied 
Russians  desisted  from  the  attack.  Marshal 
Davout  remained  firm  in  that  position  of 
Klein-Sausgarten,  where  he  threatened  the 
rear  of  the  enemy. 

The  two  armies  were  exhausted.  That  day, 
so  sombre,  was  every  moment  becoming  more 
sombre  still,  and  about  to  terminate  in  a  tre- 
mendous night.  More  than  30,000  Russians, 
struck  by  the  balls  and  the  swords  of  the 
French,  strewed  the  ground,  some  dead,  others 
wounded  more  or  less  severely.  Many  of  the 
soldiers  began  to  abandon  their  colours.1 
General  Benningsen,  surrounded  by  his  lieu- 
tenants, were  deliberating  whether  to  resume 
the  offensive,  and  try  the  effect  of  one  more 
effort.  But,  out  of  an  army  of  80,000  men, 
not  more  than  40,000  were  left  in  a  state  to 
fight,  the  Prussians  included.  If  he  were 
worsted  in  this  desperate  engagement,  he 
would  not  have  wherewithal  to  cover  his  re- 
treat. However,  he  was  still  hesitating,  when 
intelligence  was  brought  him  of  a  last  and 
important  incident.  Marshal  Ney,  who  had 
closely  followed  the  Prussians,  arriving  in 
the  evening  on  our  left,  as  Marshal  Davout 
had  arrived  in  the  morning  on  our  right,  de- 
bouched at  length  near  Althof. 

Thus  Napoleon's  combinations,  retarded  by 
time,  had,  nevertheless,  brought  upon  the  two 
flanks  of  the  Russian  army  the  forces  that 
were  to  decide  the  victory.  The  order  for 
retreat  could  no  longer  be  deferred ;  for  Mar- 
shal Davout,  having  maintained  himself  at 
Klein-Sausgarten,  would  not  have  much  to  do 
to  meet  Marshal  Ney,  who  had  advanced  to 
Schmoditten;  and  the  junction  of  these  two 
marshals  would  have  exposed  the  Russians  to 
the  risk  of  being  enveloped.  The  order  for 
retreating  was  instantly  given  by  General 
Benningsen ;  but,  to  insure  the  retreat,  he 
purposed  to  curb  Marshal  Ney,  by  attempting 
to  lake  from  him  the  village  of  Schmoditten. 
The  Russians  marched  upon  that  village,  un- 
der favour  of  the  night,  and  in  profound  si- 
lence, in  hopes  of  surprising  the  troops  of 
Marshal  Ney,  which  had  arrived  late  on  the 
field  of  battle,  when  it  was  difficult  to  recog- 
nise one  another.  But  the  latter  were  on  their 
guard.  General  Marchand,  with  the  6th  light 
and  the  39th  of  the  line,  allowing  the  Russians 
to  approach,  then  receiving  them  with  a  point- 
blank  fire,  stopped  them  short.  He  then 
rushed  upon  them  with  the  bayonet,  and 
obliged  them  to  renounce  all  serious  attack. 
From  that  moment  they  definitively  com- 
menced their  retreat. 

Napoleon,  discerning  the  real  state  of  things 
by  the  direction  of  Marshal  Davout's  and  Mar- 
shal Ney's  fires,  knew  that  he  was  master  of 
the  field  of  battle;  nevertheless,  he  was  not 
sure  that  he  should  not  have  a  second  battle 
to  fight,  either  that  night  or  on  the  morrow. 
He  occupied  that  slightly  rising  plain  beyond 
Eylati,  having  his  cavalry  and  his  guard  be- 
fore him  and  at  the  centre,  on  his  left,  in  ad- 
vance of  Eylau,  Legrand's  and  Leval's  two 
divisions  of  Marshal  Soult's  corps,  on  the  • 
right,  and  St.  Hilaire's  division,  which  con-  : 
•  The  v«ry  expression  of  .Plotho,  the  narrator. 


nected  itself  with  the  corps  of  Marshal  Da- 
vout, pushed  beyond  Klein-Sausgarten  ;  the 
French  army  thus  forming  an  oblique  line  on 
the  ground  which  the  Russians  had  possessed 
in  the  morning.  Considerably  beyond,  on  the 
left,  Marshal  Ney,  detached,  found  himself  on 
the  rear  of  the  position  which  the  enemy  was 
quitting  in  the  utmost  haste. 

Napoleon,  certain  of  being  victorious,  but 
grieved  to  the  bottom  of  his  heart,  had  re- 
mained amidst  his  troops,  and  ordered  them  to 
kindle  fires,  and  not  leave  the  ranks,  even  to 
go  in  quest  of  provisions.  A  small  quantity 
of  bread  and  brandy  was  distributed  among 
the  soldiers,  and,  though  there  was  not  enough 
for  all,  yet  no  complaints  were  heard.  Less 
joyous  than  at  Austeriitz  and  at  Jena,  they 
were  full  of  confidence,  proud  of  themselves, 
ready  to  renew  that  dreadful  struggle,  if  the 
Russians  had  the  courage  and  the  strength  to 
do  so.  Whoever  had  given  them,  at  this  mo- 
ment, bread  and  brandy,  which  they  were  in 
want  of,  would  have  found  them  in  as  high 
spirits  as  usual.  Two  artillerymen  of  Marshal 
Davout's  corps  having  been  absent  from  their 
company  during  this  engagement,  and  arrived 
too  late  to  be  present  at  the  battle,  their  com- 
rades assembled  in  the  evening  at  the  bivouac, 
tried  them,  and  not  liking  their  reasons,  in- 
flicted upon  them,  on  that  frozen  and  blood- 
stained ground,  the  burlesque  punishment 
which  the  soldiers  call  the  suvate.1 

There  was  no  great  abundance  of  any  thing 
but  ammunition.  The  service  of  the  artillery, 
performed  with  extraordinary  activity,  had  al- 
ready replaced  the  ammunition  consumed. 
With  not  less  zeal  was  the  service  of  the 
medical  and  surgical  department  performed. 
A  great  number  of  wounded  had  been  picked 
up;  to  others  relief  was  administered  on  the 
spot,  till  they  could  be  removed  in  their  turn. 
Napoleon,  overwhelmed  with  fatigue,  was  still 
afoot,  and  superintending  the  attentions  that 
were  paid  to  his  soldiers. 

In  the  rear  of  the  army  so  firm  a  counte- 
nance was  not  everywhere  presented.  Many 
stragglers,  excluded  from  the  effective  in  the 
morning,  in  consequence  of  the  rapidity  of  the 
marches,  had  heard  the  din  of  that  tremendous 
battle,  had  caught  some  hourras  of  the  Cos- 
sacks, and  fallen  back,  circulating  bad  news 
along  the  roads.  The  brave  collected  to  range 
themselves  beside  their  comrades,  the  others 
dispersed  in  the  various  routes  which  the  army 
had  traversed. 

Daybreak  next  morning  threw  a  light  upon 
that  frightful  field  of  battle,  and  Napoleon  him- 
self was  mov«d  to  such  a  degree  as  to  betray 
his  feelings  in  the  bulletin  which  he  published. 
On  that  icy  plain  thousands  of  dead  and  dying, 
cruelly  mangled,  thousands  of  prostrate  horses, 
an  infinite  quantity  of  dismounted  cannon, 
broken  carriages,  scattered  projectiles,  burning 
hamlets,  all  this  standing  out  from  a  ground  of 
snow,2  exhibited  a  thrilling  and  terrible  specta- 
cle. "This  spectacle,"  exclaimed  Napoleon, 
"  is  fit  to  excite  in  princes  a  love  of  peace  and 
a  horror  of  war!"  A  singular  reflection  from 

i  We  borrow  these  particulars  from  the  military  an/ 
manuscript  memoirs  of  Marshal  Davout. 
*  An  expression  of  Napoleon's  in  one  of  his  bulletin*. 


Feb.  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


259 


his  lips,  and  sincere  at  the  moment  when  he 
suffered  it  to  escape  them  ! 

One  singularity  struck  all  eyes.  From  a 
propensity  for  returning  to  the  things  of  past 
times,  and  also  from  economy,  an  attempt  had 
been  made  to  introduce  the  white  uniform 
again  into  the  army.  The  experiment  had 
been  made  with  some  regiments,  but  the  sight 
of  blood  on  the  white  dress  decided  the  ques- 
tion. Napoleon,  filled  with  disgust  and  horror, 
declared  that  he  would  have  none  but  blue 
uniforms,  whatever  might  be  the  cost. 

The  sight  of  this  field  of  battle,  abandoned 
by  the  enemy,  gave  the  army  an  assurance  of 
its  victory.  The  Russians  had  retired,  leaving 
upon  the  ground  7000  dead  and  more  than 
5000  wounded,  whom  the  generous  conqueror 
lost  no  time  in  removing  after  his  own.  Be- 
sides the  12,000  dead  or  dying  left  at  Eylau, 
they  took  with  them  about  15,000  wounded 
more  or  less  severely.  They  had  consequently 
twenty-six  or  twenty-seven  thousand  men  hors 
de  combat.  We  had  taken  three  or  four  thou- 
sand prisoners,  twenty-four  pieces  of  cannon, 
sixteen  colours.  Their  total  loss  then  amounted 
to  30,000  men.  The  French  had  about  10,000 
men  h&rg  de  combat,  3000  of  whom  were  killed 
and  7000  wounded;1  a  loss  far  inferior  to  that 
of  the  Russian  army,  and  which  is  accounted 
for  by  the  position  of  our  troops  posted  in  ex- 
tended order,  and  by  the  dexterity  of  our  artil- 
lerymen and  of  our  soldiers.  Thus,  on  that 
fatal  day,  nearly  40,000  men  had  perished  by 
fire  and  sword.  It  is  the  population  of  a  large 
town  cut  off  in  a  day.  Melancholy  conse- 
quence of  the  passions  of  nations! — terrible 
passions,  which  we  ought  to  take  pains  to  di- 
rect properly,  not  strive  to  extinguish ! 

So  early  as  the  morning  of  the  9th,  Napoleon 
had  sent  forward  his  cuirassiers  and  his  dra- 
goons in  pursuit  of  the  Russians,  to  drive  them 
towards  Konigsberg,  and  to  throw  them  for  the 
whole  winter  beyond  the  Pregel.  Marshal  Ney, 
who  had  not  had  much  to  do  in  the  battle  of 
Eylau,  was  charged  to  support  Murat.  Mar- 
shals Davout  and  Souk  were  to  follow1  at  a 
little  distance.  Napoleon  himself  remained  at 
Eylau,  engaged  in  healing  the  wounds  of  his 
brave  army,  in  procuring  it  supplies,  and  in 
setting  every  thing  to  rights  on  its  rear.  This 

>  It  is  seldom  that  one  can  slate  the  losses  sustained 
in  a  battle  with  such  accuracy  as  one  is  enabled  to  dp 
for  the  battle  of  Eylau.  I  undertook  a  careful  exami- 
nation, in  order  to  arrive  at  precision,  and  here  follows 
the  truth,  at  least  as  nearly  as  it  is  possible  to  attain  it 
in  such  a  matter.  The  inspector  of  the  hospitals  certi- 
fied the  same  evening,  at  Eylau,  the  existence  of  4500 
wounded ;  and  next  day,  after  going  his  rounds  in  the 
adjacent  villages,  he  increased  the  total  amount  to  7094. 
His  report  has  been  preserved.  The  reports  of  the 
different  corps  make  the  number  of  men  more  or  less 
severely  wounded  amount  to  not  fewer  than  13  or  14 
thousand.  This  difference  is  explained  by  the  manner 
in  which  the  authors  of  those  reports  understand  the 
word  wounded.  The  chiefs  of  corps  include  even  the 
•lightest  contusions,  each  of  them  naturally  striving  to 
make  the  most  of  the  sufferings  of  his  men.  But  half 
the  men  set  down  as  wounded,  never  thought  of  apply- 
ing for  any  altendance,  and  this  is  proved  by  the  report 
of  the  director  of  the  hospitals.  A  month  afterwards  a 
curious  controversy  was  kept  up  by  letter  between  Na- 
poleon and  M.  Daru,  who  could  not  find  more  than  6000 
Mrounded  in  the  hospitals  of  the  Vistula.  This  appeared 
disputable  to  Napoleon,  who  conceived  that  there  must 
be  more,  especially  if  there  were  included  in  this  num- 
ber the  wounded  of  the  battle  of  Eylau  and  those  of  the 
actions  wiiich  p'<-ceded  it,  after  the  breaking  up  of  the. 


was  of  greater  importance  than  a  pursuit,  an 
operation  which  his  lieutenants  were  perfectly 
capable  of  executing  themselves. 

On  marching,  the  French  acquired  a  still 
more  complete  conviction  than  before  of  the 
disaster  sustained  by  the  Russians.  As  they 
advanced,  they  found  the  small  towns  and  vil- 
lages of  East  Prussia  full  of  wounded ;  they 
learned  the  disorder,  the  confusion,  the  deplo- 
rable state,  in  short,  of  the  fugitive  army.  The 
Russians, nevertheless,  in  comparing  this  battle 
with  that  of  Austerlitz,  were  proud  of  the  dif- 
ference. They  admitted  their  defeat,  but  they 
made  themselves  amends  for  this  avowal,  by 
adding  that  the  French  had  paid  dearly  for  the 
victory. 

The  pursuers  did  not  stop  till  they  reached 
the  banks  of  the  Frisching,  a  small  river  which 
runs  from  the  line  of  the  lakes  to  the  sea,  and 
Murat  pushed  his  squadrons  as  far  as  Konigs- 
berg. The  Russians,  who  had  fled  in  the  ut- 
most haste,  some  beyond  the  Pregel,  the  others 
to  Konigsberg  itself,  showed  a  disposition  to 
defend  themselves  there,  and  had  planted  a 
numerous  artillery  upon  the  walls.  The  terri- 
fied inhabitants  asked  themselves  if  they  were 
to  be  exposed  to  the  fate  of  Lilbeck.  Luckily 
for  them,  Napoleon  resolved  to  put  an  end  to 
his  offensive  operations.  He  had  sent  Murat's 
horse  to  the  gates  of  Konigsberg,  but  he  had 
no  intention  of  conducting  his  army  itself 
thither.  It  would  have  required  nothing  less 
than  that  entire  army  to  attempt,  with  any  hope 
of  success,  an  attack  by  main  force  on  a  large 
city,  provided  with  some  works,  and  defended 
by  all  that  were  left  of  the  Russian  and  Prus- 
sian troops.  An  attack,  even  if  successful,  on 
that  wealthy  city,  would  not  be  worth  the  risks 
that  must  be  incurred,  if  the  attempt  should 
miscarry.  Napoleon,  having  pushed  his  corps 
to  the  banks  of  the  Frisching,  was  content  to 
leave  them  there  for  a  few  days,  to  be  fully 
certified  of  his  victory,  and  then  purposed  to 
retire,  and  resume  his  cantonments.  He  had 
not,  indeed,  obtained  the  immense  result  with 
the  prospect  of  which  he  at  first  nattered  him- 
self, and  which  would  certainly  not  have  es- 
caped him,  if  an  intercepted  despatch  had  not 
revealed  his  designs  to  the  Russians ;  but  he 
had  led  them  fighting  for  fifty  leagues ;  had 

cantonments.  However,  aAer  minute  examination, 
there  were  never  found  more  than  six  thousand  and 
some  hundred,  and  fewer  than  six  thousand  for  Eylau 
itself,  which,  taking  account  of  the  deaths  that  super- 
vened, agrees  exactly  with  the  statement  of  7094  fur- 
nished by  the  director  of  the  hospitals.  We  think, 
therefore,  that  we  are  near  the  truth  in  computing  the 
looses  of  the  battle  of  Eylau  at  3000  killed  and  70110 
wounded.  Napoleon,  speaking  in  the  bullet:n  of  2000 
killed  and  five  or  six  thousand  wounded,  had.  as  we 
see,  not  warped  the  truth  much  in  comparison  with 
what  the  Russians  had  done.  One  may  even  assert 
that,  in  the  evening  after  the  battle,  Be  was  founded  in 
supposing  that  there  were  not  more. 

As  for  the  losses  of  the  Russians,  I  have  adopted  their 
own  amounts  and  those  which  were  certified  by  the 
French.  We  found  7000  dead,  and  in  the  surrounding 
places  5000  wounded.  They  must  have  carried  awar 
a  much  greater  number.  Both,  a  German,  says  that 
they  carried  to  Konigsberg  14.900  wounded,  who  almost 
all  died  from  the  cold.  He  admits,  moreover,  that  they 
had  7000  killed,  and  left  5000  wounded  on  the  field  of 
battle.  Add  three  or  four  thousand  prisoners,  and  you 
arrive  at  a  tola!  loss  of  30,000  men,  which  can  scarcely 
be  disputed.  General  Benningsen.  always  very  inaccu 
rale,  admitted,  in  his  statement,  a  loss  of  20,000  men. 


260 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Feb.  1807. 


destroyed  9000  of  them  m  a  series  of  rear 
guard  actions;  and,  finding   them   at   Eylau 
formed   into  compact  mass,  covered  by  artil 
lery,  resolved  to  desperation,  80,000   strong 
including  the  Prussians,  in  a  plain  where  nc 
manoeuvering  was  possible,  he  had  attacker 
them  with  54,000,  destroyed  them  with  cannon- 
balls,  and  parried  all  the  accidents  of  the  en- 
gagement with  imperturbable  coolness,  while 
bis  lieutenants  were  exerting  themselves  tc 
rejoin   him.     The  Russians  on  that  day  had 
had    all  their  advantages,  solidity,   immova- 
bleness  in  fire ;  he  had  not  had  all  his  upon  a 
ground  where  it  was  not  possible  for  him  to 
manoeuvre;  but  to  their  tenacity  he  had  op- 
posed invincible  courage,  a  moral  force  above 
the  horrors  of  the  most  frightful  slaughter. 
The  spirit  of  the  soldiers  was  displayed  on 
that  day  as  strongly  as  his  own.     Assuredly, 
he  had  reason  to  be  proud  of  this  test.     Be- 
sides, for  the  twelve  or  thirteen  thousand  men 
whom  he  had  lost  during  those  eight  days, 
he  had  destroyed  36  thousand  of  the  enemy. 
But  he  must  have  been  sensible  at  that  mo- 
ment of  all  the  power  of  climate,  soil,  distance, 
for,  though  possessing  more  than  300,000  men 
in  Germany,  he  had  not  been  able  to  collect 
more  than  54,000  on  the  ground  of  the  decisive 
action.     After  such  a  victory,  he  could  not  fail 
lo  make  serious  reflections,  to  take  more  ac- 
count of  the  elements  and  fortune,  and  to  at- 
tempt less  in  future  on  the  invincible  nature 
of  things.    These  reflections  he  did  make,  and 
they  induced,  as  we  shall  presently  learn,  con- 
duct the  most  soberly  calculated  and  the  most 
admirably  provident.     Would  to  Heaven  that 
they  had  remained  for  ever  engraved  on   his 
memory ! 

Though  victorious,  and  safe  for  several 
months  from  any  enterprise  against  his  can- 
tonments, still  he  had  one  thing  to  fear,  namely, 
the  lying  reports  of  the  Russians,  the  effect 
of  those  reports  on  Austria,  on  France,  on 
Italy,  on  Spain,  in  short,  on  all  Europe,  which, 
seeing  his  progress  twice  stopped  in  three 
months,  either  by  the  mud  or  by  the  climate, 
would  be  led  to  believe  him  less  irresistible, 
less  fatally  successful, — would  regard  as  doubt- 
ful a  victory,  neverthless  the  most  incontest- 
able, the  most  cruelly  efficacious,  and  might 
be  tempted  to  disbelieve  his  fortune. 

He  resolved  therefore  to  show  here  the  cha- 
racter which  he  had  displayed  during  the  battle 
of  Eylau  itself,  and,  certain  of  his  strength,  to 
wait  till  Europe,  more  enlightened,  should  be 
equally  sensible  of  it.    After  passing  a  few 
days  on  the  Frisching,  as  the  enemy  kept  close 
within  his  lines,  he  resolved  to  return,  and  re- 
occupy  his  cantonments.    The  weather  was 
still  cold,  but  the  temperature  never  fell  more 
than  two  or  three  degress  below  freezing.     He 
availed  himself  of  it  to  remove  his  wounded  in 
sledges.    More   than   6000   endured,  without 
suffering  much,  this  singular  journey  of  forty  j 
or  fifty  leagues  to  the  Vistula.    The  extreme  I 
care  taken  to  seek  them  all  up  in  the  neigh-  | 
bouring  villages  furnished  opportunity  fur  as-  ' 
certaining  their  real  number.     It  agreed  with 
that  which  we  have  mentioned  above.     When 
every   thing   was    removed — wounded,   sick, 
prisoners,  artillery  taken   from  the  enemy — 


Napoleon  commenced,  on  the  17th  of  Febru- 
ary, his  retrograde  movement,  Marshal  Ney 
with  the  6th  corps,  Mural  with  the  cavalry, 
forming  the  rear-guard,  the  other  corps  retain- 
ing their  accustomed  position  in  the  order  of 
march,  Marshal  Davout  on  the  right,  Marshal 
Soult  in  the  centre,  Marshal  Augereau  on  the 
left ;  lastly,  Marshal  Bernadotte,  who  had  re- 
joined, forming  the  extreme  left  along  the 
Frische  HaflT. 

Napoleon,  having  ascended  the  Alle,  nearly 
to  the  lakes  from  which  it  issues,  and  from 
which  the  Passarge  likewise  issues,  changed 
his  direction,  and,  instead  of  taking  the  route 
to  Warsaw,  took  that  of  Thorn,  Marienburg, 
and  Elbing,  purposing  thenceforward  to  appuy 
himself  upon  the  Lower  Vistula.  Recent 
events  had  modified  his  ideas  respecting  the 
choice  of  his  base  of  operation.  His  motives 
for  this  change  were  these. 

The  position  between  the  branches  of  the 
Ukra,  the  Narew,  and  the  Bug,  which  he  haa 
at  first  adopted,  was  a  consequence  of  the  oc- 
cupation of  Warsaw.  It  had  the  advantage 
of  covering  that  capital,  and,  if  the  enemy  pro- 
ceeded along  the  coast,  of  allowing  him  to  be 
more  easily  outwinged,  turned,  thrown  back  to 
the  sea,  a  plan  which  Napoleon  had  just  at- 
tempted, and  which  he  would  certainly  have 
executed,  but  for  the  taking  of  his  despatches. 
But,  this  manffiuvre  once  unmasked,  it  was  not 
probable  that  the  Russians,  forewarned,  would 
expose  themselves  a  second  time  to  a  danger 
which  they  had  escaped  by  a  sort  of  miracle. 
Thus  the  position  chosen  in  advance  of  War- 
saw no  longer  possessed  the  same  advantage, 
and  it  had  a  serious  inconvenience,  that  of 
obliging  the  army  to  extend  itself  beyond  mea- 
sure, in  order  to  cover  at  once  Warsaw  and 
he  siege  of  Dantzig— a  siege  which  became 
an  urgent  operation,  to  which  it  was  necessary 
to  devote  the  leisure  of  winter.  In  fact,  in 
^lacing  himself  at  Warsaw,  Napoleon  was 
obliged  to  leave  Bernadotte's  corvis  at  a  great 
distance,  with  little  chance  of  rallying  it  to 
he  nftiin  body  of  the  army ;  and  if  he  marched 
brward,  he  should  be  obliged  to  leave  likewise 
he  fifth  corps,  that  of  Lannes,  to  guard  War- 
saw. Of  course,  he  would  have  to  act  with 
wo  corps  deficient.  The  distance  of  Berna- 
lotte's  corps  would  become  in  future  a  sub- 
ect  of  the  greater  regret,  since  it  would  very 
soon  be  necessary  to  unite  with  him  new 
'orces,  in  order  to  second  and  cover  the  siege 
f  Dantzig. 

Napoleon,  therefore,  resolved  to  keep  at  a 
listance  from  Warsaw,  to  commit  the  guard 
f  that  capital  to  the  fifth  corps,  the  Poles,  the 
Javarians — the  submission  of  the  fortresses 
n    Silesia    having   rendered    the   latter   dis- 
sosable — and  to  establish    himself,  with   the 
greater  part  of  his  troops,  in  advance  of  the 
~iower  Vistula,  behind   the    Passarge,  having 
Thorn  on  his  right.  Elbing  on  his  left,  Dantzig 
on   his  rear,  his  centre  at  Osterode,  his  ad- 
vanced posts  between  the  Passarge  and  the 
Alle.     In  this  position  he  covered  himself  the 
siege  of  Dantzig,  without  needing  to  detach 
any  part  of  his  forces  for  this  purpose.     If,  in 
fact,  the  Russians,  designing  to  relieve  Dant- 
zig, were  to  come  and  seek  a  battle,  he  could 


Feb.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


261 


oppose  to  them  all  his  collected  corps,  includ- 
ing Bernadotte's,  and  even  part  of  Lefebvre's 
troops,  which  there  would  be  nothing  to  pre- 
vent his  calling  in  to  him,  in  case  of  emer 
gency,  as  he  had  done  in  1796,  when  he  raise 
the  siege  of  Mantua  to  run  after  the  Austr 
ans.     His  only  deficiency  on  a  day  of  battl 
would   be  that  of   the  fifth  corps,  which,  ii 
whatever  way  he  operated,  was  indispensabl 
upon  the  Narew,  in  order  to  defend  Warsaw 
This  new  position,  moreover,  would  furnis! 
aecasion  for  scientific  combinations,  fertile  in 
$reat   results,  combinations  unknown  to  th 
'inemy,  whereas  he  was  acquainted  with  al 
fhose  having  Warsaw  for  base.     Cantoned  be 
hind    the  Passarge,  Napoleon   would  be   bu 
fifteen  leagues  from  KGnigsberg.     Supposing 
that  the  Russians,  encouraged  by  the  apparen 
loneliness  in  which  Warsaw  was  left,  shoulc 
advance  upon  that  capital,  one  might  run  be 
hind  them  to  KOnigsberg,  get  possession  of  tha 
city,  then,  dropping  down  by  a  movement  to 
the  right,  on  their  rear,  throw  them  upon   the 
Narew  and  the  Vistula,  into  the  marshes  of  the 
interior,  with  as  much  certainty  of  destroying 
them  as  in  the  case  of  the  movement  towards 
the  sea.     If,  on  the  contrary,  they  attacked  the 
cantonments    on   the    Passarge  in  front,  one 
would  have,  as  we  have  just  observed,  in  addi- 
tion to  the  natural  strength  of  those  canton- 
ments, the  entire  mass  of  the  army  to  oppose 
to  them.     The  position,  then  was  excellent  for 
the  siege  of  Dantzig,  excellent  for  the  future 
operations ;  for  it  would  give  rise  to  new  com- 
binations,  the  secret  of   which  was  not  re- 
vealed. 

It  is  assuredly  an  imposing  and  instructive 
sight  to  see  that  impetuous  general,  who,  as 
his  detractors  allege,  was  fit  only  for  offensive 
war,  carried  at  a  bound  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Vistula,  pausing  all  at  once  before  the  diffi- 
culties of  localities  and  of  seasons,  shutting 
himself  up  in  a  narrow  space,  carrying  on 
cold,  slow,  methodical  war  there,  disputing 
petty  streams  foot  by  foot,  after  passing  the 
largest  rivers  without  stopping,  confining  him- 
self to  covering  a  siege,  and  placed  at  so  vast 
a  distance  from  his  empire,  in  presence  of 
Europe,  which  this  new  mode  of  proceeding 
astonished,  and  in  which  doubt  began  to  gain 
ground,  retaining  unutterable  firmness,  not 
seduced  even  by  the  desire  of  striking  a  signal 
blow,  and  knowing  how  to  defer  that  blow  till 
the  moment  when  the  nature  of  things  ren- 
dered it  sure  and  possible :  it  is,  we  say,  wor- 
thy of  interest,  astonishment,  admiration ;  it 
is  a  fine  subject  for  study  and  reflection  for 
any  one  who  can  appreciate  the  combinations 
of  great  men,  and  who  takes  delight  in  medi- 
tating upon  them. 

Napoleon  proceeded  then  to  place  himself 
between  the  Passarge  and  the  Lower  Vistula. 
Marshal  Bernadotte's  corps  on  the  left,  on  the 
Passarge,  between  Braunsberg  and  Spanden  ; 
Marshal  Soult's  corps  in  the  centre,  between 
Liebstadt  and  Mohrungen  ;  Marshal  Davout's 
corps  to  the  right,  between  Allenstein  and  Ho- 
henstein,  at  the  point  where  the  Alle  and  the 
Passarge  approach  nearest  to  one  another ; 
Marshal  Ney's  corps  as  advanced  guard,  be- 
tween the  Passarge  and  the  Alle  at  Guttstadt ; 


:  the  head-quarters  and  the  guard  at  Osterode, 

•  in  a  central  position,  where  Napoleon  could 

i  assemble  all  his  forces  in  a  few  hours.     He 

drew  General  Oudinot  to  Osterode,  with  the 

grenadiers  and  voltigeurs,  forming  an  infantry 

reserve  of  six  or  seven  thousand  men.     He 

spread   the    cavalry   on    his    rear,    between 

Osterode   and   the   Vistula,   from    Thorn    to 

Elbing,  a  country  abounding  in  all  kinds  of 

forage. 

In  the  enumeration  of  the  corps  cantoned 
behind  the  Passarge,  we  have  not  mentioned 
Augereau's.  Napoleon  had  pronounced  its 
dissolution.  Augereau  had  left  the  army,  dis- 
concerted at  what  had  befallen  him  in  the  bat- 
tle of  Eylau,  erroneously  imputing  his  check 
to  the  jealousy  of  his  comrades,  who.  as  he 
said,  had  not  chosen  to  support  him,  alleging 
that  he  was  fatigued,  ill,  worn  out.  The  Em- 
peror sent  him  back  to  France,  with  testimo- 
nies of  satisfaction,  which  were  of  a  nature  to 
cheer  him.  But,  apprehensive  lest  there  might 
lurk  in  the  seventh  corps,  half  destroyed,  a 
leaven  of  the  discouragement  manifested  by 
its  chief,  he  pronounced  its  dissolution,  after 
lavishing  rewards  upon  it.  He  divided  the 
regiments  between  Marshals  Davout,  Soult, 
and  Ney.  Of  the  12,000  men  composing  the 
seventh  corps,  there  had  been  7000  present  at 
Eylau,  and  two-thirds  of  those  7000  had  been 
put  hors  de  combat.  The  survivors,  added  to 
those  who  had  lagged  behind,  furnished  the 
different  corps  of  the  army  with  a  reinforce- 
ment of  seven  or  eight  thousand  men. 

Napoleon  placed  the  fifth  corps  on  the  Omu- 
ew,  at  some  distance  from  Warsaw.  Lannes 
continuing  ill,  he  had  sent  for  the  first  of  his 
enerals,  Massena,  who  had  not  been  able  to 
agree  with  Joseph,  at  Naples,  with  regret  to 
deprive  Italy  of  him,  but  with  great  satisfac- 
ion  to  have  him  in  Poland.  He  gave  him  the 
command  of  the  fifth  corps.  The  sieges  in  Sile- 
sia advancing,  thanks  to  General  Vandamme's 
nergy  and  fertility  of  mind,  Schweidnitz 
>eing  taken,  and  Neisse  and  Glatz  alone  re- 
maining to  be  reduced,  Napoleon  took  advan- 
age  of  circumstances  to  bring  to  the  Vistula 
)eroy's  Bavarian  division,  six  or  seven  thou- 
and  strong,  and  very  good  troops,  which  was 
;antoned  at  Pultusk,  between  the  position  of 
he  fifth  corps  on  the  Omulew  and  Warsaw. 
The  Polish  battalions  of  Kalisch  and  Posen 
jad  been  sent  to  Dantzig.  Napoleon  assem- 
led  those  of  Warsaw,  organized  by  Prince 
'oniatowski,  at  Neidenburg,  so  as  to  keep  up 
tie  communication  between  the  head-quarters 
nd  the  troops  encamped  on  the  Omulew. 
'hey  were  there  under  the  command  of  Gene- 
al  Zayonscheck.  He  also  required  that  a  ca- 
alry  corps  of  one  or  two  thousand  Poles 
hould  be  organized,  in  order  to  run  after  the 
Cossacks.  These  different  Polish  troops,  des- 
ned  to  connect  the  position  of  the  grand 
rmy  on  the  Passarge  with  that  of  Massena 
n  the  Narew,  were  not  capable,  it  is  true,  of 
topping  any  Russian  army  that  might  have 
aken  the  offensive,  but  they  were  sufficient  to 
revent  the  Cossacks  from  penetrating  bo 
ween  Osterode  and  Warsaw,  and  to  exercise 
n  active  vigilance  in  that  extensive  space. 
Concentrated  thus  behind  the  Passarge  and 


2CS 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[March,  1807. 


fn  advance  of  the  Lower  Vistula,  covering  in  I  of  liberty  and  disorder,  and  ready  to  return  to 
an  inassailable  position  the  siege  of  Dantzig,  the  ranks  as  soon  as  they  should  learn  the  re- 
which  was  at  length  about  to  begin;  able,  by  sumption  of  the  operations.  Napoleon,  ap- 
a  threat  against  Konigsberg,  to  stop  any  offen-  prized  of  this  state  of  things  by  the  difference 
sive  movement  upon  Warsaw,  Napoleon  was  between  the  number  of  men  reputed  to  be  in 
in  a  situation  not  to  fear  any  thing.  Rejoined  <  the  hospitals,  and  the  number  of  those  whom 
by  the  laggards  left  behind,  and  by  Berna-  M.  Daru's  expenses  proved  to  be  really  there, 
dotte's  corps,  reinforced  by  Oudinot's  grena-  j  turned  his  serious  attention  to  this  abuse.  He 
diers  and  voltigeurs,  he  could,  in  forty-eight  employed  for  its  repression  the  police  of  the 
hours,  assemble  80,000  men  on  one  of  the  Polish  authorities,  and  then  the  gendarmerie 
points  of  the  Passarge.  This  situation  was  d'elite  attached  to  the  guard,  as  the  only  body 
very  imposing,  especially  if  we  compare  it  of  men  sufficiently  respected  to  enforce  obedi- 
with  that  of  the  Russians,  who  could  not  have  ence.  Still  this  leprosy  attached  to  large 
brought  50,000  men  into  line.  But  it  is  a  re-  armies  could  never  be  completely  destroyed  on 
mark  worthy  of  being  repeated,  though  already  the  line  of  operation.  And  yet  the  army  in 
made  by  us,  that  an  army  of  300,000  men,  question  was  the  army  of  the  camp  of  Bou- 
spread  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Vistula,  admin-1  logne,  the  steadiest,  the  best  disciplined,  the 
istered  with  a  skill  never  equalled  by  any  cap-  bravest,  that  ever  existed.  In  the  campaign 
tain,  was  incapable  of  furnishing  more  than  I  of  Austerlitz,  the  marauders  had  scarcely 
80,000  combatants  on  the  same  field  of  battle,  j  shown  themselves.  But  the  rapidity  of  the 
There  were  80,000  or  90,000  men,  capable  of  movements,  the  distance,  the  climate,  the  sea- 


acting  offensively  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Passarge,  24,000  on  the  Narew,  from  Ostro- 
lenka  to  Warsaw,  including  the  Poles  and  the 
Bavarians,  22,000  under  Lefebvre,  before 


son,  lastly  the  slaughter,  relaxing  the  ties  of 
discipline,  those  vermin,  deplorable  effect  of 
wretchedness  in  a  great  body,  began  to  multi- 
ply. Napoleon  provided  against  the  evil  for 


Dantzig  and  Colberg,  28,000  under  Mortier,  |  this  time  by  immense  forecast,  and  by  the  vic- 


Italians,  Dutch,  and  French,  spread  from  Bre- 
men and  Hamburg  to  Stralsund  and  Stettin, 
15,000  in  Silesia,  as  well  Bavarians  as  Wir- 
tembergers,  30,000  in  the  fortresses  frem  Po- 
sen  to  Erfurt  and  Mayence,  7000  or  8000  em- 
ployed in  parks,  15,000  wounded  of  all  epochs, 
60  and  some  thousand  sick  and  marauders, 
lastly,  30,000  to  40,000  recruits  on  march, 
which  gave  nearly  330,000  men  to  the  grand 
army,  270,000  of  whom  were  French,  and 
about  60,000  auxiliaries,  Italians,  Dutch,  Ger- 
mans and  Poles. 

What  will  appear  singular  is  the  enormous 


lories  which  he  soon  gained.  But  defeats  can 
in  a  few  days  aggravate  an  evil  of  this  kind 
to  such  a  degree  as  to  produce  the  dissolution 
of  armies.  Thus  in  the  very  successes  of 
that  glorious  and  terrible  campaign  of  1807, 
appeared  many  of  the  symptoms  of  a  most 
fatal  and  even  memorable  campaign,  that  of 
1812. 

The  return  into  cantonments  was  marked 
by  some  movements  on  the  part  of  the  Rus- 
sians. Their  ranks  were  exceedingly  thinned. 
They  had  not  50,000  men  capable  of  acting  left. 
General  Benningsen,  however,  quite  proud  of 


number  of  60,000  sick  or  marauders ;  a  num-  j  not  having  lost  all  to  the  very  last  man  at  Ey- 
ber,  it  is  true,  merely  approximative,1  difficult  j  lau,  and  according  to  custom  proclaiming  him- 


to  be  fixed,  but  worthy  of  the  attention  of 
statesmen,  who  study  the  secret  springs  of  the 
power  of  nations.  Of  these  60,000  absent  men 
designated  as  sick,  not  half  were  in  the  hospi- 
tals. The  others  were  gone  a-plundering.  We 
have  already  said  that  many  soldiers  were  ab- 
sent from  the  ranks  at  the  battle  of  Eylau, 
owing  to  the  rapidity  of  the  marches,  and  that, 
the  impressions  of  this  dreadful  battle  spread- 
ing to  a  distance,  cowards  and  hangers-on  had 


self  conqueror,  was  desirous  to  give  his  boasts 
the  appearance  of  truth.  He  therefore  left 
Konigsberg,  as  soon  as  he  learned  that  the 
French  army  was  retiring  upon  the  Passarge. 
He  showed  strong  columns  along  that  river, 
especially  in  its  upper  course,  towards  Gutt- 
stadt,  facing  the  position  of  Marshal  Ney.  He 
went  to  the  wrong  person;  for  that  intrepid 
marshal,  deprived  of  the  honour  of  fighting  at 
Eylau,  and  impatient  to  make  himself  amends, 


run  off  as  fast  as  their  legs  would  carry  them,  j  gave  a  vigorous  reception   to  the  corps  that 
crying  that  the  French  were  beaten.     Since    came  within  his  reach,  and  inflicted  on  them 


then,  they  had  been  joined  by  a  great  number 
of  men,  who,  on  pretext  of  illness  or  slight 
wounds,  applied  for  admission  to  the  hospitals, 
•ut  took  good  care  not  to  go  into  them,  as  they 
•should  be  detained,  watched,  and  even  receive 
great  deal  more  attendance  than  they  liked. 


a  considerable  loss.  At  the  same  moment,  the 
corps  of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  seeking  to  esta- 
blish itself  on  the  Lower  Passarge,  and  being 
obliged  for  that  purpose  to  occupy  Braunsberg, 
made  itself  master  of  that  town,  where  it  took 
prisoners  2,000  Prussians.  It  was  Duponl's 


They  had  passed  the  Vistula,  lived  in  the  vil-  |  division  which  had  the  merit  of  this  brilliant 
lages  on  the  right  and  left  of  the  high  road,  so    expedition.     The  Russians  having,  neverthe- 


as  to  escape  that  general  superintendence 
which  kept  in  order  all  the  parts  of  the  army. 
In  this  manser,  they  lived  at  the  expense  of 


less,  continued  to  bestir  themselves,  and  mani- 
festing an  intention  to  proceed  to  the  Upper 
Passarge.  Napoleon,  in  the  first  days  of 


the  country,  which  they  did  not  spare,  some  of  j  March,  resolved  to  make  an  offensive  demon- 
them  downright  cowards,  for  every  ai  «y,  how-  '  stration  on  the  Lower  Passarge,  so  as  to  alarm 
ever  heroic,  always  has  a  certain  quantity  of  j  General  Benningsen  for  the  safety  of  Konigs- 
them  in  its  ranks;  the  others  very  brave,  on  berg.  It  was  with  regret  that  Napoleon  de- 
the  contrary,  but  plunderers  by  nature,  fond  ,  cided  on  such  a  movement,  for  it  was  reveai- 
•  The  F.mperor  could  never  fix  it  exactly,  owin-  lo  i  in&  tO  the  Russians  the  risk  which  they  ran  in 

*.r.  crm>:nuul  fluctuation  of  the  effective  of  the  corps.       ascending  upon  our  right  to  threaten  Warsaw. 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


2*3 


Well  knowing  that  an  unmasked  manoeuvre  is 
a  lost  resource,  Napoleon  would  have  chosen  I 
not  to  act  at  all,  or  to  act  in  a  decisive  manner 
by  marching  for  Konigsberg  with  all  his  forces. 
But,  on  the  one  hand,  it  was  necessary  to 
oblige  the  enemy  to  keep  quiet,  in  order  to  be 
so  himself  in  his  winter  quarters;  on  the  other, 
he  had  neither  sufficient  provisions  nor  ammu- 
nition to  altempt  an  operation  of  any  duration. 
Napoleon,  therefore,  made  up  his  mind  to  a 
mere  demonstration  on  the  Lower  Passarge, 
executed  on  the  3d  of  March  by  the  corps  of 
Marshals  Soult  and  Bernadotte,  who  passed 
that  river,  while  Marshal  Ney,  at  Guttstadt, 
was  roughly  pushing  the  enemy's  corps  pro- 
ceeding to  the  Upper  Passarge.  The  Russians 
lost  in  these  simultaneous  movements  about 
2000  men;  and,  on  seeing  their  line  of  retreat 
upon  Konigsberg  endangered,  they  hastened  to 
retire  and  to  restore  tranquillity  to  our  canton- 
ments. 

Such  were  the  last  acts  of  that  winter  cam- 
paign. The  cold,  which  had  long  delayed  its 
coming,  began  to  be  severe :  the  thermometer 
had  fallen  to  eight  and  ten  degrees  below  the 
freezing  point.  There  was  going  to  be  in  March 
the  weather  that  might  have  been  expected  in 
December  and  January. 

It  was  with  the  utmost  reluctance  that  Na- 
poleon had  given  orders  for  the  last  operations. 
Writing  to  Marshal  Soult,  he  says,  "  It  is  cer- 
tainly one  of  the  inconveniences  that  I  have 
felt  from  the  present  movements,  that  they  en- 
lighten the  Russians  respecting,  their  position. 
But  they  pressed  me  too  much  on  my  right. 
Being  resolved  to  let  the  bad  season  pass,  and 
to  organize  the  supplies,  I  am  not  otherwise 
vexed  at  this  lesson  given  to  the  enemy.  With 
the  spirit  of  presumption  with  which  I  see  him 
animated,  we  need  but  to  have  patience  to 
see  him  make  capital  blunders." — (Osterode, 
March  6th.) 

If  Napoleon  had  then  had  provisions  and 
means  of  conveyance  to  carry  along  with  him 
sufficient  to  subsist  the  army  for  a  few  days, 
he  would  have  put  an  end  to  the  war  imme- 
diately, having  to  do  with  an  enemy  ill-advised 
enough  to  come  and  throw  himself  upon  his 
quarters.  Thus  the  whole  question  consisted, 
according  to  his  notions,  in  such  a  supply  of 
provisions  as  would  enable  him  to  recruit  his 
soldiers,  exhausted  by  privations,  and  to  as- 
semble them  for  some  days  without  being  liable 
to  see  them  die  of  hunger  or  to  leave  half  of 
them  behind,  as  was  the  case  at  Eylau. 

The  towns  on  the  coast,  especially  Elbing, 
would  be  able  to  furnish  him  with  provisions 
for  the  first  moments  of  his  establishment,  but 
such  resources  were  not  sufficient  for  him.  He 
purposed,  therefore,  to  bring  large  quantities, 
either  from  Warsaw  down  the  Vistula,  or  from 
Bromberg  by  the  Nackel  canal,  and  which 
should  then  be  carried  by  land  from  the  Vis- 
tula to  the  different  cantonments  of  the  army 
on  the  Passarge.  To  this  end,  he  gave  the 
most  precise  orders  for  collecting  the  neces- 
sary supplies  in  the  first  instance  at  Bromberg 
and  Warsaw,  for  next  creating  the  means  of 
transport  for  completing  the  journey  from  the 
Vistula  to  the  banks  of  the  Passarge.  His 
intention  was  to  begin  with  serving  out  to  his 


soldiers  the  entire  ration  for  each  day,  and  then 
to  form  at  Osterode,  the  centre  of  his  quarters, 
a  general  magazine  containing  some  millions 
of  rations  of  bread,  rice,  wine,  spirits.  For 
this  purpose  he  meant  to  turn  to  account  the 
zeal  of  the  Poles,  who  had  hitherto  rendered 
him  few  military  services,  and  from  whom  he 
wished  to  derive  some  administrative  services 
at  least.  As  he  had  M.  de  Talleyrand  at  War- 
saw, he  charged  him  to  arrange  with  the  pro- 
visional government  which  directed  the  affairs 
of  Poland.  He  wrote  him  therefore  the  fol- 
lowing letter,  sending  him  full  powers  for 
concluding  the  bargains,  whatever  the  prices 
might  be : — 

Osterode,  12th  March,  10  at  night 

"I  received  your  letter  of  the  10th  at  three 
this  afternoon.  I  have  300,000  rations  of  bis- 
cuit at  Warsaw.  It  takes  eight  days  to  come 
from  Warsaw  to  Osterode :  work  miracles,  but 
despatch  50,000  rations  to  me  every  day.  En- 
deavour also  to  send  me  2000  quarts  of  spirits 
per  day.  At  this  moment  the  fate  of  Europe 
and  the  most  extensive  schemes  depend  upon 
supplies  of  provisions.  To  beat  the  Russians, 
if  I  have  bread,  is  mere  child's  play.  I  have 
millions;  I  do  not  refuse  to  give  some  of  them. 
All  that  you  do  will  be  rightly  done,  but,  on  the 
receipt  of  this  letter,  there  must  be  sent  off  to 
me  by  land,  by  way  of  Mlawa  and  Takroczin, 
50,000  rations  of  biscuit  and  2000  quarts.  It 
is  a  matter  of  eighty  wagons  per  day,  which 
must  be  paid  for  handsomely.  If  the  patriot- 
ism of  the  Poles  cannot  make  this  effort,  they 
are  not  good  for  much.  The  importance  of 
what  I  am  desiring  of  you  is  greater  than  all 
the  negotiations  in  the  world.  Send  for  the 
ordonnateur,  General  Lemarrois,  and  the  most 
influential  persons  of  the  government.  Give 
money;  I  shall  approve  whatever  you  do.  Bis- 
cuit and  brandy — that  is  all  we  want.  Those 
300,000  rations  of  biscuit  and  those  eighteen 
or  twenty  thousand  quarts  of  brandy,  which 
may  reach  us  in  a  few  days — these  are  the 
things  to  foil  the  combinations  of  all  the 
powers." 

M.  de  Talleyrand  assembled  the  members 
of  the  Polish  government,  to  endeavour  to 
obtain  the  supplies  and  wagons  which  were 
wanted.  Provisions  were  not  scarce  in  Po- 
land, for,  by  furnishing  the  Jews  with  ready 
money,  you  would  be  sure  to  obtain  them. 
But  to  organize  the  means  of  conveyance  was 
a  very  difficult  task.  It  was  intended  to  hire 
them  in  the  country,  paying  liberally  for  them  ; 
but  it  was  finally  decided  to  buy  carts  and 
horses,  and  thus  relays  were  established  from 
the  banks  of  the  Vistula  to  those  of  the  Pas- 
sarge. The  provisions  were  sent  down  the 
Vistula  in  boats ;  being  then  landed  at  War- 
sow,  Plock,  Thorn,  Marienwerder,  they  were 
carried  to  Osterode,  the  centre  of  the  canton- 
ments, either  in  the  caissons  of  the  regiments, 
or  in  the  carriages  of  the  country,  or  in  those 
which  had  been  purchased  and  horsed  for  the 
purpose.  Oxen  were  bought  up  throughout  all 
Silesia,  and  driven  on  foot  to  Warsaw.  Wines 
and  spirits  were  sought  on  the  north  coasi 
whither  commerce  brings  them  in  considera- 
ble quantity  and  superior  quality.  They  were 
to  be  obtained  at  Berlin,  at  Stettin,  at  Elbing. 


264 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


.March,  180T. 


and  were  despatched  by  \rater  to  Thorn.  Na- 
poleon had  been  particularly  solicitous  to  pro- 
cure two  or  three  hundred  thousand  bottles  of 
wine,  to  cheer  the  hearts  of  his  soldiers.  He 
had  near  him  a  valuable  resource  of  this  kind, 
but  it  was  shut  up  in  the  fortress  of  Dantzig, 
where  there  were  several  millions  of  bottles 
of  excellent  wines,  that  is  to  say,  sufficient  to 
supply  the  army  for  some  months.  This  was 
no  weak  stimulus  to  reduce  that  fortress. 

These  assiduous  attentions  paid  to  the  sup- 
ply of  the  army  could  not  produce  an  imme- 
diate effect;  but,  meanwhile,  the  soldiers  were 
living  on  the  Nogath,  on  Elbing,  on  the  very 
districts  which  they  occupied,  and,  their  indus- 
try making  up  for  what  was  deficient,  they  had 
contrived  to  procure  necessaries.  Considerable 
quantities  of  hidden  provisions  had  been  dis- 
covered, and  these  enabled  them,  to  wait  for 
the  regular  arrivals  from  the  Vistula.  They 
were  lodged  in  the  villages,  and  had  ceased  to 
bivouac,  which  was  a  great  relief  for  troops 
that  had  bivouacked  for  five  successive  months, 
from  October  to  February.  At  the  advanced 
posts  they  lived  in  hovels,  the  materials  for 
which,  and  for  fuel,  were  furnished  in  abun- 
dance by  the  forests  of  the  country.  Some  wine, 
some  spirits,  found  at  Elbing,  and  distributed 
with  order,  restored  to  our  soldiers  some  of 
their  gayety-  After  the  first  days,  they  began 
to  like  the  situation  better  than  that  on  the 
Narew ;  for  the  country  was  finer,  and  they 
hoped,  on  the  return  of  the  mild  season,  to 
compensate  themselves  for  present  privations, 
and  to  put  an  end,  by  a  day  of  battle,  to  the 
terrible  struggle  in  which  they  were  engaged. 
The  provisional  regiments  destined  to  bring 
the  recruits  began  to  arrive  on  the  Vistula. 
Several  of  them,  already  gone  to  the  theatre  of 
war,  had  been  reviewed,  dissolved,  and  distri- 
buted among  the  regiments  to  which  they  be- 
longed. The  soldiers  thus  saw  their  ranks 
filled  up,  heard  talk  of  numerous  reinforce- 
ments which  were  preparing  on  the  rear  of 
the  army,  and  relied  more  than  ever  on  that 
supreme  vigilance  which  provided  for  all  their 
wants.  The  cavalry  continued  to  be  the  ob- 
ject of  the  most  attentive  care.  Napoleon  had 
formed  foot  detachments  of  all  the  dismounted 
horse,  and  had  sent  them  into  Silesia  in  quest 
of  horses,  in  which  that  province  abounded. 

Immense  works  were  in  progress  on  the 
Passarge  and  on  the  Vistula,  in  order  to  se- 
cure the  position  of  the  army.  All  the  bridges 
over  the  Passarge  had  been  destroyed,  two 
excepted — one  for  the  use  of  Marshal  Berna- 
dotte's  corps  at  Braunsberg,  the  other  for  the 
use  of  Marshal  Soult's  corps  at  Spanden. 
Vast  te'es  du  pont  were  added  to  each  of  them, 
to  afford  facility  for  debouching  beyond — Na- 
poleon repeating  incessantly  to  his  lieutenants, 
that  a  line  was  not  easy  to  defend,  unless  one 
were  able  to  cross  it  in  its  turn,  to  take  the  of- 
fensive against  any  one  who  should  attack  it.1 
Two  bridges  over  the  Vistula,  one  at  Marien- 
burg,  the  other  at  Marienwerder,  insured  the 


communication  with  the  troops  of  Marshal 
Lefebvre,  charged  with  the  siege  of  Dantzig. 
Napoleon,  therefore,  could  either  go  to  them, 
or  make  them  come  to  him,  and  everywhere 
present  a  compact  mass  to  the  enemy.  Mar- 
shal Lefebvre  was  approaching  Dantzig,  while 
awaiting  the  heavy  artillery  drawn  from  the 
fortresses  of  Silesia,  to  commence  this  import- 
ant siege,  which  was  to  be  the  occupation  and 
the  glory  of  the  winter.  The  works  of  the 
Sierock,  Praga  and  Modlin,  destined  to  con- 
solidate the  position  of  Warsaw,  were  like- 
wise prosecuted. 

It  was  at  the  little  village  of  Osterode  that 
Napoleon  directed  all  these  operations.  His 
soldiers,  having  bread,  potatoes,  meat,  brandy, 
straw  to  shelter  themselves,  wood  for  fuel, 
were  not  badly  off';  but  the  officers,  who  could 
procure  no  better  food  and  lodging  than  the 
soldier,  even  with  their  pay  punctually  paid, 
were  exposed  to  many  privations.  Napoleon 
meant  to  set  them  an  example  of  resignation 
by  remaining  among  them.  The  officers  of 
each  corps,  sent  to  Osterode,  could  not  say 
that  they  had  found  him  more  comfortably 
settled  than  the  lowest  of'them.  Accordingly, 
in  answering  his  brother  Joseph,  who  com- 
plained of  the  hardships  endured  by  the  army 
of  Naples,  he  laughed  at  his  complaints,  ac- 
cused him  of  weakness  of  mind,  and  drew  the 
following  picture : — 

"  The  officers  of  the  staff  have  not  undressed 
for  these  two  months,  and  some  not  for  four 
months  past:  I  have  myself  been  a  fortnight 
without  taking  off  my  boots.  We  are  amidst 
snow  and  mud,  without  wine,  without  brandy, 
without  bread,  eating  potatoes  and  meat,  mak- 
ing long  marches  and  counter-marches,  with- 
out any  kind  of  comforls,  fighting  in  general 
with  the  bayonet  and  under  grape,  the  wounded 
having  to  be  carried  away  in  sledges,  exposed 
to  the  air,  for  fifty  leagues." 

He  is  adverting  here  to  the  march  which 
followed  the  battle  of  Eylau — for  at  Osterode 
they  were  better  off. 

"It  is,  therefore,  a  silly  joke  to  compare  the 
places  where  we  are  with  the  fine  country  of 
Naples,  where  you  have  wine,  bread,  sheets 
to  your  beds,  society,  and  even  that  of  women. 
After  destroying  the  Prussian  monarchy,  we 
are  fighting  against  the  rest  of  Prussia,  against 
the  Russians,  the  Calmucks,  the  Cossacks,  and 
those  northern  tribes  which  of  old  overran  the 
Roman  empire.  We  are  waging  war  in  all  its 
energy  and  its  horror.  Amidst  all  these  ex- 
cessive fatigues,  everybody  has  been  more  or 
less  ill — for  my  part,  I  was  never  better,  and  I 
have  grown  fat." — (Osterode,  March  1.) 

The  situation,  of  which  Napoleon  draws 
this  sketch,  was  already  much  improved  at 
Osterode,  especially  for  the  soldiers.  But,  if 
we  suffered,  the  Russians  suffered  far  more, 
and  were  hi  extreme  distress.  Their  batta- 
lions, which,  at  the  commencement  of  the 
operations,  numbered  500  men,  were  now  re. 
duced  to  300,  200,  150.  Ten  had  just  been 


«  "  Neither  a  river  nor  any  line  whatever."  he  wrote 
lo  Bernadotte,  (6th  March,  Osterode,)  "can  be  defended 
unless  they  have  offensive  points;  for,  when  you  have 
only  defended  yourself,  you  have  run  risks  without 
gaining  my  thing.  But  when  you  can  combine  defence 


with  an  offensive  movement,  you  cause  the  enemy  to 
run  more  risks  than  he  makes  the  attacked  body  incur. 
Let.  then,  the  works  at  the  ilia  du  pont  of  Spanden  and 
Braunsberg  proceed  day  and  night " 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


265 


taken  at  orice,  which  fell  short  of  the  last  num- 
ber. If  the  Russians  were  to  attempt  to  cope 
with  Napoleon,  it  would  be  on  condition  of 
sacrificing  their  army ;  in  consequence,  they 
could  no  longer  show  themselves  in  the  open 
field.  Word  had  been  sent  to  Petersburg,  in 
the  name  of  all  the  generals,  that,  if  the  forces 
which  were  left  were  not  doubled  at  least,  they 
could  not  thenceforth  do  any  thing  but  run 
away  from  the  French.  For  the  rest,  all  the 
Russian  officers,  filled  with  admiration  of  our 
army,  sensible  that,  in  fact,  they  were  fighting 
much  more  for  England  or  Prussia  than  for 
Russia,  longed  for  peace,  and  called  loudly 
for  it. 

Their  troops,  not  supplied,  like  those  of  Na- 
poleon, by  a  superior  forecast,  were  dying  of 
hunger.  Weary  of  war,  they  had  ceased  to 
fight  with  our  men.  They  met,  in  marauding, 
almost  without  attacking  one  another.  They 
seemed  to  have  instinctively  agreed  not  to  add 
to  the  hardships  of  their  situation.  Some- 
times it  happened  that  unfortunate  Cossacks, 
driven  by  hunger,  and  expressing  themselves 
by  signs,  came  to  beg  bread  of  our  soldiers, 
giving  them  to  understand  that,  for  several 
days,  they  had  not  had  any  thing  to  eat;  and 
our  men,  always  disposed  to  pity,  gave  them 
potatoes,  of  which  they  had  a  great  abun- 
dance. Singular  sight — this  return  to  huma- 
nity even  amidst  the  cruelties  of  war ! 

Napoleon  knew  that,  while  suffering  great 
hardships,  he  had  subjected  the  enemy  to  much 
greater.  But  he  had  to  combat  the  false  re- 
ports accredited  at  Warsaw,  at  Berlin,  and 
above  all  at  Paris.  His  prodigious  glory  alone 
awed  minds,  always  independent  in  France, 
always  malevolent  in  Europe,  and  he  could 
already  anticipate  that,  on  the  first  serious  re- 
verse, he  should  see  one  after  another  desert 
him.  Never,  in  consequence,  had  he  such 
efforts  to  make,  such  energy  of  character  to 
exert,  in  order  to  control  the  public  opinion. 
Young  auditors  sent  from  Paris  to  carry  to 
head-quarters  the  despatches  of  the  different 
ministries,  unaccustomed  to  the  scenes  that 
met  their  view,  and  officers,  either  discontented 
or  more  deeply  impressed  than  usual  with  the 
horrors  of  that  war,  sent  to  France  letters  full 
of  exaggerations.  "  Concert  with  M.  Daru," 
said  Napoleon  to  M.  Maret  in  one  of  his  let- 
ters, "  about  sending  back  the  auditors,  who  are 
useless  here,  who  are  wasting  their  time,  and 
who,  unused  to  the  events  of  war,  write  nothing 
but  stupid  absurdities  to  Paris.  In  future,  I  will 
have  the  papers  brought  by  officers  of  the 
staff."  As  for  the  accounts  relative  to  the  bat- 
tle of  Eylau,  emanating  from  certain  officers, 
ind  which  Fouche  mentioned  to  him  as  the 
source  of  the  false  reports  circulated  in  Paris, 
Xapoleon  replied  that  nothing  of  the  sort  was 
.0  be  believed.  "  My  officers,"  said  he,  "  know 
as  much  about  what  is  passing  in  my  army  as 
the  loungers  parading  in  the  garden  of  the  Tuileries 
know  about  what  is  wider  deliberation  in  the  cabi- 
net. (April  13.)  Besides,  the  human  mind  is  pleased 
with  exaggeration.  The  sombre  pictures  drawn 
for  you  of  our  situation  have  for  their  authors  , 
Paris  babblers,  who  are  adepts  at  painting.  Never 
was  the  position  of  France  either  greater  or 
more  glorious.  As  for  Eylau,  I  have  said  and 

V«L.  II.— 34 


repeated  that  the  Bulletin  had  exaggerated  the 
loss ;  and  what  are  two  or  three  thousand  men 
killed  in  a  great  battle  1  When  I  take  bark  my 
army  to  France  and.  to  the  Rhine,  it  will  be  seen 
that  not  many  will  be  missing  at  roll-call.  At  the 
time  of  the  expedition  to  Egypt,  the  corre- 
spondence of  the  army,  being  intercepted  by  the 
British  cabinet,  was  printed  and  led  to  the  ex- 
pedition of  the  English,  which  was  silly,  which 
ought  to  have  failed,  but  which  succeeded  be- 
cause it  was  decreed  by  fate  that  it  should  succeed. 
Then,  too,  it  was  said  that  we  were  destitute 
of  every  thing  in  Egypt,  the  richest  country  in 
the  world;  it  was  said  that  the  army  was  de- 
stroyed, and  I  brought  back  eight-ninths  of  it 
to  Toulon  !  The  Russians  claim  the  victory  : 
so  they  did  after  Pultusk,  after  Austerlitz. 
They  were  pursued,  on  the  contrary,  at  the 
point  of  the  sword,  till  they  were  under  the 
guns  of  Ku'nigsberg.  They  had  fifteen  or  six- 
teen generals  killed.  Their  loss  was  immense. 
We  made  a  downright  butchery  of  it." 

There  had  been  printed  some  fragments  of 
letters  from  Major-general  Berthier,  making 
mention  of  the  dangers  to  which  Napoleon  had 
been  exposed.  "They  are  publishing,"  he 
wrote  to  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres, 
"  that  I  command  my  advanced  posts.  . .  .what 
absurdities  !  I  begged  you  not  to  allow  any- 
thing but  the  Bulletins  to  be  inserted  in  ihe 
Moniteur.  If  this  is  not  attended  to,  you  will 
prevent  me  from  writing  at  all,  and  then  you 
will  be  more  uneasy. . .  .  Berthier  writes  amidst 
a  field  of  battle,  wearied,  and  not  expecting 
that  his  letters  will  be  printed." — (Osterode, 
March  5.) 

Thus  Napoleon  had  no  desire  that  his  own 
personal  courage  should  be  noticed,  for  that 
very  courage  became  a  danger.  It  was  ac- 
knowledging too  plainly  that  this  military  mo- 
narchy, without  past,  without  future,  was  at  the 
mercy  of  a  cannon-ball. 

The  transports  caused  in  France  by  the  won- 
ders of  Austerlitz  and  Jena,  were  succeeded 
by  a  sort  of  uneasiness.  Paris  was  dull  and 
deserted,  for  the  emperor  and  the  chiefs  of  the 
army,  who  constituted  a  great  part  of  the  high 
society  of  that  reign,  were  absent.  Trade  suf- 
fered. Napoleon  enjoined  his  sisters  and  the 
Princes  Cambaceres  and  Lebrun  to  give  enter- 
tainments. He  wished  to  fill  up  in  this  way 
the  void  created  by  his  absence.  He  ordered  a 
survey  to  be  made  of  the  movables  of  the 
crown  at  Fontainebleau.Versailles,  Compiegne, 
St.  Cloud,  and  several  millions  taken  from  his 
personal  savings  to  be  expended  on  stuffs  in 
the  manufactories  of  Lyons.  Rouen,  and  St. 
Quentin.  He  directed  the  sums  laid  out  to  be 
proportioned,  not  to  the  wants  of  the  imperial 
residences,  but  to  the  wants  of  the  different 
branches  of  trade.  Though  he  generally  made 
a  point  of  checking  the  fondness  of  the  em- 
press and  his  sisters  for  expense,  on  this  occa- 
sion he  recommended  prodigality  to  them.  He 
desired  that  the  Sinking  Fund,  that  is  to  say, 
the  treasury  of  the  army,  should  devote  a  mil- 
lion per  month  to  be  lent  to  the  principal 
manufacturers,  on  deposit  of  goods,  and  he  de 
manded  a  projet  for  converting  that  accidental 
measure  into  a  permanent  institution,  having 
for  its  object,  he  said,  not  the  creation  of  a 
Z 


266 


HISTORY   OP'    THE 


[March,  1807. 


chest  for  the  assistance  of  bankrupts,  but  of  a 
provident  chest  destined  to  uphold  manufactu- 
rers employing  a  great  number  of  hands,  whom 
they  would  be  obliged  to  discharge,  if  they 
were  not  furnished  with  facilities  for  paying 
them. 

Lastly,  he  devised  an  extraordinary  medium 
for  procuring  capitals  for  commerce,  and  for 
making  at  the  same  time  a  notable  improve- 
ment in  the  administration  of  the  finances.  At 
that  time,  still  less  than  at  the  present  day,  was 
the  sum  total  of  the  taxes  rigidly  levied  within 
the  year.  Thus  the  bills  of  the  receivers- 
general,  representatives  of  the  taxes,  were  not 
due,  for  a  part  at  least,  till  three  or  four  months 
after  the  turn  of  the  year,  that  is  to  say,  till 
March,  April,  or  May,  in  the  following  year. 
It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  discount  them, 
a  business  undertaken  by  a  class  of  agents 
who  carried  on  a  very  active  stock-jobbing.  It 
was  the  floating  debt  of  the  time,  which  was 
met  with  the  bills  of  the  receivers-general,  as 
it  is  now  met  with  the  bons  royaux.  This  dis- 
count required  a  capital  of  eighty  millions  on 
the  part  of  the  Paris  capitalists.  Napoleon's 
idea  was  to  determine  that,  for  1808,  for  exam- 
ple, that  portion  of  the  bills  which  should  not 
be  due  till  1809,  should  be  applied  to  the  ser- 
vice of  1809  itself,  and  the  same  in  future,  so 
that  the  service  of  each  year  should  have  for 
its  use  only  those  bills  which  fell  due  in  that 
same  year.  The  deficit,  answering  to  the  por- 
tion of  the  bills  carried  back  to  1809,  would 
remain  to  be  provided  for.  This  was  a  sum 
of  eighty  millions  to  be  raised.  Napoleon  pro- 
posed to  furnish  it  by  a  loan  which  the  treasury 
of  the  state  should  obtain  from  the  treasury  of 
the  army  at  a  moderate  rate.  "  By  this  means,"  j 
he  wrote,  "my  bills  would  fall  due  all  within 
twelve  months;  the  public  treasury  would  save 
five  or  six  millions  in  expenses  of  negotiation  ; 
our  manufactures  and  our  commerce  would 
make  an  immense  gain,  since  there  would  be 
eighty  millions  idle,  which,  as  they  could  not 
find  employment  at  the  treasury,  would  be 
placed  in  commerce." — (Note  to  Prince  Cam- 
baceres,  Osterode,  April  1.) 

He  gave  orders  for  making  in  Paris  itself  a 
considerable  quantity  of  shoes,  boots,  harness, 
and  gun-carriages,  to  give  employment  to  the 
workmen  of  the  capital.  The  articles  made  in 
Paris  were  of  better  quality  than  those  made 
elsewhere.  The  only  question  was,  how  to 
transport  them  to  Poland.  Napoleon  devised 
for  this  an  expedient  as  simple  as  it  was  inge- 
nious. At  this  period  a  company  of  contractors 
was  charged  with  the  transports  of  the  army, 
and  furnished  at  a  fixed  rate  the  caissons  which 
carried  the  bread,  the  baggage,  every  thing  in 
short  that  follows  the  troops,  even  the  most 
lightly  equipped.  Napoleon  had  been  struck, 
amidst  the  quagmires  of  Pultusk  and  Golymin, 
with  the  little  zeal  of  those  drivers  enrolled  by 
private  industry,  with  their  want  of  courage 
in  danger,  and,  as  he  had  determined  to  orga- 
nize the  artillery-drivers  militarily,  so  he  re- 
solved likewise  to  organize  the  baggage-drivers 
militarily;  thinking  that,  the  danger  being 
nearly  equal  for  all  those  who  concur  in  the 
different  services  of  an  army,  it  was  necessary 
lo  connect  them  all  by  the  bond  of  honour, 


and  to  treat  them  as  soldiers,  in  order  to  im- 
pose on  them  the  duties  of  soldiers.  He  had 
therefore  given  orders  for  forming  successively 
in  Paris,  battalions  of  the  train,  charged  with  the 
driving  of  the  equipages,  for  constructing  cais- 
sons, for  purchasing  draught  horses,  and,  when 
the  personal  and  material  establishment  of 
these  battalions  should  be  organized,  for  de- 
spatching them  to  the  Vistula.  Instead  of 
coming  empty,  these  new  military  equipages 
were  to  bring  the  articles  of  equipment  manu- 
factured in  Paris.  These  articles  might  arrive 
in  time  on  the  Vistula,  for  the  journey  took  two 
months,  and  it  was  possible  that  the  war  might 
last  five  or  six.  Napoleon  purposed  by  the 
whole  of  these  measures  to  remedy  the  tempo- 
rary stagnation  of  commerce,  and  to  make  the 
war  consumption  compensate  for  the  deficiency 
of  the  peace  consumption.  The  one,  in  fact, 
consumes  not  less  than  the  other:  and,  when 
money  is  not  scarce,  a  skilful  administration 
can  furnish  workmen  with  the  employment 
that  peace  would  supply,  and  afford  them  the 
means  of  earning  a  livelihood  even  amidst  the 
difficulties  of  war. 

Such  is  the  multitude  of  objects  to  which  he 
directed  his  attention  in  the  village  of  Oste- 
rode, living  in  a  sort  of  barn,  whence  he  awed 
Europe  and  governed  his  empire.  A  more 
suitable  abode  was  at  length  found  for  him,  at 
Finkenstein  ;  it  was  a  country  house,  belong- 
ing to  one  of  the  employes  of  the  crown  of 
Prussia,  and  spacious  enough  to  accommodate 
himself  with  his  staff  and  his  military  house- 
hold. There,  as  at  Osterode,  he  was  in  the 
centre  of  his  cantonments,  and  had  it  in  his 
power  to  repair  to  any  quarter  where  his  pre- 
sence might  be  necessary.  The  portfolios  of 
the  several  ministers  were  sent  to  him  every  • 
week,  and  he  turned  his  attention  to  the  most 
important  as  well  as  the  most  trivial  matters. 
The  theatres  themselves,  at  this  distance,  did 
not  escape  his  active  superintendence.  There 
had  been  composed  in  his  honour  music  and 
verses  which  he  deemed  bad.  By  his  order, 
others  were  composed,  in  which  he  was  less 
praised,  but  in  which  elevated  sentiments  were 
expressed  in  suitable  language.  He  directed 
that  the  authors  should  be  thanked  and  re- 
warded, adding  these  noble  words:  The  best 
way  to  praise  me  is  to  write  things  which  excite  heroic 
sentiments  in  the  nation,  in  youth,  and  in  the  army. 
He  read  the  public  papers  attentively,  followed 
the  meetings  of  the  French  Academy,  desired 
that  the  tendencies  of  the  minds  of  writers 
should  be  corrected,  and  that  an  eye  should  be 
kept  opon  the  orations  delivered  before  the 
Academy.  He  considered  the  attacks  made 
by  the  Journal  de  I'JZmpire  and  the  Meratre  de 
France  upon  the  philosophers  as  mischievous. 
"  It  is  necessary."  said  he,  "  to  have  discreet 
men  at  the  head  of  those  journals.  Those 
two  journals  affect  religion  even  to  bigotry. 
Instead  of  attacking  the  excesses  of  the  ex- 
clusive system  of  some  philosophers,  they 
attack  philosophy  and  human  knowledge.  In- 
stead of  keeping  the  productions  of  the  age 
within  bounds  by  sound  criticism,  they  dis- 
courage, depreciate  and  debase  them.  I  am 
not  adverting  to  political  opinions :  one  need 
not  be  very  shrewd  to  perceive  that  if  they 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


267 


durst  launch  into  them,  they  would  not  be  | 
much  sounder  than  those  of  the  Courrier  i 
frangais." 

The  French  Academy  had  held  a  meeting 
for  the  reception  of"  Cardinal  Maury,  recalled 
to  France  and  replaced  in  the  chair  which  he 
had  formerly  occupied.  The  Abbe  Sicard,  in  i 
receiving  Cardinal  Maury,  had  expressed  him-  ! 
self  in  unbecoming  terms  of  Mirabeau.  The 
person  received  had  spoken  no  better  of  him, 
and  this  academical  meeting  had  furnished 
occasion  for  a  philippic  against  the  Revolution 
and  the  revolutionists.  Napoleon,  disagree- 
ably affected,  wrote  to  Fouche,  the  minister: 
"I  recommend  to  you,  lei  there  be  no  reaction 
in  the  public  opinion.  Let  Mirabeau  be  men- 
tioned in  terms  of  praise.  There  are  many 
things  in  that  meeting  of  the  Academy  which 
do  not  please  me.  When  shall  we  grow  wiser! 
When  shall  we  be  animated  with  genuine 
Christian  charity,  and  when  will  our  actions 
not  have  for  their  object  to  humble  anybody ! 
When  shall  we  absiain  from  awakening  recol- 
lections which  go  to  the  heart  of  so  many 
persons  !" — (Finkenstein,  May  20.) 

At  another  time,  he  learned  from  the  corre- 
spondence of  all  kinds,  which  he  paid  for  libe- 
rally and  read  with  care,  that  intestine  quarrels 
divided  the  administration  of  the  Opera,  and 
that  there  was  a  apposition  to  persecute  a 
machinist,  on  account  ?f  a  change  of  decora- 
tion which  had  failed :  "  1  will  not  have  wrang- 
ling anywhere,"  he  wrote  to  M.  Fouche.  "I 

will  not  suffer  M to  be  the  victim  of  a 

fortuitous  accident;  my  custom  is  to  support 
the  unfortunate :  whether  actresses  ascend 
into  the  clouds  or  ascend  not,  I  will  not  allow 
that  to  be  made  a  handle  for  intriguing." — 
(April  12.) 

At  the  same  time  he  showed  extreme  solici- 
tude about  the  institutions  for  education,  par- 
ticularly about  that  of  Ecouen,  where  the 
daughters  of  poor  legionaries  were  to  be  edu- 
cated. He  wished  them,  he  wrote  to  M.  de 
Lacepede,  to  be  trained  up  into  women,  sim- 
ple, chaste,  worthy  of  being  united  to  men 
who  should  have  served  him  faithfully,  either 
in  the  army  or  in  the  civil  administration. 
To  render  them  such,  it  was  requisite,  accord- 
ing to  him,  that  they  should  be  brought  up  in 
sentiments  of  solid  piety.  "I  have  attached," 
said  he,  "  but  a  secondary  importance  to  the 
religious  institutions  *br  the  school  of  Fon- 
tainebleau.  The  objecC  of  that  is  to  train 
young  officers ;  but  as  for  Ecouen,  it  is  a  to- 
tally different  affair.  It  is  there  proposed  to 
train  up  women,  wives,  mothers  of  families. 
Make  believers  of  them,  not  reasotiers.  The  weak- 
ness of  the  brain  of  women,  the  mobility  of  their 
ideas,  their  destination  in  the  social  order,  the  neces- 
sity for  inspiring  them  with  a  perpetual  resignatum 
and  a  mild  and  easy  charity — all  this  renders  the 
yoke  of  religion  indispensable  for  them.  I  am 
desirous  that  they  may  leave  it  not  agreeable 
women,  but  virtuous  women,  that  their  agree- 
able qualities  may  be  of  the  heart,  not  of  the  mind." 
In  consequence,  he  recommended  that  they 
should  be  taught  history  and  literature,  that 
they  should  be  spared  the  study  of  the  ancient 
languages  and  too  abstruse  sciences ;  that 
they  should  also  learn  sufficient  of  natural 


philosophy  to  be  able  to  dispel  the  popular 
ignorance  around  them,  somewhat  of  ordi- 
nary medicine,  of  botany,  of  dancing,  but 
not  that  of  the  Opera,  the  art  of  ciphering, 
and  all  sorts  of  needle-work.  Their  apart- 
ments, he  added,  must  be  furnished  by  their 
own  handiwork.  They  must  make  their  che- 
mises, their  stockings,  their  dresses,  their  caps, 
and  be  able,  in  case  of  need,  to  make  clothes 
for  their  infants.  I  want  to  make  these  young 
girls  useful  women,  certain  that  I  shall  there- 
by make  them  agreeable  women.  If  I  were 
to  allow  any  one  to  set  about  making  them 
agreeable  women,  I  should  soon  have  them 
turned  into  female  coxcombs,  (fetiies  malireues.) 
— (Finkenstein,  May  15.) 

Amidst  this  prodigious  activity,  sometimes 
changing  from  beneficent  vigilance  to  jealous 
mistrust,  which  cannot  fail  to  happen  with  a 
new  and  absolute  master,  Napoleon  turned  his 
attention  to  the  police,  knew  what  persons  en- 
tered Paris  and  what  left  it.  He  was  informed 
that  Madame  de  Stael  had  returned  thither, 
that  she  had  already  visited  at  several  coun- 
try-houses in  the  environs,  and  made  more 
than  one  hostile  speech.  Alleging,  that,  if 
he  did  not  interfere,  she  would  compromise 
good  citizens,  whom  he  should  afterwards  be 
obliged  to  treat  with  severity,  he  had  ordered 
her,  notwithstanding  many  contrary  solici- 
tations, to  be  expelled  from  Paris.  As  he  dis- 
trusted Fouche,  the  minister,  who  was  dis- 
posed to  spare  influential  persons,  he  had 
enjoined  him  to  make  her  set  off  without  de- 
lay, and  had  recommended  to  the  Arch-chan- 
cellor Cambaceres  to  see  to  the  execution  of 
this  order.  (March  26.)  At  the  same  mo- 
ment he  was  informed  that  the  police  had 
sent  away  from  Paris  an  old  Conventionalist, 
named  Ricord.  For  the  latter  nobody  soli- 
cited, no  great  personage  claimed  indulgence  ; 
all  were  hurried  away  by  the  reaction,  and 
there  was  neither  favour  nor  humanity  for 
those  who  were  called  revolutionists.  "  Why," 
wrote  Napoleon  to  Fouche,  "  why  send  Ricord 
the  Conventionalist  away  from  Paris  1  If  he 
is  a  dangerous  man,  he  ought  not  to  have 
been  suffered  to  return,  contrary  to  the  laws 
of  the  year  VIII.  But  since  he  has  been  per- 
mitted to  come  back,  he  must  be  left  there. 
What  he  did  formerly  is  of  little  consequence. 
He  conducted  himself  in  the  time  of  the  Con- 
vention like  a  man  anxious  to  make  his  for- 
tune; he  joined  in  the  cry  of  the  time.  He  is 
now  in  easy  circumstances,  and  will  not  in- 
volve himself  in  any  scrapes  for  the  sake  of  a 
subsistence.  Let  him  then  be  tolerated  in 
Paris,  unless  there  are  strong  reasons  to  pre- 
vent his  residing  there."  (March  6.) 

By  the  same  pains  that  he  took  to  inquire 
about  every  thing,  he  learned  from  MM. 
Monge  and  Laplace,  that  a  man  of  science 
whom  he  particularly  honoured  and  cherished, 
M.  Berthollet,  was  in  some  pecuniary  embar- 
rassment. "  I  am  informed,"  he  wrote  to 
him,  "  that  you  are  in  need  of  150,000  francs. 
I  shall  give  my  treasurer  an  order  to  place 
that  sum  at  your  disposal,  very  glad  to  find 
this  occasion  to  be  useful  to  yon,  and  to  give 
you  a  proof  of  my  esteem."-  <  Fmkens'.ein, 
May  1.) 


268 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


LMarch,  1807. 


He  then  addressed  further  advice  to  his  bro- 
thers, Louis  and  Joseph,  on  the  manner  of 
reigning,  the  one  in  Holland,  the  other  in  Na- 
ples. He  accused  Louis  of  favouring,  from 
the  vanity  of  an  upstart  king,  the  party  of  the 
old  government,  the  Orange  party ;  of  creat- 
ing marshals  without  having  an  army ;  of  in- 
stituting an  order,  which  he  gave  to  all  comers ; 
to  Frenchmen  who  were  unknown  to  him,  to 
Dutchmen  who  had  never  rendered  him  any 
service.  He  reproached  Joseph  with  being 
weak,  careless,  more  engaged  with  ostentatious 
reforms  than  with  the  subjection  of  the  Cala- 
brias;  with  preceding  the  suppression  of  the 
monks,  a  measure  which  he  highly  approved, 
by  a  preamble  that  seemed  to  be  drawn  up  by 
philosophers,  not  by  statesmen.  "  Such  a  pre- 
amble," he  said,  "  ought  to  be  written  in  the 
style  of  an  enlightened  pontiff,  who  suppresses 
the  monks  because  they  are  unserviceable  to 
religion,  burdensome  to  the  Church.  I  con- 
ceive a  bad  opinion  of  a  government  whose 
papers  are  directed  by  the  mania  of  fine  viriting" 
— (April  14.)  "  You  live  too  much,"  said  he, 
"  with  literary  and  scientific  men.  They  are 
coquettes  with  whom  one  must  keep  up  a  com- 
merce of  gallantry,  but  whom  one  must  never 
think  of  making  one's  wife  or  one's  minister." 
He  reproached  him  with  creating  illusions  re- 
specting his  situation  at  Naples,  with  flatter- 
ing himself  that  he  was  beloved,  when  he  had 
reigned  but  a  year  at  most.  "  Ask  yourself," 
said  he,  "what  would  become  of  you  if  there 
were  no  longer  thirty  thousand  French  in  Na- 
ples. When  you  have  reigned  twenty  years, 
and  have  made  yourself  feared  and  esteemed, 
then  you  may  venture  to  believe  that  your 
throne  is  consolidated."  He  then  drew  for 
him  the  following  sketch  of  the  situation  of 
the  French  in  Poland.  "  At  Naples,  you  are 
eating  green  peas,  and  perhaps  seeking  the 
shade  already :  we,  on-  the  contrary,  are  still  in 
the  month  of  January.  I  have  had  the  trenches 


opened  before  Dantzig.  jne  hundred 
of  cannon,  two  hundred  thousand  pounds  of 
gunpowder,  are  beginning  to  be  collected 
there.  Our  works  are  60  fathoms  from  the 
place,  which  has  a  garrison  of  six  thousand 
Russians  and  twenty  thousand  Prussians,  com- 
manded by  Marshal  Kalkreuth.  I  hope  to  take 

it  in  a  fortnight For  the  rest,  give  your 

self  no  uneasiness." — (Finkenstein,  April  19.) 
Such  were,  amidst  the  snows  of  Poland,  the  va- 
rious occupations  of  that  extraordinary  genius, 
embracing  every  thing,  superintending  every 
thing,  aspiring  to  govern  not  only  his  soldiers 
and  his  agents,  but  minds  themselves  :  wanting 
not  only  to  act  but  to  think  for  everybody :  most 
frequently  disposed  to  do  good,  but  sometimes, 
in  his  incessant  activity,  suffering  himself  to  be 
drawn  into  evil,  as  it  happens  to  him  who  can 
do  any  thing,  and  who  finds  no  obstacle  to  his 
own  impulsions ;  at  one  time  preventing  reac- 
tions, persecutions,  at  another  in  the  bosom 
of  immense  glory,  so  keenly  sensitive  to  the 
sting  of  an  enemy's  tongue  as  to  descend  from 
his  greatness  to  persecute  a  woman,  on  the 
same  day  that  he  defended  a  member  of  the 
Convention  against  the  reacting  spirit  of  the 
moment !  Let  us  rejoice  that  we  have  at  last 
become  subject  to  the  law,  to  the  law  equal  for 
all,  and  which  does  not  expose  us  to  the  peril 
of  being  dependent  on  the  good  or  evil  move- 
ments of  even  the  greatest  and  the  most  gene- 
rous of  souls.  Yes,  the  law  is  better  than  any 
human  will,  whatever  it  may  be!  Let  us  be 
just,  however,  to  that  will,  which  found  means 
to  accomplish  such  prodigious  things,  which 
accomplished  them  by  our  hands,  which  em- 
ployed its  fertile  energy  in  reorganizing  French 
society,  in  reforming  Europe,  in  carrying  our 
power  and  our  principles  over  the  whote 
world,  and  which,  if,  after  all  that  it  did  with 
us,  it  has  not  left  us  the  power  that  passes 
away,  has  at  least  left  us  the  glory  that  is  perma- 
nent— and  glory  sometimes  brings  back  power. 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


BOOK    XXVII. 


FRIEDLAND   AND    TILSIT. 

Events  in  the  East  during  the  Winter  of  1S07—  Sultan  Selim,  frightened  by  the  Threats  of  Russia,  restores  the 
Hospodars,  Ipsilanti.  and  Maruzzi  —  The  Russians,  nevertheless,  continue  their  March  to  the  Turkish  Frontier 
—The  Porte,  on  learning  the  Violation  of  its  Territory,  at  the  instigation  of  General  Sebastian!,  sends  the  Rus- 
sian Minister,  M.  d'ltalinski,  his  Vassports  —  The  English,  in  concert  with  the  Russians,  demand  the  return  of 
M.  d'ltalinski,  the  Expulsion  of  General  Sebastian!,  and  an  immediate  Declaration  of  War  against  France  — 
Resistance  of  the  Porte  and  Retreat  of  Mr.  Arbuthnot,  the  English  Minister,  on  board  the  English  Fleet  at 
Tenedos—  Admiral  Duckworth,  with  a  Squadron  of  seven  Sail  of  the  Line  and  iwo  Frigates,  forces  the  Darda- 
nelles, without  sustaining  any  Damage,  and  destroys  a  Turkish  Naval  Division  at  Cape  Nagara  —  The  Turkish 
Government,  divided,  is  on  the  point  of  yielding  —  General  Sebastiani  encourages  Sultan  Selim,  and  persuades 
him  to  feign  a  Negotiation,  to  gain  Time  for  arming  Constantinople  —  The  Counsel  of  the  French  Ambassador 
is  lollowed,  and  Constantinople  armed  in  a  few  Days,  with  the  Assistance  of  the  French  Officers  —  Parleys 
succeed  between  the  Porte  and  the  British  Squadron  lying  at  the  Prince's  Islands  —  These  Parleys  terminate 
in  a  Refusal  to  comply  with  the  Demands  of  the  British  Legation—  Admiral  Duckworth  proceeds  to  Constanti- 
nople, finds  the  City  armed  with  three  hundred  Pieces  of  Cannon,  and  determines  to  regain  the  Dardanelles  — 
He  passes  through  them  again,  but  with  considerable  damage  to  his  squadron—  Great  Effect  produced  in  Europe 
by  this  Event,  in  favour  of  the  Policy  of  Napoleon  —  Though  victorious.  Napoleon,  impressed  with  the  difficul- 
ties which  Nature  opposes  to  him  in  Poland,  reverts  to  the  Idea  of  a  great  continental  Alliance  —  lie  makes 
fresh  Efforts  to  discover  the  Secret  of  the  Policy  of  Austria  —  The  Court  of  Vienna,  in  answer  to  his  Questions, 
offers  its  Mediation  with  the  belligerent  Powers  —  Napoleon  regards  this  Offer  as  a  Mode  of  intermeddling  in 
the  Quarrel,  and  of  preparing  for  War  —  He  calls  out  immediately  a  third  Conscription,  draws  new  Forces 
from  France  and  Italy,  creates  wilh  extraordinary  Promptness  an  Army  of  Reserve  of  one  hundred  thousand 
Men,  and  gives  Austria  an  Intimation  of  these  Measures  —  Flourishing  State  of  the  French  Army  on  the  I,ower 
Vistula  and  the  Passarge  —  Winter,  long  delayed,  is  severely  felt  —  Napoleon  avails  himself  of  this  Period  of 
Inaction  to  undertake  the  Siege  of  Dantzig—  Marshal  Lefebvre  charged  with  the  Command  of  the  Troops, 
General  Chasseloup  with  the  Direction  of  the  Engineering  Operations  —  Long  and  difficult  Works  of  that  memo- 
rable Siege  —  The  two  Sovereigns  of  Prussia  and  Russia  resolve  to  send  a  strong  Force  to  relieve  Dantzig  — 
Napoleon,  on  his  Part,  disposes  his  Corps  in  such  a  Manner  as  to  be  able  to  reinforce  Marshal  Lefebvre  on  a 
sudden  —  Brilliant  Action  fought  under  the  Walls  of  Dantzig  —  Last  Works  of  Approach  —  The  French  ready  to 
make  the  Assault  —  The  Place  surrenders  —  Immense  Resources  in  Corn  and  Wine  found  in  the  City  of  Dantzig  — 
Marshal  Lefebvre  created  Duke  of  Dantzig  —  The  Return  of  Spring  decides  Napoleon  to  resume  the  Offensive  — 
The  Commencement  of  the  Operations  fixed  for  the  10th  of  June,  l507  —  The  Russians  anticipate  the  French,  and 
on  the  5th  of  June  make  a  general  Attack  on  the  Cantonments  of  the  Passarge  —  Marshal  Ney.  having  two-thirds 
of  the  Russian  Army  upon  him,  opposes  them  -with  heroic  Intrepidity  between  Guttstadt  and  Deppen  —  That  Mar- 
shal gives  Napoleon  time  to  concentrate  the  whole  French  Army  on  Deppen  —  Napoleon,  in  his  turn,  takes  a  vigor- 
ous Offensive,  and  follows  up  the  Russians  closely  —  General  Benningsen  retires  precipitately  towards  the  Pregel, 
descending  the  Alle  —  Napoleon  marches  in  such  a  manner  as  to  interpose  between  the  Russians  and  KSnigsherg  — 
The  Head  of  the  French  Army  finds  the  Russian  Army  encamped  at  Heilsberg  —  Sanguinary  Action  on  the  10th 
of  June  —  Napoleon,  arriving  in  the  Evening  at  Heilsberg  with  the  bulk  of  his  Forces,  prepares  for  a  decisive  En- 
gagement on  the  following  day,  when  the  Russians  decamp  —  He  continue?  to  maiMEuvre  in  such  a  manner  as  to 


cut  them  off  from  Konigsberg  —  He  sends  his  left,  composed  of  Marshals  Soult  and  Davout,  towards  Konigsberg, 
ps  of  Marshals  Lannes,  Mortier,  Ney,  Bernadotte,  and  the  Guard,  follows  the  Russian  Army 
along  the  Alle  —  General  Benningsen,  alarmed  for  the  Fate  ot  Konigsberg,  hastens  to  pass  the  Alle  at  Friedland, 


with  the  intention  of  proceeding  to  the  Relief  of  the  Capital  —  Napoleon  surprises  him  on  the  Morning  of  the  14th, 
at  the  Moment  when  he  is  passing  the  Alle  —  Memorable  Battle  of  Friedland  —  The  Russians,  overwhelmed, 
retire  towards  the  Niemen,  abandoning  Konigsberg  —  Konigsberg  taken  —  Armistice  offered  by  the  Russians  and 
accepted  by  Napoleon—  Removal  of  the  French  Head-quarters  to  Tilsit  —  Interview  between  Alexander  and 
Napoleon,  on  a  Raft  placed  in  the  middle  of  the  Niemen  —  Napoleon  invites  Alexander  to  cross  the  Niemeu, 
and  to  take  up  his  Abode  at  Tilsit  —  An  Intimacy  speedily  ensues  between  the  two  Monarchs  —  Napoleon  gains 
an  Ascendency  over  the  Mind  of  Alexander,  and  induces  him  to  concur  in  vast  Designs,  tending  to  force  all 
Europe  to  take  Arms  against  England,  if  she  will  not  consent  to  an  equitable  Peace  —  The  Partition  of  the 
Turkish  Empire  is  to  be  the  Price  of  Alexander's  Compliance  —  Dispute  about  Constantinople—  Alexander 
finally  adheres  to  all  Napoleon's  Plans,  and  appears  to  feel  the  warmest  Friendship  for  him  —  Napoleon,  put  of 
Consideration  for  Alexander,  consents  to  restore  to  the  King  of  Prussia  part  of  his  Dominions  —  The  King  of 
Prussia  repairs  to  Tilsit  —  His  Part  between  Alexander  and  Napoleon—  The  Queen  of  Prussia  also  goes  to  Til- 
sit, to  endeavour  to  obtain  from  Napoleon  some  Concessions  favourable  to  Prussia  —  Napoleon  respectful 
towards  that  unfortunate  Queen,  but  inflexible  —  Conclusion  of  the  Negotiations  —  Patent  and  Secret  Treaties 
of  Tilsit  —  Secret  Convention  still  unknown  to  Europe  —  Napoleon  and  Alexander,  agreed  upon  all  Points,  part 
with  extraordinary  Tokens  of  Affection,  and  a  Promise  to  meet  again  soon  —  Return  of  Napoleon  to  France, 
after  an  Absence  of  nearly  a  Year  —  His  Glory  after  Tilsit  —  Character  of  his  Policy  at  this  Period. 


WHILE  Napoleon,  cantoned  on  the  Lower 
Vistula,  was  waiting  amidst  the  snows  of  Po- 
land for  the  return  of  spring  to  allow  him  to 
resume  the  offensive,  and  employing  the  inter- 
val of  this  apparent  inaction  in  laying  siege 
to  Dantzig,  in  recruiting  his  army,  in  govern- 
ing his  vast  empire,  the  East,  having  recently 
interfered  in  the  quarrel  of  the  West,  afforded 
Dseful  assistance  to  his  arms  and  procured 
«ignal  success  for  his  policy. 

We  have  already  made  the  reader  acquainted 
with  Sultan  Selim,  the  nobleness  of  his  cha- 
racter, the  high  qualities  of  his  mind.  We 
have  also  shown  the  embarrassment  of  his 
situation  between  Russia  and  England,  whom 
he  disliked,  and  France,  to  whom  he  was  at- 
tached from  taste,  instinct,  foresight,  for  he 
well  knew  that  she,  even  in  the  days  of  her 


greatest  ambition,  would  never  covet  Constan- 
tinople. We  have  yet  to  relate  what  had  oc- 
curred while  the  French  army  was  fighting  in 
December  the  battle  of  Pultusk,  and  in  Feb- 
ruary that  of  Eylau. 

Sultan  Selim,  as  we  have  seen,  had  begun 
by  deposing  the  hospodars  of  'Wallachia  and! 
Moldavia,  Maruzzi  and  Ipsilanti,  notoriously 
devoted  to  the  policy  of  Russia.  But,  M.  d'lta- 
linski having  soon  threatened  him  with  an 
immediate  rupture  unless  he  replaced  them  in' 
their  post,  he  had  yielded  to  the  menaces  of 
this  represenative  of  Russia,  and  made  up 
his  mind  to  commit  the  government  of  the 
provinces  of  the  Danube  to  two  professed  ene- 
mies of  his  empire.  Russia  appealed,  in  or- 
der to  extort  this  concession,  to  *,ne  treaty  of 
Cainardge,  which  conferred  >n  her  a  sort  of 
c  2 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[March,  1807 


right  to  intervene  in  the  government  of  Molda- 
via and  Wallachia.  No  sooner  had  Sultan 
Selim,  impelled  much  more  by  the  will  of  his 
ministers  than  by  his  own,  complied  with  the 
demand,  than  he  wrote  to  Napoleon,  to  solicit 
his  indulgence,  to  assure  him  that  the  act  to 
which  he  had  suffered  himself  to  be  urged 
was  uot  a  desertion  of  the  alliance  of  France, 
but  a  measure  of  prudence  commanded  by  the 
alarming  disorganization  of  the  Turkish  forces. 
Napoleon  replied  immediately,  and,  far  from 
discouraging  him  by  expressions  of  displea- 
sure, he  had  pitied,  soothed,  cheered,  and  of- 
fered him  the  twofold  succour  of  the  French 
army  of  Dalmatia,  which  might  be  sent  Ihrough 
Bosnia  to  the  Lower  Danube,  and  of  the 
French  fleet  at  Cadiz,  which  was  ready  to  sail 
from  Spain  for  the  Dardanelles.  That  fleet, 
protected  by  the  straits,  as  soon  as  it  had 
passed  the  Bosphorus,  would  presently  be  mis- 
tress of  the  Black  Sea,  and  afford  a  great  sup- 
port there  to  the  Turks.  Meanwhile,  till  this 
succour  should  arrive,  Napoleon  had  ordered 
several  officers,  both  engineers  and  artillery, 
to  be  despatched  from  Dalmatia,  to  assist  the 
Turks  in  the  defence  of  Constantinople  and 
the  Dardanelles.  General  Sebastiani,  employ- 
ing with  skill  the  means  placed  at  his  dispo- 
sal, had  never  ceased  stimulating  the  sultan 
and  the  divan,  to  induce  them  to  declare  war 
against  the  Russians.  He  expatiated  to  them 
on  the  prodigious  success  of  Napoleon  in  the 
plains  of  the  north,  his  bold  march  beyond  the 
Vistula,  his  grand  project  for  reconstituting  Po- 
land, and  promised,  in  his  name,  if  the  Porte 
would  take  arms,  lo  obtain  for  it  the  revocation 
of  the  treaties  which  placed  it  in  the  dependence 
of  Russia,  perhaps  even  the  restitution  of  the 
Crimea. 

Sultan  Selim  would  willingly  have  followed 
the  advice  of  General  Sebastiani,  bnt  his  min- 
isters were  divided ;  one  half  of  them,  sold  to 
the  Russians  and  the  English,  openly  betrayed 
him ;  the  other  half  trembled  to  think  of  the 
impotence  into  which  the  Ottoman  empire  had 
fallen.  Though  that  empire  still  numbered 
more  than  300,000  soldiers,  mostly  barbarians, 
some  half  trained,  and  a  fleet  of  about  twenty 
ships  of  respectable  appearance,  these  forces, 
as  badly  organized  as  they  were  commanded, 
could  scarcely  be  opposed  to  the  Russians  and 
the  English,  unless  many  French  officers,  ad- 
mitted into  the  ranks  of  the  Turkish  army, 
should  come  and  communicate  at  length  Eu- 
ropean knowledge  to  the  troops,  who  were 
brave,  it  is  true,  but  whose  fanaticism,  cooled 
by  time,  could  not  make  up  as  formerly  for 
the  want  of  the  resources  of  military  science. 
While  the  Porte  was  involved  in  these  per- 
plexities, the  Russians  had  put  an  end  to  its 
uncertainty  by  crossing  the  Dniester,  even  af- 
ter the  restoration  of  the  hospodars.  That  in- 
vincible attraction  which  draws  them  toward 
Constantinople  had  silenced  in  them  all  the 
considerations  of  prudence.  It  was,  in  truth, 
an  egregious  blunder,  when  they  had  the 
French  army  upon  their  hands,  and  scarcely 
200,000  men  to  oppose  to  it,  to  employ  50,000 
of  that  number  against  the  Turks.  But, 
amidst  the  convulsions  of  this  age,  the  idea  of 
seizing  any  occasion  to  take  what  they  pleased  [ 


was  then  the  prominent  idea  of  all  govern- 
ments. The  Russians,  therefore,  said  to  them 
selves  that  the  time  was  perhaps  come  fot 
them  to  take  possession  of  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia.  The  English,  on  their  part,  were 
not  sorry  to  find  a  pretext  for  reappearing  in 
Egypt.  If  they  were  not  yet  agreed  upon  thr 
immediate  partition  of  the  Turkish  empire — 
a  subject  on  which  it  seemed  very  difficult  for 
them  to  come  to  an  agreement — they  con- 
curred at  least  in  withdrawing  the  Porte  from 
the  influence  of  France,  and  of  withdrawing  it 
from  that  influence  by  force.  The  Russians 
were  to  cross  the  Dniester  and  the  English  to 
pass  the  Dardanelles.  At  the  same  time  a 
squadron  was  to  attack  Alexandria. 

This  explains  why  the  Russians  had  passed 
the  Dniester,  even  after  the  restoration  of  the 
hospodars.  They  had  marched  in  three  corps, 
one  proceeding  towards  Choczin,  another  to 
Bender,  and  the  third  to  Yassi.  Their  design 
was  to  advance  upon  Bucharest,  to  give  the 
hand  to  the  revolted  Servians.  Their  active 
forces  amounted  to  40,000  men,  and  to  50,000 
including  the  reserves  left  in  rear. 

While  the  Russians  were  acting  on  their 
side,  the  English  Admiralty  had  ordered  Rear- 
admiral  Louis  to  proceed  with  three  ships  to 
the  Dardanelles,  to  pass  through  them  without 
committing  any  hostile  act,  which  might  be 
done,  as  the  Turks  at  that  time  granted  a  free 
passage  to  the  armed  ships  of  England  and 
Russia — merely  to  reconnoitre  the  localities, 
to  receive  on  board  the  families  of  the  English 
merchants  who  should  not  choose  to  stay  at 
Constantinople,  during  the  events  with  which 
it  was  threatened,  and  then  to  return  to  Tene- 
dos,  and  wait  for  two  divisions — the  one  under 
Admiral  Sir  Sidney  Smith,  drawn  from  the 
seas  of  the  Levant,  the  other  under  Admiral 
Duckworth  from  Gibraltar.  The  three  divi- 
sions, amounting  to  eight  ships  of  the  line, 
several  frigates,  cutters,  and  bomb-vessels, 
were  to  be  placed  under  the  command  of  Ad- 
miral Duckworth,  and  to  act  on  the  requisition 
of  Mr.  Arbuthnot,  the  ambassador  of  England 
at  Constantinople. 

When  this  display  of  force  came  to  the 
knowledge  of  the  Turks,  either  through  the 
march  of  the  Russians  beyond  the  Dniester, 
or  by  the  appearance  of  Rear-admiral  Louis 
at  the  Dardanelles,  they  considered  war  as 
inevitable;  and  they  met  it,  some  with  enthu- 
siasm, others  with  terror.  Though  Russia 
strongly  protested  her  inoffensive  intentions, 
and  declared  that  her  troops  should  come  and 
occupy  pacifically  the  Danubian  provinces,  in 
order  to  insure  the  execution  of  treaties,  the 
Porte  was  not  to  be  deceived,  and  sent  M, 
d'ltalinski  his  passports.  The  two  straits 
were  immediately  closed  against  the  military 
flag  of  all  the  powers.  The  pachas  placed  in 
the  frontier  provinces  were  ordered  to  collect 
troops ;  and  Mustapha  Baraictar,  at  the  head 
of  80,000  men,  was  charged  to  punish  the 
Russians  for  their  contempt  of  the  Turkish 
army — a  contempt  carried  to  such  a  length  as 
to  lead  them  to  invade  the  empire  with  fewer 
than  50,000  men. 

M.  d'ltalinski  being  gone,  there  was  left  at 
Constantinople  Mr.  Arbuthnot,  the  English 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULAR  tf  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


minister,  whom  there  was  no  ground  for  dis- 
missing, since  no  hostility  had  been  commit- 
ted by  the  British  forces.  He  assumed  in  his 
turn  a  most  threatening  attitude,  insisted  on 
the  recall  of  M.  d'ltalinski,  the  expulsion  of 
General  Sebastiani,  the  immediate  adoption 
of  a  policy  hostile  to  France,  the  renewal  of 
the  treaties  which  bound  the  Porte  to  Russia 
and  England,  lastly,  the  free  passage  of  the 
straits  for  the  British  flag.  It  was  impossible 
to  carry  exigency  in  things,  arrogance  in  lan- 
guage, to  a  greater  length.  The  ambassador 
even  declared  that,  if  his  conditions  were  not 
accepted  forthwith,  he  should  soon  follow  M. 
d'ltalinski,  and  that  he  should  go  on  board  the 
English  squadron  lying  at  that  moment  at  Te- 
nedos,  and  bring  it  back  by  main  force  beneath 
the  walls  of  Constantinople.  This  threat  threw 
the  Divan  into  the  greatest  consternation.  Lit- 
tle reliance  could  be  placed  on  the  fortifications 
of  the  Dardanelles,  which  had  long  been  ne- 
glected ;  and,  the  Dardanelles  once  passed, 
people  trembled  at  the  idea  of  an  English 
squadron,  master  of  the  sea  of  Marmora,  bat- 
tering with  its  guns  the  Seraglio,  St.  Sophia, 
and  the  arsenal  of  Constantinople. 

Thus  the  disposition  to  yield  was  general. 
But  the  able  ambassador  who  then  represented 
France  at  Constantinople,  and  who  had  the 
advantage  of  being  both  a  diplomatist  and  a 
soldier,  upheld  the  sinking  courage  of  the 
Turks.  He  pointed  out  to  them  all  the  mis- 
chiefs attached,  under  this  circumstance,  to  a 
pusillanimous  conduct.  He  set  before  their 
eyes  the  coincidence  of  the  designs  of  England 
and  Russia,  the  concert  of  their  efforts  for  in- 
vading the  Ottoman  territory  by  land  and  sea, 
the  speedy  junction  of  a  Russian  army  and  a 
British  fleet  under  the  walls  of  the  capital,  the 
danger  of  a  total  partition  of  the  empire,  or, 
at  least,  a  partial  dismemberment,  by  the  si- 
multaneous occupation  of  Wallachia,  Molda- 
via and  Egypt.  He  laid  great  stress  on  the 
name  of  Napoleon,  his  victories,  his  presence 
on  the  Vistula,  and  the  advantages  which 
would  be  found  in  his  alliance.  He  announced 
the  sending  very  shortly  of  considerable  suc- 
cours, and  promised  the  restoration  of  the 
ancient  Ottoman  power,  if  the  Turks  would 
but  display  for  a  moment  the  courage  of  by- 
gone times.  These  exhortations,  reaching  the 
sultan  and  the  different  members  of  the  go- 
vernment, sometimes  through  direct,  some- 
times through  indirect  but  well-chosen  chan- 
nels, seconded,  moreover,  by  the  evidence  of 
the  danger,  by  the  tidings  successively  arriving 
of  the  triumphal  progress  of  Napoleon,  pro- 
duced the  effect  that  was  to  be  expected,  and 
the  divan,  after  numerous  alternations  of  ex- 
altation and  depression,  put  an  end  to  this 
negotiation,  by  refusing  to  accede  to  the  de- 
mands of  Mr.  Arbuthnot,  and  by  manifesting 
a  firm  resolution  to  allow  him  to  depart. 

The  English  minister  left  Constantinople 
on  the  29th  of  January,  and  embarked  in  the 
Endymion,  to  be  carried  on  board  the  squadron 
lying  off  Tenedos.  outside  the  Dardanelles. 
For  a  fortnight,  Mr.  Arbuthnot  never  ceased 
threatening  the  Porte  with  the  thunders  of  the 
British  squadron,  and  thus  employed,  in  cor- 
responding, the  time  which  Admiral  Duckworth 


271 

passed  in  waiting  for  a  favourable  wind.  Ge- 
neral Sebastiani,  on  his  part,  after  working  up 
the  Porte  to  an  energetic  resolution,  had  a  much 
more  difficult  task  to  perform — that  of  rousing 
it  from  its  apathy,  conquering  its  negligence, 
i  inducing  it  at  length  to  raise  some  batteries, 
either  on  the  straits,  or  at  Constantinople. 
This  was  not  an  easy  matter,  with  an  incapa- 
ble government,  which  had  long  since  fallen 
into  a  kind  of  imbecility,  and  was  paralyzed 
at  this  moment  by  the  fear  of  the  English 
ships  much  more  than  by  that  of  the  Rus- 
sian arms.  However,  by  employing  alternate 
urgency  with  the  sultan'  and  his  ministers, 
assisted  by  his  aides-de-camp,  Messrs,  de 
Lascours  and  de  Coigny,  he  obtained  a  com- 
mencement of  arming,  which,  though  very 
imperfect,  was  nevertheless  sufficient  to  excite 
some  apprehensions  in  the  English  admiral, 
who  wrote  to  his  government  that  the  opera- 
tion, though  not  impracticable,  would  be  more 
difficult  than  it  was  imagined  in  London. 

At  length,  all  the  correspondence  between 
Mr.  Arbuthnot  and  the  Reis-Effendi  having 
proved  ineffectual,  a  south  wind,  long  wished 
for,  having  sprung  up,  Admiral  Duckworth 
made  sail  on  the  morning  of  the  19th  of  Feb- 
ruary for  the  castles  of  the  Dardanelles. 

There  is  not  a  position  in  the  world  so  well 
known  even  to  the  persons  least  versed  in 
geographical  knowledge  as  that  of  Constanti- 
nople, situated  amidst  the  sea  of  Marmora,  an 
enclosed  sea,  to  which  there  is  no  penetrating 
but  by  forcing  the  Dardanelles  or  the  Bospho- 
rus.  When,  in  coming  from  the  Mediter- 
ranean, you  have  ascended  the  strait  of  the 
Dardanelles  for  fifteen  leagues,  a  strait  which, 
from  the  closeness  of  its  shores,  and  its  con- 
tinual current,  resembles  a  large  river,  you 
enter  the  sea  of  Marmora,  about  twenty 
leagues  wide  and  thirty  long,  and  you  find 
seated  on  a  beautiful  promontory,  washed  on 
one  side  by  the  sea  of  Marmora  itself,  on  the 
other  by  the  river  of  the  Fresh  Waters,  the 
renowned  city,  which  under  the  Greeks  was 
Byzantium,  under  the  Romans  Constantinople, 
under  the  Turks  Stamboul,  the  metropolis  of 
Islamism.  Beheld  from  the  sea,  it  presents  an 
amphitheatre  of  mosques  and  Moorish  palaces, 
among  which  are  distinguished  the  domes  of 
St.  Sophia,  and,  quite  at  the  extremity  of  the 
promontory  which  it  occupies,  you  perceive 
the  Seraglio,  where  the  descendants  of  Ma- 
homet, plunged  into  voluptuousness,  slumber 
over  the  danger  of  a  bombardment,  since  their 
imbecile  incapacity  is  no  longer  competent  to 
the  defence  of  the  Dardanelles,  those  two  doors 
of  their  empire,  which  it  is  nevertheless  so 
easy  to  shut. 

When  you  have  cleared  the  Dardanelles, 
traversed  the  sea  of  Marmora,  and  passed  the 
promontory  on  which  Constantinople  is  seated, 
you  arrive  at  a  second  strait,  narrower,  more 
formidable,  seven  leagues  only  in  length,  and 
the  shores  of  which  are  so  near  to  each  other, 
that  a  squadron  must  infallibly  perish,  if  it 
were  well  defended.  This  strait  is  that  of  the 
Bosphorus,  which  leads  to  the  Black  Sea. 
The  Dardanelles  are  for  the  Ottoman  empire 
the  door  opened  towards  England,  the  Bospho- 
rus the  door  opened  towards  Russia.  But,  if 


272 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[March,  1807. 


the  Russians  have  against  them  the  narrow 
dimensions  of  the  Bosphorus,  the  English  have 
against  them  the  current  setting  incessantly 
from  the  Black  Sea  into  the  Mediterranean.  It 
was  against  this  current,  which  it  is  impossible 
to  overcome  without  a  favorable  south  wind, 
that  the  English  began  to  beat  up  on  the  19th 
of  February,  1807.  Admiral  Duckworth  hav- 
ing under  his  command  the  two  rear-admirals, 
Louis  and  Sir  Sidney  Smith,  with  seven  ships 
of  the  line,  two  frigates,  and  several  cutters 
and  bomb-vessels,  sailed  in  column  up  the 
strait  of  the  Dardanelles.  He  had  on  the  pre- 


whose  fire  nothing  could  keep  off  or  counter- 
act. Part  of  the  population  insisted,  trembling, 
on  compliance  with  the  demands  of  the  Eng- 
lish. The  other  party,  indignant,  raised 
shouts  of  fury.  The  women  of  the  Seraglio, 
exposed  first  to  Admiral  Duckworth's  fire,  dis- 
turbed the  imperial  palace  by  their  lamenta- 
tions. Alternate  fits  of  weakness  and  courage 
recommenced  in  the  bosom  of  the  divan.  Sul- 
tan Selim  was  for  resisting;  but  the  clamours 
with  which  he  was  assailed,  the  counsels  of 
some  dishonest  ministers,  alleging,  in  order  to 
persuade  him  to  yield,  a  destitution  of  re- 


ceding day  lost  one  of  his  ships,  the  Ajax,  '  sources  of  which  they  were  themselves  the 
which  had  been  consumed  by  fire.     By  the  aid   guilty  authors,  contributed  to  shake  his  heart, 
of  the  wind,  he  had  soon  cleared  the  first  part 
of  the  channel,  which  runs  from  west  to  east, 


and  which  is  of  such  width  that  the  possessors 
have  never  thought  of  defending  it.  From 
the  cape  called  that  of  the  Barbers,  to  Sestos 
and  Abydos,  the  canal  turns  northward,  and  it 
becomes  so  narrow  in  that  part  that  it  is  ex- 
tremely dangerous  to  defy  its  cross-fires.  It 
then  turns  eastward  again,  forming  an  elbow, 
upon  which  are  formidable  batteries.  These 
batteries  rake  ships  fore  and  aft,  so  that  a  squad- 
ron daring  enough  to  force  the  passage,  cannon- 
aded on  the  right  and  on  the  left  by  the  batter- 
ies of  Europe  and  Asia,  is  met  also  by  the  fire 
of  the  batteries  of  the  Sestos  for  the  space  of 
above  a  league.  It  is  at  the  entrance  and  at 
the  outlet  of  this  narrow  passage,  that  the 
castles  called  the  Dardanelles  are  situated. 
They  are  constructed  of  ancient  masonry, 
mounted  with  heavy,  unmanageable  artillery, 
which  threw  enormous  stone  balls,  formerly 
the  terror  of  the  Christian  navies. 

The  English  squadron,  in  spite  of  the  efforts 


more  noble  than  energetic-.  Meanwhile,  the 
ambassador  of  France  hastened  to  Selim, 
strove  to  make  him,  his  ministers,  all  about 
him,  blush  at  the  idea  of  surrendering  to  a 
squadron  which  had  not  a  soldier  to  land,  and 
which  might  burn  a  few  houses,  and  shatter 
the  roofs  of  some  edifices,  but  which  would  at 
last  be  obliged  to  retire,  after  useless  and  hate- 
ful ravages.  His  advice  was  to  resist  the 
English,  to  gain  time  by  means  of  a  feigned 
negotiation,  to  send  the  women,  the  court,  all 
who  trembled,  all  who  shouted,  to  Adrianople, 
then  to  employ  the  energetic  portion  of  the 
population  in  raising  batteries  on  Seraglio 
Point,  and,  this  done,  to  treat  with  the  British 
fleet,  with  the  muzzles  of  their  guns  pointed 
at  it. 

For  the  rest,  the  pretensions  of  the  English 
were  of  a  nature  to  second  by  their  harshness 
and  arrogance  the  counsels  of  M.  Sebastiani. 
Mr.  Arbuthnot,  to  whom  the  admiral  was  su- 
bordinate in  all  that  related  to  politics,  had 
determined  to  send  a  preliminary  summons  to 

of  General  Sebastiani  to  excite  the  Turks  to  the  Porte,  demanding  the  expulsion  of  the 
defend  the  Dardanelles,  had  no  great  perils  to  French  legation,  an  immediate  declaration  of 
encounter.  Not  one  of  its  masts  was  shat-  |  war  against  France,  the  delivery  of  the  whole 
tered :  it  got  off  with  a  few  torn  sails  and  about  Turkish  fleet,  lastly,  the  occupation  of  the  forts 
sixty  men  killed  or  wounded.  Having  arrived  of  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles  by  the 
at  Cape  Nagara,  at  the  entrance  of  the  sea  of  j  English  and  the  Russians.  To  comply  with 
Marmora.it  found  a  Turkish  division  at  an-  such  demands  would  be  placing  the  empire,  its 

navy,  the  keys  of  its  capital,  at  the  discretion 
of  its  enemies  by  land  and  sea.  While  await- 
ing the  answer,  the  English  went  and  anchored 
off  the  Princes'  Islands,  near  the  coast  of  Asia, 
at  some  distance  from  Constantinople. 

General  Sebastiani  did  not  fail  to  represent 
to  the  Sultan  and  his  ministers  how  disgraceful 
and  dangerous  it  would  be  to  submit  to  such 
conditions.  Luckily,  just  at  that  moment  ar- 
rived a  courier  from  the  banks  of  the  Vistula, 
bringing  a  fresh  letter  from  Napoleon,  full  of 

being  able  to  return  it.  Sir  Sidney  Smith  was  j  warm  exhortations  for  the  sultan.  "Generous 
ordered  to  destroy  it,  which  was  no  difficult  Selim,"  said  he,  "  prove  thyself  worthy  of  the 
business,  for  the  crews  were  for  the  most  part  descendants  of  Mahomet !  The  hour  is  come 

to  release  thyself  from  the  treaties  which  op- 
press thee.  .  I  am  near  thee,  engaged  in  recon- 
stituting Poland,  thy  friend  and  thine  ally.  One 
of  my  armies  is  ready  to  descend  the  Danube, 
and  to  take  the  Russians  in  flank,  while  thou 
shalt  attack  them  in  front.  One  of  my  squad- 
rons is  about  to  sail  from  Toulon,  to  guard  thy 
capital  and  the  Black  Sea.  Courage,  then,  for 
never  wilt  thou  find  such  an  occasion  for 
raising  thine  empire  and  shedding  glory  on. 
thy  memory !" — These  exhortations,  though  not 
new,  could  not  come  more  seasonably.  The 


chor :  it  consisted  of  one  ship  of  sixty-four 
guns,  four  small  frigates  and  two  cutters. 
This  division  could  not  have  been  placed  in  a 
worse  or  more  useless  position.  To  have  been 
«.tf  any  service,  it  must  have  been  well  posted, 
well  directed,  and  have  added  its  action  to  that 
of  the  land-batteries.  But,  inactive  during  the 
passage,  and  confined  after  the  passage  to  an 
anchorage  without  defence,  it  was  a  prey  of- 
fered to  the  English  to  compensate  them  for 
the  fire  which  they  had  just  endured,  without 


on  shore.  In  a  few  minutes  the  Turkish  ves- 
sels were  obliged  to  make  for  the  shore.  The 
English  followed  them  in  their  boats,  and  not 
being  sure  that  they  should  be  able  to  bring 
them  off  on  their  return,  they  preferred  burn- 
ing them  immediately,  which  they  did,  with 
she  exception  of  one  cutter  that  had  been  left 
Oy  them  at  the  anchorage.  This  second  ope- 
ration, however,  cost  them  about  thirty  men. 
On  the  morning  of  the  21st  of  February, 
U>ey  appeared  before  the  city  of  Constanti- 
nople, terrified  to  see  an  enemy's  squadron 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


273 


heart  of  Selim,  cheered  by  the  words  of  Na- 
poleon, and  by  the  urgent  importunities  of 
General  Sebastiani,  was  filled  with  the  noblest 
sentiments.  He  spoke  energetically  to  his 
ministers.  He  assembled  the  divan  and  the 
ulemas,  communicated  to  them  the  proposi- 
tions of  the  English,  fired  all  souls  with  indig- 
nation, and  it  was  unanimously  resolved  to 
resist  the  English  fleet,  whatever  it  might  at- 
tempt, but  to  follow  the  able  counsels  of  Gene- 
ral Sebastiani,  that  is  to  say,  to  endeavour  to 
gain  time  by  parleys,  and  to  employ  the  time 
so  gained  in  throwing  up  formidable  batteries 
around  Constantinople. 

The  first  thing  that  was  done  was  to  reply 
to  Mr.  Arbuthnot,  that,  without  examining  the 
grounds  of  his  propositions,  they  could  not 
listen  to  them  till  the  English  squadron  had 
taken  a  less  threatening  position,  for  it  was 
not  befitting  the  dignity  of  the  Porte  to  delibe- 
rate under  the  enemy's  guns.  It  took  at  least 
a  day  to  go  from  Constantinople  to  the  Princes' 
Islands,  and  to  return  from  them.  It  required, 
therefore,  but  a  small  number  of  communica- 
tions to  gain  the  few  days  that  were  needed. 
When  the  answer  of  the  Porte  arrived,  Mr. 
Arbuthnot  had  been  suddenly  taken  ill,  but  his 
influence  continued  to  preponderate  in  the 
English  squadron.  The  admirals  were  sensi- 
ble, like  himself,  that  to  bombard  Constanti- 
nople would  be  a  barbarous  enterprise,  that, 
having  no  land  troops,  they  should  be  obliged, 
if  the  Turks  were  determined  to  resist,  to  retire 
after  committing  useless  ravages ;  that,  in  order 
to  get  away,  they  should  moreover  be  obliged  to 
force  the  Dardanelles  again,  with  a  perhaps 
damaged  squadron  and  under  batteries  proba- 
bly better  defended  the  second  time  than  the 
first.  They  deemed  it,  therefore,  wiser  to  obtain 
by  intimidation,  and  without  proceeding  to  a 
bombardment,  all  or  part  of  their  demands. 
The  delivery  of  the  Turkish  fleet  was  the  tro- 
phy of  which  they  were  most  tenacious.  In 
consequence,  Admiral  Duckworth,  supplying 
the  place  of  Mr.  Arbuthnot,  who  was  ill,  replied 
to  the  Turks  that  he  was  ready  to  agree  to  a  fit 
place  for  negotiating,  and  desired  that  it  might 
be  immediately  fixed,  in  order  that  he  might 
send  one  of  his  officers  thither.  The  Porte 
was  in  no  hurry  to  answer  this  communica- 
tion, and  on  the  day  after  the  next,  it  proposed 
Kadikoi',  the  ancient  Chalcedon,  below  Scutari, 
opposite  to  Constantinople.  In  the  state  of 
exasperation  in  which  the  Turks  then  were, 
the  place  was  neither  the  safest  nor  the  most 
suitable  for  the  English  officer  ordered  to  repair 
thither.  Admiral  Duckworth  remarked  this, 
and  desired  that  some  other  place  might  be 
chosen,  threatening  to  act  immediately,  if 
the  Turks  did  not  make  haste  to  open  the 
negotiations. 

A  few  days  had  been  gained  by  means  of 
these  illusory  parleys,  and  they  had  been  em- 
ployed at  Constantinople  in  the  most  active 
and  judicious  manner.  Several  officers  of  ar- 
tillery and  engineers,  detached  from  the  army 
of  Dalmatia,  had  just  arrived.  General  Se- 
bastiani, seconded  by  them,  encamped  himself 
among  the  Turks.  The  whole  legation  had 
followed  him.  The  young  linguists,  hastening 
to  the  works,  served  for  interpreters.  With 

Vot.  II.— 35 


the  concurrence  of  the  population  and  of  our 
officers,  formidable  batteries  rose,  as  by  en- 
chantment, on  Seraglio  Point,  and  in  that  part 
of  the  city  bordering  the  sea  of  Marmora. 
Nearly  three  hundred  pieces  of  cannon,  drawn 
by  the  enthusiastic  populace,  who  at  that  mo- 
ment regarded  the  French  as  saviours,  were 
placed  in  battery.  Sultan  Selim,  whom  the 
sight  of  these  preparations  so  promptly  exe- 
cuted filled  with  joy,  desired  that  a  tent  should 
be  pitched  for  him  beside  that  of  the  French 
ambassador,  and  required  each  of  his  ministers 
to  come  and  establish  himself  in  one  of  the 
batteries.  Constantinople  assumed  from  hour 
to  hour  a  more  imposing  aspect,  and  the 
English  saw  new  embrasures  opened,  and  the 
muzzles  of  cannon  protruding  from  them. 

After  seven  or  eight  days  thus  employed,  the 
fear  which  at  first  withheld  the  English,  that 
of  a  useless,  perhaps,  dangerous  devastation, 
followed  by  a  second  passage  of  the  Darda- 
nelles more  difficult  than  the  first — that  fear 
became  every  day  more  founded.  Perceiving 
that  he  gained  nothing  by  wailing,  Admiral 
Duckworth  sent  a  final  summons,  in  which, 
having  taken  care  to  reduce  his  demands  and 
to  increase  his  threats,  he  merely  required  that 
the  Turkish  fleet  should  be  delivered  up  to  him, 
and  declared  that  he  should  proceed  to  Con- 
stantinople unless  a  place  fit  for  negotiation 
were  immediately  pointed  out  to  him.  This 
time,  every  thing  being  nearly  completed  at 
Constantinople,  the  answer  given  to  the  Eng- 
lish admiral  was  that,  in  the  state  of  the  peo- 
ple's minds,  they  knew  not  a  place  safe  enough 
for  them  to  venture  to  guaranty  the  lives  of 
the  negotiators  who  might  be  sent  thither. 

After  such  an  answer,  there  was  nothing  fur- 
ther to  do  but  to  commence  the  cannonade. 
But  Admiral  Duckworth  had  only  seven  ships 
of  the  line  and  two  frigates :  he  beheld  a 
frightful  mass  of  artillery  pointed  at  him,  and 
he  was  informed,  moreover,  that,  through  the 
exertions  of  the  French,  the  passes  of  the  Dar- 
danelles were  bristling  with  cannon.  It  was 
therefore  certain  that  he  should  commit  a  bar- 
barity on  Constantinople  alike  without  aim 
and  without  excuse,  and  arrive  with  a  disabled 
squadron  before  a  strait  which  it  had  become 
much  more  dangerous  to  pass  through.  In 
consequence,  after  staying  eleven  days  in  the 
sea  of  Marmora,  he  weighed  anchor  on  the 
2d  of  March,  appeared  in  line  of  battle  under 
the  walls  of  Constantinople,  stood  in  nearly  to 
within  gun-shot,  and,  perceiving  that  he  did 
not  intimidate  the  Turks,  who  were  prepared 
to  defend  themselves,  he  went  and  anchored  al 
the  entrance  of  the  Dardanelles,  intending  to 
pass  through  on  the  following,  day. 

If  mortification  and  confusion  reigned  on 
board  the  English  squadron,  boundless  was  the 
joy  that  burst  forth  in  Constantinople  at  the 
sight  of  the  enemy  s  sam  disappearing  at  the 
horizon  in  the  direction  of  the  Dardanelles 
French  and  Turks  congratulated  themselves 
on  this  happy  result  of  a  moment  of  courage, 
and  in  the  enthusiasm  of  success,  the  Turkish 
squadron,  which  had  been  speedily  equipped, 
determined  to  sail  in  pursuit  of  the  English. 
General  Sebastiani  strove,  but  in  vain,  to  pre- 
vent this  imprudence,  which  might  furnish 


274 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[March,  180T. 


Admiral  DucKworlh  with  an  occasion  to  mark 
his  retreat  with  the  destruction  of  the  Turkish 
fleet.  But  the  people  raised  such  shouts,  and 
the  crews  were  so  animated,  that  the  govern- 
ment, not  capable  of  withstanding  the  out- 
burst of  courage  any  more  than  that  of  cow- 
ardice, was  obliged  to  consent  to  the  departure 
of  the  squadron.  The  capitan-pacha  weighed 
anchor,  while  the  English,  in  haste  to  retreat, 
fled,  without  being  aware  of  it,  from  the  tri- 
umph that  was  running  after  them. 

Next  day,  the  3d  of  March,  the  English 
squadron  entered  the  narrow  and  dangerous 
part  of  the  strait  of  the  Dardanelles.  The 
small  number  of  French  officers  whom  it  had 
been  possible  to  send  to  the  strait,  had  there 
awakened  the  zeal  of  the  Turks  as  success- 
fully as  at  Constantinople.  The  batteries  were 
repaired  and  better  served.  Unluckily,  the 
heavy  artillery,  mounted  on  wretched  carriages, 
was  in  the  hands  of  inexpert  pointers.  A  cer- 
tain number  of  large  marble  balls,  more  than 
two  feet  in  diameter,  and  which,  if  well  di- 
rected, would  have  been  very  dangerous,  were, 
nevertheless,  discharged  at  the  English  squad- 
ron. The  English  were  but  an  hour  and  a  half 
in  clearing  the  narrow  part  of  the  canal,  from 
Cape  Nagara  to  the  Barbers'  Cape,  thanks  to 
a  north  wind,  which  was  very  favourable  to 
their  progress.  They  behaved  with  the  usual 
intrepidity  of  their  navy,  but  sustained  this 
time  serious  damage.  Several  of  their  ships 
were  perforated  by  those  prodigious  projectiles, 
which  would  have  sunk  them,  if  they  had  been 
hollow  and  charged  with  powder,  like  those 
now  used.  Most  of  the  ships  of  the  squadron, 
on  leaving  the  strait,  were  in  a  state  that  re- 
quired speedy  repairs.  This  second  passage 
cost  the  English  two  hundred  men,  killed  and 
wounded,  an  inconsiderable  loss  if  compared 
with  the  slaughter  in  great  land  battles,  but 
not  unimportant,  when  compared  with  what 
takes  place  in  sea-fights.  While  the  English 
squadron  was  leaving  the  strait,  Admiral  Si- 
niavin  was  arriving  atTenedos,  with  a  Russian 
division  of  six  ships.  He  used  the  strongest 
importunities  to  prevail  on  Admiral  Duck- 
worth to  recommence  the  operation.  After  the 
check  which  had  just  been  sustained,  a  fresh 
attempt  would  have  been  extravagant ;  for  six 
Russian  ships  would  not  have  materially 
changed  the  situation  or  lessened  the  difficulty. 
Such  was  the  end  of  that  enterprise,  which 
miscarried  through  the  inadequacy  of  the 
means  employed  and  scruples  of  humanity  not 
usual  at  that  time  with  English  policy.  Eng- 
land appeared  singularly  affected  with  this  re- 
sult. In  Napoloon  it  excited  a  very  natural 
joy,  for,  independently  of  the  moral  effect  pro- 
duced in  Europe  by  the  affair  of  Constanti- 
nople, an  effect  entirely  in  his  favour,  the  quar- 
rel with  the  Turks  became  one  of  the  most 
useful  diversions  for  his  arms. 

Europe  was  at  this  moment  deeply  moved 
by  the  terrible  battle  of  Eylau,  which  led  to  | 
comments  extremely  diverse  in  spirit.  Some 
rejoiced  that  a  foe  had  at  last  been  found  ca- 
pable of  making  head  against  the  French ; 
others,  in  much  greater  number,  were  affrighted 
at  the  condition  upon  which  that  foe  had  been 
able  to  resist  them  for  a  moment — a  terrible 


condition,  for  it  had  obliged  him  to  give  them 
an  army  to  slaughter,  by  throwing  it  in  their 
way,  like  a  physical  obstacle,  to  destroy.  For 
the  first  time,  it  is  true,  the  success  obtained 
by  the  French  had  not  been  so  decisive  as 
usual,  especially  in  appearance;  but  the  Rus- 
sian army  had,  nevertheless,  lost  in  that  san- 
guinary fight, one-third  of  its  effective;  and,  if 
General  Benningsen,  to  cloak  his  defeat,  did 
attempt  some  presumptuous  demonstrations  in 
face  of  our  winter  quarters,  it  was  impossible 
for  him  to  venture  upon  any  thing  of  conse- 
quence, or  to  oppose  one  of  the  sieges  under- 
taken before  his  eyes.  Napoleon,  who  began 
to  be  joined  by  his  reinforcements,  had  for 
overwhelming  him  one  hundred  thousand  men 
present  under  arms,  not  including  the  French 
troops  or  allies  who,  protected  by  the  grand 
army,  were  carrying  on  the  siege  of  Dantzig 
on  the  left,  and  completing  the  conquest  of  the 
fortresses  of  Silesia  on  the  right.  The  only 
difficulty  which  prevented  Napoleon  from  put- 
ting an  end  to  this  campaign,  already  very 
long,  was,  as  we  have  seen,  that  of  transport. 
Had  there  been  a  hard  frost,  he  could  have 
taken  with  him  upon  sledges  sufficient  to  sub- 
sist the  army  during  an  offensive  operation : 
but  the  alternations  of  frost  and  thaw  rendered 
it  impossible  to  carry  a  supply  for  a  few  days. 
He  was  therefore  obliged  to  wait  for  a  change 
of  season,  and  M.  de  Talleyrand,  left  at  War- 
saw, resorted  to  solicitations,  money,  promises, 
even  threats,  to  insure  the  transport  of  indis- 
pensable provisions  from  the  Vistula  to  the 
Passarge. 

In  this  situation,  which  might  be  prolonged 
for  months,  there  was  room  for  negotiations. 
Since  Napoleon  had  been  made  sensible  of  the 
force  of  natural  obstacles,  and  especially  since 
he  had  observed  Poland  more  closely,  that  in- 
toxication which  had  carried  him  to  the  Vis- 
tula was  somewhat  dispelled.  He  had  disco- 
vered that  the  Russians,  little  to  be  dreaded  by 
French  soldiers,  if  one  went  not  to  seek  them 
beyond  the  Danube  and  the  Elbe,  when  as- 
sisted by  the  climate,  became  an  enemy  whom 
it  was  difficult  and  took  long  to  conquer. 
Struck  at  first  by  the  enthusiasm  which  burst 
forth  at  Posen,  Napoleon  had  conceived  that 
the.  Poles  might  be  able  to  furnish  him  with  a 
hundred  thousand  men  ;  but  he  had  soon  seen 
the  country  people  indifferent  to  a  change  of 
government,  which  left  them  slaves  of  the  soil 
under  all  masters,  escaping  from  the  horrors 
of  war  by  flight  into  Austrian  Poland;  the 
population  of  the  towns  enthusiastic,  and 
ready  to  devote  itself  without  reserve,  but  the 
nobility,  with  more  forecast,  making  condi- 
tions, which  could  not  be  accepted  without 
imprudence;  the  officers  who  had  served  in 
the  French  armies  living  on  bad  terms  with 
the  nobles  w'ho  had  not  quitted  their  mansions; 
both  adding  by  their  susceptibilities  to  the 
difficulties  of  the  military  organization  of  the 
country;  lastly,  the  levies,which  were  to  amount 
to  100,000  men,  reduced  to  15,000  young  sol- 
diers, organized  into  twenty  battalions,  destined 
at  a  future  day  to  cover  themselves  with  glory 
under  the  gallant  Poniatowski,  but  at  this  mo- 
ment almost  strangers  to  military  habits,  and 
provoking  the  ridicule  of  our  soldiers.  Na- 


Man  h,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


275 


]»oleon  had  seen  all  this,  and  he  was  less  ar- 
dent to  reconstitute  Poland,  less  disposed,  since 
he  was  better  acquainted  with  it,  to  convulse 
the  continent  for  its  re-establishment.  Without 
doubting  his  own  power,  he  had  a  more  just 
conception  of  the  obstacles  which  Nature  can 
oppose  to  the  most  heroic  army,  and  a  less  fa- 
vourable opinion  of  the  work  which  had  drawn 
him  into  the  plains  of  the  north.  He  was, 
therefore,  rather  more  inclined  to  listen  to  pa- 
cific proposals,  without  departing  on  that  ac- 
count from  any  of  his  pretensions,  because  he 
was  sure,  on  the  return  of  spring:,  to  demolish 
all  the  armies  that  might  be  brought  against 
him.  In  a  negotiation  which  should  lead  to 
peace  he  saw  nothing  but  a  saving  of  time 
and  blood  ;  for  as  to  dangers,  he  deemed  him- 
self capable  of  surmounting  all,  whatever  they 
might  be. 

Since  the  battle  of  Eylau,  several  flags  of 
truce  had  passed  to  and  fro  between  Konigs- 
berg  and  Osterode.  Under  the  first  impres- 
sion of  that  battle,  Napoleon  had  sent  word  by 
General  Bertrand  to  King  Frederick  William 
that  he  was  ready  to  restore  his  dominions, 
but  only  as  far  as  the  Elbe,  which  would  entail 
upon  that  prince  the  loss  of  the  provinces  in 
Westphalia,  Saxony,  and  Franconia,  that  is  to 
say,  nearly  a  fourth  of  the  Prussian  monarchy, 
but  which  would  at  least  insure  to  him  the 
'restitution  of  the  other  three-fourths.  Napo- 
leon added  that,  filled  with  esteem  for  the  mo- 
narch who  reigned  over  Prussia,  he  would  ra- 
ther grant  this  restitution  to  himself  than  to 
the  intervention  of  Russia.  The  unfortunate 
Frederick  William,  though  the  sacrifice  was 
great,  though  his  soldiers  had  behaved  honour- 
ably at  Eylau,  and  though  he  found  himself 
somewhat  raised  in  the  estimation  of  his  allies, 
indulged  in  no  illusion  ;  and  that  battle  of  Ey- 
lau, which  the  Russians  called  almost  a  victory, 
was  in  his  eyes  but  a  sanguinary  defeat,  differ- 
ing from  Jena  and  from  Austerlitz  only  in  hav- 
ing cost  the  French  more  blood,  and  having 
led,  owing  to  the  season,  to  less  decisive  re- 
sults. He  was  persuaded  that  in  spring  the 
French  would  put  a  speedy  and  disastrous  end 
to  the  war.  But  the  queen,  but  the  war  party, 
excited  by  the  late  military  events,  by  the  in- 
fluence of  Russia,  to  which  the  Prussian 
court  was  unfortunately  too  near  at  Konigsberg, 
did  not  appreciate  the  situation  with  so  sound 
a  judgment  as  the  king,  and,  in  dictating  an 
evasive  answer,  to  the  friendly  message  which 
General  Bertrand  was  commissioned  to  de- 
liver, prevented  any  advantage  from  being  de- 
rived from  the  momentarily  pacific  disposition 
of  Napoleon. 

Thus  the  obstinacy  of  the  struggle  with 
Russia  had  for  an  instant  brought  back  Napo- 
leon towards  Prussia.  Happy  had  it  been,  if, 
reconciling  himself  completely  with  her,  re- 
storing to  her  not  only  her  provinces  beyond 
the  Elbe,  but  her  provinces  on  this  side  of  it, 
he  had  sought  to  attach  her  definitively  by  this 
act  equally  generous  and  politic.  But,  again 
finding  King  Frederick  William,  weak,  waver- 
ing, controlled,  he  was  anew  convinced  that 
Prussia  was  not  to  be  relied  on ;  and  from  that 
day  he  never  thought  of  her  but  to  despise,  to 
maltreat,  and  to  lessen  her.  Not  quite  so  much 


intoxicated,  however,  as  after  Jena,  he  was 
anew  led  to  believe  that,  in  order  to  sway  the 
continent  and  to  exclude  English  influence 
from  it,  in  order  to  conquer  the  tea  on  the  land,  he 
needed  not  only  victories  but  a  great  alliance. 
He  had  believed  this  after  Marengo  and  Ho- 
henlinden  ;  he  had  believed  it  after  Austerlitz 
and  before  Jena;  after  Jena,  without  believing 
it  the  less,  he  had  ceased  for  a  moment  to 
think  of  it;  but  he  believed  it  again  after  Pul- 
tusk  and  Eylau  ;  and  meditating  incessantly 
on  his  situation  amidst  the  difficulties  of  this 
war,  he  considered  what  alliance  he  could  ob- 
tain. Setting  aside  Prussia,  there  were  left 
Russia,  with  which  he  was  battling,  and  Aus- 
tria, which,  under  the  appearance  of  neutrality, 
was  preparing  armaments  upon  his  rear. 
Though  the  court  of  Russia,  excited  by  the 
suggestions  of  England,  and  by  the  boastings 
of  General  Benningsen,  appeared  more  ani- 
mated than  ever,  yet  its  generals,  its  officers, 
its  soldiers,  who  bore  the  burden  of  this  fright- 
ful war,  who  found  themselves  reduced  one- 
half  by  the  battles  of  Czarnowo,  Pultusk,  Goly- 
min,  and  Eylau,  who,  thanks  to  a  barbarous  ad- 
ministration, lived  on  a  few  potatoes  scratched 
from  under  the  snow  with  the  points  of  their 
bayonets,  entertained  very  different  sentiments; 
and  held  a  very  different  language  from  the 
courtiers  of  Petersburg.  Filled  with  admira- 
tion of  the  French  army,  feeling  towards  it 
none  of  those  national  antipathies  arising 
sometimes  from  neighbourhood  or  even  from 
a  common  origin,  they  asked  themselves  why 
they  were  expected  to  spill  their  blood  for  the 
benefit  of  the  English  who  were  in  no  hurry 
to  support  them,  and  for  the  Prussians  who 
were  not  capable  of  defending  themselves. 

The  idea  that  France  and  Russia,  at  the  dis- 
tance which  parts  them  from  one  another,  had 
no  ground  for  quarrel,  occurred  to  the  minds 
of  such  of  the  Russian  officers  as  reasoned, 
and  was  repeated  in  all  their  conversations. 
Several  of  our  officers,  taken  prisoners  and 
exchanged,  had  heard  the  strongest  language 
on  this  subject  from  the  lips  of  even  the  brav 
est  of  the  Russian  generals,  Prince  Bagration, 
who  commanded  the  Russian  advanced.guards 
and  rear-guards  by  turns,  the  advanced  guards 
when  attacking,  the  rear-guards  when  retreat- 
ing. 

These  particulars,  reported  to  Napoleon, 
furnished  him  with  subject  for  reflection.  He 
said  to  himself,  even  amidst  the  horrors  of  the 
present  war,  that  it  was  perhaps  with  Russia 
that  he  ought  to  seek  a  reconciliation,  in  order 
to  close  the  ports  and  the  cabinets  of  the  con- 
tinent against  England.  But,  if  that  alliance 
could  be  conceived,  it  was  not  bet  ween,  two 
battles,  when  one  was  obliged  to  communicate 
with  the  advanced  posts  by  means  of  a  trum- 
pet, that  one  could  find  means  to  prepare  and 
conclude  it.  This  actual  impossibility  forced 
him  to  revert  to  Austria.  Calling  to  mind 
what  the  Archduke  Ferdinand  had  said  to  him 
at  Wurzburg,  he  was  anew  led  to  think  of  an 
alliance  with  the  court  of  Vienna,  in  spite  of 
the  armaments  with  which  she  threatened  him, 
especially  when  he  considered  that  he  had  now 
the  power  to  restore  to  her  what  half  a  century 
before  would  have  filled  her  with  joy — SiUsia, 


276 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[March,  1807. 


that  Northern  Lombardy,  which  she  had  so 
keenly  regretted,  which  she  had  made  so  many 
efforts  to  recover,  and  for  the  sake  of  which 
she  had  been  for  thirty  years  the  ally  of 
France.  Removed  from  the  bivouac  of  Oste- 
rode  to  the  mansion  of  Finkenslein,  and  there, 
sometimes  making  the  round  of  his  canton- 
ments, and  riding  so  much  as  thirty  leagues  a 
day;  sometimes  corresponding  with  his  agents 
in  Poland  for  the  supply  of  the  army,  or  with 
his  ministers  in  Paris  for  the  administration 
of  the  Empire;  lastly,  sometimes,  in  the  long 
nights  of  the  north,  ruminating  upon  plans  of 
general  policy,  after  weighing  all  the  alliances, 
he  had  ended  by  reducing  himself  to  two,  and 
concluding  that  he  must  choose  between  that 
of  Russia  and  that  of  Austria.  In  correspond- 
ence with  M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  remained  at 
Warsaw,  and  who  there  directed  the  foreign 
affairs,  he  wrote  to  him :  "  Jill  this  must  end  in 
a  system  with  Russia,  or  in  a  system  with  Austria. 
Think  well  of  this;  fix  your  ideas  ;  and  oblige 
Austria  to  come  to  a  definitive  explanation 
with  us." 

But  Austria  covered  herself  with  an  impe- 
netrable veil.  While  General  Andreossy,  our 
ambassador  at  Vienna,  was  daily  reporting 
acts  tending  to  produce  uneasiness,  such  as 
levies  of  men,  purchases  of  horses,  the  forma- 
tion of  magazines,  General  Baron  de  Vincent, 
on  the  contrary,  sent  to  Warsaw  by  the  court 
of  Austria,  was  incessantly  affirming,  with 
every  appearance  of  frankness,  that  Austria, 
exhausted,  was  incapable  of  making  war; 
that  she  was  resolved  not  to  break  the  peace, 
unless  she  were  subjected  to  treatment  impos- 
sible to  be  borne ;  that,  if  she  was  taking 
some  precautions,  they  must  not  be  regarded 
as  preparations  hostile  or  threatening  for 
France,  but  as  measures  of  prudence  com- 
manded by  a  terrible  war,  which  embraced 
the  entire  circle  of  her  frontiers,  and  particu- 
larly by  the  state  of  the  Gallicias,  which  were 
much  agitated  by  the  rising  in  Poland.  M. 
de  Talleyrand  had  suffered  himself  to  be  per- 
suaded that  he  ought  instantly  to  denounce 
General  Andreossy  to  Napoleon  as  a  danger- 
ous agent,  observing  and  judging  wrongly  of 
what  was  passing  around  him,  and  capable, 
if  he  were  listened  to,  of  embroiling  the  two 
courts  by  means  of  incorrect  and  malevolent 
reports. 

Napoleon,  though,  like  every  other  man,  he 
was  apt  to  believe  what  pleased  him,  though 
he  was  fain  to  think  that  Austria  could  not 
raise  herself  after  the  blows  which  she  had  re- 
ceived at  Austerlitz  and  Ulm,  that  she  never 
durst  break  her  word  given  to  him  personally 
at  the  bivouac  of  Urschitz — Napoleon,  en- 
lightened by  danger,  put  more  faith  in  the  re- 
ports of  General  Andreossy  than  in  those  of 
Baron  de  Vincent.  "  Yes,"  he  wrote  to  M.  de 
Talleyrand,  "General  Andreossy  is  opinion- 
ated, an  indifferent  observer,  probably  exag- 
gerating what  he  sees  ;  but  you  are  credulous, 
as  inclined  to  allow  yourself  to  be  seduced,  as 
you  are  clever  at  seducing  others.  One  need 
but  flatter  in  order  to  deceive  you.  M.  de 
Vincent  cozens  while  coaxing  you.  Austria 
fears  us,  but  she  hates  Us — she  is  arming  to 
take  advantage  of  any  reverse.  If  we  gain  a 


great  victory  in  spring,  she  will  behave  like 
M.  de  Haugwitz,  the  day  after  Austerlitz,  and 
you  will  have  been  right.  If  the  war  is  mere- 
ly doubtful,  we  shall  find  her  in  arms  upon  our 
rear.  Meanwhile,  we  must  oblige  her  to  speak 
out.  It  is,  in  fact,  a  great  fault  in  her  not  to 
come  to  an  understanding  with  us  at  once,  and 
not  to  take  advantage  of  a  moment  when  we 
are  masters  of  Prussia  to  recover  through  our 
means  what  Frederick  formerly  wrested  from 
her.  She  can,  if  she  pleases,  indemnify  her- 
self in  a  day  for  all  that  she  has  lost  in  half  a 
century,  and  re-make  the  fortune  of  the  house 
of  Austria,  so  much  diminished  at  one  time  by 
Prussia,  at  another  by  France.  But  she  must 
explain  herself.  Does  she  want  indemnities 
for  what  she  has  lost!  I  offer  her  Silesia. 
Does  the  state  of  the  east  alarm  her!  I  am 
ready  to  satisfy  her  respecting  the  fate  of  the 
Lower  Danube,  by  disposing  of  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia  as  she  pleases.  Is  our  presence 
in  Dalmatia  a  subject  of  umbrage]  I  am 
quite  disposed  to  make  sacrifices  on  that  point 
by  means  of  an  exchange  of  territory.  Or, 
lastly,  is  it  for  war  that  she  is  preparing,  to 
try,  for  the  last  time,  the  power  of  her  arms, 
taking  advantage  of  the  union  of  the  whole 
continent  against  us  ]  Be  it  so — I  accept  this 
new  adversary.  But  let  her  not  hope  to  sur- 
prise me.  None  but  women  and  children  can 
believe  that.  I  shall  go  and  penetrate  into  the  • 
deserts  of  Russia,  without  having  taken  my 
precautions.  Austria  will  not  find  me  unpre- 
pared. In  Saxony,  in  Bavaria,  in  Italy,  she  will 
meet  with  armies  ready  to  oppose  her.  She  will 
see  me,  by  a  rearward  march,  drop  down  upon 
her  with  my  whole  weight,  crush  her,  treat  her 
worse  than  any  of  the  powers  that  I  have  ever 
conquered.  I  will  make  a  terrible,  a  striking 
example  of  her  treachery,  of  which  the  present 
fate  of  Prussia  cannot  convey  an  idea.  Let  her 
speak  out,  then,  that  I  may  know  what  I  have 
to  depend  upon  in  regard  to  her  dispositions." 

Napoleon  recommended  to  M.  de  Talley- 
rand not  to  leave  M.  de  Vincent  any  rest,  but 
to  make  incessant  attempts  to  sound  the  depths 
of  the  policy  of  Austria.  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
stimulated  by  the  Emperor,  divided  his  time 
between  exhortations  to  the  Polish  govern- 
ment to  furnish  provisions  and  wagons,  and 
interviews  with  M.  de  Vincent,  to  draw  from 
him  in  a  hundred  different  conversations  the 
secret  of  his  court. 

That  secret  he  sought  in  the  most  insignifi- 
cant expressions  of  the  Austrian  envoy,  in  the 
slightest  movement  of  his  countenance.  Some- 
times he  was  free  and  easy  with  him,  and 
strove  to  provoke  his  candour  by  unbounded 
communicativeness.  Sometimes  he  endea- 
voured to  surprise  and  agitate  him  by  laying 
abruptly  before  him,  with  feigned  anger,  ac- 
counts of  the  armaments  received  from  Vien- 
na. M.  de  Vincent,  whether  from  art  or  sin- 
cerity, always  repeated  his  story,  that  people 
at  Vienna  neither  would  nor  could  make  war, 
that  they  were  content  to  guard  themselves 
without  thinking  of  attacking  anybody.  How- 
ever, when  M.  de  Talleyrand,  proceeding  fur- 
ther, talked  sometimes  of  Silesia,  sometimes 
of  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,  sometimes  of 
Dalmatia,  as  the  price  of  an  alliance,  the  Aus- 


March   180'< 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


277 


triat  minister  replied  that  he  had  no  instruc- 
tions respecting  affairs  of  such  importance, 
and  bogged  leave  to  refer  to  his  court,  which 
he  did  by  communicating  immediately  to 
M.  de  Stadion  the  overtures  of  M.  de  Talley- 
rand. 

M.  de  Stadion  then  directed  the  foreign  af- 
fairs of  Austria  in  a  spirit  still  more  hostile  to 
France  than  the  Cobenzels  had  done,  but  we 
must  do  him  the  justice  to  admit,  without  con- 
cealing so  many  hostile  sentiments  under  the 
mask  of  cordiality.  For  the  rest,  though  full 
of  hatred,  he  could  control  himself,  and  main- 
tained a  suitable  reserve.  The  secret  of  M.  de 
Stadion  and  of  his  court  was  easy  to  penetrate, 
if  one  would  set  aside  appearances  that  pleased, 
and  confine  one's  self  to  the  ground  of  things 
which  had  nothing  pleasing  in  it.  Austria 
was  arming  to  take  advantage  of  our  reverses, 
which  in  her  was  but  very  natural,  and  it  was 
a  great  error  to  suppose  that  one  could  con- 
ciliate that  vindictive  power  with  brilliant  of- 
fers. She  was  animated,  in  fact,  by  a  hatred 
which  would  have  prevented  her  from  justly  ap- 
preciating solid  and  real  advantages,  if  they  had 
been  offered  her,  and  much  more  insufficient 
advantages,  such  as  a  portion  of  Silesia,  of 
Moldavia,  or  of  Dalmatia — advantages  far  in- 
ferior to  all  that  she  had  lost  during  the  last 
fifteen  years.  Still  she  would  have  accepted 
them,  no  doubt,  insufficient  as  they  were,  if 
she  had  imagined  that,  in  the  then  state  of  the 
world,  any  thing  could  be  given  in  a  solid  and 
durable  manner.  But,  amidst  the  continual 
changes  of  the  European  states,  she  conceived 
that  there  was  nothing  stable,  and  she  was  not 
disposed  to  take,  in  compensation  for  heredi- 
tary provinces,  anciently  belonging  to  her 
house,  provinces  given  by  the  policy  of  the 
moment,  liable  to  be  as  lightly  withdrawn  as 
they  were  given,  and  which,  besides,  would 
have  to  be  purchased  by  a  war  with  her  usual 
allies,  for  the  advantage  of  him  whom  she  ac- 
cused of  being  the  author  of  all  her  calamities. 
Thus,  on  the  part  of  Napoleon,  there  was 
nothing  that  could  attract  or  excite  confidence. 
Her  refusal  of  all  offers  coming  from  him  was 
certain  beforehand.  But,  pressed  with  ques- 
tions, she  could  not  shut  herself  up  either  in 
absolute  silence,  or  in  a  general  refusal  to  listen 
to  any  proposal.  She  therefore  bethought  her 
of  an  expedient,  which  would  furnish  her,  for 
the  moment,  with  a  suitable  answer,  and  in- 
sure to  her  afterwards  the  means  of  profiting 
by  events,  whatever  they  might  be.  In  conse- 
quence, she  conceived  the  idea  of  offering 
France  her  mediation  with  the  belligerent 
courts.  Nothing  could  be  better  calculated  for 
the  present  or  for  the  future.  For  the  present, 
it  proved  that  she  was  desirous  of  peace,  by 
labouring  for  it  herself.  For  the  future,  she 
would  labour  sincerely  for  this  peace,  and  she 
would  take  care  to  direct  its  conditions  in  a 
spirit  conformable  to  her  policy,  if  Napoleon 
were  victorious.  If,  on  the  contrary,  Napo- 
leon were  vanquished,  or  only  half  victorious, 
she  would  pass  from  a  modest  mediation  to 
an  imposed  mediation.  She  would  moderate 
or  crush  him,  according  to  circumstances. 
She  would  reserve  for  herself,  in  short,  the 
means  of  entering  into  the  quarrel  at  pleasure, 


and  having  once  entered  into  it,  of  conducting 
herself  as  fortune  might  suggest. 

M.  de  Stadion  charged  the  Baron  de  Yin- 
cent  to  reply  to  M.  de  Talleyrand  that  the 
court  of  Vienna  was  deeply  sensible  to  the  of- 
fers of  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  but  advan- 
tageous as  were  these  offers,  it  could  not  ac- 
cept them,  for  they  would  lead  to  a  war  either 
with  the  Germans,  who  were  its  countrymen, 
or  the  Russians,  who  were  its  allies ;  and  that, 
as  for  war,  it  deprecated  it  for  any  cause  or  with 
any  person,  for  it  declared  itself  incapable  of 
maintaining  it — an  admission  not  dangerous 
at  a  moment  when  Austria  was  making  the 
most  imposing  military  preparations — that  it 
was  desirous  of  peace,  peace  alone,  which  it 
preferred  to  the  most  valuable  acquisitions; 
that  as  a  proof  of  this  love  of  peace,  it  offered 
to  interpose  to  negotiate  it,  and  that,  if  France 
assented,  it  would  undertake  to  bring  into  it 
the  cabinets  of  Berlin,  Petersburg,  and  Lon- 
don ;  that  M.  de  Budberg,  minister  of  the  Em- 
peror Alexander,  having  been  consulted  on 
the  subject,  had  already  accepted  the  good  of- 
fices of  the  court  of  Vienna,  and  that  in  Lon- 
don, another  cabinet  having  taken  the  direc- 
tion of  affairs,  [that  of  Castlereagh  and  Can- 
ning,] there  was  a  chance  of  meeting  with  pa- 
cific dispositions  in  these  new  representatives 
of  the  English  policy,  for  they  would  probably 
be  delighted  to  render  themselves  popular  in 
England,  by  giving  peace  on  their  accession 
to  office.  M.  de  Stadion  directed  the  Austrian 
envoy  to  add  that  the  court  of  Vienna  would 
deem  itself  happy,  if  the  all-powerful  Empe- 
ror of  the  French  should  regard  this  offer  as  a 
pledge  of  the  sentiments  of  disinterestedness 
and  concord  which  animated  the  Emperor  of 
Austria. 

The  all-powerful  Emperor  of  the  French 
had  not  less  perspicacity  than  power,  and 
when  this  answer  was  sent  from  Warsaw  to 
Finkenstein,  he  was  not  deceived  by  it.  He 
seized  its  meaning  with  as  much  promptness 
as  he  would  have  discovered  the  movements 
of  an  enemy's  army  on  the  field  of  battle. 

This,"  he  immediately  replied  to  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand, "is  a  first  step  of  Austria,  a  com- 
mencement of  intervention  in  events.  Re- 
solved not  to  intermeddle  at  all  in  the  struggle 
kept  up  by  France,  Prussia,  Russia,  and  Eng- 
land, she  would  not  even  risk  compromising 
herself  by  transmitting  the  words  of  the  one 
to  the  others.  To  offer  herself  as  mediator  is 
to  prepare  herself  for  war,  is  to  secure  for  her- 
self a  decent  means  of  taking  part  in  it,  means 
which  she  has  need  of,  after  the  declara- 
tions from  cabinet  to  cabinet,  after  the  oaths 
from  sovereign  to  sovereign;  by  which  she 
has  promised  to  refrain  from  it  forever.  This 
circumstance,"  added  Napoleon,  "is  unfortu- 
nate, for  it  forbodes  the  presence  of  an  Aus- 
trian army  on  the  Oder  and  on  the  Elbe,  while 
we  are  on  the  Vistula.  But  it  is  impossible  to 
refuse  this  mediation.  It  would  be  a  contra- 
diction to  our  usual  language,  which  has  al- 
ways represented  us  as  disposed  to  peace.  It 
would,  above  all,  expose  us  to  the  risk  of  acce- 
lerating the  determinations  of  Austria  by  a 
peremptory  refusal,  which  would  affront  her, 
and  oblige  her  to  take  an  immediate  resolu- 
2  A 


278 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[March,  1807. 


tion.  We  must,  thereiore,  gain  time,  and  an- 
swer, that  the  offer  of  mediation  is  too  indirect 
for  us  to  accept  it  positively ;  but  that,  in  all 
cases,  the  good  offices  of  the  court  of  Vienna 
will  always  be  received  with  gratitude  and 
confidence." 

M.  de  Talleyrand,  directed  by  Napoleon, 
gave  the  prescribed  answer  to  M.  de  Vincent, 
and  manifested  a  certain  disposition  to  accept 
the  mediation  of  Austria,  but  seemed  at  the 
same  time  to  doubt  whether  the  offer  of  this 
mediation  was  serious.  M.  de  Vincent  af- 
firmed, on  the  contrary,  that  this  offer  was 
perfectly  serious,  and  for  the  rest  declared  that 
he  would  refer  the  matter  to  his  court.  He 
wrote,  accordingly,  to  M.  de  Stadion,  who,  on 
his  part,  gave  a  prompt  reply.  In  a  very  few 
days,  in  fact,  the  court  of  Vienna  intimated 
that  it  was  ready  to  proceed  from  mere  par- 
leys to  a  formal  proposal ;  that  it  was  certain 
to  get  the  mediation  accepted  in  Petersburg 
and  London  ;  that  it  should,  moreover,  address 
the  same  day  the  positive  offer  both  to  France 
and  Prussia,  and  to  Russia  and  England;  and 
that  she  awaited  the  precise  expression  of  the 
intentions  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon  on  the 
subject. 

This  answer,  so  prompt  and  so  plain,  sup- 
ported by  armaments  of  which  there  could  be 
no  further  doubt,  appeared  to  Napoleon  an  ex- 
tremely serious  act,  the  drift  of  which  it  was 
impossible  to  dissemble,  to  which,  unfortu- 
nately, no  other  reply  could  be  given  than  by 
an  acceptance,  but  against  the  consequences 
of  which  it  was  necessary  to  provide  by  means 
of  immediate  and  imposing  precautions.  He 
wrote  in  this  spirit  to  M.  de  Talleyrand,  and 
sent  him  from  Finkenstein  a  draft  of  the  note 
which  will  be  found  below.  He  intimated  to 
him  at  the  same  time  that  he  was  about  to 
add  to  that  note  new  preparations,  more  for- 
midable than  ever,  and  of  which  it  was  neces- 
sary to  inform  Austria  immediately,  that  she 
might  know  in  what  manner  her  intervention, 
friendly  or  hostile,  diplomatic  or  warlike, 
would  be  received. 

The  answer  to  the  offer  of  mediation  was 
as  follows : 

"  The  undersigned  minister  of  foreign  affairs 
has  submitted  to  his  majesty,  the  Emperor 
and  King,  the  note  delivered  to  him  by  M.  the 
baron  de  Vincent. 

"The  Emperor  accepts  for  himself  and  his 
allies  the  amicable  intervention  of  the  Empe- 
ror Francis  II.  for  the  re-establishment  of 
peace,  so  necessary  to  all  nations.  He  has 
but  one  fear,  namely,  that  the  power  which 
hitherto  appears  to  have  made  a  system  of 
founding  its  power  and  its  greatness  on  the 
divisions  of  the  continent,  will  strive  to  draw 
from  this  step  new  subjects  of  animosity,  and 
new  pretexts  for  dissensions.  However,  any 
way  that  can  encourage  a  hope  of  the  cessa- 
tion of  bloodshed,  and  at  length  bring  consola- 
tion among  so  many  families,  ought  not  to  be 
neglected  by  France,  which,  as  all  Europe 
knows,  was  dragged  in  spite  of  herself  into 
.he  last  war. 

"  The  Emperor  Napoleon  finds,  moreover, 
j*  this  circumstance,  a  natural  and  signal  oc- 
casion to  testify  to  the  Sovereign  of  Austria 


the  confidence  with  which  he  inspires  him, 
and  the  desire  which  he  has  to  see  those  bonds 
knitted  more  closely  between  the  two  nations, 
which  in  other  times  constituted  their  com- 
mon prosperity,  and  which  at  this  day  can 
more  than  any  thing  else  consolidate  their 
tranquillity  and  their  well-being." 

These  parleys  had  occupied  the  whole  month 
of  March.  The  weather  had  become  severe. 
The  frost,  which  had  been  looked  for  in  vain 
during  the  winter,  came  on  in  spring.  The 
military  operations  were  obliged  to  be  again 
deferred.  Napoleon  resolved  to  avail  himself 
of  this  delay  to  give  his  forces  an  immense 
development,  and  as  formidable  in  appear- 
ance as  it  would  be  in  reality.  His  intention 
was,  without  draining  Italy  or  France  too 
much,  to  increase  his  active  army  by  at  least 
one-third,  and  to  form  on  the  Elbe  an  army  of 
reserve  of  100,000  men,  in  order  to  be  strong 
enough  to  crush  both  the  Russians  and  the 
Prussians  on  the  very  opening  of  the  cam- 
paign, and  to  be  able,  in  case  of  necessity,  to 
turn  against  Austria,  if  she  decided  to  take 
part  in  the  war. 

To  attain  this  twofold  result,  he  resolved  to 
call  out  a  new  conscription,  that  of  1808, 
though  it  was  only  March,  1807.  He  had  al- 
ready called  out  that  of  1807  in  1806,  and  that 
of  1806  in  1805,  in  order  to  procure  the  young 
conscripts  an  apprenticeship  of  twelve  or  fif-  • 
teen  months,  and  to  keep  his  depots  always 
full.  The  general  effective  of  the  French 
army,  which  had  been  raised  from  502,000 
men  to  580,000  by  the  conscription  of  1807, 
would  be  increased  by  that  of  1808  to  about 
650,000,  exclusively  of  the  allies.  Owing  to 
the  skill  with  which  he  managed  his  resources, 
Napoleon  would  find  in  this  increase  of  effec- 
tive, the  means  of  supplying  all  his  wants  and 
of  meeting  all  events. 

But  there  was  some  difficulty,  after  calling 
in  November,  1806,  for  the  conscription  of 
1807,  to  call  in  March,  1807,  for  that  of  1808. 
It  was  making  two  calls  in  five  months,  and 
raising  150,000  men  at  once.  Napoleon  him- 
self drew  up  the  decree,  sent  it  immediately  to 
Cambaceres,  the  arch-chancellor,  who  supplied 
his  place  at  the  head  of  the  government,  and 
to  M.  Lacuee,  who  was  charged  with  the  calls, 
telling  them  both  that  he  knew  and  foresaw  the 
objections  to  which  such  measures  were  liable 
to  give  rise,  but  that  they  must  not  stop  a  mo- 
ment for  them;  for  a  single  objection  raised  in 
the  Council  of  State,  or  in  the  Senate,  would 
weaken  him  in  Europe,  and  bring  Austria  upon 
him ;  and  then  it  would  not  be  two  conscrip- 
tions, but  three  or  four  that  they  would  be 
obliged  to  decree,  perhaps  to  no  purpose,  and 
be  vanquished  at  last.  "Things,"  he  thus 
wrote,  "  must  not  be  considered  in  a  narrow 
point  of  view,  but  in  a  wide  point  of  view; 
they  must  be  considered  especially  in  all  their 
political  bearings.  A  conscription  announced 
and  resolved  upon,  without  hesitation,  which 
perhaps  I  shall  not  call  for,  which  certainly  I 
shall  not  send  to  the  active  army,  for  I  am  not 
going  to  wage  war  with  boys,  will  cause  Aus- 
tria to  drop  her  arms.  The  least  hesitation,  on 
the  contrary,  would  induce  her  to  resume  them, 
and  to  use  them  against  us.  No  objection,  I 


March,  1807.J 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


279 


repeat,  but  an  immediate  and  punctual  execu- 
tion of  the  decree  which  I  send  you — that  is 
the  way  to  have  peace — to  have  a  speedy, 
a  magnificent  peace." 

Having  despatched  this  decree  to  Paris,  Na- 
poleon sent  it  to  M.  de  Talleyrand,  at  Warsaw, 
desiring  him  to  communicate  it  to  M.  de  Vin- 
cent, with  an  express  recommendation  to  make 
him  acquainted  with  the  new  display  of  forces 
which  was  preparing  in  France,  and  to  lay  be- 
fore him  a  statement  of  the  expenses  which 
would  thence  result  for  all  the  belligerent 
powers,  and  for  Austria  in  particular :  to  de- 
clare to  him  without  circumlocution,  that  the 
Emperor  had  divined  the  drift  of  the  mediation, 
that  he  accepted  that  mediation,  but  with  a 
knowledge  of  what  it  signified;  that  to  offer 
peace  was  well,  but  that  peace  ought  to  be 
offered  with  a  white  truncheon  in  the  hand:  that 
the  armaments  of  Austria,  henceforth  impos- 
sible to  be  denied,  were  a  very  unsuitable  ac- 
companiment to  an  offer  of  mediation  ;  that, 
for  the  rest,  he  explained  himself  with  this 
frankness  to  prevent  calamities,  to  save  Aus- 
tria herself  from  them ;  that  if  she  chose  to 
send  Austrian  officers  to  France  and  Italy,  an 
engagement  should  be  given  to  show  them  the 
depots,  the  camps  of  reserve,  the  divisions  on 
march,  and  they  should  see  that,  independently 
of  the  300,000  French  already  present  in  Ger- 
many, a  second  army  of  100,000  men  was  pre- 
paring to  cross  the  Rhine,  to  check  any  hostile 
movement  on  the  part  of  the  court  of  Vienna. 

These  communications  came  very  season- 
ably. M.  de  Vincent  could  not  conceal  his 
emotion  when  informed  of  the  new  increase 
of  our  forces,  and  protested  a  thousand  times 
more,  in  the  name  of  his  government,  that  its 
intentions  were  most  pacific.  The  movements 
of  troops  which  were  complained  of,  were,  he 
said,  but  symptoms  of  a  reorganization  under- 
taken by  the  Archduke  Charles,  in  order  to 
render  the  Austrian  army  less  expensive,  and 
to  introduce  into  it  various  improvements  bor- 
rowed from  the  French  armies.  If  any  corps 
seemed  to  approach  the  frontiers  of  Poland, 
they  were  there  only  by  way  of  precaution  re- 
specting the  Gallicias,  extremely  agitated  by 
what  was  passing  in  their  neighbourhood.  The 
offer  of  mediation  ought  to  be  regarded  only 
as  a  proof  of  a  desire  to  put  an  end  to  a  war 
which  was  desolating  the  world;  and  it  must 
be  recognised  not  as  a  longing  to  intermeddle 
in  that  war,  but  as  a  frank  and  sincere  wish  to 
put  a  stop  to  it.  For  the  rest,  the  Emperor 
would  soon  be  enabled  to  judge  of  this  matter 
by  the  results,  and  to  assure  himself  of  the 
sincerity  of  Austria  by  her  persisting  in  re- 
maining neuter. 

The  intimations  sent  by  Napoleon  to  Paris, 
arrived  not  less  opportunely  than  his  commu- 
nications at  Vienna.  Though  his  star  still 
shone  in  all  its  splendour,  though  the  marvels 
of  Austerlitz  and  Jena  had  not  yet  lost  any  of 
their  spell,  though  people  were  impressed  as 
deeply  as  they  ought  to  have  been  with  that 
grand  and  prodigious  spectacle  of  a  French 
army  wintering  quietly  on  the  Vistula,  certain 
detractors,  extremely  obsequious  in  the  pre- 
sence of  Napoleoa,  gladly  reviling  him  in  his 
absence,  made,  in  very  subdued  tones,  some 


bitter  observations  on  the  sanguinary  carnage 
of  Eylau,  and  of  the  difficulties  on  the  war 
carried  to  such  a  distance;  and  little  persua- 
sion would  have  been  needed  to  induce  minds, 
always  ready  in  France  to  seize  the  weak  side 
of  things,  to  substitute  censure  for  the  con 
tinued  admiration  of  which  Napoleon  had 
never  ceased  to  be  the  object  since  he  held  in 
his  hand  the  destinies  of  France.  The  prudent 
Cambaceres  perceived  these  symptoms,  and, 
dreading  every  thing  that  was  likely  to  injure 
the  imperial  government,  he  would  fain  have 
disarmed  censure  by  sparing  the  country  new 
burdens.  M.  Lacuee,  judging  of  the  situation 
from  a  less  elevated  point  of  view,  seeing  only 
the  material  sufferings  of  the  population,  feared 
that  two  demands  of  80,000  men,  renewed  so 
soon  after  one  another,  the  one  in  November, 
1806,  the  other  in  March,  1807,  especially  after 
those  which  had  preceded  in  1805 — demands 
which  called  men  to  the  army  without  giving 
back  one  of  them — would  produce  a  mis- 
chievous effect,  by  depriving  agriculture  of 
hands,  families  of  their  supporters.  Messrs. 
Cambaceres  and  Lacuee  were  therefore  both 
of  them  disposed  to  offer  some  objections,  and 
to  desire  that  these  calls  might  be  deferred  for 
a  certain  time.  The  sentiment  which  actuated 
them  was  honest  and  prudent,  and  well  had  it 
been  for  Napoleon  if  many  men  had  then  pos- 
sessed the  courage  to  pour  into  his  ear,  before 
it  burst  forth,  the  cry  of  forlorn  mothers— a 
cry  which  was  not  yet  threatening,  but  which 
sometimes,  on  the  news  of  a  great  slaughter, 
like  that  of  Eylau,  would  be  raised  faintly  in 
the  heart.  However,  while  telling  Napoleon 
the  truth,  by  way  of  giving  him  a  profitable 
lesson  for  the  future,  the  best  thing  to  be  done 
at  that  moment  was  to  obey  his  commands ; 
for  there  was  nothing  more  serviceable,  even 
to  the  cause  of  peace,  than  the  new  display  of 
forces  which  he  had  just  decreed.  Thus  the 
objections  of  the  arch-chancellor  and  M.  La- 
cuee, sent  in  writing  to  the  head-quarters,  but 
soon  smothered  by  subsequent  letters  de- 
spatched from  them  one  after  another,  pro- 
duced no  postponement  of  the  presentation, 
adoption  and  execution  of  the  decree  calling 
out  the  conscription  of  1808. 

Napoleon  lost  no  time  in  making  that  use  of 
these  new  resources  which  suited  his  vast  de- 
signs. Since  he  entered  Poland,  he  had,  as  we 
have  seen,  drawn  from  France  seven  regiments 
of  infantry;  from  Paris  the  15th  light,  the  58th 
of  the  line,  the  first  regiment  of  the  fusiliers 
of  the  guard, and  a  municipal  regiment;  from 
Brest  the  15th  of  the  line;  from  St.  Lo  the 
34th ;  from  Boulogne  the  19th.  He  had  drawn 
from  Italy  five  regiments  of  mounted  chasseurs 
and  four  regiments  of  cuirassiers.  Most  of 
these  corps  had  recently  reached  Germany. 
The  19th,  15th,  and  58th  of  the  line,  and  the 
15th  light,  were  approaching  Berlin,  and  going 
to  co-operate  in  the  siege  of  Dantzig.  The  1st 
regiment  of  the  fusiliers  of  the  guard,  and  the 
regiment  of  the  municipal  guard  were  on  march. 
The  four  regiments  of  cuirassiers  from  Italy 
were  already  on  the  Vistula,  under  the  com- 
mand of  an  officer  of  the  most  distinguished 
merit,  General  d'Espagne.  Two  of  the  five 
regiments  of  mountf  I  chasseurs,  the  19th  ami 


280 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[March,  1807. 


23d,  had  joined  General  Lefebvre  below  Dant-  ] 
rig.  The  15th  was  remounting  in  Hanover. 
The  two  others  were  coming  with  the  utmost 
expedition. 

The  provisional  or  marching  regiments  had 
already  passed  through  Germany  to  the  num- 
ber of  twelve  of  infantry  and  four  of  cavalry. 
They  had  been  reviewed  on  the  Vistula,  dis- 
solved, and  sent  to  the  corps  on  the  Passarge 
— a  sight  always  very  gratifying  to  the  army, 
which  thus  saw  the  gaps  made  in  its  ranks 
filled  up,  and  heard  talk  every  day  of  the  nu- 
merous reinforcements  that  were  coming  to 
second  it.  Whereas,  in  the  first  days  of  its 
establishment  on  the  Passarge,  it  could  not 
have  presented  more  than  seventy-five  or  eighty 
thousand  men  on  one  spot,  it  was  now  able  to 
oppose  100,000  to  any  sudden  attack.  The 
provisions,  brought  from  all  quarters  to  the 
Vistula,  and  carried  from  the  Vistula  to  the 
different  cantonments  by  means  of  wagons 
organized  on  the  spot,  were  sufficient  for  the 
daily  ration,  and  began  to  form  the  reserve 
stores  for  unforeseen  movements.  The  army, 
well  warmed,  well  fed,  was  in  high  spirits. 
The  heavy  cavalry  and  the  cavalry  of  the  line 
had  been  taken  to  the  Lower  Vistula,  to  benefit 
by  the  forage  which  was  found  in  great  quan- 
tity towards  the  mouth  of  that  river.  The 
regiments  of  light  cavalry,  left  in  observance 
on  the  front  of  the  camps,  went  by  turns  to 
enjoy  rest  and  abundance  on  the  banks  of  the 
Vistula.  Napoleon,  who  had  determined  to 
increase  the  cavalry  from  54,000  men  to  60,000, 
then  to  70,000,  had  just  given  orders  for  raising 
the  number  of  the  horse  to  80,000.  The  cam- 
paign had  already  consumed  16,000  horses  for 
three  or  four  thousand  horse-soldiers  put  liors 
de  combat.  Besides  the  horses  taken  from  the 
Prussian  and  Hessian  armies,  Napoleon  had 
purchased  17,000  in  Germany,  and  now  he 
ordered  12,000  to  be  bought  in  France  for  the 
supply  of  the  depots.  The  works  of  Praea, 
Modlin  and  Sierock,  quite  finished,  being  con- 
structed of  timber,  were  as  solid  as  masonry. 
The  cantonments  on  the  Passarge  were  pro- 
vided with  strong  tetet  du  pout,  which  afforded 
facilities  for  repulsing  an  enemy,  or  for  attack- 
ing him,  if  necessary.  The  situation  was  not 
only  safe  but  good,  as  much  so,  at  least,  as  the 
country  and  the  season  permitted. 

The  corps  on  the  march,  thanks  to  the  dc- 
p6ts  of  infantry  and  cavalry  established  on  the 
route,  in  which  they  deposited  fatigued  men 
and  horses,  and  took  in  exchange  those  previ- 
ously left  by  other  corps — the  corps  on  march 
numbered  at  the  end  of  their  route  the  same 
effective  as  at  their  departure.  The  regiments 
'of  cuirassiers  from  Naples  had  arrived  entire 
upon  the  Vistula.  For  the  troops  that  came 
from  Italy,  Parma,  Milan,  Augsburg,  for  those 
that  came  from  France,  Mayence,  Wiirzburg, 
Erfurt,  for  both,  Willenberg,  Potsdam,  Berlin, 
Custrin,  Posen,  Thorn,  Warsaw,  were  the  sta- 
ions  where  they  found  whatever  they  needed, 
provisions,  arms,  articles  of  clothing,  made 
everywhere,  in  Pans  as  well  as  in  Berlin,  in 
the  conquered  capital,  as  well  as  in  the  con- 
quering capital ;  for  Napoleon  wished  to  afford 
subsistence  to  the  population  of  both.  It  was  by 
these  continual  attentions  that  he  had  supplied 


with  necessaries,  kept  up  at  its  effective  at  dis- 
tances from  four  to  five  hundred  leagues — a 
regular  army  of  400,000  men,  a  chimerical  num- 
ber, when  given  us  by  antiquity,  unless  in  refer- 
ence to  emigrant  populations,  never  recorded  in 
modern  histories,  and  first  reached  and  exceeded 
at  the  time  of  which  we  are  treating. 

Taking  advantage  of  the  presence  of  nume- 
rous conscripts  in  the  depots,  Napoleon  set 
about  bringing  fresh  troops  from  Italy  and 
France,  with  the  twofold  intention,  as  we  have 
said,  to  augment  considerably  the  active  army 
of  the  Vistula,  and  to  create  an  army  of  re- 
serve on  the  Elbe.  Having  it  in  his  power  to 
draw  ready-trained  conscripts  from  the  depots, 
he  ordered  Marshal  Kellermann  to  increase  the 
number  of  the  provisional  regiments  of  in- 
fantry to  twenty,  and  that  of  the  provisional 
regiments  of  cavalry  to  ten.  But  into  these 
regiments  were  to  be  admitted  only  such  con- 
scripts as  were  perfectly  trained  and  disci- 
plined. He  devised  another  combination  for 
rendering  serviceable  those  conscripts  whose 
military  education  had  scarcely  commenced, 
that  was  to  organize  battalions  called  garrison 
battalions,  composed  of  men  not  yet  trained, 
not  even  clothed;  to  send  them  to  Erfurt,  Cas- 
sel,  Magdeburg,  Hameln,  Custrin,  where  they 
would  have  time  to  get  trained,  and  thus  ren- 
der the  old  troops  left  in  the  fortress  disposable. 
He  fixed  the  effective  of  these  battalions  at 
about  ten  or  twelve  thousand  men. 

After  directing  his  attention  to  the  provi- 
sional regiments  destined  for  recruiting  the 
corps  established  on  the  Vistula,  Napoleon 
resolved  to  add  to  the  seven  regiments  of  in- 
fantry and  the  nine  regiments  of  cavalry  al- 
ready drawn  from  France  and  Italy,  some 
others,  which  was  possible  by  having  recourse 
to  numerous  combinations,  of  which  he  alone 
was  capable.  There  was  in  garrison  at  Brau- 
nau  a  superb  regiment,  the  3d  of  the  line,  com- 
prising three  war  battalions  and  3400  men 
present  under  arms.  Napoleon  ordered  it  off 
to  Berlin,  supplied  its  place  at  Braunau  by  the 
7th  of  the  line,  borrowed  from  the  garrison  of 
Alexandria,  and  replaced  the  7th  in  Alexan- 
dria by  two  regiments  from  Naples,  beaten  at 
St.  Euphemia,  and  needing  to  be  reorganized. 
Resolving  to  leave  none  but  dragoon  regiments 
in  Italy,  he  sent  for  the  14th  of  mounted  cha?- 
seurs,  which  was  still  there,  and  which  would 
increase  the  number  01'  cavalry  regiments 
brought  from  Italy  to  ten.  He  ordered  a  se- 
cond regiment  of  the  fusiliers  of  the  guard  to 
be  formed  in  Paris — which  might  be  done,  since 
there  were  two  conscriptions,  that  of  1807  and 
that  of  1808,  to  choose  out  of.  He  detached 
from  the  camp  of  St.  Lo  the  5th  light,  which 
was  not  actually  indispensable  there.  He  di- 
rected a  regiment  of  dragoons  of  the  guard, 
encamped  at  that  moment  at  Meudon,  to  be 
despatched  from  Paris  to  the  Rhine ;  it  was 
afterwards  to  be  mounted  at  Potsdam.  He 
gave  the  same  order  relative  to  the  26th  chas- 
seurs, which  was  at  Saumur.  and  which  the 
profound  tranquillity  of  the  Vendee  rendered 
disposable.  He  commanded  a  battalion  of 
seamen  of  the  guard,  very  serviceable  for  the 
navigation  of  the  Vistula,  to  be  marched  off 
There  were,  consequently,  three  French  rugi- 


March,  1807] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


281 


ments  of  infantry,  three  French  regiments  of 
cavalry,  besides  a  battalion  of  seamen,  which 
he  drew  from  France  and  Italy,  and  which 
were  to  concur  either  in  completing  the  exist- 
ing  corps,  or  to  constitute  a  new  corps  for 
Marshal  Lannes.  That  marshal,  having  been 
taken  ill  at  Warsaw,  had  been  succeeded  in 
the  command  of  the  fifth  corps  by  Massena, 
and  was  beginning  to  recover.  When  the 
siege  of  Dantzig  was  over,  Napoleon  purposed 
to  form,  with  part  of  the  troops  which  had 
been  engaged  in  it,  and  the  new  regiments 
brought  from  France,  a  corps  of  reserve, 
which  he  intended  to  give  to  Lannes,  and  to 
attach  to  the  active  army.  The  8th  corps, 
under  Marshal  Mortier,  composed  of  Dutch, 
Italians  and  French,  dispersed  from  the  Han- 
seatic  towns  to  Stralsund,  from  Stralsund  to 
Colberg,  had  hitherto  been  destined  to  over- 
awe Germany.  The  Dutch  division  guarded 
the  Hanseatic  towns ;  one  of  the  French  di- 
visions kept  in  check  the  Swedes  before  Stral- 
sund. The  other  was  at  Stettin,  ready  to 
concur  in  the  blockade  of  Stralsund,  or  in  the 
siege  of  Dantzig.  The  Italian  division  block- 
aded Colberg.  The  sieges  once  ended,  Napo- 
leon  had  resolved  to  collect,  in  the  8th  corps,  j 
all  the  troops  that  were  French,  and  to  unite 
it  with  the  active  army.  He  would  thus  have, 
besides  the  corps  of  Marshals  Ney,  Davout, 
Soult,  Bernadotte,  Murat,  on  the  Passarge,  two 
new  corps,  under  Mortier  and  Lannes,  placed 
between  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder,  and  con- 
necting themselves  with  the  second  army,  , 
which  he  purposed  to  organize  in  Germany. 

He  created  the  elements  of  this  second  army 
in  the  following  manner.     There  were,  in  Si- 
lesia, part  of  the  Bavarians  and  all  the  Wir- 
tembergers,   finishing,   under   Prince  Jerome 
and  General  Vandamrae,  the  sieges  in  Silesia. 
There  were,  on   the  coast  of  the  Baltic,  the  ; 
Dutch,  then  belonging  to  Mortier's  corps,  the  j 
Italians,  also  belonging  to  it,  the  one  esta- 
blished, as  we  have  just  said,  in  the  Hanseatic 
towns,  the  others  before  Colberg.    They  were 
good  auxiliaries,  hitherto  faithful,  and  begin- 
ning to  learn  something  of  war  in  our  school.  I 
Napoleon  thought  to  augment  the  number  of  | 
these  auxiliaries,  and  to  unite  with  them  for  a 
support  40,000  French,  good  veteran  troops, 
so  as  to  form  on  the  Elbe  an  army  of  more 
than  100,000  men. 

In  the  first  place,  he  demanded  of  the  Con- 
federation of  the  Rhine,  grounding  himself  on 
the  suspicious  armaments  of  Austria,  a  new 
portion  of  the  contingent  which  he  had  a  right 
to  require,  and  which,  as  it  would  amount  to 
20,000  men,  would  produce  about  15,000.  It 
was  giving  displeasure  to  the  German  govern- 
ments, our  allies;  but  the  present  war,  if  it 
were  complicated  by  the  intervention  of  Aus- 
tria, would  put  their  recent  aggrandizement  in 
such  jeopardy  that  he  was  authorized  to  de- 
mand of  them  such  an  effort.  For  the  rest,  it 
was  the  people,  much  more  than  the  govern- 
ments, whom  this  measure  would  dissatisfy — 
and  that  consideration  alone  rendered  such  a 
requisition  matter  of  regret.  Napoleon  thought 
also  of  demanding  of  the  new  kingdom  of  Italy 
two  of  its  regiments  of  infantry,  and  two  of  its  j 
regiments  of  cavalry.  It  was  not  in  Italy  that . 

VOL.  II.— 36 


the  Italian  soldiers  were  likely  to  find  occasion 
to  learn  war,  but  in  the  north,  in  the  school  of 
the  grand  army ;  and,  if  the  Germans  could, 
up  to  a  certain  point,  complain  of  being  made 
subservient  to  interests  which  were  not  theirs, 
the  Italians  had  no  complaint  of  that  kind  to 
raise — for  the  interests  of  France  were  cer- 
tainly those  of  Italy,  and,  in  teaching  them  to 
fight,  we  were  teaching  them  to  defend,  on 
some  future  day,  their  national  independence. 

Napoleon  conceived  another  idea,  which,  at 
the  moment,  had  all  the  appearance  of  a  jeer; 
that  was  to  demand  troops  from  Spain.  The 
day  before  the  battle  of  Jena,  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  always  engaged  in  some  treachery, 
open  or  concealed,  had  published  a  proclama- 
tion, calling  the  Spanish  nation  to  arms,  upon 
the  strange  pretext  that  the  independence  of 
Spain  was  threatened.  In  Spain,  in  France, 
in  Europe,  people  asked  by  whom  that  inde- 
pendence could  be  threatened.  The  answer 
was  easy  to  give.  The  Prince  of  the  Peace 
had  believed,  like  all  the  adversaries  of  France, 
in  the  superiority  of  the  Prussian  army;  he 
had  expected  the  destruction,  by  that  army,  of 
what  was  called  the  common  enemy.  But, 
the  victory  of  Jena  having  undeceived  him, 
he  had  the  hardihood  to  say  that  his  procla- 
mation was  designed  to  raise  the  Spanish 
nation,  for  the  purpose  of  sending  it  to  the 
assistance  of  Napoleon,  in  case  he  should 
stand  in  need  of  it.  The  falsehood  was  too 
gross  to  mislead.  Napoleon  only  smiled,  and 
deferred  this  quarrel  till  another  time.  There 
were,  however,  along  the  Pyrenees,  some  thou- 
sands of  Spaniards,  good  troops,  who  had  no- 
thing to  do  there,  if  they  were  not  destined  to 
act  against  France.  There  were,  also,  some 
thousands  of  Spaniards  at  Leghorn,  to  guard 
that  port  of  the  kingdom  of  Etruria,  and  who 
were  more  likely  to  deliver  it  up  to  the  English 
than  to  defend  it.  Napoleon,  affecting  10  take 
the  explanation  which  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
gave  of  his  proclamation,  in  a  serious  light, 
thanked  him  for  his  zeal,  and  requested  him 
to  furnish  a  proof  of  it  by  assisting  him  with 
twelve  or  fifteen  thousand  men,  who  were  ab- 
solutely useless,  either  at  the  Pyrenees,  or  at 
Leghorn.  Napoleon  added,  that  he  meant  to 
put  into  their  hands  Hanover,  an  English  pos- 
session, as  a  pledge  for  the  restitution  of  the 
Spanish  colonies.  Indeed,  there  needed  not 
reasons  so  artfully  arranged  for  the  meanness 
of  the  Spanish  government  of  that  period.  No 
sooner  had  Napoleon's  despatch  reached  Ma- 
drid, than  orders  to  march  were  sent  to  the 
Spanish  troops.  Nine  or  ten  thousand  men 
started  from  the  Pyrenees,  four  or  five  thou- 
sand from  Leghorn.  Napoleon  sent  to  all 
quarters  the  necessary  instructions  for  receiv- 
ing them,  either  in  France,  or  in  the  countries 
dependent  on  his  arms,  in  the  most  friendly 
and  hospitable  manner;  and  desired  that  they 
might  be  abundantly  supplied  with  provisions, 
clothing,  and  even  money. 

He  was,  therefore,  about  to  have  on  the  Elbe, 
Germans,  Italians,  Spaniards,  Dutch,  to  the 
number  of  60,000  men  at  least.  The  Bavari- 
ans and  the  Wirtembergers,  united  with  the 
new  contingent  required  from  the  confedera- 
tion of  the  Rhine,  might  form  about  30,000 
2.4.2 


283 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[March,  1807. 


men ;  the  Dutoh,  increased  by  some  troops, 
15,000;  the  Spaniards  15,000;  the  Italians 
seven  or  eight  thousand.  In  order  to  make 
very  good  troops  of  these  auxiliaries,  it  would 
be  sufficient  to  join  with  them  a  certain  quan- 
tity of  French.  Napoleon  devised  a  method 
of  procuring  40,000  of  the  better  sort,  likewise 
to  be  drawn  from  Italy  and  France.  He  had 
taken  the  precaution  a  long  time  beforehand 
to  give  orders  for  the  army  of  Italy  to  be  put 
on  the  war  footing.  Five  divisions  of  infan- 
try were  quite  organized  in  Frioul  and  Lom- 
bard}-. Napoleon  resolved  to  call  from  Brescia 
and  Verona  the  two  divisions  of  Molitor  and 
Boudet,  excellent  divisions,  and  which  after- 
wards proved  at  Essling  and  Wagram  what 
they  were  capable  of.  They  formed  an  effec- 
tive of  fifteen  or  sixteen  thousand  men,  almost 
all  veteran  soldiers  of  Italy,  recruited  with 
some  conscripts  of  the  last  levies.  These  di- 
visions received  orders  to  pass  the  Alps  and 
proceed  by  Augsburg,  the  one  to  Magdeburg, 
the  other  to  Berlin.  Six  weeks  were  sufficient 
for  this  journey. 

Napoleon  thus  weakened  Italy,  but  Italy 
was  at  the  moment  of  far  less  importance  than 
Germany.  Well  covered  on  his  rear  while  he 
should  be  in  Poland,  certain  of  being  able  to 
throw  himself,  by  Silesia  or  Saxony,  upon  Bo- 
hemia, and  to  lay  Austria  prostrate  by  a  single 
blow  of  the  back  of  his  sword,  he  was  always 
sure  to  disengage  Italy,  if  she  were  tempo- 
rarily overrun.  He  calculated,  therefore,  very 
ably,  in  preferring  to  make  himself  strong  in 
Germany  rather  than  in  Italy.  It  was,  how- 
ever, not  without  compensation,  that  he  weak- 
ened the  latter  country,  for  he  had  directed 
20,000  conscripts,  taken  from  the  classes  of 
1807  and  1808,  to  be  sent  thither,  and  he  or- 
dered moreover  the  companies  of  elite  to  be 
extracted  from  the  depot  battalions,  to  form 
two  new  active  divisions  in  Lombardy,  which 
his  forecast  had  rendered  easy  by  keeping  the 
depots  of  Italy,  like  those  of  France,  always 
full  and  well  exercised.  He  should,  therefore, 
soon  have,  as  before,  60,000  men  on  the  Adige, 
72.000  with  Marmont's  corps,  90,000  by  draw- 
ing a  strong  detachment  from  Naples  towards 
Milan. 

But  15,000  French  were  not  sufficient  on 
the  Elbe  to  serve  for  a  link  and  appui  to 
60,000  auxiliaries,  whom  he  was  about  to  col- 
lect there.  Napoleon  thought  to  draw  from 
France  another  valuable  resource.  He  had 
formed  at  Boulogne,  St.  Lo,  Pontivy,  and  Na- 
poleonville,  four  camps,  composed  of  a  certain 
number  of  the  oldest  regiments,  of  such  as 
had  need  to  rest  and  recruit  themselves,  and 
had  abundantly  supplied  them  with  all  that 
they  needed  in  men  and  materiel.  These  regi- 
ments formed  a  force  of  nearly  36,000  men. 
They  were  to  be  seconded,  as  we  have  seen, 
by  some  detachments  of  national  guards,  of 
which  6000  men  were  at  St.  Omer,  3000  at 
Cherbourg,  3000  between  Oleron  and  Bor- 
deaux, by  10,000  seamen  of  the  Boulogne  flo- 
lilla,  by  3000  workmen,  regimented  at  Ant- 
werp, 8000  at  Brest,  3000  at  Lorient,  4000  at 
Rocheforl,  by  12,000  coast-guaras,and  by  3000 
af  the  gendarmerie,  which  might  at  any  time 
he  assembled  at  one  point  by  calling  together 


that  militia  for  twenty-five  leagues  round. 
This  would  be  a  force  of  nearly  90,000  men 
along  the  coast,  capable  of  presenting  25  or 
30  thousand  men  on  any  point  of  it  that  might 
be  attacked.  Napoleon  designed  to  supply  the 
place  of  the  regular  troops  of  the  camps  of 
Boulogne,  St.  Lo,  Pontivy,  Napoleonville,  by 
a  new  creation.  He  gave  orders  for  the  for- 
mation of  five  legions,  composed  of  officers 
taken  out  of  the  army,  and  of  conscripts 
drawn  from  the  last  two  conscriptions,  com- 
manded by  five  senators,  each  six  battalions 
and  6000  men  strong,  the  five  comprising  30 
battalions  and  30,000  men.  They  were  to  re- 
ceive their  education  while  stationed  on  the 
coast  of  the  ocean.  The  permanent  state  of 
war  since  '92,  had  bred  up  such  a  quantity  of 
officers  that  skeletons  were  never  wanting  for 
the  creation  of  new  corps.  The  elements  of 
these  five  legions  could  not  be  brought  to- 
gether, it  is  true,  in  less  than  four  or  five 
months,  that  is  to  say,  before  the  end  of  May 
or  the  beginning  of  June.  But  the  troops  of 
the  camps  were  not  yet  going  to  leave  the 
coast.  If  in  May  or  June  the  English  were 
not  seen  standing  for  the  coast  of  France,  if, 
on  the  contrary,  they  were  seen  sailing  for  the 
coast  of  Germany,  25,000  veteran  soldiers  of 
the  camps  were  to  follow  the  movements  of 
the  English  squadrons,  proceeding  simultane- 
ously with  them  along  the  shores  of  the  Chan- 
nel, the  North  Sea.  the  Baltic,  by  Normandy, 
Picardy,  Holland,  Mecklenburg,  and  to  join  in 
Germany  the  two  divisions  of  Boudet  and  Mo- 
litor. They  had  orders  to  perform  this  march 
as  speedily  as  possible,  should  the  conduct  of 
Austria  render  it  necessary;  and  they  had 
orders,  in  any  case,  to  leave  behind  them  the 
five  new  legions,  whose  presence  might  be 
useful,  even  before  their  organization  was 
completed. 

By  means  of  this  combination,  Napoleon 
was  about  to  have  with  Boudet's  and  Molitor's 
divisions,  with  the  25,000  men  drawn  from 
Normandy  and  Bretagne,  with  the  sixty  or 
seventy  thousand  auxiliaries,  Germans,  Ita- 
lians, Spaniards,  Dutch,  a  second  army  of 
more  than  100,000  men  on  the  Elbe,  independ- 
ently of  the  two  corps  of  Marshals  Mortier  and 
Lannes,  whose  part  it  was  to  connect  the  army 
of  reserve  with  the  grand  active  army  of  the 
Vistula.  Endowed  with  an  admirable  talent 
for  moving  his  masses-,  he  could,  by  doubling 
his  tail  back  to  his  head,  or  his  head  back  to 
his  tail,  his  left  upon  his  right,  or  his  right 
upon  his  left,  carry  the  bulk  of  his  forces, 
either  forward  towards  the  Niemen,  or  back- 
ward towards  the  Elbe,  or  to  the  right  upon 
Austria,  or  to  the  left  upon  the  coast  With 
all  that  he  had  brought  together,  with  all  that 
he  was  to  .bring  together  by  and  by,  he  should 
number  not  fewer  than  440,000  men  in  Ger- 
many, 860,000  of  whom  were  French,  and 
80,000  allies.  Never  had  such  means  been 
collected  with  that  power,  with  that  vigour, 
with  that  promptness. 

Of  all  these  reinforcements,  none  had  yet 
arrived  but  the  new  regiments  drawn  from 
France  and  Italy,  the  provisional  regiments 
which  came  daily  to  recruit  the  ranks  of  the 
grand  army,  the  Bavarians  and  Wirtembergers 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


283 


acting  in  Silesia,  the  Dutch  on  the  Baltic,  and 
the  troops  of  Mortier  spread  before  Stralsund, 
Colberg,  and  Dantzig.  Orders  were  despatched 
for  Boudet's  and  Molitor's  divisions,  for  the 
Italian,  German,  Spanish,  and  French  troops. 
Marshal  Brune,  who  was  at  the  camp  of 
Boulogne,  as  commander-in-chief,  and  who 
was  still  recommended  by  the  remembrance 
of  his  conduct  at  the  Helder,  was  called  to 
Berlin,  to  be  put  at  the  head  of  the  second 
army  assembled  in  Germany. 

Meanwhile  the  sieges  continued.  Before  we 
relate  the  vicissitudes  of  the  most  important 
of  all  these  sieges,  that  which  filled  the  winter 
with  memorable  incidents,  we  must  mention  a 
circumstance  which  had  wellnigh  seriously 
endangered  the  safety  of  our  rear.  Marshal 
Mortier,  commanding  the  8th  corps,  and  hav- 
ing under  his  orders  four  divisions,  one  Dutch, 
one  Italian,  two  French,  had  placed  the  Dutch 
division  near  the  mouth  of  the  Elbe,  left  Grand- 
jean's  French  division  before  Stralsund,  posted 
Dupas'  French  division  at  Stettin,  and  sent  the 
Italian  division  before  Colburg,  to  repress  the 
incommodious  partisans  thrown  by  the  garri- 
son of  that  place  between  the  Vistula  and  the 
Oder.  We  should  add  that,  of  the  six  regi- 
ments composing  the  two  French  divisions, 
four  had  been  taken,  the  2d  light  to  be  sent 
toward  Dantzig,  the  12th  light  to  be  sent  to 
Thorn,  the  22d  and  65th  of  the  line  to  reinforce 
the  army  on  the  Passarge.  The  58th  light, 
arriving  from  Paris,  had  been  given  to  Marshal 
Mortier  in  compensation,  and  several  other 
regiments  coming  from  France  were  destined 
for  him.  He  had  therefore  not  been  able  to 
leave  General  Grandjean  more  than  two  French 
regiments,  the  4th  light,  and  the  58ih  of  the 
line.  He  had  taken  with  him  the  72d,  in  order 
to  support  the  Italians  before  Colberg. 

This  was  the  moment  that  the  Swedes  chose 
for  an  enterprise  upon  our  rear.  They  still 
occupied  Stralsund,  an  important  seaport  of 
Swedish  Pomerania,  which  was  the  place 
where  they  usually  landed  in  Germany.  This 
place  would  have  been  worth  the  trouble  of  a 
siege,  if  Dantzig  had  not  deserved  the  prefer- 1 
ence  before  any  other  conquest  of  that  kind. ! 
The  King  of  Sweden,  whose  disordered  reason 
was  destined  to  cost  his  family  the  throne,  and 
his  country  Pomerania  and  Finland — the  King 
of  Sweden  had  purposed  to  start  from  Stral- 
sund, with  an  army  composed  of  Russians, 
English,  Swedes,  and,  like  another  Gustavus 
Adolphus,  to  make  a  brilliant  incursion  upon 
the  continent  of  Germany.  But  Napoleon, 
absolute  master  of  that  continent,  had  obliged 
the  Swedish  troops  to  shut  themselves  up  in 
Stralsund,  where  they  were  blockaded,  as  it 
were,  in  a  tele  du  pont.  The  King  of  Sweden, 
extremely  vehement  with  friends  as  well  as 
foes,  was  sorely  displeased  with  Russia,  and 
still  more  with  England,  which  sent  him  not  a 
soldier,  and  doled  out  the  subsidies  with  extra- 1 
ordinary  parsimony.  Thus,  shut  up  in  his 
own  territories,  since  he  was  no  longer  per- 
mitted to  travel  on  the  continent,  he  lived  at 
Stockholm,  dull,  secluded,  leaving  General  j 
Essen  at  Stralsund  with  a  corps  of  1 5,000  j 
good  troops.  General  Essen,  apprized  of  what 
was  passing  before  him,  could  not  withstand  ( 


the  temptation  to  force  the  line  of  the  blockade, 
which  the  French  defended  with  too  small  a 
force.  In  the  first  days  of  April,  he  marched 
out  at  the  head  of  15,000  Swedes,  against 
General  Grandjean,  who  had  scarcely  five  or 
six  thousand  men,  half  of  whom  at  most  were 
French,  to  oppose  to  them.  General  Grand- 
Jean,  after  defending  himself  bravely  before 
the  place,  found  himself  threatened  with  hav- 
ing his  wings  turned,  and  was  obliged  to  retire, 
first  upon  Anklam,  and  then  upon  Uckermunde 
and  Stettin.  He  made  an  orderly  retreat,  se- 
conded by  the  valour  of  the  French  and  Dutch, 
lost  few  men  on  the  field  of  battle,  but  a  great 
quantity  of  military  effects,  and  some  solitary 
detachments,  which  could  not  be  picked  up, 
especially  in  the  islands  of  Usedom  and  Wol- 
lin,  which  close  the  Great  Haff. 

This  surprise  produced  a  certain  alarm  on 
the  rear  of  the  army,  especially  in  Berlin, 
where  a  hostile  population,  deeply  mortified, 
eagerly  watching  events,  sought  food  for  its 
hopes  in  every  unforeseen  circumstance.  But 
the  fortune  of  France,  then  so  brilliant,  could 
leave  her  adversaries  only  short  joys.  At 
that  moment,  several  regiments  coming  from 
France,  among  others  the  15th  of  the  line,  and 
several  provisional  marching  regiments,  ar- 
rived on  the  Elbe  and  the  Oder.  General 
Clarke,  who  governed  at  Berlin  with  wisdom 
and  firmness,  immediately  despatched  the  15th 
of  the  line  to  reinforce  General  Grandjean  at 
Stettin.  He  added  to  it  a  provisional  regiment 
and  several  squadrons  of  cavalry  in  the  great 
depot  at  Potsdam,  which  were  disposable. 
Marshal  Mortier,  on  his  part,  marched  back  at 
the  head  of  the  72d  and  of  several  Italian  de- 
tachments drawn  from  Colberg.  These  troops, 
united  with  Grandjean's  division,  were  suffi- 
cient to  punish  the  Swedes  for  their  attempt. 
Marshal  Mortier  formed  with  them  two  divi- 
sions under  General  Grandjean  and  Dupas,  put 
the  72d,  the  15th  of  the  line,  and  the  Dutch  in 
the  first,  the  4th  light,  the  58th  of  the  line,  and 
some  Italians,  in  the  second,  left  the  provi- 
sional regiments  to  cover  his  left  and  his  rear, 
and  marched  to  the  enemy  with  that  calm  re- 
solution which  characterized  him.  He  drove 
the  Swedes  from  position  to  position,  forced 
them  to  fall  back  on  the  Peene,  passed  that 
river  in  spite  of  them,  and  drove  them  into 
Stralsund,  with  the  loss  of  some  hundred  killed 
and  2,000  prisoners.  The  incursion  of  the 
Swedes,  commenced  in  the  first  days  of  April, 
was  finished  on  the  18th.  General  Essen,  ap- 
prehensive lest  all  Pomerania  should  soon  be 
wrested  from  him,  was  disposed  to  save  it  by 
an  armistice.  A  flag  of  truce,  sent  by  him  to 
Marshal  Mortier,  came  and  offered  to  neutralize 
that  province  by  suspending  all  kinds  of  hos- 
tilities. As  it  was  impossible  for  us  to  besiege 
Stralsund,  nothing  could  be  more  convenient 
to  us  than  to  close  an  inlet  by  which  the  Eng- 
lish might  have  been  able  to  penetrate  into 
Germany,  and  at  the  same  time  to  render  the 
troops,  which  must  otherwise  have  been  left  in 
Swedish  Pomerania,  disposable  for  the  siege 
of  Dantzig.  Marshal  Mortier,  knowing  the  in- 
tentions of  Napoleon  on  this  point,  consented 
to  an  armistice,  in  virtue  of  which  the  Swf  les 
promised  to  observe  an  absolute  neutrality,  not 


284 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[March,  1807 


to  open  Swedish  Pomerania  to  any  enemy  of  !  which  was  the  last  bulwark  of  his  kingdom. 
France,  and  not  to  afford  any  succour  either  to  the  principal  depot  of  his  wealth  ;  and,  as  long 
Colberg  or  to  Dantzig.  A  resumption  of  hos-  as  it  continued  in  his  hands,  a  serious  danger 
tilities  was  to  be  preceded  by  ten  days'  notice,  for  Napoleon.  He  had  put  into  it  a  garrison 
The  armistice  was  sent  to  Napoleon  for  his  of  18,000  men,  14,000  of  whom  were  Prus- 
approbation.  i  sians>  and  4000  Russians.  He  had  given  it 

Napoleon  could  not  reason  in  any  other  way    for  governor  the  celebrated  Marshal  Kalkreuth, 
than  his  lieutenant,  for  the  motive  which  had    at  that  moment  unemployed  and  grumbling  at 


caused  him  to  reduce  the  troops  placed  before 
Stralsund  to  the  smallest  possible  number, 
must  dispose  him  to  the  acceptance  of  an 
armistice,  which  annulled  Stralsund  without 


Kiinigsberg,  and  well  qualified  for  such  a  com- 
mand. It  was  not  to  be  apprehended  that  this 
old  warrior,  who  had  just  condemned  to  death 
the  commandant  of  Stettin  for  having  surren- 


diverting  any  part  of  our  forces  for  the  pur-j  dered  the  post  committed  to  his  keeping,  would 
pose  of  blockading  it.  He  therefore  accepted  make  a  faint  resistance  to  the  French.  No 
the  proposed  armistice  on  condition  that  the  sooner  did  he  arrive  than  Marshal  Kalkreuth 
notice  to  be  given  before  the  resumption  of  finished  burning  the  rich  suburbs  of  Dantzig, 
hostilities  should  be  extended  from  ten  days  to  j  which  his  predecessor  had  begun  to  consign 

to  the  flames,  set  about  repairing  the  works, 
rousing  the  spirit  of  the  garrison,  and  intimi- 
dating every  one  who  was  disposed  to  surrender. 


a  month. 

General  Essen  signed  the  armistice  with  this 
modification,  and  sent  it  to  Stockholm  to  obtain 
the  royal  ratification.  In  the  mean  time,  Mar- 
shal Mortier  was  to  remain  on  the  Peene  with 
his  forces,  and  then  to  march  them  to  Stettin, 
Colberg  and  Dantzig,  leaving,  however,  the 
Dutch  to  observe  the  neutralized  province. 

For  the  rest,  if  the  Swedes  had  served  us  by 
adopting  this  armistice,  they  had  likewise 
served  themselves,  for  the  French  forces  were 
accumulating  in  Berlin.  The  3d  of  the  line, 


Thus  Dantzig,  in  March,  1807,  was  no  longer 
a  ruined  and  neglected  place,  which  it  would 
be  possible  to  take  by  surprise.  Not  only- 
had  it  an  excellent  governor,  a  strong  garri- 
son, extensive  and  solid  works,  but  its  site 
was  very  difficult  of  approach.  Like  all  great 
rivers,  the  Vistula  has  its  Delta.  A  little  be- 
low Mewe,  about  fifteen  leagues  from  the  Bal- 
tic, it  divides  into  two  arms,  which  embrace  a 


drawn  from  Braunau,  and  3400  strong,  four  or  j  rich  and  fertile  tract,  called  the  Isle  of  Nogath. 
five  provisional  regiments  on  march  from  the  One  of  these  arms,  the  right,  which  goes  by 
Rhine  to  the  Elbe,  the  15th  chasseurs  remount-  the  name  of  Nogath,  throws  itself  into  the  gulf 
ing  in  Hanover,  lastly  the  19th  of  the  line/  called  the  Frische-Haff;  the  left,  retaining  the 


coming  from  the  camp  of  Boulogne,  would 
soon  have  been  advancing  upon  Swedish  Po- 
merania. The  Swedes  would  have  paid  with 
their  total  destruction  for  the  time  which  they 
would  have  caused  our  troops  to  lose. 

During  these  transactions,  Dantzig  was  in- 
vested, and  the  operations  of  the  siege  had 
commenced.  Napoleon  had  at  first  intended 
only  to  blockade  the  place.  The  war  being 
prolonged,  he  resolved  to  employ  the  winter  in 
reducing  it.  Dantzig  was  worth  the  trouble. 
It  commands,  in  fact,  the  Lower  Vistula,  the 
fertile  plains  traversed  by  that  river  towards 
its  mouth,  comprehends  a  spacious  harbour, 
and  contains  the  riches  of  the  commerce  of 
the  north.  Master  of  Dantzig,  Napoleon  could 
not  be  shaken  in  his  position  on  the  Lower 
Vistula;  he  deprived  the  allies  of  the  means 
of  turning  his  left;  and  he  obtained  possession 
of  immense  stores  of  corn  and  wine,  sufficient 
to  supply  the  army  for  above  a  year.  It  was 
impossible,  therefore,  to  make  a  better  use  of 
the  winter  than  in  effecting  such  a  conquest. 
But  it  required  a  long  siege,  as  well  on  account 
of  the  works  of  the  place  as  of  the  strong  gar- 
rison charged  to  defend  it.  If,  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  campaign,  Napoleon  could 
have  suddenly  set  about  such  a  siege,  it  is  to 
be  presumed  that  the  defences  of  Dantzig, 
which  were  of  earth,  and  in  the  most  neglected 
state,  would  have  yielded  to  an  unforeseen  at- 
tack. But  Napoleon  had  not  then  either  dis- 
posable troops  or  heavy  artillery,  and  he  had 
been  obliged  to  blockade  Dantzig  with  German 
and  some  Polish  auxiliaries,  supported  by  a 
single  French  regiment,  the  2d  light.  The 
King  of  Prussia,  forewarned,  had  therefore  had 
wine  to  put  into  a  state  of  defence  a  place 


name  of  Vistula,  proceeds  directly  north  to 
within  a  league  of  the  sea  ;  there  meets  all  at 
once  with  a  bank  of  sand,  turns  off  to  the 
west,  and,  after  running  along  this  bank  of 
sand  for  seven  or  eight  leagues,  again  turns 
northward,  and  at  last  falls  into  the  Baltic. 
It  is  at  the  mouth  of  the  latter  arm  of  the  Vis- 
tula, in  a  flat  country,  extremely  fertile,  fre- 
quently overflowed,  and  at  the  foot  of  some 
sandy  heights,  that  the  city  of  Dantzig  is  situ- 
ated, at  the  distance  of  several  thousand  paces 
from  the  sea. 

The  long  sand-bank,  at  which  the  Vistula 
turns  off  to  run  westward,  is  called  the  Neh- 
rung.  At  one  end,  it  terminates  before  Dant- 
zig, running  the  other  way  for  twenty  leagues, 
forming  one  of  the  banks  of  the  Frische-Haff 
as  far  as  KGnigsberg,  with  the  exception  of  a 
cut  at  Pillau — a  natural  channel  formed  by  the 
waters  of  the  Nogath,  the  Passarge  and  the 
Pregel,  in  order  to  discharge  themselves  from 
the  Frische-Haff  into  the  Baltic.  It  is  by 
Pillau,  in  fact,  that  you  pass  out  of  the  Frische*- 
Haff  into  the  Baltic,  and  that  shipping  pro- 
ceeds to  and  from  the  important  city  of  Kii- 
nigsberg. 

You  may  then,  provided  you  clear  the 
narrow  pass  of  the  Pillau,  communicate  bv 
land  from  Konigsberg  to  Dantzig,  by  follow- 
ing the  sand-bank  of  the  Nehru ng,  a  league 
broad,  at  most,  and  generally  much  less, 
twenty-five  long,  without  a  free,  except  near 
Dantzig,  and  presenting  only  a  few  fisher. 
men's  huts. 

Dantzig,  seated  on  the  left  arm  of  the  Vis- 
tula— the  one  which  has  retained  that  name — 
is  2300  fathoms,  or  about  a  league,  from  the 
sea.  The  fort  of  Weichselmunde,  regularly 


March.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


285 


built,  closes  the  mouth  of  the  Vistula.    T 
shorten  the  distance  from  the  place  to  the  sea 
a  canal,  called  the  canal  of  Laaken,  has  been 
dug.     The  ground,  between  the  river  and  the 
canal,  forms  an  island,  called  the  Holm.    Nu 
merous  redoubts,  established  in  this  island 
command  the  river  and  the  canal,  which  are 
the  two  outlets  toward  the  sea.     Lastly,  the 
place  itself,  seated  on  the  bank  of  the  Vistula 
traversed  by  a  little  river,  the  Motlau,  encom 
passed  by  their  united  waters,  shut  in  by  a 
bastioned  enclosure  of  twenty  fronts,  is  mos 
difficult  of  access,  surrounded  by  an  inunda- 
tion not  artificial  but  natural,  which  a  besieger 
cannot  get  rid  of  at  pleasure  by  draining,  anc 
against  which  the  very  inhabitants  have  the 
greatest  difficulty  to  defend  themselves  at  cer- 
tain litres  of  the  day  and  of  the  year.     Dant- 
zig,  thus  surrounded,  on  the  north,  the  east, 
and  the  south,  by  inundated  grounds,  would  be 
inaccessible  but  for  the  sandy  heights  which 
command  it,  and  which    terminate  in   rapid 
slopes  to  the  foot  of  the  walls  on  the  western 
side.     In  consequence,  these  heights  have  not 
failed  to  be  secured  for  the  advantage  of  de- 
fence, and  they  have  been  crowned  by  a  series 
of  works  forming  a  second  enclosure.     It  is 
from  these  heights  that  Dantzig  has  generally 
been  attacked.     In  fact,  the  double  enclosure 
which  occupies  their  summit  being  once  taken, 
the  city  may  be  overwhelmed  with  a  downward 
fire,  to  which  it  is  scarcely  possible  for  it  to 
make  any  resistance.    This  double  enclosure, 
however,  renders  the  attack  of  the  place  ex- 
tremely difficult.    The  works  of  Dantzig  are 
of  earth,  and  present  turfed  slopes  instead  of 
scarps  of  masonry.     But  at  the  foot  of  these 
slopes  were  then  standing  strong  palisades  of 
enormous  dimension,  (they  were  fifteen  inches 
in  diameter,)  very  close  together,  and  deeply 
planted  in  the  ground.     A  ball  might  some- 
times splinter  them,  sometimes  break  off  their 
heads,  but   not   knock  them   down.     On   the 
slopes  in  rear,  enormous  logs  suspended  by 
ropes  were  at  the  moment  of  an  assault  to  be 
made  to  roll  from,  top  to  bottom  upon  the  be- 
siegers.   Then  again,  at  all   the   re-entering 
angles   of    the    enclosure    (re-entering   places 
farmes')  had  been  erected  blockhouses  of  rough 
timber;  these  were  covered  with  earth,  and 
rendered  almost  impenetrable  to  ball  and  bomb. 
The   timber  of  the  plains  of  the   north,  for 
which  the  city  of  Dantzig  is  the  great  mart, 
had  been  lavishly  employed  in  all  forms  for 
the  purpose  of  fortifying  it,  and  occasion  was 
soon  offered  for  discovering  its  defensive  pro- 
perties, which  were  not  appreciated  as  they 
were  after  that  memorable  siege.     Lastly,  am- 
munition in  immense  quantity,  provisions  suf- 
ficient to  subsist  the  population  and  the  troops 
for  above  a  year,  continual  communications 
with  the  city  of  Konigsberg,  either  by  sea  or 
by  the  Nehrung,  communications  which  gave 
the    besieged   garrison  the  assurance   that  it 
should  be  relieved,  and   that  it  could   retire 
whenever  it  pleased,  added  to  the  chances  of 
the  defence  and  to  the  difficulties  of  the  attack. 
Marshal  Lefebvre,  appointed  to  the  command 
of  the  troops  which  were  to  be  employed  in 
the  siege,  possessed  none  of  the  qualifications 
requisite  for  such  an  operation      There  was 


not  in  the  whole  army  a  soldier  more  ignorant 
or  more  brave.  To  all  the  questions  of  art 
raised  by  the  engineers,  he  saw  but  one  solu- 
tion, which  was  to  proceed  to  the  assault  at  the 
head  of  his  grenadiers.  If  Napoleon  had  se- 
lected him  in  spite  of  his  deficiency.it  was  be- 
cause, as  we  have  elsewhere  said,  he  was  desi- 
rous to  give  employment  to  senators ;  it  was 
because  he  had  no  mind  to  leave  in  Paris  an 
old  soldier,  submissive  and  attached,  but  who 
frequently  let  his  tongue  run  when  he  was  not 
checked;  it  was,  lastly,  because  he  wished, 
without  intrusting  him  with  a  corps  farmee,  to 
afford  him  an  opportunity  of  earning  a  high 
reward.  The  brave  Lefebvre,  who  redeemed 
his  ignorance  by  a  certain  natural  intelligence, 
could  form  a  just  estimate  of  himself,  and  was 
absolutely  frightened  when  he  learned  what  a 
task  Napoleon  had  committed  to  him.  Napo- 
leon had  cheered  him  by  promising  to  send 
him  all  the  resources  that  he  should  need,  and 
to  guide  him  himself  from  his  camp  at  Fink- 
enstein.  "Take  courage,"  said  he;  "why 
should  not  you,  too,  when  you  get  back  to 
France,  have  something  to  talk  of  in  the  hall 
of  the  Senate!" 

Overcome  by  these  gracious  words,  the  Mar- 
shal had  cheerfully  obeyed.  Napoleon  had 
jiven  him  for  assistants  two  officers  of  the 
highest  merit,  Chasseloup  the  engineer,  and 
the  general  of  artillery,  Lariboissiere,  knowing 
that  it  is  by  means  of  engineers  and  artillery 
hat  the  walls  of  fortresses  are  overthrown.  It 
s  true  that  they  are  apt  to  differ  in  opinion,  for 
one  is  charged  to  determine  the  attacks,  the 
other  to  execute  them  by  means  of  cannon, 
and  their  provinces  trench  too  closely  upon 
one  another  for  them  not  to  disagree.  It  is  for 
he  general  commanding  in  chief  to  reconcile 
hem.  But  Napoleon  was  thirty  or  forty  leagues 
rom  Dantzig:  he  could  always  resolve  diffi- 
culties by  his  daily  correspondence,  or  send 
me  of  his  aides-de-camp,  General  Savary  or 
~eneral  Bertrand,  to  put  an  end  in  his  name  to 
he  disputes  which  Marshal  Lefebvre  was  in- 
japable  of  comprehending  and  deciding.  This 

did  several  times  during  the  siege. 

Napoleon  had  resolved  to  commence   the 

irst  operations  with  the  auxiliaries  and  one  or 

wo  French  regiments  borrowed  from  the  corps 

of  Marshal  Mortier;   then,  while  the  troops 

brought  from  France  should  be  passing  near 

he  Vistula,  to  keep  them  for  a  time  under  the 

walls  of  Dantzig   to  reinforce  the  besieging 

roops.     Marshal  Lefebvre  had,  therefore,  to 

jegin  with  five  or  six  thousand  Poles  of  the 

lew  levy,  scarcely  trained;  2500  of  the  legion 

if  the  north,  composed  of  Poles,  and  German 

nd  Russian  deserters,  having  spirit  but  not 

olidity,  for  want  of  a  sufficient  organization ; 

1200  Baden  troops,  unaccustomed  to  fire  and 

o  the  fatigues  of  the  trenches;  5000  Saxons, 

good  soldiers,  but  who,  having  sided  with  the 

russians  at  Jena,  could  not  yet  conceive  any 

"real   affection  for  us ;   lastly,  3000  French, 

amely,  the  2d  light,  the  23d  and    19th  regi- 

nenls  of  mounted  chasseurs,  which  had  ar- 

ived  from  Italy,  and  600  of  the  corps  of  engi- 

leers,  incomparable  troops,  who,  making  up  for 

11  deficiencies  in  this  famous  siege,  covered 

hemselves  with  glory.    It  was,  as  we  see.  with 


286 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[March,  1807. 


18,000  men  at  most,  only  3000  of  whom  were 
French,  that  we  were  about  to  undertake  the 
regular  attack  of  a  place  containing  a  garrison 
of  18,000  men. 

The  heavy  artillery,  of  which  at  least  one 
hundred  pieces  were  required,  with  immense 
supplies  of  powder  and  projectiles,  could  be 
obtained  only  from  the  arsenals  of  Silesia. 
Water  carriage  being  interrupted,  it  had  to 
be  drawn  with  great  labour,  along  wretched 
roads,  from  the  Oder  to  the  Vistula.  It  was 
expected  so  early  as  March.  But  the  first 
thing  to  be  done,  before  battering  the  place 
could  be  thought  of,  was  to  invest  it  closely, 
in  order  to  deprive  the  garrison  of  reinforce- 
ments and  of  the  encouragements  which  it  was 
receiving  from  Kiinigsberg.  To  accomplish 
this,  it  would  be  necessary,  on  the  one  hand, 
to  cut  it  off  from  the  fort  of  Weichselmiinde, 
and,  on  the  other,  to  intercept  the  Nehrung, 
that  long  sand-bank,  extending,  as  we  have 
said,  from  KOnigsberg  to  Dantzig,  with  a  single 
cut  at  Pillau. 

We  had  arrived  by  the  sandy  heights  which 
command  Dantzig  on  the  west,  and  we  per- 
ceived before  us  the  outer  enclosure  con- 
structed on  these  heights,  at  our  feet  the  city, 
on  the  left  the  Vistula,  throwing  itself  into  the 
Baltic,  amidst  the  works  of  the  fort  of  Weich- 
selmiinde, on  the  right  the  vast  tract  of  land 
overflowed  by  the  Motlau,  in  front,  stretching 
further  than  the  eye  could  reach,  the  Nehrung, 
washed  on  one  side  by  the  sea,  on  the  other  by 
the  Vistula,  and  sinking  at  the  horizon  towards 
the  Frische-Haff'.  It  was  a  circuit  of  seven  or 
eight  leagues,  which  it  was  impossible  to  en- 
compass with  18,000  men.  It  is  true  that,  by 
occupying  certain  points,  the  investment  might 
be  sufficient.  Thus,  by  placing  ourselves  on 
the  Vistula,  between  the  fort  of  Weichselmiinde 
and  Dantzig,  we  should  intercept  the  commu- 
nications by  sea.  By  establishing  ourselves 
on  the  Nehrung,  we  should  intercept  the  com- 
munication by  land.  But  to  possess  ourselves 
of  the  principal  points  only,  we  must  first 
crown  the  heights,  then  descend  on  the  left, 
carry  the  works  of  the  fort  of  Weichselmiinde 
on  both  hanks  of  the  Vistula,  and,  in  default 
of  this  operation,  at  least  bar  the  river,  pene- 
trate into  the  isle  of  Holm,  and  take  the  canal 
of  Laaken.  We  must  then,  after  descending 
on  the  left,  descend  on  the  right  also  into  the 
inundated  plains,  cross  it  upon  the  dikes,  pass 
the  Vistula  above  Dantzig,  as  we  had  passed 
it  below,  enter  upon  the  Nehrung,  intrench 
ourselves  there,  and  cut  off  the  land  route  as 
well  as  that  by  sea.  These  first  difficulties 
overcome,  we  might  open  the  trenches  before 
the  enclosure.  But  for  this  purpose  we  should 
have  needed  eight  or  ten  thousand  more  good 
troops,  and  we  had  them  not.  By  the  advice 
therefore  of  Chasseloup,  commanding  the  en- 
gineers, it  was  decided  to  choose  from  among 
the  various  preliminary  operations  that  which 
appeared  most  urgent  and  least  difficult  To 
cross  the  Vistula  below  Dantzig,  between  the 
fort  of  Weichselmunde  and  the  place,  to  pene- 
trate into  the  isle  of  Holm,  under  the  fire  of 
well-armed  redoubts,  and  in  spite  of  the  sallies 
which  might  be  made  either  from  Weichsel- 
miinde or  from  Dantzig,  was  too  perilous.  It 


was  resolved  therefore  to  cross  above  Dantzig, 
a  league  or  two  higher  up,  at  a  place  called 
Neufahr,  to  form  a  small  camp  there,  in  this 
manner  to  intercept  the  Nehrung,  then,  in  pro- 
portion as  means  should  be  found,  to  reinforce 
this  camp,  to  bring  it  nearer  to  Dantzig,  in 
order  that  it  might  give  a  hand  to  the  troops 
which  should  by  and  by  be  charged  to  cross 
the  Vistula,  between  the  place  and.  the  fort  of 
Weichselmunde. 

This  operation  was  intrusted  to  General 
Schramm,  with  a  corps  of  about  3000  men, 
composed  of  a  battalion  of  the  second  light, 
some  hundred  Saxon  grenadiers,  a  Polish  de- 
tachment, infantry  and  cavalry,  and  a  squadron 
of  the  19th  chasseurs.  On  the  morning  of  the 
19th  of  March,  the  troops,  having  got  as  high 
as  Neufahr,  two  leagues  above  Dantzig,  were 
embarked  in  boats  which  had  been  procured, 
crossed  the  Vistula,  which  is  not  so  broad  after 
it  has  divided  into  several  arms,  and  in  this 
operation  took  advantage  of  an  island  situated 
near  the  opposite  bank.  General  Schramm, 
having  reached  the  Nehrung  in  consequence 
of  this  passage,  divided  his  little  corps  into 
three  columns ;  one  on  the  left,  to  fall  upon  the 
enemy's  troops  which  defended  the  position 
towards  Dantzig;  one  on  the  right,  to  repulse 
those  which  might  come  from  the  Konigsberg 
side;  and  a  third,  to  act  by  way  of  reserve. 
At  the  head  of  each  of  these  columns  he  had 
placed  a  detachment  of  French,  which  would 
set  them  an  example. 

No  sooner  had  they  landed  than  General 
Schramm's  troops,  hurried  on  by  the  battalion 
of  the  2d  light,  turned  to  the  left,  went  to  meet 
the  Prussians,  and  upset  them  in  spile  of  the 
most  vehement  fire.  While  the  principal  co- 
lumn, taking  the  left,  pushed  them  towards 
Dantzig,  the  second  remained  in  observation 
on  the  Kiinigsberg  road.  The  third,  kept  in 
reserve,  served  to  reinforce  the  first.  The 
enemy,  having  tried  to  take  advantage  of  the 
obstacles  of  the  ground  to  renew  his  resistance 
— for  the  Nehrung,  as  it  approaches  Dantzig, 
has  both  hills  and  woods — the  first  column, 
assisted  by  the  third,  again  repulsed  him,  and 
killed  and  took  some  men.  The  Saxons  vied 
on  this  occasion  with  the  French.  Both  drove 
back  the  enemy  to  the  glacis  of  the  fort  of 
Weichselmunde,  from  which  the  troops  that 
defended  the  Nehrung  had  come. 

The  affair  seemed  to  be  over,  when,  about 
seven  o'clock  in  the  evening,  a  column  of 
three  or  four  thousand  Prussians  was  seen 
debouching  from  Dantzig,  and  ascending  the 
Vistula,  with  drums  beating  and  colours  fly- 
ing. The  2d  light,  by  a  well-directed  and 
well-sustained  fire,  stopped  that  column,  then 
charged  it  with  the  bayonet,  and  drove  it  back 
upon  Dantzig,  whither  it  ran  to  shut  itself  up. 
This  day,  which  put  us  in  possession  of  a 
passage  over  the  Vistula  above  Dantzig,  and 
of  a  position  which  intercepted  the  Nehrung, 
cost  the  enemy  two  or  three  hundred  men  put 
horg  de  combat,  and  five  or  six  hundred  made 
prisoners.  Captain  Girod,  of  the  engineers, 
appointed  to  direct  the  expedition, distinguished 
himself  by  his  intelligence  and  his  coolness 
The  operation  being  finished,  he  had  trees  felled, 
epaulements  thrown  up,  a  bridge  of  boats  esVa 


March,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


287 


blished  over  the  Vistula,  with  the  accompani- 
ment of  a  strong  tete  du  pont.  Behind  this 
shelter  the  troops  lodged,  and  they  were 
guarded  by  means  of  posts  of  cavalry,  which, 
on  one  side,  pushed  on  to  beneath  the  glacis 
of  the  fort  of  Weichselmunde,  and,  on  the 
other,  ran  along  the  Nehrung,  in  the  direction 
of  Konigsberg. 

On  the  following  days,  general  Schramm, 
who  commanded  this  detachment,  endeavoured 
to  descend  as  far  as  Heubude,  in  order  to  press 
the  place  more  closely,  and  to  gain  possession 
of  a  sluice,  which  had  the  greatest  influence 
upon  the  inundation.  But  this  sluice,  sur- 
rounded by  water,  was  not  accessible  on  any 
side.  General  Schramm  was  obliged  to  relin- 
quish the  design  of  taking  it,  and  to  confine 
himself  to  bringing  down  the  bridge  of  boats 
to  Heubude.  However,  this  post  of  the  Upper 
Vistula,  after  its  removal  to  Heubude,  had  six 
leagues  to  go  in  order  to  communicate  with 
the  head-quarters,  across  the  inundated  lands 
and  along  the  dikes.  In  attempting  to  cut  off  the 
communications  of  the  besieged,  he  therefore 
ran  the  risk  of  losing  his  own  communications. 

On  the  26th  of  March,  the  enemy  attempted 
two  sorties;  one  from  the  place,  directed  by 
the  Schidlilz  and  Oliva  gates  upon  our  advanced 
posts,  with  the  intention  of  completing  the 
burning  of  the  suburbs ;  the  other  from  the 
outworks  of  the  fort  of  Weichselmiinde,  and 
directed  upon  the  left  of  the  head-quarters  by 
Langenfurth.  Both  were  briskly  repulsed. 
A  Polish  cavalry  officer,  Captain  Sokolniki, 
distinguished  himself  there  by  his  intrepidity 
and  skill.  A  celebrated  Prussian  partisan, 
the  Baron  de  Kakow,  was  taken  there. 

Our  troops,  in  driving  back  the  enemy  to 
the  foot  of  the  works,  approached  nearer  to 
the  place  than  they  had  yet  done,  so  that  one 
could  study  its  configuration.  General  Chas- 
seloup  formed  the  plan  of  the  attacks  with  the 
perspicacity  of  an  equally  scientific  and  prac- 
tised engineer.  The  outer  enclosure,  con- 
structed on  the  margin  of  the  heights,  pre- 
sented two  works,  connected  with  each  other, 
but  distinct  and  separated  by  a  small  valley, 
at  the  farther  end  of  which  is  the  suburb  of 
Schidlilz.  The  first  of  these  works,  that  on 
the  right  (the  right  of  the  besieging  army)  is 
called  the  Bischoffsberg ;  the  second,  that  of 
the  left,  is  called  Hagelsberg.  It  was  the  lat- 
ter which  General  Chasseloup  chose  for  the 
object  of  the  principal  attack,  reserving  the 
option  of  directing  a  false  attack  upon  the 
Bischoffsberg.  The  motives  which  decided 
him  were  the  following :' 

The  works  of  the  Hagelsberg  appeared  less 
carefully  constructed  than  those  of  the  Bis- 
choffsberg. The  Hagelsberg  was  narrow,  in- 
convenient for  the  deploying  of  troops,  whe- 
ther the  besieged  had  to  make  sorties  or  to 
repulse  an  assault ;  whereas  the  Bischoffs- 
berg, spacious  and  well  distributed,  admitted 
of  three  or  four  thousand  men  being  drawn 


»  We  have  thought  it  right  to  relate  wilh  some  detail 
the  siege  of  Dantzig.  because  it  is  a  fine  model  of  a 
regular  siege,  and  perhaps  the  most  remarkable  of  our 
age,  because  examples  of  regular  sieges,  to  frequent 
and  so  perfect  under  Louis  XIV.,  have  become  very 


up  in  order  of  battle,  and  thrown  in  a  mass 
upon  the  besieger.  The  Hagelsberg  could  be 
battered  from  behind  by  the  Stolzenberg,  one 
of  the  outer  positions ;  the  Bischoffsberg 
could  not  be  from  any  side.  The  Hagelsberg 
was  reached  over  ground  undulated,  but  un- 
broken. To  approach  the  Bischoffsberg,  you 
came  to  a  deep  ravine,  in  which  it  would  not 
be  easy  to  make  paths,  and  into  which  also 
you  ran  the  risk  of  being  flung,  if  you  at- 
tempted to  cross  it  in  proceeding  to  the  as- 
sault. Not  only  was  the  Hagelsberg  easier  to 
take  than  the  Bischoffsberg,  but  the  position 
when  taken  was  better.  You  commanded  the 
place  from  both  alike,  and  could  overwhelm  it 
with  your  fire.  But,  if  that  fire  was  not  suffi- 
cient to  reduce  it,  and  it  were  necessary  to 
descend  from  the  heights  to  force  the  second 
enclosure,  you  found,  on  descending  from  the 
bastion  of  Heilige  Leichnam  to  the  bastion  of 
St.  Elizabeth,  a  salient  front,  and  which  not  be- 
ing flanked  on  any  side,  could  present  but  few 
difficulties  to  the  besieger.  In  descending  from 
the  Bischoffsberg,  on  the  contrary,  from  the  bas- 
tion of  St.  Elizabeth  to  the  bastion  of  St.  Gertrude, 
you  found  on  all  sides  a  re-entering  flank,  and 
exposed,  moreover,  to  the  fire  of  several  very 
elevated  platforms  (cavaliers').  Lastly,  a  rea- 
son deduced  from  the  general  situation  ought 
to  decide  the  attack  on  the  Hagelsberg.  This 
attack  would  bring  our  principal  forces  nearer 
to  the  Lower  Vistula,  and  it  was  in  fact  by 
the  Lower  Vistula  that  the  besiegers  must 
think  of  investing  the  place,  by  drawing  from 
this  point  the  detached  corps  of  General 
Schramm,  by  giving  a  hand  to  him  for  pass- 
ing into  the  isle  of  Holm,  and  by  thus  cutting 
off  Dantzig  from  the  fort  of  WeichselmQnde. 
These  reasons  were  convincing,  and  con- 
vinced Napoleon  himself.  General  Kirgener, 
placed  under  General  Chasseloup,  had  con- 
ceived the  idea  of  fixing  the  point  of  attack 
still  more  to  the  left,  towards  the  Oliva  gate, 
in  the  low  ground  between  the  Hagelsberg 
and  the  Vistula,  opposite  to  the  isle  of  Holm. 
This  idea  was  not  adopted  ;  for  it  would  have 
been  necessary,  in  the  first  place,  to  carry  the 
outer  enclosure,  while  exposed  on  the  right  to 
the  fire  of  the  Hagelsberg.  Such  a  mode  of 
operating  was  not  admissible. 

General  Chasseloup,  called  for  several  days 
to  Thorn,  to  trace  the  plan  of  some  defensive 
works  there,  left,  at  his  departure,  the  plan  oi 
the  attacks,  and  orders  for  the  commencement 
of  the  operations. 

There  was  no  longer  any  reason  for  delay, 
for  Marshal  Lefebvre  had  received  the  rein- 
forcements which  had  been  promised  him. 
The  44th  of  the  line,  drawn  from  Augereau's 
corps,  arrived  at  that  moment  from  the  banks 
of  the  Vistula;  it  was  only  a  thousand  men. 
but  of  the  very  best.  The  19th,  which  had 
set  out  from  France  two  months  before,  arrived 
also  from  Stettin,  with  a  convoy  of  artillery, 
which  it  escorted.  This  was  sufficient,  while 


rare  in  our  days,  because  that  of  Dantzig  had  the  signal 
honour  to  be  covered  by  Napoleon  at  the  head  of  200,008 
men,  because,  finally,  it  is  the  imtispensable  episode 
which  connects  the  winter  campaign  wilh  the  summet 
campaign  in  the  glorious  war  in  Poland. 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[April,  1807. 


expecting  the  other  regiments  announced,  for 
commencing  the  operations,  and  for  setting  an 
example  for  the  auxiliary  troops. 

Without  being  versed  in  that  fine  science 
which  immortalized  Vauban,  every  one  knows 
with  what  precaution  fortresses  must  be  ap- 
proached. You  must  burrow  under  ground, 
open  trenches,  throw  up  the  rubbish  proceed- 
ing from  those  trenches  on  the  side  next  to  the 
enemy,  and  advance  under  the  fire  of  the  heavy 
artillery.  In  this  manner  you  produce  lines 
which  are  called  parallels,  because  they  are 
parallel  to  the  front  which  you  are  attacking. 
These  are  then  armed  with  batteries,  for  reply- 
ing to  the  fire  of  the  besieged.  Having  traced 
the  first  parallel,  you  approach,  working  under 
ground,  by  zigzags,  to  the  distance  at  which 
you  intend  to  form  the  second  parallel,  which 
you  arm  with  batteries  like  the  first.  You 
arrive  successively  at  the  third,  from  which 
you  leap  upon  the  border  of  the  ditch,  which 
is  called  the  covered  way.  You  then  descend 
into  that  ditch  with  fresh  precautions,  break 
down  with  breaching  batteries  the  walls,  called 
scarps,  fill  the  ditch  with  their  rubbish,  and 
lastly  mount  upon  that  rubbish  to  the  assault. 
Sorties  of  the  enemy  to  disturb  these  difficult 
operations,  combats  of  heavy  artillery,  mines 
which  blow  into  the  air  besiegers  and  besieged, 
add  animated,  and  frequently  terrible,  scenes 
to  this  subterranean  warfare,  in  which  science 
vies  with  heroism  for  attacking  or  defending 
large  cities,  whose  wealth,  geographical  situ- 
ation, or  military  strength,  render  them  worthy 
of  such  efforts. 

To  such  complicated  means,  one  is  obliged 
to  resort,  when  a  fortress  cannot  be  taken  by 
surprise.  This  was  the  case  here,  for  the 
causes  already  assigned;  and, in  the  night  be- 
tween the  1st  and  2d  of  April,  the  trenches 
were  opened  facing  the  Hagelsberg,  which  was 
the  point  of  attack  fixed  upon.  Our  troops  had 
taken  a  position  on  the  Zigankenberg.  They 
sought,  as  usual,  to  conceal  this  first  opera- 
tion from  the  enemy,  and  by  daybreak  our 
soldiers  were  covered  by  an  epaulement  of 
earth  for  an  extent  of  two  hundred  fathoms. 
The  besieged  kept  up  a  very  brisk  fire  upon 
them,  but  could  not  prevent  them  from  com- 
pleting the  work  in  the  course  of  the  day.  In 
the  night  between  the  2d  and  3d  of  April,  they 
got  beyond  the  first  parallel  by  the  transverse 
trenches,  called  zigzags,  and  thus  gained 
ground.  While  part  of  our  men  were  thus 
employed,  an  attempt  was  made  to  carry  a 
work  that  was  soon  to  annoy  our  operations. 

This  was  the  redoubt  known  by  the  name  of 
Kalk-Schanze,  situated  on  our  left  on  the  very 
margin  of  the  Vistula,  and  consequently  on  the 
low  ground  through  which  the  river  runs. 
Though  lower  than  the  point  which  we  were 
crowning  with  our  works,  it  enfiladed  our 
trenches— a  sufficient  motive  for  striving  to  get 
rid  of  it.  Soldiers  of  the  legion  of  the  north, 
daring  fellows,  as  we  have  said,  but  not  very 
uteady,  threw  themselves  boldly  into  the  work, 
and  made  themselves  masters  of  ii.  During  the 
same  night,  the  enemy  made  a  sortie  upon  our 
first  trenches  and  upon  the  redoubt  which  had  ; 
just  been  taken.  He  was  at  first  repulsed,  but 
retook  the  redoubt,  and  drove  out  the  soldiers 


of  the  legion  of  the  north  and  the  Baden  men. 
No  sooner  was  he  established  there,  than  he 
filled  the  ditches  with  the  water  of  the  Vistula, 
surrounded  the  scarps  of  earth  with  strong 
palisades,  and  rendered  himself  almost  im- 
pregnable there. 

We  were  therefore  obliged  to  continue  our 
works,  notwithstanding  the  proximity  of  so 
incommodious  a  neighbour,  against  whom  it 
became  necessary  for  us  to  protect  ourselves 
by  traverses,  a  sort  of  epaulements  of  earth, 
opposed  to  the  flank  fire,  which  circumstance, 
occasioning  an  increase  of  labour,  was  likely 
to  prolong  the  operations  of  the  siege. 

During  the  following  nights  and  days,  from 
the  4th  to  the  7th  of  April,  the  works  of  ap- 
proach were  prosecuted  under  the  fire  of  the 
place,  to  which  we  could  not  reply,  our  heavy 
artillery  not  having  yet  arrived.  We  had  only 
field  artillery,  placed  in  some  redoubts,  to  play 
upon  the  enemy  in  case  of  sortie.  The  works 
were  attended  with  more  difficulties  than  occur 
in  most  regular  sieges.  The  soil  in  which 
they  were  carried  on,  consisted  of  a  fine,  loose, 
incompact  sand,  which  sunk  down  when  struck 
by  balls,  and  which  the  wind,  that  had  become 
violent  on  the  approach  of  the  equinox,  drove 
into  the  faces  of  our  men.  The  weather  was 
bad,  alternately  snowy  and  rainy.  Lastly,  we 
had  no  staunch  labourers  but  the  French,  and 
these  were  not  numerous,  and  worn  out  with 
fatigue. 

In  the  night  between  the  7th  and  8th,  a  pa- 
rallel was  opened  against  the  Bischoffsbers:, 
with  the  twofold  intention  of  diverting  the 
enemy  by  a  false  attack,  and  establishing  bat- 
teries which  should  take  the  Hagelsberg  from 
behind,  and  could  even  fire  upon  the  city. 

In  the  following  days  the  works,  as  well  for 
the  real  as  for  the  false  attack,  were  continued. 
The  besieged,  on  their  part,  had  undertaken 
works  of  counter-approach,  with  a  view  to 
gain  possession  of  a  hillock  which  would  give 
them  the  command  of  our  trenches.  In  the 
night  between  the  10th  and  llth,  General 
Chasseloup,  who  had  returned  to  the  camp, 
made  the  necessary  dispositions  for  destroying 
the  works  directed  against  ours.  At  ten  o'clock 
at  night,  four  companies  of  the  44th  of  the 
line,  with  120  soldiers  of  the  legion  of  the 
north,  commanded  by  Rogniat,  chef  de  bataillon, 
crossed  a  kind  of  ravine,  which  separated  the 
left  of  our  first  parallel  from  the  position  occu- 
pied by  the  Prussians,  fell  upon  them,  over- 
turned them,  took  thirteen,  and  obliged  the 
others  to  scamper  off,  throwing  away  their 
muskets.  The  soldiers  of  the  legion  of  the 
north  were  immediately  set  to  work  to  fill  with 
the  shovel  the  trenches  begun  by  the  besieged. 
Now  this  destruction  of  the  enemy's  works 
took  place  within  forty  fathoms  of  the  fortress, 
and  under  a  murderous  fire  of  grape  and  ball. 
Our  labourers  of  the  legion  of  the  north,  hav- 
ing withstood  it  for  some  time,  at  length  ran 
away  one  after  another,  so  that  the  Prussians 
could  return  to  the  abandoned  work  before  it 
was  completely  destroyed.  At  one  in  the 
morning,  General  Chasseloup  and  Marshal 
Lefebvre,  having  perceived  the  return  of  the 
enemy,  resolved  to  drive  him  out  again.  Four 
hundred  men  of  the  14th,  sent  against  the 


April,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


289 


work,  found  there  a  strong  detachment  of  Prus- 
sian grenadiers,  attacked  them  with  the  bayo- 
net, killed  or  wounded  about  fifty,  and  took 
about  the  same  number,  with  a  considerable 
quantity  of  muskets  and  tools.  A  company 
of  Saxons  remained  till  daylight  to  fill  the 
trenches  of  the  besieged,  but  when  it  was 
light,  though  seconded  by  our  tirailleurs,  they 
could  hold  out  no  longer  against  the  fire  of 
the  place,  and  were  obliged  to  retire. 

The  Prussians  reoccupied  the  work  in  the 
course  of  the  12th,  and  threw  up  in  the  utmost 
hasle  a  sort  of  palisaded  redoubt  on  the  hil- ' 
lock  to  which  they  attached  so  much  value. ' 
It  was  not  possible  to  leave  them  thus  quietly 
settled  on  the  left  of  our  trenches.  It  was  de- 
cided that  in  the  following  night  this  position 
should  be  taken  from  them  for  the  third  time, 
and  that  no  time  should  be  lost  in  connecting  • 
it  with  the  second  parallel  which  had  that  day 
been  opened.  At  nine  in  the  evening  of  the 
12th,  Rogniat,  chef  de  bataillon,  and  General 
Puthod,  at  the  head  of  300  Saxon  Bevilacqua 
grenadiers,  a  company  of  carbineers  of  the 
legion  of  the  north,  and  a  company  of  grena- 
diers of  the  44th,  commanded  by  the  chef  de 
batnillon,  Jacquemard,  resolutely  attacked  the 
work.  The  enemy  made  a  vigorous  resistance. 
Covered  by  the  palisades,  he  kept  up  such  a 
fire  of  musketry  as  for  a  moment  staggered 
our  troops.  But  the  grenadiers  of  the  44th 
marched  right  up  to  the  palisades,  while  the 
Saxon  Bevilacqua  grenadiers,  led  by  a  brave 
drummer,  finding  a  way  that  turned  the  work 
on  the  left,  got  into  it  and  decided  the  success. 
We  remained  masters  of  the  redoubt,  and 
made  haste  to  connect  it  with  the  second  par- 
allel. 

On  the  return  of  daylight,  however,  the 
enemy,  resolved  to  dispute  with  us  to  the  last 
a  position  which  would  enable  him  to  stop  our 
works,  if  he  could  succeed  in  retaining  it, 
made  a  sortie  in  great  force,  and  directed  a 
strong  column  upon  the  point  so  warmly  con- 
tested. All  the  guns  of  the  place  supported 
his  efforts.  He  fell  upon  the  redoubt  in  which 
the  Saxons  still  were,  overwhelmed  them  by 
numbers,  notwithstanding  the  most  courageous 
resistance  on  their  part,  and  having  recon- 
quered the  work,  marched  resolutely  to  our 
trenches,  with  the  intention  to  take  and  to  de- 
stroy them.  He  had  already  entered,  when 
Marshal  Lefebvre,  who,  on  the  first  noise  of 
this  sally,  had  speedily  collected  a  battalion  of 
the  44th,  fell  upon  the  Prussians,  sword  in 
hand,  and.  amidst  a  shower  of  balls,  drove 
them  out  of  the  trenches,  and  followed  them 
with  the  bayonet  to  the  glacis  of  the  Hagels- 
berg.  Having  arrived  there,  he  was  obliged 
to  retire  under  a  shower  of  grape.  In  this  ac- 
tion the  Prussians  lost  about  300  men.  It  cost 
us  fifteen  officers  and  about  100  men,  Saxons 
and  French. 

From  that  moment  that  hillock  on  the  left 
was  relinquished  to  us  by  the  enemy.  It  was 
definitively  connected  with  our  trenches,  and 
we  then  debouched  by  new  traverses  beyond 
the  second  parallel.  The  troops  worked  in 
like  manner  at  that  which  had  been  marked 
out  before  the  Bischoft'sberg,  and  the  object  of 
which  we  have  already  specified. 

VOL.  II.— 37 


These  three  days'  fighting  had  greatly  re- 
tarded the  operations  of  the  siege,  inasmuch 
as,  our  trenches  being  continually  threatened, 
we  were  obliged  to  reserve  our  best  troops  to 
guard  them.  The  following  days  were  em- 
ployed in  finishing  the  second  parallel,  in  en- 
larging it,  and  forming  places  <Parmes,  for  lodg- 
ing the  troops  who  were  to  guard  it,  in  prepar- 
ing the  sites  of  batteries,  while  awaiting  the 
arrival  of  the  heavy  cannon ;  and  the  same 
pains  were  bestowed  on  the  parallel  of  the 
false  attack  undertaken  before  the  Bischoffs- 
berg.  Two  regiments  had  arrived  agreeably 
to  the  orders  of  Napoleon,  who  was  extremely 
attentive  to  the  operations  of  this  great  siege. 
It  was,  on  the  one  hand,  the  regiment  of  the 
municipal  guard  of  Paris,  and,  on  the  other 
the  12th  light,  temporarily  detached  from  Thorn 
and  sent  to  Dantzig.  At  the  same  time,  Napo- 
leon had  ordered  Marshal  Mortier,  who  had 
just  finished  the  affair  of  the  armistice  with 
the  Swedes,  to  march  his  troops  by  way  of 
Stettin  to  Dantzig;  and  he  was  collecting,  in 
the  isle  of  Nogath,  the  elements  of  the  infan- 
try reserve  which  Marshal  Lannes  was  to  com- 
mand. He  was  therefore  in  hopes  of  being 
soon  strongly  appuved. 

The  besieging  army  being  provided  with 
two  new  French  regiments,  it  was  fitting  to 
complete  the  investment  of  the  place,  and  to 
continue  the  operations  projected  on  the  Vis- 
tula by  bringing  General  Schramm  from  the 
height  of  Heubude  to  that  of  the  isle  of  Holm, 
which   became   the   more   urgent,   since    the 
enemy  was  daily  communicating  by  the  fort 
of  Weichselmiinde  with  the  sea,  whence  he 
received  succours  in  money  and  ammunition. 
In  consequence,  on  the  15th  of  April,  General 
Gardanne,  who  had  taken  the  command  of  the 
troops  placed  in  the  Nehrung,  descended  the 
course  of  the  Vistula  with  those  troops  and 
some  reinforcements  which  had  been  sent  him, 
and  went  and  established  himself  along  the 
canal  of  Laaken,  between  Dantzig  and  the  fort 
of  Weichselmunde,  at  the  distance  of  700  fa- 
thoms from  the  glacis  of  that  fort.     He  was 
posted   in  such  a  manner  as  to  intercept  the 
navigation  of  the  canal,  and  subsequeutly  that 
of  the  Vistula  itself,  when  the  troops  at  the 
head-quarters  should  come  and  join  their  fires 
with  his  by  descending  on  their  left   to  the 
bank  of  the  river,  which  was  not  at  first  much 
opposed,  unless  by  the  redoubts  on  the  isle  of 
Holm  ;  but  Marshal  Kalkreuth,  having  soon 
!  perceived  the  importance  of  the  enterprise,  re- 
1  solved  to  make  the  greatest  efforts  to  maintain 
!  his  communications  with  the  sea.      On   the 
|  16th  of  April,  three  thousand  .Russians  and 
two   thousand   Prussians    sallied    simultane- 
ously, the   first   from   the  fort  of  Weichsel- 
!  munde,  the  second  from  Dantzig,  to  attack  our 
'  troops,  who  had  not  had   time  to  establish 
i  themselves  solidly  in  the  Nehrung  and  at  the 
'  mouth  of  the  canal.     An  extremely  sharp  ac- 
i  tion  took  place  near  Weichselmunde  with  the 
Russians,  and  luckily  just  before  the  Prus 
sians    had  debouched  from  Dantzig.      They 
were  driven  back  to  the  glacis  of  the  fort,  after 
sustaining  considerable  loss.    No  sooner  had 
our  troops  finished   with  them  than  they  were 
obliged  to  begin  again  with  the  Prussians,  but 
2  B 


290 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


[April,  1807. 


that  affair  was  neither  difficult  nor  long,  for  I 
for  our  auxiliaries,  having  the  2d  light  at  their 
head,  behaved  gallantly.    The  enemy  lost  in 
the   whole   five   or  six   hundred  men,  killed 
or  prisoners.     We  lost  about  two  hundred. 

After  this  action,  our  establishment  on  the 
Lower  Vistula  and  in  the  Nehrung  appeared 
safe.  Pains  were,  nevertheless,  taken  to  conso- 
lidate it.  A  double  epaulement  of  earth  was 
thrown  up  to  protect  it  at  once  against  the  fort 
and  against  Dantzig,  and  it  was  extended  far 
enough  for  it  to  join  the  river  on  one  side,  and 
on  the  other  the  woods  which  cover  this  part 
of  the  Nehrung.  Vast  abattis  rendered  these 
woods  almost  inaccessible.  A  strong  block- 
house was  placed  in  the  centre  of  our  intrench- 
ments.  To  these  precautions  was  added  a 
guard  of  sloops  on  the  canal  and  the  river,  for 
preventing  the  enemy's  craft  from  ascending 
or  descending  the  Vistula.  While  these  works 
were  going  forward  on  the  right  bank,  the 
troops  from  the  head-quarters  on  the  left  bank, 
descending  from  the  heights  to  the  margin  of 
the  Vistula,  had  thrown  up  redoubts  there,  in 
order  to  cross  their  fires  with  those  of  the 
troops  established  in  the  Nehrung.  They  se- 
cured themselves  on  this  side  by  a  gabion 
work  two  hundred  fathoms  in  length.  A  brave 
officer,  named  Tardiville,  having  quartered 
himself  with  about  a  hundred  men,  in  a  house 
on  the  bank  of  the  Vistula,  maintained  him- 
self there,  in  spite  of  the  enemy's  projectiles, 
with  such  obstinacy  that  this  house  was  named 
after  him  while  the  siege  lasted.  The  isle  of 
Holm  was  still  left  to  be  conquered  before 
the  investment  was  complete  and  definitive. 
Still,  however,  it  was  not  without  difficulty 
that  the  enemy's  vessels  got  up  to  Dantzig.  Se- 
veral barks,  indeed,  had  been  taken,  and  a 
cutter,  having  attempted  to  ascend  the  Vistula, 
had  been  stopped  by  the  fire  from  the  two 
shores.  The  soldiers,  led  by  an  officer  of  en- 
gineers named  Lesecq,  had  leaped  from  the 
top  of  the  intrenchments,  placed  themselves 
uncovered,  on  the  bank  of  the  river,  and  over- 
whelming the  enemy's  vessel  with  their  mus- 
ketry, had  obliged  her  to  sheer  off.  Captain 
Lesecq  had  his  sword  carried  away  by  a  shot, 
without  sustaining  any  injury  himself. 

It  was  on  the  20th  of  April.  The  French 
had  been  six  weeks  before  the  place,  and  it 
was  twenty  days  since  the  trenches  were 
opened.  The  heavy  artillery  had  just  arrived, 
part  from  Breslau,  part  from  Stettin,  part  from 
Thorn  and  Warsaw.  Nothing  ran  short  but 
ammunition.  Still  there  was  sufficient  for  open- 
ing the  fire  of  the  batteries  of  the  first  and 
second  parallel.  Every  arrangement  had  been 
made  for  commencing  on  the  20th,  when  a 
tremendous  equinoctial  tempest,  bringing  a 
heavy  fall  of  snow  along  with  it,  filled  the 
trenches  and  interrupted  the  operations  in 
them.  It  took  two  days  to  clear  them  out,  and 
our  soldiers,  bivouacking  in  the  open  air  in 
that  rude  climate,  rendered  still  more  rude  by 
the  lateness  of  winter,  suffered  very  severely. 
At  length  in  the  night  of  the  23d,  fifty-eight 
pieces,  mortars,  howitzers,  twenty-four  and 
twelve-pounders,  fired  at  once,  and  continued 
to  batter  the  place  the  whole  of  the  24th.  The 
enemy's  artillery,  which  had  reserved  its 


means  to  oppose  ours,  replied  briskly  and  with 
tolerable  precision.  But,  after  some  hours  of 
this  fight  with  great  guns,  directed  with  supe- 
rior skill  by  General  Lariboissiere,  a  great 
number  of  the  enemy's  embrasures  were  de- 
molished, many  of  his  pieces  dismounted,  and 
a  fierce  conflagration,  kindled  by  the  shells 
thrown  in  the  false  attack,  raged  in  the  inte- 
rior of  the  city.  Columns  of  smoke  were  seen 
rising  above  the  highest  edifices,  melancholy 
evidences  of  the  ravages  which  we  had  caused. 
Marshal  Kalkreuth,  nevertheless,  succeeded 
in  extinguishing  the  fire  by  means  of  the 
abundance  of  water  with  which  the  city  was 
provided.  He  appeared  to  be  unshaken.  Next 
day,  the  25th,  Marshal  Lefebvre,  to  sound  his 
disposition,  sent  him  word  that  he  was  going 
to  fire  red-hot  balls.  He  made  no  reply.  The 
fire  of  all  our  pieces  then  recommenced  with 
still  greater  energy,  and  occasioned  a  new  con- 
flagration, which  was  again  extinguished  by 
the  united  efforts  of  the  garrison  and  the  in- 
habitants. The  violent  fire  of  our  artillery, 
drawing  upon  it  the  enemy's  projectiles,  had 
produced  a  diversion  serviceable  to  our  works, 
which,  having  become  more  easy,  advanced 
more  rapidly.  Thanks  to  the  ardour  of  the 
engineer  troops,  digging  out  the  sand  amidst 
balls  which  demolished  the  head  of  the  shafts, 
and  carried  away  gabions  and  sand-bags,  the 
zigzags  were  carried  to  the  third  parallel, 
opened  at  length  in  the  night  between  the  25th 
and  26th,  by  flying  sap. 

In  the  night  between  the  26th  and  27th,  great 
part  of  that  parallel  was  traced,  still  by  favour 
of  the  combat  of  the  two  artilleries.  Unluckily, 
we  had  not  a  sufficient  quantity  of  pieces  or  of 
ammunition.  We  fired  scarcely  two  thousand 
shot  a  day,  while  the  enemy  fired  three  thou- 
sand. We  had  many  iron  guns  which  burst 
in  the  hands  of  our  artillerymen,  and  did  as 
much  mischief  as  the  enemy's  projectiles. 
Our  soldiers,  however,  made  amends  for  infe- 
riority of  number  by  accuracy  of  aim.  On  the 
27th,  the  enemy  resolved  to  resume  the  offen- 
sive by  means  of  sorties.  Taking  advantage 
of  the  works  of  the  third  parallel  being  yet 
unfinished,  he  resolved  to  destroy  them,  and 
suddenly  suspended  his  fire  about  seven  o'clock 
in  the  evening.  This  circumstance  led  to  the 
presumption  of  an  enterprise  on  the  part  of 
the  besieged.  Companies  of  the  12th  light, 
recently  arrived,  were  placed  on  the  right  and 
left,  behind  the  epaulements,  which  concealed 
them.  Six  hundred  Prussian  grenadiers,  fol- 
lowed by  two  hundred  labourers,  advanced 
upon  the  parallel,  still  imperfect  and  of  easy 
access.  A  sentinel,  lying  on  the  ground  upon 
his  belly,  having  perceived  them,  retired  to  let 
them  enter.  The  companies  of  the  12th  light 
then  rushed  suddenly  upon  them,  attacked 
them  with  the  bayonet  in  the  ditch,  and  fought 
them  hand  to  hand.  The  combat,  was  san- 
guinary, but  they  were  driven  out,  leaving  120 
killed  or  wounded  on  the  spot.  A  certain 
number  were  taken,  and  the  rest  driven  at  the 
point  of  the  bayonet  to  the  glacis  of  the  place. 

Marshal  Kalkreuth  solicited  a  suspension  of 
arms,  for  the  purpose  of  taking  away  the  dead 
and  wounded.  With  the  advice  of  the  direc- 
tors of  the  artillery  and  engineers,  who  wished 


April,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


291 


for  this  suspension  >f  arms,  in  order  to  make 
some  reconnoissances,  it  was  granted  by  Mar- 
shal Lefebvre.  Generals  Lariboissiere  and 
Chasseloup  hastened  immediately  under  the 
walls  of  the  place,  to  seek  positions  whence 
the  works  of  the  besieged  might  be  more 
effectually  battered.  These  reconnoissances 
being  finished,  they  fell  to  work  again,  and  set 
about  establishing  new  batteries  at  the  points 
which  they  had  chosen,  taking  care  to  connect 
them  by  branches  with  our  trenches. 

In  the  night  between  the  28th  and  29th,  the 
enemy  attempted  another  sortie  with  a  column 
of  2000  men,  divided  into  three  detachments. 
He  marched  as  he  had  done  two  days  before 
on  our  third  parallel,  the  works  of  which  he 
seemed  desirous  to  interrupt  at  any  rate.  As 
soon  as  the  first  detachment  appeared,  two 
companies  of  the  19th  of  the  line  fell  upon  it 
with  the  bayonet,  and  pushed  it  to  the  glacis 
of  the  Hagelsberg,  but,  received  there  with  a 
very  brisk  fire  from  the  covered  way,  and  en- 
veloped by  the  second  detachment,  which  they 
had  not  perceived,  they  lost  about  forty  men. 
They  were,  nevertheless,  timely  succoured  and 
extricated.  The  enemy,  driven  back,  left  us 
seventy  killed  and  130  prisoners. 

These  violent  efforts  directed  against  our 
third  parallel  did  not  prevent  us  from  complet- 
ing its  works,  lengthening  it  on  the  right  and 
left,  and  arming  it  with  batteries.  New  con- 
voys, recently  arrived,  had  permitted  eighty 
pieces  of  large  calibre  to  be  placed  in  battery. 
From  that  moment  the  fire  of  the  artillery  re- 
doubled, and  we  debouched  at  length  from  the 
third  parallel  on  two  sides,  in  order  to  get  upon 
the  salients  of  the  Hagelsberg.  This  work 
was  composed  of  two  bastions,  between  which 
there  was  a  half-moon.  The  French  proceeded 
towards  the  salient  of  the  left  bastion  and  to- 
wards the  salient  of  the  half-moon.  The  works 
of  approach  then  became  extremely  destruc- 
tive. The  enemy,  who  had  saved  the  greatest 
resources  of  his  artillery  for  the  conclusion 
of  the  siege,  directed  the  best  part  of  it  against 
our  works.  Our  soldiers  of  the  engineers  saw 
their  shafts  destroyed,  and  the  loose  sand  which 
they  had  thrown  out  dashed  back  into  the 
trenches  by  the  shock  of  the  numerous  pro- 
jectiles. Their  firmness  in  labouring  on  amidst 
all  these  dangers  was  unconquerable.  Our 
infantry,  on  their  part,  had  to  endure  excessive  j 
fatigue ;  for  the  nearer  we  approached  the  j 
place,  the  more  necessary  it  became  to  com- ' 
mit  the  guard  of  the  trenches  to  tried  soldiers. 
Out  of  forty-eight  hours,  they  passed  twenty-  '• 
four  either  in  working  or  in  protecting  those  ' 
who  were  at  work.  We  advanced,  therefore, ' 
at  that  moment  very  slowly.  Marshal  Le- ' 
febvre,  who  began  to  lose  patience,  found  fault ; 
with  everybody,  with  the  engineers,  whose 
combinations  he  did  not  comprehend,  with  the 
artillery,  whose  efforts  he  did  not  appreciate, 
and  particularly  with  the  auxiliaries,  who  did 
him  much  less  service  than  the  French.  The 
Saxons  fought  well,  but  showed  little  willing- 
ness, especially  for  labour.  The  Baden  sol- 
diers were  not  good  for  work  or  fight.  The 
Poles  of  the  new  levy  had  zeal  but  no  habit 
of  war.  The  soldiers  of  the  legion  of  the  north, 
very  prompt  in  attack,  dispersed  on  the  slightest 


resistance.  As  all  these  auxiliaries  were  in- 
clined to  desertion,  care  was  taken  to  supply 
them  from  the  magazines  of  the  head-quarters, 
that  they  might  not  have  to  run  about  in  the 
neighbouring  villages ;  so  that  it  was  neces- 
sary to  provide  them  with  better  fare  than  the 
French,  though  they  were  far  from  doing  such 
good  service.  Marshal  Lefebvre  spoke  of 
them  in  the  most  abusive  terms,  saying  inces- 
santly that  they  could  do  nothing  but  eat,  called 
all  the  arguments  of  the  engineers  gibberish, 
declaring  that  he  would  do  more  than  they 
with  the  breasts  of  his  grenadiers,  and  abso- 
lutely insisting  on  putting  an  end  to  tie  siege 
by  means  of  a  general  assault 

The  design  was  rash,  for  we  were  still  at  a 
distance  from  the  works  of  the  place,  and,  if 
we  were  to  leap  into  the  ditch,  we  should  meet 
with  those  formidable  palisades,  which  at  Dant- 
zig  served  instead  of  scarps  of  masonry.  The 
engineers,  as  it  is  usual  in  sieges,  could  not 
agree  with  the  artillery.  They  accounted  for 
the  slowness  of  their  progress  by  the  loose  na- 
ture of  the  soil,  by  the  insufficient  protection 
which  they  received  from  the  artillery,  by  the 
too  small  number  of  good  labourers.  The 
artillery  replied  that  it  had  too  few  guns,  too 
little  ammunition,  to  equal  the  fire  of  the 
enemy,  and  that  it  could  do  no  better.  In  con- 
sequence, the  marshal,  to  settle  all  differences, 
proposed  to  put  an  end  to  the  business  by  an 
assault,  even  before  the  works  of  approach 
were  finished.  The  engineers,  who  lost  many 
men,  replied  that,  if  the  artillery  would  by  a. 
ricochet  battery  throw  down  one  length  of  the 
palisades,  they  would  cheerfully  lead  our  in- 
fantry to  the  assault  of  the  Hagelsberg.  As, 
however,  the  Russians  had  in  1724,  lost  5000 
men  before  Dantzig,  in  an  enterprise  of  this 
kind,  undertaken  from  impatience,  they  durst 
not  risk  so  rash  a  proceeding  without  submit- 
ting the  matter  to  the  Emperor. 

Luckily,  he  was  about  thirty  leagues  off,  and 
they  could  have  his  answer  in  forty-eight 
hours.  He  would  even  have  gone  himself  to 
give  it  in  person,  if  the  presence  of  the  King 
of  Prussia  and  of  the  Emperor  of  Russia  at 
the  head-quarters  of  Bartenstein  had  not  made 
him  apprehensive  of  some  enterprise  on  their 
part  against  his  winter  quarters.  As  soon  as 
he  had  received  Marshal  Lefebvre's  letter,  he 
lost  no  time  in  moderating  the  ardour  of  the 
old  soldier  by  addressing  to  him  a  strong  repri- 
mand. He  reproved  him  severely  for  his  im- 
patience, his  contempt  for  science,  which  he 
did  not  possess,  his  bad  language  respecting 
the  auxiliaries.  "You  can  do  nothing,"  said 
he,  "  but  find  fault,  abuse  our  allies,  and  change 
your  opinion  at  the  pleasure  of  the  first  comer. 
You  wanted  troops;  I  sent  you  them;  I  am 
preparing  more  for  you,  and  you,  like  an  ingratt, 
continue  to  complain  without  thinking  even 
of  thanking  me.  You  treat  our  allies,  espe- 
cially the  Poles  and  the  Baden  troops,  without 
any  delicacy.  They  are  not  used  to  fire,  but 
they  will  get  accustomed  to  it.  I)o  you  ima- 
gine that  we  were  as  brave  in  '92  as  we  are 
now,  after  fifteen  years  of  war!  Have  some 
indulgence,  then,  old  soldier  as  you  are,  for  the 
young  soldiers,  who  are  starting  in  the  career, 
and  have  not  yet  your  coolness  amidst  danger. 


292 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[April,  1807. 


The  Prince  of  Baden,  whom  you  have  with 
yon,  [that  prince  had  put  himself  at  the  head 
of  the  Badeners,  and  was  present  at  the  siege 
of  Dantzig,]  has  chosen  to  leave  the  pleasures 
of  the  court  for  the  purpose  of  leading  his 
troops  into  fire.  Pay  him  respect,  and  give 
him  credit  for  a  zeal  which  his  equals  rarely 
imitate.  The  breasts  of  your  grenadiers,  which 
you  are  for  bringing  in  everywhere,  will  not 
throw  down  walls.  Yon  must  allow  your  en- 
gineers to  act,  and  listen  to  the  advice  of 
General  Chasseloup,  who  is  a  man  of  science, 
and  from  whom  you  ought  not  to  take  your 
confidence  at  the  suggestion  of  the  first  petty 
caviller  pretending  to  judge  of  what  he  is  inca- 
pable of  comprehending/  Reserve'  the  courage 
of  your  grenadiers  for  the  moment  when  sci- 
ence shall  teh  you  that  it  may  be  usefully  em- 
ployed, and  in  the  mean  time  learn  patience. 
It  is  not  worth  while,  for  the  sake  of  a  few 
days,  which,  besides,  I  know  not  how  to  em- 
ploy just  now,  to  get  some  thousand  men  killed, 
whose  lives  it  is  possible  to  spare.  Show  the 
calmness,  the  consistency,  the  steadiness,which 
befit  your  age.  Your  glory  is  in  the  taking  of 
Dantzig;  take  that  place,  and  you  shall  be 
satisfied  with  me." 

Nothing  more  was  needed  to  pacify  the  mar- 
shal. He  was  content,  therefore,  to  allow  the 
operations  of  the  siege  to  be  continued  accord- 
ing to  all  the  rules  of  the  art.  Though  the  camp 
of  the  Nehrung  had  been  removed  to  the 
Lower  Vistula,  and  the  passage  of  the  canal 
and  the  river  barred,  the  investment  could  not 
be  rendered  complete  without  the  reduction  of 
the  isle  of  Holm,  and  it  was  only  by  the  reduc- 
tion of  that  island,  too,  that  it  was  possible  to 
nullify  a  number  of  redoubts,  the  Kalk-Schanze 
in  particular,  which  took  our  trenches  at  the 
back,  annoyed  them  by  its  fire,  and  retarded 
our  progress,  on  account  of  the  cross-trenches 
which  it  was  necessary  to  add  to  our  works. 
Though  we  had  not  all  the  troops  that  we  might 
have  desired  for  pushing  the  siege  briskly,  still 
we  had  sufficient  for  making  an  attempt  on  the 
isle  of  Holm.  The  night  between  the  6th  and 
7th  of  May  was  devoted  to  this  enterprise. 
Orders  were  given  to  General  Gardanne  to 
concur  in  it  on  his  part,  by  proceeding  to  the 
canal  of  Laaken  and  endeavouring  to  pass  it 
on  rafts.  Eight  hundred  men,  descending  from 
the  left  of  the  head-quarters  to  the  bank  of  the 
Vistula,  were  to  cross  that  river  at  twice  and 
to  make  the  principal  attack.  At  ten  o'clock 
at  night,  twelve  barks  were  brought  opposite 
to  the  village  of  Schellnmhl,  unperceived  by 
the  enemy.  At  one  in  the  morning,  these 
barks,  carrying  detachments  of  the  regiment 
of  the  Paris  guard,  of  the  2d  and  12th  light, 
and  fifty  soldiers  of  the  engineers,  started  from 
.he  left  bank,  and  reached  the  isle  of  Holm. 
The  enemy  directed  a  few  rounds  of  grape  at 
the  craft.  Our  troops  leaped  ashore  in  spite 
of  the  fire.  The  grenadiers  of  the  Paris  guard 
ran  to  the  nearest  redoubt  without  firing  a 
shot,  a#d  took  it  from  the  Russians  who  de- 
rended  it.  At  the  same  instant,  100  men  of  the 
55d  light  and  100  men  of  the  12th,  likewise  ran 
to  two  other  redoubts,  the  one  constructed  at 
ihe  point  of  the  island,  the  other  at  a  building 
trailed  «he  White  House.  They  received  a  first 


discharge,  but  marched  so  fast  that  in  a  few 
minutes  the  redoubts  were  carried  and  the 
Russians  taken.  Our  troops  fell  with  the  same 
rapidity  upon  the  other  works,  and  in  half  an 
hour  had  made  themselves  masters  of  half  the 
island  and  taken  500  prisoners;  While  this 
operation  was  so  promptly  executed,  the  barks 
employed  in  the  passage  of  the  Vistula  brought 
a  second  column,  composed  of  Baden  troops 
and  soldiers  of  the  legion  of  the  north,  which 
turned  to  the  right,  and  proceeded  towards  that 
part  of  the  island  which  faces  the  city  of  Dant- 
zig. These  troops,  inspirited  by  the  example 
which  the  French  had  just  set  them,  threw 
themselves  boldly  upon  the  enemy's  posts,  sur- 
prised and  disarmed  them,  and  took  in  an  in- 
stant 200  men  and  200  artillery  horses.  Gene- 
ral Gardanne  had  on  his  part  crossed  the  canal 
of  Laaken  and  landed  in  the  island.  This  im- 
portant conquest  was  thus  fully  secured. 

This  was  a  favourable  occasion  for  an  at- 
tempt to  gain  possession  of  the  Kalk-Schanze, 
that  annoying  redoubt  which  had  been  taken 
and  lost  at  the  commencement  of  the  siege. 
This  redoubt,  surrounded  by  water,  and  open 
at  the  gorge  on  the  side  nearest  to  the  isle  of 
Holm,  owed  its  principal  strength  to  the  sup- 
port which  it  received  from  that  island.  At 
the  very  moment  when  our  two  columns  were 
reducing  the  isle  of  Holm,  a  detachment  of 
Saxons  and  soldiers  of  the  legion  of  ihe  north, 
led  by  the  chef  de  bataillon  Roumette,  entered 
the  ditches  of  the  redoubt,  with  the  water  up 
to  their  arm-pits,  threw  itself  upon  the  pali- 
sades, cleared  them,  and,  in  spite  of  a  brisk 
fire  of  musketry,  remained  masters  of  the 
work,  in  which  were  taken  180  Prussians,  four 
officers,  and  several  pieces  of  cannon. 

This  series  of  coups-de-main,  which  gave  us 
600  prisoners  and  17  pieces  of  cannon,  and 
cost  the  enemy  600  killed  or  wounded,  gained 
us  above  all  the  possession  of  the  isle  of  Holm, 
which  completed  the  investment  of  Dantzig, 
and  put  an  end  to  the  fire  so  mischievous  to 
our  trenches.  Owing  to  the  rapidity  of  th« 
execution,  our  loss  had  been  very  trifling. 

Our  works  of  approach  had  reached  the  sa- 
lient of  the  half-moon.  A  circular  trench, 
embracing  that  salient  and  turning  it  both  on 
the  right  and  left,  had  been  opened.  The  mo- 
ment for  the  assault  of  the  covered  way  had  ar- 
rived. That  name  is  given  to  the  inner  side 
of  the  ditch  along  which  the  besieged  move 
about  and  defend  themselves,  under  shelter 
of  a  range  of  small  palisades.  In  the  night 
between  the  7th  and  8th,  a  detachment  of  the 
19th  of  the  line  and  of  the  12th  light,  preceded 
by  about  fifty  men  of  the  engineers,  armed 
with  hatchets  and  shovels,  under  the  direction 
of  Barthelemy  and  Beaulieu,  officers  of  engi- 
neers, and  Berlrand,  chef  de  bataillon  of  infan- 
try, debouched  from  the  two  extremities  of  the 
circular  trench,  and  advanced  briskly  along 
the  covered  way.  This  detachmeni  was 
greeted  with  a  shower  of  balls.  The  soldiers 
of  the  engineers,  marching  at  the  head,  fell 
upon  the  palisades  with  their  hatchets,  and 
cut  down  some  of  them.  Our  foot-soldiers, 
pushing  on  after  them  in  the  covered  way, 
traversed  it  amidst  the  grape  poured  down 
from  the  walls  of  the  place.  They  then  pn> 


May,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


ceeded  to  the  strong  blockhouses  which  had 
been  constructed  in  the  re-entering  angles  of 
the  enclosure  ;  but  they  found  themselves  ex- 
posed to  so  brisk  a  fire  of  musketry  that  they 
were  obliged  to  return  to  the  salient  of  the 
half-moon.  The  covered  way,  nevertheless, 
remained  in  their  possession.  The  miners 
had  meanwhile  run  about  everywhere  to  satisfy 
themselves  that  no  mines  had  been  com- 
menced, and,  as  usual,  disposed  in  such  a 
manner  as  to  blow  up  the  ground  conquered 
by  the  besiegers.  A  sergeant  of  engineers  ac- 
tually discovered  the  shaft  of  a  mine  in  the  sa- 
lient of  the  half-moon.  He  leaped  in,  sword 
in  hand,  found  twelve  Prussians  at  work  upon 
the  branches  of  the  mine,  and,  taking  advan- 
tage of  th^  fright  produced  by  his  sudden  ap- 
pearance, made  all  of  them  prisoners.  He  then 
overturned  the  whole  work.  The  name  of 
this  brave  man,  which  is  worthy  of  being  pre- 
served, was  Chopot. 

The  assault  of  the  covered  way,  always  one 
of  the  most  sanguinary  operations  of  a  regu- 
lar siege,  cost  us  17  killed  and  76  wounded — 
a  rather  large  loss  considering  the  small  num- 
ber of  men  employed  on  so  contracted  a  space. 
Masters  of  the  covered  way  of  the  half-moon, 
we  were  established  on  the  margin  of  the 
ditch.  It  would  be  necessary  to  descend  into 
it,  then  to  overthrow  the  range  of  strong  pali- 
sades which  occupied  the  bottom  of  it,  next  to 
carry  by  assault  the  turfed  slopes  which  sup- 
plied the  place  of  scarps  of  masonry.  These 
were  not  easy  undertakings.  It  was  requisite, 
moreover,  to  execute  at  the  salient  of  the  left 
bastion  the  same  operation  that  we  had  just 
executed  at  the  salient  of  the  half-moon,  that 
we  might  not  be  taken  in  flank  by  the  guns 
of  that  bastion,  when  we  should  attack  the 
half-moon  itself. 

We  established  ourselves,  then,  on  the  ditch, 
covering  ourselves  there  with  the  usual  pre- 
cautions, and  continued  to  proceed  towards 
the  left,  in  order  to  approach  the  salient  of  the 
bastion.  The  8th,  9th,  10th,  llth,  12th,  and 
13th  of  May  were  employed  in  this  work, 
which  had  become  extremely  dangerous,  for 
at  this  short  distance  the  enemy's  balls  over- 
turned the  saps,  penetrated  into  the  trenches, 
swept  oft"  the  men,  and  frequently  caused  the 
epaulements  which  they  had  laboriously  raised, 
to  fall  down  upon  them.  The  effect  of  the 
musketry  at  that  distance  was  not  less  terrible 
than  that  of  the  artillery.  The  sand  which 
the  soldiers  threw  out  sunk  down  every  mo- 
ment, and  they  were  obliged  to  begin  the  same 
works  several  times  over.  Lastly,  the  nights, 
having  become  very  short  in  May — for  every- 
body knows  that  the  nearer  you  approach  to 
the  pole,  the  longer  the  nights  are  in  winter, 
the  shorter  in  summer — left  us  scarcely  four 
hours  to  work  out  of  the  twenty-four.  Mar- 
shal Lefebvre,  growing  more  and  more  impa- 
tient, was  incessantly  asking  when  they  would 
render  the  assault  practicable,  by  throwing 
down  the  line  of  palisades  which  fenced  the 
bottom  of  the  ditch.  The  engineers  told  him 
that  it  was  the  province  of  the  artillery  to  de- 
stroy it  by  ricochet  shot.  The  artillery,  ap- 
prehensive that  the  ground  was  undermined, 
replied  that  there  was  not  room  for  its  batte- 


ries. The  difficulty  which  we  met  with  here 
was  a  proof  of  the  defensive  properties  ol 
wood  :  for  if,  on  reaching  the  edge  of  the  ditch, 
we  had  a  wall  of  masonry  facing  us  instead 
of  a  line  of  palisades,  we  should  have  esta- 
blished a  breaching  battery,  demolished  that 
wall  in  forty-eight  hours,  filled  the  ditch  with 
the  rubbish,  and  mounted  to  the  assault.  But 
the  balls  broke  off"  the  heads  of  some  of  the 
palisades,  in  many  cases  scarcely  splintered 
them,  and  knocked  down  none.  The  decisive 
moment  approached  :  impatience  was  extreme. 
It  was  almost  that  moment  of  a  siege  when 
the  besieged  make  the  last  efforts  of  resist- 
ance, and  when  the  besiegers,  to  put  an  end 
to  the  matter,  are  disposed  to  hazard  the  most 
daring  attempts. 

But  all  at  once  a  rumour  was  circulated 
among  the  besieged  as  well  as  besiegers,  that 
a  Russian  army  was  coming  to  the  relief  of 
Dantzig.  That  relief,  indeed,  had  been  long 
promised,  and  there  was  reason  to  be  asto- 
nished that  it  had  not  yet  arrived.  The  sove- 
reigns of  Russia  and  Prussia,  who  were  then 
together  at  their  head-quarters,  knew  in  what 
danger  Dantzig  was.  They  were  well  aware 
how  important  it  was  for  them  to  prevent  its 
fall,  for,  while  they  retained  that  place,  they 
held  Napoleon's  left  in  check,  they  rendered 
his  establishment  on  the  Vistula  precarious, 
they  obliged  him  to  deprive  himself  of  25,000 
men  employed  either  in  a  blockade  or  a  siege; 
lastly,  they  closed  against  him  (he  most  exten- 
sive mart  for  supplies  that  existed  in  the  north. 
If  they  were  sooner  or  later  to  resume  the  of- 
fensive, it  was  worth  while  to  make  haste  on 
account  of  so  important  a  motive.  For  reliev- 
ing Dantzig  they  had  two  direct  courses  :  either 
to  attack  Napoleon  on  the  Passarge,  in  order 
to  take  from  him  the  positions  under  shelter 
of  which  he  covered  the  siege ;  or  to  send  a 
considerable  corps,  either  by  land,  following 
the  Nehrung,  or  by  sea,  embarking  their  troops 
at  Kiinigsberg,  and  landing  them  at  the  fort  of 
Weichselmiinde.  There  was,  it  is  true,  a  third 
course,  but  not  dependent  on  themselves, 
namely,  a  landing  of  25,000  English,  a  hun- 
dred times  promised,  a  hundred  times  an- 
nounced, never  executed.  It  is  certain  that, 
if  the  English  had  kept  their  word  to  their 
allies,  and  if,  instead  of  retaining  part  of  their 
forces  in  England,  as  a  check  upon  the  camp 
of  Boulogne,  sending  another  to  Alexandria  to 
lay  hands  on  Egypt,  and  a  third  to  the  banks 
of  La  Plata,  to  possess  itself  of  the  Spanish 
colonies,  they  had  thrown  an  army  either  into 
Stralsund  or  into  Dantzig,  when  we  had  scarcely 
three  or  four  French  regiments  dispersed  in 
Pomerania,  they  might  have  changed  the  course 
of  events,  or  at  least  have  caused  us  great  em- 
barrassment. Napoleon,  in  fact,  would  have 
been  forced  to  detach  20,000  men  from  the 
grand  army,  and,  if  he  had  been  attacked  at 
the  same  moment  on  the  Passarge,  he  wou1^ 
have  been  deprived  of  a  considerable  portion 
of  his  forces  for  making  head  against  the  prin- 
cipal Russian  army. 

But  the  English  had  no  intention  of  coming 

to  the  assistance  of  their  allies.    It  was  too 

frightful  a  thing  for  them   to  set  foot  on  the 

continent.    It   suited   them   better  to  employ 

2  B  3 


294 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[May,  1807. 


iheir  troops  in  taking  colonies.  Besides,  a 
change  of  ministry,  to  the  causes  and  the  ef- 
fects of  which  we  shall  presently  advert,  ren- 
dered all  resolutions  in  London  uncertain. 
The  only  succour  sent  to  Dantzig  was  that  of 
three  cutters,  laden  with  ammunition,  and 
commanded  by  intrepid  officers,  who  had 
orders  to  ascend  the  Vistula  and  penetrate  to 
the  place  at  any  rate. 

Thus  it  was  from  Prussian  and  Russian 
troops  alone  that  any  efficacious  succour  could 
be  expected  for  Dantzig.  The  two  sovereigns, 
having  met  at  Bartenstein,  deliberated  on  the 
subject  with  their  generals,  and  had  the  greatest 
difficulty  to  agree.  One  reason,  the  want  of 
provisions,  opposed  a  plan  which  would  have 
been  most  suitable,  and  consisted  in  resuming 
active  operations  immediately.  The  ground 
was  not  yet  sufficiently  fecundated  by  the  sun 
to  furnish  food  for  men  and  horses.  The  allies 
had  few  magazines,  they  could  at  most  supply 
the  men  with  corn  and  butcher's  meat,  and  as 
for  the  horses,  they  had  nothing  to  give  them 
but  the  straw  which  thatched  the  cottages  of 
the  peasants  in  Old  Prussia.  They  thought, 
therefore,  of  waiting  till  the  grass  was  high 
enough  to  feed  the  horses.  It  was  the  same 
reason  that  detained  Napoleon  on  the  Pas- 
sarge.  But  he  had  no  important  fortress  to 
save;  every  day, on  the  contrary,  brought  him 
strength,  and  enabled  him  to  take  a  fresh  step 
towards  the  walls  of  Dantzig. 

In  this  situation,  the  two  allied  sovereigns 
resorted  to  the  means  of  the  most  slender  suc- 
cour, and  resolved  to  send  about  ten  thousand 
men,  half  by  the  tongue  of  land  called  the 
Nehrung,  half  by  sea  and  the  fort  of  Weich- 
selmunde.  The  plan  was  to  force  the  line  of 
investment,  to  take  the  French  camp  on  the 
Nehrung,  by  debouching  upon  that  camp  either 
from  the  fort  of  Weicbselmiinde,  or  from  the 
Nehrung  itself  by  the  Konigsberg  road,  then 
to  penetrate  into  the  isle  of  Holm,  to  re-esta- 
blish the  communications  with  Dantzig,  to 
enter  the  place,  and,  if  all  these  operations 
should  prove  successful,  to  make  a  general 
sortie  against  the  besieging  corps,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  destroying  its  works  and  obliging  it  to 
raise  the  siege.  It  would  have  required  for 
this  much  more  than  ten  thousand  men,  and 
above  all,  that  they  should  have  had  able  com- 
manders. 

A  Prussian  and  Russian  corps  composed  in 
great  part  of  cavalry,  under  the  command  of 
Colonel  Billow,  was  to  be  conveyed  in  sloops 
through  the  pass  of  Pillau,  to  land  on  the  point 
of  the  Nehrung,  and  to  proceed  over  that  nar- 
row sand-bank  for  the  twenty  leagues  that  se- 
parate Pillau  from  Dantzig.  Eight  thousand 
men,  mostly  Russians,  were  embarked  in  trans- 
ports, at  Pillau,  and  escorted  by  English  ships 
of  war  to  the  fort  of  Weichselmiinde.  They 
were  commanded  by  General  Kamenski,  the 
*on  of  that  old  general,  who  had  for  a  moment 
commanded  the  Russian  army  at  the  com- 
mencement of  the  winter  campaign.  Arriving 
on  the  12th  of  May  at  the  mouth  of  the  Vis- 
tula, they  were  landed  on  the  outer  mole,  under 
the  protection  of  the  guns  of  Weichselmunde. 
At  this  same  time,  demonstrations  had  taken 
place  against  all  ou»  winter  quarters.  Before 


Massena,  a  feint  had  been  made  of  passing  the 
Bug,  as  if  it  were  the  intention  to  act  at  the 
other  extremity  of  the  theatre  of  war.  Nume- 
rous patroles  were  sent  out  facing  our  canton- 
ments on  the  Passarge.  Lastly,  the  corps 
destined  to  march  along  the  Nehrung  moved 
rapidly  towards  the  detached  posts  which  he 
had  at  the  extremity  of  that  sand-bank,  and 
obliged  them  to  fall  back. 

The  assembling  at  Pillau  of  two  corps,  which 
were  to  go  by  different  ways  to  the  relief  of 
Dantzig,  had  been  noted.  Reports  emanating 
from  the  besieged  fortress  had  confirmed  the 
news  from  Pillau,  and  this  was  sufficient  to 
throw  Marshal  Lefebvre  into  the  greatest  un- 
easiness. He  had  lost  no  time  in  recurring  to 
the  emperor,  in  calling  to  him  General  Oudi- 
not,  who  was  in  the  isle  of  Nogath,  with  the 
division  of  the  grenadiers  which  was  to  form 
part  of  the  corps  of  reserve  destined  for  Mar- 
shal Lannes.  He  had  at  the  same  time  writ- 
ten to  all  quarters,  applying  for  assistance  to 
the  commanders  of  the  troops  placed  in  his 
vicinity. 

But  Napoleon,  whom  twenty-four  hours  suf- 
ficed for  sending  a  courier  from  Finkenstein 
to  Dantzig,  had  provided  beforehand  for  every 
thing.  He  reprimanded  Marshal  Lefebvre,  but 
mildly,  for  this  manner  of  acting.  He  cheered 
him  with  the  intelligence  of  speedy  succours, 
which,  long  prepared,  could  not  fail  to  arrive 
in  time.  Napoleon  was  under  little  concern 
about  the  puerile  demonstrations  made  on  his 
right,  for  he  could  too  well  distinguish  in  war 
between  a  feint  and  a  real  design,  for  it  to  be 
possible  to  deceive  him.  He  had,  moreover, 
soon  learned  to  a  certainty  that  one  large  de- 
tachment only  would  be  despatched  for  Dant- 
zig, either  by  the  Nehrung  or  by  sea,  and  he 
had  proportioned  his  precautions  to  the  se- 
riousness of  the  danger. 

Marshal  Mortier,  having  become  entirely 
disposable  by  the  definite  conclusion  of  the 
armistice  with  the  Swedes,  had  received  orders 
to  hasten  his  march,  and  to  send  off  a  portion 
of  his  troops  before  him  to  Dantzig.  In  con- 
sequence of  this  order,  the  72d  of  the  line  had 
arrived  at  the  camp  of  Marshal  Lefebvre,  at 
the  moment  of  his  greatest  agitation.  The  re- 
serve of  Marshal  Lannes,  prepared  in  the  isle 
of  Nogath,  began  to  be  formed,  and,  meanwhile, 
the  fine  division  of  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  which 
was  the  nucleus  of  it,  had  been  placed  between 
Marienwerder  and  Dirschau,  two  or  three 
marches  from  Dantzig.  The  3d  of  the  line, 
drawn  from  Brannau,  3400  strong,  was  also 
stationed  in  the  isle  of  Nogath.  The  resources, 
therefore,  were  quite  sufficient.  Napoleon 
ordered  one  of  General  Oudinot's  brigades  to 
proceed  to  Furstenwerder,  to  throw  a  bridge 
across  there,  and  to  hold  itself  in  readiness  to 
pass  the  arm  of  the  Vistula  which  separates 
the  isle  of  Nogath  from  the  Nehrung.  The 
cavalry  being  dispersed  in  the  pasture-grounds 
of  the  Lower  Vistula,  in  the  environs  of  El- 
bing,  he  ordered  General  Beaumont  to  take  a 
thousand  dragoons,  to  proceed  to  Furstenwer- 
der,  to  allow  the  enemy's  corps  coming  over 
the  Nehrung  to  file  away,  to  cut  it  off  when  it 
should  have  passed  Furstenwerder,  and  make 
as  many  prisoners  of  it  as  possible.  Lastlj, 


May,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


he  enjoined  Marshal  Lannes  to  march  with 
Ondinot's  grenadiers  to  Dantzig,  not  to  fatigue 
the  troops  while  there  by  employing  them  in 
the  labours  of  the  siege,  but  to  keep  them  in 
reserve,  in  order  to  throw  them  upon  the  Rus- 
sians as  soon  as  they  should  attempt  to  land 
in  the  environs  of  Weichselmiinde. 

These  dispositions,  prescribed  in  time, 
thanks  to  a  foresight  which  did  every  thing 
opportunely,  brought  around  Dantzig  more 
troops  than  were  needed  to  dispel  the  danger. 
The  Russians  had  begun  to  land  on  the  12th 
of  May.  From  the  sandy  heights  which  we 
occupied,  they  were  seen  distinctly  on  the 
moles  of  the  fort  of  Weichselmiinde.  They 
were  not  all  landed  and  assembled  in  advance 
of  Weichselmiinde  till  the  evening  of  the  14th. 
Repeated  advices  sent  meanwhile  to  Marshal 
Lannes,  caused  him  to  accelerate  his  march, 
and  on  the  14th  he  arrived  under  the  walls  of 
Dantzig,  with  Oudinot's  grenadiers,  excepting 
the  two  battalions  left  at  Furstenwerder.  The 
72d  was  already  at  the  camp.  Marshal  Mor- 
tier,  with  the  rest  of  his  corps,  was  one  march 
behind. 

Marshal  Lefebvre,  made  easy  by  these  rein- 
forcements, had  sent  the  regiments  of  the 
municipal  guard  of  Paris  to  General  Gardanne, 
who  commanded  the  camp  of  the  Lower  Vis- 
tula in  the  Nehrung,  and  waited,  before  he 
despatched  further  succours  to  him,  for  the 
design  of  the  Russians  to  be  clearly  indicated, 
for  they  could  debouch  from  the  fort  of  Weich- 
selmiinde, or  on  the  right  bank,  to  attack  Gene- 
ral Gardanne's  camp,  or  on  the  left  bank  to 
attack  the  head-quarters. 

On  the  15th  of  May,  at  three  in  the  morn- 
ing, the  Russians,  to  the  number  of  seven  or 
eight  thousand,  sallied  from  the  fort  of  Weich- 
selmiinde, and  marched  to  attack  our  positions 
on  the  Nehrung.  These  positions  commenced 
at  the  point  of  the  isle  of  Holm,  the  same  at 
which  the  canal  of  Laaken  joins  the  Vistula, 
extended  under  the  form  of  a  palisaded  epaule- 
ment  to  the  wood  which  covers  this  part  of  the 
Nehrung,  were  protected  in  that  part  by  nu- 
merous abattis,  and  terminated  at  the  sand- 
hills along  the  sea.  General  Schramm,  now 
under  the  command  of  General  Gardanne, 
defended  that  line  with  a  battalion  of  the  2d 
light,  a  detachment  of  the  regiment  of  the  Pa- 
ris guard,  a  Saxon  battalion,  part  of  the  19th 
chasseurs,  and  some  Polish  horse  under  Cap- 
tain Sokolniki,  whom  we  have  already  seen 
distinguishing  himself  at  this  siege.  General 
Gardanne  kept  in  rear  with  the  rest  of  his 
forces,  either  to  be  ready  to  succour  the  troops 
defending  the  intrenchments,  or  to  oppose  a 
sortie  from  the  place.  Marshal  Lefebvre,  per- 
ceiving from  the  heights  of  the  Zigankenberg 
the  movements  of  the  Russians,  had  sent  him 
in  the  morning  a  battalion  of  the  12th  light. 
Shortly  afterwards,  Marshal  Lannes  had  set 
out  himself  with  four  battalions  of  Oudinot's 
division,  and  marched  upon  the  dikes  which 
ran  through  the  flat  country  situated  on  our 
right,  the  engineers  not  having  yet  been  able 
to  construct  a  bridge  towards  our  left,  to  com- 
municate directly  with  the  camp  of  the  Neh- 
rung by  the  Lower  Vistula. 

The  Russians  advanced  in  three  columns 


one  directed  along  the  Vistula,  facing  our  re- 
doubts,  the  second  against  the  wood  and  the 
abattis  which  defended  the  approach  to  it,  the 
hird  composed  of  cavalry,  and  destined  to 
keep  along  the  sea-shore.  A  fourth  had  re- 
mained in  reserve,  to  assist  any  of  the  three 
that  might  waver.  The  English  cutters  arriv- 
ing at  the  same  time,  were,  for  their  part,  to  as- 
cend the  Vistula,  to  destroy  the  bridges  which 
were  supposed  to  exist,  to  take  our  works 
from  behind,  and  to  second  the  movement  of 
the  Russians  by  the  fire  of  sixty  pieces  of 
large  calibre.  But  the  wind  was  not  favour- 
able for  the  execution  of  this  plan,  and  the 
cutters  were  forced  to  remain  at  the  mouth  of 
the  Vistula. 

The  Russian  columns  marched  with  vigour 
to  the  attack  of  our  positions.  Our  soldiers, 
placed  behind  intrenchments  of  earth,  coolly 
waited  for  them,  and  fired  upon  them  when 
very  close.  The  Russians  were  not  stag- 
gered; they  approached  to  the  very  foot  of 
the  redoubts,  but  could  not  get  into  them. 
On  every  repulsed  attempt,  our  soldiers  leaped 
from  the  intrenchments,  and  pursued  the  as- 
sailants with  the  bayonet.  The  column,  which 
had  proceeded  to  the  abattis,  having  a  less 
solid  obstacle  to  overcome,  endeavoured  to  pe- 
netrate into  the  woods,  and  to  establish  itself 
there.  It  was  stopped,  like  the  first,  but  it  re- 
turned to  the  charge,  and  engaged  in  a  series 
of  hand-to-hand  fights  with  our  troops.  The 
conflict,  at  this  point,  was  long  and  obstinate. 
The  column  of  cavalry  ordered  to  march  along 
the  shore  remained  in  observation  before  our 
detachments  of  cavalry,  without  making  any 
serious  movement.  The  action  lasted  for  se- 
veral hours;  and  our  troops  employed  in  the 
defence  of  the  works,  numbering  no  more  than 
two  thousand  men  against  seven  or  eight 
thousand — for  General  Gardanne  was  obliged, 
with  the  rest,  to  take  care  of  the  debouches  of 
the  place— our  troops  were  exhausted,  and 
must  at  length  have  succumbed  under  these 
repeated  attacks,  if  a  battalion  of  the  Paris 
guard,  sent  by  General  Gardanne,  and  the  bat- 
talion  of  the  12th  light,  which  had  come  from 
the  head-quarters,  had  not  brought  them  deci- 
sive succours.  These  brave  battalions,  di- 
rected by  General  Schramm,  fell  upon  the 
Russians,  and  repulsed  them.  All  the  troops, 
animated  by  this  example,  rushed  upon  them, 
and  drove  them  back  to  the  glacis  of  the  fort 
of  Weichselmiinde. 

Meanwhile,  General  Kamenski  had  orders 
to  make  the  utmost  efforts  to  relieve  Dantzig. 
He  would  not,  therefore,  shut  himself  up  in 
the  fort  till  he  had  made  a  last  attempt.  Join- 
ing with  the  troops  which  had  just  been  fight- 
ing the  reserve  which  had  not  yet  been  en- 
gaged, he  again  advanced  upon  our  intrench- 
ments, so  violently,  so  ineffectually  attacked. 
But  it  was  too  late.  Marshal  Lannes  and 
General  Oudinot  had  broughtGeneral  Schramm 
the  reinforcement  of  four  battalions  of  grena- 
diers. One  of  these  four  battalions  was  suf- 
ficient to  put  an  end  to  the  fight.  General 
Oudinot,  at  the  head  of  this  battalion,  rallying 
around  him  the  mass  of  our  troops,  then 
bringing  them  forward,  overturned  the  Rus- 
sians, and  drove  them,  with  the  bayonet  at 


396 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[May,  1807 


their  loins,  to  the  glacis  of  the  fort  of  Weich- 
selmiinde,  where  he  forced  them  to  shut  them- 
selves up  definitively.  This  action  might  well 
be,  and  it  was,  the  last. 

The  Russians  left  2000  men  on  the  field  of 
battle,  most  of  them  dead  or  wounded,  some 
prisoners.  Our  loss  was  about  300  men  hors 
de  combat.  General  Oudinot  had  a  horse  killed 
by  a  cannon  ball,  which,  passing  between  him 
and  Marshal  Lannes,  missed  very  little  of 
killing  the  latter.  The  moment  had  not  yet 
arrived  when  the  illustrious  marshal  was  to 
sink  under  so  many  repeated  exploits.  Fate, 
before  it  struck  him,  still  reserved  for  him 
some  brilliant  days. 

Thenceforward,  Marshal  Lefebvre  could  not 
entertain  any  uneasiness,  nor  Marshal  Kalk- 
reuth  any  hope.  Meanwhile,  the  commanders 
of  the  cutlers,  sent  from  England  to  succour 
Dantzig,  were  anxious  to  execute  their  instruc- 
tions. The  place  being  chiefly  in  want  of 
ammunition,  the  captain  of  the  Dauntless  was 
desirous  to  take  advantage  of  a  stiff  breeze 
from  the  north  to  ascend  the  Vistula.  But  no 
sooner  had  he  passed  the  fort  of  Weichsel- 
miinde,  and  approached  our  redoubts,  than  he 
was  assailed  by  a  violent  fire  of  artillery. 
The  troops,  leaving  the  intrenchments,  joined 
the  fire  of  musketry  to  that  of  the  cannon,  and 
reduced  the  cutter  to  such  a  state  that  very 
soon  she  would  not  answer  the  helm,  and 
struck  upon  a  sand-bank,  where  she  was 
obliged  to  haul  down  her  colours.  She  con- 
tained a  great  quantity  of  powder,  and  de- 
spatches for  Marshal  Kalkreuth. 

The  place,  therefore,  was  absolutely  left  to 
itself.  Unfortunately,  the  operations  of  the 
siege  became  every  moment  more  difficult. 
The  troops  were  lodged  on  the  margin  of  the 
ditch ;  they  had  already  attempted  to  descend 
into  it;  but  the  nature  of  that  soil,  falling 
down  incessantly,  and  the  immense  quantity 
of  artillery  which  the  enemy  had  at  his  dis- 
posal, and  which  enabled  him  to  overwhelm 
our  trenches  with  his  bombs,  rendered  the  ope- 
rations as  slow  as  they  were  perilous.  It  was 
necessary,  however,  cost  what  it  might,  to  get 
to  the  bottom  of  the  ditch,  and  proceed,  hatchet 
in  hand,  to  cut  an  opening  in  the  palisades 
wide  enough  to  admit  our  columns  of  attack. 
The  men  began,  therefore,  to  descend  into  the 
ditch,  making  use  of  the  blinded  passages — 
that  is  to  say,  advancing  under  a  frame-work 
covered  with  earth  and  fascines.  Several 
times  the  enemy's  bombs  broke  through  these 
blinds,  and  crushed  the  men  whom  they  shel- 
tered. But  nothing  could  daunt  our  engineer 
troops.  Out  of  six  hundred  men  of  that  arm, 
nearly  three  hundred  had  fallen.  Half  of  the 
officers  were  either  killed  or  wounded.  Among 
the  obstacles  that  we  had  to  conquer,  was 
the  block-house  in  the  re-entering  angle  which 
the  half-moon  formed  with  the  bastion.  It 
was  resolved  to  blow  up  by  mining  this  work, 
which  withstood  even  cannon  balls.  A  mine, 
-vhich  had  not  been  carried  near  enough  to 
ine  block-house,  exploded,  and  covered  it  with 
earth,  but  rendered  it  still  more  difficult  to  de- 
stroj  The  men  then  established  themselves 
on  the  funnel  of  the  mine,  cleared,  under  the 
enemy's  fire,  the  ground  about  the  block-house, 


which  they  set  on  fire,  and  thus,  at  last,  got  rid 
of  it. 

When  they  had  reached  the  bottom  of  the 
ditch,  several  soldiers  of  the  engineers  tried 
to  go  under  the  very  fire  of  the  place  to  cut 
the  palisades.  It  took  them  half  an  hour  to 
destroy  three.  Thus  the  operation  could  not 
fail  to  be  very  long  and  very  sanguinary.  It 
was  now  the  18th  of  May,  and  forty-eight  days 
since  the  trenches  were  opened.  There  was 
no  fault  to  be  found  with  the  engineer  corps, 
which  displayed  admirable  devotedness.  Some 
detractors  laid  the  blame  of  the  slowness  of  the 
siege  on  General  Chasseloup.  General  Kir- 
gener,  who  was  sub-director  of  the  works,  and 
who  had  conceived  different  ideas  respecting 
the  choice  of  the  point  of  attack,  was  inces- 
santly repeating  to  Marshal  Lefebvre  that  the 
Hagelsberg  had  been  ill  chosen,  and  that  this 
was  the  only  cause  of  the  delays  that  we  had 
experienced.  This  he  repeated  so  often,  that 
Marshal  Lefebvre  at  last  believed  him,  and 
wrote,  on  the  18th  of  May,  to  the  Emperor, 
complaining  of  General  Chasseloup,  and  attri- 
buting the  long  resistance  of  the  place  to  the 
wrong  choice  of  the  point  of  attack,  alleging 
that  the  Bischoffsberg  would  have  presented 
far  fewer  difficulties. 

Complaints  at  this  moment  would  have 
availed  nothing,  had  they  been  as  well  founded 
as  they  were  the  reverse.  But  Napoleon,  who 
never  ceased  to  watch  the  siege  attentively,  did 
not  make  the  marshal  wait  long  for  an  answer. 
"I  really  conceived,"  he  thus  wrote  to  him, 
"  that  you  had  more  character  and  opinion.  Is  it 
at  the  end  of  a  siege  that  a  man  ought  to  suffer 
himself  to  be  persuaded  by  inferiors  that  the 
point  of  attack  must  be  changed,  to  discourage 
the  army  by  it,  and  to  discredit  your  own  judg- 
ment 1  The  Hagelsberg  is  judiciously  chosen. 
It  is  by  the  Hagelsberg  that  Dantzig  has  al- 
ways been  attacked.  Give  your  confidence  to 
Chasseloup,  who  is  the  most  skilful,  the  most 
experienced,  of  your  engineers ;  take  his  ad- 
vice alone  and  that  of  M.  de  Lariboissiere,  and 
drive  away  all  petty  cavillers." 

Marshal  Lefebvre  was,  therefore,  obliged  to 
persist  in  the  first  choice,  and  to  wait  the  slow 
but  sure  effects  of  an  art,  of  which  he  was 
wholly  ignorant.  The  troops  of  the  engineers, 
unsparing  of  themselves,  had  got,  on  one  side, 
to  the  bottom  of  the  ditch  of  the  half-moon, 
and  on  the  other,  to  the  bottom  of  the  ditch  of 
the  bastion,  being  forced,  on  account  of  the 
narrow  space  in  which  they  operated,  to  work 
under  the  bombs,  and  themselves  to  defend  the 
works  against  the  sorties  of  the  place.  Lastly, 
facing  the  left  bastion,  which  was  attacked  at 
the  same  time  as  the  half-moon,  they  had, 
sometimes  with  fires  of  fascines,  sometimes 
with  powder  bags,  sometimes  also  with  the 
hatchet,  destroyed  the  palisades  for  the  space 
of  ninety  feet.  This  was  sufficient  to  afford  a 
passage  for  the  columns  of  assault.  That  mo- 
ment was  impatiently  awaited  by  the  troops. 
The  night  of  the  21st  of  May  was  fixed  for  the 
assault.  Several  columns,  to  the  number  of 
4000  men,  were  brought  into  the  ditch,  led 
successively  to  the  foot  of  the  slope  of  earth 
which  rose  behind  the  palisades,  that  they 
might  previously  see  the  work  that  was  to  be 


May,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


scaled,  and  learn  how  to  climb  it.    Filled  with  ' 
ardour  at  the  sight,  they  demanded  with  loud  | 
cries  permission  to  rush  to  the  assault.    Three  i 
enormous  logs,  suspended  by  ropes  at  the  top 
of  the  earth  slopes,  were  ready  to  roll  down  i 
upon  the  assailants.     A  brave  soldier,  whose 
name  history  ought  to  record,  Franpois  Valle, 
a  chasseur  of  the  12th  light,  who  several  times 
assisted  the  working  engineers  to  demolish  the 
palisades,  offered  to  go  and  cut  the  ropes  which  i 
supported  these  logs,  and  thus  effect  their  fall 
before    the    assault.     Seizing   a   hatchet,   he 
climbed  the  turfed  scarps,  cut  the  ropes,  and  it 
was  not  till  he  was  just  finishing  that  he  was 
struck  by  a  ball-;  but,  we  may  add,  the  wound 
was  not  mortal. 

At  length  the  hour  of  the  assault  drew  near, 
when,  all  at  once,  the  troops  learned  to  their 
great  regret  that  Marshal  Kalkreuth  had  de- 
sired to  capitulate. 

Colonel  Lacoste,  in  fact,  had  gone  with  a 
flag  of  truce  to  deliver  to  Marshal  Kalkreuth 
the  letters  addressed  to  him  which  had  been 
found  on  board  the  English  cutter  recently 
taken.  He  arrived  very  opportunely  to  afford 
Frederick's  lieutenant  an  honourable  opportu- 
nity for  proposing  a  capitulation,  which  had 
become  necessary.  The  marshal  entered  into 
conversation  with  the  colonel,  acknowledged 
the  necessity  for  surrendering,  but  claimed  for 
the  garrison  of  Danlzig  the  conditions  which 
the  garrison  of  Mayence  had  formerly  obtained 
from  him,  that  is  to  say,  liberty  to  march  out 
without  being  prisoners  of  war,  without  laying 
down  arms,  and  merely  engaging  not  to  serve 
against  France  before  the  expiration  of  a  year. 
Marshal  Lefebvre  signed  these  conditions,  for 
he  was  sorely  afraid  of  seeing  the  siege  pro- 
longed; but  he  required  time  to  consult  Napo- 
leon. The  latter  was  not  in  such  a  hurry,  for 
he  held  the  Russians  in  check  on  the  Passarge, 
and  he  would  gladly  have  sacrificed  a  few 
more  days  to  take  prisoners  a  whole  corps 
iTarmee,  making  no  account  of  the  engagement 
entered  into  by  the  enemy's  troops  not  to  serve 
for  a  year.  He  expressed,  therefore,  a  certain 
regret,  but  consented  to  the  proposed  capitula- 
tion, ordering  Marshal  Lefebvre  to  tell  M.  de 
Kalkreuth,  that  it  was  out  of  consideration  for 
him,  for  his  age,  for  his  glorious  services,  and 
for  his  courteous  manner  of  treating  the 
French,  that  such  favourable  conditions  were 
granted.  The  capitulation  was  signed  and  ex- 
ecuted on  the  26th. 

On  the  morning  of  the  26th,  Marshal  Le- 
febvre made  his  entry  into  the  fortress.  He 
had  proposed  to  Marshal  Lannes  and  Marshal 
Mortier,  who  had  arrived  a  few  days  before,  to 
enter  with  him ;  but  they  would  not  dispute 
with  him  an  honour  which  belonged  to  him, 
and  which  he  had  earned,  if  not  by  his  skill  at 
least  by  his  bravery  and  by  his  perseverance 
in  living  for  two  months  in  those  formidable 
trenches.  He  made  his  entry,  therefore,  at  the 
head  of  a  detachment  of  all  the  troops  which 
had  concurred  in  the  siege.  The  engineers 
naturally  marched  first.  This  distinction  was 
due  to  them  on  all  accounts,  for,  out  of  six 
hundred  men,  about  half  had  been  put  hart  de 
combat.  Accordingly,  Napoleon  immediately 
published  the  following  order  of  the  day : 

VOL.  II.— 38 


"Finkerutein,  May  38, 1907. 

"The  fortress  of  Dantzig  has  capitulated, 
and  our  troops  entered  it  to-day  at  noon. 

"  His  majesty  expresses  his  satisfaction  to 
the  besieging  troops.  The  sappers  have  co- 
vered themselves  with  glory." 

This  memorable  siege  had  been  long,  since 
the  place  had  held  out  for  fifty-one  days  after 
the  trenches  were  opened.  Various  causes 
contributed  to  the  length  of  this  resistance. 
The  configuration  of  the  place,  its  vast  extent, 
the  strength  of  the  besieged  garrison,  nearly 
equal  to  that  of  the  besieging  army,  the  tardy 
arrival  and  the  insufficiency  of  the  heavy  ar- 
tillery, which  permitted  the  enemy  to  reserve 
his  fire  for  the  moment  of  the  last  approaches, 
the  small  number  of  good  labourers  propor- 
tioned to  the  small  number  of  good  troops,  the 
nature  of  the  soil,  slipping  down  incessantly 
under  the  projectiles,  the  defensive  qualities  of 
the  timber,  which  could  not  be  battered  in 
breach,  but  which  required  to  be  demolished 
with  pickaxe  and  hatchet,  lastly,  the  terrible 
weather,  variable  as  at  the  equinox,  passing 
from  frost  to  torrents  of  rain — all  these  causes, 
we  say,  contributed  to  prolong  this  siege,  which 
was  alike  honourable  to  the  besieged  and  to 
the  besiegers.  Marshal  Kalkreuth  took  away 
with  him  but  a  small  portion  of  his  originally 
strong  garrison.  Out  of  18,320  men,  only 
7120  marched  from  Dantzig.1  There  had  been 
2700  killed,  3400  wounded,  800  prisoners,  4300 
deserters.  Frederick's  old  pupil  had  on  this 
occasion  proved  himself  worthy  of  that  great 
school  of  war  in  which  he  had  been  brought  up. 

Marshal  Lefebvre  by  his  bravery,  General 
Chasseloup  by  his  skill,  Napoleon  by  his  vast 
foresight,  the  engineer  corps  by  their  incredi- 
ble devotedness,  had  obtained  for  the  army  this 
important  conquest.  Though  there  had  been 
a  deficiency  of  heavy  artillery,  it  was  a  down- 
right miracle,  at  such  a  prodigious  distance 
from  the  Rhine,  in  such  a  season,  to  have  been 
able  to  draw  the  materiel  necessary  for  so  great 
a  siege  from  Silesia,  Prussia,  and  Upper  Po- 
land. It  would,  no  doubt,  have  been  easy  for 
Napoleon,  by  detaching  one  of  his  corps  de 
armee  from  the  Passarge  or  the  Vistula,  to  put 
an  end  much  sooner  to  the  resistance  of  Dant- 
/ig.  But  he  would  have  obtained  this  accele- 
ration only  at  the  price  of  a  great  imprudence; 
for,  according  to  all  probabilities,  Napoleon 
would  be  attacked  during  the  siege  by  the  Rus- 
sian and  Prussian  armies,  and,  if  he  had  been, 
the  20,000  men  detached  to  Dantzig  would  have 
considerably  weakened  him.  We  cannot  then 
too  much  admire  the  art  with.which  he  chose 
that  position  of  the  Passarge,  where  he  covered 
the  siege  of  Dantzig,  and  at  the  same  time  faced 
the  allied  armies  which  might  every  moment 
present  themselves — the  art  in  particular,  with 
which  he  took  advantage  of  so  many  regiments 
on  march,  as  well  troops  returning  from  Stral- 
sund,  as  infantry  reserve,  prepared  on  the 
Lower  Vistula,  to  keep  up  around  Dantzig  a 
force  sufficient  for  the  operations  of  the  siege 
— finally,  the  art  with  which  he  awaited  a  re- 
sult that  he  might  have  endangered  by  endea 


•  These  numbers  are  taken  from  statements  found  in 
the  place. 


298 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[May,  1807. 


vouring  to  hasten  it,  and  that,  besides,  he  would 
have  had  no  interest  in  hastening,  for,  not  in- 
tending to  act  offensively  till  June,  his  not 
completing  the  conquest  of  Dantzig  till  May 
was  of  very  little  consequence. 

It  was  not  sufficient  to  have  taken  Dantzig, 
it  was  necessary  to  be  master  of  the  mouth  of 
the  Vistula  and  the  sea  approaches,  that  is  to 
say,  the  fort  of  Weichselmunde,  which,  well- 
defended,  would  have  required  a  regular  attack 
and  occasioned  a  great  loss  of  time.  But  the 
moral  effect  of  the  reduction  of  Dantzig  pro- 
duced the  surrender  of  the  fort  of  Weichsel- 
munde forty-eight  hours  afterwards.  Half  of 
the  garrison  having  deserted,  the  other  half 
surrendered  the  fort,  desiring  to  capitulate  oh 
the  same  terms  as  the  garrison  of  Dantzig. 
The  route  of  the  Nehrung  as  far  as  Pillau 
served  both  for  returning  to  Konigsberg.  Be- 
sides the  advantage  of  securing  a  base  of 
operation  on  the  Vistula  that  was  not  to  be 
shaken,  Napoleon  acquired  in  the  city  of  Dant- 
zig immense  supplies.  With  great  wealth, 
Dantzig  contained  300,000  quintals  of  corn, 
and  above  all  seven  million  bottles  of  wine 
of  the  best  quality,  which,  in  this  dreary  cli- 
mate, would  be  to  the  army  a  subject  of  joy 
and  a  source  of  health.  Napoleon  immediately 
sent  his  aid-de-camp,  Rapp,  on  whose  devoted- 
ness  he  had  perfect  reliance,  to  take  the  com- 
mand of  Dantzig,  and  to  prevent  the  misappli- 
cation of  valuable  things.  He  immediately 
followed  him  in  person,  and  went  to  pass  two 
days  at  Dantzig,  wishing  to  judge  from  his 
own  observation  of  the  importance  of  that 
place,  of  the  works  which  would  be  required 
to  render  it  impregnable,  lastly,  of  the  re- 
sources which  might  be  derived  from  it  for 
the  subsistence  of  the  army. 

He  ordered  18,000  quintals  of  wheat  to  be 
conveyed  immediately  to  Elbing,  to  supply  the 
exhausted  magazines  of  that  city,  which  had 
already  furnished  80,000  quintals  of  corn.  He 
sent  off  a  million  bottles  of  wine  to  the  quar- 
ters on  the  Passarge.  He  inspected  all  the 
works  of  the  siege,  approved  all  that  had  been 
done,  highly  praised  General  Chasseloup  and 
the  attack  by  the  Hagelsberg,  distributed  signal 
rewards  among  the  officers  of  the  army,  and 
promised  himself  to  compensate  them  soon  by 
magnificent  donations  for  all  the  booty  that  he 
had  wisely  and  nobly  withdrawn  from  them  in 
intrusting  General  Rapp  with  the  government 
of  Dantzig.  He  resolved  to  create  Marshal 
Lefebvre  Duke  of  Dantzig,  and  to  add  a  superb 
endowment  to  the  title.  He  wrote  to  M.  Mol- 
lien,  desiring  him  to  purchase,  with  the  funds 
of  the  army  treasury,  an  estate  with  a  mansion 
producing  a  nett  income  of  100,000  livres,  to 
form  the  appanage  of  the  new  duke.  He  like- 
wise recommended  to  M.  Mollien  to  buy  about 
twenty  mansions  which  had  belonged  to  ancient 
families,  and  as  many  as  possible  situated  in 
the  west,  for  presents  to  the  generals  who 
freely  spilt  their  blood  for  him,  striving  thus 
to  renew  the  aristocracy  of  France,  as  he  was 
renewing  the  dynasties  of  Europe  by  the  strokes 
of  his  sword,  transformed  in  his  hand  into  a 
sort  of  magic  wand,  from  which  dropped  glory, 

°alth,  and  crowns. 
He  gave  the  necessary  orders  for  the  imme- 


1  diate  repair  of  the  works  of  Dantzig.  He 
placed  there  by  way  of  garrison  the  44th  and 
49th  of  the  line,  which  had  suffered  severely 
during  the  siege.  He  desired  that  all  the  pro- 
visional regiments,  which  should  not  have 
time  to  reach  the  army  before  the  resumption 
of  offensive  operations,  should  be  assembled 
there.  He  assigned  to  the  legion  of  the  north, 
whose  zeal  and  fatigues  had  been  extreme,  and 
whose  fidelity  was  undoubted,  the  custody  of 
the  fort  of  Weichselmunde.  He  directed  part 
of  the  German  troops  to  be  distributed  in  the 
Nehrung.  He  ordered  the  Saxons,  who  were 

'.  good  soldiers,  but  who  needed  to  serve  in  our 
ranks  that  they  might  become  attached  to  us, 
to  join  Lannes'  corps,  which  had  already  re- 
turned to  the  Vistula,  and  the  Poles,  whom  he 
wished  to  inure  to  war,  to  join  Mortier's  corps, 
likewise  destined  to  proceed  to  the  Vistula. 
The  Italians  were  left  to  blockade  Colberg,  the 
rest  of  the  Poles  to  blockade  the  little  citadel 
of  Graudenz,  points  of  little  importance  which 
he  had  yet  to  take. 

Napoleon,  on  his  return  to  Finkenstein, 
made  all  his  dispositions  for  recommencing 
offensive  operations  in  the  first  days  of  the 
month  of  June.  The  crafty  negotiations  of 
Austria  had  terminated  only  in  rendering  a  so- 
lution by  arms  inevitable.  The  offer  of  me- 
diation made  by  that  court,  accepted  with  mis- 
trust and  regret  but  with  a  good  grace  by  Na- 
poleon, had  been  immediately  transmitted  to 
England,  Prussia,  and  Russia.  The  ,  new 
English  cabinet,  though  its  policy  was  far  from 
inclining  to  peace,  could  not  at  its  outset  pro- 
claim too  marked  a  preference  for  war.  Mr. 
Canning,  as  minister  for  foreign  affairs,  re- 
plied, that  Great  Britain  cheerfully  accepted 
the  mediation  of  Austria,  and  would  follow  in 
this  negotiation  the  example  of  the  allied 
courts,  Prussia  and  Russia.  The  answer  of 
the  latter  was  the  least  amicable  of  the  three. 
The  Emperor  Alexander  had  repaired  to  the 
head-quarters  of  his  army,  at  Bartenstein,  on 
the  Alle.  He  had  there  been  joined  by  the 
King  of  Prussia,  who  had  come  from  Konigs- 
berg to  converse  with  him.  The  imperial 
guard,  which  had  lately  left  Petersburg,  and  nu- 
merous recruits  drawn  from  the  remotest  pro- 
vinces of  the  empire,  had  brought  the  Russian 
army  a  reinforcement  of  30,000  men,  and  re- 
paired the  losses  of  Pultusk  and  Eylau.  The  ri- 
diculous exaggerations  of  General  Benningsen, 
pushed  beyond  the  limit  that  a  wish  to  raise 
the  courage  of  one's  soldiers,  one's  country, 
and  one's  sovereign,  allows,  had  deceived  the 
voung  czar.  He  almost  imagined  that  he  had 
been  conqueror  at  Eylau,  and  he  was  tempted 
to  try  once  more  the  fortune  of  arms.  The 
King  of  Prussia,  on  the  contrary,  whom  parti- 
cular relations  with  Napoleon,  kept  up  through 
the  medium  of  Duroc,  had  enlightened  respect- 
ing the  somewhat  more  favourable  dispositions 
of  the  conqueror  of  Jena,  appeared  inclined  to 
treat,  on  condition  that  the  greater  part  of  his 
kingdom  should  be  restored  to  him.  He  had  not 
deceived  himself  in  regard  to  the  successes 
obtained  by  the  coalition.  He  had  seen  the 
principal  fortress  in  his  dominions  taken  be- 
fore the  face  of  the  Russian  army,  powerless 
to  prevent  it,  and  he  could  not  persuade  him- 


May,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


299 


self  that  the  allies  would  soon  be  able  to  force 
Napoleon  back  to  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder.1 
He  was,  therefore,  in  favour  of  peace.  But 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  infatuated  by  his  pre- 
tended advantages,  to  which,  however,  the  re- 
duction of  Dantzig  gave  a  signal  contradiction, 
affirmed  to  King  Frederick  William  that  very 
shortly  his  whole  patrimony  would  be  restored 
to  him  without  the  reservation  of  a  single 
province,  that  the  independence  of  Germany 
would  be  re-established,  and  that  for  this  pur- 
pose it  would  be  sufficient  to  gain  a  single 
battle,  that  one  victory  would  decide  Austria, 
and  that  they  should  thus  ensure  the  ruin  of 
Napoleon  and  the  liberation  of  Europe.  Fred- 
erick William,  therefore,  allowed  himself  to 
be  led  away  by  new  suggestions,  very  like 
those  which  had  already  seduced  him  at  Pots- 
dam, and  the  mediation  of  Austria  was  refused 
in  reality,  though  accepted  in  appearance. 
The  allies  replied  that  they  should  be  delighted 
to  see  peace  restored  to  Europe,  and  restored 
through  the  good  offices  of  Austria,  but  they 
wished  first  to  know  on  what  bases  Napoleon 
intended  to  treat  with  them.  This  evasive 
answer  left  no  doubt  of  the  continuation  of  the 
war,  and  it  gave  great  displeasure  to  Austria, 
who  thus  lost  the  means  of  entering  into  the 
quarrel  in  order  to  terminate  it  as  she  pleased, 
either  by  the  concurrence  of  her  arms,  if  Na- 
poleon sustained  reverses,  or  by  a  peace,  of 
which  she  should  be  arbitress,  if  he  continued 
successful.  Nevertheless,  she  would  not  re- 
linquish the  mediation  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
appear  beaten :  she  communicated  the  an- 
swers which  she  had  received  to  Napoleon, 
and  begged  him  to  clear  up  the  doubts  which 
seemed  to  prevent  the  belligerent  powers  from 
opening  the  negotiations.  It  was  M.  de  Vin- 
cent who  was  charged  with  the  series  of  these 
parleys.  He  could  only  carry  them  on  in  writ- 
ing, for  while  he  had  remained  at  Warsaw  M. 
de  Talleyrand  had  joined  Napoleon  at  Finken- 
stein. 

This  conclusion  pleased  Napoleon,  who  had 
viewed  the  mediation  of  Austria  with  great  ap- 
prehension. Still  persisting  in  not  taking  upon 
himself  the  refusal  of  peace,  he  replied  that 
he  was  ready  to  adopt  the  medium  of  conces- 
sions, provided  there  were  granted  to  his  allies 
Spain,  Holland,  the  Porte,  restitutions  equiva- 
lent to  those  which  he  was  disposed  to  make. 
He  added  that,  as  soon  as  a  place  should  be 
fixed  upon  for  the  meeting  of  a  congress,  he 
would  send  his  plenipotentiaries  thither  with- 
out delay. 

But  the  mediation  had  miscarried,  for  it 
would  take  several  months  to  bring  such  par- 
leys to  any  terminations  whatever,  and  he 
hoped  in  a  few  days  of  fine  weather  to  finish 
the  war. 

Every  thing  was  ready,  in  fact,  on  both  sides, 
for  resuming  hostilities  with  the  greatest  en- 
ergy. The  two  sovereigns,  living  together  at 
Bartenstein,  had  contracted  the  most  solemn 
engagements  towards  each  other,  and  promised 


not  to  lay  down  their  arms  till  the  cause  of 
Europe  was  avenged,  and  the  whole  of  the 
Prussian  dominions  restored.  They  had 
signed  at  Bartenstein  a  convention  by  which 
they  bound  themselves  to  act  only  in  concert, 
and  not  to  treat  with  the  enemy  but  by  common 
consent.  The  proposed  aim  of  their  efforts 
was  not,  they  said,  the  abasement  of  France, 
but  the  emancipation  of  the  powers,  great  and 
small,  abased  by  France.  They  were  going  to 
fight  in  order  to  bring  about  the  evacuation  of 
Germany,  Holland,  even  Italy,  if  Austria 
joined  them,  to  establish,  in  default  of  the  an- 
cient German  confederation,  a  new  federative 
constitution,  which  should  ensure  the  inde- 
pendence of  all  the  German  States,  and  a  rea- 
sonable influence  to  Austria  and  Prussia  in 
Germany.  For  the  rest,  the  extent  of  the  pro- 
jected reparations  was  to  depend  on  the  suc- 
cess of  the  coalition.  Other  conventions  had 
been  signed,  as  well  with  Sweden  as  with  Eng- 
land. The  latter,  more  interested  in  the  war 
than  any  other,  and  hilherto  profiting  by  the 
efforts  of  the  powers  without  making  any  her- 
self, had  promised  subsidies  and  land  troops. 
Her  avarice  in  regard  to  subsidies  had  indis- 
posed the  King  of  Sweden  to  such  a  degree 
as  to  disgust  that  prince  with  the  crusade 
which  he  had  always  meditated  against  France. 
Still,  with  the  assistance  of  Russia,  there  had 
been  wrung  from  England  a  million  sterling 
for  Prussia,  a  yearly  allowance  for  the  Swedes 
employed  in  Pomerania,  and  an  engagement 
to  send  a  corps  of  20,000  English  to  Stralsund. 
Prussia  had  promised  on  her  part  to  send  to 
Stralsund  eight  or  ten  thousand  Prussians, 
who,  united  with  the  20,000  English  and 
15,000  Swedes,  would  form  on  the  rear  of  Na- 
poleon a  respectable  army,  and  the  more  to  be 
feared  by  him  as  it  would  cover  itself  with 
the  veil  of  the  armistice  signed  with  Marshal 
Mortier. 

These  conventions  communicated  to  Aus- 
tria had  no  influence  upon  her.  Besides, 
the  taking  of  Dantzig,  which  attested  the  im- 
potence of  the  Russians,  was  sufficient,  with 
all  that  was  known  at  Vienna  concerning  the 
relative  situation  of  the  belligerent  armies,  to 
confine  that  court  to  its  system  of  expectant 
politics. 

Alexander  and  Frederick  William  were, 
therefore,  left  to  struggle  on  against  the 
French  with  the  wrecks  of  the  Prussian 
forces,  consisting  of  about  30,000  men,  mostly 
prisoners  who  had  escaped  from  our  custody, 
with  the  Russian  army  recruited,  with  the 
Swedes  and  a  promised  corps  of  English  in 
Pomerania.  General  Benningsen's  troops 
were  still  suffering  severe  distress,  and, 
while  Napoleon  contrived  to  obtain  from 
an  enemy's  country  the  most  abundant  re- 
sources, the  Russian  administration,  amidst 
a  friendly  country,  with  considerable  means 
of  navigation,  knew  not  how  to  find  where- 
withal to  appease  the  painful  cravings  of 
her  army.  That  unfortunate  army  suffered, 


i  It  is  very  difficult  to  know  precisely  what  passed 
between  these  two  sovereigns,  living  in  a  continual 
ttte-ii-tete,  and  not  communicating  their  secret  disposi- 
tion to  those  about  them.  But  what  passed  at  head- 
quarters became  known  from  communication*  of  the 


court  of  Prussia  to  several  petty  Germaa  courts;  and 
besides,  the  assertion  which  I  make  here  is  derived 
from  statements  made  by  the  Queen  of  Prussia  hernelf 
to  one  of  the  most  respectable  diplomatists  of  the 
time 


300 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[May,  1807 


complained,  but  on  seeing  its  young  sove 
reign  at  Bartenstein,  it  mingled  cries  of  at 
tachment  with  its  cries  of  pain,  and  deceivec 
him  while  promising  by  its  acclamations  more 
than  it  could  perform  for  the  policy  and  the 
glory  of  the  Moscovite  empire.  Though  igno 
rant,  it  could  form  a  just  estimate  of  the  use 
lessness  of  that  war,  but  it  was  desirous  to 
march  forward,  were  it  only  to  conquer  pro 
visions.  Accordingly,  the  two  sovereigns 
repairing,  the  one  to  Tilsit,  the  other  to  Ko 
nigsberg.  whither  they  went  to  await  the  re 
suit  of  the  campaign,  had  left  orders  to  their 
generals  to  take  the  offensive  as  soon  as  pos- 
sible. 

General  Benningsen  had  posted  himself  on 
the  upper  course  of  the  Alle,  at  Heilsberg, 
where,  in  imitation  of  Napoleon,  he  had  cre- 
ated an  intrenched  camp,  formed  some  very 
ill-stocked  magazines,  and  prepared  his  ground 
to  fight  a  defensive  battle,  if  Napoleon  entered 
first  into  action.  He  could  assemble  under 
his  hand  about  100,000  men.  Besides  this 
principal  mass,  he  had  at  his  left  a  corps  of 
18,000  men  on  the  Narew,  placed  at  first  un- 
der the  command  of  General  Essen,  and  after- 
wards under  that  of  General  Tolstoy.  He  had 
on  his  right  about  20,000  men,  composed  of 
Kamenski's  division,  returned  from  Weichsel- 
miinde,  and  of  the  Prussian  corps  of  Lestocq ; 
he  had,  lastly,  some  depots  at  Kiinigsberg, 
making  a  total  of  140,000  men  scattered  from 
Warsaw  to  KOnigsberg,  100,000  of  whom  were 
assembled  on  the  Alle,  opposite  to  our  can- 
tonments on  the  Passarge.  General  Labanof 
was  bringing  a  reinforcement  of  30,000  men, 
troops  drawn  from  the  interior  of  the  empire. 
But  these  troops  were  not  likely  to  be  on  the 
theatre  of  war  before  the  resumption  of  the 
operations. 

Though  this  army  could  present  itself  with 
confidence  before  any  enemy,  whoever  he 
might  be,  it  could  not  fight  with  any  chance 
of  success  against  the  French  army  of  Auster- 
litz  and  Jena,  to  which,  besides,  it  had  be- 
come greatly  inferior  in  number,  since  Napo- 
leon had  had  time  to  extract  from  France  and 
Italy  new  forces,  of  which  we  have  already 
given  a  long  renumeration.  Napoleon,  in 
fact,  was  about  to  reap  the  fruit  of  his  inces- 
sant attentions  and  his  admirable  forecast. 
His  army,  rested,  fed,  recruited,  was  able  to 
face  all  his  enemies,  either  then  declared,  or 
ready  to  declare  ihemselves  on  the  first  event. 
On  his  rear,  Marshal  Brune,  with  15,000 
Dutch,  collected  in  the  Hanseatic  towns,  with 
14,000  Spaniards,  despatched  from  Leghorn, 
Perpignan,  and  Bayonne,  and  on  march  to- 
wards the  Elbe,  with  the  15,000  Wirtem- 
bergers  recently  employed  in  reducing  the 
fortresses  in  Silesia,  with  the  16,000  French 
in  Boudet'sand  Molitor's  divisions,  which  had 
entered  Germany, with  10,000  men  of  the  gar- 
rison battalions  occupying  Hameln,  Magde- 
burg, Spandau,  Custrin,  Stetten,  with  the  new 
contingent  of  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine 
— Marshal  Brune  had  an  army  of  about  80,000 
tnen.  This  army  could,  in  case  of  need,  be 
reinforced  by  25,000  veteran  soldiers,  drawn 
from  the  coasts  of  France,  which  would  make 
amount  to  100,000  or  110,000  men. 


The  fatigued  French  troops,  and  the  allied 
troops  on  which  the  least  dependence  was 
placed,  guarded  Dantzig  or  continued  the 
blockade  of  Colberg  and  Graudenz.  Two 
new  corps  compensated  on  the  Vistula  the 
dissolution  of  Augereau's  corps  ;  these  were, 
as  we  have  seen,  that  of  Marshal  Mortier  and 
that  of  Marshal  Lannes.  The  corps  of  Mar- 
shal Mortier  was  composed  of  the  4th  light,  of 
the  45th  and  58th  of  the  line,  of  the  Paris  mu- 
nicipal regiment,  forming  Dupas's  division, 
and  of  part  of  the  Polish  regiments  recently 
levied.  The  corps  of  Lannes  was  composed 
of  Oudinot's  famous  grenadiers  and  voltigeurs, 
of  the  2d  and  12th  light,  of  the  3d  and  72d  of 
the  line,  forming  Verdier's  division.  The 
Saxons  were  to  constitute  the  third  division 
of  Lannes'  corps.  These  two  corps  were 
upon  the  different  arms  of  the  Lower  Vistula, 
one  at  Dirschau,  the  other  at  Marienburg. 
That  of  Mortier  could  furnish  11,000  or  12,000 
men  present  under  fire,  that  of  Lannes  15,000. 
Their  nominal  effective  was  much  more  con- 
siderable. 

Beyond  the  Vistula,  and  facing  the  enemy, 
Napoleon  possessed  five  corps,  besides  the 
sjuard  and  the  cavalry  reserve. 

Massena,  occupying  both  the  Narew  and 
the  Omulew,  having  his  right  near  Warsaw, 
lis  centre  at  Ostrolenka,  his  left  at  Neiden- 
aurg,  guarded  the  extremity  of  our  line  with 
36,000  men,  24,000  of  whom  were  ready  to 
fight.  Among  the  number  were  6000  Ba- 
varians. 

The  corps  of  Poles  recently  levied,  that  of 
iayonschek,  five  or  six  thousand  strong,  in 
real  part  cavalry,  nominally  belonging  to 
Vtortier's  corps,  filled  the  interval  between 
Vlassena  and  the  cantonments  on  the  Pas- 
arge,  and  sent  out  continual  patroles,  either  in 
he  forests,  or  in  the  marshes  of  the  country. 

Lastly  came  the  old  corps  of  Marshals  Ney, 
)avout,  Soult  and  Bernadotte,  cantoned  all 
bur  behind  the  Passarge. 

We  have  already  described  the  Passarge 
and  the  Alle,  rising  near  one  another,  and  the 
nimerous  lakes  of  the  country,  the  first  run- 
ning to  our  left  perpendicularly  to  the  sea ; 
he  second,  right  before  us,  perpendicularly  to 
he  Pregel,  thus  forming  both  of  them  an  an- 
jle,  one  side  of  which  we  occupied,  and  the 
lussians  the  other.  Each  of  the  two  armies 
was  ranged  in  a  different  manner  on  the  sides 
f  this  angle.  We  bordered  the  Passarge 
ongitudinally,  that  is  for  about  twenty  leagues 
rom  Hohenstein  to  Braunsberg.  The  Rus- 
ians,  on  the  contrary,  in  order  to  face  us, 
were  concentrated  on  the  upper  course  of  the 
Alle,  near  Heilsberg. 

Marshal  Ney,  established  at  the  top  of  this 
angle,  which    was   rather   irregular,  like  all 
hose  of  Nature's  making,  held  at  once  the 
Alle  and  the  Passarge,  by  Guttstadt  and  Dep- 
ien,  with  his  corps  of  25,000  men,  furnishing 
7,000  combatants,  incomparable  troops,  and 
worthy  of  their  commander.      At  the  same 
tieight,  but  somewhat  in  rear,  Marshal  Da- 
out  was,  like  Marshal  Ney,  between  the  Alle 
and  the  Passarge,  between  Allenstein  and  Ho- 
icnstein,  flanking   Marshal  Ney,  preventing 
he  enemy  from  turning  the  army,  and  coming 


May,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


301 


by  Osterode  to  open  a  passage  toward  the 
Vistula.  His  corps,  a  model  of  discipline  and 
bearing,  made  in  the  image  of  him  who  com- 
manded it,  could  bring  into  action  30,000  out 
of  40,000  men.  He  it  was,  among  all  the 
marshals,  whose  troops  always  presented  the 
greatest  number  of  men  fit  for  fighting,  thanks 
to  his  vigilance  and  his  vigour.  Marshal 
Soult,  placed  on  the  left  of  Marshal  Ney, 
guarded  at  Liebstadt  the  middle  of  the  course 
of  the  Passarge,  having  intrenched  posts  at 
the  bridges  of  Pittehnen  and  Lomitten.  He 
had  an  effective  of  43,000  men,  and  30,000  or 
31,000  present  under  arms.  Marshal  Berna- 
dotte  defended  the  Lower  Passarge,  from  Span- 
den  to  Braunsberg,  with  36,000  men,  24,000 
of  whom  were  ready  to  march.  Dupont's 
fine  division  occupied  the  shore  of  the  sea,  or 
Frische-Haff. 

Lastly,  between  the  Passarge  and  the  Vis- 
tula, in  a  tract  interspersed  with  lakes  and 
marshes,  were  situated  the  head-quarters  of 
Finkenstein,  where  Napoleon  was  encamped 
amidst  his  guard,  mustering  8000  or  9000 
combatants  out  of  an  effective  of  12,000  men. 
A  little  further  in  rear,  and  to  the  left,  was 
spread  Murat's  cavalry,  comprehending  all  the 
cavalry  of  the  army,  with  the  exception  of  the 
hussars  and  chasseurs  left  to  each  corps  as 
the  means  of  guarding  itself.  Out  of  30,000  '• 
horse,  it  contained  20,000  ready  to  mount. 

Such  were  the  forces  of  Napoleon.     From  ! 
the  Rhine  to  the  Passarge,  from  Bohemia  to 
the  Baltic,  in  troops  on  march,  or  which  had  i 
already  reached  the  theatre  of  war,  in  troops  j 
guarding  his  rear  or  ready  to  take  the  often-  j 
sive,  invalid  soldiers,  wounded  or  sick,  French  j 
or  allies,   he   numbered   more   than   400,000 
men.     If  we  take  into  account  those  only  that 
were  about  to  enter  into  action,  and  exclude 
the  corps  of  Massena  destined  to  guard  the 
Narew,  we  may  say  that  he  had  at  hand  six 
corps,  those  of  Marshals  Ney,  Davout,  Soult, 
Bernadotte,  Lannes,  Mortier,  besides  the  ca- 
valry and  the  guard,  which  composed  an  ef- 
fective of  225,000    men,1    160,000  of  whom 
were  real  combatants.     Such  is  the  difficulty 
of  the  offensive  !     The  further  you  advance,  ] 
the  more  fatigue,  dispersion,  the  necessity  for 
guarding  yourself,  diminish  the  strength  of 
armies.    Let  us  suppose  these  400,000  men 
falling  back  to  the  Rhine,  not  in  consequence 
of  defeat,  but  from  a  calculation  of  prudence, 
every  man,  excepting  the  sick,  would  have 
furnished  a  combatant.     On   the  Vistula,  on 
the  contrary,  less  than  half  could  fight     Let 
us  suppose  them  to  be  two  hundred  leagues 
further  off,  not  more  than  a  fourth  could  have 
presented  themselves  before  the  enemy.     And 


1 

Effective. 

Present  under  arms. 

Ney  

...  25.000  .. 

17.000 

Da'out  

...  40,000  •- 

30.000 

Soult  

-  •  •  43.000  •  • 

31  or  32.000 

Bernadotte 

•  ••  36,000  -• 

24.000 

Mural  

...  30,000  • 

20,000 

Guard  

—  12.000  • 

8or   9.000 

Lanaes  

20.000 

15,000 

Mortier  

•••  15,000  • 

10.000 

221.000 

155.000 

Reckoning  Zayonschek's  Poles.  5000  for  »even  or 
eight  thousand,  we  shall  have  160,000  combatants  out 
of  a  total  effective  of  226,000  men. 


yet  he  who  conducted  these  masses  was  the 
greatest  organizer  that  ever  existed.  Let  us 
be  thankful  to  the  nature  of  things  which  has 
decreed  that  attack  should  be  more  difficult 
than  defence ! 

But  the  160,000  men,  whom  Napoleon  had 
at  his  disposal,  after  he  had  sufficiently  co- 
vered his  flanks  and  his  rear,  were  all  in  rank. 
If  the  same  method  of  counting  had  been  ap- 
!  plied  to  the  Russian  army,  most  assuredly 
there  would  not  have  been  140,000  men.  Na- 
poleon's soldiers  were  perfectly  rested,  abun- 
dantly fed,  suitably  clothed  for  war,  that  is  to 
say,  dressed  and  shod,  well  provided  with 
arms  and  ammunition.  The  cavalry,  in  par- 
ticular, recomposed  in  the  plains  of  the  Lower 
Vistula,  mounted  with  the  finest  horses  of 
Germany,  having  resumed  its  exercises  for 
two  months  past,  presented  a  superb  specta- 
cle. Napoleon,  wishing  to  see  it  all  together 
in  one  plain,  had  gone  to  Elbing  to  review  it 
Eighteen  thousand  horse,  an  enormous  mass, 
moved  by  a  single  chief,  Prince  Murat  had, 
after  maneuvering  before  him  for  a  whole 
day,  dazzled  his  eyes,  though  so  accustomed 
to  large  armies,  to  such  a  degree,  that,  writing 
an  hour  afterwards  to  his  ministers,  he  could 
not  help  extolling  the  fine  sight  which  he  had 
just  beheld  in  the  plains  of  Elbing. 

From  a  forecast  for  which  he  had  great  rea- 
son to  applaud  himself,  Napoleon  had  given 
orders  that,  after  the  1st  of  May,  all  the  corps 
should  leave  the  villages  in  which  they  were 
cantoned,  and  encamp  in  divisions,  within 
reach  of  one  another,  in  well-chosen  situa- 
tions, and  behind  good  field-works.  This  was 
the  right  way  to  prevent  being  surprised;  for 
the  examples  of  armies  attacked  unawares  in 
their  winter  quarters  have  all  been  furnished 
by  troops,  which  had  spread  themselves  for 
the  sake  of  lodging  and  provisions.  An  army 
vigorously  attacked  in  this  position  may,  be- 
fore it  has  time  to  rally,  lose  in  number  half 
its  force,  in  territory,  provinces  and  kingdoms. 
The  precaution  of  encamping,  though  infinitely 
prudent,  he  had  great  difficulty  to  obtain  from 
officers  and  soldiers,  for  it  obliged  them  to 
leave  good  cantonments,  where  each  had  com- 
fortably established  himself,  and  thenceforward 
expect  from  magazines  alone,  those  provisions 
which  they  found  more  surely  on  the  spot. 
Napoleon,  nevertheless,  required  it,  and,  in  ten 
or  fifteen  days,  all  the  corps  were  encamped 
in  hovels,  covered  by  earth-works  or  by  im- 
mense abattis,  maneuvering  every  day,  and, 
having  recovered,  in  consequence  of  their  as- 
semblage in  mass,  the  energy  of  the  military 
spirit,  an  energy  which  is  infinitely  fluctuating, 
which  rises  or  sinks,  not  only  from  victory  or 
defeat,  but  by  activity  or  rest,  by  all  the  cir- 
cumstances, in  short,  which  stretch  or  relax 
the  human  mind  like  a  spring. 

Nature,  so  dreary  in  this  climate  during  win- 
ter, but  which  is  nowhere  destitute  of  beauty, 
especially  when  the  returning  sun  brings  back 
to  it  light  and  life— Nature  herself  invited  the 
men  to  motion.  Rich  pastures  afforded  food 
for  the  horses,  and  allowed  all  the  means  of 
transport  to  be  devoted  to  the  subsistence  of 
the  men.  The  two  armies  were  in  presence, 
within  cannon-shot,  sometimes  maneuvering 
2C 


302 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


before  each  other's  face,  reciprocally  serving 
for  a  sight  to  one  another,  but  abstaining  from 
firing,  certain  that  this  peaceful  activity  would 
change  soon  enough  to  a  sanguinary  conflict. 
On  both  sides  a  speedy  resumption  of  the  ope- 
rations was  expected,  and  they  kept  on  their 
guard  for  fear  of  being  surprised.  One  day 
even,  towards  Braunsberg,  a  post  occupied  by 
Dupont's  division,  there  was  heard  at  night- 
fall a  confused  sound  of  voices,  which  seemed 
to  denote  the  presence  of  a  numerous  corps. 
The  officers  ran  up,  conceiving  that  the  attack 
of  the  cantonments  had  at  length  commenced, 
and  that  the  Russians  were  taking  the  initia- 
tive. But,  on  approaching  the  place  whence 
the  noise  proceeded,  they  perceived  a  multi- 
tude of  wild  swans  sporting  in  the  Passarge, 
on  the  banks  of  which  they  dwell  in  countless 
flocks.1 

Meanwhile,  Napoleon,  having  returned  from 
Dantzig  to  Elbing,  and  having  all  his  means 
collected  between  the  Vistula  and  the  Passarge, 
resolved  to  set  himself  in  motion  on  the  10th 
of  June,  to  march  to  the  Alle,  to  descend  its 
course,  to  separate  the  Russians  from  Konigs- 
berg,  to  take  that  city  before  their  faces,  and 
to  throw  them  back  upon  the  Niemen.  He 
had  given  orders  that,  by  the  10th,  each  corps 
d'urmee  should  be  supplied  with  bread  and 
biscuit  for  fourteen  days,  four  in  the  soldiers' 
knapsacks,  ten  in  the  caissons.  But,  while  he 
was  preparing  to  recommence  hostilities,  the 
Russians,  determined  to  be  beforehand  with 
him,  anticipated  by  five  days  the  movements 
of  the  French  army. 

It  might  have  been  expected  that  they  would 
have  defied  all  the  risks  of  the  offensive,  when 
the  salvation  of  Dantzig  was  at  stake.  But 
now,  when  no  pressing  interest  urged  them  to 
haste,  to  venture  to  attack  Napoleon  in  long 
studied,  carefully  defended  positions,  merely 
because  the  fine  season  had  arrived,  was  a 
proceeding  conceivable  only  of  a  general  act- 
ing without  reflection,  obeying  vague  instincts 
rather  than  an  enlightened  reason.  One  ought 
to  have  been  as  sure  as  one  was  uncertain,  of 
the  due  execution  of  the  operations,  in  then 
opposing  the  Russian  troops  to  the  French 
troops,  that  there  would  not  have  been  any 
good  plan  of  offensive  against  Napoleon,  es- 
tablished as  he  was  upon  the  Passarge.  To 
attack  by  sea,  to  attempt  to  take  Braunsberg 
on  the  Lower  Passarge,  and  then  to  dash 
against  the  Lower  Vistula  and  Dantzig  which 
we  occupied,  would  be  but  a  series  of  follies. 
To  attack  on  the  opposite  side,  that  is  to  say, 
to  ascend  the  Alle,  to  pass  between  the  sources 
of  the  Alle  and  those  of  the  Passarge,  to  turn 
our  right  to  slip  between  Marshal  Ney  and 
Massena's  corps,  in  the  space  guarded  by  the 
Poles,  was  all  that  Napoleon  himself  desired ; 
for,  in  this  case,  he  shou'd  ascend  by  his  left, 
get  between  the  Russians  and  Kiinigsberg.cut 
them  off  from  their  base  of  operation,  and 
throw  them  into  the  inextricable  difficulties  of 
the  interior  of  Poland.  In  taking  the  offen- 
sive, then,  there  were  but  dangers  to  incur, 
without  a  single  advantageous  result  to  obtain. 

•  These  particulars  are  derived  from  General  Du- 
ponl's  rruhiury  Memo.rs,  «JH  manuscript,  and  replete 
will  the  highest  interest. 


[June,  1807, 

To  wait  for  Napoleon  on  the  Pregel,  the  right 
to  Kiinigsberg,  the  left  to  Wehlau,  to  defend 
that  line  stoutly,  then,  that  line  being  lost,  to 
fall  back  in  good  order  upon  the  Niemen,  to 
entice  the  French  into  the  recesses  of  the  em- 
pire, avoiding  great  battles,  opposing  to  them 
.  the  most  formidable  of  obstacles,  that  of  dis 
'•,  tance,  and  refusing  them  the   advantage  ol 
|  signal  victories — such  would  have  been  the 
only  rational  conduct  on  the  part  of  the  Rus- 
sian general,  and,  as  subsequent  experience 
has   unfortunately  for   us   demonstrated,  the 
only  wise  course. 

But  General  Benningsen,  who  had  promised 
his  sovereign  to  draw  the  most  brilliant  con- 
sequences from  the  battle  of  Eylau,  and  soon 
to  gain  for  him  an  ample  compensation  for  the 
loss  of  Dantzig,  could  no  further  prolong  the 
inaction  observed  during  the  siege  of  that 
place,  and  thought  himself  obliged  to  take  the 
initiative.  Accordingly,  he  had  formed  the 
plan  of  falling  upon  Marshal  Ney,  whose  very 
advanced  position  was  more  favourable  to  sur- 
prise than  any  other.  Napoleon,  in  fact,  desi- 
rous of  keeping  not  only  the  Passarge  up  to 
its  sources,  but  the  Alle  itself  in  the  upper  part 
of  its  course,  so  as  to  occupy  the  apex  of  the 
angle  described  by  those  two  rivers,  had  placed 
Marshal  Ney  at  Guttstadt  on  the  Alle.  The 
latter  must  have  appeared  in  the  air  to  any 
one  not  acquainted  with  the  precautions  taken 
to  remedy  the  apparent  inconvenience  of  such 
a  situation.  But  all  the  means  of  a  prompt 
concentration  were  secured  and  prepared  be- 
forehand. Marshal  Ney  had  his  retreat  indi- 
cated upon  Deppen,  Marshal  Davout  upon  Os- 
terode,  Marshal  Soult  upon  Liebstadt  and 
Mohrungen,  Marshal  Bernadotte  upon  Preuss- 
Holland.  If  the  enemy  persisted,  they  were 
all  to  make  one  march  further,  to  join  them- 
selves at  Saalfeld  with  the  guard,  with  Lannes, 
with  Mortier,  with  Murat,  in  a  labyrinth  of 
lakes  and  forests,  the  outlets  of  which  were 
known  to  none  but  Napoleon,  and  where  he 
had  prepared  a  disaster  for  the  imprudent 
adversary  who  should  come  thither  in  quest 
of  him. 

Without  having  dived  into  any  of  these  com- 
binations, General  Benningsen  resolved  to  sur- 
prise Marshal  Ney's  corps,  and  made  such  dis- 
positions as  at  first  sight  seemed  calculated  to 
succeed.  He  directed  the  greater  part  of  his 
forces  upon  Marshal  Ney,  confining  himself  to 
mere  demonstrations  against  the  other  mar- 
shals. Three  columns,  and  even  four,  reckoning 
the  imperial  guard,  accompanied  by  all  the  ca- 
valry, were  to  ascend  the  Alle,  to  attack  Marshal 
Ney  in  front  by  Altkirch,on  the  left  by  Wolfs- 
dorf,  on  the  right  by  Guttstadt,  while  Plato w,  het- 
man  of  the  Cossacks,  filling  Avith  his  horsemen 
the  space  which  separated  us  from  the  Narew, 
and  with  the  light  infantry  forcing  the  Alle 
above  Guttstadt,  was  to  endeavour  to  slip  be- 
tween Ney's  corps  and  Davout' s.  Meanwhile, 
the  imperial  guard,  under  the  Grand-duke  Con- 
slantine,  was  to  place  itself  in  reserve  behind 
the  three  columns  destined  to  attack  Marshal 
Ney,  and  to  proceed  to  the  assistance  of  any 
of  them  that  might  need.it.  A  column  com- 
posed of  two  divisions,  under  the  command  of 
Lieutenant-general  Doctorow,  had  orders  to 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


SOS 


come  from  Olbersdorf  to  Lomitten,  to  attack 
the  bridges  of  Marshal  Soult,  and  to  prevent 
him  from  assisting  Marshal  Ney.  Another 
Russian  column,  under  Generals  Kamenski 
and  Rembow,  was  directed  to  make  a  strong 
demonstration  on  the  bridge  of  Spanden,  which 
Marshal  Bernadotte  was  guarding,  so  that  the 
whole  course  of  the  Passarge  would  be  threat- 
ened at  once.  The  Prussian  General  Lestocq 
was  even  directed  to  show  himself  before 
Braunsberg,  in  order  to  increase  the  uncer- 
tainty of  the  French  respecting  the  general  plan 
upon  which  all  these  attacks  were  arranged. 

It  remained  to  be  seen  whether  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  Russian  general,  apparently  well 
calculated,  would  be  executed  with  the  preci- 
sion requisite  for  giving  success  to  such  com- 
plicated operations,  and  whether  they  would 
not  find  the  French  so  prepared,  so  resolute,  j 
that  it  would  be  impossible  to  surprise  them 
and  to  force  them  in  their  position.  The  move-  ' 
ments  of  these  numerous  columns,  concealed 
by  the  forests  and  the  lakes  of  that  dreary 
country,  escaped  our  generals,  who  had  no  idea 
that  the  Russians  were  ready,  but  who,  know- ; 
ing  that  they  were  ready  themselves,  and  ex- 
pecting to  march  every  moment,  felt  neither 
surprise  or  fear  at  sight  of  the  preparations  of 
the  enemy. 

Here  we  may  perceive  that  forecast  is  all- 
powerful  in  war.     This  formidable  attack,  di- 
rected against  Marshal  Ney,  would  infallibly 
have  succeeded,  if  our  troops,  scattered  in  the 
villages,  had  been  surprised  and  obliged  to  run  '. 
to  the  rear  to  rally.   But  this  was  not  the  case, 
and,  thanks  to  the  orders  of  Napoleon,  disa- 1 
greeable  orders  to  all  the  corps,  and  which  he  ' 
had  been  obliged  to  render  absolute  in  order  to 
enforce  their  execution,  the  troops  were  en- 
camped by  divisions,  covered  by  earth-works 
and  by  abattis,  established  in  such  a  manner 
that  they  could  defend  themselves  for  a  long 
time,  and  succour  one  another  before  they  were 
obliged  to  give  way. 

On  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  June,  by  day- 
break, the  Russian  advanced-guard,  led  by 
Prince  Bagration,  advanced  rapidly  upon  the 
position  of  Altkirch,  one  of  those  occupied  by 
Marshal  Ney  with  a  division,  and  neglected  all 
the  petty  French  posts  scattered  in  the  woods, 
intending  to  take  by  turning  them.  Our  troops, 
which,  in  consequence  of  the  encampment, 
slept  ready  for  battle,  pleased  rather  than  as- 
tonished at  sight  of  the  enemy,  full  of  compo- 
sure, exercised  every  day  in  firing,  opened  a 
murderous  fire  upon  the  Russians,  which 
quickly  brought  them  to  a  stand.  The  39th, 
placed  in  advance  at  Altkirch,  did  not  retire 
till  it  had  strewed  the  foot  of  the  intrench- 
ments  with  slain.  Meanwhile,  the  attacks  made 
upon  Wolfsdorf  on  the  left,  upon  Guttstadt  on 


the  right,  and  further  still  to  the  right  apon 
Bergfried,  were  vigorously  executed,  but  luckily 
without  any  unity,  and  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
allow  Marshal  Ney  time  to  effect  his  retreat 
Hastening  to  the  head  of  his  troops,  he  per- 
ceived that  the  principal  effort  of  the  Russian 
army  was  concentrated  upon  him,  and  that  it 
was  time  for  him  to  take  the  road  to  Deppen, 
assigned  by  the  foresight  of  Napoleon  as  his 
line  of  retreat  He  had  one  of  his  divisions 
in  advance  of  Guttsladt  at  Krossen,  the  other 
in  rear  at  Glottau.  He  united  them,  taking 
time,  however,  to  collect  his  artillery,  his  bag- 
gage, his  detached  posts  in  the  woods,  all  which 
he  took  away  with  him,  except  two  or  three 
hundred  men,  left  at  the  furthest  extremity  of 
the  forest  of  Amt-Guttstadt  He  followed  the 
road  from  Gultstadt  to  Deppen,  through  Quetz 
and  Ankendorf,  slowly  traversing  the  narrow 
space  comprised  between  the  Alle  and  the  Pas- 
sarge, halting  with  extraordinary  coolness  to 
give  fire  with  two  ranks,  sometimes  charging 
with  the  bayonet  the  infantry  which  pressed 
him  too  closely,  or  forming  in  square,  pouring 
volleys,  within  point  blank  range,  upon  the 
innumerable  Russian  cavalry,  in  short,  filling 
the  enemy  with  an  admiration  which  they  ex- 
pressed themselves  a  few  days  afterwards.1 
He  was  unwilling  to  give  up  entirely  the  space 
of  four  or  five  leagues,  which  separates  the 
Alle  at  this  place  from  the  Passarge,  and  he 
halted  at  Ankendorf.  He  had  had  to  do  with 
15,000  infantry  and  15,000  cavalry;  and, if  the 
two  columns  of  Prince  Bagration  and  Lieu- 
tenant-general Sacken  had  acted  together,  if 
the  imperial  guard  had  joined  them,  opposed 
to  60,000  men,  he  could  scarcely  have  failed 
to  experience  a  terrible  disaster.  He  had  lost 
twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  killed  or  wounded, 
but  more  than  3000  Russians  had  fallen.  At 
three  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  the  enemy  de- 
sisted of  himself,  without  any  motive,  as  it 
frequently  happens  when  a  firm  and  consistent 
mind  does  not  direct  the  movements  of  great 
masses. 

On  the  same  day,  the  hetman  Platow  had 
passed  the  Alle  at  Bergfried,  and  inundated 
with  his  Cossacks  the  marshy  and  woody  tract 
which  separated  the  grand  army  from  the  posts 
of  Marshal  Massena.  But  it  was  not  at  all 
probable  that  he  would  venture  to  attack  Mar- 
shal Davout's  30,000  men.  The  latter,  hearing 
the  distant  thunder  of  the  cannon,  hastily  col- 
lected his  troops  between  the  Alle  and  the  Pas- 
sarge, and  took  the  road  to  Alt-Ramteu,  which 
permitted  him  to  succour  Marshal  Ney,  at  the 
same  time  that  he  was  approaching  Osterode. 
By  a  lucky  stratagem  of  war,  he  sent  one  of 
his  officers  in  the  direction  of  the  enemy,  with 
despatches  announcing  his  speedy  arrival  at 
the  head  of  50,000  men  to  support  Marshal 


»  Hlotho  gives  the  following  account  of  the  retreat  of 
Matshal  Ney  to  Deppen. 

"The  French,  consummate  masters  in  the  art  of  war, 
resolved  on  that  day  this  very  difficult  problem,  to  exe- 
cute a  retreat  that  is  become  indispensable,  in  the  face 
of  an  enemy  who  is  much  stronger  and  urgently  press- 
ing, and  to  render  it  as  little  prejudicial  as  possible. 
They  extricated  themselves  from  the  situation  with  the 
utmost  ski!!.  The  calmness  and  order,  and,  at  the  same 
time,  the  rapidity,  shown  by  Ney's  corps,  in  assembling 
at  the  signal  of  three  cannon-shot ;  the  coolness  and 
attentive  circumspection  with  which  it  executed  its  re- 


treat, during  which  it  opposed  a  resistance  renewed  at 
every  step,  and  knew  how  to  avail  itself,  in  a  masterly 
manner,  of  every  position — all  this  proved  the  talent  of 
the  captain  who  commanded  the  French,  and  the  habil 
of  war  carried  by  them  to  perfection,  as  strongly  as  the 
finest  dispositions  and  the  most  scientific  execution  of 
an  offensive  operation  could  have  done.  For  attacking 
with  success,  as  well  as  for  opposing  a  regular  resist- 
ance in  a  retreat,  there  are  required  rare  qualities,  vir- 
tues difficult  to  practise;  and  yet  it  is  necessary  that  all 
these  should  be  combined  in  the  some  pe.1  son  to  form 
the  great  captain." 


304 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[June,  1807. 


Ney.  On  the  opposite  side,  to  the  left  of  Ney's 
corps,  the  attacks  projected  against  Marshals 
Soult  and  Bernadotte  were  executed  conform- 
ably to  the  plan  agreed  upon.  Lieutenant- 
General  Doctofow,  marching  with  two  divi- 
sions by  Wormditt  and  Olbersdorf,  over  the 
tltetdupont  which  Marshal  Soult  was  guarding, 
found,  in  advance  of  the  Passarge,  numerous 
abattis,  and  behind  those  abattis  brave  tirail- 
leurs, who  kept  up  a  constant  and  well-directed 
fire.  He  was  obliged  to  fight  for  several  suc- 
cessive hours,  in  order  to  overcome  the  obsta- 
cles which  defended  the  approaches  of  the 
bridge  of  Lomitten.  No  sooner  had  he  carried 
one  part  of  the  abattis,  than  companies  of 
reserve,  falling  upon  his  troops,  drove  them 
out  at  the  point  of  the  bayonet.  Detachments 
of  Russian  cavalry,  having  crossed  some  fords 
of  the  Passarge,  were  obliged  by  our  mounted 
chasseurs  to  fall  back.  The  course  of  the 
Passarge  was  everywhere  left  in  the  posses- 
sion of  the  valiant  troops  of  Marshal  Soult: 
merely  the  half-burnt  abattis,  in  advance  of 
the  bridge  of  Lomitten,  had  been  finally  relin- 
quished to  the  Russians.  General  Doctorow 
desisted  towards  nightfall,  exhausted  with  fa- 
tigue, despairing  of  overcoming  such  obstacles, 
defended  by  such  soldiers.  The  Russians,  at- 
tacking uncovered  our  troops,  who  were  well 
sheltered,  had  more  than  2000  men  put  hors  du 
combat,  and  we  had  not  lost  above  1000.  Gene- 
rals Ferey  and  Vivies  of  Carra-St.  Cyr's  divi- 
sion, with  the  47th  and  56th  of  the  line,  and 
the  24th  light,  had  covered  themselves  with 
glory  at  the  bridge  of  Lomitten. 

An  action  nearly  similar  had  taken  place  at 
the  bridge  of  Spanden,  which  belonged  to  Mar- 
shal Bernadotte.  An  intrenchment  of  earth 
covered  the  bridge.  The  27th  light  guarded 
this  post,  having  in  rear  the  two  brigades  of 
Villate's  division.  At  the  very  commencement 
of  the  action,  Marshal  Bernadotte  received  a 
wound  in  the  neck,  which  obliged  him  to  re- 
linquish the  command  to  his  chief  of  the  staff, 
General  Maison,  one  of  the  most  intelligent 
and  energetic  officers  in  the  army.  The  Rus- 
sians, here  united  with  the  Prussians,  cannon- 
aded the  teledupont  for  a  long  time,  and  when 
they  conceived  that  they  had  daunted  the  troops 
which  defended  it,  they  advanced  to  scale  it. 
The  soldiers  of  the  27th  light  had  received 
orders  to  lie  down  on  the  ground  that  they 
might  not  be  perceived.  They  allowed  the 
assailants  to  come  to  the  foot  of  the  intrench- 
ment, and  then,  by  a  point-blank  discharge, 
swept  down  three  hundred,  and  wounded  several 
hundred  more.  The  Russians  and  Prussians, 
struck  with  terror,  dispersed,  and  retired  in  dis- 
order. The  17th  dragoons,  then  debouching 
from  the  tete  dv,  pont,  rushed  upon  them  at  a 
gallop  and  cut  down  a  great  number. 

The  attack  was  not  pushed  beyond  this  point. 
It  had  cost  the  enemy  not  fewer  than  six  or 
seven  hundred  men.  Our  loss  was  insig- 
nificant 

This  vigorous  manner  of  receiving  the  Rus- 
sians all  along  the  Passarge,  excited  in  them 
a  surprise  easy  to  be  conceived,  and  produced  a 
commencement  of  hesitation  in  plans,  adopted 
with  too  little  reflection  to  be  prosecuted  with 
Pfrseverance.  The  Russian  and  Prussian 


column  of  Generals  Kamenski  and  Rembow, 
beaten  at  Spanden,  awaited  ulterior  orders, 
before  engaging  in  fresh  enterprises.  General 
Doctorow,  stopped  at  the  bridge  of  Lomitten, 
ascended  the  Passarge  to  approach  the  main 
body  of  the  Russian  army.  General  Benning- 
sen,  surrounded  at  Quetz  by  the  greater  num- 
ber of  his  troops,  not  having  been  able  to  take 
Marshal  Ney's  corps,  but  having  obliged  him 
to  fall  back,  and  not  yet  aware  of  all  the  ob- 
stacles which  he  should  have  to  encounter, 
resolved  to  make  a  new  effort  on  the  following 
day  against  that  same  corps,  the  object  of  his 
most  violent  attacks. 

Six  or  seven  hours  after  these  simultaneous 
attempts  on  the  line  of  the  Passarge,  Napoleon 
received  intelligence  of  them  at  Finkenstein, 
for  he  was  scarcely  twelve  leagues  from  the 
most  distant  of  his  lieutenants;  and  he  had 
taken  care  to  regulate  his  means  of  correspond, 
ence  in  such  a  manner  as  to  be  informed  of 
the  most  trivial  incident  with  extreme  prompt- 
ness. He  was  anticipated  by  six  days  only — 
since  his  orders  had  been  given  for  the  10th 
of  June.  He  was  not,  therefore,  taken  at  un- 
awares. His  resolutions  were  formed  for  all 
cases — no  hesitation,  consequently,  no  loss  of 
time  could  retard  his  dispositions.  He  ap- 
proved the  conduct  of  Marshal  Ney,  gave  him 
i«e  praise  which  he  deserved,  and  enjoined 
him  to  retire  in  good  order  upon  Deppen,  and, 
if  he  could  not  defend  the  Passarge  at  Deppen, 
to  fall  back,  through  the  labyrinth  of  the  lakes, 
first  to  Liebemiihl,  then  to  Saalfeld.  He  or- 
dered Marshal  Davout  to  unite  his  three  divi- 
sions immediately  on  the  left  flank  of  Marshal 
Ney,  directing  his  course  to  Osterode — which 
was  already  done,  as  we  have  seen.  He  en- 
joined Marshal  Soult  to  persist  in  defending 
the  Passarge,  and  to  retire  upon  Mohrungen, 
and  from  Mohrungen  to  Saalfeld,  if  he  was 
forced  in  his  position,  or  one  of  his  neighbours 
was  forced  in  his.  The  same  instructions 
were  sent  to  the  corps  of  Marshal  Bernadotte, 
with  indication  of  the  route  from  Preuss-Hol- 
land  to  Saalfeld,  as  the  line  of  retreat. 

While  Napoleon  was  bringing  back  to  Saal- 
feld his  lieutenants  placed  in  front,  he  was 
calling  to  the  same  point  his  lieutenants 
placed  in  rear.  He  ordered  Marshal  Lannes 
to  march  from  Marienburg  to  Christburg  and 
Saalfeld;  Marshal  Mortier,  who  was  at  Dir- 
schau,  to  follow  the  same  route,  and  both  to 
take  with  them  as  large  a  quantity  of  provi- 
sions as  they  could.  The  light  cavalry  was 
to  assemble  at  Elbing,  the  heavy  cavalry  at 
Christburg,  and  to  proceed  towards  Saalfeld. 
The  three  divisions  of  dragoons,  encamped  on 
the  right  at  Bischoffswerder,  Strasburg  and 
Soldau,  had  orders  to  rally  around  Davout's 
corps  by  Osterode.  All  were  to  take  their 
provisions  along  with  them  by  means  of  con- 
veyances previously  provided.  It  would  take 
forty-eight  hours  before  these  different  concen- 
trations were  effected,  and  160,000  men  were 
assembled  between  Saalfeld  and  Osterode. 
Napoleon,  moreover,  made  his  guard  march 
from  Finkenstein  for  Saalfeld,  and  prepared 
to  leave  Finkenstein  himself  on  the  following 
day,  the  6th,  when  the  movements  of  the  ene- 
my should  be  more  decided,  and  his  designs 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


305 


more  clearly  indicated.  He  sent  his  house- 
hold to  Dantzig,  as  well  as  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
who  was  quite  unfit  for  the  fatigues  and  dan- 
gers of  the  head-quarters. 

On  the  6th,  in  fact,  the  Russian  columns, 
charged  to  prosecute  the  attack  commenced 
on  the  corps  of  Marshal  Ney,  were  more 
concentrated,  in  consequence  of  the  offensive 
movement  which  they  had  made  on  the  pre- 
ceding day,  and  Marshal  Ney  was  about  to 
have  upon  his  hands  30,000  infantry  and 
15,000  cavalry.  After  the  losses  sustained 
on  the  preceding  day,  he  could  oppose  but 
15,000  men  to  the  enemy.  But  he  had  pro- 
vided beforehand  for  every  contingency.  He 
had  sent  on  his  wounded  and  his  baggage  be- 
yond Deppen,  thai  the  road  might  be  free,  and 
that  his  corps  d'armee  might  not  meet  with  any 
obstacle  on  its  passage.  Instead  of  decamp- 
ing in  haste,  Marshal  Ney  boldly  waited  for 
the  enemy,  the  brigades  of  which  his  two  di- 
visions were  composed  being  ranged  en  eche- 
lons, each  extending  beyond  the  other.  Each 
dchelon,  before  it  retired,  delivered  its  fire,  fre- 
quently even  charging  with  the  bayonet,  and 
leaving  the  next  echelon  to  repress  the  Rus- 
sians. On  open  ground,  with  troops  less 
steady,  such  a  retreat  would  have  ended  in  a 
rout.  But,  owing  to  a  skilful  choice  of  posi- 
tions, owing  also  to  extraordinary  firmness  in 
the  men,  Marshal  Ney  could  take  several  hours 
to  traverse  the  space  of  less  than  two  leagues. 
Every  moment  he  beheld  a  multitude  of  horse 
rushing  en  masse  upon  his  bayonets;  but  all 
their  efforts  were  foiled  by  his  unyielding 
squares.  Having  arrived  near  a  small  lake, 
the  enemy  committed  the  blunder  of  dividing, 
in  order  that  one  part  might  pass  on  the  right 
of  the  lake,  the  other  part  on  the  left.  The 
intrepid  marshal,  seizing  the  opportune  mo- 
ment, with  equal  resolution  and  presence  of 
mind,  halted,  resumed  the  offensive  against 
the  divided  enemy,  charged  him  with  vigour, 
repulsed  him  to  some  distance,  and  thus  ob- 
tained time  to  regain  quietly  the  bridge  of 
Deppen,  behind  which  he  should  be  protected 
from  all  attack.  On  reaching  that  spot,  he 
placed  his  artillery  advantageously,  in  ad- 
vance of  the  Passarge,  and,  as  soon  as  the 
enemy  attempted  to  show  himself,  he  riddled 
him  with  balls. 

This  action,  which  cost  us  some  hundred 
men,  but  the  enemy  twice  or  thrice  as  many, 
heightened  the  admiration  excited  in  both 
armies  by  the  intrepidity  of  Marshal  Ney. 
On  our  left,  alone  the  Lower  Passarge,  the 
Russian  columns  remained  motionless,  await- 
ing the  result  of  the  action  going  on  between 
Guttstadt  and  Deppen.  On  our  right,  Marshal 
Davout's  corps,  on  march  since  the  preceding 
day,  had  proceeded  without  accident  to  the 
flank  of  Marshal  Ney,  in  order  to  support  him, 
or  to  gain  Osterode. 

With  such  lieutenants,  with  such  soldiers, 
the  combinations  of  Napoleon  had,  besides 
their  merit  of  conception,  the  advantage  of  an 
almost  infallible  execution.  In  the  evening 
of  the  6th,  Napoleon,  having  directed  all  that 
were  behind  to  Saalfeld,  repaired  thither  him- 
self, to  judge  of  events  from  personal  observa- 
tion, to  rally  his  lieutenants  there  if  they  were 

Vox..  II.— 39 


repulsed,  or  to  direct  upon  any  one  of  them 
the  mass  of  his  troops  if  they  had  maintained 
their  ground,  in  order  to  take  the  offensive,  in 
his  turn,  with  an  overwhelming  superiority 
of  forces.  On  his  arrival  at  Saalfeld,  he 
learned  that  the  greatest  tranquillity  had  pre- 
vailed during  the  day;  that,  on  the  Upper 
Passarge,  the  intrepid  Ney  had  effected  the 
most  successful  retreat  toward  Deppen,  and 
that  Marshal  Davout  was  already  on  march 
upon  the  right  flank  of  Marshal  Ney  towards 
Alt-Ramten.  Things  could  not  be  going  on 
better.  Next  day,  the  7th,  Napoleon  resolved 
to  go  himself  to  Deppen,  to  the  advanced  posts, 
and  left  orders  for  all  the  corps  marching  to 
Saalfeld  to  follow  him  to  Deppen.  In  the 
evening  of  the  7th,  he  went  to  Alt-Reichau, 
and,  having  again  learned  that  all  still  con- 
tinued quiet,  he  proceeded  to  Deppen,  con- 
gratulated Marshal  Ney  and  likewise  his 
troops  on  their  gallant  conduct,  saw  the  Rus- 
sian army  motionless  as  an  army  whose  un- 
decided commander  is  puzzled  what  course  to 
pursue,  and  ordered  a  strong  demonstration, 
in  order  to  judge  of  his  real  intentions.  The 
Russians  repulsed  it  in  such  a  manner  as  to 
prove  that  they  were  more  disposed  to  fall 
back  than  to  persist  in  their  offensive  march. 
General  Benningsen,  in  fact,  perceiving  the 
futility  of  the  efforts  directed  against  Marshal 
Ney's  corps,  the  little  success  gained  on  the 
other  points  of  the  Passarge,  and  above  all  the 
rapid  concentration  of  the  French  army,  was 
soon  aware  that  a  more  decided  movement 
upon  Warsaw,  with  Napoleon  on  his  right 
flank,  could  not  lead  to  any  thing  but  disaster. 
He  determined,  therefore,  to  pause.  Having 
passed  the  7th  at  Guttstadt,  in  a  perplexity 
natural  under  such  serious  circumstances,  he 
determined  at  last  to  recross  the  Alle  and  pro- 
ceed to  Heilsberg,  for  the  purpose  of  occupy- 
ing the  defensive  position  which  he  had  long 
since  prepared  there  by  means  of  good  field- 
works.  On  the  7th,  at  night,  he  prescribed  to 
his  army  a  first  retrograde  movement  to  Quetz. 
On  the  8th,  apprized  of  the  march  of  most  of 
the  French  corps  for  Deppen,  he  was  confirmed 
in  his  resolution  to  retreat,  and  enjoined  all 
his  divisions  to  descend  the  Alle  and  to  pro- 
ceed to  Heilsberg.  That  part  of  his  troops 
which  had  advanced  further  between  Guttstadt 
and  Deppen,  was  to  slip  away  instantaneously, 
by  redrossing  the  Alle  forthwith  and  gaining 
Heilsberg  by  the  right  bank.  Four  bridges 
were  thrown  over  the  Alle  to  facilitate  this 
passage.  Prince  Bagration  was  charged  to 
cover  this  retreat  with  his  division  and  with  the 
Cossacks.  The  other  columns,  which  had  not 
proceeded  so  far  in  that  direction,  were  merely 
to  regain  the  position  of  Heilsberg  by  way  of 
Launau,  and  by  the  left  bank.  The  most  dis- 
tant of  the  Russian  columns,  that  of  General 
Kamenski,  which,  in  conjunction  with  the 
Prussians,  had  attacked  the  tele  du  pont  of 
Spanden,  was  ordered  to  retire  by  Mehlsack, 
so  that  it  would  have  to  traverse  the  base  of 
the  triangle  formed  by  Spanden,  Heilsherg  and 
Guttstadt.  It  left  the  Prussian  infantry  with 
General  Lestocq,  and  took  their  cavalry  only 
along  with  it.  General  Lestocq  was  to  fall 
back  in  rear  to  cover  Konigsberg,  with  great 
2  c  2 


306 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[June,  1807. 


danger  of  being  cut  off  from  the  Russian 
army ;  for,  following  the  sea-coast  while  Gene- 
ral Benningsen  followed  the  course  of  the 
Alle,  he  should  be  from  fifteen  to  eighteen 
leagues  distant  from  the  latter. 

In  the  night  of  the  8th,  the  Russian  army 
was  in  full  retreat  On  the  9th,  it  finished 
crossing  the  Passarge  about  Guttstadt,  when 
the  French  came  up.  A  considerable  portion 
of  our  troops  was  in  fact  collected  around 
Deppen.  Lannes,  starling  from  Marienburg, 
the  guard  from  Finkenstein,  Murat  from  Christ- 
burg,  and  all  arriving  at  Deppen  in  the  even- 
ing of  the  8lh,  formed,  with  Marshal  Key's 
corps,  a  mass  of  fifty  to  sixty  thousand  men. 
They  pressed  the  enemy  closely.  Murat's  ca- 
valry, swimming  across  the  Alle,  dashed  after 
Prince  Bagration.  The  Cossacks  showed  more 
mettle  than  usual,  kept  close  together  about 
the  Russian  infantry,  and  sustained,  bravely, 
for  partisans,  the  fire  of  our  light  artillery. 

Meanwhile,  Marshal  Soult,  crossing  by  Na- 
poleon's order  the  Passarge  at  Elditten,  fell  in 
with  General  Kamenski's  corps  near  Wolfs- 
dorf,  overturned  one  of  its  detachments,  and 
took  a  great  number  of  prisoners.  Marshal 
Davout,  rectified  in  his  direction,  since  the 
army,  instead  of  retiring,  was  marching  for- 
ward, drew  near  Guttstadt.  Napoleon  would 
have  there  at  hand  the  corps  of  Marshals  Da- 
vout, Ney,  Lannes,  Soult,  besides  the  guard 
and  Murat,  who  never  quitted  him,  and  like- 
wise Marshal  Mortier,  who  was  one  march  be- 
hind. This  formed  a  force  of  126,000  men,1 
exclusively  of  Bernadotte's  corps,  which  re- 
mained on  the  Lower  Passarge,  and  which  it 
was  necessary  to  leave  there  for  two  or  three 
days  to  watch  the  conduct  of  the  Prussians. 
But,  the  Prussians,  once  thrust  upon  the  rear 
by  our  forward  march,  Napoleon  could  draw 
in  to  him  the  corps  of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  and 
thus  have  at  his  disposal  150,000  combatants, 
being  deprived  of  Massena's  corps  alone,  which 
was  indispensable  upon  the  Narew.  General 
Benningsen, on  the  contrary,  separated  like  Na- 
poleon from  the  corps  left  on  the  Narew,  (18,000 
men,)  and  doomed,  in  descending  the  Alle,  to 
separate  himself  from  Lestocq,  (18,000  men,) 
would  have  to  face  Napoleon  with  the  central 
mass  of  his  forces  only,  that  is  to  say,  with 
about  100,000  men,  weakened  by  six  or  seven 
thousand  killed  and  wounded  left  at  the  foot  of 
our  intrenchments. 

The  plan  of  Napoleon  was  soon  decided 
upon,  for  that  plan  was  the  very  consequence 
of  all  that  he  had  foreseen,  willed,  and  prepared 
for  four  months  past.  In  fact  since,  by  the 
skilful  disposition  of  his  cantonments  between 
the  Passarge  and  the  Lower  Vistula,  by  the 
strong  occupation  of  Braunsberg,  Elbing,  and 
Marienburg,  and  by  the  taking  of  Dantzig,  he 
had  rendered  himself  invincible  on  his  left  and 
loward  the  sea,  he  had  left  no  other  course  for 


»  Davout 

Ney 

Lannes 

Soult 

The  Guard 

Murat 

Mortier 


•  30,000 

•  15,000 

•  15,000 

•  30,000 

•  8,000 

•  lb,000 

•  10,000 

126,000 


the  Russians  but  to  attack  his  right,  that  is  to 
say,  to  ascend  the  Alle,  in  order  to  threaten 
Warsaw.  Thenceforward  his  manoeuvre  was 
ready  chalked  out.  He  must,  in  his  turn,  push 
forward,  turn  the  enemy's  right,  separate  him 
from  Konigsberg,  throw  him  back  upon  the 
Pregel,  and  without  stopping,  occupy  by  a  de- 
tachment that  valuable  depot,  Konigsberg, 
where  the  Russians  had  shut  up  their  last  re- 
sources, and  whither  the  English  had  sent  the 
succours  promised  to  the  coalition.  The  more 
Russians  he  should  find  entangled  on  the  upper 
course  of  the  Alle,  the  greater  must  be  the  re- 
sult of  that  manoeuvre.  They  had  indeed  just 
stopped  abruptly  for  the  purpose  of  re-descend- 
ing the  Alle  by  the  right  bank.  But  Napoleon 
was  about  to  descend  it  after  them  by  the  left 
bank,  with  nearly  a  certainty  of  beating  them 
in  speed,  of  arriving  as  soon  as  they  at  the 
ccnflux  of  the  Alle  and  the  Pregel,  and  of  in- 
flicting upon  them  by  the  way  some  great  dis- 
aster, if  they  attempted  to  pass  that  river  be- 
fore him,  in  order  to  march  to  the  rescue  of 
Konigsberg. 

Views  so  long  and  so  deeply  reflected  upon 
must  very  quickly  transmute  themselves  into 
formal  dispositions,  and  without  the  loss  of  a 
single  moment  for  deliberation.  So  early  as 
the  9th,  Napoleon  ordered  Marshal  Davoul  to 
join  the  right  of  the  army  immediately,  Mar- 
shal Ney  to  rest  for  a  day  at  Guttstadt  from 
his  severe  combats,  and  then  to  rejoin  Mar- 
shal Soult,  who  was  a  little  to  the  left,  near 
Launau,  to  march  along  the  Alle  to  Heilsberg, 
preceded  and  followed  by  Murat's  cavalry, 
Marshal  Lannes  to  accompany  Marshal  Soult, 
lastly,  Marshal  Mortier  to  quicken  his  pace 
and  form  his  junction  with  the  bulk  of  the 
army.  He  himself,  with  the  guard,  followed 
this  movement,  and  prescribed  to  Marshal 
Bernadotte's  corps,  commanded  temporarily 
by  General  Victor,  to  concentrate  itself  on 
the  Lower  Passarge,  for  the  purpose  of  pro- 
ceeding beyond  it,  as  soon  as  the  designs  of 
the  enemy  on  our  left  should  be  more  clearly 
indicated. 

Accordingly,  on  the  10th  of  June,  the  army 
marched  on  the  right  bank  of  the  Alle  for 
Heilsberg.  It  was  obliged  to  cross  a  defile, 
near  a  village  called  Beverniken.  Here  it 
found  a  strong  rear-guard,  which  was  soon  re- 
pulsed, and  debouched  from  it  in  sight  of  the 
positions  occupied  by  the  Russian  army. 

After  so  many  presumptuous  demonstra- 
tions, the  enemy's  general  could  not  but  feel  a 
temptation  not  to  run  away  so  swiftly,  but  to 
stop  and  fight,  especially  in  a  position  where 
a  great  many  precautions  had  been  taken  tc 
render  the  chances  of  a  great  battle  less  dis- 
advantageous. But  it  was  far  from  wise,  for 
time  became  precious,  if  he  wished  not  to  be 
cut  off  from  Konigsberg.  Pride,  nevertheless, 
drowning  the  voice  of  reason,  General  Ben- 
ningsen resolved  to  wait  before  Heilsberg  for 
the  French  army. 

Heilsberg  is  situated  on  the  heights  between 
which  runs  the  river  Alle.  Numerous  re- 
doubts had  been  erected  on  those  heights. 
They  were  occupied  by  the  Russian  army, 
parted  in  two  by  the  Alle.  This  very  serious 
inconvenience  was  redeemed  by  four  bridges 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


307 


constructed  in  well-sheltered  nooks,  and  allow- 
ing troops  to  be  moved  from  one  shore  to  the 
other.     As,  according  to  all  indications,  the 
French  would  come  along  the  left  bank,  the 
greater  part  of  the  Russian  troops  had  been  con- 
centrated on  that  side.     In  the  redoubts  of  the 
right  bank,  General  Benningsen  had  left  only 
the  imperial  guard  and  Bagration's  division, 
fatigued  with  the  actions  fought  on  the  pre- 
ceding days.     Batteries  had  been  disposed  to 
fire  from  one  bank  to  the  other.     On  the  left 
bank,  by  which  we  were  to  attack,  was  seen 
the  bulk  of  the  enemy's  army,  under  the  pro- 
tection of  three  redoubts  bristling  with  artil- 
lery.    General  Kamenski,  who  had  joined  on 
the   10th,   defended  these  redoubts.     Behind, 
and  a  little  above,  the  Russian  infantry  was 
drawn  up  in  two  lines.    The  first  and  third 
battalion  of  each  regiment,  entirely  deployed, 
composed  the  first  line.    The  second  battalion 
formed  in  column  behind  the  former,  and  in 
their  intervals,  composed  the  second.   Twelve 
battalions,  placed  a  little  farther  off,  were  des- 
tined for  a  reserve.     On  the  prolongation  of 
this  line  of  battle,  and  forming  a  hook  to  the 
right  behind,  was  the  whole  of  the  Russian 
cavalry,  reinforced  by  the  Prussian  cavalry, 
and  constituting  a  mass  of  squadrons  beyond 
all  the  usual  proportions.    Lastly,  still  further 
on  the  right,  towards  Konegen,  the  Cossacks 
were  on  the  watch.     Detachments  of  light  in- 
fantry occupied  some  patches   of  wood  sprin- 
kled here  and  there  in  front  of  the  position. 
Thus  the  French  coming  to  Heilsberg  had  to 
sustain  in  flank  the  fire  of  the  redoubts  of  the 
right  bank,  in  front  the  fire  of  the  redoubts  of 
the  left  bank,  besides  the  attacks  of  a  nume- 
rous infantry,  and  the  charges  of  a  still  more 
numerous  cavalry.     But,  impelled  by  the  ar- 
dour of  success,  persuaded  that  the   enemy 
was  thinking  only  of  flight,  and  eager  to  wrest 
from  him  some  trophies  before  he  had  time 
to  escape,  they  took  no  account  either  of  num- 
ber or  of  positions.    This  spirit  was  universal 
among  the  soldiers  as  well  as  the  generals. 
Napoleon  not  being  yet  on  the  spot  to  repress 
their  ardour,  Prince  Murat  and  Marshal  Soult, 
on  debouching  upon  Heilsberg,  attacked  the 
Russians  before  they  were  followed   by  the 
rest  of  the  army.     Prince  Bagration,  placed  at 
first  on  the  right  bank,  was  rapidly  transferred 
to  the  left  bank,  to  defend  the  defile  of  Bever- 
niken,  and  General  Benningsen  had  ordered 
General  Ouwaroff  to  support  him  with  twenty- 
five  squadrons.    Marshal  Soult,  having  forced 
the  defile,  had  taken  care  to  place  thirty-six 
pieces  of  cannon  in  battery,  which  had  greatly 
facilitated  the  deploying  of  his  troops.    Carra- 
St.  Cyr's  division  first  advanced  in  column  by 
brigades,  and  flung  back  the  Russian  infantry 
beyond  a  ravine,  descending  from  the  village 
of  Lawden,  to  the  Alle.     Under  favour  of  this 
movement,  Murat's  cavalry  was  enabled   to 
deploy;   but,  harassed  by  fatigue,  not  being 
yet  entirely  assembled,   and  attacked   at  the 
moment  when  it  was  forming  by  the  twenty- 
five  squadrons  of  General  Ouwaroff,  it  los 
ground,  ran  to  the  rear  to  form  anew,  again 
charged,  and  regained  the  advantage.     Carra- 
St.  Cyr's  division  bordered  the  ravine  beyond 
which  it  had  flung  the  Russians.    Cannonaded 


n  front  by  the  redoubts  of  the  left  bank,  in 
lank  by  those  of  the  right  bank,  it  had  suf- 
>red  severely.  St.  Hilaire's  division  came  to 
upply  its  place  in  the  fire,  passing  in  close 
columns  through  the  intervals  of  our  line  of 
>attle.  That  brave  division  of  St.  Hilaire's 
passed  the  ravine,  drove  back  the  Russians, 
and  followed  them  to  the  foot  of  the  three  re- 
doubts which  covered  their  centre,  while  Mu- 
rat's cavalry  fell  upon  the  cavalry  of  Prince 
Bagration,  cut  it  in  pieces,  and  killed  General 
Soring.  During  these  transactions,  Legrand's 
division,  the  third  of  Marshal  Soult's,  had  ar- 
rived and  taken  position  on  our  left,  before 
the  village  of  Lawden.  It  had  driven  the 
nemy's  tirailleurs  from  the  patches  of  wood 
situated  between  the  two  armies,  and  it  too 
had  reached  the  foot  of  the  redoubts  which 
onstituted  the  strength  of  the  Russians. 
General  Legrand  then  detached  the  26th  light 
to  attack  that  of  the  three  redoubts  which  was 
within  his  reach.  That  gallant  regiment 
dashed  off  at  a  run,  carried  the  redoubt  in 
spite  of  General  Kamenski's  troops,  and  kept 
possession  of  it,  after  an  obstinate  fight.  But 
the  officer  who  commanded  the  enemy's  artil- 
lery, having  had  his  guns  drawn  off  at  a  gal- 
lop, quickly  removed  them  to  the  rear,  to  a 
spot  which  commanded  the  redoubt,  and  co- 
vered the  26th  with  grape,  which  made  pro- 
digious havoc.  At  the  same  moment,  the 
Russian  General  Warneck,  perceiving  the  bad 
plight  of  the  26th,  rushed  upon  it  at  the  head 
of  the  Kaluga  regiment,  and  retook  the  re- 
doubt. The  55th,  which  formed  the  left  of  St. 
Hilaire's  division,  and  was  next  neighbour  to 
the  26th,  came  to  its  assistance,  but  could  not 
mend  matters.  It  was  obliged  to  rejoin  its  di 
vision  after  losing  its  eagle.  Our  soldiers  re 
mained  thus  exposed  to  the  fire  of  a  numerous 
and  powerful  artillery  without  flinching.  Ge- 
neral Benningsen  then  resolved  to  employ  his 
immense  cavalry,  and  had  several  charges 
made  upon  Legrand's  and  St.  Hilaire's  divi- 
sions. They  sustained  those  charges  with 
admirable  coolness,  and  gave  the  French  ca- 
valry time  to  form  behind  them,  and  in  its 
turn  to  charge  the  Russian  squadrons.  Mar- 
shal Soult,  placed  in  the  middle  of  one  of  the 
squares,  in  which  were  mixed,  pell-mell, 
French  and  Russians,  foot  soldiers  and  dis- 
mounted horse,  kept  all  to  their  duty  by  the 
energy  of  his  attitude.  Napoleon,  who  was 
still  at  a  distance  from  the  theatre  of  this  ac- 
tion, as  soon  as  he  heard  the  guns,  had  given 
General  Savary  the  young  fusiliers  of  the 
guard,  to  go  to  the  assistance  of  the  corps 
which  had  rashly  engaged.  General  Savary, 
hastening  up,  took  position  between  St.  Hi- 
laire's and  Legrand's  divisions.  Formed  into 
square,  he  sustained  for  a  long  time  the 
charges  of  the  Russian  cavalry,  which  a  ter- 
rible fire  from  the  redoubts  would  have  ren- 
dered dangerous,  if  our  troops  had  been  less 
firm,  and  not  had  such  excellent  officers.  The 
brave  General  Roussel,  who  was,  sword  in 
hand,  amidst  the  fusiliers  of  the  guard,  had 
his  head  carried  off  by  a  cannon  ball.  This 
imprudent  action,  in  which  30,000  unsheltered 
j  French  were  opposed  to  90,000  Russians  pro- 
i  tected  by  redoubts,  was  kept  up  till  the  nigh* 


308 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[June,  1807. 


was  far  advanced.  At  length  Marshal  Lan- 
ces appeared  at  the  extreme  right,  strove  to 
•earn  something  of  the  enemy's  position,  but 
would  not  attempt  any  enterprise  without 
orders  from  the  Emperor.  The  booming  of 
the  guns  soon  ceased;  the  night  was  rainy, 
and  each,  stretching  himself  on  the  ground, 
sought  to  get  a  little  rest  The  Russians,  more 
numerous  and  close  than  we,  had  sustained 
a  loss  far  superior  to  ours.  They  numbered 
3000  killed,  and  seven  or  eight  thousand 
wounded.  We  had  2000  killed,  and  5000 
wounded. 

Napoleon,  arriving  late,  because  he  had  not 
supposed  that  the  enemy  would  pause  so  soon 
to  resist  him,  was  highly  pleased  with  the  en- 
ergy of  his  troops,  but  far  less  with  their  ea- 
gerness for  fighting,  and  resolved  to  wait  till 
the  morrow  to  give  battle  with  his  collected 
forces,  if  the  Russians  should  persist  in  de- 
fending the  position  of  Heilsberg,  or  to  pursue 
them  to  the  utmost  if  they  should  decamp. 
He  bivouacked  with  his  soldiers  on  the  field 
of  carnage,  where  lay  18,000  Russians  and 
French,  dead,  dying,  and  wounded. 

General  Benningsen,  a  prey  to  acute  pain 
and  to  great  perplexities,1  passed  the  night  at 
the  bivouac,  wrapped  in  his  cloak.  It  requires 
a  strong  mind  to  defy  at  once  physical  pain 
and  moral  pain.  General  Benningsen  was  ca- 
pable of  enduring  both.  Divided  between  the 
satisfaction  of  having  made  head  against  the 
French,  and  the  fear  of  having  them  all  upon 
his  hands  on  the  morrow,  he  waited  for  day- 
light before  he  decided  what  course  to  pursue. 
Our  troops,  on  their  part,  were  astir  by  four 
o'clock  in  the  morning,  picking  up  the  wound- 
ed, and  exchanging  musket-shots  with  the 
enemy's  advanced  posts.  Our  carps  d'armee 
successively  took  their  positions.  Marshal 
Lannes  had  placed  himself  the  evening  be- 
fore on  the  left  of  Marshal  Soult;  the  corps 
of  Marshal  Davout  began  to  show  itself  on  the 
left  of  Marshal  Lannes,  towards  Grossendorf; 
the  guard,  foot  and  horse,  deployed  on  the 
heights  in  rear;  and  every  thing  denoted  a  de- 
cisive attack  with  formidable  masses.  This 
sight,  and  particularly  the  appearance  of  the 
corps  of  Marshal  Davout,  which  turned  at 
Grossendorf  the  Russian  army,  and  which 
even  seemed  to  be  taking  the  direction  of  K5- 
nigsberg,  determined  General  Benningsen  to 
retreat.  He  was  unwilling  to  lose  at  once  a 
day  and  a  battle,  and  to  run  the  risk  of  arriv- 
ing perhaps  too  late,  perhaps  half  destroyed, 
to  the  relief  of  Konigsberg.  General  Kamen- 
ski  was  to  start  first,  in  order  to  gain  in  time 
the  Konigsberg  road,  and  to  join  the  Prussians, 
with  whom  he  was  accustomed  to  fight.  Hav- 
ing withdrawn  from  Heilsberg  all  that  could 
he  removed,  General  Benningsen  marched 
himself  with  his  army  by  the  right  bank  of  the 
Alle,  in  the  course  of  the  i ,  th.  He  proceeded 
in  four  columns  for  Bortenstein,  the  first  post 
beyond  Heilsberg.  His  head-quarters  had 
long  been  fixed  there.  Napoleon  spent  part 
of  the  day  in  observing  that  position,  and,  if 
be  did  not  exert  his  usual  promptness  in  at- 


•  I'lotho.   the   Russian   historian,  says  that  Genera! 
--        was  afflicted  with  the  stone. 


tacking,  it  was  because  he  had  no  great  incli- 
nation to  give  battle  on  such  ground,  and  had 
no  doubt  that,  by  pushing  forward  his  left,  he 
should  oblige  the  Russian  army  to  decamp  by 
a  mere  demonstration.  Things  having  turned 
out  as  he  had  foreseen,  he  entered  Heilsberg 
the  same  evening,  and  established  himself 
there  with  his  guard.  He  found  in  the  town 
considerable  magazines,  many  Russian  wound- 
ed, to  whom  he  desired  the  same  attention  to 
be  paid  as  to  the  wounded  French,  and  whose 
number  attested  that  the  enemy's  army  had 
lost  on  the  preceding  day  from  ten  to  eleven 
thousand  men. 

The  battle  of  Heilsberg  could  not  make  any 
change  in  the  plans  of  Napoleon.  What  he 
had  to  do  was  still  to  tend  to  turn  the  Russians, 
to  cut  them  off  from  Konigsberg,  and  to  take 
advantage  of  the  first  false  movement  they 
should  make  to  get  at  that  important  place, 
which  was  the  base  of  their  operation.  They 
had  not  presented  themselves  to  him  this  time 
in  a  situation  that  permitted  him  to  crush 
them,  but  the  favourable  opportunity  for  which 
he  was  waiting  could  not  fail  to  occur  soon. 
For  its  failure  there  could  have  been  required 
nothing  less  than  that  General  Benningsen,  in 
the  difficult  position  in  which  he  was  placed, 
should  not  commit  a  fault. 

In  order  the  better  to  attain  his  aim,  Napo- 
leon somewhat  modified  his  march.  On  pass- 
ing Heilsberg,  indeed  on  passing  Launau,  the 
Alle  turns  to  the  right,  making  a  thousand 
windings,  and  forming  a  very  long  route — if 
you  choose  to  follow  its  course,  a  route  which, 
moreover,  carries  you  away  from  the  sea  and 
from  Konigsberg.  General  Benningsen  stand- 
ing in  need  of  the  Alle  to  appuy  himself  upon 
it,  was  certainly  obliged  to  follow  its  windings. 
Napoleon,  on  the  contrary,  who  wanted  only 
to  find  his  enemy  deprived  of  appui,  and  who 
had  especial  occasion  to  take  an  intermediate 
position  between  Konigsberg  and  the  Alle, 
whence  he  could  send  a  detachment  to  KOnigs- 
berg,  without  being  at  too  great  a  distance 
from  that  detachment,  could  leave  the  banks 
of  the  Alle  without  inconvenience,  nay,  even 
with  advantage.  In  consequence,  he  resolved 
to  strike  into  an  intermediate  route,  which  he 
had  travelled  in  the  preceding  winter,  that 
from  Landsberg  to  Eylau,  which  runs  in  a  di- 
rect line  with  the  Pregel.  On  coming  into 
this  road,  beyond  Eylau,  that  is  to  say,  at  Dom- 
nau,  you  find  yourself  two  marches  from  Ko- 
nigsberg on  the  left,  and  on  the  right  one 
march  only  from  the  Alle  and  the  town  of 
Friedland,  because  the  Alle,  turning  westward 
again  after  numerous  windings,  is  nearer  at 
Friedland  to  Konigsberg  than  in  any  part  of  its 
course.  It  was  there  that,  with  good  luck  and 
skill,  one  must  have  the  best  chances  of  taking 
Konigsberg  with  one  hand,  and  striking  the 
Russian  army  with  the  other. 

With  this  idea,  Napoleon  despatched  Murat 
with  part  of  the  cavalry  to  Landsberg.  He 
sent  after  him  the  corps  of  Marshals  Soult  and 
Davout,  destined  to  form  the  left  wing  of  the 
army,  and  to  extend  themselves  to  Kiinigsherg, 
or  to  fall  back  upon  the  centre,  if  they  were 
wanted  for  fighting  a  battle.  Napoleon  left 
upon  the  Alle  the  rest  of  his  cavalry,  com- 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


309 


posed  of  chasseurs,  hussars,  and  dragoons,  for 
the  purpose  of  beating  the  banks  of  that  river 
and  closely  pursuing  the  enemy.  He  sent 
through  Landsberg  for  Eylau  the  corps  of 
Lannes,  which  he  had  at  hand,  that  of  Ney, 
which  had  stopped  a  day  at  Guttstadt  to  rest 
itself,  that  of  Mortier,  still  one  march  behind- 
hand, and  made  them  advance  each  by  a  dif- 
ferent track,  to  avoid  encumbering,  but  so  as 
io  be  able  to  collect  them  in  a  few  hours. — 
Lastly,  the  Prussians,  retreating  towards  Ko- 
nigsberg,  no  longer  deserving  any  attention, 
Bernadotte's  corps,  left  provisionally  on  the 
Lower  Passarge,  had  orders  to  rejoin  the  army 
immediately  by  Mehlsack  and  Eylau. 

These  dispositions,  and  many  others  relative 
to  the  magazines,  the  ovens,  the  hospitals 
which  he  purposed  to  organize  at  Heilsberg, 
to  the  rich  supplies  of  Dantzig,  which  he  never 
ceased  to  watch  over,  to  the  navigation  of  the 
Frische-Haff,  of  which  he  took  care  to  possess 
himself,  by  closing  the  path  of  Pillau,  and  by 
making  the  seamen  of  the  guard  cruise  there 
in  shipping  of  the  country — these  dispositions 
detained  Napoleon  at  Heilsberg  the  whole  of 
the  12th.  During  this  interval,  his  corps  were 
marching,  and  it  would  be  easy  for  him  to 
overtake  them  on  horseback  in  a  few  hours. 

On  the  morning  of  the  13th,  Napoleon  him- 
self repaired  to  Eylau.  It  was  no  longer  that 
Tast  snow-clad,  dull  and  dreary-looking  plain, 
which  had  been  drenched  with  so  much  blood 
on  the  8th  of  February;  it  was  a  fertile  and 
smiling  country,  covered  with  green  woods 
and  beautiful  lakes,  and  studded  with  nume- 
rous villages.  The  cavalry  and  the  artillery 
discovered  with  astonishment  that,in  the  great 
battle  of  Eylau,  they  had  galloped  on  the  sur- 
face of  the  lakes  then  completely  frozen.  The 
indications  collected  respecting  the  march  of 
General  Benningsen  were  as  uncertain  as  the 
plans  of  that  general.  On  the  one  hand,  the 
light  cavalry  had  followed  the  main  body  of 
the  Russian  army  along  the  Alle,  had  seen  it 
between  Bartenstein  and  Schippenbeil  ;  on  the 
other,  it  had  been  imagined  that  detachments 
of  the  enemy  had  been  perceived  going  to- 
wards Konigsberg,  and  designing,  according 
to  all  appearances,  to  join  General  Lestocq,  in 
order  to  defend  that  city.  From  the  whole  of 
these  indications  it  could  not  but  be  concluded 
that  the  Russian  army  was  inclined  to  proceed 
to  Kiinigsberg,  that  for  this  purpose  it  would 
quit  the  Alle,  and  that  in  this  movement  the 
French  would  meet  with  it  at  Domnau.  Na- 
poleon then  pushed  Marshals  Soult  and  Murat 
with  half  the  cavalry  upon  Kreuzburg,  and 
ordered  them  to  march  to  Konigsberg  and 
make  a  sudden  attack  on  it.  He  sent  after 
them  Marshal  Davout,  who  was  to  take  an  in- 
termediate position,  so  as  to  join  in  a  few 
hours  either  Marshal  Soult  or  the  main  body 
of  the  army  according  to  circumstances.  He 
immediately  despatched  Marshal  Lannes  from 
Eyiau  for  Domnau,  joined  with  him  part  of 
the  cavalry  and  of  Grouchy's  dragoons,  with 
orders  to  send  parties  as  far  as  Fricdland,  to 
learn  what  the  enemy  was  about,  to  ascertain 
if  he  was  or  was  not  quitting  the  Alle,  if  he 
was  or  was  not  going  to  the  assistance  of  Ko- 
nigsberg. Marshal  Mortier,  who  had  arrived 


at  Eylau,  was  sent  off  immediately  for  Dora 
nau,  and  would  arrive  there  a  few  hours  after 
Marshal  Lannes.  Marshal  Ney,  with  his  corps, 
General  Victor,  with  Bernadotte's,  were  at  that 
moment  entering  Eylau.  Before  he  would 
direct  them  either.upon  Domnau  or  after  Mar- 
shals Lannes  and  Mortier,  or  upon  Kiinigsberg 
after  Marshals  Davout  and  Soult,  Napoleon 
waited  till  further  reports  of  the  cavalry 
should  throw  a  light  on  the  real  march  of  the 
enemy. 

In  the  evening  of  the  13th,  the  reconnois- 
sances  of  the  day  left  no  further  doubt  that 
General  Benningsen  had  descended  the  Alle, 
and  appeared  to  be  taking  the  road  to  Fried- 
land,  either  to  continue  his  march  along  the 
Alle,  or  to  leave  there  the  banks  of  that  river, 
in  order  to  gain  Kiinigsberg.  It  was  at  Fried- 
land,  in  fact,  that  he  was  likely  to  be  tempted 
to  quit  the  Alle,  because  it  is  the  point  where 
that  river  approaches  nearest  to  Konigsberg. 
Napoleon  hesitated  not  a  moment  longer.  He 
despatched  towards  Lannes  and  Mortier  all 
that  part  of  the  cavalry  which  had  not  fol- 
lowed Murat.  and  gave  the  command  of  it  to 
General  Grouchy.  He  enjoined  Lannes  and 
Mortier  to  proceed  to  Friedland,  to  make  them- 
selves masters  of  that  town  if  they  could,  and 
of  the  bridges  of  the  Alle.  He  ordered  Ney 
and  Victor  to  advance  upon  Domnau,  to  follow 
Lannes  and  Mortier  at  a  greater  or  less  dis- 
tance from  Friedland,  according  to  circum- 
stances. He  then  marched  ofl'  his  guard,  and 
resolved  to  start  himself  on  horseback  at  day- 
break, to  be  on  the  morrow,  the  14th  of  June, 
at  the  head  of  his  assembled  troops.  That 
day,  the  14th  of  June,  the  anniversary  of  the 
battle  of  Marengo,  reminding  him  of  the  most 
glorious  day  of  his  life,  filled  him  with  a  secret 
and  joyful  presentiment.  He  had  not  ceased 
to  believe  in  his  good  fortune,  and  that  belief 
was  still  well  founded. 

Lannes,  arriving  at  Domnau  a  few  hours 
before  Marshal  Mortier,  had  forthwith  sent  the 
9th  hussars  on  reconnoissance  to  Friedland. 
That  regiment  had  penetrated  into  Friedland, 
but,  presently  attacked  by  more  than  thirty 
enemy's  squadrons,  which  brought  with  them 
a  great  quantity  of  light  artillery,  it  had  been 
very  roughly  handled  and  obliged  to  flee  to 
Georgenau,  an  intermediate  post  between 
Domnau  and  Friedland.  On  this  intelligence, 
Lannes  despatched  the  light  horse  and  the 
Saxon  cuirassiers  to  the  assistance  of  the  9th 
hussars,  then  set  himself  in  march  for  Fried- 
land,  to  fling  back  the  enemy's  cavalry  beyond 
the  Alle,  and  to  close  the  outlet  by  which  it 
seemed  to  be  the  intention  of  the  Russian  army 
to  proceed  to  the  succour  of  Konigsberg.  He 
arrived  there  about  one  in  the  morning  of  the 
14th,  and,  perceiving,  as  he  thought,  a  consi- 
derable quantity  of  troops  amidst  the  darkness 
of  the  night,  he  stopped  at  Posthenen,  after 
dislodging  a  detachment  of  the  enemy  that  was 
guarding  that  village.  He  was  not  strong 
enough  to  occupy  the  town  of  Friedland  itself 
— a  very  fortunate  circumstance,  for,  by  occu- 
pying it  he  would  have  prevented  an  egregious 
blunder  of  General  Benningsen's,  and  snatched 
from  Napoleon  one  of  his  most  splendid  tri- 
umphs. 


310 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[June,  1807. 


At  this  moment,  in  fact,  the  whole  Russian 
army  was  approaching  Friedland,  preceded  by 
thirty-three  squadrons,  eighteen  of  them  be- 
longing to  the  imperial  guard,  by  the  infantry 
of  that  guard,  and  by  twenty  pieces  of  light 
artillery.  The  main  body  of  the  army  was  to 
enter  in  a  few  hours.  General  Benningsen, 
aware  that  there  was  no  time  to  be  lost  if  he 
would  save  Konigsberg,  or  at  least  save  him- 
self behind  the  Pregel,  had  marched  the  whole 
night  between  the  llth  and  the  12th,  in  order 
to  reach  Bartenstein,  given  a  few  hours'  rest 
there  to  his  soldiers,  resumed  his  march  for 
Schippenbeil,  arrived  there  on  the  13th,  and, 
learning  that  the  French  had  appeared  at 
Domnau,  had  hastened  to  reach  Friedland,  the 
point  where  the  Alle,  as  we  have  just  observed, 
approaches  nearer  to  Konigsberg  than  in  any 
other  part  of  its  course.  He  had  taken  care 
to  send  before  him  a  strong  advanced  guard 
of  cavalry. 

Lannes,  established  at  Posthenen,  could  not 
appreciate  before  daylight  the  importance  of 
the  event  that  was  preparing.  In  a  country 
so  near  the  pole,  twilight,  in  the  month  of  June, 
commences  at  two  in  the  morning.  It  was 
quite  light  by  three  o'clock.  Marshal  Lannes 
soon  distinguished  the  nature  of  the  ground, 
the  troops  which  occupied  it,  and  those  which 
were  crossing  the  bridges  of  the  Alle,  for  the 
purpose  of  disputing  with  us  the  road  to  Ko- 
nigsberg. 

The  course  of  the  Alle,  near  the  spot  where 
the  two  armies  were  about  to  meet,  exhibits 
numerous  windings.  We  arrived  by  woody 
hills,  beyond  which  the  ground  gradually  sinks 
to  the  bank  of  the  Alle.  The  ground  at  this 
season  is  covered  with  rye  of  great  height. 
The  Alle  was  seen  on  our  right,  pursuing  its 
way  through  the  plain  in  many  meanders,  then 
turning  round  Friedland,  coming  to  our  left, 
and  thus  forming  an  elbow  open  on  our  side, 
and  the  further  end  of  which  was  occupied  by 
the  town  of  Friedland.  It  was  by  the  bridges 
of  Friedland,  placed  in  this  elbow  of  the  Alle, 
that  the  Russians  came  to  deploy  in  the  plain 
opposite  to  us.  They  were  seen  distinctly 
hurrying  across  the  bridges,  passing  through 
the  town,  debouching  from  the  suburbs,  and 
drawing  up  in  line  of  battle  facing  the  heights. 
A  rivulet  called  the  Mill  Stream,  running  to- 
wards Friedland,  there  formed  a  small  pond, 
then  threw  itself  into  the  Alle,  after  dividing 
that  plain  into  two  unequal  halves.  The  half 
situated  on  our  left  was  the  less  extensive  of 
the  two.  It  was  that  on  which  Friedland  was 
seated,  between  the  Mill  Stream  and  the  Alle, 
at  the  very  corner  of  the  elbow  which  we  have 
just  described. 

Marshal  Lannes,  in  his  haste  to  march,  had 
brought  with  him  only  Oudinot's  voltigeurs 
and  grenadiers,  the  9th  hussars,  Grouchy's 
dragoons,  and  two  regiments  of  Saxon  cavalry. 
He  could  not  oppose  more  than  10,000  men1  to 
the  enemy's  advanced  guard,  which,  succes- 
sively reinforced,  was  treble  that  number,  and 
was  soon  to  be  followed  by  the  whole  Russian 
army.  Fortunately,  the  soil  afforded  numerous 


Oudinot,  7000;    Grouchy,  1800;    9th  hussars,   light 
torse,  and  Sajjof.  cuirassier"*,  1200:  total,  10,000. 


resources  to  the  skill  and  courage  of  the  illus- 
trious marshal.  In  the  centre  of  the  position 
which  it  was  necessary  to  occupy  in  order  to 
bar  the  way  against  the  Russians,  was  a  vil- 
lage, that  of  Posthenen,  through  which  ran  the 
Mill  Stream  to  pursue  its  course  to  Friedland. 
Somewhat  in  rear  rose  a  plateau,  from  which 
the  plain  of  the  Alle  might  be  battered.  Lannes 
placed  his  artillery  there,  and  several  battalions 
of  grenadiers  to  protect  it  On  the  right,  a 
thick  wood,  that  of  Sortlack,  protruded  in  a 
salient,  and  divided  into  two  the  space  com- 
prised between  the  village  of  Posthenen  and 
the  banks  of  the  Alle.  There  Lannes  posted 
two  battalions  of  voltigeurs,  which,  dispersed 
as  tirailleurs",  would  be  able  to  stop  for  a 
long  time  troops  not  numerous  and  not  very 
resolute.  The  9th  hussars,  Grouchy's  dra- 
goons, the  Saxon  cavalry,  amounted  to  3000 
horse,  ready  to  fall  upon  any  column  which 
should  attempt  to  penetrate  that  curtain  of 
tirailleurs.  On  the  left  of  Posthenen,  the  line 
of  woody  heights  extended,  gradually  lowering 
to  the  village  of  Heinrichsdorf,  through  which 
ran  the  high  road  from  Friedland  to  Konigs- 
berg. This  point  was  of  great  importance,  for 
the  Russians,  desirous  to  reach  Konigsberg, 
would  of  course  obstinately  dispute  the  road 
thither.  Besides,  this  part  of  the  field  of  battle 
being  more  open,  was  naturally  more  difficult 
to  defend.  Lannes,  who  had  not  yet  troops 
sufficient  to  establish  himself  there,  had  placed 
on  his  left,  taking  advantage  of  the  woods  and 
heights,  the  rest  of  his  battalions,  thus  ap- 
proaching the  houses  of  Heinrichsdorf  with- 
out being  able  to  occupy  them. 

The  fire,  commenced  at  three  in  the  morn- 
ing, became  all  at  once  extremely  brisk.  Our 
artillery,  placed  on  the  plateau  of  Posthenen, 
under  the  protection  of  Oudinot's  grenadiers, 
kept  the  Russians  at  a  distance,  and  made  con- 
siderable havoc  among  them.  On  the  right, 
our  voltigeurs,  scattered  on  the  skirt  of  the 
wood  of  Sortlack,  stopped  their  infantry  by  an 
incessant  tirailleur  fire ;  and  the  Saxon  horse, 
directed  by  General  Grouchy,  had  made  several 
successful  charges  against  their  cavalry.  The 
Russians  having  become  threatening  towards 
Heinrichsdorf,  General  Grouchy,  moving  from 
the  right  to  the  left,  galloped  thither,  to  dispute 
with  them  the  Konigsberg  road,  the  important 
point  for  the  possession  of  which  torrents  of 
blood  were  about  to  be  spilt. 

Though,  in  these  first  moments,  Marshal 
Lannes  had  but  10,000  men  to  oppose  twenty- 
five  or  thirty  thousand,  he  maintained  his 
round,  thanks  to  great  skill  and  energy,  and 
also  to  the  able  concurrence  of  General  Oudi- 
not, commanding  the  grenadiers,  and  of  Gene- 
ral Grouchy,  commanding  the  cavalry.  But 
the  enemy  reinforced  himself  from  hour  to 
hour,  and  General  Benningsen,  on  arriving  at 
Friedland,  had  suddenly  formed  the  resolution 
to  give  battle — a  very  rash  resolution,  for  it 
would  have  been  much  wiser  for  him  to  con- 
tinue to  descend  the  Alle  to  the  junction  of 
that  river  with  the  Pregel,  and  to  take  a  posi- 
tion behind  the  latter,  with  his  left  to  Wehlau 
his  right  to  Konigsberg.  It  would  have  taken 
him,  it  is  true,  another  day  to  reach  Konigs- 
berg ;  but  he  would  not  have  risked  a  battle 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


311 


against  an  army  superior  in  number,  in  qua-    some  detachments  sent  to  Wehlau  to  guard  th 
litv,  better  officered,  and  in  a  very  unfavourable    bridges  of  the  Alle.  still  amounted  to  seventy 


r  losi: 


and  i.  <-d  iha« 

a  detach' 

the  French  army,  an'! 
for  hi 

this  was  ;i 

by  F>  . 

of  his-  hands. 

In  c 
three 
-andtw 


I 
w*ed  at  ihe  l^. : 

n«  *  i  for  h* 

•aeral 
'  h<-f»vv  c/i 


ui.der 

draw; 

others. 

Uiem. 

ally  narrou 
angle 


The  cavi 

Genera!  K 
been  t: 
migVi 
the  two  wi., 

had  b« 

.-•.k.  to  collect  the 


' 
e  Mill  Stream  a:: 

up  in  two  lineb  but 
in  account  of  the  w; 
i   commanded 
•T'\  was   there,  - 

D 

.ween 


. 

lions  of  g i  Anadir 


two  mousana  men  anei   ntrusoeig,  sejmraieu 
at  this  time  from  Kamenski's  corps  and  from 


26.50« 


312 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[June,  1807. 


first  been  drawn  up  to  the  left  of  Posthenen. 
Lannes  drew  them  nearer  to  him,  and  could 
oppose  their  closer  ranks  to  the  attacks  of  the 
Russians,  either  before  Posthenen  or  before  the 
wood  of  Sortlack.  General  Oudinot,  who  com- 
manded them,  taking  advantage  of  all  the  ac- 
cidents of  ground,  sometimes  from  clumps  of 
wood  scattered  here  and  there,  sometimes  from 
pools  of  water,  produced  by  the  rains  of  the 
preceding  days,  sometimes  from  above  the 
corn,  disputed  the  ground  with  equal  skill  and 
energy.  By  turns  he  hid  or  exhibited  his  sol- 
diers, dispersed  them  as  tirailleurs,  or  exposed 
them  in  a  mass,  bristling  with  bayonets,  to  all 
the  efforts  of  the  Russians.  Those  brave  gre- 
na^iers,  notwithstanding  their  inferiority  in 
number,  kept  up  the  fight,  supported  by  their 
general,  when,  luckily  for  them,  Verdier's  divi- 
sion arrived.  Marshal  Lannes  divided  it  into 
two  movable  columns,  to  be  sent  alternately 
to  the  right,  to  the  centre,  to  the  left,  wherever 
the  danger  was  most  pressing.  It  was  the  skirt 
of  the  wood  of  Sortlack  and  the  village  of  the 
same  name,  situated  on  the  Alle,  that  were  the 
most  furiously  disputed.  In  the  end,  the  Rus- 
sians remained  masters  of  the  village,  the 
French,  of  the  skirts  of  the  wood.  When  the 
Russians  attempted  to  penetrate  into  that  wood, 
Lannes,  making  a  brigade  of  Verdier's  divi- 
sion sallying  from  it  on  a  sudden,  drove  them 
back  to  a  distance.  Terrified  by  these  start- 
ling appearances,  fearing  that  Napoleon  was 
lying  concealed  with  his  army  in  this  myste- 
rious wood,  they  durst  no  longer  venture  to 
approach  it. 

The  enemy,  unable  to  force  our  right  be- 
tween Posthenen  and  Sortlack,  made  a  vigor- 
ous attempt  on  our  left  in  the  plain  of  Hein- 
richsdorf, which  presented  few  obstacles.  The 
nature  of  the  ground  having  induced  them  to 
direct  the  greater  part  of  their  cavalry  to  that 
side,  they  had  there  more  than  12,000  horse  to 
oppose  to  General  Grouchy's  five  or  six  thou- 
sand. The  latter,  studying  to  compensate  in- 
feriority of  number  by  skilful  dispositions, 
deployed  in  the  plain  a  long  line  of  cuirassiers, 
and  on  the  flank  of  that  line,  behind  the  vil- 
lage of  Heinrichsdorf,  he  placed  in  reserve 
the  dragoons,  the  brigade  of  the  carabineers, 
and  the  light  artillery.  These  dispositions 
completed,  he  put  himself  at  the  head  of  the 
deployed  line  of  his  cuirassiers,  advanced  upon 
the  Russian  cavalry  as  if  going  to  charge  it, 
then,  suddenly  facing  about,  he  affected  to  re- 
tire at  a  trot  before  the  mass  of  the  enemy's 
squadrons.  In  this  manner,  he  enticed  them 
to  follow  him,  till,  having  passed  Heinrichs- 
dorf, they  offered  their  flank  to  the  troops  con- 
cealed behind  that  village.  Then  halting  and 
wheeling  round,  he  Jed  back  his  cuirassiers 
upon  the  Russian  cavalry,  charged  it,  over- 
turned it,  obliged  it  to  pass  back  under  Hein- 
richsdorf, whence  burst  a  shower  of  grape,  and 
from  which  the  dragoons  and  carabineers  in 
ambush  rushed  upon  it  and  finished  by  throw- 
ing it  into  disorder.  But  the  encounters  of 
troops  on  horseback  are  never  so  destructive 
as  to  prevent  the  repetition  of  them.  The  Rus- 
sian cavalry,  therefore,  returned  to  the  charge, 
anrl  General  Grouchy,  practising  each  time  the 
same  manoeuvre,  drew  it  beyond  Heinrichsdorf, 


and  caused  it  to  be  taken  in  flank  and  rear  in 
the  way  that  we  have  already  seen,  as  soon  as 
it  was  past  the  village.  After  several  encoun- 
ters, the  plain  of  Heinrichsdorf  remained  in 
our  hands,  covered  with  dead  men  and 
horses,  dismounted  riders,  and  glistening 
cuirasses. 

Thus,  on  the  one  hand,  the  resistance  which 
the  Russian  infantry  met  with  at  the  skirts  of 
the  wood  of  Sortlack,  and  on  the  other  the 
flank  attacks  to  which  their  cavalry  was  ex- 
posed, when  it  passed  the  village  of  Hein- 
richsdorf, kept  them  at  the  foot  of  our  posi- 
tions, and  Lannes  was  enabled  to  prolong  till 
noon  this  conflict  of  26,000  men  against  75,000. 
But  it  was  high  time  for  Napoleon  to  arrive 
with  the  rest  of  his  army. 

Lannes,  anxious  to  apprize  him  of  what 
was  passing,  had  sent  to  him  almost  all  his 
aides-de-camp,  one  after  another,  ordering 
them  to  get  back  to  him  without  loss  of  time, 
if  they  killed  their  horses.  They  found  him 
coming  at  a  gallop  to  Friedland,  and  full  of  a 
joy  that  was  expressed  in  his  countenance. 
"  This  is  the  14th  of  June,"  he  repeated  to 
those  whom  he  met ;  "  it  is  the  anniversary  of 
Marengo;  it  is  a  lucky  day  for  us!"  Napo- 
leon, outstripping  his  troops  through  the  speed 
of  his  horse,  had  successively  passed  the  long 
files  of  the  guard,  of  Ney's  corps,  of  Berna- 
dotte's  corps,  all  marching  for  Posthenen.  He 
had  saluted  in  passing,  Dupont's  fine  division, 
which,  from  Ulm  to  Braunsberg,  had  never 
ceased  to  distinguish  itself,  though  never  in 
his  presence,  and  he  had  declared  that  it 
would  give  him  great  pleasure  to  see  it  fight 
for  once. 

The  presence  of  Napoleon  at  Posthenen 
fired  his  soldiers  and  his  generals  with  fresh 
ardour.  Lannes,  Mortier,  Oudinot,  who  had 
been  there  since  morning,  and  Ney,  who  had 
just  arrived,  surrounded  him  with  the  most 
lively  joy.  The  brave  Oudinot  hastening  up 
with  his  coat  perforated  by  balls,  and  his 
horse  covered  with  blood,  exclaimed  to  the 
Emperor:  "Make  haste,  Sire,  my  grenadiers 
are  knocked  up;  but,  give  me  a  reinfoicement, 
and  I  will  drive  all  the  Russians  into  the  wa- 
ter." Napoleon,  surveying  with  his  glass  that 
plain,  where  the  Russians,  backed  in  the  elbov 
of  the  Alle,  were  endeavouring  in  vain  to  de 
ploy,  soon  appreciated  their  perilous  situation 
and  the  unique  occasion  offered  him  by  For- 
tune, swayed,  it  must  be  confessed,  by  his  ge- 
nius ;  for  the  fault  which  the  Russians  were 
committing  had  been  inspired,  as  it  were,  by 
him,  when  he  pushed  them  from  the  other  side 
of  the  Alle,  and  thus  forced  them  to  pass  it 
before  him,  in  going  to  the  relief  of  Konigs- 
berg.  The  day  was  far  advanced,  and  it 
would  take  several  hours  to  collect  all  the 
French  troops.  Some  of  Napoleon's  lieuten- 
ant's were,  therefore  of  opinion  that  they  ought 
to  defer  fighting  a  decisive  battle  till  the  mor- 
row. "  No,  no,"  replied  Napoleon,  "  one  does 
not  catch  an  enemy  twice  in  such  a  scrape." 
He  immediately  made  his  dispositions  for  the 
attack.  They  were  worthy  of  his  marvellous 
perspicacity. 

To  drive  the  Russians  into  the  Alle  was 
the  aim  which  every  individual,  ilown  to  the 


June   1307.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPlKfc. 


313 


meanest  soldier,  assigned  to  the  battle.  But  I 
how  to  set  about  it,  how  to  ensure  that  result,  f 
and  how  to  render  it  as  great  as  possible,  was 
the  question.  At  the  farthest  extremity  of  this 
elbow  of  the  Alle,  in  which  the  Russian  army 
was  engulphed,  there  was  a  decisive  point  to 
occupy,  namely,  the  little  town  of  Freidland 
itself,  situated  on  our  right,  between  the  Mill 
Stream  and  the  Alle.  There  were  the  four 
bridges,  the  sole  retreat  of  the  Russian  army, 
and  Napoleon  purposed  to  direct  his  utmost 
efforts  against  that  point.  He  destined  for 
Ney's  corps  the  difficult  and  glorious  task  of 
plunging  into  that  gulf,  of  carrying  Friedland 
at  any  rate,  in  spite  of  the  desperate  resist- 
ance which  the  Russians  would  not  fail  to 
make,  of  wresting  the  bridges  from  them,  and 
thus  barring  against  them  the  only  way  of 
safety.  But  at  the  same  time  he  resolved, 
while  acting  vigorously  on  his  right,  to  sus- 
pend all  efforts  on  his  left,  to  amuse  the  Russian 
army  on  that  side  with  a  feigned  fight,  and  not 
to  push  it  briskly  on  the  left  till,  the  bridges 
being  taken  on  the  right,  he  should  be  sure, 
by  pushing  it,  to  fling  it  into  a  receptacle  with- 
out an  outlet. 

Surrounded  by  his  lieutenants,  he  explained 
to  them,  with  that  energy  and  that  precision 
of  language  which  were  usual  with  him,  the 
part  which  each  of  them  had  to  act  in  that 
battle.  Grasping  the  arm  of  Marshal  Ney, 
and  pointing  to  Friedland,  the  bridges,  the 
Russians  crowded  together  in  front,  "  Yonder 
is  the  goal,"  said  he;  "march  to  it  without 
looking  about  you:  break  into  that  thick 
mass,  whatever  it  costs  you  ;  enter  Friedland, 
take  the  bridges,  and  give  yourself  no  concern 
about  what  may  happen  on  your  right,  on 
your  left,  or  on  your  rear.  The  army  and  I 
shall  be  there  to  attend  to  that." 

Ney,  boiling  with  ardour,  proud  of  the  for- 
midable task  assigned  to  him,  set  out  at  a  gal- 
lop to  arrange  his  troops  before  the  wood  of 
Sortlack.  Struck  with  his  martial  attitude, 
Napoleon,  addressing  Marshal  Mortier,  said, 
"  That  man  is  a  lion  I"1 

On  the  same  ground,  Napoleon  had  his  dis- 
positions written  down  from  his  dictation,  that 


«  I  got  these  particulars  from  Marshal  Mortier,  with 
whom  I  had  the  honour  to  be  acquainted,  and  who  has 
often  related  them  to  me  himself. 

»  Nothing  is  more  difficult  than  to  compute,  with  strict 
accuracy,  the  force  of  an  army  on  a  day  of  battle.  One 
rarely  has  authentic  staiements,  and  when  one  can  pro- 
cure such,  it  is  still  more  rarely  that  such  statements 
agree  with  reality.  M.  Derode,  in  an  excellent  paper 
on  the  battle  of  Friedland,  has  made  use  of  a  statement 
extracted  from  the  work  of  General  Mathieu  Dumas — a 
statement  which,  though  derived  from  the  depdt  of  war, 
is  incorrect  in  several  particulars.  In  the  offices  of  the 
ministry  in  Paris  were  drawn  up  statements,  with 
which  the  facts  occurring  on  the  Vistula  did  not  always 
correspond.  There  exists  in  the  Louvre,  in  the  rich 
depot  of  the  papers  of  Napoleon,  memorandum  books, 
kept  by  himself,  which  he  always  had  at  hand,  and 
which,  renewed  month  by  month,  contained  an  accu- 
rate description  of  each  of  the  corps  acting  under  his 
command.  The  leaves  of  these  books  have  writing  on 
one  side  only,  and  on  the  other  are  sometimes  given,  in 
red  ink,  the  changes  that  happened  in  the  course  of  the 
month.  It  is  in  these  little  books,  but  on  condition  of  not 
taking  even  them  for  absolute  ground- work,  and  on  con- 
dition of  incessantly  modifying  their  data,  by  the  appre- 
ciation of  the 'circumstances  of  the  moment — it  is  in 
these  little  books,  we  say,  that  one  may  look  for  the 
approximative  truth.  I  have  not  found  those  for  the 
months  of  May,  June,  and  July,  ISO? ;  I  have  therefore 
VOL.  II— 40 


each  of  his  generals  might  have  them  bodily 
present  to  his  mind,  and  not  be  liable  to  devi- 
ate from  them.  He  ranged,  than,  Marshal 
Ney's  corps  on  the  right,  so  that  Lannes, 
bringing  back  Verdier's  division  upon  Posthe- 
nen,  could  present  two  strong  lines  with  that 
and  the  grenadiers.  He  placed  Bernadotte's 
corps  (temporarily  Victor's)  between  Ney 
and  Lannes,  a  little  in  advance  of  Posthenen, 
and  partly  hidden  by  the  inequalities  of  the 
ground.  Dupont's  fine  division  firmed  the 
head  of  this  corps.  On  the  plat<  au  behind 
Posthenen,  Napoleon  established  the  imperial 
guard,  the  infantry'  in  three  close  columns, 
the  cavalry  in  two  lines.  Between  Posthenen 
and  Heinrichsdorf  was  the  corps  of  Marshal 
Mortier,  posted  as  in  the  morning,  but  more 
concentrated,  and  augmented  by  the  young 
fusiliers  of  the  imperial  guard.  A  battalioa 
of  the  4th  light  infantry,  and  the  regiment  of 
the  municipal  guard  of  Paris,  had  taken  the 
place  of  the  grenadiers  of  the  Albert  brigade 
in  Heinrichsdorf.  Dombrowski's  Polish  divi- 
sion had  joined  Dupas's  division,  and  guarded 
the  artillery.  Napoleon  left  to  General  Grou- 
chy the  duty  of  which  he  had  already  so  ably 
acquitted  himself,  that  of  defending  the  plain 
of  Heinrichsdorf.  To  the  dragoons  and  the 
cuirassiers  commanded  by  that  general  he 
added  the  light  cavalry  of  Generals  Beaumont 
and  Colbert,  to  assist  him  to  rid  himself  of 
the  Cossacks.  Lastly,  having  two  more  divi- 
sions of  dragoons  to  dispose  of,  he  placed  that 
of  General  Latour  Maubourg,  reinforced  by 
the  Dutch  cuirassiers,  behind  the  corps  of 
Marshal  Ney,  and  that  of  General  La  Hous- 
saye,  reinforced  by  the  Saxon  cuirassiers,  be- 
hind Victor's  corps.  The  French  in  this  im- 
posing order  amounted  to  no  fewer  than 
80,000  men.2  The  order  was  repeated  to 
the  left  not  to  advance,  but  merely  to  keep 
back  the  Russians  till  the  success  of  the 
right  was  decided.  Napoleon  required  that 
before  the  troops  recommenced  firing,  they 
should  wait  for  the  signal  from  a  battery  of 
twenty  pieces  of  cannon  placed  above  Pos 
thenen. 

The  Russian  general,  struck  by  this  deploy- 


been  obliged  to  resort  to  those  for  the  months  of  March 
and  August,  though  that  for  March  is  too  incomplete, 
for  the  army  had  not  then  received  all  the  reinforce- 
ments which  arrived  in  May  and  June;  and  though 
that  of  the  month  of  August  is  too  complete,  on  the  con- 
trary, for  al  that  period  a  considerable  portion  of  forces, 
on  march  during  the  events  of  June,  had  joined.  But, 
by  using  these  statements,  by  comparing  them,  by  recti- 
fying them  above  all  by  Napoleon's  correspondence, 
and  by  enlightening  one's  self,  in  regard  to  the  battle  of 
Friedland,  by  a  note  in  his  own  handwriting,  which 
gives  the  strength  of  several  of  the  corps  that  figure  in 
that  battle,  one  arrives  at  the  following  computation, 
which  I  believe  to  be  very  near  the  truth.  I  will  add 
that  this  approximation  to  the  truth  is  sufficient ;  for,  to 
judge  of  a  great  event  like  Friedland  or  Austerlitz,  it  is 
of  little  importance  to  ascertain  whether  there  were  80 
or  82  thousand  men  who  fought.  Two  or  three  thou- 
sand combatants  more  or  less,  make  no  change  either 
in  the  character  of  the  event  or  in  the  combination* 
which  decided  it.  If  the  historian  ought  not  to  spate 
any  pains  to  arrive  at  the  absolute  truth,  it  is  because 
he  ought  to  make  a  constant  habit  of  it,  in  order  that  he 
may  never  sutler  the  scrupulous  regard  for  truth  to  be 
relaxed  in  him ;  but  the  important  point  is  the  charactei, 
not  the  minute  detail  of  things. 

The  most  probable  computation,  then,  of  the  force  of 
the  French  army  in  the  battle  of  Friedland,  is  as  fol 
lows: — 

ftti 


314 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[June,  1807 


ment,  discovered  the  mistake  which  he  had 
committed  in  supposing  that  he  had  to  do  with 
but  the  single  corps  of  Marshal  Lannes ;  he 
was  surprised,  and  naturally  hesitated.  His 
hesitation  had  produced  a  sort  of  slackening 
in  the  action.  Scarcely  did  occasional  dis- 
charges of  artillery  indicate  the  continuance 
of  the  battle.  Napoleon,  who  desired  that  all 
his  troops  should  have  got  into  line,  rested  for 
at  least  an  hour,  and,  being  abundantly  sup- 
plied with  ammunition,  was  in  no  hurry  to 
begin,  and  resisted  the  impatience  of  his  ge- 
nerals, well  knowing  that,  as  at  this  season,  in 
this  country,  it  was  light  till  ten  in  the  even- 
ing, he  should  have  time  to  subject  the  Rus- 
sian army  to  the  disaster  that  he  was  prepar- 
ing for  it.  At  length,  the  fit  moment  appear- 
ing to  him  to  have  arrived,  he  gave  the  signal. 
The  twenty  pieces  of  cannon  of  the  battery  of 
Posthenen  fired  at  once ;  the  artillery  of  the 
army  answered  them  along  the  whole  line ; 
and,  at  this  impatiently-awaited  signal,  Mar- 
shal Ney  moved  off  his  corps  d'armee. 

From  the  wood  of  Sortlack  issued  Mar- 
chand's  division,  advancing  the  first  to  the 
right,  Bisson's  division  the  second  to  the  left. 


Both  were  preceded  by  a  storm  of  tirailleurs, 
who,  as  they  approached  the  enemy,  fell  back 
and  returned  into  the  ranks.  These  troops 
marched  resolutely  up  to  the  Russians,  and 
took  from  them  the  village  of  Sorllack,  so  long 
disputed.  Their  cavalry,  in  order  to  stop  our 
offensive  movement,  made  a  charge  on  Mar- 
chand's  division.  But  Latour-Maubourg's 
dragoons  and  the  Dutch  cuirassiers,  passing 
through  the  intervals  of  our  battalions,  charged 
that  cavalry  in  their  turn,  drove  it  back  upon 
its  infantry,  and,  pushing  the  Russians  against 
the  Alle,  precipitated  a  great  number  into  the 
deeply  embanked  bed  of  that  river.  Some 
saved  themselves  by  swimming;  many  were 
drowned.1  His  right  once  appuyed  on  the 
Alle,  Marshal  Ney  slackened  its  march,  and 
pushed  forward  his  left,  formed  by  Bisson's 
division,  in  such  a  manner  as  to  thrust  back 
the  Russians  into  the  narrow  space  comprised 
between  the  Mill  Stream  and  the  Alle.  When 
arrived  at  this  point,  the  fire  of  the  enemy's 
artillery  redoubled.  The  French  had  to  sus- 
tain not  only  the  fire  of  the  batteries  in  front, 
but  also  the  fire  of  those  on  the  right  bank  of 
the  Alle ;  and  it  was  impossible  to  get  rid  of 


The  guard,  though  increased  to  9000  men,  had 
not  in  its  ranks  either  the  seamen  or  the  dra- 
goons, and  had  sustained  a  considerable  loss 
in  fusiliers.  It  numbered  of  men  present,  at 

most 

The  note  in  the  hand-writing  of 
Napoleon,  mentioned  above,  com- 
putes Oudinot's  grenadiers  at,  men 

present 7000 

Verdier's  division  at 8000 

The  Saxon  infantry  at 4000 

The  ninth  hussars  at 400 

The  Saxon  cuirassiers  at 600 

The  Saxon  light-horse  at 200 

Making  for  the  whole  corps  of  Lan 

nes  a  total  of 20,200 

But  the  Saxons  had  been  left  at  Heilsberg,  ex- 
cepting, however,  three  battalions,  which, 
according  to  some  accounts,  were  at  Fried- 
land.  Verdier's  division  had  sustained  con- 
siderable loss  at  Heilsberg,  and  lastly,  the 
troops  had  marched  very  fast.  I  think,  there- 
fore, that  we  shall  be  about  the  mark,  if  we 
set  down  Lannes'  corps  as  follows : — 

Oudinot 7000 

Verdier 6500 

Saxons 1200 

Cavalry 1200 

15,900 

(The  artillery  is  included  in  the  divi- 
sions of  infantry.) 

Lannes 

Marshal  Ney's  corps  amounted  to  16  or  17  thou- 
sand men  present  under  arms  at  the  moment 
of  taking  the  field,  which  is  proved  by  a  letter 
from  Marshal  Ney  to  Napoleon.  He  had  lost 
not  fewer  than  from  2000  to  2500  men,  killed, 
wounded,  and  prisoners,  in  the  battles  of  Gutt- 
stadt  and  Deppen.  Taking  marches  into  ac- 
count, it  amounted  then,  at  most,  to 

Marshal  Mortier,  according  to  the 
note  of  Napoleon's  already  men- 
tioned, had  in  Dupas's  division 6400 

In  Dombrowski's  division 4000 

He  had  a  detachment  of  Dutch  horse, 
the  designation  of  which  is  uncer- 
tain, in  the  note  referred  to 1500 

11,900 

When  we  know  from  Marshal  Lefebvre's  letters 
how  the  Poles  behaved,  and  how  steadily  they 
followed  the  colours,  we  cannot  set  down 

Marshal  Mortier's  corps  at  more  than 

The  corps  of  Marshal  Bernadotte,  commanded 
by  General  Victor,  had  in  March,  without  the 
div.mon  of  dragoons,  about  22,000  men  present 


7,500 


Amount  brought  forward 47,400 

under  arms.  It  was  allerwards  recruited, 
but  had  left  behind  several  posts ;  and  if  it 
amounted  to  25,000  men,  it  could  not  have 

taken  to  Friedlaud  above 22,000 

The  cavalry  comprehended  General 
Nansouty's  cuirassiers,  from  whom 
must  be  deducted  the  losses  on 

march,  at  Heilsberg,  &c. 3500 

General  Grouchy's  dragoons 1800 

General  La  Houssaye's  dragoons-  ••  •    1800 
General  Lalour-Maubourg's  dragoons, 

^         forming  six  regiments 2400 

The  light  cavalry  of  Generals  Beau- 
mont and  Colbert 2000 

11,500 


Thus  we  find  for  the  total  of  the  army 


80,900 


15,900 


14,000 


I  think,  therefore,  we  may  say  that  the  French  army 
was  about  80,000  men  at  the  battle  of  Friedlancl,  25,000 
of  whom,  as  we  shall  see,  never  fired  a  shot.  There 
were,  further,  the  corps  of  Marshal  Davout,  which  had 
not  fought,  and  which  amounted  to  29  or  30  thousand 
men,  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign,  to  28,000,  if 
we  allow  for  those  left  behind  on  march;  Marshal 
Soult's,  which  had  lost  about  5000  men  at  Heilsberg, 
and  could  scarcely  exceed  27.000;  lastly,  Mural,  with 
about  10,000  men,  which  would  make  the  total  of  the 
army  in  action  at  the  moment — 

At  Friedland 80,000 

Before  Konigsberg,  or  on  march         vut- '        ' 
for  that  city 


Total 


145,000 


10,000 


A  mount  carried  forward 47,400 


This  total  of  145,000  men  in  action  would  correspond 
well  both  with  the  forces  existing  on  the  5th  of  June, 
and  with  the  probable  losses  sustained  in  the  various 
fights  since  the  5th  of  June.  Reckoning  these  losses  at 
12  or  15  thousand  men,  killed,  wounded,  prisoners,  or 
laggards,  we  shall  again  find  the  160.000  men  composing 
the  army  at  the  opening  of  the  campaign.  Though  these 
numbers  are  taken  from  the  only  documents  worthy  of 
credit  —  documents  rectified,  modified,  by  a  correspond- 
ence of  each  day,  we  consider  them  as  approximative, 
and  nothing  more.  And,  if  we  have  entered  into  these 
details,  it  is  to  convey  an  idea  of  the  difficulty  of  arriv- 
ing at  strict  accuracy  in  matters  of  this  kind.  But,  wo 
repeat  it,  if  the  historian,  in  order  never  to  relax  in  his 
duty,  ought  to  aspire  to  the  strict  truth,  posterity,  in 
reading  him,  judging  from  his  elTbrts,  can  feel  satisfied, 
in  regard  to  numbers  and  details,  of  the  general  truth. 
It  is  this  general  truth  which  is  of  importance  to  him, 
which  is  sufh'cient  for  him,  —  for  it  is  that  which  consti- 
tutes the  real  character  of  thing?  and  of  events. 

i  Two  thousand,  says  Marshal  Ney,  in  his  report 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


815 


the  latter  by  taking  them,  as  they  were  sepa- 
rated from  them  by  the  deep  bed  of  the  river. 
Our  columns,  battered  at  once  in  front  and 
flank  by  the  balls,  endured  with  admirable 
coolness  this  terrible  convergence  of  fires. 
Marshal  Ney,  galloping  from  one  end  of  the 
line  to  the  other,  kept  up  the  courage  of  his 
soldiers  by  his  heroic  bearing.  Meanwhile, 
whole  files  were  swept  away,  and  the  fire  be- 
came so  severe  that  the  very  bravest  of  the 
troops  could  no  longer  endure  it.  At  this 
sight,  the  cavalry  of  the  Russian  guard,  com- 
manded by  General  Kollogribow,  dashed  off 
at  a  gallop,  to  try  to  throw  into  disorder  the 
infantry  of  Bisson's  division,  which  appeared 
to  waver.  Staggered  for  the  first  time,  that 
valiant  infantry  gave  ground,  and  two  or  three 
battalions  threw  themselves  in  rear.  General 
Bisson,  who,  from  his  stature,  overlooked  the 
lines  of  his  soldiers,  strove  in  vain  to  detain 
them.  They  retired,  grouping  themselves 
around  their  officers.  The  situation  soon  be- 
came most  critical.  Luckily,  General  Dupont, 
placed  at  some  distance  on  the  left  of  Ney's 
corps,  perceived  this  commencement  of  disor- 
der, and,  without  waiting  for  directions  to 
march,  moved  off  his  division,  passing  in 
front  of  it,  reminding  it  of  Ulm,  Dirristein  and 
Halle,  and  taking  it  to  encounter  the  Russians. 
It  advanced,  in  the  finest  attitude,  under  the 
fire  of  that  tremendous  artillery,  while  Latour- 
Maubourg's  dragoons,  returning  to  the  charge, 
fell  upon  the  Russian  cavalry,  which  had  scat- 
tered in  pursuit  of  our  foot-soldiers,  and  suc- 
ceeded in  the  attempt  to  drive  it  back.  Du- 
pont's  division,  continuing  its  movement  on 
that  open  ground,  and,  supporting  its  left  on 
the  Mill  Stream,  brought  the  Russian  infantry 
to  a  stand.  By  its  presence  it  filled  Ney's 
soldiers  with  confidence  and  joy.  Bisson's 
battalions  formed  anew,  and  our  whole  line, 
re-invigorated,  began  to  march  forward  again. 
It  was  necessary  to  reply  to  the  formidable 
artillery  of  the  enemy,  and  Ney's  artillery 
was  so  very  inferior  in  number,  that  it  could 
scarcely  stand  in  battery  before  that  of  the 
Russians.  Napoleon  ordered  General  Victor 
to  collect  all  the  guns  of  his  divisions,  and  to 
range  them  in  mass  on  the  front  of  Ney.  The 
skilful  and  intrepid  General  Senarmont  com- 
manded that  artillery.  He  moved  it  off  at  full 
trot,  joined  it  to  that  of  Marshal  Ney,  took  it 
some  hundred  paces  ahead  of  our  infantry, 
and,  daringly  placing  himself  in  face  of  the 
Russians,  opened  upon  them  a  fire,  terrible 
from  the  number  of  the  pieces  and  the  accu- 
racy of  aim.  Directing  one  of  his  batteries 
against  the  right  bank,  he  soon  silenced  those 
which  the  enemy  had  on  that  side.  Then, 
pushing  forward  his  line  of  artillery,  he  gra- 
dually approached  to  within  grape-shot  range, 
and,  firing  upon  the  deep  masses,  crowding 
together  as  they  fell  back  into  the  elbow  of  the 
Alle,  he  made  frightful  havoc  among  them. 
Our  line  of  infantry  followed  this  movement, 
and  advanced  under  the  protection  of  General 
Senarmont's  numerous  guns.  The  Russians, 
thrust  further  and  further  back  into  this  gulf, 
felt  a  sort  of  despair,  and  made  an  effort  to 
extricate  themselves.  Their  imperial  guard, 
appuyed  upon  the  Mill  Stream,  issued  from 


that  retreat,  and  marched,  with  bayonet  fixed, 
upon  Dupont's  division,  also  placed  along  the' 
rivulet.  The  latter,  without  waiting  for  the 
imperial  guard,  went  to  meet  it,  repulsed  it 
with  the  bayonet,  and  forced  it  back  to  the 
ravine.  Thus  driven,  some  of  the  Russians 
threw  themselves  beyond  the  ravine,  the  others 
upon  the  suburbs  of  Friedland.  General  Du- 
pont, with  part  of  his  division,  crossed  the 
Mill  Stream,  drove  before  him  all  that  he  met, 
found  himself  on  the  rear  of  the  right  wing 
of  the  Russians  engaged  with  our  left  in  the 
plain  of  Heinrichsdorf,  turned  Friedland,  and 
attacked  it  by  the  Konigsberg  road;  while 
Ney,  continuing  to  march  straight  forward, 
entered  by  the  Eylau  road.  A  terrible  conflict 
ensued  at  the  gates  of  the  town.  The  assail- 
ants pressed  the  Russians  in  all  quarters ; 
they  forced  their  way  into  the  streets  in  pur- 
suit of  them  ;  they  drove  them  upon  the  bridges 
of  the  Alle,  which  General  Senarmont's  artil- 
lery, left  outside,  enfiladed  with  its  shot.  The 
Russians  rushed  upon  the  bridges  lo  seek 
refuge  in  the  ranks  of  the  fourteenth  division, 
left,  in  reserve,  on  the  other  side  of  the  Alle, 
by  General  Benningsen.  That  unfortunate 
general,  full  of  grief,  had  hurried  to  this  divi- 
sion, with  the  intention  of  taking  it  to  the 
bank  of  the  river  to  the  assistance  of  his  en- 
dangered army.  Scarcely  had  some  wrecks 
of  his  left  wing  passed  the  bridges,  when  those 
bridges  were  destroyed — set  on  fire  by  the 
French,  and,  by  the  Russians  themselves,  in 
their  anxiety  to  stop  us.  Ney  and  Dupont, 
having  performed  their  task,  met  in  the  heart 
of  Friedland  in  flames,  and  congratulated  one 
another  on  this  glorious  success. 

Napoleon,  placed  in  the  centre  of  the  di- 
visions which  he  kept  in  reserve,  had  never 
ceased  to  watch  this  grand  sight.  While  he 
was  contemplating  it  attentively,  a  ball  passed 
at  the  height  of  the  bayonets,  and  a  soldier, 
from  an  instinctive  movement,  stooped  his 
head.  «  If  that  ball  were  destined  for  you," 
said  Napoleon,  smiling,  "  though  you  were  to 
burrow  a  hundred  feet  under  ground,  it  would 
be  sure  to  find  you  there."  Thus  he  wished 
to  give  currency  to  that  useful  belief  that 
Fate  strikes  the  brave  and  the  coward  without 
distinction,  and  that  the  coward  who  seeks  a 
hiding-place  disgraces  himself  to  no  purpose. 

On  seeing  that  Friedland  was  occupied  and 
the  bridges  of  the  Alle  destroyed,  Napoleon  at 
length  pushed  forward  his  left  upon  the  right 
wing  of  the  Russian  army,  deprived  of  all 
means  of  retreat,  and  having  behind  it  a  river 
without  bridges.  General  GortschakofF,  who 
commanded  that  wing,  perceived' the  danger 
with  which  he  was  threatened,  and,  thinking  to 
dispel  the  storm,  made  an  attack  on  the  French 
line,  extending  from  Posthenen  to  Heinrichs- 
dorf, formed  by  the  corps  of  Marshal  Lannes, 
by  that  of  Mortier,  and  by  General  Grouchy's 
cavalry.  But  Lannes,  with  his  grenadiers, 
made  head  against  the  Russians.  Marshal 
Mortier,  with  the  15th  and  the  fusiliers  of  the 
guard,  opposed  to  them  an  iron  barrier.  Mor- 
tier's  artillery,  in  particular,  directed  by  Colonel 
Balbois  and  an  excellent  Dutch  officer,  M.  Van- 
briennen,  made  incalculable,  havoc  among 
them.  At  length,  Napoleon,  anxious  to  take 


316 


HISTORY    OF   THE 


[June,  1807. 


advantage  of  the  rest  of  the  day,  carried  for- 
ward his  whole  line.  Infantry,  cavalry,  artil- 
lery, started  all  at  once.  General  Gortscha- 
koff,  while  he  found  himself  thus  pressed,  was 
informed  that  Friedland  was  in  the  possession 
cf  the  French.  In  hopes  of  retaking  it,  he 
despatched  a  column  of  infantry  to  the  gates 
of  the  town.  That  column  penetrated  into  it, 
and  for  a  moment  drove  back  Dupont's  and 
Ney's  soldiers ;  but  these  repulsed  in  their  turn 
the  Russian  column.  A  new  fight  took  place 
in  that  unfortunate  town,  and  the  possession 
of  it  was  disputed  by  the  light  of  the  flames 
that  were  consuming  it.  The  French  finally 
remained  masters,  and  drove  GortschakofTs 
corps  into  that  plain  without  thoroughfare 
which  had  served  it  for  field  of  battle.  Gorts- 
chakoff  s  infantry  defended  itself  with  intre- 
pidity, and  threw  itself  into  the  Alle  rather 
than  surrender.  Part  of  the  Russian  soldiers 
were  fortunate  enough  to  find  fordable  pas- 
sages, and  contrived  to  escape.  Another 
drowned  itself  in  the  river.  The  whole  of  the 
artillery  was  left  in  our  hands.  A  column, 
the  furthest  on  the  right  (right  of  the  Russians) 
fled  and  descended  the  Alle,  under  General 
Lambert,  with  a  portion  of  the  cavalry.  The 
darkness  of  the  night  and  the  inevitable  dis- 
order of  victory  facilitated  its  retreat,  and  en- 
abled it  to  escape  from  our  hands. 

It  was  half-past  ten  at  night.  The  victory 
was  complete  on  the  left  and  on  the  right. 
Napoleon,  in  his  vast  career,  had  not  gained  a 
more  splendid  one.  He  had  for  trophies  80 
pieces  of  cannon,  few  prisoners,  it  is  true,  for 
the  Russians  chose  rather  to  drown  themselves 
than  to  surrender,  but  25,000  men,  killed, 
wounded,  or  drowned,  covered  with  their  bodies 
both  banks  of  the  Alle.  The  right  bank,  to 
which  great  numbers  of  them  had  dragged 
themselves,  exhibited  almost  as  frightful  a 
scene  of  carnage  as  the  left  bank.  Several 
columns  of  fire,  rising  from  Friedland  and  the 
neighbouring  villages,  threw  a  sinister  light 
over  that  place,  a  theatre  of  anguish  for  some, 
of  joy  for  others.  On  our  side  we  had  to  re- 
gret upward  of  seven  or  eight  thousand  men, 
killed  or  wounded.  Out  of  about  80,000  French, 
25,000  had  not  fired  a  shot.  The  Russian 
army,  deprived  of  25,000  combatants,  weak- 
ened, moreover,  by  a  great  number  of  men 
who  had  lost  their  way,  was  thenceforward 
incapable  of  keeping  the  field.  Napoleon  had 
owed  this  glorious  triumph  as  much  to  the 
general  conception  of  the  campaign  as  to  the 
plan  itself  of  the  battle.  In  taking  for  several 
months  past  the  Passarge  for  base,  in  thus  se- 
curing to  himself  beforehand  in  all  cases  the 
means  of  separating  the  Russians  from  Kii- 
nigsberg,  in  marching  from  Guttstadt  to  Fried- 
land  in  such  a  manner  as  constantly  to  out- 
wing  them,  he  had  obliged  them  to  commit  a 
great  imprudence  in  order  to  reach  Kiinigs- 
berg,  and  had  deserved  from  fortune  the  lucky 
chance  of  finding  them  at  Friedland  backed 
upon  the  river  Alle.  Always  disposing  his 
masses  with  consummate  skill,  he  had  con- 
trived, while  sending  sixty  and  odd  thousand 
men  to  Konigsberg,  to  bring  forward  80,000 
•U  Friedland.  And,  as  we  have  just  seen, 


there  was  no  need  for  so  many  to  overwhelm 
the  Russian  army. 

Napoleon  slept  on  the  field  of  battle,  sur- 
rounded by  his  soldiers,  joyous  on  this  occa- 
sion, as  at  Austerlitz  and  Jena,  shouting  Vive 
I'Empereur  !  though  they  had  nothing  to  eat 
but  a  piece  of  bread  brought  in  their  knap- 
sacks, and  contenting  themselves  with  the 
noblest  of  the  acquisitions  of  victory — glory. 
The  Russian  army,  cut  in  two,  descended  the 
Alle  in  a  clear,  transparent  night,  with  soul 
steeped  in  despair,  though  it  had  done  all  its 
duty.  Fortunately  for  it,  Napoleon  had  at 
hand  only  half  his  cavalry.  If  he  had  had  the 
other  half  and  Mural  himself,  the  entire  Rus- 
sian corps  descending  the  Alle  under  General 
Lambert  would  have  been  taken. 

So  rapid  was  the  march  of  the  Russians, 
that  on  the  following  day  they  were  at  Wehlau 
on  the  Pregel.  They  cut  down  all  the  bridges, 
and,  on  the  morning  of  the  16th,  they  esta- 
blished themselves  a  little  beyond  the  Pregel, 
at  Petersdorf,  intending  not  to  retire  to  the 
Niemen  till  the  detached  corps  of  Generals 
Kamenski  and  Lestocq,  incapable  of  defending 
Konigsberg  against  the  French  army,  had 
joined  them,  for  the  purpose  of  effecting  their 
retreat  together. 

On  the  day  after  the  battle  of  Friedland, 
Napoleon  lost  not  a  moment  in  deriving  from 
his  victory  all  the  results  possible.  Having, 
according  to  custom,  visited  the  field  of  battle, 
shown  a  warm  interest  for  the  wounded,  in- 
formed his  soldiers  what  rewards  his  high  for- 
tune permitted  him  to  promise  and  to  give,  he 
had  set  out  for  the  Pregel,  preceded  by  all  his 
cavalry,  which  ran  in  pursuit  of  the  Russians 
while  descending  both  banks  of  the  Alle. — 
But  the  Russians  had  twelve  hours'  start,  for 
it  had  been  impossible  to  deny  a  night's  rest 
to  soldiers  who  had  marched  the  whole  of  the 
preceding  night  in  order  to  reach  the  field  of 
battle,  and  who  had  afterwards  fought  all  day, 
from  two  in  the  morning  till  ten  at  night.  The 
Russians,  having  thus  the  advantage  of  some 
hours,  and  retiring  with  the  celerity  of  an  army 
which  cannot  find  safely  but  in  flight,  we 
could  not  flatter  ourselves  that  we  should  reach 
the  Pregel  before  them.  When  we  arrived 
there  all  the  bridges  were  broken  down.  Na- 
poleon lost  no  time  in  re-establishing  them, 
and  making  the  dispositions  necessary  for  en- 
abling us  to  secure,  between  the  Pregel  and 
Niemen,  all  the  prizes  which  he  had  not  had 
time  to  take  between  Friedland  and  Wehlau. 

While  he  was  occupied  with  the  Russian 
army  at  Friedland,  Marshals  Soultand  Davout, 
preceded  by  Murat,  had  marched  for  Konigs- 
berg. Marshal  Soult  falling  in  with  the  rear- 
guard of  General  Lestocq,  had  taken  from  it 
an  entire  batlalion,  and  had  surrounded  and 
taken,  near  Konigsberg  itself,  a  column  of 
twelve  or  fifteen  hundred  men,  which  had  not 
retired  in  time  from  the  environs  of  Brauns- 
berg.  He  had  appeared  on  the  14th  under  the 
walls  of  Konigsberg,  too  well  defended  for  it 
to  be  possible  to  take  it  by  a  sudden  attack. 
Davout  and  Murat,  having,  for  their  part,  re 
ceived  orders  to  return  to  Friedland,  in  case 
the  battle  should  have  lasted  more  than  one 


Jane,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


317 


day,  had  both  left  Marshal  Soult  and  proceeded 
to  the  right  for  Wehlau.  Having  received 
fresh  tidings  by  the  way,  and  learned  the  vic- 
tory of  Friedland  and  the  retreat  of  the  Rus- 
sians, they  had  directed  their  march  to  Tapiau 
on  the  Pregel,  an  intermediate  point  between 
Konigsberg  and  Wehlau.  Having  collected 
the  means  of  passing  the  Pregel,  they  had 
crossed  it,  in  order  to  intercept  as  many  of 
the  Russian  troops  as  they  could  on  their 
flight. 

On  the  news  of  the  battle  of  Friedland,  the 
Prussian  and  Russian  detachments  guarding 
Konigsberg  no  longer  hesitated  to  quit  that 
place,  which  was  not  in  a  condition  to  sustain 
a  siege  like  Dantzig.  The  court  of  Prussia 
had  already  fled  to  the  small  frontier  town  of 
Memel,  the  last  of  the  kingdom  founded  by 
the  great  Frederick.  Generals  Kamenski  and 
Lestocq,  therefore,  retired,  abandoning  the  im- 
mense stores,  as  well  as  the  sick  and  wounded 
of  the  two  armies,  collected  at  Konigsberg.  A 
battalion,  left  to  stipulate  the  capitulation,  de- 
livered it  to  Marshal  Soult,  who  could  enter 
immediately.  In  Konigsberg  were  found  corn, 
wine,  100,000  muskets,  sent  by  England,  and 
still  on  board  the  vessels  which  had  brought 
them,  lastly,  a  considerable  number  of  wound- 
ed, who  had  been  there  ever  since  Eylau.  Of 
these,  the  surrounding  villages  contained  seve- 
ral thousand. 

Generals  Lestocq  and  Kamenski,  bringing 
their  troops  in  the  greatest  haste  by  the  Ko- 
nigsberg road  to  Tilsit,  threw  themselves  into 
the  forest  of  Baum,  before  Marshal  Davout 
and  Prince  Murat  had  intercepted  the  route 
from  Tapiau  to  Labiau.  Still,  they  did  not 
join  General  Benningsen  without  leaving  three 
thousand  prisoners  in  the  hands  of  Marshal 
Davout. 

Napoleon,  having  arrived  at  Wehlau,  con- 
tinued to  follow  up  the  Russian  army  without 
intermission,  and  to  lay  snares  for  its  detached 
corps  with  a  view  to  take  such  as  should  be 
behind.  He  kept  Marshal  Soult  at  Konigsberg, 
to  establish  himself  there,  and  to  commence  im- 
mediately the  attack  of  Pillau.  That  little  fort 
taken,  the  garrison  of  Konigsberg  was  to  give 
the  hand  by  the  Nehrung  to  the  garrison  of  Dant- 
zig. and  moreover  to  close  against  the  English 
the  Frische-Haff,  the  navigation  of  which  was 
at  this  moment  performed  by  the  seamen  of  the 
guard.  He  sent  his  aide-de-camp,  Savary,  to 
take  the  command  of  the  citadel  of  Konigs- 
berg, as  he  had  sent  Rapp  to  Dantzig,  with 
the  intention  of  preventing  waste  of  the  stores 
taken  from  the  enemy,  and  of  creating  a  new 
depot.  He  directed  Marshal  Davout  upon  La- 
biau, the  point  where  the  whole  inland  navi- 
gation of  these  provinces  terminates  at  the 
Baltic,  and  gave  him  a  corps  of  some  thousand 
horse  under  General  Grouchy  to  pick  up  the 
Russian  detachments  left  behind.  He  sent  off 
Murat,  with  the  bulk  of  the  cavalry,  upon  the 
direct  road  from  Wehlau  to  Tilsit,  and  de- 
spatched after  him  the  corps  of  Mortier,  Lan- 
nes,  Victor,  and  Ney.  Davout's  corps  was,  in 
case  of  emergency,  to  rejoin  the  army  by  a 
single  march.  Napoleon  was,  therefore,  strong 
enough  to  crush  the  Russians,  if  they  had  the 
presumption  to  sloo  again  to  fight.  On  the 


;  right,  he  threw  out  2000  light  horse,  hussars, 
and  chasseurs,  to  ascend  the  Pregel,  and  to 
bar  the  road  against  all  who  should  retire 
on  that  side,  wounded,  sicK,  stragglers,  con- 
voys. 

These  skilful  dispositions  occasioned  the 
capture  of  several  thousand  more  prisoners 
and  of  divers  convoys  of  provisions,  but  they 
could  not  procure  us  another  battle  with  the 
Russians.  In  haste  to  take  refuge  behind  the 
Nicmen,  they  arrived  there  on  the  18th,  finish- 
ed crossing  on  the  19th,  and  destroyed  all  the 
means  of  passage  for  a  considerable  distance. 
On  the  19th,  our  scouts,  after  pursuing  some 
parties  of  Calmucks  armed  with  bows,  which 
highly  amused  our  soldiers,  unaccustomed  to 
that  kind  of  enemy,  pushed  on  to  the  Niemen, 
and  saw  the  Russian  army  on  the  other  side 
of  the  river,  encamped  behind  that  bulwark 
of  the  empire  which  it  had  been  so  impatient 
to  reach. 

There  was  destined  to  end  the  daring  march 
of  the  French  army,  which,  setting  out  from 
the  camp  of  Boulogne,  in  September,  1805,  had 
traversed  the  continent  in  its  greatest  width, 
and  conquered  in  twenty  months  all  the  armies 
of  Europe.  The  new  Alexander  was  about  to 
pause  at  last,  not  on  account  of  the  fatigue  of 
his  soldiers,  ready  to  follow  him  whithersoever 
he  should  wish  to  lead  them,  but  on  account 
of  the  exhaustion  of  his  enemies,  incapable 
of  further  resistance,  and  obliged  to  beg  that 
peace  which,  a  few  days  before,  they  had  had 
the  imprudence  to  refuse. 

The  King  of  Prussia  had  left  at  Memel  the 
queen,  his  consort,  the  afflicted  instigator  of 
that  fatal  war,  to  rejoin  the  Emperor  Alexander 
on  the  banks  of  the  Niemen.  The  modest 
Frederick  William,  though  not  sharing  the 
silly  illusions  which  the  battle  of  Eylau  had 
excited  in  his  young  ally,  had,  nevertheless, 
yielded  to  his  persuasions  to  refuse  peace,  and 
he  now  foresaw  that  he  should  have  to  pay  for 
that  refusal  with  the  greater  part  of  his  domi- 
nions. Alexander  was  dispirited,  as  on  the 
day  after  Austerlitz.  He  was  angry  on  ac- 
count of  recent  events  with  General  Benning- 
sen, who  had  promised  what  he  could  not  per- 
form, and  he  felt  that  he  had  no  further  strength 
to  continue  the  war.  His  army,  too,  cried  out 
loudly  for  peace.  It  was  not  dissatisfied  with 
itself,  for  it  was  aware  that  it  had  behaved  well 
at  Heilsberg  and  Friedland;  but  it  considered 
itself  incapable  of  coping  with  the  army  of 
Napoleon,  collected  entire  since  the  taking  of 
Kdiiigsberg,  reinforced  by  Massena,  who  had 
just  repulsed  Tolstoy's  corps  at  Durczewo,.and 
able  to  oppose  170,000  men  to  the  70,000  Rus- 
sian and  Prussian  soldit.s  who  were  still  left. 
They  asked  for  whom  the  war  was  carried  on  ; 
was  it  for  the  Prussians,  who  could  not  defend 
their  own  country  1  Was  it  for  the  English, 
who,  after  so  frequently  announcing  succours, 
sent  none,  and  thought  only  of  conquering 
colonies  1  The  contempt  expressed  for  the 
Prussians  was  unjust,  for  they  had  conducted 
themselves  gallantly  of  late,  and  had  done  all 
that  could  be  expected  from  their  small  num- 
l  ber.  The  Prussians,  in  their  turn,  complained 
,  of  the  barbarism,  the  ignorance,  the  devastat 
ing  ferocity  of  the  Russian  soldiers.  The  t 
2  i)  2 


318 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[June,  1807 


agreed  in  nothing  but  in  regard  to  the  English 
These,  indeed,  by  landing  either  at  Stralsund 
or  at  Dantzig,  might  have  brought  useful  sue 
cours,  and  perhaps  have  changed,  or  at  leas 
slackened  the  course  of  events.  But  they  hac 
shown  no  activity  except  in  sending  expedi 
tions  to  the  Spanish  colonies ;  and  about  the 
very  subsidies,  which,  in  default  of  armies 
constituted  their  sole  co-operation,  they  hac 
haggled  till  they  had  cooled  the  King  of  Swe 
den  and  disgusted  him  with  the  war.  It  is  a 
relief  under  misfortune  to  be  able  to  com- 
plain, and,  at  this  moment,  Russians  anc 
Prussians  inveighed  vehemently  against  the 
British  cabinet.  The  Russian  officers,  in  par- 
ticular, loudly  declared  that  it  was  for  the  Eng- 
lish, for  their  paltry  ambition,  that  brave  men 
were  set  together  by  the  ears,  though  they  hac 
no  reason  to  hate  or  even  to  be  jealous  of  each 
other,  since,  after  all,  Russia  and  France  had 
nothing  to  envy  one  another. 

The  two  vanquished  monarchs  shared  the 
animosity  of  their  soldiers  against  England, 
and  felt  still  more  than  they  the  necessity  of 
separating  from  her,  and  obtaining  peace  im- 
mediately. The  King  of  Prussia,  who  would 
have  wished  for  it  earlier,  and  who  foresaw 
how  dearly  he  should  pay  for  having  retarded 
it,  was  of  opinion,  without  complaining,  that 
they  ought  to  solicit  it  of  Napoleon,  and  left 
the  business  of  negotiating  it  to  the  Emperor 
Alexander.  He  hoped  that  his  friend,  who 
alone  had  insisted  on  that  fatal  prolongation 
of  the  war,  would  defend  him  in  the  negotia- 
tions better  than  on  the  field  of  battle.  It  was 
therefore  agreed  that  they  should  propose  an 
armistice,  and  that,  having  obtained  this  armi- 
stice, the  Emperor  Alexander  should  seek  to 
obtain  an  interview  with  Napoleon.  It  was 
known  by  experience  how  extremely  sensible 
he  was  to  the  attentions  of  hostile  sovereigns, 
how  accommodating  on  the  morrow  of  his  vic- 
tories; and  the  recollection  of  what  the  Em- 
peror Francis  had  obtained  from  him  at  the 
bivouac  of  Urschitz,  encouraged  hopes  of  a 
peace  less  disadvantageous  than  might  be 
feared,  if  not  for  Russia,  which  had  nothing 
but  consideration  to  lose,  at  least  for  Prussia, 
which  was  wholly  in  the  hands  of  the  con- 
queror. 

In  consequence,  on  the  19th  of  June,  Prince 
Bagration  transmitted  to  Murat,  at  the  advanced 
posts,  a  letter  written  to  him  by  the  general-in- 
chief,  Benningsen,  in  which  the  latter,  deplor- 
ing the  miseries  of  war,  offered  an  armistice 
as  the  means  of  putting  an  end  to  them.  This 
letter,  delivered  to  Napoleon,  who  at  that  mo- 
ment arrived  at  Tilsit,  was  very  favorably  re- 
ceived ;  for,  as  we  have  said,  he  began  to  find 
how  much  distance  aggravated  the  difficulties 
of  military  operations.  It  was  nearly  a  year 
that  he  had  been  far  away  from  the  centre 
of  his  empire,  and  he  felt  an  urgent  desire  to 
return  thither,  to  assemble  in  particular  the 
legislative  body,  the  meeting  of  which  he  had 
deferred,  not  choosing  to  call  it  together  in  his 
absence.  Lastly,  in  listening  to  the  language 
held  by  the  Russian  army,  he  was  led  to  think 
that  he  should  perhaps  find  in  Russia  that  ally 
whom  he  needed  for  closing  the  continent 
against  England  for  ever. 


He  returned,  therefore,  an  amicable  answer, 
saying  that,  after  so  many  efforts,  fatigues, 
victories,  he  desired  nothing  but  a  safc  and 
honourable  peace,  and  if  this  armistice  could 
be  the  means  of  effecting  that,  he  was  ready 
to  consent  to  it.  Upon  this  answer,  Prince 
Labanoff  repaired  to  Tilsit,  had  an  interview 
with  Napoleon,  represented  to  him  the  dispo- 
sitions that  were  manifested  by  all  about  Alex- 
ander;  and  after  having  received  the  assurance 
that,  on  the  part  of  the  French,  the  wish  for 
peace  was  not  less  strong,  though  less  com- 
manded by  necessity,  he  agreed  to  an  armistice. 
Napoleon  required  that  the  Prussian  fortresses 
in  Pomerania  and  Poland,  which  still  held  out, 
such  as  Colberg,  Pillau,  Graudenz,  should  be 
given  up  to  him.  But  for  this  the  consent  of 
the  King  of  Prussia  would  be  necessary,  and 
he  was  then  absent  from  the  Russian  head- 
quarters. Some  resistance  was,  indeed,  ap- 
prehended on  his  part,  when  it  should  be  pro- 
posed to  him  to  give  up  fortresses,  the  last 
remaining  in  his  hands.  A  separate  armistice 
was  in  consequence  stipulated  between  the 
French  and  Russian  armies,  which  was  signed 
on  the  22d  of  June  by  Prince  Labanoff  and  the 
Prince  of  Neufchatel,  and  carried  to  the  head- 
quarters of  Alexander,  who  ratified  it  imme- 
diately. 

Marshal  Kalkreuth  then  came  forward  to 
treat  on  behalf  of  the  Prussian  army.  Napo- 
leon received  him  with  many  civilities,  told 
turn  that  he  was  the  distinguished  and  still 
more  the  courteous  officer,  who  alone,  of  ali 
the  officers  of  his  nation  had  treated  the  French 
prisoners  humanely;  that,  on  this  account,  he 
•eceived  and  granted  a  suspension  of  arms, 
without  insisting  on  the  delivery  of  the  Prus- 
sian fortresses.  It  was  a  pledge  that  he  \ras 

enerous  to  leave  in  the  hands  of  Prussia,  and 
which  could  not  give  uneasiness  to  the  French 
army,  too  solidly  established  on  the  Vistula  by 
Warsaw,  Thorn,  and  Dantzig,  on  the  Pregel 
>y  Konigsberg  and  Wehlau,  to  have  any  thing 
to  fear  from  such  points  as  Colberg,  Pillau, 
and  Graudenz.  The  armistice  was  therefore 
signed  with  Marshal  Kalkreuth,  as  it  had  been 
with  Prince  Labanoff.  The  demarcation  which 
eparated  the  belligerent  armies  was  the  Nie- 
men  as  far  as  Grodno,  and  then,  turning  back- 
ward on  the  right,  the  Bober  as  far  as  its  influx 
nto  the  Narew,  and  lastly  the  Narew  as  far  as 
3ultusk  and  Warsaw. 

Napoleon,  never  relaxing   his  usual   vigi- 
ance,  organized  himself  behind  this  line,  as  if 
ic  was  soon  to  continue  the  war  and  carry  k 
nto   the   heart  of  the  Russian   empire.     He 
drew  Massena's  corps  nearer  to  him,  and  es- 
abiished  it  at   Bialistock.     He  united   Dom- 
>rowski's  -and  Zayonschek's  Poles  into  a  sin- 
le  corps  of  10,000  men,  which  was  to  connect 
Wassena  with  Marshal  Ney.    He  placed  the 
alter  at  Gumbinnen  on  the  Pregel.     He  col- 
ected  at  Tilsit  Marshals  Mortier,  Lannes,  Ber- 
nadotte,  Davout,  the  cavalry,  and  the  guard. 
He  left  Marshal  Soult  at  Konigsberg.     He  or- 
ered  an  intrenched  camp  to  be  prepared  at 
Wehlau,  to  concentrate  himself  there  in  case 
f  need,  with  his  whole  army.    He  gave  orders 
t  Dantzig  and  Konigsberg  for  withdrawing 
part  of  the  immense  stores  found  in  those 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


319 


places,  and  sending  them  off  to  the  Niemen. 
Lastly,  he  enjoined  General  Clarke,  at  Berlin, 
and  Marshal  Kellermann,  at  Mayence,  to  con- 
tinue to  direct  the  marching  regiments  to  the 
Vistula,  just  as  if  the  war  was  not  interrupted. 
Of  the  various  measures  which  he  adopted  for 
augmenting  his  forces  in  spring,  he  suspended 
but  one,  namely,  the  calling  out  of  the  second 
portion  of  the  conscription  of  1808.  He  was 
desirous  that  this  news,  accompanying  that  of 
his  triumphs,  should  be  an  additional  reason  for 
France  to  rejoice  and  to  applaud  his  victories. 

In  this  imposing  attitude,  Napoleon  awaited 
the  opening  of  the  negotiations,  and  invited  M. 
de  Talleyrand,  who  had  gone  to  Dantzig  to 
seek  a  little  safety  and  quiet,  to  come  immedi- 
ately to  Tilsit  to  lend  him  the  aid  of  his 
shrewdness  and  patient  ingenuity.  According 
to  his  custom,  Napoleon  addressed  to  his  army 
a  proclamation  impressed  with  the  two-fold 
greatness  of  his  soul  and  of  the  circumstances. 
It  was  as  follows : 

"  Soldiers — On  the  5th  of  June  we  were  at- 
tacked in  our  cantonments  by  the  Russian 
army.  The  enemy  had  mistaken  the  causes 
of  our  inactivity.  He  perceived  too  late  that 
our  repose  was  that  of  the  lion :  he  repents  of 
having  disturbed  it. 

"  In  the  battles  of  Guttstadt  and  Heilsberg, 
and  in  that  ever  memorable  one  of  Friedland, 
in  a  campaign  of  ten  days,  in  short,  we  have 
taken  120  pieces  of  cannon,  seven  colours, 
killed,  wounded,  or  made  prisoners,  60,000 
Russians,  taken  from  the  enemy's  army  all  its 
magazines,  its  hospitals,  its  ambulances,  the 
fortress  of  KGnigsberg,  the  300  vessels  which 
were  in  that  port,  laden  with  all  kinds  of  mili- 
tary stores,  160,000  muskets  which  England 
was  sending  to  arm  our  enemies. 

"  From  the  banks  of  the  Vistula,  we  have 
come  with  the  speed  of  the  eagle  to  those  of 
the  Niemen.  You  celebrated  at  Austerlitz  the 
anniversary  of  the  coronation;  this  year,  you 
have  worthily  celebrated  that  of  the  battle  of 
Marengo,  which  put  an  end  to  the  war  of  the 
second  coalition. 

"  Frenchmen,  you  have  been  worthy  of  your- 
selves and  of  me.  You  will  return  to  France 
covered  with  laurels,  and,  after  obtaining  a 
glorious  peace,  which  carries  with  it  the  gua- 
rantee of  its  duration.  It  is  high  time  for  our 
country  to  live  in  quiet,  screened  from  the  ma- 
lignant influence  of  England.  My  bounties 
shall  prove  to  you  my  gratitude,  and  the  full 
extent  of  the  love  that  I  feel  for  you. 

"  At  the  Imperial  Camp  of  TUsit,  June  22d,  IS07." 

The  two  vanquished  sovereigns  were  in  a 
still  greater  hurry  than  Napoleon  to  open  the 


i  It  is  very  difficult  to  ascertain  precisely  what  passed 
in  the  long  conversations  which  Napoleon  and  Alex- 
ander had  together  at  Tilsit.  All  Europe  has  rung  with 
controverted  statements  relative  to  this  subject;  and 
not  only  have  chimerical  conversations  been  invented, 
but  there  have  been  published  a  quantity  of  treaties 
under  the  designation  of  'secret  articles  of  Tilsit, 
•which  are  absolute  forgeries.  The  English,  in  particu- 
lar, to  justify  their  subsequent  conduct  towards  Den- 
mark, have  put  forth  a  great  many  secret  articles  of 
Tilsit,  as  they  are  called,  some  devised  after  the  event 
by  collectors  of  treaties,  others  really  communicated  at 
the  time  to  the  cabinet  of  London  by  diplomatic  spies, 
who,  on  this  occasion,  ill  earned  the  money  that  was 
lavished  upon  them.  Thanks  to  the  authentic  and  official 
documents,  which  I  have  been  enabled  to  consult,  I 


negotiations.  Prince  Labanoff,  one  of 
Russians  who  wished  most  sincerely  for  har- 
mony between  France  and  Russia,  returned  on 
the  24th  to  Tilsit,  to  obtain  an  audience  of  Na- 
poleon. It  was  immediately  granted.  That 
Russian  noble  expressed  the  strong  desire  felt 
by  his  master  to  put  an  end  to  the  war,  his  ex- 
cessive disgust  for  the  English  alliance,  his 
extreme  impatience  to  see  the  great  man  of  the 
age,  and  to  come  to  a  frank  and  cordial  expla- 
nation with  him.  Napoleon  desired  nothing 
better  than  to  meet  that  young  sovereign,  of 
whom  he  had  heard  so  much,  whose  under- 
standing, grace,  and  seduction,  which  were 
highly  extolled,  excited  in  him  great  curiosity 
and  little  fear,  for  when  he  entered  into  com- 
munication with  men  he  was  more  certain  to 
win  than  to  be  won.  Napoleon  accepted  the 
interview  for  the  following  day,  the  25th  of 
June. 

He  determined  that  a  certain  pomp  should 
mark  this  meeting  of  the  two  most  powerful 
princes  in  the  world,  to  confer  about  termi- 
nating their  sanguinary  quarrel.  He  had  a 
large  raft  moored  by  General  Lariboissiere, 
of  the  artillery,  in  the  middle  of  the  Niemen, 
equi-distant  from  and  within  sight  of  both 
banks  of  the  river.  Upon  one  part  of  this  raft 
a  pavilion  was  constructed,  with  all  the  rich 
stuffs  to  be  procured  in  the  little  town  of  Tilsit, 
for  the  reception  of  the  two  monarchs.  On 
the  25th,  at  one  o'clock  in  the  afternoon,  Na- 
poleon embarked  on  the  river,  accompanied 
by  the  Grand-duke  of  Berg,  the  Prince  of  Neuf- 
chatel,  Marshals  Bessiere  and  Duroc,  and  Can- 
laincourt,  grand-equerry.  At  the  same  instant, 
Alexander  quitted  the  other  bank,  accompanied 
by  the  Grand-duke  Ccnstantine,  Generals  Ben- 
ningsen  and  Ouwaroff,  Prince  Labanoff,  and 
Count  Lieven.  The  two  boats  reached  the 
raft  at  the  same  time,  and  the  first  movement 
of  Napoleon  and  Alexander,  on  meeting,  was 
to  embrace  one  another.  This  testimony  of 
a  frank  reconciliation,  perceived  by  the  nume- 
rous spectators  who  lined  the  river — for  the 
Niemen  at  this  place  is  not  wider  than  the 
Seine — excited  vehement  applause.  The  two 
armies,  in  fact,  were  ranged  along  the  Niemen, 
the  half-savage  people  of  these  parts  had  joined 
them ;  and  the  witnesses  of  this  extraordinary 
scene,  little  versed  in  the  secrets  of  politics, 
seeing  their  masters  embrace,  imagined  that 
peace  was  concluded,  and  a  stop  thencefor- 
ward put  to  the  spilling  of  their  blood. 

After  this  first  demonstration,  Alexander  and 
Napoleon  entered  the  pavilion  which  had  been 
prepared  for  their  reception.1  "  Why  are  we 
at  war]"  they  asked  one  another,  in  corn- 


shall  make  known  for  the  first  time  the  real  stipulations 
of  Tilsit,  both  public  and  secret:  1  shall  furnish,  in  par 
ticular,  the  substance  of  the  conversations  of  Napoleon 
and  Alexander.  For  this  purpose  I  shall  have  recourse 
to  a  very  curious  collection,  probably  doomed  to  remain 
secret  for  a  long  time,  but  from  which  I  can  without  in- 
discretion extract  what  relates  to  Tilsit.  I  allude  to  the 
private  correspondence  of  Messrs,  de  Savary  and  De 
Caulaincourt  with  Napoleon,  and  the  correspondence 
of  Napoleon  with  them.  General  Savary  remained 
some  months  at  Petersburg  as  envoy-extraordinary, 
M.  de  Caulaincourt  resided  them  several  years  in 
quality  of  ambassador.  The  devoledness  of  the  one, 
the  veracity  of  the  other,  forbid  any  doubt  of  the  pains 
which  they  took  to  acquaint  Na;-c*on  with  the  whole 
truth  J  and  I  must  say  that  the  tone  of  sincerity  which 


320 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[June,  1807 


mencing  this  conversation.  Napoleon,  in  fact, 
was  warring  with  Russia  only  as  an  ally  of 
England ;  and  Russia,  on  her  part,  though 
justly  uneasy  about  the  continental  domina- 
tion of  France,  was  serving  the  interests  of 
England  much  more  than  her  own  in  perse- 
vering in  this  contest  with  such  animosity  as 
she  had  done.  "If  your  grudge  is  against 
England,  and  against  her  alone,"  said  Alex- 
ander to  Napoleon,  "  we  shall  easily  agree ; 
for  I  have  as  much  reason  to  complain  of  her 
as  you  have."  He  then  enumerated  his  griev- 
ances against  Great  Britain,  the  avarice,  the 
selfishness  which  she  had  manifested,  the  false 
promises  with  which  she  had  lured  him,  the 
deserted  state  in  which  she  had  left  him,  with 
the  resentment  excited  by  a  disastrous  war, 
which  he  had  been  obliged  to  wage  single- 
handed.  Napoleon,  seeking  to  discover  what 
were  the  sentiments  of  the  speaker  which  he 
ought  to  flatter,  soon  perceived  that  two  were 
then  predominant:  in  the  first  place,  deep 
spleen  against  allies,  burdensome  like  Prus- 
sia, or  selfish  like  England ;  and,  in  the  next, 
a  very  sensitive  and  deeply-mortified  pride. 
He  took  pains,  therefore,  to  prove  to  young 
Alexander  that  he  had  been  duped  by  his  al- 
lies; that,  moreover,  he  had  conducted  him- 
self with  nobleness  and  courage.  He  strove 
to  persuade  him  that  Russia  was  wrong  to 
persist  in  patronising  ungrateful  and  jealous 
neighbours,  like  the  Germans ;  or  in  serving 
the  interests  of  greedy  traders,  like  the  Eng- 
lish. He  attributed  this  mistake  to  generous 
sentiments  carried  to  excess,  to  misconcep- 
tions to  which  ministers,  incompetent  or  bribed, 
had  given  rise.  Lastly,  he  highly  extolled  the 
bravery  of  the  Russian  soldiers,  and  told  the 
Emperor  Alexander  that,  if  they  were  to  unite 
the  two  armies  which  had  fought  so  valiantly 
against  one  another  at  Austerlitz,  at  Eylau,  at 
Friedland,  but  which  in  those  battles  had  berth 
behaved  like  real  giants  fighting  blindfold, 
they  might  divide  the  world  between  them, 
for  its  own  peace  and  welfare.  He  then  in- 
sinuated, but  very  cautiously,  that,  by  waging 


pervades  that  correspondence,  is  honourable  to  both. 
Fearful  of  substituting  their  judgment  for  that  of  Napo- 
leon, and  anxious  to  enable  him  to  judge  for  himself, 
they  were  accustomed  to  annex  to  their  despatches 
minutes,  in  question  and  answer,  of  their  private  con- 
versations with  Alexander.  The  one  and  the  other  had 
interviews  with  him  almost  every  day,  tite-ii-tite,  in 
the  greatest  familiarity;  and  in  reporting  word  for  word 
what  he  said,  they  have  drawn,  without  pretending  to  dp 
so,  a.  most  interesting  and  certainly  a  most  faithful  portrait 
of  him.  Many  people,  and  many  Russians,  in  particular, 
in  order  to  excuse  this  intimacy  of  Alexander's  with 
Napoleon,  place  it  to  the  account  of  policy,  and,  making 
him  more  profound  than  he  was,  say  that  he  was  de- 
ceiving Napoleon.  This  singular  excuse  would  not 
even  be  attempted,  if  such  persons  had  read  the  corre- 
spondence in  question.  Alexander  was  dissembling,  but 
he  was  impressionable,  and  in  these  conversations  we 
find  him  incessantly  throwing  off  all  restraint,  and  say- 
ing whatever  he  thought.  It  is  certain  that  he  attached 
himself  for  some  time,  not  to  the  person  of  Napoleon, 
who  always  excited  in  him  a  certain  apprehension,  but 
to  his  policy,  and  that  he  served  it  very  actively.  He 
had  conceived  a  very  natural  ambition,  which  Napoleon 
Miflered  to  spring  up,  which  he  flattered  for  a  while, 
and  which  he  ended  with  deceiving.  Then  it  was  that 
Alexander  detached  himself  from  France,  detached 
himself  before  he  avowed  it,  which  constituted  for  a 
momen.  ;hat  falseness  which-  the  Russians  place  to  his 
credit,  but  which  scarcely  was  such,  so  easy  was  it  to 
discern  in  his  language  and  in  his  involuntary  move- 
nenU  the  change  of  his  dispositions.  I  should  be  antici- 


war  with  France,  Russia  was  spending  her 
strength  without  any  possible  compensation  ; 
whereas,  if  she  would  unite  with  France  in 
subjecting  the  west  and  the  east,  on  land  and 
on  sea,  she  would  gain  as  much  glory,  and 
certainly  more  profit.  Without  explaining 
himself  further,  he  seemed  to  take  it  upon 
him  to  make  the  fortune  of  his  young  antago- 
nist much  more  satisfactorily  than  they  who 
had  led  him  into  a  career  in  which  he  had 
hitherto  met  with  nothing  but  defeats.  Alex- 
ander, it  is  true,  was  under  engagements  to 
Prussia,  and  it  was  requisite  that  his  honour 
should  get  out  of  that  situation  unstained. 
The  Emperor,  therefore,  gave  him  to  under- 
stand that  he  would  restore  to  him  so  much 
of  the  Prussian  states  as  would  be  required  to 
release  him  honourably  from  his  engagements 
to  his  allies ;  after  which  the  Russian  cabinet 
would  be  at  liberty  to  follow  a  new  policy,  the 
only  true,  the  only  profitable  policy,  resem- 
bling in  all  respects  that  of  the  great  Cathe- 
rine. 

This  conversation,  which  had  lasted  above 
an  hour,  and  which  had  touched  upon  all  ques- 
tions without  investigating  them  thoroughly, 
had  deeply  moved  Alexander.  Napoleon  had 
opened  to  him  new  prospects,  which  is  always 
a  pleasing  thing  to  a  fickle,  and,  especially,  to 
a  discontented  mind.  Besides,  more  than 
once,  Alexander,  amidst  his  defeats,  feeling 
keenly  the  inconveniences  of  that  furious 
war  into  which  he  had  been  led  against 
France,  and  the  advantages  of  a  system  of 
union  with  her,  had  said  to  himself  some- 
thing like  what  Napoleon  had  just  been  say- 
ing to  him;  but  not  with  that  clearness,  that 
force,  and,  above  all,  that  seduction  of  a  con- 
queror, who  presents  himself  to  the  conquered 
with  hands  full  of  presents,  with  mouth  full 
of  caressing  words.  Alexander  was  seduced 
— Napoleon  clearly  perceived  it,  and  promised 
himself  soon  to  render  the  seduction  com- 
plete. 

After  flattering  the  monarch,  he  resolved  to 
flatter  the  man.  "  You  and  I,"  said  he,  "  shall 


pating  the  history  of  later  times,  were  I  to  mention  here 
what  was  that  ambition  of  Alexander's  which  Napo- 
leon flattered,  and  which  at  last  he  would  not  gratify. 
What  I  ought  to  explain  at  this  moment  is,  how  the  long 
series  of  conversations  between  Alexander  and  Messrs, 
de  Savary  and  de  Caulaincourt  could  enable  me  to  clear 
up  the  mystery  of  Tilsit.  It  was  in  the  following  man- 
ner that  I  arrived  at  this  elucidation: — Alexander,  full 
of  the  recollections  of  Tilsit,  was  incessantly  relating 
to  Messrs,  de  Savary  and  de  Caulaincourt  all  that  had 
been  said  and  done  in  that  celebrated  interview;  and 
frequently  repeated  the  conversations  of  Napoleon,  the 
expressions,  by  turns  profound  and  poignant,  which 
dropped  from  his  lips,  and  particularly  the  promises 
which  he  said  he  had  received.  All  this,  faithfully 
transcribed  on  the  very  same  day,  was  transmitted  to 
Napoleon,  who  sometimes  disputed,  at  other  times  visi- 
bly admitted,  as  not  capable  of  being  disputed,  what 
they  reported  to  him.  It  is  from  the  contradictory  re- 
productions of  these  recollections  that  I  have  derived 
the  particulars  which  I  am  about  to  furnish,  and  the 
authenticity  of  which  cannot  be  questioned.  I  have 
obtained,  moreover,  from  a  foreign  source,  equally  au- 
thentic and  official,  the  communication  of  very  curious 
despatches  containing  the  private  conversations  of  the 
Queen  of  Prussia,  on  her  return  from  Tilsit,  with  an 
old  diplomatist,  worthy  of  her  confidence,  of  her  friend- 
ship. It  is  with  the  assistance  of  these  different  ma- 
terials that  1  have  composed  the  sketch  which  I  am 
about  to  submit  to  the  reader,  and  which  I  believe  to  be 
the  only  true  one  among  all  those  that  pretend  to  de- 
scribe the  memorable  scenes  of  Tilsit 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


321 


understand  each  other  better,  if  we  treat  di- 
rectly, than  by  employing  our  ministers,  who 
frequently  deceive  or  misunderstand  us ;  and 
we  shall  advance  business  more  in  an  hour 
than  our  negotiators  in  several  days.  Be- 
tween you  and  me,"  he  added, "  there  must  be 
no  third  person."  It  was  impossible  to  flatter 
Alexander  in  a  more  sensible  manner,  than  by 
attributing  to  him  a  superiority  over  those 
around  him,  similar  to  that  which  Napoleon 
had  a  right  to  attribute  to  himself  over  all  his 
servants.  In  consequence,  Napoleon  proposed 
to  him  to  leave  the  hamlet  where  he  was  liv- 
ing, and  to  establish  himself  in  the  little  town 
of  Tilsit,  which  should  be  neutralized  to  re- 
ceive him,  and  where  they  might  treat  of 
business  themselves,  in  person,  at  any  hour. 
This  proposal  was  eagerly  accepted,  and  it 
was  agreed  that  M.  de  Labanoff  should  go  that 
day  to  Tilsit  to  make  the  necessary  arrange- 
ments. They  had  still  to  talk  of  that  unfortu- 
nate King  of  Prussia,  who  was  at  Alexander's 
head-quarters,  awaiting  what  should  be  done 
with  him  and  his  kingdom.  Alexander  offered 
to  bring  him  to  that  same  raft  on  the  Niemen 
to  introduce  him  to  Napoleon,  who  should  ad- 
dress a  few  soothing  words  to  him.  It  was 
recessarv,  in  fact,  that  Alexander,  before  he 
passed  from  one  system  of  politics  to  another, 
should,  if  he  meant  not  to  dishonour  himself, 
have  saved  some  portion  of  the  crown  of  his 
ally.  Napoleon,  who  had  already  taken  his 
determination  on  this  point,  and  who  was  well 
aware  that  he  must  grant  certain  concessions 
to  save  the  honour  of  Alexander,  consented  to 
receive  the  King  of  Prussia  on  the  following 
day.  The  two  sovereigns  then  left  the  pavi- 
lion, and,  passing  from  serious  affairs  to  testi- 
monies of  courtesy,  complimented  the  persons 
of  their  respective  suits.  Napoleon  treated 
the  Grand-duke  Constaniine  and  General  Ben- 
ningsen  in  a  flattering  manner.  Alexander 
congratulated  Murat  and  Berthier  on  being 
the  worthy  lieutenants  of  the  greatest  captain 
of  modern  times.  Parting  with  fresh  demon- 
strations of  friendship,  the  two  emperors  again 
embarked  in  sight,  and  amidst  the  applause 
of  the  numerous  spectators  assembled  on  the 
banks  of  the  Niemen. 

Prince  Labanoff  came  in  the  afternoon  to 
the  French  head-quarters,  to  settle  every  thing 
relative  to  the  removal  of  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander to  Tilsit.  It  was  agreed  that  the  town 
of  Tilsit  should  be  neutralized;  that  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  should  occupy  one  half,  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  the  other;  that  the  Rus- 
sian imperial  guard  should  pass  to  the  left 
bank  to  do  duty  about  its  sovereign,  and  that 
this  change  of  abode  should  take  place  the 
very  next  day,  after  the  presentation  of  the 
King  of  Prussia  to  Napoleon. 

Accordingly,  on  the  next  day,  the  26th  of 
June,  the  two  emperors,  conveyed,  as  on  the 
preceding  day,  to  the  middle  of  the  Niemen, 
observing  the  same  etiquette,  repaired  to  the 
pavilion  where  their  first  interview  had  taken 
place.  Alexander  brought  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia. That  prince  had  not  received  any  grace 
from  nature,  and  misfortune,  grief,  could  not 
be  supposed  to  have  conferred  any.  He  was 
an  honest  man,  sensible,  modest  and  awkward. 

VOL.  II.— 41 


He  did  not  humble  himself  before  the  con- 
queror;  he  was  sad,  dignified  and  stiff.  The 
conversation  could  not  be  long,  for  he  was  the 
prince  vanquished  by  Napoleon,  the  protege  of 
Alexander;  and  if  there  appeared  to  be  a  dis- 
position to  restore  to  him  part  of  his  domi- 
nions, which  was  probable,  but  not  certain, 
from  the  conversation  of  the  preceding  day,  it 
was  the  policy  of  Napoleon  which  granted 
that  restitution  for  the  honour  of  Alexander; 
but  nothing  was  done  for  him,  nothing  was 
expected  of  him,  so  that  there  were  no  expla- 
nations to  give  him.  The  interview,  conse- 
quently, could  not  but  be  short,  and  so  it  really 
!  was.  The  King  of  Prussia,  however,  appeared 
to  make  a  particular  point  of  proving  that  he 
had  not  wronged  Napoleon,  and  that,  if,  after 
having  long  been  the  ally  of  France,  he  had 
become  her  enemy,  it  was  by  the  effect  of  cir- 
cumstances, and  not  in  consequence  of  any 
breach  of  engagement  for  which  an  honest 
man  ought  to  blush.  Napoleon,  on  his  part, 
affirmed  that  he  had  nothing  to  reproach  him- 
self with;  and,  too  generous  and  too  sensible 
to  wound  an  humbled  prince,  he  merely  said 
1  to  him  that  the  cabinet  of  Berlin,  often  warned 
j  to  beware  of  the  intrigues  of  England,  had 
I  committed  the  fault  of  not  listening  to  this 
friendly  counsel,  and  that  to  this  cause  alone 
were  to  be  ascribed  the  disasters  of  Prussia. 
For  the  rest.  Napoleon  added,  that  France,  vic- 
torious, did  not  pretend  to  draw  the  very  last 
consequences  from  her  victories,  and  that,  in 
!  a  few  days,  they  should  probably  be  so  fortu- 
!  nate  as  to  come  to  an  understanding  relative 
to  the  conditions  of  an  honourable  and  solid 
peace. 

The  three  sovereigns  parted,  after  an  inter- 
view which  had  lasted  scarcely  half  an  hour. 
:  It  was  decided  that  the  King  of  Prussia  also 
should  come  to  Tilsit  to  reside  with  his  ally 
i  the  Emperor  of  Russia. 

At   five  o'clock  the   same  day,  Alexander 
crossed  the  Niemen.    Napoleon  went  to  the 
bank  of  the  river  to  meet  him,  conducted  him 
to  the  quarters  destined  for  him,  and  received 
him   at  dinner  with  the  highest  honours  and 
the  most  delicate  attentions.     From  that  day 
it  was  settled  that  the  Emperor  Alexander,  not 
having  his  household  with  him,  should  take  all 
his  meals  with  the  Emperor  Napoleon.     They 
passed  the  evening  together,  conversed  for  a 
long  time  in  a  confidential  manner,  and  their 
j  nascent  intimacy  was  manifested  on  both  sides 
by  a  familiarity  at  once  dignified  and  graceful. 
Next  day,  the  27th,  they  mounted  their  horses 
to  review  the  French  imperial  guard.    These 
j  old  soldiers  of  the  revolution,  by  turns  soldiers 
:  of  the  Republic,  of  the  Empire,  and  always 
heroic  servants  of  France,  showed  themselves 
with  pride  to  the  sovereign  whom  they  had 
vanquished.     They  had  not  to  display  to  him 
!  the  lofty  stature,  the   regular  and  measured 
I  march,  of  the  soldiers  of  the  north ;  but  they 
;  exhibited  that  freedom  of  movement,  that  as- 
surance of  attitude,  and  that  intelligence  of 
look,  which  accounted  for  their  victories  and 
their  superiority  over  all  the  armies  of  Europe. 
Alexander  complimented  them  highly.    Thej 
answered  his  flatteries  with  repeated  sV'ili 
i  of  "  Vive  jUlexandre  !  vine  Napoleon .'" 


322 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[June,  1807 


It  was  forty-eight  hours  since  the  two  empe- 
rors first  met,  and  they  were  already  on  such 
intimate  terms  that  they  could  speak  out  freely. 
Napoleon  then  laid  before  the  astonished  eyes 
of  Alexander  the  designs  in  which  he  would 
fain  associate  him — designs  suggested  to  him 
by  recent  circumstances. 

It  was  an  extraordinary  situation,  that  of 
Napoleon  at  this  moment.  While  showing 
conspicuously  the  greatness  of  his  genius,  the 
prodigious  height  of  his  fortune,  it  revealed  at 
the  same  time  the  weak  sides  of  his  policy,  an 
extravagant  and  variable  policy,  like  the  pas- 
sions which  produced  it. 

We  have  often  adverted  to  the  alliances  of 
France  at  that  period;  we  have  often  said  that, 
for  realizing  the  alarming  phenomenon,  hap- 
pily impossible,  of  universal  monarchy,  Na- 
poleon should  have  done  nothing  less  than 
strive  to  number  in  Europe  other  than  ene- 
mies, publicly  or  secretly  leagued  against  him, 
and  that  he  should  have  endeavoured  to  make 
himself  a  friend  there — at  least  one.  We  have 
said  that  Spain,  our  most  ancient  and  most 
natural  ally,  was  completely  disorganized,  and, 
till  her  entire  regeneration,  destined  to  be  a 
burden  to  those  who  should  unite  themselves 
with  her;  that  Italy  was  yet  to  create;  that 
England,  uneasy  about  the  possession  of  India, 
alarmed  to  see  us  established  at  the  Texel,  at 
Antwerp,  at  Brest,  at  Cadiz,  at  Toulon,  at  Genoa, 
at  Naples,  at  Venice,  at  Trieste,  at  Corfu,  as 
proprietors  or  sovereigns,  was  irreconcilable 
with  us;  that  Austria  would  be  implacable  so 
long  as  we  had  not  restored  or  made  her  for- 
get Italy ;  that  Russia  was  jealous  of  us  on 
the  continent,  as  of  England  on  the  ocean ; 
that  Prussia  alone,  the  natural  rival  of  Aus- 
tria, a  neighbour  threatened  by  Russia,  a  Pro- 
testant, innovating  power,  enriched  by  the 
possessions  of  the  Church,  was  the  only  one 
whose  political  interests  and  moral  principles 
were  not  absolutely  incompatible  with  ours, 
and  that  in  her  was  to  be  sought  that  strong 
and  sincere  friend  by  whose  means  all  coali- 
tions would  be  rendered  either  impracticable 
or  incomplete.  But  we  have  seen  that  Prus- 
sia, placed  between  the  two  parties  which  then 
divided  the  world,  wavering  and  hesitating,  had 
committed  faults  of  weakness,  Napoleon  faults 
of  strength ;  that  a  deplorable  rupture  had  en- 
sued; that  Napoleon  had  gained  the  immense 
military  glory,  had  the  immense  political  mis- 
fortune to  destroy  in  a  fortnight  a  monarchy 
which  was  our  only  possible  ally  in  Europe; 
lastly,  that  the  Russians  coming  to  the  assist- 
ance of  the  Prussians  in  Poland,  as  they  had 
done  to  the  assistance  of  the  Austrians  in  Gal- 
licia,  he  had  crushed  them  at  Friedland  as  at 
Austerlitz. 

Conqueror  of  the  entire  continent,  surrounded 
by  powers  successively  beaten,  the  one  ten  days 
before  at  Friedland,  the  other  eight  months  be- 
fore at  Jena,  the  third  eighteen  months  before 
at  Austerlitz,  Napoleon  found  himself  at  liberty 
Vo  choose,  not  between  sincere  friends,  but  be- 
tween officious,  submissive,  obsequious  friends. 
If,  by  a  concatenation  of  things,  almost  impos- 
sible to  break,  the  moment  for  attempting  a 
Russian  alliance  had  not  then  arrived  for  him, 
h»  would  have  been  able,  at  this  moment,  to 


control  Fate  in  some  measure,  to  return  sud- 
denly into  the  ways  of  sound  policy,  never  to 
leave  them  again,  and  he  would  there  have 
found,  with  less  apparent  power,  more  real 
strength,  and  perhaps  an  everlasting  duration, 
if  not  for  his  dynasty,  at  least  for  the  greatness 
of  France,  which  he  loved  as  much  as  his 
dynasty.  For  this  he  must  have  conducted 
himself  as  a  generous  conqueror,  and  by  an 
unexpected  act,  but  by  no  means  odd  though 
unexpected,  have  raised  prostrate  Prussia,  re- 
composed  her  stronger,  more  extensive  than 
ever,  saying  to  her,  You  have  done  wrong,  you 
have  not  been  candid  with  me ;  I  have  pun- 
ished you  for  it;  let  us  forget  your  defeat  and 
my  victory ;  I  am  aggrandizing  instead  of  di- 
minishing you,  that  you  may  for  ever  be  my 
ally.  Assuredly  Frederick  William,  who  had 
an  aversion  for  war,  who  daily  reproached 
himself  for  having  suffered  others  to  drag  him 
into  it,  and  who  subsequently,  in  1813,  when 
Napoleon,  half  vanquished,  presented  a  prey 
easy  to  devour,  still  hesitated  to  avail  himself 
of  the  turn  of  Fortune,  and  who  took  up  arms 
only  because  his  people  took  them  up  in  spite 
of  him, — this  king,  loaded  with  benefits  after 
Jena  and  Friedland,  forced  to  gratitude,  would 
never  have  formed  part  of  a  coalition,  and  Na- 
poleon, having  only  Austria  and  Russia  to  fight, 
would  not  have  been  overwhelmed.  If  Na- 
poleon desired  a  crown  in  Germany  for  one  of 
his  brothers — an  unlucky  and  unwise  desire — 
he  had  Hesse,  which  Prussia  would  have  been 
too  happy  to  relinquish  to  him.  He  would 
have  held  the  fate  of  Hanover  in  suspense, 
ready  to  give  it  to  England  as  the  price  of 
peace,  or  to  Prussia  as  the  price  of  a  close 
alliance.  And  as  for  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
having  nothing  to  take  from  him,  nothing  to 
restore  to  him,  Napoleon  would  have  left  him 
without  a  single  grievance,  by  reconstituting 
Prussia  on  the  morrow  of  the  joint  defeat  of 
the  Russians  and  the  Prussians.  He  would 
have  constrained  her  to  admire  the  conqueror, 
to  sign  the  peace  without  saying  a  word,  with- 
out any  more  talk  about  Italy,  or  Holland,  or 
Germany,  the  ordinary  pretexts  at  that  period 
for  disputes  between  France  and  Russia. 

What  we  are  imagining  here  was  no  doubt 
a  Utopia,  not  of  generosity,  for  Napoleon  was 
perfectly  capable  of  that  unexpected,  that  daz- 
zling generosity  which  sometimes  springs 
from  a  great  heart  eager  after  glory,  but  a 
Utopia  with  reference  to  the  combinations  of 
the  moment.  At  that  time,  indeed,  the  course 
of  events  which  leads  men,  even  the  most 
powerful,  conducted  Napoleon  to  other  reso- 
lutions. In  regard  to  alliances,  he  had,  though 
only  in  the  middle  of  his  reign,  already  tried 
all  sorts  of-  them.  No  sooner  had  he  arrived 
at  the  consulship,  the  period  of  good,  wise, 
profound  thoughts,  because  they  were  the  first 
that  the  sight  of  things  inspired  him  with  long 
before  the  corruption  which  springs  from  pro- 
longed power,  he  had  turned  towards  Prussia, 
and  made  her  his  ally.  For  a  moment  under 
Paul  I.,  but  as  an  expedient,  he  had  thought 
of  uniting  himself  with  Russia.  For  a  mo- 
ment again,  during  the  peace  of  Amiens,  he 
had  conceived  the  idea  of  uniting  himself  with 
England,  seduced  by  the  advantage  of  joining 


June,  180.'.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


323 


the  naval  powers  to  the  land  power,  but  only 
in  a  transient  manner,  and  Prussia  had  not 
ceased  to  be  still  his  intimate  confidante,  his  ac- 
complice in  all  the  affairs  of  Europe.  Having 
fallen  ouc  with  Prussia  so  seriously  as  to  de- 
clare war  against  her,  feeling  his  loneliness, 
he  made  Austria  overtures,  which  would  have 
done  little  honour  to  his  penetration,  if  the ! 
need  to  have  an  ally,  even  amidst  his  vic- 
tories, had  not  justified  him  in  seeking  not  the 
most  likely.  Presently,  apprized  of  the  treach- 
erous armaments  of  Austria,  intoxicated  by 
Jena,  he  imagined  that  he  could  dispense  with 
everybody.  Transported  into  Poland,  and 
surprised  after  Eylau,  at  the  obstacles  which 
nature  can  throw  in  the  way  of  heroism  and 
genius,  he  had  once  more  thought  of  alliance  ' 
with  Prussia.  But,  offended  at  the  answers  j 
of  that  power,  answers  less  eager  than  he  had  ! 
right  to  expect  of  her,  and  having  again  '• 
proved  victorious  as  ever  at  Friedland,  finally 
desiring  to  put  an  end  to  a  distant  war,  he 
had  been  necessarily  led,  in  turning  inces- 
santly in  the  circle  of  his  thoughts  to  that 
which  had  not  yet  had  its  day  to  that  which 
was  favoured  by  so  many  present  circum- 
stances, to  the  thought  of  an  alliance  with 
Russia.  Alienated  definitively  from  Prussia, ! 
which  had  not  the  skill  to  seize  a  moment  of  j 
returning  kindness  for  her,  irritated  to  the 
highest  degree  at  the  crafty  conduct  of  Aus- 
tria, finding  Russia  disgusted  with  allies  who 
had  so  ill  seconded  her,  conceiving  that  there 
•would  be  more  sincerity  in  Russia  than  in 
Prussia,  because  there  would  be  less  ambi- 
guity of  position,  lastly,  seduced  by  novelty, 
which  always  misleads  to  a  certain  degree 
even  the  strongest  minds,  Napoleon  thought 
to  make  Alexander  an  ally,  a  friend,  by  ac- 
quiring an  ascendency  over  him,  by  filling  his 
head  with  ambitious  ideas,  by  placing  before 
his  dazzled  eyes  spells  which  it  was  easy  to 
create,  to  keep  up  for  some  time,  but  not  to 
perpetuate,  unless  they  were  renewed  by  the 
most  dangerous  satisfactions.  The  east  natu- 
rally presented  itself  as  a  resource  for  pro- 
curing young  Alexander  satisfactions,  easy 
enough  to  imagine,  much  less  so  to  realize, 
but  which  had  all  at  once  been  facilitated  by 
an  accidental  and  recent  circumstance ;  so 
true  it  is  that,  when  the  moment  for  an  event 
has  arrived,  every  thing  seems  to  favour  it, 
even  the  most  unlooked-for  accidents. 

Napoleon  had  enlisted  the  Turks  in  his 
quarrel  by  exciting  them  to  dispute  the  pro- 
vinces of  the  Danube  with  the  conquerors  of 
the  Crimea,  Egypt  with  the  possessors  of  In- 
dia. He  had  promised  to  assist  them  by  land 
against  the  Russians,  by  sea  against  the  Eng- 
lish, and  he  had  begun  by  aiding  them  with 
his  officers  to  defend  the  Dardanelles.  Lastly, 
he  had  engaged  not  to  sign  a  peace  without 
rendering  it  common  and  advantageous  to  the 
Ottoman  empire.  But  the  unfortunate  Selim, 
hated  by  the  ulemas,  whose  power  he  wanted 
to  reduce,  by  the  janissaries,  whom  he  wanted 
to  subject  to  the  European  discipline,  had  ex- 
piated his  wise  and  generous  designs  by  a 
frightful  downfall.  The  uleraas  had  long 
manifested  a  profound  defiance  of  him.  The 
janisaries  saw  with  a  sort  of  frenzy  the  new 


troops  known  by  the  name  of  mzam-diedid. 
Both  only  awaited  an  opportunity  to  gratify 
their  resentment.  The  sultan  having  required 
the  janissaries  keeping  garrison  in  the  castles 
of  the  Bosphorus  and  of  the  Dardanelles  to 
take  the  costume  of  the  nizam-djedid,  a  revolt 
broke  out  among  them,  and  spread  with  the 
swiAness  of  lightning  among  the  companies 
of  janissaries  that  were  either  at  Constanti- 
nople or  in  the  towns  near  the  capital.  All 
thronged  to  Constantinople,  assembled  riot- 
ously in  the  square  of  the  At-Meidan  (the  an- 
cient Hippodrome)  with  their  camp-kettles 
reversed,  the  usual  sign  of  revolt,  denoting 
that  they  refused  the  food  of  a  master  who 
had  become  odious  to  them.  The  ulemas  as- 
sembling on  their  part,  declared  that  a  prince 
who  had  reigned  seven  years  without  having 
posterity,  under  whom  the  pilgrimage  to  Mecca 
had  been  interrupted,  was  unworthy  to  reign. 
The  janissaries  remaining  assembled  for  seve- 
ral clays,  had  successively  demanded,  obtained, 
and  in  some  instances  taken  without  their  be- 
ing given  to  them,  the  heads  of  the  ministers 
of  the  Porte,  accused  of  favouring  the  new 
system ;  and,  at  length,  the  revolt  becoming 
more  alarming,  the  mufti  had  proclaimed  the 
deposition  of  Selim  and  the  elevation  of  Mus- 
tapha  to  the  throne.  The  unfortunate  Selim, 
confined  in  an  apartment  of  the  Seraglio,  had 
reason  to  hope,  it  is  true,  for  the  assistance  of 
his  army  commanded  by  a  devoted  subject, 
the  grand-vizier  Baraictar.  But  this  assist- 
ance would  involve  serious  dangers,  for  it  was 
to  be  feared  that  the  appearance  of  the  grand- 
vizier  at  the  head  of  faithful  soldiers  would 
cause  the  dethroned  sultan  to  be  murdered 
before  he  could  be  rescued.  Such  was  the 
intelligence  which  Napoleon  received  at  his 
head-quarters  at  Tilsit,  on  the  24th  of  June. 
According  to  all  probability,  the  new  Turkish 
government  would  be  inimical  to  France, 
merely  because  the  overturned  government 
had  been  her  friend.  It  was  certain,  besides, 
that  the  anarchy  which  was  undermining  this 
unfortunate  empire  classed  it  with  Spain 
among  those  allies,  from  whom  more  trouble 
than  service  was  to  be  expected,  especially 
when  such  an  ally,  placed  at  the  distance 
which  separates  Constantinople  from  Paris, 
could  not  be  counselled  without  difficulty,  or 
assisted  without  delay.  Napoleon,  in  whom 
revolutions  of  ideas  were  wrought  with  the 
vivacity  natural  to  his  genius,  all  at  once 
viewed  the  events  in  the  east  in  a  new  light. 
The  statesmen  of  Europe  had  long  considered 
the  Turkish  empire  as  on  the  eve  of  dismem- 
berment, and  it  was  in  this  view  that  Napo- 
leon had  intended  to  seize  beforehand  the 
share  of  France  by  taking  possession  of 
Egypt.  He  had  for  a  moment  given  up  this 
idea,  when,  in  1802,  he  thought  to  reconcile 
France  with  all  the  powers.  He  reverted  to 
it  with  vehemence  on  observing  what  was 
passing  at  Constantinople,  and  said  to  him- 
self, that  since  it  was  impossible  to  keep  that 
empire  alive,  the  best  thing  that  could  be  done 
was  to  benefit  by  what  it  had  left  for  the  bet- 
ter arrangement  of  the  affairs  of  Europe,  and 
particularly  for  the  humiliation  of  England. 
He  had  with  him.  vanquished  out  still  form*- 


324 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[June,  1807. 


dable,  the  sovereign  whose  young  head  it  was 
easy  to  turn,  by  showing  !um  the  mouths  of 
the  Danube,  the  Bosphorus,  Constantinople, 
and  he  thought  that,  with  some  of  these  Turk- 
ish spoils,  which  sooner  or  later  must  devolve 
to  Russia,  he  might  obtain,  not  only  peace, 
which  at  the  moment  was  no  longer  doubtful, 
but  a  close,  an  intimate  alliance,  by  means 
of  which  he  should  conquer  England,  and  ac- 
complish those  revolutions  on  the  thrones  of 
the  west  which  he  meditated. 

Having  the  Emperor  Alexander  daily  at  his 
side,  either  at  reviews,  or  in  long  rides  on  the 
banks  of  the  Niemen,  or  in  his  writing  cabi- 
net, where  the  map  of  the  world  was  spread 
out,  and  where  he  often  shut  himself  up  with 
him  after  dinner,  he  mastered  the  mind  of  that 
prince  to  such  a  degree  as  to  upset  it  com- 
pletely, by  placing  before  him,  in  an  almost  un- 
interrupted conversation  of  several  days,  the 
following  views. 

A  dispensation  of  Providence,  said  he  to 
Alexander,  has  just  set  me  at  liberty  in  regard 
to  the  Porte.  My  ally  and  my  friend,  Sultan 
Selim,  has  been  hurled  from  the  throne  into 
confinement.  I  did  think  that  one  might  make 
something  of  those  Turks,  restore  to  them 
some  energy,  teach  them  to  make  use  of  their 
natural  courage ;  'tis  an  illusion.  It  is  time  to 
put  an  end  to  an  empire  which  can  no  longer 
hold  together,  and  to  prevent  its  spoils  from 
contributing  to  increase  the  power  of  England. 

Napoleon  thereupon  unfolded  to  Alexander 
the  new  projects  which  he  had  just  conceived. 
If  Alexander  desired  to  be  the  ally  of  France, 
her  solid  and  sincere  ally,  nothing  was  more 
easy,  nothing  would  be  more  advantageous  for 
himself  and  for  his  empire.  But  this  alliance 
must  be  entire,  without  reserve,  followed  by  a 
complete  devotedness  to  the  mutual  interests 
of  the  two  powers.  In  the  first  place,  this  al- 
liance was  the  only  one  that  was  suitable  for 
Russia.  What,  in  fact,  was  France  accused 
of]  of  wanting  to  rule  Italy,  Holland,  perhaps 
Spain ;  of  wanting  to  create  on  the  Rhine  a 
system  which  would  overthrow  the  old  pre- 
ponderance of  Austria  in  Germany,  and  stop 
the  rising  preponderance  there  of  Prussia. 
But  need  Russia  care  about  Italy,  Spain,  Hol- 
land 1  Germany  herself,  was  she  not  at  once 
jealous  of  Russia  and  her  secret  enemy? 
Was  it  not  doing  Russia  a  service  to  weaken 
the  principal  German  powers  1  What,  on  the 
contrary,  was  England  accused  of?  of  want- 
ing to  rule  the  seas,  which  are  the  property  of 
everybody;  to  oppress  neutral  flags,  to  which 
the  flag  of  Russia  belonged;  to  possess  her- 
6elf  of  the  commerce  of  nations;  to  fleece 
th?m  by  making  them  pay  for  colonial  produce 
v.  hatever  price  she  pleased ;  to  set  foot  wher- 
-ver  she  could  upon  the  continent,  in  Portugal, 
ja  Denmark,  in  Sweden  ;  to  take  or  to  threaten 
the  dominant  points  of  the  globe,  the  Cape, 
Malta,  Gibraltar,  the  Sound,  in  order  to  impose 
her  laws  on  the  whole  trading  world.  At  this 
very  moment,  instead  of  assisting  her  allies, 
was  she  not  endeavouring  to  conquer  Egypt? 
And  recently,  if  she  had  possessed  herself  of 
the  Dardanelles,  what  would  she  have  done 
•arith  them  ?  Now  about  these  English  cravings 
one  cannot  say  as  about  the  longings  imputed 


to  France — what  do  they  concern  Russia?  It 
was  the  opinion  of  the  great  Catherine  and  of 
Paul  I.,  that  they  deeply  concerned  Russia, 
since  both  of  them  declared  war  against  Great 
Britain  on  account  of  the  rights  of  the  neutral 
flag.  The  English  oppressed  the  commerce 
of  nations  to  such  a  degree  that  they  had  mo- 
nopolized that  of  St.  Petersburg,  all  the  capi- 
tals of  which  they  held,  and  this  became  in 
their  hands  a  dangerous  source  of  influence 
over  Russia,  for  by  merely  withholding  ready 
money,  they  could  instigate  to  murmuring  and 
to  the  murdering  of  emperors.  A  French  army, 
led  by  a  great  captain,  could,  strictly  speaking, 
come  to  the  Vistula,  to  the  Niemen:  would  it 
get  to  the  Neva  ?  An  English  fleet,  on  the 
contrary,  after  forcing  the  Sound,  could  burn 
Cronstadt,  threaten  Petersburg,  after  forcing 
the  Bosphorus,  destroy  Sevastapol  and  Odessa. 
An  English  fleet  could  shut  up  the  Russians 
in  the  Baltic  and  in  the  Black  Sea,  keep  them 
prisoners  in  those  seas  as  in  a  lake.  But 
France  and  Russia,  not  touching  at  any  point, 
having  the  same  enemies,  the  English  on  the 
sea,  the  Germans  on  land,  having,  moreover, 
a.  common  and  pressing  object  of  solicitude, 
the  Turkish  empire,  ought  to  be  upon  good 
terms,  to  concert  together,  and  if  they  chose 
to  do  that,  they  were  powerful  enough  to  rule 
the  world  between  them. 

To  these  grand  views  Napoleon  attached  a 
system  of  means  still  more  seductive  than  the 
general  ideas  which  he  had  just  developed. — 
He  was  accused  of  being  fond  of  war  for  the 
sake  of  war.  That  was  not  the  case,  and  he 
would  instantly  prove  it — Be  my  mediator, 
said  he  to  Alexander,  with  the  cabinet  of  Lon- 
don. That  character  befits  your  position  as 
the  former  ally  of  England  and  the  future  ally 
of  France.  I  have  done  thinking  of  Malta. 
Let  Great  Britain  keep  that  island  in  compen- 
sation for  what  I  have  acquired  since  the  rup- 
|  ture  of  the  peace  of  Amiens.  But  let  her,  in 
her  turn,  give  up  the  colonies  of  Spain  and  of 
Holland,  and  at  that  price  I  will  restore  Han- 
over to  her.  Are  not  these  conditions  just,  per- 
fectly equitable  ?  Can  I  accept  others  ?  Can 
1 1  desert  my  allies  ?  And  when  I  sacrifice  my 
conquests  on  the  continent,  such  a  conquest 
as  Hanover,  to  recover  the  distant  possessions 
of  my  allies,  is  it  possible  to  dispute  my  pro- 
bity and  my  moderation  ? 

Alexander  admitted  that  these  conditions 
were  perfectly  just,  and  that  France  could  not 
accept  others.  Napoleon,  continuing,  brought 
that  prince  to  acknowledge  that,  if  England 
persisted  after  such  proposals,  she  ought  to  be 
forced  to  submit,  as  it  was  not  right  that  the 
world  should  be  for  ever  disturbed  by  her;  and 
he  proved  to  him  that  they  had  the  means  of 
reducing  her  by  a  mere  declaration.  If,  said 
he,  England  refuses  peace  on  these  conditions, 
proclaim  yourself  the  ally  of  France  ;  declare 
that  you  will  join  your  forces  with  hers  to  en- 
sure a  maritime  peace.  Let  England  know 
that,  besides  war  with  France,  she  will  have 
war  with  the  whole  Continent,  with  Russia, 
with  Prussia,  with  Denmark,  with  Sweden, 
and  with  Portugal,  which  must  obey  when  we 
signify  our  will  to  them,  with  Austria  herself, 
who  will  be  obliged  to  speak  out  in  the  same 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


325 


spirit,  if  we  declare  to  her  that  she  will  have 
war  with  us,  in  case  she  does  not  choose  to 
have  war  with  England  on  the  conditions  sig- 
nified by  us.  England,  then,  exposed  to  a  uni- 
versal war,  if  she  will  not  conclude  an  equi- 
table peace — England  will  lay  down  her  arms. 
All  this,  added  Napoleon,  ought  to  be  commu- 
nicated to  each  cabinet,  and  precise  and  short 
terms  fixed  for  deciding.  If  England  does  not 
yield,  we  will  act  in  concert,  and  we  shall  find 
.sufficient  indemnities  to  compensate  us  for 
this  continuation  of  the  war.  Two  very  im- 
portant countries,  one  of  them  in  particular, 
lor  Russia,  will  perhaps  resist.  These  are 
Portugal  and  Sweden,  whose  maritime  position 
places  them  under  the  influence  of  Great  Bri- 
tain. Relative  to  Portugal,  said  Napoleon,  I 
will  settle  with  Spain.  You  will  take  Finland 
as  a  compensation  for  the  war  which  you  will 
have  been  obliged  to  wage  with  Sweden.  The 
King  of  Sweden,  it  is  true,  is  your  brother- 
in-law  and  your  ally:  let  him  follow  the 
changes  of  your  policy,  or  let  him  take  the 
consequences  of  his  ill-will.  Sweden,  repeated 
Napoleon  several  times,  may  be  a  relation,  an 
ally  of  the  moment,  but  she  is  a  geographical 
enemy.1  Petersburg  is  too  near  the  frontiers 
of  Finland.  The  fair  Hussions  of  Petersburg 
must  not  again  hear  from  their  palaces  the  cannon 
of  the  Swedes. 

Napoleon,  after  assigning  Finland  to  Alexan- 
der, as  the  price  of  the  war  against  England, 
held  forth  to  him  something  still  more  alluring 
in  the  east.  "You  are  to  act  as  mediator 
with  England  for  me,"  said  he  to  Alexander, 
"  and  as  armed  mediator  who  imposes  peace. 
I  will  act  the  same  part  for  you  with  the  Porte. 
I  will  signify  my  mediation  to  her;  if  she  re- 
fuses to  treat  on  such  conditions  as  satisfy  you 
in  the  state  of  anarchy  into  which  she  has 
fallen,  I  will  unite  with  you  against  the  Turks, 
as  you  will  have  united  with  me  against  the 
English,  and  then  we  shall  make  a  suitable 
partition  of  the  Ottoman  empire." 

Here  it  was  especially  that  the  field  of  hypo- 
theses became  immense,  and  that  the  imagina- 
tion of  the  two  sovereigns  strayed  into  infinite 
combinations.  The  first  wish  of  Russia  was  to 
obtain  at  once,  whatever  might  result  from  the 
negotiation  with  the  Porte,  some  portion  of  the 
provinces  of  the  Danube.  Napoleon  assented, 
in  return  for  the  assistance  which  Russia  was  to 
lend  him  in  the  affairs  of  the  west.  However, 
as  it  was  probable  that  the  Turks  would  not 
give  up  any  thing,  war  would  ensue,  and  after 
the  war  the  partition.  But  what  partition  7 
Russia  might  have,  besides  Bessarabia,  Mol- 
davia, Wallachia,  Bulgaria,  as  far  as  the  Bal- 
kans. Napoleon  would  naturally  wish  for  the 
maritime  provinces,  such  as  Albania,  Thes- 
saly,  Morea,  Candia.  Some  indemnities  for 
Austria  would  be  found  in  Bosnia  and  Servia, 
either  ceded  to  her  in  full  property,  or  made 
the  appanage  of  an  arch-duke;  and  thus  they 
would  endeavour  to  console  her  for  those  con- 
vulsions of  the  world,  from  each  of  which  she 
would  come  forth  lessened  and  her  rivals 
aggrandized. 


«  These  are  the  very  expressions  of  Napoleon,  re- 
peated by  Alexander,  in  relating  to  M.  de  Caulaincourt 
what  bad  passed  at  Tilsit. 


Figure  to  yourself  the  young  czai,  humbled 
the  day  before,  coming  to  the  camp  of  Napo- 
leon to  solicit  peace,  feeling  of  course  no  un- 
easiness about  his  own  dominions,  the  distance 
of  which  saved  them  from  the  coveting  of  the 
conqueror,  but  expecting  to  lose  a  large  portion 
of  the  territory  of  his  ally,  the  King  of  Prussia, 
and  to  retire  disgraced  from  this  war — figure 
him  to  yourself,  suddenly  transported  into  a 
sort  of  world  at  once  imaginary  and  real,  im- 
aginary by  its  grandeur,  real  by  its  possibility, 
finding  himself,  immediately  after  a  signal  de- 
feat, in  the  way  to  conquer  Finland  and  part 
of  the  Turkish  empire,  and  to  acquire  by  a  dis- 
astrous war,  more  than  was  formally  acquired 
by  a  successful  war,  as  if  the  honour  of  hav- 
ing been  vanquished  by  Napoleon  was  almost 
equivalent  to  a  victory,  and  ought  to  pro- 
duce the  fruits  of  one — figure  to  yourself  this 
young  monarch,  eager  after  glory,  seeking  it 
everywhere  for  seven  years  past,  sometimes 
in  the  precocious  civilization  of  his  empire, 
sometimes  in  the  creation  of  a  new  European 
equilibrium,  and  meeting  only  with  unpar- 
alleled defeats,  then  all  at  once  finding  that 
glory  so  earnestly  sought,  in  a  system  of  alli- 
ance with,  his  conqueror,  an  alliance  which 
was  to  give  him  a  share  in  the  sway  of  the 
world,  below  but  by  the  side  of  the  great  man 
who  was  pleased  to  divide  it  with  him,  worth 
to  Russia  the  brilliant  conquests  promised  by 
Catherine  to  her  successors,  which,  since  Ca- 
therine's time,  had  fled  into  the  realm  of  chi- 
meras— figure  to  yourself,  we  say,  passing  from 
such  deep  dejection  to  such  high  hopes,  and 
you  will  comprehend  without  difficulty  his  agi- 
tation, his  intoxication,  his  sudden  friendship 
for  Napoleon — a  friendship  which  assumed 
the  form  of  an  affection,  enthusiastic  and 
assuredly  sincere,  at  least  in  these  first  mo- 
ments. 

Alexander,  who,  as  we  have  already  said, 
was  mild,  humane,  intelligent,  but  fickle  as  his 
father,  rushed  eagerly  into  the  new  track 
opened  for  him  by  his  wily  seducer.  Never 
did  he  once  leave  Napoleon  without  expressing 
his  unbounded  admiration.  What  a  great 
man !  he  said  incessantly  to  those  who  ap- 
proached him ;  what  a  genius  !  what  extensive 
views !  what  a  captain !  what  a  statesman ! 
had  I  but  known  him  sooner,  how  many  faults 
he  might  have  spared  me !  what  great  things 
we  might  have  accomplished  together!  His 
ministers  who  rejoined  him,  his  generals  who 
were  about  him,  perceived  the  influence  exer- 
cised over  him,  and  they  were  not  sorry  for  it, 
for  they  saw  him  getting  out  of  a  deplorable 
scrape  with  advantage  and  honour,  judging  at 
least  from  the  satisfaction  that  beamed  from 
his  countenance. 

Meanwhile,  the  unfortunate  King  of  Prussia 
had  come  to  Tilsit,  bringing  with  him  his  mis- 
fortunes, his  affliction,  his  homely  reason,  and 
his  modest  good  sense.  Those  intoxicating 
secrets  which  enraptured  Alexander  were  not 
adapted  for  him.  Alexander  represented  his 
intimacy  with  Napoleon  as  the  means  of  ob- 
taining larger  restitutions  in  favour  of  Prussia. 
But  he  concealed  from  him  the  new  alliance 
that  was  preparing,  or  intrusted  him  with  ouly 
the  smallest  part  of  the  secret.  It  would  havf 
2E 


326 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[June,  1801 


appeared  strange,  in  fact,  that  one  of  the  two 
conquered  sovereigns  should  obtain  such  fine 
acquisitions  when  the  other  was  going  to  lose 
half  his  kingdom.  Frederick  William,  treated 
with  infinite  respect  by  Napoleon,  was  never- 
theless left  by  himself.  On  horseback,  at  the 
head  of  troops,  he  had  not  the  brilliant  grace- 
fulness of  Alexander,  the  quiet  ascendency  of 
Napoleon.  He  remained  in  general  behind, 
lonely  as  the  unfortunate,  making  his  crowned 
companions  wait  when  they  mounted  or 
alighted  from  their  horses,  an  object,  in  short, 
of  little  interest,  and  even  of  less  esteem  than 
he  deserved ;  for  the  French  believed,  from  the 
gossip  of  the  imperial  court,  that  Napoleon 
had  been  betrayed  by  Prussia,  and  the  Rus- 
sians incessantly  repeated  that  she  had  fought 
ill.  As  for  Alexander,  all  attentions  were  for 
him.  When  he  returned  from  long  excursions, 
Napoleon  detained  him,  lent  him  even  furni- 
ture, and  his  linen,  and  would  not  let  him^lose 
time  in  going  to  his  quarters  to  change  his 
dress.  A  superb  dressing-case  of  gold,  used 
by  Napoleon,  having  appeared  to  please  him, 
was  instantly  offered  and  accepted.  After  din- 
ner, which  the  three  sovereigns  took  together, 
and  always  at  Napoleon's,  they  separated 
early,  and  the  two  emperors  went  and  shut 
themselves  up  together — a  privacy  from  which 
Frederick  William  was  excluded,  and  which 
was  always  charged  to  the  same  account — the 
efforts  making  by  Alexander  with  Napoleon  to 
recover  the  greater  part  of  the  Prussian  mo- 
narchy. 

That,  however,  was  not  the  subject  discussed 
in  those  long  tete~d-teles,  but  that  immense  sys- 
tem by  which  they  were  to  hold  joint  rule  over 
Europe.  The  possible,  the  probable  partition 
of  the  Turkish  empire  was  the  continual  topic 
of  conversation.  A  first  partition  had  been 
discussed,  as  we  have  seen,  but  it  seemed  in- 
complete. Russia  was  to  have  the  banks  of 
the  Danube  as  far  as  the  Balkans.  Napoleon 
the  maritime  provinces,  such  as  Albania  and  the 
Morea.  The  inland  provinces,  as  Bosnia  and 
Servia,  were  allotted  to  Austria.  The  Porte  re- 
tained Roumelia,  that  is  the  country  south  of  the 
Balkans,  Constantinople,  Asia  Minor,  Egypt. 
Thus,  according  to  this  plan,  Constantinople, 
the  key  of  the  seas,  and  in  the  imagination  of 
men  the  real  capital  of  the  east, — Constanti- 
nople, so  positively  promised  to  the  descend- 
ants of  Peter  the  Great  by  the  universal  opinion, 
an  opinion  formed  from  the  hopes  of  the  Rus- 
sians and  the  fears  of  Europe — Constantinople, 
with  St.  Sophia's,  was  left  to  the  barbarians 
of  Asia! 

Alexander  reverted  to  this  point  several 
times,  and  a  more  complete  partition,  which 
should  have  given  Napoleon  not  only  the  Mo- 
rea, but  also  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago, 
Candia,  Syria,  Egypt,  but  Constantinople  to 
the  Russians,  would  have  pleased  him  better. 
Napoleon,  however,  who  thought  that  he  had 
done  enough,  nay,  more  than  enough,  to  attach 
ehe  young  emperor  to  himself,  would  never  go 
*o  far.  To  give  up  Constantinople,  no  matter 


•  I  have  these  particulars  from  M.  de  Meneval  him- 
self, an  eye-witness ;  and  their  accuracy  is  guarantied 
not  ocly  by  the  veracity  of  that  respectable  witness,  but 
also  LV  the  correspondence  of  Messrs,  de  Savary  and 


to  whom,  so  it  were  a  declared  enemy  of  Eng. 
land,  and  thus  let  any  one  during  his  lifetime 
make  the  most  brilliant  acquisition  that  it  was 
possible  to  imagine,  could  not  suit  Napoleon. 
He  could,  indeed,  as  in  obedience  to  a  natural 
tendency  of  things,  and  to  resolve  many  Euro- 
pean difficulties,  lastly  to  gain  a  powerful  alli- 
ance against  England, — he  could  certainly  per- 
mit the  torrent  of  Russian  ambition  to  dash 
against  the  foot  of  the  Balkans,  especially  in 
the  desire  of  diverting  that  torrent  from  the 
Vistula;  but  he  would  not  suffer  it  to  pass 
those  tutelary  mountains.  He  would  not  suffer 
the  most  striking  work  of  modern  times  to  be 
accomplished  by  any  one  before  his  face,  or  at 
his  side.  He  was  too  jealous  of  the  greatness 
of  France,  too  jealous  of  occupying  alone  the 
imagination  of  mankind,  to  consent  to  such  aa 
encroachment  upon  his  own  glory. 

Thus,  notwithstanding  his  strong  desire  to 
seduce  his  new  friend,  he  never  could  be  per- 
suaded to  any  other  partition  than  that  which 
should  take  from  the  Porte  the  provinces  of 
the  Danube,  too  loosely  attached  to  the  empire, 
and  Greece,  already  too  much  awakened  to 
submit  long  to  the  yoke  of  the  Turks. 

One  day  the  two  emperors,  on  returning  from 
a  long  ride,  shut  themselves  up  in  the  writing 
cabinet,  where  numerous  maps  were  spread 
out.  Napoleon,  apparently  continuing  a  con- 
versation briskly  began  with  Alexander,  de- 
sired M.  de  Meneval  to  bring  him  the  map  of 
Turkey,  unfolded  it,  then  resumed  the  conver- 
sation, and,  suddenly  clapping  his  finger  oa 
Constantinople,  exclaimed  several  times,  re- 
gardless of  being  heard  by  his  secretary,  in 
whom  he  had  absolute  confidence:  "Constan- 
tinople! Constantinople!  never!  'tis  the  em- 
pire of  the  world  !"1 

However,  Finland,  the  Danubian  provinces, 
as  the  price  of  the  concurrence  of  Russia  in 
the  projects  of  France,  held  out  a  prospect 
sufficiently  brilliant  to  enchant  Alexander,  for 
his  reign  would  equal  that  of  the  great  Cathe- 
rine, if  he  obtained  these  extensive  territories, 
It  was  in  consequence  agreed  that  France  and 
Russia  should  form  from  that  moment  a  close 
alliance,  at  once  defensive  and  offensive,  should 
have  in  future  only  the  same  friends,  the  same 
enemies,  should  on  all  occasions  direct  their 
joint  land  and  sea  forces  towards  the  same 
object.  The  number  of  men  and  ships  to  be 
employed  in  each  particular  case,  was  to  be 
settled  afterwards  by  a  special  convention. 
Russia  was  immediately  to  offer  her  mediation 
to  the  British  cabinet  for  the  re-establishment 
of  peace  with  France,  and,  if  that  mediation, 
on  the  conditions  fixed  by  Napoleon,  were  not 
accepted,  she  bound  herself  to  declare  war 
against  Great  Britain.  Immediately  afterwards, 
they  were  to  force  all  Europe,  Austria  included, 
to  concur  in  that  war.  If  Sweden  and  Porto- 
gal,  as  it  was  easy  to  foresee,  should  resist,  a 
Russian  army  was  to  occupy  Finland,  a  French 
army  Portugal.  As  for  the  Turks,  Napoleon 
engaged  to  offer  them  his  mediation  for  restor- 
ing peace  between  them  and  Russia;  and  if 


de  Caulaincourt.  which  proves  that,  notwithstanding  all 
the  efforts  of  Alexander,  the  limit  of  the  Balkan*  WM 
never  passed. 


June,  1807.] 


CONSULATE    AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


they  refused  this  mediation,  it  was  stipulated 
that  the  war  of  Russia  against  them  should  be 
common  to  France,  and  that  the  powers  should 
afterwards  do  what  they  thought  fit  with  the 
Ottoman  empire,  with  the  proviso  that  dismem- 
berment was  to  extend  no  further  than  the  Bal- 
kans and  the  gulf  of  Salonichi. 

These  resolutions  once  adopted  in  substance, 
Napoleon  undertook  to  draw  up  with  his  own 
hand  the  treaties,  patent  and  secret,  which ' 
were  to  include  them.  It  was  requisite,  how- ' 
ever,  that  they  should  come  to  an  understand- 
ing about  that  unfortunate  Prussia  which  Na- 
poleon had  promised  not  utterly  to  destroy,  and 
for  the  honour  of  Alexander  to  allow  it  to 
subsist,  at  least  in  part.  There  were  two  fun- 
damental conditions  which  Napoleon  had  laid 
down,  and  from  which  he  would  not  depart: 
that  is,  to  take,  for  the  purpose  of  various  com- 
binations, all  the  German  provinces  which 
Prussia  possessed  on  the  left  of  the  Elbe,  and 
likewise  the  Polish  provinces  which  she  had 
acquired  by  the  various  partitions  of  Poland. 
This  was  not  less  than  half  of  the  Prussian 
states,  in  territory  and  population.  With  the 
provinces  of  Westphalia,  Brunswick,  Magde- 
burg, Thuringia,  anciently  or  recently  acquired 
by  Prussia,  Napoleon  purposed,  by  uniting 
them  with  the  grand-duchy  of  Hesse,  to  com- 
pose a  German  kingdom,  which  he  should  call 
the  kingdom  of  Westphalia,  for  his  brother 
Jerome,  in  order  to  introduce  a  member  of  his 
family  into  the  confederation  of  the  Rhine. 
He  had  already  crowned  two  of  his  brothers, 
the  one  who  reigned  in  Italy,  the  other  in  Hol- 
land. He  should  thus  establish  a  third  in  Ger- 
many. As  for  Hanover,  which  had  belonged 
for  a  moment  to  Prussia,  Napoleon  intended 
to  keep  it  as  a  pledge  of  peace  with  England. 
With  respect  to  Poland,  his  idea  was  to  com- 
mence its  restoration  by  means  of  the  pro- 
vinces of  Posen  and  Warsaw,  which  he  should 
constitute  into  an  independent  state,  in  order 
to  repay  the  services  of  the  Poles,  who  had 
been  of  little  assistance  to  him  hitherto,  but 
might  be  of  greater,  when  they  should  combine 
the  advantage  of  organization  with  their  na- 
tural courage ;  in  order,  likewise,  to  abolish 
by  its  overthrow  the  principal  and  most  cen- 
surable of  the  works  of  the  great  Frederick — 
the  partition  of  Poland.  Napoleon  knew  not 
how  much  time  would  subsequently  permit 
him  to  take  from  Austria,  by  exchanges  or  by 
force  of  the  Polish  provinces  retained  by  that 
power ;  and,  meanwhile,  he  revived  the  king- 
dom of  Poland  by  the  creation  of  a  Polish 
state  of  considerable  extent  and  of  real  import- 
ance. To  facilitate  this  restoration  still  more, 
he  conceived  the  idea  of  reverting  to  another 
combination  of  the  past,  that  was,  to  give  Po- 
land to  Saxony.  Thus,  in  destroying  one  of 
the  great  monarchies  of  Germany,  Prussia,  he 
designed  to  substitute  for  it  two  new  allied  mo- 
narchies, Westphalia,  composed  of  many  frag- 
ments, in  behalf  of  his  youngest  brother,  Saxony, 
so  aggrandized  to  be  doubled,  and  both  destined, 
according  to  all  probability,  to  remain  faith- 
fully attached  to  him.  He  intended  in  this 
manner  tore-form  a  new  German  equilibrium, 
and  to  replace  by  two  alliances  the  strong  alli- 
ance of  Prussia,  which  he  had  lost.  He  as- 


signed, therefore,  for  limits  to  the  confederation 
of  the  Rhine,  the  Inn  in  regard  to  Austria,  the 
Elbe  in  regard  to  Prussia,  the  Vistula  in  regard 
to  Russia. 

Russia  had  not  many  objections  to  raise 
against  such  combinations,  especially  when 
once  she  had  determined  to  associate  herself 
with  the  policy  of  France.  Excepting  the  sa- 
crifices imposed  on  Prussia,  excepting  the 
restoration  of  the  kingdom  of  Poland,  she 
cared  but  little  about  these  creations,  about 
these  dismemberments  of  German  States.  But 
the  sacrifices  imposed  on  Prussia  were  em- 
barrassing for  the  Emperor  Alexander,  espe- 
cially when  he  recollected  the  oaths  sworn 
over  the  tomb  of  the  great  Frederick,  and  the 
demonstrations  of  chivalrous  devotedness  la- 
vished on  the  Queen  of  Prussia.  From  nine 
millions  and  a  half  of  inhabitants,  the  Prussian 
monarchy  was  reduced  to  five  millions.  From 
a  revenue  of  a  hundred  and  twenty  millions 
francs,  it  was  reduced  to  sixty-nine.  Alexander 
could  not  therefore  consent  to  such  a  lessening 
of  his  ally  without  some  objections.  He  sub- 
mitted them  to  Napoleon,  and  was  listened  to 
but  coolly.  Napoleon  replied,  that  it  was  out  of 
consideration  for  him  that  he  left  Prussia  so 
many  provinces ;  that,  but  for  the  desire  to 
please  him,  he  would  have  reduced  her  to  a 
third-rate  power.  He  would  even  have  taken 
Silesia  from  her,  he  said,  and  either  given  it  to 
Saxony,  for  the  purpose  of  transferring  to  the 
latter  all  the  consequence  which  Prussia  had 
possessed,  or  to  Austria,  in  exchange  for  the 
Gallicias. 

This  double  combination  would  certainly 
have  been  the  better  of  the  two.    The  determi- 
nation to  sacrifice  Prussia  once  taken,  it  had 
been  better  to  destroy  her  entirely  than  but 
half.    In  all  cases,  it  is  a  bad  system  to  over- 
throw  old  states  in  order  to  create  new  ones; 
for  old  states  are  apt  to  revive,  new  ones  apt 
to  die,  unless  you  act  decidedly  in  a  manner 
consistent  with  the  progress  of  things.    The 
progress  of  things  had  brought   with  it  the 
gradual  aggrandizement  of  Prussia,  the  gra- 
dual destruction  of  Poland  and  Saxony.    All 
that  might  be  done  in  this  spirit  would  have  a 
i  chance  of  lasting;  all  that  might  be  done  in 
!  the  contrary  spirit  had  little  chance.     To  give 
consistence  to  the  new  work,  it  was  requisite 
that  Prussia  should  at  once  be  made  so  weak, 
Saxony  and  Poland  so  strong,  that  the  former 
should  have  few  means  of  recovering,  and  the 
'  two    others   numerous   means   of    upholding 
themselves.      Not   reconstituting   Prussia   in 
I  her  integrity — a  reconstruction  which  would 
have  been  preferable  to  any  other — Napoleon 
,  had   done   better  to  destroy  her  completely 
He  thought  so  himself,  and  so  he  told  the  Em. 
i  peror  Alexander.     He  went  so  far  as  to  offer 
him  part  of  the  spoils  of  the  house  of  Branden- 
burg, if  he  would  countenance  his  plans  for 
the  more  complete  re-establishment  of  Poland. 
But  Alexander  refused — for  it  was  evidently 
impossible   for  him  to  accept  the  spoils  of 
Prussia.     It  was  bad  enough   not  to  defend 
I  her  more  strenuously,  and  to  become  the  in- 
'  terested  ally  of  the  conqueror  who  despoiled 
her.      Independently  of  the  fate  inflicteu  on 
i  Prussia,  Alexander  could  not  view  with  plea- 


328 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[July,  1807. 


snre  the  restoration  of  Poland.  But  Napoleon 
strove  to  prove  to  him  that,  towards  the  west, 
Russia  ought  to  stop  at  the  Niemen ;  that,  in 
passing  it,  to  approach  the  Vistula,  as  she  had 
done  in  the  last  partition  of  Poland,  she  in- 
curred  the  suspicion  and  odium  of  Europe; 
acquired  subjects,  long,  perhaps  even  for  ever, 
refractory ;  and,  for  the  sake  of  doubtful  con- 
quests, rendered  herself  dependent  on  neigh- 
bouring powers,  always  ready  to  foment  in- 
surrection in  her  territories;  that  it  was  re- 
quisite to  seek  her  aggrandizement  in  other 
quarters;  that  she  would  find  it  in  the  north 
towards  Finland,  in  the  east  towards  Turkey; 
that,  in  the  latter  direction  in  particular,  there 
was  opening  for  her  the  track  of  real  great- 
ness, of  greatness  without  limits,  since  India 
itself  was  in  perspective ;  that,  in  seeking  to 
aggrandize  herself  on  that  side,  she  would  find, 
on  the  continent,  friends,  allies — France  in 
particular — and  that  she  would  have  no  ad- 
versary but  England,  whose  power,  reduced 
to  that  of  her  ships,  could  never  dispute  with 
her  the  banks  of  the  Danube.  The  reasons  of 
Napoleon  were  strong,  and  had  they  been  bad, 
his  auditor  was  not  in  a  position  to  contradict 
them.  He  had  to  choose — either  to  have  no 
share  anywhere,  not  to  aggrandize  himself  in 
any  quarter,  without  preventing  the  revival  of 
Poland,  the  downfall  of  Prussia;  or  to  aggran- 
dize himself  extensively  in  the  direction  pointed 
out  by  Napoleon.  Alexander  hesitated  not. 
Besides,  he  was  so  seduced,  so  fascinated, 
that  there  was  no  need  of  force  to  decide  him. 
But  what  puzzled  him  was  how  to  render  his 
misfortune  endurable  to  Frederick  William, 
who,  seeing  the  two  emperors  so  intimate, 
might  flatter  himself  that  he  was  the  motive 
of  that  intimacy,  and  that  he  should  reap  be- 
nefit from  it.  Alexander  undertook,  embar- 
rassing as  was  the  task,  to  break  the  matter 
to  him,  and  having  communicated  to  Frede- 
rick William  the  resolutions  which  concerned 
him,  leaving  to  him  the  business  of  arranging 
with  the  supreme  arbiter,  who  fixed  the  bound- 
aries of  every  power.  Frederick  William 
received  Alexander's  communication  very 
coldly,  and  promised  to  confer  with  Napoleon 
on  the  subject.  The  luckless  King  of  Prussia, 
to  whom  Fortune  was  then  so  unfavourable, 
but  whom  she  afterwards  compensated,  was 
not  capable  of  negotiating  his  own  business 
himself.  He  was  neither  adroit  nor  imposing, 
and  if  his  spirit,  heaving  off  the  load  of  cala- 
mity, indulged  in  some  involuntary  move- 
ments, they  were  movements  of  testiness,  not 
well  befitting  a  king  without  dominions  and 
without  army.  The  town  of  Memel,  where 
the  Queen  of  Prussia  passed  her  nights  and 
her  days  in  weeping,  and  General  Lestocq's 
ten  or  fifteen  thousand  men,  were  all  that  he 
had  left  That  prince  had  a  long  explanation 
with  Napoleon,  and,  at  the  first  interview,  he 
took  great  pains  to  prove  to  him  that  he  had 
not  deserved  his  misfortune,  for  the  origin  of 
his  quarrel  with  France  dated  from  the  viola- 
tion of  the  territory  of  Anspach;  and  he  af- 
firmed most  pertinaciously  that,  in  passing 
through  the  province  of  Anspach,  Napoleon 
had  violated  the  Prussian  sovereignty.  At 
the  point  to  which  things  had  now  arrived, 


'  this  question  was  of  little  importance;  but  on 
that  subject  Napoleon  entertained  a  convic- 
tion as  strong  as  that  of  the  king.  In  passing 
through  that  province  of  Anspach,  he  had 
acted  with  perfect  sincerity,  and  he  was  as 
anxious  to  set  himself  right  on  this  point  as 
if  he  had  not  been  the  stronger.  The  two 
:  monarchs  grew  warm,  and  the  King  of  Prus- 
sia, in  his  despair,  was  hurried  into  transports 
!  of  passion,  to  be  lamented  for  the  sake  of  his 
dignity,  far  from  serviceable  to  his  cause,  per- 
plexing for  Napoleon.  Annoyed  by  his  com- 
plaints, Napoleon  referred  him  to  his  ally, 
Alexander,  who  had  induced  him  to  continue 
the  war,  when,  on  the  morrow  of  Eylau,  peace 
would  have  been  possible  and  advantageous 
for  Prussia.  "  For  the  rest,"  said  he,  "  the 
Emperor  Alexander  has  the  means  of  indem- 
nifying you — namely,  to  sacrifice  to  you  his 
relations,  the  Princes  of  Mecklenburg  and 
Oldenburg,  whose  dominions  will  furnish  a 
fine  compensation  for  Prussia  towards  the 
!  north  and  towards  the  Baltic ;  he  can  also 
give  up  to  you  the  King  of  Sweden,  from 
whom  you  may  take  Stralsund  and  that  por- 
tion of  Pomerania  which  he  makes  such  bad 
use  of.  Let  the  Emperor  Alexander  consent 
for  you  to  these  acquisitions,  not  equal  to  the 
|  territories  that  are  taken  from  you,  but  better 
;  situated,  and,  for  my  part,  I  shall  make  no 
I  objections."  Napoleon  had  good  reason  for 
referring  Frederick  William  to  Alexander, 
j  who  could,  in  fact,  have  obtained  those  com- 
pensations for  Prussia.  But  Alexander  was 
already  in  trouble  enough,  caused  by  the  grief 
I  of  his  Prussian  allies,  without  raising  up 
i  complaints,  reproaches,  dismayed  faces,  in 
|  his  own  family.  Frederick  William  would 
never  have  even  ventured  to  mention  such  a 
thing,  and  regarded  the  ofier  as  an  evasion. 
He  was,  therefore,  obliged  to  make  up  his 
mind  to  the  sacrifice  of  half  his  kingdom.  It 
was  possible,  however,  to  afl'ord  him  some 
petty  consolations,  which  had  considerably 
soothed  his  grief.  Old  Prussia,  Pomerania, 
Brandenburg,  Silesia  were  still  left  him;  the 
provinces  on  the  left  of  the  Elbe  were  taken 
from  him,  and,  in  taking  these  extensive  por- 
tions of  his  dominions,  it  was  necessary  to 
avoid  separating  from  him  too  much  those 
that  were  left  him.  It  was,  in  fact,  by  suc- 
cessive encroachments  on  Poland  that  Frede- 
rick had  connected  together  Old  Prussia, 
Pomerania,  Brandenburg  and  Silesia.  The 
question  was,  what  portions  of  Poland  should 
be  left  to  Prussia  for  the  purpose  of  binding 
those  provinces  properly  together.  Lastly, 
and  above  all,  it  was  necessary  to  decide 
whether,  in  assigning  to  Prussia  the  frontier 
of  the  Elbe  in  Germany,  the  fortress  of  Mag- 
deburg, seated  on  the  Elbe,  a  more  important 
place  than  Mayence,  or  Strasburg  on  the 
Rhine,  should  be  granted  to  her.  Napoleon 
consented  that  the  boundaries  of  Poland  should 
i  be  so  traced  as  to  connect  together,  as  much 
!  as  possible,  Old  Prussia,  Pomerania,  Bran- 
denburg and  Silesia;  but,  in  conceding  the 
Lower  Vistula  to  Frederick  William,  he  in- 
sisted on  taking  Dantzig  from  him,  and  con- 
stituting it  a  free  city,  like  Lubeck,  Bremen 
and  Hamburg.  With  regard  to  Magdeburg, 


July,  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


329 


he  was  inflexible.  Mayence,  Magdeburg, 
formed  the  entrepots  of  his  power  in  the 
north ;  it  was  not  possible  for  him  to  part 
with  them.  He  was,  therefore,  peremptory 
in  his  resolutions  relative  to  Dantzig  and 
Magdeburg, 

The  King  of  Prussia  made  up  his  mind  to 
the  loss  of  Dantzig,  but  he  was  loth  to  relin- 
quish Magdeburg;  for,  situated  in  the  heart  of 
Germany,  it  was  an  important  point  d'appui, 
and  the  key  of  the  Elbe,  which  had  become 
his  frontier.  He  urged  not  this  motive,  but  a 
reason  of  ancient  affection.  In  fact,  the  in- 
habitants of  the  duchy  of  Magdeburg,  lying 
both  on  the  right  and  on  the  left  of  the  Elbe, 
were  among  the  oldest  and  most  loyal  subjects 
of  the  monarchy.  He  gained  nothing,  how- 
ever, by  this  new  argument.  As  he  was 
very  urgent,  sometimes  with  Napoleon,  some- 
times with  Alexander,  the  latter  conceived  the 
idea  of  shaking  Napoleon  by  inviting  the 
Queen  of  Prussia  to  Tilsit,  to  try  the  power  of 
her  understanding,  her  beauty,  and  her  mis- 
fortune on  the  conqueror  of  Europe.  The 
calumnious  reports  to  which  the  admiration 
of  Alexander  for  this  princess  had  given  rise, 
had  prevented  her  from  going  to  Tilsit.  Re- 
course was,  nevertheless,  had  to  her  interven- 
tion as  a  last  expedient,  not  for  coarsely  touch- 
ing Napoleon,  but  for  working  upon  his  most 
delicate  feelings  by  the  presence  of  a  queen, 
beautiful,  accomplished,  and  unfortunate. 

It  was  late  to  try  such  a  resource,  for  the 
ideas  of  Napoleon  were  definitively  fixed,  and, 
for  the  rest,  it  was  not  at  all  probable  that,  at 
any  time  whatever,  Napoleon  would  have 
sacrificed  part  of  his  designs  under  the  influ- 
ence of  a  woman,  how  interesting  soever  she 
might  be. 

Frederick  William,  therefore,  invited  the 
queen  to  come  to  Tilsit.  She  decided  to  com- 
ply, and  the  negotiation,  which  had  already 
lasted  about  twelve  days,  was  spun  out  to  give 
that  princess  time  to  make  the  trip.  She  ar- 
rived at  Tilsit  on  the  6th  of  July.  An  hour 
after  her  arrival,  Napoleon  anticipated  her,  by 
calling  to  pay  her  a  visit.  The  Queen  of  Prus- 
sia was  then  thirty-two  years  old.  Her  beauty, 
formerly  brilliant,  appeared  to  be  slightly  af- 
fected by  age,  but  «he  was  still  one  of  the  finest 
women  of  her  time.  With  a  superior  under- 
standing she  combined  a  certain  habit  of  busi- 
ness, from  taking  an  indiscreet  part  in  it,  per- 
fect nobleness  of  character  and  dignity  of 
attitude.  However,  too  strong  a  desire  to  pro- 
duce an  effect  on  the  great  man,  on  whom  she 
was  dependent,  was  a  drawback  upon  her  suc- 
cess. She  spoke  of  the  greatness  of  Napo- 
leon, of  his  genius,  of  the  misfortune  of  having 
mistaken  him,  in  terms  not  simple  enough  to 
touch  him.  But  the  energy  of  character  and 
strength  of  mind  of  that  princess  were  soon 
displayed  in  that  conversation  to  such  a  degree 
as  to  embarrass  Napoleon  himself,  who,  while 
paying  her  the  utmost  attentions  and  respect, 
took  good  care  not  to  drop  a  single  word  that 
could  be  binding  upon  him. 

She  came  to  dine  with  Napoleon,  who  re- 
ceived her  at  the  door  of  his  imperial  residence. 
During  dinner,  she  strove  to  conquer  him,  to 
draw  from  him  at  least  one  word  from  which 
VOL.  II.— 42 


she  could  derive  hope,  especially  respecting 
Magdeburg.  Napoleon,  on  his  part,  always 
respectful,  courteous,  but  evasive,  disappointed 
her  by  a  resistance  which  resembled  a  con- 
tinual flight.  She  divined  the  tactics  of  her 
mighty  adversary,  and  bitterly  lamented  that 
he  would  not,  at  parting,  leave  in  her  soul  a 
recollection  which  permitted  her  to  join  with 
admiration  for  the  great  man's  genius  inviola- 
ble attachment  for  the  generous  conqueror. 
Perhaps,  if  Napoleon,  less  preoccupied  with 
plans  for  aggrandizing  ungrateful  royalties,  or 
for  creating  ephemeral  royalties,  had  yielded 
on  this  occasion  and  conceded  not  only  what 
was  solicited  of  him,  but  what  he  could  further 
have  granted  without  prejudice  to  his  other 
projects — perhaps  he  might  have  attached  to 
himself  the  warm  heart  of  that  queen,  and  the 
honest  heart  of  her  husband.  But  to  the  soli- 
citations of  the  princess  he  opposed  an  invin- 
cible respect.  He  had  fixed  with  his  immuta- 
ble will  all  that  related  to  Prussia,  to  Poland, 
to  Westphalia;  he  had  consented  to  a  demar- 
cation between  Poland  and  Pomerania,  which, 
following  the  banks  of  the  Netze  and  the  canal 
of  Bromberg,  ran  and  joined  the  Vistula  be- 
low Bromberg.  He  made  one  concession  in 
regard  to  Magdeburg,  namely,  that,  in  case 
Hanover  should  remain  in  the  possession  of 
France,  either  because  peace  was  not  con- 
cluded with  England,  or  because  she  concluded 
it  without  restoring  Hanover,  there  should  be 
ceded  back  to  Prussia,  on  the  left  of  the  Elbe 
and  in  the  environs  of  Magdeburg,  a  territory 
of  three  or  four  hundred  thousand  souls,  in- 
cluding the  restitution  of  the  fortress  itself. 

He  would  not  grant  any  thing  more.  M.  de 
Talleyrand  had  orders  to  confer  with  Messrs, 
de  Kourakin  and  de  Labanoff,  and  to  settle  all 
disputed  points  on  the  7th,  so  that  the  queen, 
sent  for  to  Tilsit  to  soften  the  lot  of  Prussia, 
only  accelerated  the  result,  which  it  was  the 
intention  to  prevent,  by  the  very  embarrass- 
ment which  she  occasioned  Napoleon,  through 
the  success  that  she  had  wellnigh  obtained 
by  her  solicitations,  at  once  delicate  and  per- 
severing. The  Russian  and  Prussian  nego- 
tiators, finding  themselves  summoned  pe- 
remptorilv  to  consent  or  to  refuse,  at  length 
yielded.  The  treaty,  concluded  on  the  7th, 
was  signed  on  the  8th,  and  assumed  the 
title,  which  has  become  famous,  of  TIIEATT 
OF  TILSIT. 

There  are  three  sorts  of  stipulations  : 

A  patent  treaty  between  France  and  Rus- 
sia, and  another  between  France  and  Prussia; 

Secret  articles  added  to  this  double  treaty.; 

Lastly,  an  occult  treaty  of  alliance,  offensive 
and  defensive,  between  France  and  Russia, 
which  the  two  parties  engaged  to  envelope  in 
absolute  secrecy  till  both  should  agree  to  pub- 
lish it. 

The  two  patent  treaties  between  France, 
Russia,  and  Prussia,  contained  the  following 
stipulations : 

Restitution  to  the  King  of  Prussia,  in  consi- 
deration of  the  Emperor  of  Russia,  of  Old  Prus- 
sia, Pomerania,  Brandenburg,  Upper  and 
Lower  Silesia; 

Cession  to  France  of  all  the  provinces  t.' 
the  left  of  the  Elbe,  for  the  purpose  of  com 
2  £  2 


330 


HISTORY   OF  THE 


[July,  1807. 


posing  with  them  and  me  grand-duchy  of 
Hesse  a  kingdom  of  Westphalia,  in  behalf  of 
the  youngest  of  Napoleon's  brothers,  Prince 
Jerome  Bonaparte; 

Cession  of  the  duchies  of  Posen  and  War- 
saw, for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  Polish  state, 
which  under  the  title  of  grand-duchy  of  War- 
saw, was  to  be  assigned  to  Saxony,  with  a 
military  road  across  Silesia,  affording  passage 
from  Germany  to  Poland. 

Acknowledgment  by  Russia  and  by  Prus- 
sia of  Louis  Bonaparte  as  King  of  Holland, 
of  Joseph  Bonaparte  as  King  of  Naples,  of 
Jerome  Bonaparte  as  King  of  Westphalia; 
acknowledgment  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine,  and  in  general  of  all  the  States  created 
by  Napoleon  ; 

Re-establishment  in  their  sovereignties  of  the 
princes  of  Mecklenburg  and  Oldenburg,  but 
occupation  of  their  territories  by  the  French 
troops,  for  the  execution  of  the  continental 
blockade ; 

Lastly,  mediation  of  Russia,  for  re-esta- 
blishing peace  between  France  and  England  ; 

Mediation  of  France  to  re-establish  peace 
between  the  Porte  and  Russia. 

The  secret  articles  contained  the  following 
stipulations  : 

Restitution  to  the  French  of  the  mouths  of 
the  Cattaro ; 

Cession  of  the  Seven  Islands,  which  were 
thenceforward  to  belong  to  France,  in  full 
sovereignty ; 

Promise  in  regard  to  Joseph,  already  recog- 
nised as  King  of  Naples  in  the  patent  treaty, 
to  acknowledge  him  as  also  King  of  the  Two 
Sicilies,  when  the  Bourbons  of  Naples  should 
be  indemnified  either  by  means  of  the  Balearic 
Islands  or  Candia ; 

Promise,  in  case  of  the  incorporation  of 
Hanover  with  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia,  to 
restore  to  Prussia  on  the  left  of  the  Elbe  a  ter- 
ritory containing  three  or  four  hundred  thou- 
sand inhabitants; 

Lastly,  annuities  for  life,  settled  on  the  dis- 
possessed heads  of  the  Houses  of  Hesse, 
Brunswick,  and  Nassau  Orange. 

The  occult  treaty,  the  most  important  of  all 
those  signed  at  the  moment,  and  which  the 
parties  engaged  to  envelope  in  inviolable  se- 
crecy, contained  an  engagement  on  the  part 
of  Russia  and  France  to  make  common  cause 
in  all  circumstances,  to  unite  their  forces  by 
land  and  sea  in  any  war  which  they  should 
have  to  carry  on;  to  take  arms  against  Eng- 
land if  she  would  not  subscribe  to  the  condi- 
tions which  we  have  recapitulated ;  against 
the  Porte,  if  the  latter  should  not  accept  the 
mediation  of  France,  and  in  this  last  case  to 
withdraw,  so  said  the  text,  the  European  pro- 
vinces from  the  vexations  of  the  Porte,  excepting 
Constantinople  and  Roumeha.  The  two  powers 
engaged  to  summon,  jointly,  Sweden,  Den- 
mark, Portugal,  Austria  herself,  to  concur  in 
the  projects  of  France  and  Russia,  that  is  to 
say,  to  shut  their  ports  against  England,  and 
to  declare  war  against  her.1 

The  signature  given  by  the  Russians  neces- 


i  I  am  not  giving  ihe  text,  but  a  strictly  accurate 
analysis  of  the  treaty,  the  precise  words  of  which  have 
•enlmuuU  unknown  to  this  day. 


j  sarily  deciding  that  of  the  Prussians,  produced 
i  strong  emotion  in  the  latter.  The  Queen  of 
Prussia  determined  to  set  out  immediately. 
After  dining  as  usual  at  Napoleon  -s,  on  the 
8th,  after  addressing  to  him  some  complaints, 
full  of  pride,  and  some  to  Alexander,  full  of 
bitterness,  she  withdrew,  attended  by  Duroc, 
who  had  never  ceased  to  feel  a  warm  attach- 
ment to  her,  and  threw  herself  into  her  car- 
riage, sobbing.  She  set  out  immediately  for 
Memel,  whither  she  went  to  mourn  her  im- 
prudence, her  political  passions,  the  mischiev- 
ous influence  which  they  had  exercised  on 
public  affairs,  the  fatal  confidence  which  she 
i  had  placed  in  the  fidelity  of  chiefs  of  empires, 
in  their  word  and  in  their  friendship.  For- 
tune was  to  change  for  her  country  and  her 
husband;  but  this  hapless  princess  was  not 
destined  to  witness  that  change. 

Alexander,  having  got  rid  of  his  unfortunate 
friends,  whose  sorrows  annoyed  him,  gave 
himself  up  wholly  to  enthusiasm  for  his  new 
projects.  He  was  conquered,  but  his  armies 
were  honoured ;  and  instead  of  sustaining 
losses  in  consequence  of  a  war  in  which  he 
had  met  with  nothing  but  disasters,  he  left 
Tilsit  with  the  hope  of  speedily  realizing  the 
great  designs  of  Catherine.  The  thing  de- 
pended on  himself,  for  he  could  turn  to  peace 
or  war  the  mediation  of  Russia  with  the  cabi- 
net of  Great  Britain,  and  the  mediation  of 
France  with  the  Divan.  One  was  to  procure 
him  Finland,  the  other  the  whole  or  part  of 
the  Danubian  provinces.  He  was  delighted 
with  his  new  ally.  They  promised  to  be  in- 
violably attached  to  one  another,  to  conceal 
nothing  from  each  other,  to  meet  again  soon, 
to  continue  those  direct  relations  which  had 
already  borne  such  excellent  fruit.  Alexander 
durst  not  propose  to  Napoleon  to  come  to 
see,  in  the  recesses  of  the  north,  the  capital  of 
an  empire  yet  too  young  to  deserve  his  notice  : 
but  he  would  go  to  Paris,  visit  the  capital  of 
the  most  civilized  empire  in  the  world,  where 
was  exhibited  the  spectacle  of  the  best  go- 
vernment succeeding  the  most  frightful  anar- 
chy, and  where  he  hoped,  he  said,  to  learn,  by 
attending  the  meetings  of  the  Council  of  State, 
the  great  art  of  reigning,  which  the  Emperor 
of  the  French  practised  in  so  superior  a 
manner. 

On  the  9th  of  July,  the  very  day  after  the 
signature  of  the  treaties,  the  solemn  exchange 
of  the  ratifications  and  the  parting  of  the  two 
sovereigns  took  place.  Napoleon  wearing  the 
grand  cordon  of  St.  Andrew,  went  to  the  house 
occupied  by  Alexander.  He  was  received  by 
that  prince,  who  wore  the  grand  cordon  of  the 
Legion  of  Honour,  and  who  had  about"  him  his 
guard  under  arms.  The  two  emperors,  having 
exchanged  the  ratifications,  mounted  their 
horses  and  showed  themselves  to  their  troops. 
Napoleon  desired  that  the  soldier  reputed  to  be 
the  bravest  of  the  Russian  Imperial  Guard 
should  be  ordered  to  step  out  of  the  ranks,  and 
gave  him  with  his  own  hand  the  cross  of  the 
Legion  of  Honour.  Then,  after  conversing 
for  a  considerable  time -with  Alexander,  he  ac- 
companied him  towards  the  Niemen.  They 
embraced  each  other  for  the  last  time,  amidst 
the  applause  of  all  the  spectators,  and  parted. 


My,  1807.; 


CONSULATE    AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


331 


Napoleon  remained  on  the  bank  of  the  Nie- ' 
men  (ill  he  had  seen  his  new  friend  land  on  the 
other  bank.  Not  till  then  did  he  retire,  and 
after  taking  leave  of  his  soldiers,  who  by  their 
heroism  had  rendered  such  wonders  possible, 
he  set  out  for  Konigsberg,  where  he  arrived 
on  the  following  day,  the  10th  of  July. 

In  that  city  he  arranged  all  the  details  of  the 
evacuation  of  Prussia,  and  directed  Prince  Ber- 
thier  to  make  them  the  subject  of  a  conven- 
tion which  should  be  signed  with  M.  de  Kal- 
kreuth.  The  banks  of  the  Niemen  were  to  be 
evacuated  by  the  24th  of  July,  those  of  the 
Pregel  by  the  25th,  those  of  the  Passarge  by 
the  20th  of  August,  those  of  the  Vistula  by  the 
4th  of  September,  those  of  the  Oder  by  the  1st 
of  October,  those  of  the  Elbe  by  the  1st  of  No- 
vember, on  the  condition,  however,  that  the 
contributions  owing  by  Prussia,  both  ordinary  I 
and  extraordinary,  should  be  wholly  paid  either 
in  specie  or  in  bills  accepted  by  the  intendant  ' 
of  the  army.  The  amount  was  five  or  six  hun- 
dred millions,  imposed  on  the  Hanseatic  towns, ! 
on  the  German  States,  on  the  dispossessed  j 
princes,  on  Hanover,  and,  lastly,  on  Prussia 
properly  so  called.  That  sum  comprised  both 
what  the  French  or  allied  troops  had  con- 
sumed in  kind,  and  what  was  to  be  paid  them 
in  money.  The  treasury  of  the  army,  begun 
at  Austerlitz,  would  therefore  receive  consider- 
able augmentation  and  sufficient  resources  for 
rewarding  the  attachment  of  heroic  soldiers 
to  the  most  magnificent  of  all  masters. 

Napoleon  divided  the  army  into  four  com- 
mands, under  Marshals  Davout,  Soult,  Mas- 
sena,  and  Brune.  Marshal  Davout,  with  the 
third  corps,  the  Saxons,  the  Poles,  and  several 
divisions  of  dragoons  and  light  cavalry,  was  to 
form  the  first  command,  and  to  occupy  Poland 
till  it  should  be  evacuated.  Marshal  Soult, 
with  the  fourth  corps,  the  infantry  reserve 
which  had  belonged  to  Marshal  Lannes,  part 
of  the  dragoons  and  of  the  light  cavalry,  was 
to  form  the  second  command,  to  occupy  old 
Prussia  from  Konigsberg  to  Dantzig,  and  to 
take  upon  him  all  the  details  of  the  evacua- 
tion. Marshal  Massena,  with  the  fifth  corps, 
with  the  troops  of  Marshals  Ney  and  Mortier, 
with  the  Bavarian  divisions  of  Wrede,  was  to 
form  the  third  command,  and  to  occupy  Silesia 
till  the  general  evacuation.  Lastly,  Marshal 
Brune,  forming  the  fourth  command,  with  all 
the  troops  left  on  the  rear,  was  charged  to 
watch  the  coasts  of  the  Baltic,  and,  if  the 
English  should  appear  there,  to  receive  them 
as  he  had  formerly  done  at  the  Helder.  The 
guard  and  Victor's,  formerly  Bernadotte's, 
corps  were  marched  for  Berlin. 

Napoleon  left  Konigsberg  on  the  13th  of 
July,  and  proceeded  straight  to  Dresden,  to  pass 
a  few  days  there  with  his  new  ally  the  King  of 
Saxony,  created  Grand-duke  of  Warsaw,  and 
to  agree  with  him  what  constitution  to  give  to 
the  Poles.  That  good  and  wise  prince,  far 
from  ambitious,  but  flattered,  as  well  as  all  his 
subjects,  with  the  greatness  conferred  on  his 
family,  received  Napoleon  with  transports  of 
delight  and  gratitude.  Napoleon  left  him  to 
return  to  Paris,  where  he  was  impatiently  ex- 
pected, and  which  had  not  seen  him  for  nearly 


a  year.     He  arrived  there  on  the  27th  of  July, 
at  six  in  the  morning. 

Never  had  greater  lustre  surrounded  the  per- 
son and  the  name  of  Napoleon ;  never  had 
greater  apparent  power  been  acquired  for  his 
imperial  sceptre.  From  the  strait  of  Gibral- 
tar to  the  Vistula,  from  the  mountains  of  Bo- 
hemia to  the  North  Sea,  from  the  Alps  to  the 
Adriatic,  he  ruled  either  directly  or  indirectly, 
either  personally  or  by  princes,  who  were 
some  of  them  his  creatures,  the  others  his  de- 
pendants. Beyond  were  allies  or  subjugated 
enemies,  England  alone  excepted.  Thus  al- 
most the  whole  continent  was  under  his  sway; 
for  Russia,  after  resisting  him  for  a  moment, 
had  warmly  adopted  his  designs,  and  Austria 
found  herself  forced  to  suffer  them  to  be  ac- 
complished, and  even  threatened  with  being 
compelled  to  concur  in  them.  England,  in 
short,  secured  from  this  vast  domination  by  the 
ocean,  was  about  to  be  placed  between  the 
acceptance  of  peace  and  a  war  with  the  whole 
world. 

Such  was  the  external  appearance  of  that 
gigantic  power:  it  had  in  it  enough  to  dazzle 
the  world,  and  it  did  actually  dazzle  it;  but  the 
reality  was  less  solid  than  brilliant.  A  mo- 
ment's cool  reflection  would  have  sufficed  to 
convince  one's  self  of  this.  Napoleon,  di- 
verted from  his  struggle  with  England  by  the 
third  coalition,  drawn  from  the  Shores  of  the 
ocean  to  those  of  the  Danube,  had  punished 
the  house  of  Austria  by  taking  from  it,  in  con- 
sequence of  the  campaign  of  Austerlitz,  the 
Venetian  States,  the  Tyrol,  Suabia,  and  had 
thus  completed  the  territory  of  Italy,  aggran- 
dized our  allies  of  South  Germany,  removed 
the  Austrian  frontiers  from  ours.  So  far,  so 
good — for,  to  finish  the  territorial  emancipation 
of  Italy,  to  secure  friends  in  Germany,  to  place 
new  spaces  between  Austria  and  France,  was 
assuredly  consistent  with  sound  policy.  But 
in  the  intoxication  produced  by  the  prodigious 
campaign  of  1805,  to  change  arbitrarily  the 
face  of  Europe,  and  instead  of  being  content 
to  modify  the  past,  which  is  the  greatest  tri- 
umph given  to  the  hand  of  man,  instead  of 
keeping  up  for  our  profit  the  old  rivalship  of 
Prussia  and  Austria  by  advantages  granted  to 
the  one  over  the  other — to  wrest  the  Germanic 
sceptre  from  Austria  without  giving  it  to  Prus- 
sia; to  convert  their  antagonism  into  a  com- 
mon hatred  of  France  ;  to  create,  by  the  title 
of  Confederation  of  the  Rhine,  a  pretended 
French  Germany,  composed  of  French  princes, 
to  whom  their  subjects  had  a  natural  antipathy, 
of  German  princes,  unthankful  for  our  gifts, 
and  after  rendering  by  this  unjust  displacement 
of  the  boundary  of  the  Rhine,  war  with  Prus- 
sia inevitable,  war  impolitic  as  it  was  glorious, 
to  suffer  one's  self  to  be  carried  by  the  torrent 
of  victory  to  the  banks  of  the  Vistula,  and  on 
arriving  there  to  attempt  the  restoration  of 
Poland,  having  on  one's  rear  Prussia,  van 
quished  but  fuming,  Austria  secretly  implaca 
ble — all  this,  admirable  as  a  military  work, 
was,  as  a  political  work,  imprudent,  extrava- 
gant, chimerical. 

With  the  aid  of  his  genius,  Napoleon  up- 
held himself  at  these  perilous  extremities,  tri- 


332 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[July,  1807. 


umphed  over  all  obstacles,  distances,  climate, 
mud,  cold — and  completed  on  the  Niemen  the 
defeat  of  the  continental  powers.  But,  at  the 
bottom,  he  was  anxious  to  put  an  end  to  this 
daring  expedition,  and  his  whole  conduct  at 
Tilsit  betokens  that  situation.  Having  es- 
tranged for  ever  the  heart  of  Prussia,  which 
he  had  not  the  good  idea  to  attach  to  himself 
for  ever  by  a  signal  act  of  generosity,  enlight- 
ened respecting  the  sentiments  of  Austria, 
feeling,  how  victorious  soever  he  might  be,  the 
necessity  for  making  himself  an  alliance,  he 
accepted  that  of  Russia,  which  presented  itself 
at  the  moment,  and  conceived  a  new  system 
of  policy  founded  on  a  single  principle — the 
concurrence  of  two  ambitions,  Russian  and 
French,  to  do  whatever  they  pleased  in  the 
world — a  mischievous  concurrence,  for  it  be- 
hoved France  not  to  allow  Russia  to  do  every 
thing,  and  above  all  not  to  allow  herself  to  do 
every  thing.  After  having  aggravated,  by  the 
treaty  of  Tilsit,  the  deep  ranklings  of  Germany, 
by  creating  in  her  bosom  a  French  royalty 
which  must  cost  us  in  men,  money,  animosi- 
ties to  overcome  vain  counsels,  all  that  those 
of  Naples  and  Holland  already  cost  us :  after 
having  half  reconstituted  Prussia,  instead  of 
restoring  or  destroying  her  entirely ;  after  hav- 
ing, in  like  manner,  half  reconstituted  Poland, 
and  done  every  thing  in  an  incomplete  man- 
ner, because  at  these  distances  time  pressed, 
the  strength  began  to  fail,  Napoleon  made 
irreconcilable  enemies,  impotent  or  doubtful 
friends,  raised,  in  short,  an  immense  edifice,  in 
which  every  thing  was  new  from  bottom  to  top, 
an  edifice  run  up  so  rapidly  that  the  founda- 
tion had  not  had  time  to  settle,  the  mortar  to 
harden. 

But,  if  every  thing  is  censurable  in  our  opi- 
nion in  the  political  work  of  Tilsit,  brilliant  as 
it  may  appear,  all  is  admirable,  on  the  con- 
trary, in  the  conduct  of  the  military  operations. 
That  army  of  the  camp  of  Boulogne,  which, 
carried  with  incredible  despatch  from  the  strait 
of  Calais  to  the  sources  of  the  Danube,  enve- 
loped the  Austrians  at  Ulm,  drove  back  the 
Russians  upon  Vienna,  finished  by  crushing 
both  at  Austerlitz,  having  then  rested  some 
months  in  Franconia,  soon  recommenced  its 


j  victorious  march,  entered  Saxony,  surprised 
;  the  Prussian  armj'  in  retreat,  broke  it  up  by  a 
j  single  stroke  at  Jena,  pursued  it  without  inter- 
mission, turned  it,  took  it  to  the  last  man  on 
the  shores  of  the  Baltic;  that  army  which, 
diverted  from  north  to  east,  ran  to  meet  the 
Russians,  hurled  them  into  the  Pregel,  then 
exhibited  the  unheard  of  spectacle  of  a  French 
army  quietly  encamped  on  the  Vistula,  then 
suddenly  disturbed  in  its  quarters,  left  them  to 
punish  the  Russians,  reached  them  at  Eylau, 
fought,  though  perishing  with  cold  and  hunger, 
a  bloody  battle  with  them,  returned  after  that 
battle  to  its  quarters,  and  there,  encamped 
again  upon  snow  in  such  a  manner  that  its 
repose  alone  covered  a  great  siege,  fed,  re- 
cruited during  a  long  winter,  at  distances 
which  baffle  all  administration,  resumed  its 
arms  in  spring,  and,  this  time,  Nature  assist- 
ing genius,  placed  itself  between  the  Russians 
and  their  base  of  operation,  compelled  them, 
in  order  to  regain  Kunigsberg,  to  cross  the 
river  before  its  face,  flung  them  into  it  at  Fried- 
land,  and  thus  terminated  by  a  splendid  vic- 
tory, and  on  the  banks  of  the  Niemen,  the 
longest,  the  most  daring  expedition,  not  through 
defenceless  Persia  or  India,  like  the  army  of 
Alexander,  but  through  Europe,  swarming  with 
soldiers  as  well  disciplined  as  brave — this  is 
unparalleled  in  the  history  of  ages,  this  is 
worthy  of  the  everlasting  admiration  of  men, 
this  combines  all  qualities,  celerity  and  slow- 
ness, daring  and  prudence,  the  art  of  fighting 
and  the  art  of  marching,  the  genius  of  war 
and  that  of  administration,  and  these  things, 
so  diverse,  so  rarely  united,  always  opportune, 
always  at  the  moment  when  they  were  needed 
to  ensure  success.  Every  one  will  ask  him- 
self how  it  was  possible  to  display  so  much 
prudence  in  war,  so  little  in  politics.  The 
answer  will  be  easy, — in  war  Napoleon  was 
guided  by  his  genius,  in  politics  by  his  passions. 
We  shall  add  in  conclusion,  that  the  edifice 
so  hastily  constructed  might  have  stood  for 
some  time,  had  not  new  weights,  accumulated 
on  its  already  overladen  foundations,  occa- 
sioned its  downfall.  The  fortune  of  France, 
though  endangered  at  Tilsit,  was  not,  therefore, 
inevitably  ruined,  and  her  glory  was  immense. 


July,  1V)7.]  CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE.  833 

BOOK  XXVIII. 

FONTAINEBLEAU. 

Joy  caused  in  France  and  in  the  Allied  Countries  by  the  Peace  of  Tilsit — First  Acts  of  Napoleon  after  his  Return  to 
Paris — Mission  of  General  Savary  to  St.  Petersburg — Fresh  Distribution  of  the  French  Troops  in  the  North — Marshal 
Brune's  Qnrps  (TArm£e  directed  to  occupy  Swedish  Pomerania  and  to  besiege  Stralsund,  in  case  of  the  Resumption 
of  Hostilities  against  Sweden — Solicitations  to  induce  Denmark  to  enter  into  the  New  Continental  Coalition — Seizure 
of  English  Merchandise  over  the  whole  Continent — First  Explanations  of  Napoleon  with  Spain,  after  the  Restoration 
of  Peace  —Summons  addressed  to  Portugal,  in  order  to  compel  her  to  drive  the  English  out  of  Lisbon  and  Oporto- 
Assemblage  of  a  French  Army  at  Bayoune — Similar  Measures  in  regard  to  Italy — Occupation  of  Corf  u — Disposition* 
relative  to  the  Navy — Events  which  occurred  at  Sea  from  the  Month  of  October,  1805.  to  the  Month  of  July,  1807 — 
System  of  cruizing  Squadrons — Squadron  of  Captain  L'llermitte  on  the  Coast  of  Africa,  of  Kear-Admiral  Willaumei 
on  the  Coasts  of  both  Americas,  of  Captain  Leduc  in  the  Northern  Seas — Succours  sent  to  the  French  Colonies,  and 
State  of  those  Colonies — Increased  attention  of  Napoleon  to  the  Navy — System  of  Naval  Warfare,  which  he  deter- 
mines to  pursue — Internal  Affairs  of  the  French  Empire — Changes  in  the  high  Offices — M.  de  Talleyrand  appointed 
Vice-Grand  Elector,  Prince  Berthier  Vice-Constable — M.  de  Champagny  appointed  Minister  for  Foreign  Affairs, 
M.  Crete  t  Minister  of  the  Interior,  General  Clarke  Minister  of  War — Death  of  M.  Portal  is  who  is  succeeded  by 
M.  Bigot  de  Preameneu — Definitive  Suppression  of  the  Tribunate — Purification  of  the  Magistracy — State  of  the 
Finances — Budgets  of  1806  and  1807 — Balance  re-established  between  the  Receipts  and  the  Expenses,  without  having 
recourse  to  Loans — Creation  of  the  Gmse  de  Service, — Institution  of  the  Court  of  Accounts — Public  Works — Loan's 
derived  for  these  Works  from  the  Treasury  of  the  Army — Assignments  granted  to  the  Marshals,  Generals,  Officers, 
and  Soldiers — Institution  of  Titles  of  Nobility — State  of  Manners  and  of  French  Society — Character  of  Literature  and 
of  the  Arts  and  Sciences  under  Napoleon — Legislative  Session  of  1807 — Adoption  of  the  Code  of  Commerce — Marriage 
of  Prince  Jerome — Close  of  the  short  Session  of  1807,  and  translation  of  the  Imperial  Court  to  Fontaiiirhlcati — 
Affairs  in  Europe  during  the  Three  Mouths  devoted  by  Napoleon  to  the  Internal  Affairs  of  the  Empire — state  of  tba 
Court  of  St.  Petersburg  since  the  Peace  of  Tilsit — Efforts  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  to  reconcile  Russia  with  France 
— He  offers  his  Mediation  to  the  British  Cabinet — State  of  Parties  in  England — The  Fox  and  Gr>-nville  Administra- 
tion is  succeeded  by  that  of  Canning  and  Castlereagh — Dissolution  of  Parliament — Formation  of  a  Majority  favour- 
able to  the  new  Ministry — Evasive  answer  to  the  offer  of  the  Mediation  of  Russia,  and  despatch  of  a  Fleet  to 
Copenhagen,  to  secure  the  Danish  Navy — Landing  of  English  Troops  under  the  Walls  of  Copenhagen,  and  Prepara- 
tions for  Bombardment — The  Danes  summoned  to  give  up  their  Fleet — On  their  refusal,  the  English  bombard  the 
City  for  three  Days  and  three  Nights — Disastrous  Fate  of  Copenhagen — General  indignation  in  Europe,  and  re- 
doubled Hostilities  against  England — Efforts  of  the  latter  to  cause  the  odious  Act  committed  by  her  against  Denmark 
to  be  approved  at  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg — Dispositions  produced  in  the  Court  of  Russia  by  recent  Events — She 
determines  to  ally  herself  more  closely  with  Napoleon,  in  order  to  obtain  thereby  Moldavia  and  Wallnchia,  in 
addition  to  Finland — Solicitations  of  Alexander  to  Napoleon — Resolutions  of  the  latter,  after  the  Disaster  of  Copen- 
hagen— He  encourages  Russia  to  take  possession  of  Finland,  keeps  up  his  hopes  in  regard  to  the  Danubian  Pro- 
vinces, concludes  an  arrangement  with  Austria,  moves  his  troops  from  the  North  towards  the  South  of  Italy,  with 
a  view  to  prepare  an  expedition  against  Sicily,  re-organizes  the  Boulogne  flotilla,  and  hastens  the  invasion  of  Por- 
tugal— Formation  of  a  second  Oarps  d'Armce  to  support  the  march  of  General  Junot  towards  Lisbon,  under  the 
designation  of  Second  Corps  of  Observation  of  the  Gironde — The  Question  concerning  Portugal  gives  rise  to  that  of 
Spain — Inclinations  and  hesitations  of  Napoleon  in  regard  to  Spain — The  systematic  idea  of  excluding  Bourbons 
from  all  the  thrones  of  Europe  is  gradually  formed  in  his  mind — The  want  of  a  sufficient  pretext  for  dethroning 
Charles  IV.  causes  liim  to  hesitate — The  part  performed  by  M.  de  -Talleyrand  and  Prince  Cambaceres  on  this  occa- 
sion— Napoleon  determines  upon  a  provisional  partition  of  Portugal  with  the  Court  of  Madrid,  and  signs  the  Treaty 
of  Fontainebleau  on  the  27th  of  October — While  he  is  disposed  to  an  adjournment  in  regard  to  Spain,  important 
occurrences  at  the  Escurial  demand  his  whole  attention — State  of  the  Court  of  Madrid — Administration  of  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace — The  Navy,  the  Army,  the  Finances,  the  Commerce  of  Spain  in  1807 — Parties  into  which  the 
Court  is  divided — Party  of  the  Queen  and  the  Prince  of  the  Peace — Party  of  Ferdinand,  Prince  of  the  Asturias — An 
Illness  of  Charles  IV.,  which  excites  fears  for  his  life,  suggests  to  the  Queen  and  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  the  idea  of 
depriving  Ferdinand  of  the  throne — Means  devised  by  the  latter  to  defend  himself  against  the  plans  of  his  enemies 
—He  addresses  himself  to  Napoleon  to  obtain  the  hand  of  a  French  Princess — Some  imprudences  committed  by  him 
excite  suspicion  respecting  his  way  of  living,  and  occasion  the  seizure  of  his  papers — Arrest  of  the  Prince  and  com- 
mencement of  a  criminal  process  against  him  and  his  friends — Charles  IV.  reveals  to  Napoleon  what  is  passing  in 
his  family — Napoleon,  urged  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Spain,  forms  a  third  Oorpt  d'Armee,  towards  the  Pyrenees, 
and  gives  orders  for  the  departure  of  the  troops  by  post — While  he  is  preparing  to  interfere,  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  alarmed  at  the  effect  produced  by  the  arrest  of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  decides  to  obtain  his  pardon,  if  he 
will  mate  a  disgraceful  submission — Pardon  and  humiliation  of  Ferdinand — Temporary  calm  in  the  affairs  of  Spain 
— Napoleon  takes  advantage  of  it  to  visit  Italy — He  sets  out  from  Fontainebleau  for  Milan  about  the  middle  of 
November,  1807. 


THE  peace  of  Tilsit  had  caused  profound  and 
universal  joy  in  France.  Under  the  conqueror 
of  Austerlitz,  of  Jena,  of  Friedland,  people 
could  not  be  afi  aid  of  war ;  yet  they  had  felt  a 
moment's  uneasiness  on  seeing  him  venture  so 
far  in  such  a  rancorous  struggle ;  and  more- 
over a  secret  instinct  said  plainly  to  some,  in- 
distinctly to  all,  that,  in  his  career,  as  in  every 
other,  a  man  must  know  where  to  stop ;  that, 
after  successes,  there  might  come  reverses ; 
that  Fortune,  prone  to  be  fickle,  ought  not  to 


They  felt,  besides,  the  want  of  peace  and  of 
its  soothing  enjoyments.  Napoleon  had,  it  is 
true,  procured  for  France  internal  security, 
and  to  such  a  degree  had  he  procured  it  for 
her,  that  during  an  absence  of  nearly  a  year, 
and  at  a  distance  of  400  or  500  leagues,  no 
disturbance  whatever  had  broken  out. 

A  brief  anxiety,  produced  by  the  carnage 
of  Eylau,  by  the  dearth  of  provisions  during 
the  winter,  by  the  timid  language  held  in  the 
drawing-rooms  of  certain  discontented  persons, 


be  pushed  to  extremity;    and  that   Napoleon    had  been  the  only  agitation  that  marked  the' 
would  be   the  only  one  of  the  three  or  four    crisis    through  which   the   country   had    just 


heroes  of  humanity,  whom  she  would  not  have 
doomed  to  expiate  her  favours,  if  he  ventured 
to  abuse  them.  In  all  human  things  there  is  a 
limit,  which  must  not  be  overstepped,  and,  ac- 
cording to  an  impression  which  was  then  gene- 
ral, Napoleon  was  approaching  that  limit, 
•which  the  mind  discerns  more  easily  than  the 
passions  choose  to  recognise  it. 


passed.  But,  though  the  people  no  longer 
dreaded  the  horrors  of  '93,  and  indulged  an 
entire  confidence,  still  it  was  on  condition  that 
Napoleon  should  live,  and  that  he  should  cease 
to  expose  his  precious  person  in  the  field ;  it 
was  with  the  desire  of  enjoying,  without  any 
mixture  of  uneasiness,  the  immense  prosperity 
which  he  had  conferred  on  France.  Those  wi« 


334 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[July,  1807. 


were  indebted  to  him  for  high  situations  aspired 
to  enjoy  them ;  the  classes  that  live  by  agri- 
culture, industry,  and  commerce — that  is  to 
say,  nearly  the  whole  of  the  nation,  wished  at 
length  to  profit  by  the  consequences  of  the  re- 
volution and  the  vast  extent  of  markets  opened 
to  France  ;  for,  if  the  seas  were  closed  against 
us,  the  entire  Continent  offered  itself  to  our 
activity,  to  the  exclusion  of  British  industry. 
The  seas  themselves  would,  it  was  hoped,  be 
opened  afresh  in  consequence  of  the  negotia- 
tions of  Tilsit.  The  two  greatest  powers  of  the 
Continent,  enlightened  respecting  the  conform- 
ity of  their  present  interest,  the  uselessness  of 
their  contest,  had,  in  fact,  been  seen  embrac- 
ing each  other,  in  a  manner,  on  the  banks  of 
the  Niemen,  in  the  person  of  their  sovereigns, 
and  joining  to  shut  out  England  from  the  shores 
of  Europe,  and  to  turn  the  efforts  of  all  nations 
against  her ;  and  people  flattered  themselves 
that  this  power,  alarmed  at  her  loneliness  in 
1807,  as  in  1802,  would  accept  peace  on  mode- 
rate conditions.  It  was  not  to  be  supposed 
that  the  mediation  of  the  Russian  cabinet, 
which  had  just  been  offered  her,  rendering 
easy  to  her  pride  a  pacification  claimed  by  her 
interests,  could  be  rejected.  On  the  Continent 
people  enjoyed  peace ;  they  had  a  glimpse  of 
peace  on  the  seas ;  and  they  were  happy  at 
once  in  what  they  possessed  and  what  they 
hoped  for.  The  army,  upon  which  rested  more 
particularly  the  burden  of  the  war,  was  not, 
however,  so  eager  after  peace  as  the  rest  of 
the  nation.  Its  principal  leaders,  it  is  true, 
who  had  already  seen  so  many  distant  coun- 
tries and  bloody  battles,  who  were  covered 
with  glory,  whom  Napoleon  was  about  to  load 
with  wealth,  wished,  like  the  nation  itself,  to 
enjoy  all  that  they  had  acquired.  A  great 
number  of  old  soldiers,  assured  of  their  share 
in  the  munificence  of  Napoleon,  were  of  the 
same  way  of  thinking.  But  the  young  gene- 
rals, the  young  officers,  the  young  soldiers,  and 
these  formed  a  great  part  of  the  army,  desired 
nothing  better  than  to  see  fresh  occasions  of 
glory  and  fortune  springing  up.  At  any  rate, 
after  a  severe  campaign,  an  interval  of  rest 
was  not  displeasing  to  them ;  and  we  may  say, 
that  the  peace  of  Tilsit  was  hailed  by  the  una- 
nimous acclamations  of  the  nation  and  of  the 
army,  of  France  and  of  Europe,  of  the  victors 
And  of  the  vanquished.  Excepting  England, 
who  found  the  Continent  once  more  united 
against  her ;  excepting  Austria,  who  had  for  a 
moment  hoped  for  the  ruin  of  her  controller ; 
there  was  not  a  person  but  applauded  this 
peace,  following  suddenly  upon  the  greatest 
bustle  of  warfare  that  has  occurred  in  modern 
times. 

Napoleon  was  awaited  with  impatience;  for, 
besides  the  reasons  which  people  had  to  take 
no  pleasure  in  observing  his  absences,  always 
occasioned  by  war,  they  were  glad  to  know 
that  he  was  near  them,  watching  over  the 
peace  of  the  whole  world,  and  endeavouring  to 
ilraw  from  his  inexhaustible  genius  new  sources 
«f  prosperity.  Tl.e  cannon  of  the  Invalides, 
which  proclaimed  his  arrival  at  the  palace  of 
St.  Cloud,  pealed  in  all  hearts  as  the  signal  of 
the  happiest  event ;  and  at  night  a  general 
illumination,  not  commanded  either  by  the  po- 
lice of  Paris,  or  by  the  threats  of  the  mob,  and 
•which  was  displayed  in  the  windows  of  the 


citizens  as  well  as  on  the  fronts  of  the  public 
edifices,  attested  a  feeling  of  joy,  genuine, 
spontaneous,  universal. 

My  reason,  tempered  by  time,  enlightened 
by  experience,  is  well  aware  of  all  the  dangers 
concealed  beneath  this  immeasurable  greatness, 
— dangers,  moreover,  which  it  is  easy  to  appre- 
ciate after  the  event.  Still,  though  devoted  to 
the  modest  worship  of  good  sense,  let  me  be 
allowed  a  moment  of  enthusiasm  for  so  many 
wonders,  which  did  not  last,  but  which  might 
have  lasted,  and  to  relate  them  with  an  entire 
forgetfulness  of  the  calamities  which  followed. 
In  order  to  retrace  with  a  more  just  feeling 
those  times  so  different  from  ours,  I  will  not 
turn  my  eyes  to  those  calamitous  days  which 
have  since  succeeded,  until  they  arrive. 

A  vulgar  sign,  but  a  true  one,  of  the  dispo- 
sition of  minds,  is  the  rate  of  the  public  funds 
in  the  great  modern  States  which  make  use  of 
credit,  and  which,  in  a  vast  market,  called  Ex- 
change, permit  the  sale  and  purchase  of  the 
titles  of  loans  which  they  have  contracted  with 
the  capitalists  of  all  nations.  The  6  per  cent, 
stock,  (signifying,  as  everybody  knows,  an  in- 
terest of  5  allowed  for  a  nominal  capital  of 
100,)  which  Napoleon  had  found  at  12  francs 
on  the  18th  Brumaire,  and  which  afterwards 
rose  to  60,  got  up,  after  the  battle  of  Auster- 
litz,  to  70,  and  then  passed  that  point  to  reach 
90,  a  height  at  that  time  unprecedented  in 
trance.  The  disposition  to  confidence  was 
even  so  strong,  that  the  price  of  this  stock  rose 
still  higher,  and  towards  the  end  of  July,  1807, 
reached  92  and  93.  Previously  to  the  time  of 
the  assignats,  when  a  fondness  for  financial 
speculations  did  not  exist, — when  the  public 
funds  had  not  yet  made  the  fortune  of  great 
speculators,  and  had,  on  the  contrary,  brought 
ruin  on  the  legitimate  creditors  of  the  State, — 
when  the  value  of  money  was  such  that  it  was 
easy  to  find  in  solid  depositories  an  interest  of 
6  or  7  per  cent., — it  required  immense  confi- 
dence in  the  established  government  to  cause 
the  titles  of  the  perpetual  debt  to  be  accepted 
at  an  interest  of  5  per  cent. 

On  the  morning  of  the  27th  of  July,  Napo- 
leon arrived  at  the  palace  of  St.  Cloud,  where 
he  was  accustomed  to  pass  the  summer.  With 
the  princesses  of  his  family,  eager  to  see  him 
again,  were  assembled  the  grand  dignitaries, 
the  ministers,  and  the  principal  members  of 
the  bodies  of  the  State.  Confidence  and  joy 
beamed  from  his  face.  "  There,"  said  he, 
"you  are  sure  of  continental  peace;  and,  as 
for  maritime  peace,  we  shall  soon  obtain  that 
by  the  voluntary  or  the  forced  concurrence  of 
all  the  continental  powers.  I  have  reason  to 
believe  the  alliance  that  I  have  just  concluded 
with  Russia  to  be  solid.  A  less  powerful  alli- 
ance would  have  sufficed  to  enable  me  to  con- 
trol Europe,  to  deprive  England  of  all  re- 
source. With  that  of  Russia,  which  victory  has 
given  me,  which  policy  will  preserve  to  me,  I 
shall  put  an  end  to  all  resistances.  Let  us  en- 
joy our  greatness,  and  now  turn  traders  and 
manufacturers."  Addressing  himself  particu- 
larly to  his  ministers,  Napoleon  said  to  them : 
— "  I  have  had  enough  of, the  trade  of  general ; 
I  shall  now  resume  with  you  that  of  first  minis- 
ter, and  recommence  my  great  reviews  of  a/airs, 
which  it  is  time  to  substitute  for  my  great 
reviews  of  armiet."  He  detained  at  St.  Cloud 


July,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


333 


Prince  Cambace'reg,  whom  he  admitted  to  his 
family  dinner,  and  with  whom  he  conversed 
upon  his  plans ;  for  his  ardent  head,  inces- 
Bantly  at  work,  never  finished  one  operation 
without  beginning  another. 

On  the  following  day,  he  employed  himself 
in  giving  orders,  which  embraced  Europe  from 
Corfu  to  Konigsberg.  His  first  idea  was  to 
secure  immediately  the  consequences  of  the 
Russian  alliance  which  he  had  just  concluded 
at  Tilsit.  By  that  alliance,  purchased  at  the 
price  of  sanguinary  victories  and  infinite  hopes 
excited  in  Russian  ambition,  it  behoved  him  to 
profit,  before  time  or  inevitable  miscalculations 
should  come  to  cool  its  first  ardours.  He  had  pro- 
mised himself  to  force  Sweden,  to  persuade  Den- 
mark, to  draw  off  Portugal  by  means  of  Spain, 
and  in  this  manner  to  decide  all  the  States  bor- 
dering on  the  European  seas  to  declare  against 
England.  He  had  even  proposed  to  himself 
to  coerce  Austria,  in  order  to  bring  her  into 
similar  resolutions.  England  would  thus  find 
herself  encompassed  by  a  girdle  of  hostilities, 
from  Kronstadt  to  Cadiz,  from  Cadiz  to  Trieste, 
unless  she  accepted  the  conditions  of  peace 
which  Russia  was  commissioned  to  offer  her. 
During  his  journey  from  Dresden  to  Paris,  Na- 
poleon had  already  given  orders,  and  the  very 
day  after  his  arrival  at  Paris,  he  gave  further 
directions  for  the  immediate  execution  of  this 
vast  system.  His  first  care  was  to  send  to  St. 
Petersburg  an  agent  who  should  continue  with 
Alexander  the  work  of  seduction  commenced 
at  Tilsit.  Most  assuredly  he  could  not  find  an 
ambassador  so  seductive  as  he  was  himself.  It 
was  requisite,  nevertheless,  to  find  one  who 
was  able  to  please,  to  win  confidence,  and  to 
Bmooth  the  difficulties  that  may  arise  even  in 
the  most  sincere  alliance.  This  choice  required 
some  reflection.  Till  he  should  fix  upon  one 
who  combined  the  desired  qualifications,  Napo- 
leon sent  an  officer,  usually  employed,  and  fit 
for  every  thing — for  Avar,  for  diplomacy,  for 
police,  who  could  be  by  turns  supple  and  arro- 
gant, and  was  very  capable  of  insinuating  him- 
self into  the  mind  of  the  young  monarch,  whom 
he  had  already  contrived  to  please.  This  was 
General  Savary,  whose  talents,  courage,  un- 
scrupulous and  unbounded  devotedness,  we 
have  elsewhere  had  occasion  to  notice.  Gene- 
ral Savary,  despatched  in  1805  to  the  Russian 
head-quarters,  had  found  Alexander  full  of 
pride  on  the  day  before  the  battle  of  Auster- 
litz,  dismayed  on  the  morrow, — had  not  abused 
the  change  of  fortune,  had,  on  the  contrary, 
skilfully  spared  the  vanquished  prince,  and, 
availing  himself  of  the  ascendency  which  weak- 
nesses give  over  another  whose  secret  one  has 
detected,  had  acquired  a  sort  of  influence  suf- 
ficient for  a  temporary  mission.  In  this  first 
moment,  when  the  point  was  to  ascertain  whe- 
ther Alexander  was  sincere,  whether  he  would 
have  the  courage  to  defy  the  resentment  of  his 
nation,  which  had  not  passed  so  speedily  as  he 
had  done  from  the  sorrows  of  Friedland  to  the 
illusions  of  Tilsit,  General  Savary  was  fitted 
by  his  shrewdness  to  penetrate  into  the  young 
prince,  to  intimidate  him  by  his  boldness,  and, 
if  need  were,  to  reply  by  a  completely  military 
insolence  to  the  insolences  that  he  might  meet 
with  at  St.  Petersburg.  General  Savary  had 
another  advantage,  of  which  the  malicious 
pride  of  Napoleon  disdained  not  to  avail  itself. 


|  The  war  with  Russia  had  commenced  on  ac- 
count of  the  death  of  the  Duke  of  Enghiea : 
Napoleon  was  not  sorry  to  send  to  that  power 
the  man  who  had  figured  most  in  that  catas- 
trophe. He  thus  galled  the  Russian  aristo- 
cracy, which  was  inimical  to  France,  without 
hurting  the  prince,  who,  from  his  versatility, 
had  forgotten  the  cause  of  the  war  as  quickly 
as  the  war  itself. 

Napoleon  gave  General  Savary,  without  any 
apparent  title,  extensive  powers  and  plenty  of 
money,  that  he  might  live  in  suitable  style  at 
St.  Petersburg.  General  Savary  was  to  protest 
to  the  young  emperor  the  sincerity  of  France,  to 
urge  him  to  come  to  an  explanation  with  Eng- 
land, and  to  bring  matters  with  her  to  a  speedy 
result — either  peace  or  war — and,  if  it  should 
be  war,  to  take  immediate  possession  of  Fin- 
land— an  enterprise  which,  while  it  flattered 
Moscovite  ambition,  would  have  the  effect  of 
definitively  engaging  Russia  in  the  politics  of 
France.  The  general,  in  short,  was  to  apply 
all  the  resources  of  his  mind  to  cultivate  and 
give  stability  to  the  alliance  concluded  at  Tilsit. 

Having  paid  this  attention  to  the  relations 
with  Russia,  Napoleon  directed  it  to  the  other 
cabinets  called  upon  to  concur  in  his  system. 
He  scarcely  expected  sensible  conduct  from 
Sweden,  then  governed  by  an  extravagant  king. 
Though  that  power  had  a  twofold  interest  in 
not  waiting  till  she  should  be  forced — the  inte- 
rest of  contributing  to  the  triumph  of  the  neu- 
trals and  that  of  sparing  a  Russian  invasion — 
Napoleon  nevertheless  thought  that  he  should 
%oon  be  obliged  to  employ  force  against  her. 
This  would  be  a  very  easy  matter,  with  an  army 
of  420,000  men,  commanding  the  Continent  from 
the  Rhine  to  the  Niemen.  He  went,  therefore, 
no  further  than  making  some  dispositions  for 
the  immediate  invasion  of  Swedish  Pomerania, 
the  only  possession  which  her  ancient  and  her 
recent  follies  had  allowed  Sweden  to  retain  on 
the  soil  of  Germany.  With  this  view,  Napoleon 
made  various  changes  in  the  distribution  of  his 
forces  in  Poland  and  Prussia.  He  purposed 
not  to  evacuate  Poland  till  the  new  Saxon  roy- 
alty, which  he  had  just  re-established  there, 
should  be  firmly  settled ;  and  Prussia  not  till 
the  war  contributions,  as  well  ordinary  as  ex- 
traordinary, should  be  completely  paid  up.  In 
consequence,  Marshal  Davout,  with  his  corps, 
with  the  Polish  troops  of  the  new  levy,  with  the 
greater  part  of  the  dragoons,  had  orders  to 
occupy  that  part  of  Poland  destined,  under  the 
title  of  grand-duchy  of  Warsaw,  for  the  king 
of  Saxony.  One  division  was  to  be  stationed 
at  Thorn,  another  at  Warsaw,  a  third  at  Posen. 
The  dragoons  were  to  find  forage  on  the  banks 
of  the  Vistula.  This  was  denominated  the  first 
command.  Marshal  Soult,  with  his  corps  (Tarmte 
and  almost  all  the  reserve  cavalry,  was  com- 
missioned to  occupy  old  Prussia,  from  the  Pregel 
to  the  Vistula,  from  the  Vistula  to  the  Oder, 
with  orders  to  retire  successively,  according  to 
the  payment  of  the  contributions.  The  heavy 
and  the  light  cavalry  were  to  live  in  the  island 
of  Nogath,  amidst  the  abundance  afforded  by 
the  Delta  of  the  Vistula.  Into  the  bosom  of  this 
second  command,  Napoleon  introduced  another, 
in  some  measure  exceptional,  like  the  place 
which  required  its  presence — that  was  Dantzig. 
There  he  placed  Oudinot's  grenadier?,  and  like- 
wise Verdier's  division,  which  had  formed  th« 


336 


HISTORY"  OF   THE 


[July,  1307. 


sorps  of  Marshal  Lannes ;  and  these  were  des- 
tined to  occupy  that  rich  town,  as  well  as  the 
territory  which  it  had  recoTered,  together  with 
the  quality  of  a  free  city.  Verdier's  division 
was  not  intended  to  remain  there,  but  the  gre- 
nadiers had  orders  to  stay  till  the  complete  set- 
tlement of  European  affairs.  The  third  com- 
mand, embracing  Silesia,  which  was  committed 
to  Marshal  Mortier,  whom  Napoleon  was  glad 
to  place  in  the  provinces  where  there  was  abund- 
ance of  wealth  to  save  from  the  disorders  of 
war,  and  who  had  quitted  his  corps  darmie,  re- 
cently dissolved  by  the  reunion  of  the  Poles  and 
the  Saxons  in  the  duchy  of  Warsaw.  This  mar- 
shal had  under  his  command  the  fifth  and  sixth 
corps,  which  Marshals  Massena  and  Ney  had 
lately  left.  These  two  and  Marshal  Lannes  had 
•btained  permission  to  go  to  France,  to  rest 
themselves  from  the  fatigues  of  war.  The  fifth 
corps  was  cantoned  in  the  environs  of  Breslau, 
in  Upper  Silesia ;  the  sixth  around  Glogau,  in 
Lower  Silesia.  The  first  corps,  transferred  to 
General  Victor,  since  the  wound  of  the  Prince 
of  Ponte  Corvo,  had  orders  to  occupy  Berlin, 
accompanying  in  its  retrograde  movement  the 
imperial  guard,  which  was  returning  to  France, 
to  be  there  treated  with  magnificent  festivities. 
Lastly,  the  troops  which  had  formed  the  army 
of  observation,  in  the  rear  of  Napoleon,  were 
rapidly  moved  towards  the  coast.  The  Italians, 
part  of  the  Bavarians,  the  Baden  troops,  the 
Hessians,  the  two  fine  French  divisions  of  Bou- 
det  and  Molitor,  were  marched,  with  the  park 
»f  artillery  which  had  been  employed  in  the 
siege  of  Dantzig,  towards  Swedish  Pomerania.' 
Napoleon  increased  this  park  with  all  the  ar- 
tillery and  ammunition,  which  the  fine  season 
allowed  to  be  collected,  and  ordered  them  to  be 
placed  opposite  to  Stralsund,  for  the  purpose 
of  wresting  that  spot  from  the  King  of  Sweden, 
in  case  that  prince,  adhering  to  his  character, 
should  single-handed  resume  hostilities,  when 
all  besides  had  laid  down  their  arms. 

Marshal  Brune,  who  had  been  placed  at  the 
head  of  the  army  of  observation,  received  the 
direct  command  of  these  troops,  forming  a  total 
of  38,000  men,  provided  with  an  immense  mate- 
riel. Chasseloup,  the  engineer  who  had  so  ably 
directed  the  siege  of  Dantzig,  was  charged  with 
the  direction  of  that  of  Stralsund  also,  if  it 
should  be  necessary  to  undertake  it. 

Marshal  Bernadotte,  Prince  of  Ponte  Corvo, 
who  had  gone  to  Hamburg  to  recover  from  his 
wound,  had  the  command  of  the  troops  destined 
to  guard  the  Hanseatic  towns  and  Hanover. 
The  Dutch  were  drawn  towards  Holland  and 
marched  upon  the  Ems :  the  Spaniards  occupied 
Hamburg.  These  latter  had  traversed,  some 
Italy,  others  France,  to  proceed  through  Ger- 
many towards  the  coast  of  the  North  Sea.  They 
formed  a  corps  of  14,000  men,  under  the  com- 
mand of  the  Marquis  de  la  Romana.  They  were 
fine  soldiers,  with  dark  complexion,  spare  limbs, 
shivering  with  cold  on  the  dreary  and  frozen 
shores  of  the  Northern  Ocean,  exhibiting  a  sin- 
gular contrast  with  our  northern  allies,  and  re- 
minding one,  by  the  strange  diversity  of  nations 
subject  to  the  same  yoke,  of  the  times  of  Roman 
greatness.  Followed  by  a  great  number  of  wo- 
»en,  children,  horses,  mules,  and  asses,  laden 
with  baggage,  ill-dressed,  but  in  an  original 
manner,  lively,  animated,  noisy,  acquainted 
with  no  language  but  their  own,  living  exclu- 


sively by  themselves,  exercising  little,  and 
spending  great  part  of  the  day  in  dancing  to 
the  sound  of  the  guitar,  with  the  womea  who 
accompanied  them,  they  attracted  the  stapified 
curiosity  of  the  grave  inhabitants  of  Hamburg, 
whose  papers  communicated  these  details  to 
Europe,  astonished  at  so  many  extraordinary 
scenes.  The  corps  of  Marshal  Mortier  haviny 
been  dissolved,  as  we  have  related,  the  French 
division  of  Dupas,  which  had  formed  part  of  it, 
was  marched  towards  the  Hanseatic  towns,  to 
be  ready  to  fly  to  the  assistance  of  our  allies, 
Dutch  or  Spaniards,  in  case  an  enemy  should 
pay  them  a  visit.  That  enemy  could  not  be  any 
other  than  the  English,  who,  for  a  year  past, 
had  kept  promising  in  vain  a  continental  expe- 
dition, and  who  might  possibly,  as  it  frequently 
happens  after  long  hesitation,  act  when  the  time 
for  action  was  past.  The  troops  of  Marshal 
Brune,  charged  to  station  themselves  before 
Stralsund,  and  those  of  Marshal  the  Prince  of 
Ponte  Corvo,  commissioned  to  observe  Hanover 
and  Holland,  were  to  be  joined,  in  case  of  need, 
by  Dupas'  division  at  first,  and  afterwards  by 
the  whole  first  corps  concentrated  at  that  mo- 
ment around  Berlin.  Any  attempt  of  the  Eng- 
lish could  not  but  miscarry  against  such  a  com- 
bination of  forces. 

Thus  every  thing  was  ready,  if  the  Russian 
mediation  should  not  succeed,  to  drive  the 
Swedes  from  Pomerania  into  Stralsund,  from 
Stralsund  into  the  island  of  Riigen,  from  the 
island  of  Riigen  into  the  sea,  and  to  throw  the 
English  themselves  into  it  in  case  of  their  land- 
ing on  the  Continent.  These  measures  were 
intended  also  to  have  the  effect  of  obliging  Den- 
mark to  complete  by  her  adhesion  the  conti- 
nental coalition  against  England.  Every  thing 
was  easy  in  reference  to  the  course  to  be  pur- 
sued towards  the  Swedes.  They  had  behaved 
in  a  manner  so  hostile,  so  arrogant,  that  nothing 
more  needed  to  be  done  than  to  summon  them, 
and  then  drive  them  into  Stralsund.  The  Danes, 
on  the  contrary,  had  scrupulously  observed  the 
neutrality,  had  conducted  themselves  with  such 
moderation,  inclining  in  heart  towards  the  cause 
of  France,  which  was  their  own,  but  not  daring 
to  speak  out,  that  it  would  not  be  right  to  treat 
them  as  roughly  as  the  Swedes.  Napoleon 
charged  M.  de  Talleyrand  to  write  immediately 
to  the  cabinet  of  Copenhagen,  to  represent  to 
it  that  it  was  time  to  come  to  a  decision :  that 
the  cause  of  France  was  its  own ;  that  if  France 
was  at  war  with  England,  it  was  on  account  of 
the  question  of  the  neutrals,  and  the  question 
of  the  neutrals  was  a  question  of  existence  for 
all  the  naval  pc/wers,  especially  for  the  smallest, 
habitually  least  spared  by  British  supremacy. 
M.  de  Talleyrand  had  orders  to  be  friendly,  but 
pressing.  He  was  ordered  also  to  offer  Denmark 
the  finest  troops  of  France,  and  the  concurrence 
of  a  formidable  artillery,  capable  of  keeping  at 
a  distance  the  best  armed  English  ships. 

It  was  by  frightening  England  with  this  com- 
bination of  forces,  and  by  proceeding  with  the 
utmost  rigour  against  her  commerce,  that  Na- 
poleon thought  to  second  in  a  useful  manner 
the  Russian  mediation.  While  he  wae  taking 
the  military  measures  that  we  have  been  detail- 
ing, he  had  caused  English  merchandise  to  be 
seized  at  Le'pzig,  where  there  was  a  consider- 
able quantity.  Dissatisfied  with  the  manner  in 
which  his  orders  had  been  executed  in  the  Han- 


July,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


337 


Beatic  towns,  he  directed  the  English  factory  at 
Hamburg  to  be  seized,  bills  and  goods  to  a  large 
amount  to  be  confiscated,  and  the  letters  of  Bri- 
tish commerce  to  be  intercepted  at  all  the  post- 
offices,  and  more  than  100,000  of  them  were 
burned.  King  Louis,  on  the  throne  of  Holland, 
•was  incessantly  aggravating  him  by  his  incon- 
siderate measures,  by  his  vanity,  by  the  pro- 
jected reduction  of  the  Dutch  army  and  navy, 
(notwithstanding  which  he  purposed  to  institute 
a  royal  guard,  to  appoint  marshals,  to  go  to  the 
expense  of  a  coronation,) — King  Louis  united 
with  all  his  plans,  devised  to  please  his  new 
subjects,  a  tolerance  in  regard  to  English  com- 
merce, which  became  downright  treason  against 
the  policy  of  France.  Napoleon,  out  of  all  pa- 
tience, wrote  to  him  that,  unless  there  was  a 
change  of  conduct,  he  should  proceed  to  the 
last  extremities,  and  have  the  ports  of  Holland 
guarded  by  French  troops  and  custom-house 
officers.  This  threat  had  some  success,  and 
the  prohibitions  issued  against  English  com- 
merce in  Holland  were  somewhat  more  strictly 
executed. 

Napoleon  required  that  all  the  goods  seized 
should  be  sold,  and  the  produce  paid  into  the 
chest  of  the  war  contributions,  to  increase  the 
wealth  of  that  chest;  the  application  of  which, 
at  once  noble,  ingenious,  and  beneficial,  we  shall 
presently  notice.  He  gave  orders  that  Hano- 
ver, to  which  he  granted  no  indulgence,  because 
it  was  an  English  province,  that  Hesse,  that  the 
Prussian  provinces  in  Franconia,  lastly,  that 
Prussia  itself,  should  pay  up.  their  contributions 
before  the  army  retired.  It  may  be  said  with 
truth  that  the  vanquished  had  not  been  treated 
Tery  severely,  especially  when  we  recollect  what 
occurred  in  the  17th  century,  during  the  wars 
of  Louis  XIV.,  in  the  18th,  during  the  wars  of 
the  great  Frederick,  and  in  our  own  times,  when 
France  was  invaded  in  1814  and  1815.  Napo- 
leon had  added  to  the  ordinary  contribution, 
half  of  which  at  most  had  been  paid,  an  extra- 
ordinary contribution,  which  was  far  from  over- 
whelming, and  which  amounted  to  precisely  the 
cost  of  the  war  that  had  been  raised  against 
him.  By  means  of  this  contribution  he  caused 
all  that  was  taken  from  the  houses  of  the  in- 
habitants to  be  paid  for.  He  charged  M.  Daru, 
his  able  and  upright  representative  for  the  finan- 
cial affairs  of  the  army,  to  treat  with  Prus- 
sia relative  to  the  mode  of  discharging  the  con- 
tributions that  were  still  due,  declaring  that, 
notwithstanding  his  desire  to  recall  the  French 
.troops,  in  order  to  move  them  to  the  coasts  of 
Europe,  he  would  not  evacuate  a  province 
or  even  a  place  of  Prussia  before  the  integral 
payment  of  the  sums  which  had  been  promised 
him.  He  hoped  in  this  manner,  all  the  expenses 
of  the  campaign  being  paid,  and  by  adding 
to  the  contributions  of  Germany  the  remnants 


1  I  shall  coon  have  to  handle  a  most  important  subject, 
the  invasion  of  Spain,  and  the  moment  is  approaching 
when  I  shall  have  to  relate  the  tragic  catastrophe  of  the 
Spanish  Bourbons,  the  origin  of  an  atrocious  and  calamit- 
ous war  for  both  countries.  I  announce  beforehand  that, 
furnished  with  the  only  authentic  document*  that  exist. 
which  are  very  numerous,  frequently  contradictory,  and 
reconcilable  only  by  means  of  great  efforts  of  criticism, 
I  think  myself  capable  of  giving  the  entire  secret,  which 
i*  yet  unknown,  of  the  unfortunate  events  of  that  period, 
and  that  on  many  points  I  shall  disagree  with  the  works 
which  have  appeared  on  the  same  subject.  I  am  not  al- 
luding to  the  thousand  rhapsodies,  published  by  histo- 
rians, who  had  neither  mission,  nor  information,  nor  con- 

VOL.  II.— 43 


of  the  contribution  levied  upon  Austria,  to  re- 
serve about  300  millions,  a  sum  worth  at  that 
time  double  what  it  would  be  worth  now,  and 
which  in  his  skilful  hands  was  to  become  a  ma- 
gical means  of  beneficence  and  of  creations  of 
all  kinds. 

While  Napoleon  was  taking  his  measures  foi 
the  North,  he  took  them  likewise  for  the  accom- 
plishment of  his  system  in  the  South.  During 
the  campaign  in  Prussia,  Spain  had  given  him 
just  cause  for  distrust,  and  the  proclamation  of 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  in  which  he  called  the 
whole  Spanish  population  to  arms,  upon  pre- 
text of  resisting  an  unknown  enemy,  was  not 
to  be  accounted  for,  unless  by  absolute  trea- 
chery. And  such  in  fact  it  was ;  for,  at  that 
very  moment,  on  the  eve  of  the  battle  of  Jena, 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  had  begun  secret  rela- 
tions with  England.  Though  unacquainted 
with  these  details,  Napoleon  was  not  to  be  de- 
ceived; but  he  resolved  to  dissemble  till  he 
should  have  recovered  the  full  liberty  of  his 
movements.  The  ignoble  favourite,  who  go- 
verned the  Queen  of  Spain,  and  through  the 
queen,  the  king  and  the  monarchy,  had  be- 
lieved, like  all  Europe,  in  the  invincibility  of 
the  Prussian  army.  But  on  the  morrow  of  the 
victory  of  Jena,  he  had  thrown  himself  at  the 
feet  of  the  conqueror.  Ever  since  that  time, 
there  was  no  sort  of  flattery  but  he  employed 
to  appease  the  wrath,  dissembled  but  easy  to 
be  guessed,  of  Napoleon.  There  was  but  one 
kind  of  obedience  which  he  did  not  add  to  his 
meannesses — that  was  to  govern  Spain  well,  to 
raise  her  navy  again,  to  defend  her  colonies, 
to  render  her  at  length  a  useful  ally — a  kind 
of  expiation,  which,  in  the  eyes  of  Napoleon, 
would  have  been  sufficient,  which  would  even 
have  stifled  the  first  feelings  of  his  anger. 

On  his  return  to  Paris,  Napoleon  began  to 
direct  his  attention  to  this  the  most  important 
portion  of  the  coast  of  Europe ;  and  he  .xm- 
ceived  that  it  behoved  him  to  take  some  resolu- 
tion in  regard  to  that  backsliding  of  Spain, 
which  was  always  ready  to  transform  itself 
into  treason.  But,  though  his  mind  was  never 
at  rest,  though  it  flew  incessantly  from  one 
object  to  another,  like  his  eagle  flying  from 
capital  to  capital,  he  thought  that  he  ought  not 
yet  to  take  up  that  important  question,  being 
unwilling  to  complicate  the  present  situation, 
and  to  throw  obstacles  in  the  way  of  a  general 
pacification,  which  he  ardently  desired,  which 
he  had  little  hope  of,  and  which,  if  it  were  ac- 
complished, would  render  the  regeneration  of 
the  Spanish  monarchy  much  less  necessary  to 
him.  If,  on  the  contrary,  England,  under  the 
guidance  of  the  weak  and  violent  heirs  of  Mr. 
Pitt,  was  bent  on  continuing  the  war  in  spite 
of  her  lonely  condition,  he  then  proposed  to 
turn  his  serious  attention  to  the  state  of  Spain, ' 


cern  about  truth.  I  speak  of  historians  worthy  of  being 
taken  into  consideration,  of  those  who  have  been  permit- 
ted by  exception  to  make  researches  in  the  depots  of  fo- 
reign affairs  and  war,  or  of  those  who,  like  M  de  Toreno, 
having  occupied  the  highest  posts,  had  not  only  a  know- 
ledge of  things,  but  the  means  of  informing  themselves 
concerning  them.  I  shall  have  to  contradict  the  asser- 
tions of  both,  for  there  is  nothing  relative  to  the  business 
of  Spain  in  the  depot  of  the  Foreign  Office,  Beauharnais, 
the  ambassador,  having  never  possessed  the  secret  of  his 
government;  and  in  the  depot  of  war  there  is  only  tlm 
detail  of  the  military  operations  and  even  that  frequently 
incomplete.  Lastly,  as  for  the  Spanish  historians,  they 
.  could  not  be  acquainted  with  the  secret  of  resolution* 
2F 


338 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[July,  1807. 


and  to  take  a  decisive  resolution  on  that  point. 
For  the  moment,  he  thought  of  one  thing  only 
— to  obtain  from  her  the  utmost  strictness 
against  British  commerce,  and  the  submission 
of  Portugal  to  his  vast  designs. 

Spain  had  at  Paris,  besides  an  ordinary  am- 
bassador, M.  de  Masserano,  an  absolutely  use- 
less official  agent,  charged  solely  with  the 
honorary  functions  of  his  station,  M.  Yzquierdo, 
a  secret  agent  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  who 
was  invested  with  the  entire  confidence  of  that 
prince,  and  with  whom  had  been  negotiated 
the  financial  convention,  concluded  in  1806 
between  the  Spanish  Treasury  and  the  French 
Treasury.  He  alone  was  charged  with  real 
business,  and  he  was  well  fitted  for  it  by  his 
astuteness,  and  by  his  acquaintance  with  all 
the  secrets  of  the  court  of  Spain.  The  unfor- 
tunate sovereigns  of  the  Escurial,  conceiving 
that  these  two  agents  were  not  sufficient  to 
soothe  the  wrath  of  Napoleon,  bethought  them 
of  sending  to  him  a  third,  who,  with  the  title 
of  ambassador  extraordinary,  should  come  to 
congratulate  him  on  his  victories,  and  to  ex- 
press a  joy  at  his  successes  which  they  were 
far  from  feeling.  For  this  ostentatious  and 
puerile  part  was  selected  one  of  the  highest 
grandees  of  Spain,  the  Duke  de  Frias,  and  per- 
mission to  send  him  to  Paris  was  solicited.  So 
much  homage  was  not  required  for  disarming 
Napoleon.  A  little  more  activity  against  the 
common  enemy  would  have  appeased  him  with 
much  greater  certainty  than  the  most  magni- 
ficent embassies.  Napoleon,  unwilling  to  give 
unnecessary  uneasiness  to  that  court,  which 
was  conscious  of  its  offences,  received  the  Duke 
de  Frias  with  great  distinction,  listened  to  the 
congratulations  on  his  triumphs,  then  said  to 
the  new  ambassador,  repeated  to  the  old  one, 
and  informed  the  most  active  of  the  three,  M. 
Yzquierdo,  that  he  accepted  the  congratula- 
tions which  were  addressed  to  him  upon  his 
triumphs  and  upon  the  restoration  of  the  con- 
tinental peace,  but  that  he  must  make  the  con- 
tinental peace  produce  a  maritime  peace ;  but 
this  result,  so  desirable  for  Spain  and  for  her 
colonies,  could  be  attained  only  by  intimidating 
the  common  enemy  by  a  concurrence  of  ener- 
getic efforts,  and  by  an  absolute  interdiction 
of  her  commerce ;  that  it  was  necessary  to 
second  France,  and,  in  this  view,  to  require  of 
Portugal  an  immediate  and  entire  adhesion  to 
the  continental  system :  as  for  himself,  he  was 
resolved  to  insist  not  on  a  sham  exclusion  of 
the  English  from  Oporto  and  Lisbon,  but  a 
complete  exclusion,  followed  up  by  an  imme- 
diate declaration  of  war  and  the  seizure  of  all 
British  goods;  that,  if  Portugal  would  not 


!  consent  to  this  at  once,  Spain  must  prepare 
her  troops,  for  he  was  already  preparing  his, 
and  they  must  forthwith  take  possession  of 
Portugal,  not  for  a  week  or  a  fortnight,  as  had 
been  done  in  1801,  but  for  the  whole  time  of 
the  war,  perhaps  for  ever,  according  to  circum- 
stances. The  three  envoys  of  Spain  bowed  to 
this  declaration,  which  they  were  to  transmit 
without  delay  to  their  cabinet. 

Napoleon,  at  the  same  time,  sent  for  M.  de 
Lima,  the  ambassador  of  Portugal,  and  signi- 
fied to  him  that  if,  in  the  time  strictly  neces- 
sary for  writing  to  Lisbon  and  receiving  an 
answer,  he  were  not  promised  the  exclusion  of 
the  English,  the  seizure  of  their  commerce, 
persons,  and  effects,  and  a  declaration  of  war, 
M.  de  Lima  must  take  his  passports  and  expect 
to  see  ci  French  army  march  from  Bayonne  to 
Salamanca,  from  Salamanca  to  Lisbon.  Such 
were  the  determinations  of  a  policy  agreed 
upon  among  the  great  powers,  and  indispen- 
sable for  the  re-establishment  of  peace  in 
Europe.  Napoleon,  in  his  contest  with  the 
English,  insisted  on  severities  against  both 
their  property  and  their  persons,  because  he 
knew  that  a  feigned  exclusion  was  already 
secretly  arranged  between  the  courts  of  Lon- 
don and  Lisbon ;  and  it  was  necessary  that  the 
latter  should  wholly  compromise  itself,  if  one 
wished  to  arrive  at  a  serious  result.  The 
course  of  events  proved  that  he  had  guessed 
rightly.  Besides,  having  seen  the  English,  on 
the  rupture  of  the  peace  of  Amiens,  make 
seizures  from  us  to  the  amount  of  more  than 
one  hundred  millions,  and  capture  a  great 
number  of  commercial  men  sailing  upon  the 
faith  of  treaties,  he  sought  everywhere  to 
secure  pledges,  both  in  men  and  merchandise. 

M.  de  Lima  promised  to  write  immediately 
to  his  court,  and  failed  not  to  do  so.  But 
Napoleon,  not  satisfied  with  a  mere  declara- 
tion of  his  will,  and  clearly  foreseeing  that 
this  declaration  would  not  be  efficacious  unless 
it  were  followed  up  by  an  armed  demonstra- 
tion, made  his  dispositions  for  having  in  a  few 
days  a  corps  of  25,000  men  at  Bayonne,  quite 
ready  to  recommence  the  expedition  of  1801 
against  Portugal.  It  will  no  doubt  be  recol- 
lected that,  some  months  before,  while  availing 
himself  of  the  inaction  of  winter  to  carry  on 
the  siege  of  Dantzig,  and  to  prepare  on  his  rear 
an  army  of  observation,  to  secure  him  against 
any  attempt  of  Austria  and  of  England,  he  had 
conceived  the  idea  of  rendering  the  camps 
formed  on  the  coasts  disposable,  and  replacing 
them  by  five  legions  of  reserve,  of  six  bat- 
talions eacl^,  the  organization  of  which  was  to 
be  consigned  to  five  old  generals,  who  had  be- 


which  wore  all  taken  at  Paris.  The  whole  is  to  be  found 
in  the  private  papers  of  Napoleon  deposited  in  the  Louvre, 
which  comprehend  both  the  French  documents  and  the 
Spanish  documents  carried  off  from  Madrid.  In  these 
documents,  frequently  contradictory,  as  I  hare  just  ob- 
served, one  cannot  come  at  the  truth  but  by  dint  of  com- 
parisons, approximations,  and  the  exercise  of  critical 
Judgment.  It  will  be  evident  from  the  various  notes, 
whHi,  contrary  to  my  custom,  I  shall  be  obliged  to  place 
at  the  foot  of  the  pages  of  this  book,  what  efforts  I  have 
been  forced  to  make,  even  with  the  authentic  documents, 
to  arrive  at  the  truth.  But  from  this  very  moment,  I  de- 
clare that  all  the  historians  who  have  represented  the 
origin  of  Napoleon's  designs  upon  Spain  as  dating  so  far 
back  as  Tilsit  are  mistaken;  that  all  those  who  have  sup- 
posed that  Napoleon  assured  himself  at  Tilsit  of  the  con- 
cent of  Alexander  to  what  he  projected  respecting  Madrid, 
and  that  he  was  in  haste  to  sign  the  peace  of  the  North, 


in  order  to  return  the  sooner  to  the  affairs  of  the  South, 
are  equally  ipistaken.  At  Tilsit  Napoleon  settled  nothing 
but  a  general  alliance,  which  guarantied  the  adhesion  of 
Russia  to  all  that  he  should  do  on  his  part  on  condition 
that  Russia  should  be  suffered  to  do  what  she  pleased  on 
hers.  At  this  period,  he  did  not  at  all  consider  it  urgent 
to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Spain  ;  he  was  full  of  resent- 
ment on  account  of  the  proclamation  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  promised  himself  to  express  his  sentiments  upon  it 
some  day,  and  to  secure  himself,  but  thinking  at  his  re- 
turn of  nothing  but  imposing  peace  upon  England,  by 
threatening  her  with  complete  exclusion  from  the  Con- 
tinent, and  of  making  use  of  the  cabinet  of  Madrid  to 
bring  the  cabinet  of  Lisbon  into  his  projects.  We  shall 
soon  see  how  and  through  whom  arose  the  temptation  to 
intermeddle  in  the  affairs  of  Spain.  I  correct  that  error  at 
present :  I  shall  correct  others  as  the  order  of  facts  and 
the  progress  of  my  narrative  require  it. 


July,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


339 


come  senators.  Four  months  had  since  elapsed, 
and  he  wrote  immediately  to  the  senators 
charged  with  this  organization,  to  learn  if  he 
could  already  dispose  of  two  battalions  out  of 
the  six  in  each  of  these  legions.  Trusting,  till 
their  arrM'al,  to  the  terror  which  the  speedy 
return  of  the  grand  army  must  strike  into  the 
English,  having  no  fear  that  the  expeditions 
agrtinst  the  Continent,  with  which  they  were 
said  to  have  been  so  long  occupied,  would  be 
directed  against  the  coasts  of  France,  having 
all  his  precautions  taken  on  those  of  Holland, 
Hanover,  Pomerania,  old  Prussia,  he  hesitated 
not  to  strip  those  of  Normandy  and  Bretagne, 
and  ordered  the  assemblage  at  Bayonne  of  the 
troops  distributed  among  the  camps  of  St.  Lo, 
Pontivy,  and  Napoleon-Vendee.  Each  of  these 
camps,  formed  of  third  battalions  and  some 
complete  regiments,  contributed  a  good  di- 
vision, and,  with  the  depots  of  dragoons 
collected  at  Versailles  and  St.  Germain,  and 
with  detachments  of  artillery  drawn  from 
Kennes,  Toulouse,  and  Bayonne,  would  com- 
pose an  excellent  army  of  about  25,000  men. 
This  army  had  orders  to  concentrate  itself 
forthwith  at  Bayonne.  For  the  command  of  it, 
Napoleon  selected  General  Junot,  who  was 
acquainted  with  Portugal,  where  he  had  been 
ambassador,  who  was  a  good  officer,  entirely 
devoted  to  his  master,  and,  as  Governor  of 
Paris,  had  no  other  fault  but  indulging  there 
too  freely  in  his  pleasures.  He  was  said  to 
have  formed  a  connection  with  one  of  the 
princesses  of  the  imperial  family,  which  caused 
some  scandal,  so  that  several  circumstances 
united  to  recommend  this  choice.  These  mea- 
sures were  taken  ostensibly,  and  in  such  a 
manner  that  Spain  and  Portugal  could  not  be 
ignorant  how  serious  the  consequences  of  a 
refusal  would  be  to  them.  At  the  same  time 
the  necessary  orders  were  given  for  the  two 
battalions  of  each  of  the  legions  of  reserve  to 
hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  replace  on  the 
coast  the  troops  that  were  about  to  be  with- 
drawn from  it. 

It  was  in  the  same  spirit  that  Napoleon  di- 
rected his  attention  at  this  moment  to  the 
affairs  of  Italy.  There  as  elsewhere,  redoubled 
severity  against  English  commerce  was  his  first 
care,  always  with  the  intention  of  rendering 
the  cabinet  of  London  more  sensible  to  the 
overtures  of  Russia.  The  Queen  of  Etruria, 
daughter,  as  the  reader  knows,  of  the  sove- 
reigns of  Spain,  placed  by  Napoleon  on  the 
throne  of  Tuscany,  who  had  become,  by  the 
death  of  her  husband,  regent  for  her  son'  of 
that  petty  kingdom,  governed  it  with  the  care- 
lessness of  a  woman  and  a  Spaniard,  and  with 
very  little  fidelity  to  the  common  cause.  The 
English  carried  on  commerce  at  Leghorn  as 
freely  as  in  any  port  of  their  own  country. 
Napoleon  had  collected  all  the  depots  of  the 
army  of  Naples  in  the  Legations.  With  his 
accustomed  vigilance,  he  kept  them  constantly 
supplied  with  conscripts  and  materiel.  He  or- 
dered Prince  Eugene  to  draft  from  them  a  di- 
vision of  4000  men,  to  march  across  the  Apen- 
nines upon  Pisa,  to  fall  suddenly  upon  the 
English  commerce  at  Leghorn,  to  carry  off 
both  men  and  goods,  and  then  to  declare  to 
the  Queen  of  Etruria  that  he  was  come  to 

urdx  Prince  of  Lucca  and  Parma. 


I  secure  that  important  port  against  any  hostile 
attempt,  an  attempt  both  possible  and  pro- 
bable, since  the  Spanish  garrison  had  gone  to 
join  the  corps  of  La  Romana  in  Hanover. 
While  prescribing  this  expedition,  he  sent  or- 
ders for  detachments  of  troops  to  march  under 
General  Lemarrois  into  the  provinces  of  Ur- 
bino,  Macerata,  and  Fermo,  to  occupy  the 
coast,  to  drive  the  English  from  it,  and  to  pre- 
pare safe  harbours  for  the  French  flag,  which 
was  soon  to  make  its  appearance  in  those  seas. 
Napoleon  had,  in  fact,  just  recovered  the  mouths 
of  the  Cattaro,  Corfu  and  the  Ionian  Islands. 
He  purposed  to  take  advantage  of  circum- 
stances for  conquering  Sicily  and  to  cover  the 
surface  of  the  Mediterranean  with  his  ships. 
He  recommended  at  the  same  time  to  General 
Lemarrois  to  observe  the  spirit  of  those  pro- 
vinces, and  if  a  disposition,  evinced  in  general 
by  the  provinces  of  the  Holy  See  to  escape 
from  the  government  of  priests  and  to  place 
themselves  under  the  lay  government  of  Prince 
Eugene,  should  manifest  itself  among  these, 
not  to  oppose  either  contradiction  or  obstacle 
to  that  disposition. 

At  that  moment,  the  quarrel  with  the  Holy 
See,  the  origin  of  which  we  have  elsewhere 
noticed,  but  neglected  to  record  its  daily  vicis- 
situdes, was  every  instant  making  fresh  pro- 
gress. The  Pope  who,  having  come  to  Paris  to 
anoint  Napoleon,  had  carried  back,  together 
with  many  moral  and  religious  satisfactions, 
the  temporal  mortification  of  not  having  re- 
covered the  Legations ;  who  had  since  seen  hia 
independence  rendered  nominal  by  the  succes- 
sive extension  of  the  French  power  in  Italy ; 
had  conceived  a  resentment  which  he  was  un- 
able to  dissemble.  Instead  of  coming  to  an 
understanding  with  an  omnipotent  sovereign, 
against  whom  powers  even  of  the  first  order 
could  then  effect  nothing,  who,  moreover,  wa3 
a  well-wisher  to  religion,  and  never  ceased  to 
confer  benefits  on  it,  who  had  no  idea  to  pos- 
sess himself  of  the  sovereignty  of  Rome,  and 
merely  required  him  to  behave  like  a  good 
neighbour  in  regard  to  the  new  French  States 
founded  in  Italy — the  Pope  committed  the  er- 
ror of  yielding  to  mischievous  suggestions, 
which  had  the  stronger  influence  over  his  mind, 
since  they  accorded  with  his  secret  sentiments. 
Animated  by  similar  dispositions,  he  had  op- 
posed Napoleon  in  all  the  arrangements  rela- 
tive to  the  kingdom  of  Italy.  He  had  insisted 
on  reserving  there  all  the  rights  of  the  Papacy, 
which  are  much  greater  in  Italy  than  in  France, 
and  would  not  admit  of  an  equal  Concordat  in 
the  two  countries.  At  Parma,  at  Placentia, 
there  were  the  like  demands,  and  the  like  dis- 
agreements. To  these  were  added  other  an- 
noyances of  a  still  more  personal  kind.  Prince 
Jerome  Bonaparte,  during  his  naval  campaigns 
in  America,  had  contracted  marriage  with  a 
very  handsome  person,  of  good  family,  but  at 
an  age  which  rendered  that  alliance  null,  and 
without  the  concurrence  of  her  parents,  a  de- 
fect which  made  it  still  more  null.  Napoleon, 
who  purposed,  in  marrying  that  prince  with  a 
German  princess,  to  found  a  new  kingdom  in 
Westphalia,  had  refused  to  acknowledge  a  mar- 
riage, null  in  the  eye  of  the  civil  law  as  in  that 
of  the  religious  law,  and  in  the  highest  degree 
contrary  to  his  political  designs.  He  had  ap- 
plied to  the  Pope,  soliciting  its  annulment, 


840 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[July,  1807. 


which  the  Pope  had  formally  refused.  Lastly, 
the  city  of  Rome,  in  still  more  open  hostility, 
•which  no  religious  scruple  could  justifj- — the 
city  of  Rome  had  become  the  refuge  of  all  the 
enemies  of  King  Joseph.  The  Pope  had  not  only 
protested  against  the  French  royalty  establish- 
ed in  Naples,  in  his  quality  of  ancient  lord  para- 
mount of  the  crown  of  the  Two  Sicilies ;  but  he 
had  received,  almost  allured  to  him,  the  car- 
dinals who  had  refused  their  oath  to  King 
Joseph.  He  had,  moreover,  given  an  asylum 
to  all  the  robbers  who  infested  the  roads  of  the 
kingdom  of  Naples,  and  who,  still  covered  with 
the  blood  of  Frenchmen,  took  refuge  without 
any  disguise  in  the  suburbs  of  Rome.  Never 
•was  it  possible  to  obtain  justice  or  the  delivery 
of  any  of  them. 

Napoleon,  during  his  journey  from  Tilsit  to 
Paris,  wrote  from  Dresden  to  Prince  Eugene, 
who  voluntarily  made  himself  the  advocate  of 
the  court  of  Rome,  recapitulating  his  grievances 
against  that  court,  commissioning  him  to  inform 
the  Vatican  of  them,  and  to  give  the  Pontiff  to 
understand  that  his  patience,  seldom  very  great, 
•was  this  time  at  an  end,  and  that,  without 
touching  his  spiritual  authority,  he  should  not' 
hesitate,  if  necessai-y,  to  strip  him  of  his  tem- 
poral authority.  Such  were  then  the  relations 
with  the  court  of  Rome,  and  these  relations 
account  sufficiently  for  the  facility  with  which 
Napoleon  adopted  the  measures  we  have  just 
described  respecting  that  part  of  the  coast  of 
the  Adriatic  dependent  on  the  Holy  See. 

The  treaty  of  Tilsit  stipulated  the  restitution 
of  the  Mouths  of  the  Cattaro,  as  well  as  the 
cession  of  Corfu  and  all  the  Ionian  Islands.  No 
possession  had  been  more  coveted  by  Napoleon, 
none  so  highly  gratified  his  imagination,  so 
prompt  and  so  vast.  He  beheld  in  it  the  com- 
plement of  his  Illyrian  provinces,  the  dominion 
of  the  Adriatic,  an  approach  towards  the  pro- 
vinces of  Turkey  in  Europe  which  were  destined 
for  him,  in  case  there  should  be  a  partition  of 
the  Ottoman  empire,  lastly,  an  additional 
means  of  making  himself  master  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, where  he  resolved  to  reign  in  an 
absolute  manner,  in  compensation  for  the  re- 
linquishment  of  the  Ocean,  in  spite  of  himself, 
to  England. 

It  will  be  recollected  that  the  Russians,  after 
the  peace  of  Presburg,  had  taken  advantage  of 
the  moment  when  the  Austrian  garrison  was 
about  to  be  replaced  by  a  French  garrison,  to 
get  possession  of  the  forts  of  the  Cattaro.  To 
prevent  the  English  from  doing  the  same  this 
time,  Napoleon  had  given  orders  from  Tilsit 
itself  to  General  Marmont,  that  the  French 
troops  should  be  assembled  under  the  walls  of 
Cattaro,  at  the  moment  when  the  Russians 
•were  retiring  from  it.  These  orders  had  been 
executed  point  by  point ;  and  our  troops,  hav- 
ing entered  Cattaro,  strongly  occupied  that 
important  maritime  position. 

But  Corfu  and  the  Ionian  Islands  interested 
him  still  more  than  the  mouths  of  the  Cattaro. 
He  enjoined  his  brother  Joseph  to  march  se- 
cretly towards  Tarento,  and  in  such  a  manner 
as  not  to  excite  any  suspicion  in  the  English, 
the  5th  Italian  of  the  line,  the  6th  French  of 
the  line,  some  companies  of  artillery,  artificers, 
ammunition,  officers  of  the  staff,  and  General 
Caesar  Berthier,  appointed  to  the  command  of 
the  garrison,  and  to  form  with  them  several 


convoys,  to  be  transported  in  feluccas  from 
Tarento  to  Corfu.  The  distance  being  but  a 
few  leagues,  forty-eight  hours  would  be  suf- 
ficient to  convey  in  several  trips  the  4000  men 
composing  the  expedition.  Admiral  Siniavin, 
commander  of  the  Russian  forces  in  the  Archi- 
pelago, was  commissioned  to  deliver  up  the 
Ionian  Islands  to  the  French.  He  performed 
the  operation  with  extreme  and  undissembled 
displeasure ;  for  the  Russian  navy,  directed  in 
general,  either  by  English  officers  or  by  Rus- 
sians educated  in  England,  was  much  more 
hostile  to  the  French  than  the  army  itself, 
which  had  just  fought  at  Eylau  and  at  Fried- 
land.  The  admiral,  nevertheless,  obeyed,  and 
delivered  over  to  the  French  troops  those  fine 
positions  which  he  had  been  appointed  to 
guard.  But  his  vexation  had  a  double  motive, 
for,  besides  the  surrender  of  Corfu  and  the 
Seven  Islands,  which  was  painful  to  him,  he 
would  presently  find  himself  in  the  middle  of 
the  Mediterranean,  being  prevented  from  re- 
turning to  the  Black  Sea  through  the  Darda- 
nelles, in  consequence  of  the  rupture  with  the 
Turks,  and  forced  to  pass  through  the  Straits 
of  Gibraltar,  the  Channel,  the  Sound,  through 
the  English  fleets,  which,  according  to  the 
state  of  the  negotiations  commenced,  might 
either  suffer  him  to  proceed  or  stop  him.  Na- 
poleon had  foreseen  all  these  complications, 
and  had  sent  word  to  the  Russian  admirals, 
that  they  would  find  in  the  ports  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, as  well  in  those  of  Italy  and  France 
as  of  Spain  and  Portugal,  safe  harbours  to  put 
into,  provisions,  stores,  and  means  of  refitting. 
He  wrote  to  Venice,  Naples,  Toulon,  C»diz, 
even  to  Lisbon,  to  his  maritime  prefects,  ad- 
mirals, and  consuls,  and  recommended  to  them, 
wherever  the  Russian  ships  should  make  their 
appearance,  to  receive  them  cordially  and  to 
supply  them  with  every  thing  they  might  need. 
At  Cadiz,  in  particular,  where  he  was  repre- 
sented by  Admiral  Rosily,  who  commanded  the 
French  fleet  lying  in  that  port  ever  since  Tra- 
falgar, and  where  it  was  most  probable  that 
the  Russians  would  seek  an  asylum,  Napoleon 
enjoined  the  French  admiral  to  prepare  sup- 
plies that  were  not  to  be  expected  from  the 
Spanish  administration,  accustomed  to  leave 
its  own  sailors  to  starve,  and  authorized  him, 
if  need  were,  to  give  his  signature,  in  order  to 
obtain  the  necessary  funds  from  the  Spanish 
bankers. 

The  Russian  naval  forces,  apprized  by  their 
own  government  and  by  ours,  retired  in  two 
divisions  in  different  directions.  The  division 
which  had  on  board  the  garrison  of  Cattaro 
steered  for  Venice,  where  it  landed  the  Rus- 
sian troops,  whom  Eugene  received  with  tha 
greatest  cordiality.  The  division  which  con~ 
veyed  the  troops  from  Corfu,  landed  them  at 
Manfredonia,  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  and 
then  steered  under  Admiral  Siniavin  for  the 
Straits.  This  admiral,  who  had  not  yet  en- 
tered into  the  views  of  his  sovereign,  had  no 
inclination  to  put  into  a  French  port  or  one 
dependent  on  French  influence,  and  flattered 
himself  that  he  should  reach  the  seas  of  the 
North,  before  the  negotiations  between  his 
court  and  that  of  England  should  have  termi- 
nated in  a  rupture. 

The  intention  of  Napoleon  was  not  to  stop  at 
the  precautions  which  he  had  already  taken  for 


July,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


341 


the  provinces  of  the  Adriatic  and  the  Mediter- 
ranean. The  corps  of  4000  men  which  he  had 
sent  to  Corfu  appeared  to  him  insufficient.  He 
was  well  aware  that  the  English  would  not  fail 
to  make  great  efforts,  in  case  the  war  should  be 
prolonged,  to  wrest  from  him  the  Ionian  Islands, 
which  were  of  such  importance  as  to  counter- 
balance that  of  Malta.  He  therefore  ordered 
the  French  14th  light,  and  several  other  detach- 
ments, to  be  sent  thither,  so  as  to  increase  the 
French  and  Italian  forces  to  seven  or  eight 
thousand  men,  exclusive  of  some  Arnauts  and 
Greeks,  enrolled  under  French  officers,  for 
guarding  the  small  islands.  Five  thousand  men 
were  to  reside  at  Corfu  itself,  and  1500  at  St. 
Maura.  Five  hundred  were  to  guard  the  port 
of  Parga,  on  the  continent  of  Epire.  As  for 
Zante  and  Cephalonia,  Napoleon  resolved  to 
keep  only  mere  French  detachments  there,  to 
support  and  control  the  Arnauts.  He  directed 
Prince  Eugene  and  King  Joseph  to  despatch 
from  Ancona  and  Tarento,  by  means  of  small 
Italian  vessels,  and  in  all  favourable  winds, 
corn,  biscuit,  powder,  projectiles,  muskets,  can- 
non, gun-carriages,  and  to  continue  to  send 
stores  of  these  kinds  without  interruption,  till 
there  should  be  collected  at  Corfu  an  immense 
stock  of  things  necessary  for  a  long  defence,  so 
that  they  might  not  be  liable,  as  at  Malta,  to 
lose  through  famine  a  position  which  the  enemy 
could  not  take  from  us  by  force.  Not  relying 
upon  the  solvency  of  the  Treasury  of  Naples, 
he  despatched  sums  in  gold  from  the  chest  at 
Turin,  in  order  to  keep  the  .troops  constantly 
paid  up,  and  to  pay  the  workmen  employed  in 
constructing  fortifications.  Admirable  instruc- 
tions to  General  Caesar  Berthier,  (brother  of  the 
major-general,)  providing  for  all  cases,  and 
pointing  out  the  conduct  to  be  pursued  under 
all  imaginable  circumstances,  accompanied  the 
resources  which  we  have  just  enumerated. 

General  Marmont  had  already  constructed 
fine  roads  in  the  provinces  of  Illyria,  which  he 
governed  with  great  intelligence  and  zeal.  He 
had  orders  to  continue  them  to  Ragusa  and 
Cattaro,  to  push  reconnaissances  as  far  as  Bu- 
trinto,  a  point  of  the  coast  of  Epire  facing  Corfu, 
and  to  prepare  the  means  for  expeditiously 
leading  a  division  thither.  Napoleon  caused 
application  to  be  made  to  the  Porte  to  give  up 
Butrinto  to  him,  that  he  might  be  able  to  use 
more  freely  that  position,  from  which  it  was 
easy  to  send  supplies  to  Corfu:  and  it  was 
granted  to  him  without  difficulty.  Lastly,  he 
claimed,  and  obtained  also,  the  establishment 
of  relays  of  Tatars  from  Cattaro  to  Butrinto, 
that  General  Marmont  might  be  speedily  ap- 
prized of  any  appearance  of  the  enemy,  and 
might  hasten  up  with  ten  or  twelve  thousand 
men — a  force  sufficient  to  throw  the  English 
into  the  sea,  if  they  should  attempt  a  landing. 

To  these  means  Napoleon  added  those  which 
the  concurrence  of  the  navy  was  capable  of 
affording.  He  sent  from  Toulon,  Captain  Chau- 
nay-Dnclos,  with  the  frigates  La  Pomone  and 
La  Pauline,  and  the  corvette  La  Victorieuse,  to 
form  at  Corfu  the  commencement  of  a  navy. 
He  directed  moreover  that  two  large  brigs  should 
be  put  on  the  stocks  in  the  port  of  Corfu,  that 
they  should  be  equipped  with  the  assistance  of 
the  sailors  of  the  country  and  some  detachments 
of  French  troops.  Thia  infant  navy,  composed 
of  frigates  and  brigs,  was  to  cruise  incessantly 


between  Italy  and  Epire,  between  Corfu  and  the 
other  islands,  so  as  that  the  passage  should  be 
always  open  to  our  merchantmen  and  closed  to 
those  of  the  enemy. 

In  addressing  these  multiplied  instructions  to 
King  Joseph,  to  Prince  Eugene,  to  General  Mar- 
mont, not  only  with  the  imperious  accent  with 
which  he  always  accompanied  his  orders,  but 
with  the  impassioned  accent  which  he  always 
imparted  to  them,  when  his  orders  were  con- 
nected with  any  of  the  grand  designs  which  occu- 
pied his  mind,  Napoleon  wrote  thus: — "These 
measures  belong  to  a  system  of  projects  which 
you  cannot  be  acquainted  with.  Know  only 
that  in  the  state  of  the  world,  the  loss  of  Corfu 
would  be  the  greatest  misfortune  that  could 
befall  the  Empire." 

Indeed,  few  persons  in  Europe  were  acquaint- 
ed with  these  projects.  M.  de  Talleyrand,  Na- 
poleon's negotiator  at  Tilsit,  had  himself  but  a 
very  incomplete  idea  of  them.  They  were  known 
to  none  but  to  Alexander  and  Napoleon,  who, 
in  their  long  conversations  on  the  banks  of  the 
Niemen,  had  engaged  to  join  in  the  partition  of 
the  Turkish  empire — a  partition  in  which  the 
one  sought  the  satisfaction  of  French  greatness, 
the  other  the  consummation  of  the  ruin  of  the 
Ottoman  empire,  which  Asiatic  effeminacy  could 
no  longer  defend  against  European  energy.  Na- 
poleon was  far  from  desiring  to  hasten  this  re- 
sult :  Alexander,  on  the  contrary,  longed  for  it 
most  eagerly — and  this  constituted  the  peril  of 
their  alliance.  But,  in  the  foresight  of  events, 
Napoleon  was  disposed  to  lay  his  hand  on  the 
Turkish  provinces  situated  within  his  reach, 
and  moreover,  whether  this  necessity  should  oc- 
cur or  not,  he  intended  to  make  himself  master 
of  the  Mediterranean.  He  conceived  that,  when 
master  of  that  sea,  the  shortest  communication 
between  the  East  and  the  West,  he  might  con- 
sole himself  for  being  but  the  second  upon  the 
Ocean.  Napoleon,  therefore,  was  resolved,  the 
very  day  after  the  signature  of  the  peace  of 
Tilsit,  to  recover  Sicily,  which  he  considered  as 
his  own,  ever  since  he  had  taken  Naples  for  one 
of  his  brothers,  and  he  hoped  to  keep  it,  either 
through  the  relinquishment  of  it  by  the  English, 
if  the  Russians  should  succeed  in  negotiating 
peace,  or  by  the  force  of  his  arms,  should  the 
war  continue.  Accordingly,  as  soon  as  winter 
was  over,  he  had  begun  to  send  orders  to  his 
minister  of  the  marine  to  despatch  squadrons 
in  the  direction  of  Toulon,  and  thus  to  prepare 
a  great  expedition  against  Sicily. 

These  orders,  the  fulfilment  of  which  was 
thwarted  by  circumstances  and  the  inadequacy 
of  the  resources,  were  repeated  with  increased 
force  after  the  signature  of  the  continental 
peace.  On  the  very  day  that  this  peace  was 
signed  at  Tilsit,  Napoleon  wrote  to  four  persons 
at  once,  to  Prince  Eugene,  to  King  Joseph,  to 
the  King  of  Holland,  to  the  minister  of  the  ma- 
rine, that,  the  continental  war  being  at  an  end, 
he  must  turn  his  attention  towards  the  sea,  and 
think  at  length  of  deriving  some  benefit  from 
the  immense  extent  of  coast  at  his  disposal. 
England  had  undoubtedly  the  advantage  of  her 
insular  position,  the  hitherto  immovable  foun- 
dation of  her  maritime  greatness ;  but  the  pos- 
session of  all  the  European  coasts  from  Kron- 
stadt  to  Cadiz,  from  Cadiz  to  Naples,  from  Na- 
ples to  Venice,  WHS  likewise  a  means  of  n>tri- 
time  power,  and  a  formidable  means,  if  one  had 
2r2 


842 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[July,  1807 


the  art  and  the  time  to  make  use  of  it.  Napo- 
leon had  said  in  Berlin,  in  exultation  over  his 
victories,  "The  sea  must  be  ruled  by  the  land." 
He  had  just  realized  so  much  of  this  idea  as  it 
•was  possible  to  realize,  by  obtaining  at  Tilsit 
the  voluntary  or  forced  union  of  all  the  powers 
of  the  Continent  against  England ;  and  it  was 
requisite  for  him  to  hasten  to  take  advantage 
of  this  union,  before  the  continental  domination 
of  France  should  become  still  more  intolerable 
to  the  world  than  the  maritime  domination  of 
England. 

Twenty-two  months  had  elapsed  since  that 
fatal  battle  of  Trafalgar,  in  which  our  flag  had 
displayed  a  sublime  heroism  amidst  an  immense 
disaster.  Those  twenty-two  months  had  been 
employed  with  some  activity,  and  here  and  there 
some  glory,  with  that  at  least  which  is  due  to 
the  courage  that  reverses  cannot  depress.  Ad- 
miral Decres,  continuing  to  place  at  the  service 
of  the  impetuous  will  of  Napoleon  profound  ex- 
perience and  a  superior  mind,  could  not  always 
succeed  in  persuading  him  that  in  the  navy, 
with  good-will,  with  courage,  with  money,  with 
genius  itself,  it  is  not  possible  to  make  amends 
for  time  and  long  training.  He  had  proposed 
to  Napoleon  to  substitute  for  the  system  of  great 
naval  battles  that  of  small  and  very  distant 
squadrons.  By  this  system,  you  have  the  ad- 
vantage of  risking  less  at  once,  of  acquiring, 
while  cruising,  that  experience  which  you  want, 
of  doing  great  mischief  to  the  enemy's  com- 
merce, and  of  having  a  chance  of  at  length  fall- 
ing in  with  your  adversary,  inferior  in  numeri- 
cal force ;  for  the  sea,  from  its  very  immensity, 
is  the  field  of  chance.  Such  a  system  was  as- 
suredly worth  trying,  and  for  us  it  would  have 
had  incontestable  advantages  over  the  other,  if 
the  numerical  disproportion  of  our  forces  to 
those  of  the  English  had  not  been  so  great,  and 
if  our  distant  settlements  had  not  been  so  ut- 
terly ruined,  so  destitute  of  all  resource. 

Conformably  to  the  plan  of  M.  Decres,  seve- 
ral squadrons  had  been  prepared  at  Brest, 
Rochefort,  and  Cadiz,  for  the  purpose  of  running 
out,  towards  the  end  of  1805,  by  taking  advan- 
tage of  the  autumnal  gales.  One  division  of 
four  frigates  had  sailed  in  order  to  cruise  in  the 
track  of  the  Indian  Ocean,  to  destroy  the  Eng- 
lish commerce  there,  and  to  support  the  island 
of  Bourbon  and  the  Isle  of  France  by  the  pro- 
duce of  their  prizes,  since  they  could  no  longer 
support  themselves  by  trade.  These  frigates, 
arriving  without  accident,  did,  in  fact,  procure 
tolerably  abundant  resources  for  our  two 
islands.  Captain  L'Hermitte,  with  one  ship  of 
the  line,  the  Regulus,  two  frigates,  the  Cybele 
and  the  President,  two  brigs,  the  Surveillant  and 
the  Diligent,  had  sailed  from  Port  Lorient  on 
the  30th  of  October,  1805,  and  steered  for  the 
Canaries.  Running  down  the  coast  of  Africa, 
from  north  to  south,  for  many  hundred  leagues, 
for  the  purpose  of  seizing  the  English  vessels 
engaged  in  the  slave-trade,  he  took  or  destroyed 
a  great  number ;  for  the  English  Admiralty,  not 
foreseeing  the  visit  of  a  French  squadron  in  that 
quarter,  had  not  taken  any  precautions.  Hav- 
ing cruised  during  the  months  of  December, 
January,  February,  and  March,  committed 
great  ravages,  made  rich  captures,  this  division, 
excepting  the  Survtiltant  brig,  which  had  been 
sent  to  France,  with  intelligence  of  its  proceed- 
ings, would  fain  have  put  into  some  port  to  re- 


fit the  ships,  to  repair  the  rigging,  to  rest  the 
crews,  and  to  procure  fresh  provisions.  Not 
daring  to  return  to  France  during  the  summer, 
not  disposed  to  go  to  our  West  India  islands, 
which  were  always  closely  watched,  and  having 
but  few  ports  either  French  or  allied  to  choose 
from,  it  was  caught  by  the  trade  winds,  which 
carried  it  towards  the  coast  of  America,  and  in 
April  it  reached  San  Salvador,  a  port  of  Brazil, 
where  it  had  a  chance  of  obtaining  provisions, 
and  selling  to  advantage  the  blacks  taken  from 
the  English  traders.  Having  put  in  there  for 
twenty-two  days,  it  again  sailed  to  cruise  off  Rio 
Janeiro,  was  frequently  pursued  by  English 
ships  going  to  India,  bore  away  for  the  latitude 
of  the  West  Indies,  continued  to  make  prizes, 
and  was  at  length  overtaken  on  the  19th  of 
August  by  a  tremenduous  hurricane,  one  of  the 
most  terrible  that  had  been  experienced  in  those 
seas  for  a  quarter  of  a  century.  It  was  dis- 
persed. The  Regulus,  haying  lost  sight  of  her 
frigates  and  looked  for  them  in  vain,  reached 
Brest  on  the  3d  of  October,  1806,  after  having 
been  nearly  a  year  at  sea.  The  Cybele  frigate, 
dismasted,  had  steered  for  the  United  States. 
The  President,  separated  from  the  division,  had 
been  taken.  Captain  L'Hermitte  had  destroyed 
twenty-six  of  the  enemy's  vessels,  taken  570 
prisoners,  destroyed  goods  worth  more  than  five 
millions,  and  brought  back  considerable  sums, 
far  exceeding  the  expenses  of  the  cruise.  The 
slade-trade  was  ruined  for  that  year  on  the 
coast  of  Africa,  and  the  English  insurance  com- 
panies cried  out  furiously  against  the  Admi- 
ralty. But  our  large  squadrons  were  not  des- 
tined to  be  so  fortunate. 

Cadiz  presented  nothing  but  wrecks,  which 
required  to  be  reunited  and  reorganized  before 
a  division  could  be  formed  out  of  them.  Roche- 
fort  contained  the  division  of  Admiral  Allemand, 
who  was  resting  in  that  port,  after  the  difficult 
cruise  which  he  had  made  in  consequence  of 
having  missed  Admiral  Villeneuve,  purposing 
to  enter  a  port  of  France  during  the  equinoc- 
tial gales,  which  drove  off  the  enemy. 

Brest  alone  afforded  resources  for  equipping 
a  very  strong  division.  Of  the  twenty-one  ships 
collected  in  the  great  harbour,  six,  the  fittest 
for  a  long  voyage,  had  been  selected,  and  de- 
spatched, under  the  command  of  Rear-admiral 
Willaumez,  on  the  13th  of  December,  1805,  to 
the  American  seas.  This  division  was  composed 
of  the  Foudroyant,  an  80-gun  ship,  the  Veteran, 
the  Cassard,  the  Impetueux,  the  Patriote,  and 
the  Eole  of  74  guns,  and  two  frigates,  the  Valeu- 
reuse  and  the  Comttf,.  It  carried  provisions  for 
seven  months.  On  the  news  of  its  sailing,  more 
than  thirty  English  ships  had  started  in  pursuit 
of  it,  for  the  purpose  of  seeking  it  in  all  the 
seas.  It  had  first  cruised  off  St.  Helena,  in  the 
months  of- February  and  March,  180C,  taken 
several  prizes  there,  and  then,  having  sick  on 
board,  and  being  in  want  of  fresh  provisions,  it 
had  gone  to  San  Salvador,  from  the  same  mo- 
tives which  had  led  Captain  L'Hermitte  to  that 
port.  After  a  rest  of  seventeen  days,  it  had 
sailed  to  cruise  again,  and  in  June  had  touched 
at  Madeira,  with  the  intention  of  getting  into 
the  wind  of  the  Antilles  and  there  falling  in 
with  the  great  Jamaica  convoys.  At  Marti- 
nique it  had  found  but  a  small  quantity  of  pro- 
visions, the  colony  having  scarcely  sufficient  for 
its  own  consumption,  few  means  of  refitting,  foi 


July,  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


343 


the  almost  continual  state  of  war  for  fifteen 
years  had  permitted  scarcely  any  naval  stores 
to  be  sent  thither ;  and  it  went  to  lie  in  ambush 
in  the  passes  of  the  Antilles,  in  the  hope  of 
making  some  rich  capture,  equivalent  to  the 
expense  of  so  large  an  armament.  On  the  28th 
of  July,  the  ships  of  the  squadron  were  sailing 
apart,  with  the  intention  of  taking  a  convoy 
which  had  been  descried,  when,  the  wind  fresh- 
ening, the  distance  which  separated  them  began 
rapidly  to  increase.  Next  morning,  the  29th, 
at  day-break,  the  admiral  had  lost  sight  of  the 
Veteran,  on  board  of  which  was  Prince  Jerome 
Bonaparte,  and  of  the  Valeureuse  frigate.  In 
the  hope  of  meeting  with  these  two  ships,  he 
stood  to  the  northward  along  the  coast  of  Ame- 
rica, and  proceeded  to  cruise  thirty-eight 
leagues  to  eastward  of  New  York ;  but,  not 
falling  in  with  either  the  Veteran  or  the  Valeu- 
reuse, he  steered  for  the  rendezvous  previously 
agreed  upon  for  such  ships  as  should  part  com- 
pany, in  latitude  29°  N.  and  longitude  67°  W. 
Here  he  was  joined  by  the  Valeureuse,  but  not 
by  the  Veteran,  which  had  that  moment  sailed 
for  the  bank  of  Newfoundland,  and  he  remained 
in  that  quarter  till  the  18th  of  August.  During 
these  vicissitudes,  the  English  divisions  had 
missed  him,  as  he  had  himself  missed  the  Ja- 
.  m:iicu  convoy,  which  passed  within  forty  leagues 
of  his  squadron.  Such  are  the  hazards  of  the 
eea  !  Having  waited  at  the  rendezvous  beyond 
the  time  assigned  for  his  ships,  Admiral  Wil- 
laumez,  who  had  intended  to  proceed  to  New- 
foundland, assembled  his  captains,  held  a  coun- 
cil of  war  with  them,  and,  having  ascertained 
that  they  had  a  great  number  of  sick,  scarcely 
any  water,  wood,  or  provisions,  he  resolved  to 
touch  at  Porto  Rico,  then  to  sail  northward  to 
the  bank  of  Newfoundland,  destroy  the  English 
fisheries  there,  and  return  to  Europe.  But 
scarcely  was  this  resolution  adopted,  when,  in 
the  night  of  the  18th  of  August,  1806,  the  same 
hurricane  which  had  dispersed  L'Hermitte's  di- 
vision, overtook  the  squadron  of  Admiral  Wil- 
laumez,  and  for  three  successive  days  tossed  it 
about  upon  the  waves  till  it  was  on  the  point 
of  perishing.  The  Foudroyant  and  the  Impe- 
tueux,  the  only  ships  of  the  squadron  which  had 
not  been  separated  by  the  tempest,  lost  all  their 
masts,  repaired  themselves  at  sea  as  well  as 
they  could,  and  purposed  to  proceed  in  com- 
pany, when  fresh  gales  parted  them  also.  Per- 
ceiving amidst  the  tempest,  the  lights  of  seve- 
ral enemy's  ships,  they  sought  safety  wherever 
they  could.  The  Foudroyant,  the  admiral's 
ship,  took  refuge  at  the  Havannah ;  the  Imp6- 
tueux,  having  lost  her  masts,  one  tier  of  guns 
thrown  overboard,  and  part  of  her  powder, 
suffered  herself  to  drive  at  the  mercy  of  the 
hurricane  into  the  bay  of  Chesapeake,  where 
she  ran  aground,  pursued  by  two  enemy's  ships. 
The  crew,  seeing  their  ship  lost,  sought  refuge 
on  shore,  where  they  were  protected  by  the 
American  neutrality,  and  assembled  on  board 
the  Cybele,  Captain  L'Hermitte's  frigate,  which 
had  likewise  taken  shelter  in  the  Chesapeake. 
While  the  Foudroyant  and  the  Impetueux  were 
thus  struggling  against  ill  fortune,  the  Eole, 
completely  dismasted,  exposed  to  the  winds  and 
the  enemy,  had  also  fled  into  the  Chesapeake. 
There,  towed  by  American  vessels,  she  was  got 
aground  sufficiently  high  to  be  safe  from  the 
English.  The  Patriote,  having  lost  her  top- 


masts, her  mizen-mast,  and  all  her  sails,  had 
likewise  reached  the  Chesapeake,  and  cast  an- 
chor at  Annapolis.  The  Valeureuse  frigate  had 
fled  to  the  Delaware.  The  Cassard,  after  being 
long  buffeted  by  the  waves,  having  lost  the  bar 
of  her  helm,  having  had  fourteen  stanchions 
stove  in,  had  well  nigh  been  upset.  As,  how- 
ever, she  made  no  water  in  her  hold,  she  was 
righted  and  repaired  at  sea.  Her  sails  were  in 
tolerably  good  condition,  and  she  had  still  pro- 
visions for  seventy-eight  days.  Upon  the 
strength  of  these  circumstances,  it  was  thought 
that  she  had  no  need  to  go  to  Porto  Rico,  and 
she  sailed  for  Europe,  reaching  Brest  on  the 
18th  of  October.  The  Veteran,  Captain  Jerome, 
which  had  been  long  separated  from  the  squad- 
ron, after  roving  for  some  time  on  the  coast 
of  North  America,  had  returned  to  Europe ; 
but  the  blockade  of  Lorient  had  obliged  her  to 
take  refuge  in  the  bay  of  Concarneau,  where 
she  was  scarcely  safe. 

Thus,  of  the  six  ships  which  sailed  from 
Brest,  the  Foudroyant  had  taken  refuge  at  the 
Havannah  ;  the  Impetueux  was  destroyed ;  the 
Patriote  and  the  Eole  had  ascended  the  Chesa- 
peake in  a  deplorable  state,  and  without  much 
chance  of  getting  out  again;  the  Cassard  was 
saved  ;  the  Veteran  had  got  to  an  anchorage  at 
Concarneau,  from  which  it  was  difficult  to  ex- 
tricate her.  As  for  the  frigates  of  the  expedi- 
tion, the  Valeureuse  was  in  the  Delaware ;  the 
Comete  had  taken  shelter  in  an  American  port. 
A  few  prizes  takon  from  the  enemy  formed  a 
slender  compensation  for  such  disasters. 

About  the  same  time  three  frigates,  the 
Syrtne,  the  Revanche,  and  the  Guerriere,  had 
been  despatched  from  Lorient  for  the  northern 
seas,  under  the  command  of  a  brave  Flemish 
seaman,  Captain  Leduc.  The  three  frigates 
directed  by  this  intrepid  navigator  had  not 
experienced  the  same  disasters  as  the  large 
division  of  Willaumez,  but  had  met  with  terri- 
ble seas  and  undergone  great  hardships.  Cap- 
tain Leduc,  sailing  from  Lorient  in  March, 
1806,  steered  for  the  Azores,  where  he  picked 
up  some  prizes,  was  separated  for  a  moment 
from  the  Guerriere,  then,  coming  back  towards 
the  west  coast  of  Ireland,  had  borne  away  for 
the  point  of  Iceland,  which  he  came  in  sight 
of  on  the  21th  of  May,  and  for  the  point  of 
Spitzbergen,  which  he  had  descried  on  the 
12th  of  June.  In  those  latitudes  he  had  met 
with  frightful  weather,  and  lost  sight  of  the 
Guerriere.  Diseases  soon  broke  out:  he  num- 
bered so  many  as  forty  dead,  160  sick,  180 
convalescent,  out  of  700  or  800  men,  who  com- 
posed the  crews  of  his  two  frigates.  Continuing 
to  cruise,  sometimes  off  the  coast  of  Greenland, 
sometimes  off  that  of  Iceland,  now  and  then 
taking  prizes,  he  had  returned  in  September 
to  St.  Malo,  and  being  unable  to  land  there, 
he  put  into  the  little  roadstead  of  Brehat. 
Notwithstanding  these  crosses  and  the  severi- 
ties of  the  weather,  endured  by  Captain  Leduc 
with  extraordinary  fortitude,  he  had  taken 
fourteen  English  vessels  and  one  Russian,  made 
270  prisoners,  and  destroyed  nearly  three  mil- 
lions' worth  of  property.  Unfortunately  he 
had  lost  ninety-five  men.  This  cruise  might 
be  considered  as  advantageous,  though  the 
weather  was  so  extremely  unfavourable.  It 
did  the  highest  honour  to  Captain  Leduc,  the 
commander. 


844 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[July,  ISO? 


In  September,  1806,  Rear-admiral  Cormao, 
the  same  who  had  behaved  so  nobly  at  Trafal- 
gar, sailed  from  Toulon  with  the  ships  the 
B&rte  and  the  Annibal,  the  Uranie  frigate,  and 
the  Sucees,  to  fetch  from  Genoa  the  ship  Le 
Genois,  built  in  that  port.  Having  crossed  the 
gulf,  he  returned  to  Toulon,  opening  that  sea 
to  French  and  Italian  commerce.  He  repeated 
this  trip  more  than  once,  and  always  succeeded 
in  driving  off  the  enemy's  cruisers. 

At  the  same  time  Captain  Soleil,  sailing  from 
Rochefort  with  four  frigates  and  a  brig  belong- 
ing to  Allemand's  division,  experienced  a  san- 
guinary disaster.  The  English  had  adopted  a 
new  system  of  blockade :  it  consisted  in  not 
keeping  so  close  to  the  coast,  in  order  to  tempt 
our  blockaded  vessels  to  slip  out,  and  thus  to 
procure  for  themselves  the  means  of  cutting 
them  off,  before  they  had  time  to  turn  back. 
This  stratagem  completely  succeeded  in  the 
case  of  Captain  Soleil.  The  custom  then  was 
to  start  at  night,  in  order  to  pass  the  enemy's 
cruisers  unperceived.  The  English  not  being 
in  sight,  owing  to  the  distance  at  which  they 
kept,  Captain  Soleil  slipped  out  at  night  on  the 
24th  of  September,  1806,  met  with  none  of 
them  in  his  way,  perceived  them  next  morn- 
ing, the  25th,  in  the  offing,  crowded  all  sail  to 
outstrip  them  in  speed,  cleared  the  space  of 
100  miles  without  being  overtaken,  but  on  the 
26th  was  surrounded  by  Sir  Samuel  Hood's 
whole  squadron,  composed  of  seven  ships  of  the 
line  and  several  frigates,  and  maintained  for 
several  hours  an  heroic  fight  with  five  of  the 
enemy's  ships.  Excepting  the  Themis,  which 
contrived  to  escape  with  two  brigs,  the  whole 
French  division  was  taken  or  destroyed. 

About  the  same  time  with  these  encounters, 
to  which  the  too  great  numerical  superiority 
of  the  enemy  gave  sooner  or  later  an  unfortu- 
nate termination,  there  were  others,  in  which 
the  courage  of  our  seamen  showed  that,  ship 
to  ship,  when  circumstances  were  not  too  un- 
favourable, we  were  capable  of  facing  the 
English,  and  even  of  beating  them.  On  the 
24th  of  April  in  the  same  year,  Captain  Bou- 
rayne,  proceeding  to  the  Cape  with  la  Canon- 
niere  frigate,  had  fallen  in  with  an  English  con- 
voy, and  dashed  into  the  midst  of  it  to  make 
prizes,  when  a  74-gun  ship,  charged  to  escort 
this  convoy,  all  at  once  made  her  appearance. 
Captain  Bourayne  at  first  wished  to  decline  an 
unequal  combat  with  this  adversary ;  but,  find- 
ing himself  pressed  too  closely,  he  gallantly 
accepted  battle,  and  profiting  by  the  circum- 
stance that  the  swell  of  the  sea  prevented  the 
enemy's  ship  from  using  her  lower  deck-guns, 
he  had  taken  an  advantageous  position,  and  in 
a  few  moments  brought  down  her  main-mast, 
completely  cut  up  her  rigging,  and  obliged  her 
to  sheer  off.  Some  stout  merchantmen  having 
sought  to  interfere  in  the  fight,  he  bore  down 
upon  them,  presently  spoiled  their  stomach, 
and  continued  his  route  to  the  Cape,  being  yet 
unaware  of  its  conquest  by  the  English.  These 
latter,  in  order  to  entrap  French  or  Dutch  ves- 
sels, had  not  struck  the  Dutch  colours.  No 
sooner  had  Captain  Bourayne  cast  anchor, 
than,  at  a  signal,  all  the  Dutch  colours  were 
hauled  down,  replaced  by  English,  and  a 
shower  of  bombs  and  balls  poured  upon  the 
Canonniere.  The  undaunted  Captain  Bourayne 
cut  his  cable,  sacrificed  his  anchors,  and,  crowd- 


ing sail,  escaped  all  dangers.  He  arrived  safe 
and  sound  at  the  Isle  of  France,  where  he  was 
destined  to  signalize  himself  by  fresh  naval 
adventures  not  less  bold,  not  less  glorious. 

Another  circumstance   of  this  kind,  which 
occurred  on  our  own  coast  likewise,  proved  all 
that  could  be  expected  from  the  ardour  and 
intrepid  courage  of  our  seamen.     The  flute  la 
Salamandre,  having  sailed  from  St.  Malo  with 
a  cargo  of  ship-timber  for  Brest,  being  pursued 
I  by  a  large  corvette  of  24  guns,  two  brigs,  and 
I  a  cutter,  ran  herself  aground  near  the  mouth 
!  of  Erquy,   and  the  crew  defended  themselves 
!  as  well  as  they  could  with  small  arms.     Soon 
j  perceiving  the  impossibility  of  prolonging  this 
defence,  they  got  away  in  a  boat  and  on  the 
wreck  of  the  mast,  succeeded  in  reaching  the 
land,  proceeded  to  the  battery  called  St.  Michel, 
directed  its  fire  upon  the  English  corvette,  which 
had  approached  too  near  to  the  coast,  crippled 
her  so  that  she  could  not  be  worked,  and  thus 
forced  hei  to  run  aground.     They  then  dashed 
into  the  water,  and,  seconded  by  a  few  soldiers 
who  had  run  to  the  shore,  took  possession  of 
the  corvette  in  spite  of  the  remnant  of  the 
English  crew,  part  of  whom  were  hors  de  com- 
bat, and  part  had  run  away. 

Such  were  the  actions,  unimportant  but  gal- 
lant, by  which  our  sailors  signalized  themselves* 
against  a  power  usually  superior  to  us  in  num- 
ber and  training,  and  still  more  superior  at  a 
moment  when  all  our  forces  were  exclusively 
directed  to  the  war  on  land.  Thus,  at  the 
conclusion  of  1806,  the  able  and  unfortunate 
minister  Decres,  having  nothing  but  disasters 
to  relate  to  a  master  who  was  receiving  only 
favourable  news  from  all  quarters,  was  en- 
tirely discouraged  and  not  less  disgusted  with 
the  system  of  cruises  than  with  the  system  of 
great  battles.  Being y  obliged  to  acquaint  Xa- 
poleon  with  the  reverses  which  we  had  sus- 
tained in  this  new  system  of  warfare  as  well 
as  in  the  old  one,  he  gave  him  sound  reasons 
which  ought  to  have  convinced  him  that  all 
kinds  of  naval  warfare  were  alike  danger- 
ous in  the  then  state  of  things.  In  the  first 
place,  the  numerical  disproportion  was  so 
great,  according  to  him,  that  the  English  could 
blockade  our  ports  with  several  strong  squad- 
rons, and  keep  at  the  same  time  numerous 
divisions  to  run  after  our  cruisers  the  moment 
they  were  descried ;  which  proved  that,  even 
without  pretending  to  fight  general  battle?,  very 
considerable  forces  were  still  required  for  car- 
rying on  war  with  petty  divisions.  In  the  next 
place,  our  materiel  was  too  defective  in  compari- 
son with  that  of  the  enemy ;  and,  though  our 
sailors,  never  inferior  in  courage,  were  far  be- 
hind in  experience,  the  materiel  which  they  em- 
ployed was  much  more  in  fault  than  their  skill. 
Their  ships  withstood  the  tempest  much  less 
vigorously  than  they  withstood  it  themselves. 
In  the  hurricane  of  the  19th  of  August,  which 
had  destroyed  Willaumez's  division,  and  sadly 
shattered  L'Hermitte's,  the  English  had  borne 
its  fury  better  than  we  had  done,  because  their 
rigging  was  not  only  better  managed,  but  also 
because  it  was  of  far  superior  quality.  .More 
numerous,  better  equipped,  they  were  always 
certain  that  among  them,  enough  would  always 
escape  the  dangers  of  the  sea  to  oblige  our 
ships,  some  to  surrender,  others  to  run  aground, 
and  others  to  run  away.  But  the  inferiority 


July,  18J7  ] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


315 


of  number  and  that  of  materiel  were  not,  ac- 
cording to  Admiral  Decres,  the  only  causes  of 
our  disasters.  The  ships  of  Willaumez's  divi- 
sion, on  leaving  the  port  of  Brest,  where  they 
were  selected  with  care  from  a  considerable 
squadron,  were  not  inferior  in  quality  to  good 
English  ships.  But  ten  months'  continuance 
at  sea,  without  finding  any  harbour  to  put  into 
well  supplied  with  provisions  and  spare  arti- 
cles, had  put  them  out  of  condition  either  to 
escape  by  their  sailing  from  a  stronger  squad- 
ron, or  to  withstand  a  storm,  or  to  prosecute 
their  cruise  without  a  fresh  stock  of  provisions, 
which  exposed  them  to  the  danger  of  being  dis- 
covered by  the  enemy.  Admiral  Decres  there- 
fore wrote  to  Napoleon  on  the  23d  of  October, 
1890,  "After  ten  months'  continuance  at  sea, 
the  yards  and  topmasts  break,  the  rigging  gets 
relaxed,  and  wears  the  more,  because  one  can- 
not follow  up  its  gradual  repair  while  out  at 
sea ;  the  lower  masts  give,  the  ships  become 
loose  ;  and  there  is  no  example  of  vessels  hav- 
ing continued  at  sea  for  so  long  a  time,  without 
taking  occasion  to  repair  themselves  afresh, 
and  quietly,  in  some  port."  Unfortunately, 
we  had  no  longer  any  ports,  or  those  which  we 
had  were  scantily  supplied  with  stores.  We 
possessed,  it  is  true,  an  excellent  one,  incom- 
parable for  its  advantages  in  the  Indian  Ocean : 
this  was  that  of  the  Isle  of  France,  which,  at 
the  time  of  the  American  war,  had  served  the 
bailli  Suffrein  for  the  base  of  operations  during 
his  brilliant  campaign  in  India.  But  amidst 
the  disorders  of  the  Revolution  and  the  diffi- 
culties of  the  continental  war>  the  government 
had  not  been  able  to  supply  it  with  naval  stores. 
The  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  which  belonged  to 
allies,  could  not  be  provisioned  like  a  national 
port,  and,  besides,  it  had  just  been  taken.  On 
the  coast  of  Brazil,  we  had  nothing  but  a  neu- 
tral and  almost  hostile  port,  as  it  was  Portu- 
guese— that  of  San  Salvador..  Lastly,  in  the 
West  Indies,  we  were  masters  of  the  magnifi- 
cent road  of  Fort  Royal,  one  of  the  safest  and 
most  capacious  in  the  world ;  but  Martinique 
was  utterly  distitute  of  naval  stores,  and  as  to 
provisions,  it  rather  needed  that  our  squadron 
should  leave  part  of  their  biscuit  for  the  troops 
of  the  garrison,  than  have  to  renew  the  stock 
consumed  at  sea.  With  four  well-stored  places 
to  resort  to,  one  in  the  West  Indies,  one  on  the 
coast  of  Brazil,  one  at  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope, 
one  in  India,  we  might  have  kept  advantage- 
ously at  sea.  But,  deprived  of  these  resources, 
we  could  but  appear  as  fugitives,  always  hur- 
ried, always  dreading  an  encounter,  having  not 
only  the  chances  of  inferior  number  against 
us,  but  all  those  of  inferior  and  inadequate 
equipment.  Such  were  the  consequences  of 
long  domestic  convulsions  and  of  foreign  wars, 
unparalleled  for  their  magnitude,  their  dura- 
tion, and  their  rancour. 

Napoleon,  whom  it  was  not  easy  to  discourage, 
nnd  who  thought  that,  notwithstanding  many 
unfortunate  accidents,  these  last  expeditions  had 
done  great  damage  to  the  enemy's  commerce, 
resolved  to  send  out  fresh  cruisers  in  1807 ; 
but  this  was  strongly  opposed  by  M.  Decres, 
who  said  that  the  coast  of  Africa,  ravaged  in 
1800  by  Captain  L'Hermitte,  was  this  year  pro- 
vided with  considerable  means  of  defence,  in 
consequence  of  the  vehement  complaints  of 
English  commerce ;  that  we  possessed  no  place 

VOL.  II.— 44. 


of  resort  either  at  the  Isle  of  France,  which 
was  destitute  of  stores,  or  at  the  Cape,  which 
was  taken,  or  at  San  Salvador,  which  was  ex- 
hausted, or  at  Martinique,  which  had  scarcely 
necessaries  for  itself.  To  consolidate,  mean- 
while, the  continental  peace,  to  occupy  the  Eng- 
lish cruisers  with  squadrons  fitted  out  in  our 
ports,  and  to  take  advantage  of  certain  mo« 
ments  for  sending  succours  to  the  colonies  in 
frigates,  appeared  to  him  to  be  the  only  allow- 
able activity — an  activity  that  could  do  little 
harm  for  the  present  and  advantageous  for  the 
future.  Napoleon,  who,  between  Eylau  and 
Friedland,  had  had  to  create  new  armies  to 
overawe  Europe  on  his  rear,  had  admitted  the 
negative  system  of  M.  Decres,  and  the  opera- 
tions of  our  navy  in  1807  were  confined  to  some 
succours  despatched  to  the  East  and  West  In- 
dies. 

Our  colonies,  though  exposed  to  many  hard- 
ships, received,  nevertheless,  frequent  relief. 
Producing  nothing  but  sugar,  coffee,  some 
spices,  a  few  dyeing  materials,  and  no  provi- 
sions, no  clothing,  their  prosperity  consisted  in 
selling  their  natural  productions  to  advantage, 
in  order  to  procure  in  exchange  the  means  of 
clothing  and  subsisting  themselves.  At  the 
period  of  which  we  are  treating,  it  was  difficult 
to  forward  these  commodities,  and  provisions 
arrived  with  still  greater  difficulty,  on  account 
of  the  English  cruisers.  In  this  state  of  dis- 
tress, the  severity  of  the  exclusive  system  was 
relaxed  in  favour  of  our  colonies.  They  were 
allowed  that  commerce  with  neutrals,  which,  in 
time  of  peace,  is  reserved  for  nationals  alone. 
The  North  Americans  came  to  fetch  their  sugar 
and  their  coffee,  and  gave  them  in  return  corn 
and  cattle.  But  as  people  are  more  eager  to 
sell  their  own  commodities  than  to  buy  those  of 
another,  the  Americans  brought  provisions  to  a 
greater  amount  than  that  of  the  sugar  and  cof- 
fee which  they  exported.  On  account  of  the 
difficulty  of  selling  colonial  produce  again  in 
Europe,  they  frequently  insisted  on  being  paid 
in  cash  for  their  corn  and  their  cattle,  which 
began  to  render  ready  money  very  scarce. 
Moreover,  •  paying  no  custom-house  duties  at 
their  departure,  because  they  went  in  ballast, 
they  occasioned  a  considerable  diminution  of 
the  local  revenues,  which  consisted  almost  solely 
in  the  produce  of  the  customs,  and,  in  conse- 
quence, nearly  all  the  budgets  of  our  settle- 
ments exhibited  a  deficit.  This  state,  still  en- 
durable at  the  period  in  question,  was  likely  to 
be  soon  aggravated :  if  peace  were  not  restored, 
and  the  maritime  contest  should  assume  a 
character  of  increased  rancour,  the  measures 
for  crippling  commerce  would  be  more  strictly 
enforced,  on  the  part  both  of  France  and  Eng- 
land. Thus  far,  however,  the  despatch  of 
frigates  to  India,  and  that  of  brigs  to  our  An- 
tilles, furnished  tolerably  abundant  resources 
in  specie,  provisions,  and  goods  adapted  for 
clothing.  The  Semillante  and  Ptemontaise  fri- 
gates had  performed  prodigies  at  the  Isle  of 
France  in  1806,  and  captured  between  them 
property  to  the  amount  of  nearly  eight  millions. 
They  had  powerfully  seconded  the  brave  Gene- 
ral Decaen,  who,  from  that  magnificent  posi 
tion,  devoured  with  his  eyes  the  peninsula  of 
India,  and  demanded  10,000  men  only  to  throw 
the  whole  of  it  into  insurrection.  Guade- 
loupe and  Martinique  had  been  supplied  witk 


84G 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


negroes  by  the  cruisers,  and  several  thousand 
of  them  had  been  received ;  so  that  the  labour- 
ing population  there  had  been  increased  in 
spite  of  the  war.  But  the  blockades  being  daily 
rendered  stricter  by  the  enemy,  naval  stores 
were  wanting  for  the  equipment  of  cruisers, 
and  our  colonies  demanded  articles  of  consump- 
tion, at  least  for  the  troops,  specie  to  pay  for 
the  American  provisions,  armed  vessels  to  con- 
tinue the  cruises,  lastly,  recruits  to  fill  the 
vacancies  which  took  place  in  our  garrisons  : 
thus,  at  the  Isle  of  France,  which  would  have 
required  3000  or  4000  men,  they  were  reduced 
to  1600.  At  Martinique,  where  there  had  been 
4700,  and  which  needed  5000  at  least,  there 
were  left  3000  at  most.  At  Guadaloupe  there 
were  scarcely  2000  left.  These  garrisons,  it  is 
true,  seconded  by  inhabitants  full  of  energy 
and  patriotism,  were  sufficient  to  repel  any 
force  which  the  English  squadrons  could  trans- 
port to  so  remote  a  distance.  At  St.  Domingo, 
terrible  convulsions  and  the  destruction  of  a  fine 
French  army  were  followed  by  scenes  equally 
ridiculous  and  atrocious.  Dessalines,  a  negro, 
aping  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  as  Toussaint 
Louverture  had  endeavoured  to  imitate  the 
First  Consul  Bonaparte,  was  seen  placing  an 
imperial  crown  upon  his  black  head,  soon  sink- 
ing beneath  the  daggers  of  the  negro  Christophe 
and  the  mulatto  Pethion;  then  these  two  new 
competitors  contending,  like  the  generals  of 
Alexander,  for  the  power  of  Toussaint  Louver- 
tnre,  drenching  with  their  blood  that  soil  which 
they  would  not  water  with  their  sweat,  and 
leaving  it  sterile — for  blood,  let  people  say  what 
they  will,  never  fertilizes  the  earth.  After 
these  sanguinary  and  burlesque  scenes,  we 
lost  the  French  part  of  the  island;  we  were 
confined  to  the  Spanish  part,  where  we  occupied 
the  town  of  Santo  Domingo  with  1800  men,  the 
relics  of  an  army  equally  unfortunate  and 
heroic.  General  Ferrand  conducted  himself 
there  with  ability  and  vigour,  profiting  by  the 
divisions  of  the  blacks  and  the  mulattoes  to 
maintain  his  ground,  and,  by  the  safety  enjoyed 
under  the  protection  of  our  bayonets,  drawing 
to  him  numerous  colonists,  French  and  Spanish, 
black  and  white,  masters  and  slaves. 

Such  was  the  state  of  our  navy  and  of  our 
maritime  establishment,  on  the  return  of  Na- 
poleon from  his  long  campaign  in  the  north. 
Encouraged  by  his  prodigious  triumphs  to  at- 
tempt every  thing,  persuaded  that,  at  the 
head  of  the  continental  powers,  he  should  ob- 
tain peace,  or  that  he  should  conquer  England 
by  a  combination  of  overwhelming  forces,  he 
was  full  of  ardour.  Accustomed,  moreover,  to 
find  in  his  genius  inexhaustible  resources  for 
conquering  men  and  the  elements,  he  was  far 
from  sharing  in  the  discouragement  of  Admiral 
Decres.  He  discovered  in  the  future  new  and  as 
yet  untried  resources  against  the  English.  In 
the  first  place,  all  the  inlets  had  not  till  then 
been  closed  against  British  commerce.  By 
Russia,  Prussia,  Denmark,  and  the  Hanseatic 
towns,  by  Portugal,  which  was  hostile,  by  Spain, 
which  was  negligently  watched,  by  Austria, 
which  it  had  been  necessary  to  treat  with  more 
delicacy,  many  doors  had  been  left  at  least 
ajar;  and  English  commodities,  being  sold 
cheap,  (which  they  might  well  be  at  that  period, ) 
had  found  means  to  penetrate  to  the  Continent. 
Now,  on  the  contrary,  every  avenue  was  to  be 


[July,  1807. 


closed,  and  an  immense  injury  was  preparing 
for  the  manufactures  of  England.  Napoleon, 
moreover,  was  about  to  be  at  liberty  to  increase 
his  naval  force,  either  with  the  resources  of  the 
French  budget,  daily  becoming  more  wealthy, 
or  with  the  produce  of  conquest,  or  with  the 
timber  and  the  hands  of  the  whole  coast  of 
Europe.  His  numerous  armies  being,  besides, 
disposable,  he  had  conceived  a  vast  system,  the 
successive  development  of  which  we  shall  see 
hereafter,  and  which  would  have  so  multiplied  the 
chances  of  a  great  expedition  directed  against 
London,  Ireland,  or  India,  that  this  expedition, 
once  eluding  the  vigilance  of  the  Admiralty, 
might  perhaps  have  at  last  succeeded,  or  that 
British  obstinacy  might  in  the  end  have  yielded 
to  the  threat  of  an  ever  imminent  danger. 
Napoleon,  in  fact,  was  not  much  in  favour  of 
great  naval  battles,  which,  for  the  rest,  he  had 
accepted  on  certain  occasions,  merely  to  avoid 
recoiling  in  too  manifest  a  manner  from  the 
enemy.  Neither  was  he  more  in  favour  of  cruises, 
which  the  want  of  safe  and  well-stored  places 
of  resort  rendered  too  perilous.  But  his  de- 
sign was,  uniting  the  Russian,  Dutch,  French, 
Spanish,  Italian  navies — having  armed  fleets 
at  the  Texel,  Flushing,  Boulogne,  Brest,  Lori- 
ent,  Rochefort,  Cadiz,  Toulon,  Genoa,  Tarento, 
and  Venice — keeping  numerous  camps  full  of 
invincible  troops  near  these  fleets — his  design 
was  to  oblige  England  to  maintain  before  those 
ports  naval  forces  inadequate  to  blockade  all, 
and  starting  unawares  from  one  that  might  be 
ill  watched,  to  transport  an  army  either  to 
Egypt,  to  India,  or  even  to  London,  and,  while 
waiting  for  the  realization  of  this  chance,  to 
exhaust  the  English  nation  of  men,  timber, 
money,  perseverance,  and  courage.  We  shall 
see,  in  fact,  that,  if  he  had  not  exhausted  him- 
self in  a  thousand  enterprises  foreign  to  this 
great  object,  if  he  had  not  wearied  out  the 
good-will  or  the  patience  of  his  allies,  certainly 
the  means  were  so  vast,  so  well  conceived,  that 
they  would  in  the  end  have  triumphed  over 
England. 

But  before  arriving  at  this  immense  develop- 
ment, which  two  or  three  years  would  have 
sufficed  for  attaining,  Napoleon  began  by  issu- 
ing orders  for  redoubled  activity  in  the  build- 
ing of  ships  throughout  the  empire,  and  then 
by  trying  in  the  Mediterranean  that  system  of 
expeditions  ever  ready  and  ever  threatening, 
by  making  an  attempt  on  Sicily,  in  order  to 
add  that  island  to  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  al- 
ready given  to  his  brother  Joseph. 

Informing  his  brother  Louis  that  the  Dutch 
army  was  about  to  return,  and  thenceforward 
to  absorb  a  smaller  portion  of  his  resources, 
he  enjoined  him  to  put  the  Texel  fleet  into  good 
condition  and  to  collect  there  at  least  nine  ships 
of  the  line  fully  equipped.  At  Antwerp  and 
Flushing  he  had  already  obtained  astonishing 
results.  Five  ships,  some  of  eighty,  the  others 
of  seventy-four  guns,  built  at  Antwerp,  had 
descended  without  accident  to  Flushing,  crossed 
the  shoals  of  the  Scheldt,  and  were  equipping 
in  the  latter  port.  Three  others,  nearly 
finished,  on  the  stocks  at  Antwerp,  would  in- 
crease the  Scheldt  squadron  to  eight.  Dutch, 
Flemish,  Picard  sailors 'were  collected  from  all 
the  coasts  to  man  them.  Napoleon  ordered  the 
three  ships  finished  to  be  launched,  and  fresh 
keels  to  be  laid  down  upon  the  stocks  which 


Aug.  1807.J 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


847 


had  become  vacant,  and  the  number  of  those 
stocks  to  be  increased ;  for  it  was  his  intention 
that  Antwerp  should  become  the  port  for  build- 
ing, not  only  for  Flushing  but  for  Brest,  on  ac- 
count of  the  timber  of  Germany  and  the  North, 
floated  down  by  the  rivers  into  the  whole  of  the 
Netherlands.  He  purposed  to  reserve  the  tim- 
ber at  Brest  for  the  repair  of  the  squadrons 
which  were  always  equipping  at  that  great 
port.  He  promised  himself,  on  his  return  to 
Paris,  to  review  the  old  Boulogne  flotilla  and 
to  organize  it  upon  a  different  plan.  He  urged 
the  building  of  frigates  at  Dunkirk,  Havre, 
Cherbourg,  and  St.  Malo.  At  Brest,  where, 
ever  since  the  squadron  of  Willaumez  sailed, 
there  had  remained  twelve  ships  armed,  five  of 
which  were  bad  and  seven  good,  Napoleon  or- 
dered the  five  bad  to  be  put  out  of  service,  and 
the  seven  good  to  be  equipped  in  the  best  pos- 
sible manner,  reserving  the  sailors  who  had  be- 
come disposable  for  the  new  ships  which  were 
preparing  to  be  built.  He  directed  that  a  ship, 
the  building  of  which  was  just  finished,  should 
be  added  at  Lorient  to  a  division  of  two  ships 
already  there.  He  consented  that  the  Veteran, 
which  had  taken  refuge  at  Concarneau,  and 
was  obstinately  blockaded  by  the  English, 
should  be  disarmed  and  the  crew  conveyed  to 
Lorient  to  man  a  ship  lately  built.  We  had  at 
Rochefort  a  fine  division  of  five  ships,  equally 
well  equipped  and  commanded.  The  com- 
mander was  one  of  those  men  whom  the  sailors 
in  their  familiar  language,  call  sea-wolves,  the 
brave  Admiral  Allemand,  deprived  of  his  fri- 
gates by  the  disaster  of  Captain  Soleil,  but  im- 
patient nevertheless  to  sail,  and  always  stopped 
by  an  English  squadron,  which,  for  eight  or  ten 
months,  had  not  lost  sight  of  the  Isle  of  Aix. 
Napoleon  gave  orders  for  launching  a  ship  that 
was  finished,  for  refitting  another  that  might 
be  rendered  serviceable,  and  for  increasing 
this  division  to  seven.  Wherever  ships  were 
launched,  he  had  other  keels  laid  immediately 
upon  the  stocks.  His  financial  resources,  old 
and  new,  enabled  him,  as  we  shall  presently 
see,  to  make  these  immense  efforts.  At  Cadiz 
he  had  an  excellent  division  of  five  ships,  relics 
of  Trafalgar,  well  organized,  well  manned,  and 
commanded  by  Admiral  Rosily.  Napoleon 
would  have  wished  to  add  to  them  some  Spa- 
nish ships ;  but  when  he  cast  his  eyes  upon  the 
Peninsula,  he  could  not  suppress  a  mingled 
feeling  of  pity,  anger,  and  indignation,  when 
thinking  that,  at  Ferrol  and  Cadiz,  Spain  was 
•$ot  able  to  equip  one  division ;  that,  at  Cartha- 
gena  alone,  she  had  six  ships,  which  had  been 
equipped  several  years  before,  the  hulls  of 
which  were  in  a  filthy  state  from  lying  in  the 
port,  with  rigging  hanging  loose,  and  provi- 
sions insufficient  for  the  shortest  campaign ;  for 
the  crews  had  consumed  those  on  board,  hav- 
ing none  on  shore.  He  said  to  himself  that  he 
must  come  to  the  point  and  insist  that  Spain, 
for  her  own  sake,  for  the  sake  of  her  allies, 
Bhould  govern  herself  differently ;  and  mean- 
while he  addressed  almost  threatening  repre- 
sentations to  the  cabinet  of  Madrid,  to  induce 
it  to  attach  a  few  ships  to  those  of  Admiral  Ro- 
sily, and  recommended  to  the  latter  to  hold 
himself  in  readiness  to  weigh  anchor  at  the 
first  signal.  At  Toulon  there  were  three  ships, 
two  belonging  to  Toulon  and  one  to  Genoa.  In 
conjunction  with  several  frigates,  they  made 


!  some  successful  sorties.  Napoleon  desired  that 
;  the  Commerce  de  la  Ville  de  Paris  and  the  Ro- 
|  buste  should  be  launched  at  Toulon,  and  the 
j  Breslau  at  Genoa,  that  they  should  be  equipped 
!  by  dismantling  either  bad  or  inferior  ships; 
that  fresh  ships  should  be  laid  down  on  the 
stocks  where  they  were  built,  and  that  there 
should  be  six  ships  ready  in  that  port.  He 
sent  engineers  to  Spezzia,  to  examine  that  po- 
sition, which  the  continual  study  of  the  map 
had  revealed  to  him.  He  enjoined  his  brother 
Joseph,  after  obtaining  information  concerning 
the  ports  of  Naples  and  Castellamare,  to  com- 
mence there  the  building  of  two  ships,  and  to 
proceed  soon  to  the  building  of  four.  Recol- 
lecting that  a  French  ship  had  found  an  asylum 
at  Ancona,  he  thought  that  he  might  make  use 
of  that  port,  and  ordered  two  ships  to  be  built 
there,  for  the  purpose  of  employing  the  timber 
and  the  workmen  of  the  Roman  State,  caring 
but  little  about  the  temporal  sovereignty  of  the 
Pope,  whom  he  already  treated  as  though  it  no 
longer  existed.  Lastly,  at  Venice  there  were 
five  ships  building.  He  ordered  three  more  to 
be  put  upon  the  stocks  on  account  of  the  Trea- 
sury of  Italy  and  two  on  account  of  the  Trea- 
sury of  France,  and  directed  canals  to  be  cut, 
for  taking  the  resuscited  navy  of  Venice  from 
their  arsenal  to  the  Adriatic  Sea.  The  same 
Italian  provinces  which  were  to  furnish  the 
timber  and  the  workmen  for  these  operations, 
were  also  to  furnish  sailors,  always  very  plen- 
tiful on  their  coasts.  With  these  numerous 
new  ships,  with  sailors  to  be  found  on  the  coasts 
of  Europe,  with  an  addition  of  young  French 
soldiers  and  officers,  the  number  of  whom  Na- 
poleon never  had  difficulty  to  augment,  he 
might  hope  to  double  or  treble  the  naval  forces 
of  the  empire  before  a  year  had  elapsed.  These 
ships,  insufficient  at  first  to  match  English  ships, 
would  be  sufficient  in  a  short  time  to  carry 
troops,  and  would  be  so  immediately  to  neces- 
sitate fresh  blockades  and  to  doom  England  to 
ruinous  expenses. 

While  these  immense  armaments  were  in  pre- 
paration, Napoleon  intended  forthwith  to  send 
succours  to  the  colonies,  and  to  assemble  by  the 
same  operation  forty  sail  in  the  Mediterranean. 
For  this  purpose  he  directed  that  the  divisions 
of  Brest,  Lorient,  and  Rochefort  should  take  on 
board  3100  men,  and  a  great  quantity  of  stores ; 
that  they  should  land  1200  at  Martinique,  600 
at  Guadaloupe,  500  at  St.  Domingo,  300  at 
Cayenne,  100  at  Senegal,  and  400  at  the  Isle 
of  France,  and  on  their  return  to  Europe,  pro- 
ceed through  the  Straits  of  Gibraltar  to  Toulon. 
The  junction  at  Toulon  of  seven  ships  from 
Brest,  three  from  Lorient,  seven  from  Roche- 
fort,  six  from  Cadiz,  and  six  from  Toulon, 
would  compose,  with  frigates,  a  total  of  forty 
sail,  twenty-nine  of  them  of  the  line,  a  force 
superior  to  any  that  the  English,  even  if  timely 
apprized,  could  bring  into  that  sea  under  two 
or  three  months,  and  capable  of  throwing  fif- 
teen or  eighteen  thousand  men  into  Sicily,  and 
as  many  as  one  pleased  into  the  Ionian  Islands. 
Admiral  Decres,  who  applied  himself  with 
honourable  courage  to  oppose  Napoleon's  pro- 
jects when  the  magnitude  of  them  was  not  pro- 
portionate to  the  means,  did  not  fail  to  impugn 
this  scheme  of  junctions  preceded  by  a  voyaga 
to  the  West  Indies.  He  thought  that  to  make 
the  revictualling  of  the  colonies  dependent  on 


848 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Aug.  1807. 


the  success  of  two  or  three  great  expeditions  j 
was  an  imprudent  thing ;  for  these  great  expe- 
ditions of  several  ships  of  the  line  and  frigates, 
to  carry  a  few  hundred  men  to  the  colonies, 
incurred  dangers  which  were  not  in  proportion 
to  the  importance  of  the  object;  that  it  would 
be  better  to  despatch  single  frigates,  each  car- 
rying a  certain  quantity  of  stores  and  two  or 
three  hundred  men ;  that  if  we  lost  one,  the 
loss  was  inconsiderable ;  so  the  others  arrived, 
the  colonies  would  be  always  sure  of  receiving 
a  portion  of  the  succours  which  were  destined 
for  them.  As  for  junctions  in  the  Mediterra- 
nean, he  maintained  that  the  divisions  ordered 
to  pass  through  the  Straits,  in  spite  of  the  Eng- 
lish squadron  at  Gibraltar,  would  have  to  run 
immense  risks ;  that,  to  escape  them,  they 
ought  to  be  left  at  liberty  to  take  advantage 
of  the  first  favourable  gale ;  that,  therefore,  no 
other  instruction  ought  to  be  given  them  but 
to  pass  the  Straits,  leaving  them  to  seize  the 
first  favourable  circumstance,  without  compli- 
cating their  mission  by  a  voyage  to  the  West 
Indies  and  a  return  to  Europe.  Lastly,  he 
thought  that  it  would  be  sufficient  to  send  into 
the  Mediterranean  the  Cadiz  division  placed  so 
near  to  the  goal,  and  perhaps  that  of  Roche- 
fort;  but  that  we  ought  not  to  deprive  our- 
selves of  all  the  forces  we  had  in  the  ocean, 
by  despatching  the  Lorient  and  the  Brest  divi- 
signs  also  to  Toulon. 

Napoleon,  who  suffered  his  ideas  to  be  modi- 
fied by  experienced  men,  when  those  men  fur- 
nished him  with  good  reasons,  received  favour- 
ably the  observations  of  M.  Decres.  In  con- 
sequence, he  decided  that,  from  the  ports  of 
Dunkirk,  Havre,  Cherbourg,  Nantes,  Roche- 
fort,  Bordeaux,  in  which  there  were  many  fri- 
gates, single  vessels  should  sail  for  the  colo- 
nies ;  that  the  naval  divisions  ordered  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  Mediterranean  should  have  that 
sole  direction ;  and,  as  for  the  number,  he  pro- 
posed to  call  two  at  least  to  Toulon,  that  of 
Rochefort  and  that  of  Cadiz,  which  would  form, 
with  the  Toulon  division,  a  squadron  of  seven- 
teen or  eighteen  sail  of  the  line,  besides  seven 
or  eight  frigates,  a  force  sufficient  to  make  him 
absolute  master  of  the  Mediterranean,  and  to 
execute  there  all  that  he  meditated  relative  to 
Sardinia,  Sicily,  and  the  Ionian  Islands.  In 
consequence,  Admiral  Allemand  at  Rochefort, 
Admiral  Rosily  at  Cadiz,  had  orders  to  seize 
the  first  propitious  occasion  for  weighing  an- 
chor, passing  the  Straits,  making  any  manoeu- 
vre which  their  experience  and  the  circum- 
stances of  the  sea  should  suggest.  The  court 
of  Spain  was  required  to  equip  a  few  ships  at 
Cadiz,  and  to  issue  immediate  orders  that  the 
Carthagena  division,  commanded  by  Admiral 
Salcedo,  should  be  supplied  with  the  provisions 
necessary  for  a  short  expedition,  and  despatch- 
ed to  Toulon. 

Such  were  the  measures  ordered  by  Napo- 
leon in  execution  of  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  to 
intimidate  England  by  an  immense  concurrence 
of  means,  to  dispose  her  to  peace,  and  if  she 
were  bent  upon  war,  to  force  Sweden,  Denmark, 
Prussia,  Portugal,  Austria,  to  close  their  ports 
against  the  productions  of  Manchester  and  Bir- 
mingham, to  prepare,  with  the  junction  of  all 
the  naval  forces  of  the  continent,  expeditions, 
•  he  ever  threatening  possibility  of  which  would 
•ooner  or  later  weary  out  the  perseverance  or 


exhaust  the  finances  of  the  English  nation, 
without  taking  into  account  that  the  success  of 
a  single  one  would  be  sufficient  to  strike  Ler  to 
the  heart.  But  the  attention  of  Napoleon  waa 
not  wholly  engrossed  by  foreign  affairs.  He 
was  anxious  at  length  to  direct  it  to  the  admin- 
istration, the  finances,  public  works,  legisla- 
tion, to  every  thing  that  could  conduce  to  the 
internal  prosperity  of  France,  which  he  had  as 
much  at  heart  as  his  glory. 

Before  he  turned  it  to  those  points,  he  was 
obliged  to  make  some  indispensable  changes 
in  the  high  civil  and  military  offices.  M.  de 
Talleyrand  was  the  principal,  if  not  the  sole, 
cause  of  these  changes.  That  able  represen- 
tative of  Napoleon  to  all  Europe,  who  was  in- 
dolent, addicted  to  pleasure,  never  in  haste  to 
act  or  to  bestir  himself,  and  whose  physical 
infirmities  increased  his  fondness  for  indul- 
gence, had  been  severely  tried  by  the  cam- 
paigns of  Prussia  and  Poland.  To  live  in  the 
cold  climate  of  those  distant  regions,  to  scam- 
per over  the  snow  after  an  indefatigable  con- 
queror, through  bands  of  Cossacks,  to  sleep 
most  frequently  under  thatch,  and,  when  fa- 
voured by  the  fortune  of  war,  to  live  in  a 
wooden  house,  decorated  with  the  title  of  the 
castle  of  Finkenstein,  harmonized  no  better 
with  his  taste  than  with  his  energy.  He  was 
tired,  therefore,  of  the  ministry  for  foreign 
affairs,  and  wished  to  resign,  not  the  direction 
of  those  affairs,  which  were  his  favourite  occu- 
pation, but  to  direct  them  under  a  different 
title  from  that  of  minister.  His  pride  had 
been  much  hurt  at  his  not  becoming  grand  dig- 
nitary like  M.  de  Cambace"res  and  M.  Lebrun ; 
and  the  principality  of  Benevento,  which  had 
been  conferred  on  him  in  compensation,  had 
only  postponed,  not  satisfied,  his  longing.  An 
occasion  offered  for  increasing  the  number  of 
the  grand  dignitaries ;  this  was  the  indefinite 
number  of  the  princes  of  the  imperial  family, 
who  were  at  the  same  time  grand  dignitaries 
and  foreign  sovereigns.  There  were  three  in 
this  predicament:  Louis  Bonaparte,  w,ho  was 
King  of  Holland  and  constable ;  Eugene  de 
Beauharnais,  who  was  Viceroy  of  Italy  and 
arch-chancellor  of  state ;  Joseph,  who  was 
King  of  Naples  and  grand  elector.  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand had  insinuated  to  the  Emperor  that 
they  ought  to  have  deputies  appointed,  with 
the  titles  of  vice-constable,  vice-grand  elector, 
vice-chancellor  of  state,  and  that  if,  indeed, 
their  by  no  means  active  functions  scarcely 
required  a  double  titulary,  still  the  high  offices 
destined  to  reward  signal  services  could  not  be 
multiplied  too  much.  M.  de  Talleyrand  would 
have  wished  to  become  vice-grand  elector,  and 
leaving  to  a  minister  for  foreign  affairs  the  vul- 
gar duty  of  opening  and  sending  off  despatches, 
continue-  himself  to  direct  the  principal  nego- 
tiations. While  with  the  army,  he  had  not 
neglected  any  opportunity  of  talking  to  the 
Emperor  on  this  subject,  never  ceasing  to  extol 
the  advantages  of  these  new  creations,  and  al- 
leging, in  regard  to  himself  in  particular,  his 
age,  his  infirmities,  his  fatigues,  and  his  need 
of  rest.  By  dint  of  perseverance,  he  had  ob- 
tained a  sort  of  promise,  which  Napoleon  per- 
mitted to  be  wrung  from  him  against  his  will ; 
for  he  never  intended  that  the  grand  dignita- 
ries should  perform  any  active  functions,  see- 
ing that,  partaking  in  some  measure  in  the  in- 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


849 


violability  of  the  sovereign,  they  were  not  ex-  ] 
pected  to  be  responsible.  On  the  contrary, 
Napoleon  held  it  to  be  essential  that  he  should 
possess  the  power  of  removing  persons  invested 
with  active  functions,  and  he  especially  disliked 
to  place  in  a  position  of  demi-inviolability  a 
personage  whom  he  distrusted,  and  whom  he 
deemed  it  prudent  to  keep  constantly  under  his 
all-powerful  hand. 

As  soon  as  he  had  returned  to  Paris,  at  the 
moment  when  every  one  came  to  receive  the 
reward  for  his  serrices  during  the  late  war, 
M.  de  Talleyrand  went  to  St.  Cloud  to  remind 
Napoleon  of  his  promises.  The  Arch-chan- 
cellor Cambace'res  was  present.  Napoleon  be- 
trayed a  strong  feeling  of  displeasure.  "I 
cannot  comprehend,"  said  he,  sharply,  to  M.  de 
Talleyrand,  "your  impatience  to  become  a 
grand  dignitary,  and  to  quit  a  post  in  which 
you  have  acquired  importance,  and  from  which 
I  am  aware  you  have  reaped  great  advantages," 
(alluding  to  the  contributions  said  to  have  been 
levied  from  the  German  princes,  at  the  time  of 
the  secularizations.)  "You  ought  to  know 
that  I  will  not  suffer  any  one  to  be  at  the  same 
time  grand  dignitary  and  minister ;  that  the 
foreign  affairs  cannot  then  be  reserved  for  you, 
and  thus  you  will  lose  an  eminent  post,  for 
which  you  are  qualified,  to  gain  a  title  which 
will  be  no  more  than  a  satisfaction  granted  to 
your  vanity." 

"I  am  worn  out,"  replied  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
with  apparent  phlegm,  and  with  the  indiffer- 
ence of  a  man  who  had  not  understood  the 
Emperor's  cutting  allusions,  "I  have  need  of 
rest." 

"Be  it  so,"  rejoined  Napoleon,  "you  shall 
be  grand  dignitary;  but  not  you  alone."  Then 
addressing  Prince  Cambace'res,  "Berthier," 
said  he,  "has  rendered  me  as  much  service  as 
any  person  whatever;  it  would  be  unjust  not 
to  make  him  grand  dignitary,  too.  Draw  up 
a  decree  by  which  M.  de  Talleyrand  shall  be 
raised  to  the  dignity  of  vice  grand-elector,  Ber- 
thier to  that  of  vice-constable,  and  bring  it  to 
me  to  sign."  M.  de  Talleyrand  retired,  and 
the  Emperor  expressed  more  at  length  to  Prince 
Cambace'res  all  the  dissatisfaction  that  he  felt. 
It  was  in  this  manner  that  M.  de  Talleyrand 
quitted  the  ministry  for  foreign  affairs,  and, 
with  great  prejudice  to  himself  and  to  public 
business,  withdrew  from  the  person  of  the  Em- 
peror. 

The  decree  was  signed  on  the  14th  of  Au- 
gust, 1807.  It  was  necessary  to  appoint  suc- 
cessors to  Prince  de  Talleyrand  and  Prince 
Berthier ;  the  one  as  minister  of  foreign  affairs, 
the  other  as  minister  of  war.  Napoleon  had 
at  hand  M.  de  Champagny,  minister  of  the 
interior,  a  mild,  honest,  industrious  man,  ini- 
tiated by  his  embassy  at  Vienna  in  the  ways, 
but  not  in  the  secrets,  of  diplomacy,  and  unfor- 
tunately not  capable  of  withstanding  Napoleon, 
whom,  it  is  true,  nobody  would  then  have  been 
capable  of  restraining,  such  was  the  overpower- 
ing influence  of  success  and  circumstances. 
M.  de  Champagny  was  therefore  appointed 
minister  for  foreign  affairs,  and  succeeded  in 
the  ministry  of  the  interior  by  M.  Cr6tet,  a 
well-informed  and  laborious  member  of  the 
Council  of  State,  and  at  the  moment  Governor 
of  the  Bank  of  France.  He  was  preferred  to 
Count  Regnault  de  Saint-Jean-d'Angely,  whose 


double  talent  of  writing  and  speaking  seemed 
to  render  him  indispensably  necessary  in  the 
Council  of  State  and  in  the  Legislative  Bodv, 
and  whose  character  appeared  unsuitable  to 
the  post  of  minister  of  the  interior.  M.  Jau- 
bert,  another  member  of  the  Council  of  State, 
succeeded  M.  Cr^tet,  as  Governor  of  the  Bank. 

Napoleon,  in  raising  Prince  Berthier  to  the 
dignity  of  vice-constable,  had  no  intention  to 
deprive  himself  of  his  services  as  major-gene- 
ral of  the  grand  army,  a  post  in  which  none 
could  equal  him,  and  in  which  he  therefor* 
continued  him.  But  he  selected  for  his  suc- 
cessor as  minister  of  war,  General  Clarke, 
whose  administrative  talents  he  had  recently 
put  to  the  test,  in  the  post  of  Governor  of  Berlin 
— talents  more  specious  than  solid — but  who, 
assuming  the  appearance  of  anxious  docility 
and  close  application  to  business,  had  misled 
Napoleon.  There  was,  however,  sufficient 
ground  for  this  choice,  for  the  military  men  fit 
for  active  war  were  all  employed ;  and  among 
those  who  were  better  suited  to  the  cabinet 
than  to  the  field  of  battle,  General  Clarke  ap- 
peared to  be  the  one  who  had  most  of  the  spirit 
of  order,  and  of  that  comprehension  of  details 
which  administrative  matters  require.  M. 
Dejean  continued  in  the  post  of  minister  of  the 
materiel  of  war.  General  Hullin,  whose  attach- 
ment and  personal  courage  Napoleon  had  had 
more  than  one  occasion  to  appreciate,  suc- 
ceeded to  the  command  of  Paris,  in  place  of 
Junot,  appointed  to  head  the  army  of  Portugal. 

About  this  time  France  sustained  a  serious 
loss  in  the  person  of  the  minister  of  public 
worship,  (ministre  des  cultes,)  Count  de  Portalis, 
a  learned  lawyer,  an  ingenious  and  brilliant 
writer,  an  able  co-operator  in  the  two  most 
meritorious  works  of  Napoleon,  the  Civil  Code 
and  the  Concordat,  having  in  his  relations  with 
the  clergy  had  the  skill  to  preserve  a  due 
medium  between  weakness  and  rigour,  esteemed 
by  the  French  Church,  and  exercising  a  useful 
influence  over  it  and  over  Napoleon  :  a  person 
age,  in  short,  much  to  be  regretted  at  a  mo- 
ment when  we  were  on  the  point  of  an  open 
rupture  with  the  court  of  Rome,  and  as  much 
to  be  regretted  in  the  administration  of  the 
cultes,  as  Talleyrand  in  the  direction  of  the 
foreign  affairs.  That  laborious  man,  struck 
with  a  sort  of  blindness,  had  had  the  art  to 
supply  the  want  of  the  sense  of  which  he  was 
deprived  by  a  prodigious  memory ;  and  it  once 
happened  that,  being  summoned  to  write  from 
Napoleon's  dictation,  he  reproduced  from 
memory  his  ideas,  with  their  vivid  expression, 
which  he  had  made  believe  to  take  down  in 
writing.  M.  de  Portalis  had  become  dear  to 
Napoleon,  by  whom  he  was  deeply  regretted. 
His  successor,  as  ministre  des  cultes,  was  another 
lawyer — another  author  of  the  Civil  Code,  .M. 
Bigot  de  Pre"amcneu,  a  man  of  no  very  brilliant 
understanding,  but  discreet,  and  religious  with- 
out weakness. 

It  was  requisite  to  compensate  M.  Regnault 
de  Saint-Jean-d' Angel}',  who  had  approached 
the  ministry  of  the  interior  without  arriving  at 
it.  M.  Regnault  was  one  of  the  members  of 
the  Council  of  State  most  employed  by  Napo- 
leon, on  account  of  his  intimate  acquaintance 
with  matters  of  business,  and  his  facility  of 
expounding  them  in  perspicuous  and  eloquent  # 
reports.  As  there  was  then  no  other  disputw 
2  G 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Aug.  1807 


tion,  but  that  of  a  councillor  of  State  discuss- 
i).g  a  subject  in  opposition  to  a  member  of  the 
Tribunate,  before  the  mute  Legislative  Body, 
and  adducing  reasons  agreed  upon  against 
arguments  likewise  agreed  upon,  nothing  more 
•was  wanted  for  these  contests,  arranged  before- 
hand in  preparatory  conferences,  and  resem- 
bling those  of  free  assemblies  as  much  as  the 
manoeuvres  of  a  review  resemble  war,  than 
fluency,  variety,  and  brilliancy.  Only  it  was 
lequisite  that  this  talent  should  be  ready  and 
indefatigable,  under  a  master,  prompt  in  con- 
ceiving and  in  executing,  desiring,  when  he 
turned  his  attention  to  a  subject,  to  go  through 
with  it  at  the  moment  that  it  suggested  itself, 
in  order  to  proceed  immediately  to  another. 
M.  Regnault  was  the  first  of  orators  for  such  a 
part;  and  it  may  be  said  that  all  the  eloquence 
of  the  time  was  his  alone.  Napoleon,  appre- 
ciating his  services,  resolved  to  compensate 
him  with  the  title  of  minister  of  State,  a  title 
without  definition,  which  gave  the  rank  of 
minister  without  conferring  the  power,  and 
with  a  place  at  court,  to  which  was  attached  a 
very  handsome  salary ;  that  of  Secretary  of 
State  to  the  imperial  family.  M.  Defermon, 
for  his  services  in  the  section  of  the  finances, 
M.  Lacue'e,  for  those  which  he  rendered  in  the 
direction  of  the  conscription,  obtained  also  the 
quality  of  ministers  of  State. 

These  appointments  being  decided  upon  with 
the  arch-chancellor,  the  only  person  whom  he 
consulted  on  such  occasions,  Napoleon  bestow- 
ed on  legislation,  the  internal  administration, 
the  finances,  and  the  public  works,  an  attention 
which  he  had  never  refused  them  during  the 
war,  but  which,  given  at  a  distance,  hastily, 
amid  the  pealing  of  cannon,  was  sufficient  for 
superintending,  not  for  creating. 

The  first  point  to  which  Napoleon  turned  his 
thoughts  was  the  introduction  into  the  imperial 
constitution  of  a  modification  which*  appeared 
necessary  to  him,  though  in  itself  of  very  little 
importance — that  was,  the  suppression  of  the 
Tribunate.  This  body  had  ceased  to  be  any 
more  than  a  mere  shadow,  since  it  had  been 
reduced  to  the  number  of  fifty  members,  de- 
prived of  tribune,  divided  into  three  sections, 
those  of  legislation,  internal  administration, 
and  finances.  It  discussed  with  the  correspond- 
ing sections  of  the  Council  of  State,  in  particu- 
lar conferences,  the  projets  de  lois  which  were  to 
be  proposed  by  the  government.  We  have  ex- 
plained elsewhere  how  this  business  was  ma- 
naged. The  lapse  of  time  had  made  no  change 
in  the  proceedings;  all  that  it  had  brought 
with  it  was  a  little  more  calmness  and  silence. 
After  conferences  held  at  the  arch-chancellor's, 
a  member  of  the  Tribunate  and  a  member  of 
the  Council  of  State  went  each  of  them  to  de- 
liver a  speech  before  the  Legislative  Body, 
either  in  a  contrary  sense,  or  in  the  same  sense, 
according  as  there  had  been  agreement  or  di- 
vergence. The  Legislative  Body  then  voted, 
•without  speaking  a  word,  and  by  an  immense 
majority,  theprofets  (bills)  presented,  excepting 
in  some  very  rare  cases,  which  concerned  ma- 
terial interests,  the  only  interests  on  which 
members  ventured  to  differ  in  opinion  from  the 
government ;  also  excepting  in  some  still  more 
rare  cases,  in  which  the  propositions  in  ques- 
tion wounded  the  sentiments  of  men  attached 
to  the  revolution, — sentiments  dormant,  not  ex- 


tinguished, in  their  hearts.  At  such  times, 
minorities  of  forty  or  fifty  voices  proved  that 
liberty  was  deferred,  not  destroyed,  in  France. 
Thus  internal  affairs  were  carried  on  silently 
and  speedily,  with  the  general  approbation, 
founded  on  the  persuasion  that  these  affairs 
were  perfectly  conducted,  the  Emperor  having 
most  frequently  devised,  the  Council  of  State 
thoroughly  examined,  the  Tribunate  contra- 
dicted in  their  speech,  the  measures  adopted. 
As  for  foreign  affairs,  which  it  would  then  have 
been  high  time  to  discuss  boldly,  in  order  to 
stop  him  whom  the  impetuosity  of  his  genius 
was  soon  to  plunge  into  an  abyss,  they  were  re- 
served exclusively  for  the  Emperor  and  the 
Senate,  in  very  unequal  proportions,  as  may 
well  be  imagined.  Napoleon  decided  at  will 
upon  peace  and  war,  in  a  manner  more  abso- 
lute than  the  emperors  of  ancient  Rome,  the 
sultans  of  Constantinople,  or  the  czars  of 
Russia ;  for  he  had  neither  praetorians  nor 
janissaries,  neither  Strelitzes,  nor  Ulenias,  nor 
aristocracy.  He  had  but  soldiers,  equally  sub- 
missive and  heroic,  but  a  salaried  clergy,  ex- 
cluded from  public  affairs,  but  an  aristocracy 
which  he  created,  with  titles  begotten  by  his 
imagination,  and  with  a  fortune  derived  from 
his  vast  conquests.  From  time  to  time  he  com- 
municated in  confidence  to  the  Senate  diplo- 
matic negotiations,  when  they  had  terminated 
in  war.  The  Senate,  which,  since  180o,  had, 
in  the  absence  of  the  Legislative  Body,  received 
the  attribution  of  voting  levies  of  men,  paid 
for  those  confidences  with  two  or  three  con- 
scriptions, which  the  Emperor  paid  for  in  his 
turn  with  magnificent  bulletins,  with  blackened 
and  tattered  colours,  with  treaties  of  peace, 
unfortunately  too  far  from  durable ;  and  the 
country,  dazzled  with  all  this  glory,  delighted 
with  its  tranquillity,  finding  internal  affairs 
conducted  with  superior  ability,  the  external 
affairs  raised  to  an  unparalleled  height,  wished 
that  this  state  of  things  might  last  for  a  long 
time  to  come  ;  and  now  and  then  only,  on  see- 
ing the  French  army  wintering  on  the  Vistula, 
and  battles  fought  near  the  Niemen,  began  to 
fear  that  all  this  greatness  might  find  an  end 
in  its  very  excess. 

A  slight  agitation  was  manifested  in  this  go- 
vernment only  when  one-fifth  of  the  Legislative 
Body  was  to  go  out.  Then  some  intrigues  were 
formed  about  the  Senate,  which  was  required 
to  choose  the  members  of  the  deliberative  bodies 
from  the  lists  presented  by  electoral  colleges 
formed  for  life.  Applications  to  the  principal 
senators  were  resorted  to,  and  men  solicited  a 
seat  in  the  Legislative  Body,  mute,  but  having 
a  salary  attached  to  it,  as  they  would  solicit  a 
place  in  the  finances.  The  arch-chancellor 
Cambace"res  superintended  the  elections,  in 
order  to  admit  none  but  adherents ;  and  for 
this  very  little  picking  and  choosing  was  re- 
quired. The  worst  that  could  happen  was, 
that  at  the  end  of  each  list  there  might  slip 
in  a  few  creatures  of  the  opposition  in  the  Se- 
nate, timid  and  not  numerous  adversaries,  whom 
Sieyes  had  deserted  and  forgotten,  who  repaid 
by  forgetting  him  in  their  turn,  and  who  found 
fault  with  Napoleon,  not  foi  the  rash  enter- 
prises which  were  to  bring  ruin  upon  France, 
but  for  the  Concordat,  for  the  Civil  Code,  and 
for  many  other  equally  excellent  creations. 

Such  were  the  forms  of  that  heroic  despotism 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


351 


which  sprang  from  the  Revolution.  It  was  of 
little  consequence  to  change  them,  for  the 
ground-work  must  have  remained  the  same. 
Certain  details  might  no  doubt  have  been  rec- 
tified in  the  organization  of  those  dependent 
and  submissive  bodies.  This  might  have  been 
done,  and  Napoleon  had  so  designed  in  regard 
to  the  Tribunate.  The  Tribunate,  confined  to 
criticism  on  words  in  the  private  conferences, 
annoying  to  the  Council  of  State,  to  which  it 
was  nothing  but  the  obscure  rival,  had  a  false 
position,  a  position  unworthy  of  its  title.  The 
Legislative  Body,  though  not  desiring  more  im- 
portance than  it  had,  and  by  no  means  disposed 
to  use  the  liberty  of  speaking,  in  case  that  were 
restored  to  it,  was  sometimes  confused  at  its 
mute  condition,  which  exposed  it  to  ridicule. 
There  was  one  very  simple  thing  to  be  done, 
and  which  could  scarcely  have  been  prejudicial 
to  the  liberty  of  the  time — this  was  to  unite 
the  Tribunate  to  the  Legislative  Body,  by  blend- 
ing together  attributions  and  persons.  This 
Napoleon,  after  conferring  with  the  arch-chan- 
cellor, resolved  to  do.  In  consequence,  he  de- 
cided that  the  Tribunate  should  be  suppressed, 
that  its  attributions  should  be  transferred  to  the 
Legislative  Body,  thus  put  again  in  possession 
of  the  liberty  of  speech ;  that,  at  the  opening 
of  every  session,  there  should  be  formed  in  the 
bosom  of  the  Legislative  Body,  and  by  ballot, 
three  commissions,  of  seven  members  each,  des- 
tined, like  the  suppressed  commissions  of  the 
Tribunate,  to  attend,  the  first  to  legislation,  the 
second  to  internal  administration,  the  third  to 
finances ;  that  these  sections'  should  continue 
to  discuss  with  the  corresponding  sections  of 
the  Council  of  State,  and  in  private  conferences, 
the  projets  de  lois  submitted  by  the  government ; 
that  when  they  should  find  themselves  agreed 
with  the  Council  of  State,  a  member  of  that 
Council  should  come  and  explain  from  the  tri- 
bune of  the  Legislative  Body  the  motives  which 
the  government  had  had  for  proposing  the  pro- 
jet  in  question  ;  and  that  the  president  of  the 
commission  should  give,  on  his  part,  the  mo- 
tives which  it  had  for  approving  it ;  but  that, 
in  case  of  disapproval,  all  the  members  of  the 
commission  should  be  admitted  to  produce  pub- 
licly the  reasons  on  which  their  opposition  was 
founded ;  and  that,  lastly,  the  Legislative  Body 
should  continue  to  vote,  without  any  other  de- 
bate, on  the  measures  submitted  to  its  appro- 
bation. It  was  further  determined  that,  to 
avoid  changing  the  present  state  of  things  in 
the  session  that  was  about  to  open,  and  all  the 
business  of  which  was  already  prepared,  the 
tenatus-consulte,  containing  the  new  arrange- 
ments, should  not  be  promulgated  till  the  day 
on  which  that  session  should  close. 

In  fact,  the  Legislative  Body,  recovering  the 
faculty  of  speech,  since  twenty-one  of  its  mem- 
bers, elected  annually  by  ballot,  were  called  to 
the  discussion  of  the  matters  under  considera- 
tion, the  suppression  of  the  Tribunate  merely 
put  out  of  sight  a  body  which  had  long  been  de- 
prived of  life.  The  Legislative  Body  was  sen- 
sible of  this  restitution  of  speech,  not  that  it 
•was  ready  to  make  use  of  it,  but  because  it 
would  relieve  it  from  a  ridicule  which  had  be- 
come annoying.  At  any  rate,  there  was  one 
word  suppressed,  a  word  which  had  had  some 
importance :  it  was  that  of  Tribunate.  This  was 
enough  to  displease  certain  constant  friends  of 


the  Revolution,  and  to  please  Napoleon ;  who 
was  not  afraid,  in  order  to  get  rid  of  a  word 
which  the  recollections  of  1802  rendered  dis- 
agreeable, to  restore  to  the  Legislative  Body 
prerogatives  of  some  value.  It  is  true  that  a 
precaution  was  taken  against  these  new  pre- 
rogatives, namely,  to  fix  at  forty  years  the  age 
at  which  a  member  could  sit  in  the  Legislative 
Body  —  a  paltry  precaution,  which  would  not 
have  prevented  an  assembly  from  being  enter- 
prising, if  the  spirit  of  liberty  could  have  then 
awakened,  and  which  caused  the  political  edu- 
cation of  public  men  to  begin  too  late. 

After  getting  rid  of  this  troublesome  shadow 
of  the  Tribunate,  it  still  remained  to  be  con- 
sidered what  was  to  become  of  the  persons, 
whom  Napoleon,  from  natural  kindliness  of  dis- 
position, as  much  as  from  policy,  never  liked  to 
ruffle.  He  therefore  resolved  that  the  members 
of  the  Tribunate  should  go  with  their  preroga- 
tives and  seek  an  asylum  in  the  bosom  of  the 
Legislative  Body,  where  they  were  to  find  a 
title  and  appointments.  Still  Napoleon  was 
unwilling  to  render  the  Legislative  Body,  then 
limited  to  300  members,  too  numerous  by  pour- 
ing into  it  the  whole  Tribunate.  He  therefore 
opened  this  asylum  to  the  most  obscure  mem- 
bers only  of  the  body.  As  for  those  who  had 
displayed  intelligence  and  application  to  busi- 
ness, he  destined  them  for  high  employments. 
He  first  placed  in  the  Senate  M.  Fabre  de 
1'Aude,  who  had  presided  over  the  Tribunate 
with  distinction,  and  M.  Cure"e,  who  had  com- 
menced his  career  by  the  manifestation  of  an 
ardent  republicanism,  but  who  had  finished  it 
with  a  motion  for  restoring  monarchy  by  insti- 
tuting the  Empire.  As  for  the  other  members 
of  the  Tribunate  distinguished  by  their  merit, 
Napoleon  ordered  the  ministers  of  the  interior 
and  of  justice  to  propose  them  to  him  for  the 
vacant  places  of  prefects,  first  presidents,  and 
procureurs-ffenerauz.  Lastly,  he  reserved  some 
others  to  make  them  figure  in  a  new  magistracy, 
which  was  to  be  the  complement  of  our  financial 
institutions  —  the  Court  of  Accounts,  the  crea- 
tion of  which  we  shall  presently  relate. 

There  was  another  measure  which  Napoleon 
was  not  less  impatient  to  take,  and  which  he 
considered  as  much  more  urgent  than  the  sup- 
pression of  the  Tribunate:  this  was  the  puri- 
fication of  the  magistracy.  The  government 
of  the  Consulate,  at  the  moment  of  its  instal- 
lation, had  brought  an  excellent  spirit  into  its 
selections ;  but,  in  haste  to  establish  itself,  it 
had  chosen  in  haste  the  members  of  all  the 
administrations,  and,  if  it  had  erred  less  than 
the  governments  which  preceded  it,  still  it  had 
erred  too  much  not  to  be  obliged  to  reform 
some  of  its  first  nominations.  In  all  the  classes 
of  functions  it  had  amended  several  of  them, 
and  these  changes  of  persons  had  been  the 
more  approvable  and  approved,  since  it  was 
never  political  influence  that  dictated  them, 
but  the  knowledge  acquired  of  the  merit  of 
each.  In  the  magistracy  nothing  of  the  kind 
could  be  effected,  on  account  of  the  irremov- 
ability established  by  the  constitution  of  M 
Sieyes ;  and  certain  selections  made  in  the 
year  VIII.,  in  ignorance  of  the  individuals,  in 
the  hurry  of  a  reorganization,  had  become  in. 
time  a  permanent  scandal.  Ther»had,  indeed,, 
been  attributed  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  a  dis  ' 
ciplinary  jurisdiction  over  the  magistracy;  bat 


352 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[Aug.  1807. 


this  jurisdiction,  sufficient  in  ordinary  times, 
was  not  so  in  regard  to  an  establishment  of 
magistrates  nominated  in  mass,  on  the  eve  of 
an  immense  convulsion,  and  among  whom 
wretches,  unworthy  of  the  rank  which  they 
occupied,  had  slipped  in.  While  decency  and 
application  prevailed  amongst  all  the  agents 
of  the  government  placed  under  an  active 
superintendence,  the  magistracy  alone  some- 
times set  pernicious  examples.  Against  such 
it  was  requisite  to  provide  ;  and  Napoleon,  who 
deemed  himself  called  in  1807  to  lend  a  finish- 
ing hand  to  the  reorganization  of  France,  had 
decided  to  put  a  stop  to  such  disorder,  lie 
had  asked  the  opinion  of  the  arch-chancellor, 
supreme  judge  on  the  like  matters.  That 
mind,  equally  fertile  and  wise,  had  found  on 
this  occasion,  as  on  many  others,  an  ingenious 
expedient,  founded,  moreover,  on  solid  reasons. 
The  constitution  of  the  year  VIII. ,  though  it 
declared  the  members  of  the  judicial  order 
irremovable,  nevertheless  subjected  them  to 
a  condition  common  to  all  the  members  of  the 
government,  namely,  that  they  should  appear 
in  the  lists  of  eligible  persons.  It  had  not, 
therefore,  insured  to  them  the  perpetuity  of 
their  offices,  excepting  conditionally,  and  when 
they  should  deserve  all  their  life  the  public 
esteem.  This  precaution  having  been  done 
away,  along  with  the  lists  of  eligible  persons, 
since  abolished,  we  must  supply  its  place,  said 
Prince  Cambace'res ;  and  he  proposed  two  mea- 
sures, the  one  permanent,  the  other  temporary. 
The  first  consisted  in  not  considering  the  nomi- 
nations in  the  magistracy  as  definitive  and 
conferring  irremovability  till  after  the  expi- 
ration of  five  years,  and  according  to  the  ex- 
perience had  of  the  morality  and  the  capacity 
of  the  magistrates  chosen.  The  second  con- 
sisted in  forming  a  commission  of  ten  mem- 
bers, and  charging  this  commission  to  review 
the  whole  of  the  magistracy,  and  to  point  out 
such  of  its  members  as  had  proved  themselves 
unworthy  to  administer  justice.  This  ingenious 
and  cheering  combination  was  adopted  by  Na- 
poleon, and  converted  into  a  senatus-consulte, 
which  was  to  be  laid  before  the  Senate.  At 
any  other  time,  this  measure  would  have  been 
considered  as  a  violation  of  the  Constitution. 
At  this  period,  succeeding  immense  convul- 
sions, in  presence  of  an  acknowledged  neces- 
sity, and  with  the  intervention  of  a  body  whose 
elevation  ensured  impartiality,  it  appeared  no 
more  than  what  it  really  was,  a  reparative  and 
necessary  act.  This  purification,  soon  carried 
into  effect  with  justice  and  discretion,  was 
more  approved  in  its  execution  than  in  its 
principle. 

While  engaged  upon  these  constitutional  and 
administrative  measures,  Napoleon  directed  his 
attention  to-  the  finances  also.  There  was  no 
department  of  the  administration  with  which 
he  had  reason  to  be  so  well  satisfied  as  with 
this;  for  abundance  prevailed  at  the  Treasury, 
and  order  was  completely  re-established  there. 
"We  have  seen  the  budget,  fixed  at  first  at  500 
millions  in  1802,  soon  swelling  by  the  definitive 
liquidation  of  the  public  debt,  by  the  develop- 
ment given  to  public  works  of  general  utility, 
by  the  successive  re-establishment  of  the  ser- 
vices of  the  Church  in  the  smallest  communes 
in  France,  by  the  creation  of  a  vast  system  of 
iustruction,  by  the  extension  of  ship-building; 


lastly,  by  the  institution  of  monarchy  and  the 
creation  of  a  civil  list,  to  about  COO  millions, 
and  on  the  breaking  out  of  the  war  to  700  mil- 
lions (820,  including  the  expenses  of  collection.) 
In  1806,  Napoleon,  on  his  return  from  Prussia, 
had  declared  to  the  Legislative  Body,  with  the 
intention  that  Europe  should  be  apprized  of  it, 
that  600  millions  were  sufficient  for  peace,  700 
millions  for  war,  and  that,  without  recurring 
to  loans,  a  system  to  which  at  that  time  France 
had  an  antipathy,  he  should  obtain  that  sum 
by  the  re-establishment  of  the  natural  collec- 
tions, which  the  French  Revolution  had  abolish- 
ed, instead  of  confining  itself  to  the  reform 
of  them.  In  consequence,  he  had  re-established, 
under  the  name  of  droits  reunis,  the  taxes  upon 
liquors,  and,  instead  of  the  tolls  at  the  barriers, 
a  tax  upon  salt.  These  imposts  soon  justified 
his  foresight  and  firmness ;  for  the  droits  reunis, 
after  producing  20  millions  in  the  first  year, 
yielded  48  in  the  year  1806,  and  promised  76 
in  the  year  1807.  The  salt-tax,  which  had 
produced  frrm  six  to  seven  millions  in  1806, 
brought  in  i\)  millions  in  1807,  and  encouraged 
a  hope  of  much  more  in  the  following  years. 
The  old  taxes  had  likewise  shown  considerable 
improvement.  The  registration  had  increased, 
from  160  millions  to  180 ;  the  customs  from  40 
millions  in  1806  to  66  in  1807  ;  for  if  maritime 
commerce  was  prohibited,  the  commerce  with 
the  Continent  was  prodigiously  increasing. 

Hence  the  ordinary  revenues,  which  Napoleon 
in  1806  had  estimated  at  700  millions,  rose 
far  higher  in  1807,  and  might  be  computed  ap- 
proximatively  at  740  millions,  made  up  in  the 
following  manner :  315  millions  arising  from  the 
direct  contributions  (tax  on  land,  buildings, 
doors  and  windows,  rent,  &c. ;)  180  from  re- 
gistration, (duty  on  stamps,  legacies,  changes 
of  property,  with  the  addition  of  the  produce 
of  the  forests  ;)  80  produced  by  the  droits  reunis, 
50  by  the  customs,  30  by  salt,  five  by  salt  and 
tobacco  beyond  the  Alps,  five  by  the  salt-works 
of  the  East,  12  by  the  lottery,  10  by  the  posts, 
one  by  powder  and  saltpetre,  10  by  instalments 
due  from  purchasers  of  national  domains,  six 
by  various  receipts,  36  by  the  Italian  subsidy, 
representing  the  cost  of  the  French  army  em- 
ployed in  guarding  Italy.  This  total  sum  of 
740  millions,  increased  by  special  items  to  the 
amount  of  30  millions,  that  is  to  say,  by  the 
additional  centimes  to  the  direct  contributions 
for  the  departmental  expenses,  and  the  tolls 
established  on  certain  rivers  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  the  navagation,  would  make  altogether 
770  millions.  Some  of  these  items,  such  as  the 
produce  of  the  registration,  of  the  d roils  n-n/u's, 
of  the  customs,  might  rise  or  fall,  but  the  total 
amount  must  reach  and  exceed  successively  the 
mean  revenue  of  740  millions,  770  with  the 
special  items. 

It  is  true  that  the  expenditure  had  surpassed 
not  less  than  the  receipts  the  limits  specified  in 
the  law  of  the  finances.  Napoleon,  in  1806,  had 
estimated  at  700  millions  the  budget  of  the  state 
of  war,  at  that  time  the  most  usual  state ;  which, 
with  30  millions  of  special  items,  must  carry 
the  total  expenditure  to  730  millions.  We 
know  already  that  it  would  be  760  millions  for 
that  same  year  1806.  It  was  afterwards  known 
that  it  amounted  even  to  770.  It  had  therefore 
exceeded  the  estimated  sum  by  40  million!!. 
In  1807,  the  history  of  which  year  we  are  at 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


353 


this  moment  relating,  the  expenditure,  com- 
puted at  720  millions,  750  with  the  special 
items,  threatened  to  be  much  more  con- 
siderable. It  was  subsequently  fixed  at  778 
millions.  The  cause  of  these  augmentations 
may  easily  be  guessed ;  for  the  expense  of  the 
war,  (for  the  two  ministries,  of  the  personnel 
and  of  the  materiel,)  estimated  at  300  millions, 
had  amounted  to  340.  Even  this  sum  is  far 
from  revealing  the  whole  extent  of  it :  for,  in- 
dependently of  the  expenses  charged  to  the 
St.-ite,  the  countries  occupied  by  our  troops 
furnished  part  of  the  provisions,  and  the  Trea- 
sury of  the  army,  into  which  the  war  contribu- 
tions were  paid,  had  defrayed  part  of  the  ex- 
penses of  the  materiel  and  of  the  pay.  The  sup- 
plements drawn  from  this  treasury  amounted 
to  not  less  than  40  or  50  millions  for  1806, 
and  to  at  least  140  or  150  for  1807.  But,  the 
current  receipts  of  the  year  furnishing  already 
740  millions,  (770  with  the  special  items,)  and 
the  Treasury  of  the  army  being  capable  of  fur- 
nishing some  supplements  without  being  im- 
poverished, we  are  authorized  to  assert  that 
Napoleon  had  attained  his  aim,  to  make  the 
receipts  balance  the  expenses,  even  during  a 
state  of  war,  without  having  recourse  to  loans. 

For  the  rest,  the  total  expenditure  of  770 
millions  for  1806,  of  778  for  1807,  was  not  yet 
wholly  revealed ;  for  French  account  ability, 
though  then  in  progress,  had  not  yet  arrived  at 
the  perfection  which  at  present  enables  us,  a 
few  months  after  the  turn  jf  the  year,  to  ascer- 
tain and  to  fix  the  expenditure  of  it.  It  took 
.not  less  than  two  or  three  years  to  arrive  at 
such  a  liquidation.  Napoleon  then  estimated 
the  expenses  of  the  year  at  720  millions,  750 
including  the  services  paid  out  of  the  special 
items ;  and,  excepting  a  few  extra  sums  for 
the  maintenance  of  the  army,  that  estimate 
was  correct.  In  this  total  of  720  millions,  the 
public  debt  would  require  104  millions,  (54  of  5 
per  cent,  rentes  perpetuelles,  17  of  life  annuities, 
24  of  ecclesiastical  pensions,  5  of  civil  pensions, 
4  of  the  debt  of  Piedmont,  Genoa,  Parma,  and 
Placentia;)  the  civil  list  28,  (including  the 
princes;)  the  service  of  foreign  affairs  8;  the 
administration  of  justice  22;  the  expenses  of 
the  interior  and  of  the  public  works  54,  (not  in- 
cluding the  works  in  the  departments  paid  for 
out  of  the  30  millions  of  special  items;)  the 
salaries  of  the  clergy  12  ;  the  general  police  1 ; 
the  finances  3G,  (including  10  millions  for  the 
sinking  fund : )  the  administration  of  the  Trea- 
sury 18,(including  10 millions  paid  for  discount;) 
the  navy  106;  war  324;  lastly,  a  reserve  of  10, 
destined  for  unforeseen  expenses — total  720 
millions,  750  with  the  expenses  of  the  depart- 
ments. 

This  total  of  the  expenses  forming  750  mil- 
lions, compared  with  the  produce  of  the  re- 
ceipts forming  770  millions,  left  in  hand  a 
balance  of  20  millions.  Napoleon  immediately 
resolved  to  restore  the  benefit  of  it  to  the  coun- 
try, by  the  abolition  of  the  10  war  centimes  im- 
posed in  1804,  in  place  of  the  voluntary  dona- 
tions voted  by  the  departments  for  the  building 
of  the  Boulogne  flotilla.  It  was  a  considerable 
relief  upon  the  direct  contributions,  the  heaviest 
of  all  at  that  period,  and  the  third  of  the  kind 
granted  since  the  18th  Brumaire.  Napoleon 
ordered  that,  when  the  law  of  finances  was 
presented  to  the  Legislative  Body,  which  was 

VOL.  II.— 45 


I  about  to  be  assembled  after  a  prorogation  of  a 
year,  this  important  improvement  in  the  con- 
dition  of  the  tax-payers  should  be  immediately 
'  proposed  to  him,  and  that  thus  the  termination 
of  part  of  the  burdens  of  the  war  should  be 
proclaimed,  before  the  termination  of  the  war 
itself. 

His  ardent  mind,  fond  of  diving  into  the  fu- 
ture, had  already  inquired  what  would  be  the 
!  state  of  the  finances  of  the  country  in  a  few 
!  years ;  and  he  had  ascertained  that,  in  fifteen 
!  years,  the  rapid  extinction  of  the  life-annuities 
•  and  ecclesiastical  pensions,  that  the  equally 
rapid  redemption  of  the  rentes  perpetuelles,  pro- 
vided with  a  sinking  fund,  to  which  the  sale, 
daily  more  advantageous,  of  the  national  pro- 
perty gave  a  very  powerful  operation,  would  re- 
duce the  public  debt  from  104  millions  to  74.  But, 
long  before  this  result,  for  which  he  should  be 
obliged  to  wait  several  years,  the  restoration 
of  peace  might  reduce  the  public  expenses  far 
below  720  millions,  causing  the  revenue  to  rise 
much  higher,  and  afford  abundant  means  for 
either  alleviations  or  useful  creations.  But  for 
the  faults  which  we  shall  soon  have  to  record, 
these  fair  prospects  would  have  been  realized, 
and  the  finances  of  France  would  have  been 
saved  with  her  greatness. 

With  the  favourable  state  of  the  finances  was 
combined,  ever  since  the  preceding  year,  a  com- 
pletely new  facility  in  the  service  of  the  Trea- 
sury. It  will  be  recollected  that  various  causes, 
one  of  them  permanent,  the  other  accidental, 
had  rendered  this  service  extremely  difficult,  and 
given  the  Treasury  the  appearance  of  a  rich  man 
in  embarrassments,  who,  either  from  want  of 
order,  or  from  the  difficulty  of  recovering  his  re- 
venues, cannot  provide  for  his  current  expenses. 
The  permanent  cause  arose  from  the  system  of 
obligations  and  bills  at  sight,  which  the  receivers- 
general  subscribed,  and  which,  payable  at  their 
chest  month  by  month,  were  the  medium  by 
which  the  produce  of  the  taxes  reached  the 
Treasury.  The  obligations,  representing  the 
amount  of  the  direct  contributions,  were  drawn 
only  at  distant  dates,  and  one  fourth,  at  least, 
was  not  payable  till  four,  five,  or  six  months 
after  the  year  to  which  they  belonged.  The 
bills  at  sight,  representing  the  indirect  contri- 
butions, and  drawn  at  indefinite  periods,  sub- 
sequently to  the  actual  receipt  of  the  tax,  kept 
back  the  produce  of  these  contributions  from 
the  State  for  fifty  or  sixty  days  after  they  had 
been  paid  into  the  chests  of  the  receivers-gene- 
ral. These  latter  had,  therefore,  the  benefit  of 
the  funds,  which  constituted  part  of  their 
emoluments.  But  what  occasioned"  much  inure 
serious  inconvenience  than  the  excessive  emolu- 
ments allowed  to  the  receivers,  was  the  neces- 
sity, under  which  the  Treasury  found  itself,  to 
realize  its  revenues  at  seasonable  times,  to  get 
those  obligations  and  bills  at  sight  discounted, 
sometimes  by  the  bank,  sometimes  by  great 
capitalists,  who  made  it  pay  as  high  a  discount 
as  12  and  16  per  cent.,  and  had  even,  like  M. 
Ouvrard,  turned  its  paper  to  fltrange  purposes 
The  sums  which  were  thus  carried  back  beyond 
the  twelve  months  of  the  year  were  computed 
at  124  millions.  Nevertheless,  as  the  expense 
was  not  paid,  any  more  than  the  tax,  in  thosu 
twelve  months,  the  service  of  the  Treasury 
might  have  been  carried  on  almost  without  dia 
count,  if  other  causes,  wholly  accidental,  had 
2o2 


354 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Aug.  1807 


not  supervened  to  complicate  the  ordinary  situa- 
tion. On  the  one  hand,  the  anterior  budgets 
of  1805,  1804,  and  1803,  had  left  arrears,  for 
which  endeavours  were  made  to  provide  w\th 
the  current  resources ;  and,  on  the  other  hand, 
the  extraordinary  financial  adventure  of  the 
United  Merchants,  who,  by  blending  the  affairs 
of  France  and  Spain,  had  deprived  the  State 
of  a  sum  of  141  millions,  had  thrown  the 
Treasury  into  a  double  embarrassment.  It 
had  found  itself  obliged  to  meet  an  anterior 
deficit  of  60  to  70  millions,  and  a  debit  of  141 
millions,  created  by  the  United  Merchants.  It 
had,  it  is  true,  solid  assets,  but  difficult  to  be 
realized,  in  pledge  for  this  debit.  It  had, 
therefore,  been  necessary,  in  addition  to  the 
annual  discount  of  124  millions'  worth  of 
obligations,  not  due  till  in  the  following  year,  to 
meet  a  deficit  of  about  200  millions.  This  ac- 
counts for  the  financial  distress  of  1805  and 
1806,  even  amidst  the  prodigious  successes  of 
the  campaign  which  was  terminated  by  the  vic- 
tory of  Austerlitz. 

But  the  arrival  of  Napoleon  in  January,  1806, 
returning  victorious,  and  his  hands  full  of  me- 
tals taken  from  Austria,  had  revived  confidence, 
and  afforded  a  first  relief,  for  which  there  was 
great  need.  Credit  soon  recovered  itself ;  the 
interest  of  twelve  and  fifteen  per  cent,  fell  to 
nine  and  even  to  six  per  cent,  on  the  discount 
of  the  assets  of  the  Treasury. 

Other  means  had  been  pursued  for  removing 
the  difficulties  of  the  moment,  and  rendering 
their  recurrence  impossible.  In  the  first  place, 
the  national  domains,  which  constituted  the 
endowments  of  the  Senate,  the  Legion  of  Ho- 
nour, and  the  University,  were  withdrawn  from 
them ;  annuities  were  allotted  to  them  in  com- 
pensation, and  the  domains  transferred  to  the 
sinking  fund,  that  might  effect  a  gradual  sale 
of  them,  which  it  did  with  prudence  and  ad- 
vantage. These  domains  were  valued  at  60 
millions,  and  upon  this  pledge  inscriptions  to 
that  amount  had  been  created,  bearing  an  in- 
terest of  six  and  seven  per  cent.,  according  to 
the  time  they  had  to  run,  and  payable  succes- 
sively by  the  said  fund,  in  the  course  of  five 
years.  These  rescriptions,  on  account  of  the 
interest  which  they  yielded,  the  security  of  the 
pledge,  and  the  confidence  inspired  by  the  fund 
which  was  surety  for  them,  had  acquired  the 
credit  of  the  best  assets,  and  had  never  ceased 
to  be  negotiable  at  a  rate  nearly  approaching 
to  par.  They  had  thus  furnished  a  medium 
for  discharging  the  arrear  of  the  budgets  of 
1803,  1804,  and  1805.  The  domains  given  in 
pledge  acquiring  in  time  a  more  considerable 
value,  the  amount  of  these  rescriptions  might 
be  increased  to  70  and  even  80  millions,  in  or- 
der to  defray  the  charges  successively  revealed 
by  the  liquidation  of  anterior  assets. 

After  this  arrear  had  been  provided  for, 
great  pains  were  taken  for  the  recovery  of  the 
141  millions  constituting  the  debit  of  the 
United  Merchants.  M.  Mollien,  who  had  be- 
come minister  of  the  Treasury  on  the  removal 
of  M.  de  Marbois,  and  was  incessantly  stimu- 
lated by  Napoleon,  had  displayed  remarkable 
zeal  and  ability  in  the  realization  of  the  assets 
composing  this  debit.  In  the  first  place,  im- 
movable property  belonging  to  the  sieurs 
Ouvrard  and  Vanlerbergh,  worth  10  or  11 
millions,  had  been  seized.  M.  Vanlerbergh's 


!  warehouses  had  next  been  taken  possession  of; 
'  and,  as  the  Emperor  was  much  pleased  with 
]  his  activity,  he  had  continued  to  him  the  sup- 
;  ply  of  the  provisions  for  the  army  and  navy ; 
I  and,  by  paying  only  in  part  for  his  supplies, 
means  had  been  secured  for  soon  recovering  a 
sum  of  about  40  millions.  Messrs.  Ouvrard, 
Desprez,  and  Vanlerbergh  had  fu,  ther  ad- 
vanced, in  different  payments,  or  in  effects 
upon  Holland,  a  sum  of  30  millions.  Lastly, 
Spain,  acknowledging  herself  personally  a 
debtor  to  the  total  amount  of  60  millions,  had 
paid  in  assignations  upon  Mexico  for  36  mil- 
lions of  piastres,  and  promising  to  pay  directly 
24  millions  in  the  course  of  1806,  at  the  rate 
of  two  millions  per  month — Spain  was  the 
worst  debtor  of  all;  for,  of  the  24  millions 
payable  by  monthly  instalments  in  1806,  she 
had  paid  but  14  millions  in  August,  1807,  after 
showing  an  evident  ill-will  before  Jena,  and 
after  Jena  a  deplorable  exhaustion.  It  was  by 
means  of  loans  in  Holland  that  she  discharged, 
in  August,  1807,  14  of  the  24  millions  due  in 
1806.  As  for  the  36  millions  of  piastres  to  be 
received  in  the  counting-houses  of  Mexico, 
Vera  Cruz,  the  Caraccas,  the  Havannah,  and 
Buenos  Ayres,  M.  Mollien  devised  a  very  in- 
genious expedient  for  recovering  that  amount; 
this  was,  to  transfer  them  to  the  Dutch  house 
of  Hope,  which  made  them  over  to  the  English 
house  of  Baring ;  and,  on  account  of  the  scar- 
city of  the  precious  metals  in  England,  the 
latter  obtained  permission  to  bring  them  over 
from  the  Spanish  ports  in  English  frigates. 
France  guarantied  only  the  delivery  in  harbour 
to  English  boats,  at  the  rate  of  3  fr.  75  cent., 
the  rate  at  which  she  took  them.  The  profit 
of  1  fr.  25  cent.,  relinquished  to  those  who 
risked  the  difficulties  of  the  operation,  was, 
therefore,  not  at  her  cost,  but  at  that  of  Spain, 
which  thus  paid  by  an  enormous  discount  for 
the  distance  of  the  sources  of  her  wealth,  and 
the  weakness  of  her  flag,  obliged  to  leave  to 
that  of  England  the  transport  of  the  metals  of 
America.  The  houses  of  Baring  and  Hope 
afterwards  remitted  to  the  French  Treasury, 
by  transfers  of  assets,  the  amount  of  the  ceded 
piastres.  The  bargain  had  been  made  on  these 
conditions  for  more  than  25  millions,  part  of 
which  had  just  arrived.  The  surplus  had  been 
applied  to  the  payment,  in  the  United  States, 
or  in  the  Spanish  colonies,  of  debts  contracted 
by  our  ships,  and  especially  those  of  Admiral 
Willaumez,  which  had  sought  refuge,  some  in 
the  port  of  the  Havannah  and  others  in  the 
Delaware  and  the  Chesapeake. 

It  was  by  the  aid  of  these  various  combina- 
tions, that  in  August,  1807,  the  French  Trea- 
sury had  found  means  to  recover  100  millions 
of  the  141  composing  the  enormous  debit  of 
the  United  Merchants.  The  payment  of  the 
balance  of  41  millions  was  secured  within 
about  four  or  five  millions  and  at  very  short 
intervals. 

The  Treasury,  deeply  in  debt  in  the  wintei 
of  1806,  soon  relieved  by  the  metallic  succours 
which  Napoleon  had  brought  from  abroad,  by 
the  revival  of  confidence,  by  the  integral  pay- 
ment of  the  arrear  of  the  budgets,  by  the  al- 
most total  recovery  of  the  debit  of  the  United 
Merchants,  had  had  to  provide  in  1807  for  only 
a  small  part  of  that  debit,  and  for  the  124  mil- 
lions of  obligations  usually  recoverablt  in  the 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


355 


following  year,  which  was  an  easy  matter,  as  | 
•we  have  already  observed,  the  payment  of  the 
expenses  being  deferred  nearly  as  long  as  that 
of  the  taxes.  The  Emperor,  therefore,  had 
been  able  to  demand  and  to  obtain  that  the 
pay  of  the  grand  army,  which  amounted  to  four 
or  five  millions  per  month,  and  from  the  imme- 
diate payment  of  which  he  had  dispensed  the 
French  Treasury,  should  gradually  accumulate 
at  Erfurt,  at  Mayence,  at  Paris,  and  there  form 
a  depot  of  specie  to  the  amount  of  more  than 
40  millions,  an  excessive  precaution,  which 
proves  how  prudent  in  war  was  that  man  so 
imprudent  in  politics.1 

But  a  new  institution,  which  was  the  neces- 
sary complement  of  our  financial  organization, 
facilitated  in  1806  the  operations  of  the  Trea- 
sury, and  in  the  course  of  1807  caused  an  abun- 
dance previously  unknown  to  prevail  there. 
According  to  the  system  proposed  to  the  First 
Consul  by  M.  Gaudin,  on  the  morrow  of  the 
18th  Brumaire,  a  system  pursued  till  1807,  the 
receivers-general  signed,  as  we  have  said,  for 
the  profit  of  the  Treasury,  bills  of  exchange, 
with  the  title  of  obligations  or  bills  at  sight,  fall- 
ing due  month  by  month.  Such  was  the  me- 
thod employed  for  getting  in  the  public  revenue. 
The  Treasury  thus  had  the  certainty  of  a  fixed 
term  for  payments,  and  left  as  emoluments  to 
the  receivers-general  the  profits  thence  result- 
ing ;  for  the  taxes  always  came  in  before  these 
obligations  or  bills  at  sight  were  due.  It  was  no 
doubt  a  great  improvement,  in  reference  to  the 
time  at  which  this  system  was  devised ;  for  it 
insured  fixed  terms  for  the  payment  of  the 
taxes.  In  1807  there  was  one  step  more  left 
to  be  taken — that  was  to  oblige  the  receivers 
to  hand  over  their  funds  to  the  Treasury  the 
very  moment  that  they  received  them.  But  to 
suppress  all  at  once  this  system  of  bills  of  ex- 
change, and  to  substitute  for  it  the  more  natu- 
ral system  of  an  immediate  payment  under  the 
form  of  an  account  current  between  the  Trea- 
sury and  the  receivers-general,  would  have 
been  too  abrupt  a  change,  and  perhaps  a  dan- 
gerous one.  The  experience  and  the  inventive 
spirit  of  M.  Mollien  suggested  to  him  one  of 
the  happiest  of  transitions. 

M.  Mollien,  as  the  reader  no  doubt  recollects, 
•was  director  of  the  sinking  fund,  when  Napo- 
leon, satisfied  with  the  manner  in  which  he  had 
directed  that  fund,  called  him  in  1806  to  the 
ministry  of  the  Treasury,  as  successor  to  M. 
de  Marbois,  dismissed  in  consequence  of  the 
affair  of  the  United  Merchants.  Mollien  was 
a  shrewd,  ingenious  talker,  full  of  the  doctrines 
of  the  economists,  very  clever  at  business, 
though  he  expounded  it  in  affected  language, 
timid,  susceptible,  easily  agitated  in  the  pre- 
sence of  Napoleon,  who  disliked  long  disserta- 
tions, but  soon  finding  in  himself  the  independ- 
ence of  an  honest  man  and  the  firmness  of  a 


1  The  details  which  I  am  here  recording  may  appear  tri- 
Tial,  but  to  me  they  seem  indispensable  for  conveying  a 
notion  of  the  coarse  of  our  finances,  of  the  administrative 
ability  of  Napoleon  and  his  agents,  and  of  the  singular 
times  in  which  they  lived.  These  details,  and  in  particu- 
lar those  which  are  about  to  follow  concerning  the  crea- 
tion of  the  new  system  of  the  Treasury,  are  extracted,  not 
*rom  official  publications,  which  had  become  extremely 
rare  at  this  period,  left,  moreover,  very  incomplete,  and, 
above  all,  perfectly  silent  respecting  the  means  of  execu- 
won,  but  from  the  archives  of  the  Treasury  itself.  With 
the  authorization  of  Messrs.  Human  and  Damon,  the 
ministers  of  the  finances,  I  hare  availed  myself  of  these  . 


convinced  mind.  Napoleon  sometimes  treated 
the  theories  of  M.  Mollien  with  the  freedom 
of  omnipotence  and  of  genius,  and  then  left 
that  able  minister  to  act,  knowing  how  con- 
scientious, how  zealous,  and  above  all  how  well 
qualified  he  was  to  reform  the  mechanism  of 
the  Treasury,  where  still  reigned  old  practices, 
protected  by  obstinate  interests. 

When  the  negotiation  of  the  assets  of  the 
Treasury  was  taken  from  M.  Desprez,  the  re- 
presentative of  the  company  of  the  United  Mer- 
chants, a  committee  of  receivers-general  had 
been  charged  to  supply  his  place.  This  com- 
mittee existed  for  some  time,  and  its  service 
consisted  in  discounting  the  obligations  and  bills 
at  sight,  acting  on  account  of  the  receivers- 
general.  The  funds  employed  by  this  commit- 
tee came  to  it  from  the  receivers-general  them- 
selves, who  always  received  the  amount  of  the 
taxes  before  the  time,  when  the  maturity  of  the 
obligations  and  the  bills  of  sight  obliged  them  to 
pay  it  in.  M.  Mollien,  struck  with  the  remark 
that  the  money  with  which  this  committee  dis- 
counted the  assets  of  the  Treasury,  was  the 
money  of  the  Treasury  itself,  conceived  the  idea 
of  requiring  its  immediate  payment  by  means  of 
a  combination  which,  without  depriving  the  re- 
ceivers of  the  use  of  the  funds  by  which  they 
made  a  profit,  should  lead  them  to  pay  over  the 
produce  of  the  taxes  to  the  chests  of  the  Trea- 
sury directly  and  without  intermediate  agent. 
To  accomplish  this,  he  created  a  chest  called 
caisse  de  service,  a  title  borrowed  for  its  very  ob- 
ject, to  which  the  receivers-general  were  to 
send,  the  moment  they  received  them,  all  the 
funds  obtained  from  the  tax-payers,  for  which 
an  interest  of  five  per  cent,  was  to  be  allowed. 
This  chest,  in  order  to  acquit  itself  towards 
them,  was  afterwards  to  give  them  back  their 
obligations  and  bills  at  sight,  when  they  became 
due.  To  induce  the  receivers-general  to  pay 
the  sums  collected  into  this  chest,  he  addressed 
to  them  a  circular,  in  which  he  said  that,  if  on 
the  one  hand  the  funds  were  not  owing  till  their 
obligations  became  due,  on  the  other,  they  were 
but  depositaries  of  those  funds  and  had  no  right 
to  employ  them  in  private  speculations ;  that 
the  caisse  de  service,  instituted  to  receive  them, 
would  be  the  most  natural  and  the  safest  depo- 
sitory, and  would  pay  them  a  reasonable  inte- 
rest, that  of  five  per  cent.  He  added  that  their 
account  current  with  this  chest  would  be  sub- 
mitted every  month  to  the  inspection  of  the 
Emperor,  whom  every  body  knew  to  be  attentive, 
and  full  of  memory  and  justice.  This  was  enough 
to  stimulate  the  zeal  of  those  who  were  well 
disposed.  With  the  others  M.  Mollien  took  a 
different  course.  Relieved  by  the  abundance 
of  money  which  he  began  to  enjoy  from  the  ne- 
cessity of  recurring  so  frequently  to  the  dis- 
count of  the  obligations  and  bills  at  sight,  he  suf- 
fered not  one  of  those  papers  to  be  seen  on  the 

archives  in  the  composition  of  a  considerable  work,  for 
which,  long  as  it  may  be,  I  have  been  compensated  by  tho 
information  which  I  have  obtained  respecting  the  progress 
of  our  financial  administration.  I  have  also  been  much 
enlightened  as  to  what  concerns  this  period,  by  the  peru- 
sal of  the  unpublished  and  highly  important  memoirs  of 
Count  Mollien.  I  guarantee,  therefore,  the  perfect  accu- 
racy of  the  details  which  have  preceded  and  are  about  to 
follow,  in  regard  to  the  fact*  themselves  and  in  regard  to 
the  figures :  only  I  have  given  the  round  sums,  and.  for 
amounts  varying  from  day  to  day,  the  mean  bum?,  which 
best  expressed  the  durable  truth  of  things. 


356 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Aug.  1807. 


i  'lace,  and  if,  in  certain  pressing  emergencies, 
be  was  obliged  to  apply  to  the  Bank  of  France 
to  discount  a  few  millions  in  paper,  it  was  on 
condition  that  it  should  keep  those  assets  in  its 
portfolio.  Thenceforward  the  receivers-gene- 
ral who  employed  the  funds  arising  from  the 
taxes  in  jobbing  upon  obligations  and  bills  at 
tight,  had  no  other  resource  than  the  caisse  de 
service  itself,  and  they  sent  those  funds  to  it. 
Some  from  zeal,  from  emulation  to  distinguish 
then- selves  in  the  eyes  of  the  Emperor  himself—- 
others, from  the  impossibility  of  finding  else- 
where  an  employment  for  their  capitals,  since 
the  obligation*  had  ceased  to  appear  on  the  Place, 
paid  the  realized  produce  of  the  taxes  into  the 
caisse  de  service  for  the  sake  of  the  interest  of 
five  per  cent.,  and  the  chest  acquitted  itself  to- 
wards them  by  giving  them  back  their  obliga- 
tions whenever  they  became  due.  The  opera- 
tion of  discount  was  thus  naturally  suppressed, 
and  succeeded  by  an  immediate  payment  to  the 
Treasury  on  condition  of  an  interest  of  five  per 
cent,  for  the  time  to  run  between  the  period 
of  payment  and  the  period  when  the  obligations 
and  the  bills  at  sight  would  become  due. 

Instituted  at  the  conclusion  of  1806,  at  the 
moment  of  the  departure  of  Napoleon  for  Prus- 
sia, the  caisse  de  service  was  disgorging  funds  in 
1807  at  the  moment  of  his  return.  M.  Mollien, 
whose  ingenious  and  skilful  combinations  on 
this  occasion  cannot  be  too  much  admired,  did 
not  stop  at  directing  the  funds  of  the  receivers- 
general  towards  the  cause  de  service ;  he  went 
further.  It  was  not  the  receivers  only  who  had 
recourse  to  the  obligations  and  the  bills  at  sight, 
for  the  employment  of  funds  at  their  temporal 
disposal ;  it  was  also  individuals,  who  sought  to 
place  them  there  for  a  short  term,  (as  is  done  at 
the  present  day  by  the  French  capitalists,  who 
look  out  for  bills  of  the  Treasury ;  or  by  the  Eng- 
lish capitalists,  who  buy  Exchequer  Bills ; )  it  was 
also  public  establishments  which  had  capitals  to 
place  out,  such  as  the  Mont-de-Pie'te',  the  Bank, 
the  sinking  fund,  &c.  These  different  capitalists 
applied  to  the  bankers  usually  jobbing  in  obliga- 
tions and  bills  at  sight,  in  order  to  procure  some. 
M.  Mollien  authorized  the  caisse  de  service,  by 
the  decree  of  institution,  to  issue  bills  on  itself, 
bearing  an  interest  at  5  per  cent,  and  at  a  fixed 
term.  Instead  of  giving  obligations  or  bills  at 
sight  to  private  individuals,  it  gave  them  the 
bills  upon  itself,  and  it  had  soon  issued  to  the 
amount  of  18  millions,  which  put  it  in  posses- 
sion of  a  like  sum  in  cash.  It  concluded,  more- 
over, a  particular  treaty  with  the  Mont-de- 
Pie'te',  which  usually  needed  from  15  to  18  mil- 
lions' worth  of  obligations  for  the  employment 
of  its  funds.  Instead  of  giving  it  obligations, 
notes  of  the  caisse  de  service  were  delivered  to  it, 
with  a  guarantee  of  the  reserve  of  18  millions' 
worth  of  obligations,  kept  at  the  Treasury  in  a 
special  portfolio.  In  this  manner  the  obligations 
and  bills  at  sight  were  withdrawn  from  circula- 
tion, and  the  notes  of  the  caisse  de  service  were 
taken  by  the  public  in  their  stead.  In  July, 
1807,  this  chest  had  existed  a  year,  and  it  had 
already  received  45  millions  from  the  receivers- 
general,  (half  on  their  own  account,  half  on  ac- 
count of  capitalists  in  the  country,)  18  millions 
from  the  public,  and  18  millions  from  the  Mont- 
de-Pie'te',  thatistosay,  a  sum  total  of  80  millions. 

It  may  be  conceived  what  facility  the  crea- 
tion of  the  new  chest  must  have  given  to  the 


service  of  the  Treasury,  which,  relieved  from 
the  arrear  of  the  budgets  by  the  creation  of 
the  70  millions'  worth  of  rescriptions,  reim- 
bursed for  the  greatest  part  of  the  debit  of  the 
United  Merchants,  found  besides,  in  this  float- 
ing loan  of  80  millions,  resources  which  dis- 
pensed it  from  recurring  to  the  discount  of 
obligations  and  bills  at  sight.  This  loan  had  in 
reality  always  existed,  since  capitals  had  always 
sought  a  temporary  location  in  the  good  paper 
of  the  Treasury.  But  the  Treasury  had  not 
been  their  intermediary.  Speculators,  placed 
between  it  and  the  public,  drew  away  the  capi- 
tals to  themselves,  and  then  made  their  custom- 
ers beg,  pray,  frequently  wait,  and  pay  at  an 
exorbitant  rate  the  discount  of  the  obligations 
and  bills  at  sight.  Sometimes  even  these  specu- 
lators were  no  other  than  its  own  receivers,  who 
lent  it  the  funds  from  the  taxes,  and  not  only 
fleeced  it  without  shame,  but  likewise  con- 
tracted the  mischievous  habits  of  jobbing.  The 
caisse  de  service,  having  become  the  intermediary, 
also  became  master  of  that  permanent  loan,  of 
the  rate  at  which  it  was  contracted,  and  libe- 
rated itself  from  the  receivers,  whom  it  re- 
duced to  mere  depositaries  of  the  public  money, 
and  left  them  nothing  more  of  the  part  of 
bankers  than  the  business  of  moving  the  funds 
of  the  Treasury  from  one  point  to  another. 
The  sudden  and  extraordinary  reduction  in  the 
expenses  of  negotiation  for  1806  and  1807  fur- 
nished the  material  proof  of  all  these  advan- 
tages. For  the  service  of  1806,  which,  on  ac- 
count of  the  change  in  the  calendar,  compre- 
hended not  only  the  twelve  months  of  1806  but 
the  last  three  months  of  1805,  the  amount  of 
the  expense  of  negotiation  rose  to  the  exorbit- 
ant sum  of  from  27  to  28  millions.*  For  the 
first  four  months  it  had  been  14  millions,  (equal 
to  3J  millions  per  month,  or  40  millions  per 
year.)  For  the  seven  following  months  it  had 
been  nearly  9  millions,  (being  on  an  average 
no  more  than  1200  thousand  francs  per  month, 
and  14  or  15  millions  per  annum.)  Lastly,  for 
the  last  four  months  it  had  been  4  million  300 
thousand  francs,  (which  would  be  equal  to,  at 
most,  12  millions  per  year.)  This  expense  was 
reduced  in  1807  to  9  or  10  millions,  a  consider- 
able saving,  which  left  to  the  capitalists  only 
legitimate  profits,  and  by  no  means  to  be 
grudged,  if  we  consider  in  particular  how  it 
was  to  be  divided.  Of  these  9  millions  the 
Bank  received  1400  thousand  francs,  the  sink- 
ing fund  1500  thousand,  the  Mont-de-Piete  1350 
thousand,  the  receivers-general  and  private  in- 
dividuals, for  their  perquisites  and  expenses,  5 
millions.  What  a  change,  if  we  look  back  to 
the  preceding  years,  when  the  receivers-general 
made  enormous  profits  by  the  sums  which  they 
retained,  .if  we  go  back  especially  to  the  times 
of  the  ancient  monarchy,  when  the  farmers- 
general  paid  the  court,  the  ministers,  the  em- 
ployes, and  amassed  immense  fortunes  besides 
during  a  lease  of  a  few  years ! 

The  cause  de  service,  in  addition  to  these  differ- 
ent advantages,  of  emancipating  the  Treasury, 
of  producing  great  savings,  of  bringing  the  re- 
ceivers into  better  habits,  was  attended  with 

i  27,369,022  fr   for  4fi5  days,  divided  as  follows  >- 
for  130  days,  14.385,680  fr. 
for  197  days,    8,609.872 
for  138  days,    4,373;470 
Total,      27,369,022 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


857 


this  consequence,  to  put  a  stop,  in  the  general 
circulation  of  paper,  to  false  movements,  which 
resolved  themselves,  for  the  State  and  for  the 
country  itself,  either  into  banking  expenses,  or 
the  useless  displacing  of  cash ;  when,  for  in- 
stance, the  Treasury  was  not  yet  in  direct  and 
daily  communication  with  its  receivers,  by 
means  of  an  account  current  with  them,  and  it 
had  need  of  money  somewhere,  ignorant  as  it 
was  of  this,  it  got  obligations  discounted  at  Paris, 
and  despatched  the  amount  to  the  spot,  where 
frequently  there  were  abundant  funds  in  the 
chest  of  the  receiver-general.  The  receiver- 
general,  on  his  part,  interested  in  ridding  him- 
self of  unprofitable  funds,  sought  to  transmit  j 
them  to  Paris  or  to  other  points,  and  loaded  the 
public  conveyances  with  specie;  whereas,  if  the 
account  current  had  existed,  merely  writing 
•would  have  spared  the  Treasury  the  sending  of 
cash  to  the  departments,  and  the  departments 
the  sending  of  it  to  Paris. 

M.  Mollien  had  not  confined  himself  to  the 
creation  of  a  came  de  service  in  the  centre  of  the 
Empire  ;  he  had  instituted  a  similar  one  in  the 
departments  beyond  the  Alps.  There,  still  more 
than  in  Old  France,  prevailed  the  pernicious 
contradiction  of  stagnant  capitals  in  the  hands 
of  the  receivers,  with  urgent  wants  for  which 
it  was  necessary  to  provide  by  the  transmission 
of  specie.  To  put  an  end  to  this  serious  incon- 
venience, M.  Mollien  established,  not  at  Turin, 
but  at  Alexandria,  in  the  circuit  of  the  great 
fortresses  erected  by  Napoleon,  a  transfer  chest 
(came  de  virements)  into  which  all  the  receivers 
of  Liguria,  Piedmont,  and  all  French  Italy, 
were  to  pay  their  funds,  and  which,  in  its  turn, 
forwarded  them  to  the  places  where  they  were 
needed,  to  Milan  in  particular,  where  the  French 
army  had  to  be  paid.  This  chest,  placed  under 
the  direction  of  an  able  agent,  M.  Dauchy,  had 
soon  produced  the  same  advantages  as  that 
which  had  been  instituted  in  Paris,  that  is  to 
say,  rendered  the  service  easy,  the  sources 
abundant,  the  transmission  of  specie  useless; 
and  in  truth  it  was  worth  while  to  introduce 
such  order  into  this  portion  of  the  finances  of 
\he  Empire  :  for  French  Italy  (by  this  name  we 
mean  that  which  was  converted  into  depart- 
ments, and  not  that  which  was  constituted  under 
Prince  Eugene  into  an  allied  but  independent 
State)  yielded  at  this  period  so  much  as  40 
Millions,  18  of  which  were  expended  on  the  local 
administration,  justice,  the  police,  the  roads  ; 
and  22  millions  remained,  either  for  the  con- 
struction of  fortresses,  or  to  contribute  to  the 
maintenance  of  120,000  men,  who  barred  the 
routes  of  Lombardy  against  the  Austrians. 

Napoleon,  while  making  war  in  the  North, 
had  watched  attentively  the  course  and  progress 
of  these  new  financial  creations,  and,  at  his  re- 
turn, on  the  very  day  that  the  ministers  had 
come  to  hail  in  him  the  fortunate  conqueror  of 
the  Continent,  he  had  congratulated  M.  Mollien, 
with  a  sort  of  effusion  of  heart.  Never  satisfied 
with  doing  good  by  halves,  he  proposed  to  ren- 
der what  he  called  the  emancipation  of  the 
Treasury  more  complete.  The  new  cause  de 
service,  owing  to  the  floating  loan  of  80  millions 
which  has  just  been  adverted  to,  was  almost 
dispensed  from  discounting  obligations  and  bills 
at  sight,  save  in  certain  pressing  emergencies, 
•when  it  applied  to  the  Bank.  But  Napoleon  re- 
eolved  to  insure  its  resources  in  a  definitive 


manner,  with  the  aid  of  a  combination,  the  idea 
of  which  he  had  conceived  while  bivouacking 
amidst  the  snows  of  Poland.  The  sum  of  the 
obligations  and  bills  at  sight,  not  due  till  the  fol- 
lowing year,  and  which  it  was  consequently  ne- 
cessary to  discount,  amounted  to  about  124 
millions.  It  is  true  that,  if  the  money  was  not 
received,  neither  was  the  expense  paid  till  the 
next  year.  But  Napoleon  proposed  to  have,  as 
far  as  possible,  the  expenditure  paid  during  the 
same  year,  and  for  this  end  to  realize  the  re- 
venues of  the  State  within  the  same  interval 
of  time.  Conformably  to  this  design,  which 
he  had  conceived  in  Poland,  he  directed  that 
the  obligations  of  1807,  which  would  not  fall  due 
till  1808,  should  be  left  for  the  service  of  1808; 
that  those  of  1808,  which  would  not  be  due  till 
1809,  should  be  left  in  like  manner  for  1809; 
so  that  to  the  service  of  each  year  should  be 
attached  only  the  paper  becoming  due  in  the 
twelve  months  of  its  duration.  But  to  accom- 
plish this,  it  would  be  requisite  to  furnish  1807 
with  an  equivalent  for  the  124  millions'  worth 
of  paper  transferred  to  the  following  years. 
Napoleon  resolved  to  make  a  loan  for  the  caisse 
de  service  of  124  millions,  which  would  settle  the 
matter,  thanks  to  the  resources  which  he  had 
at  his  disposal.  After  various  combinations,  he 
fixed  on  the  idea  of  making  the  Treasury  of  the 
army  furnish  84  of  the  124  millions,  and  those 
establishments  which  were  in  the  habit  of  plac- 
ing their  funds  in  assets  of  the  Treasury  supply 
the  remaining  40.  The  new  chest  would  thence- 
forward find  itself  in  extraordinary  abundance, 
having  84  millions  coming  to  it  all  at  once  from 
the  army,  and  having  no  more  than  40  millions 
to  apply  to  the  public  for,  instead  of  80,  which 
it  had  borrowed  of  it  in  1807.  It  would  be  dis- 
pensed in  future  from  discounting  the  obligations 
and  bills  at  sight,  since  the  service  of  each  year 
would  thenceforward  have  at  its  disposal  nothing 
but  paper  falling  due  in  that  same  year.  Napo- 
leon decided,  moreover,  that  the  124  millions' 
worth  of  obligations  and  bills  at  sight  transferred 
from  one  year  to  anotiier,  should  be  shut  up  in 
a  portfolio  and  not  taken  out  till  the  following 
year,  at  the  moment  of  replacing  them  by  an 
equal  sum  in  new  paper.  It  would  then  become 
easy  to  suppress  them  as  useless,  for  their  only 
function  would  consist  in  remaining  in  deposit 
in  the  portfolio,  or  in  affording  the  receivers- 
general  by  paper  at  prolonged  dates  those  pro- 
fits from  interest  which  it  had  been  thought 
proper  to  grant  them.  The  same  results  might 
be  obtained  by  regulating  the  account  of  inte- 
rest kept  between  the  Treasury  and  the  re- 
ceivers-general, so  as  to  indemnify  the  latter. 
This,  in  fact,  was  done  afterwards.  The  cai»*« 
de  service,  instituted  upon  the  same  principles, 
is  called  central  chest  of  the  Treasury.  The 
receivers- general  have  an  account  current  with 
this  chest.  They  are  debited,  that  is  to  say, 
made  debtors  for  all  that  they  have  received 
during  the  ten  days.  In  like  manner  they  are 
credited,  or  made  creditors  for  all  that  they 
have  paid  into  the  chest  during  the  same  days. 
The  interest,  which  runs  against  them  when 
they  are  debtors,  runs  for  them  when  they  are 
creditors.  The  interest  account  is  then  balanced 
every  three  months,  and  at  the  end  of  the  year 
besides  they  are  allowed,  for  the  mass  of  the 
direct  contributions  formerly  represented  by 
the  obligation*,  an  improvement  of  interest  which 


358 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Aug.  1807. 


indemnifies  them  if  the  receipts  have  not  taken 
place  in  the  twelve  months,  which  rewards  them 
if  they  have  managed  to  effect  them  in  that  in- 
terval of  time,  and  which  finally  interests  them 
in  the  speedy  and  easy  collection  of  the  public 
money. 

This  fine  operation  completed  the  reorganiza- 
tion of  the  finances,  by  the  good  constitution  of 
the  Treasury.  It  was  agreed  that  it  should  not 
be  definitively  carried  into  execution  till  1808, 
as  well  on  account  of  the  debit  of  the  United 
Merchants,  which  could  not  be  entirely  dis- 
charged before  that  period,  as  on  account  of  the 
collection  of  the  foreign  contributions,  which  it 
was  impossible  to  effect  sooner.  The  loan  of 
124  millions  was  to  be  applicable  to  the  service 
of  1808,  which,  owing  to  this  sum  of  124  mil- 
lions, would  cause  all  the  obligations  and  bills  at 
sight  falling  due  after  the  31st  December,  1808, 
to  stand  over  for  the  service  of  1809  ;  so  that 
the  service  of  1809  was  to  be  the  first  that 
should  have  at  its  disposal  nothing  but  paper 
becoming  due  in  the  twelve  months  of  its 
duration.1 

This  loan  granted  to  the  Treasury  of  the  State 
by  the  Treasury  of  the  army  was  not  to  be  tem- 
porary, but  definitive,  by  means  of  a  profound 
combination,  which  revealed  still  more  clearly 
the  use  that  Napoleon  intended  to  make  of  the 
produce  of  victory.  He  surmised  that,  after  he 
had  paid  the  extraordinary  war  expenses  of 
1805,  1806,  and  1807,  he  should  have  left  about 
300  millions,  which  were  already  in  part  depo- 
sited, and  the  whole  of  which  was  to  be  depo- 
sited in  the  chest  of  the  sinking  fund.  He  pur- 
posed to  draw  from  this  Treasury,  as  from  a 
wonderful  spring,  not  only  wealth  for  his  gene- 
rals, his  officers,  his  soldiers,  but  the  prosperity 
of  the  Empire.  If  to  this  sum  be  added  from 
12  to  15  millions,  which  he  had  the  art  to  save 
every  year  out  of  the  25  millions  of  the  civil  list, 
besides  a  number  of  domains  in  Poland,  Prus- 
sia, Hanover,  and  Westphalia,  we  shall  have  an 
idea  of  the  immense  resources  which  he  had  re- 
served, in  order  to  insure  at  once  private  for- 
tunes and  the  public  fortune.  But  in  the  desire 
to  derive  from  them  a  double  benefit,  he  should 
take  good  care  not  to  reward  his  generals,  his 
officers,  his  soldiers,  with  sums  of  money ;  for 
the  sums  would  soon  be  consumed  by  those 
whom  he  designed  to  enrich,  and  who,  sensible 
that  they  were  continually  exposed  to  death, 
meant  to  enjoy  life  while  it  was  left  them.  It 
was  sufficient,  therefore,  for  him  that  the  Trea- 
sury of  the  grand  army  was  rich  in  revenues, 
and  he  was  not  solicitous  that  it  should  be  so 
in  ready  money.  In  consequence,  he  decided 
that,  for  the  84  millions  which  he  was  about  to 
pay  into  the  came  de  service,  the  State  should 
furnish  the  Treasury  of  the  army  with  an  equi- 
valent sum  in  inscriptions  of  5  per  cent,  rentes. 
Fully  resolved  not  to  have  recourse  to  the  public 
for  contracting  loans,  he  had  thus  in  the  Trea- 
sury of  the  army  a  capitalist  always  at  hand  to 
lend  the  State  at  a  reasonable  interest,  without 
either  any  jobbing  or  any  depreciation  of  assets; 
and  moreover  he  could  complete  with  assign- 
ments in  rentes  the  military  fortunes  which  he 
had  already  commenced  with  assignments  in 
lands. 


'  The  definitive  decree,  ordering  the  loan  of  84  millions, 
raj  not  signed  till  the  6th  of  March,  1808. 


Upon  this  principle  it  was  that  he  finished 
regulating  the  budgets  of  1806  and  1807,  which 
were  not  yet  definitively  liquidated.  The  war 
contributions  imposed  on  conquered  countries 
served  to  defray  the  extraordinary  expenses  of 
subsistence,  mate'riel,  and  remounts  of  the  army; 
and  Napoleon  left  nothing  to  the  account  of  the 
Treasury  but  the  annual  and  ordinary  pay. 
But  this  charge  alone  of  pay  would  make  the 
budget  of  1806  amount  to  770  millions,  and  that 
.  of  1807  to  778,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  the  ordi- 
nary resources  of  the  taxes  had  not  yet  attained 
that  standard.  Napoleon  thought  that  the  pro- 
duce of  victory  ought  to  serve  not  only  to  enrich 
his  soldiery,  but  also  to  relieve  the  finances  and 
to  keep  them  in  equilibrium.  He  resolved, 
therefore,  that  the  chest  of  the  army  should 
make  provision  for  those  excesses  of  expense 
which  the  taxes  could  not  cover,  as  far  as  the 
payment  of  33  millions  for  1806  and  27  millions 
for  1807.  Thanks  to  this  assistance,  the  four- 
teen months'  pay,  the  payment  of  which  had 
been  deferred,  and  the  amount  of  which  had 
been  gradually  accumulated  in  specie  in  the 
provident  chests  established  in  Paris,  Mayence, 
and  Erfurt,  would  be  liquidated.  If  we  add 
this  supplement  to  those  which  the  chest  of  the 
contributions  had  already  furnished  for  the  ex- 
traordinary expenses  of  the  war,  we  shall  come 
at  the  sums  of  80  millions  for  1806,  and  150 
millions  for  1807  ;  which  would  make  the  total 
expenses  of  the  army  amount  to  372  millions 
for  1806,  and  to  43  millions  for  1807,  to  say 
nothing  of  many  other  local  consumptions  es- 
caping all  computation.  It  is  this  that  explains 
how,  out  of  the  60  millions  imposed  on  Austria 
in  1805,  and  the  570  imposed  on  Germany  in 
1806  and  1807,  there  should  be  left  in  the  Trea- 
sury of  the  army  no  more  than  about  20  mil- 
lions of  the  first  contribution  and  280  of  the 
second.  But  this  kind  of  service  was  not  the 
only  one  that  the  Treasury  of  the  army  was  to 
render  to  the  budgets  of  1806  and  1807.  The 
Treasury  had  counted  as  receipts  for  the  ser- 
vices for  the  two  years  upon  assets  not  suscep- 
tible of  being  immediately  realized,  such  as  the 
10  millions'  worth  of  property  given  up  by  the 
United  Merchants,  six  millions  of  the  price  of 
the  salt  works  of  the  East,  eight  millions  of  old 
accounts  of  purchasers  of  national  property, 
the  whole  amounting  to  24  millions.  Napoleon 
consented  that  the  Treasury  should  pay  with 
these  assets  what  it  owed  to  the  army  for  the 
settlement  of  the  pay.  These  assets,  of  more 
or  less  remote  date,  but  certain  realization, 
suited  the  Treasury  of  the  army,  which  had  no 
need  of  money  but  of  revenues,  and  did  not 
suit  the  Treasury  of  the  State,  which  wanted 
immediate  resources. 

Napoleon  completed  the  fine  financial  mea- 
sures of  this  year  by  the  establishment  of  the 
new  system  of  accounts  by  double  entry,  (en 
partie  double,}  which  put  the  finishing  hand  to 
the  5ntr9duction  into  our  finances  of  that  ad- 
mirable clearness  which  has  ever  since  reigned 
in  them. 

The  new  came  de  service  having  created  for 
the  receivers-general  the  duty,  the  interest,  the 
necessity,  of  paying  in  their  funds  to  the  Trea- 
sury, at  the  very  moment 'when  they  received 
them,  without  any  further  than  the  inevitable 
delay  of  the  local  collection,  of  the  centraliza- 
tion in  the  chief  town  of  the  department,  and 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


359 


of  forwarding  money  for  expenses  either  to 
Paris  or  to  the  places  where  they  occurred,  had 
furnished  the  means  of  observing  more  accu- 
rately the  facts  of  which  the  receipt  and  the 
paying  in  of  the  taxes  are  composed.  M.  Mol- 
lien had  formerly  been  employed  in  the  depart- 
ment of  the  farms,  in  which  were  not  followed 
in  the  keeping  of  accounts  the  vague  and  anti- 
quated forms  of  the  ancient  Treasury,  but  the 
simple,  practical,  and  sure  forms  of  commerce, 
had  introduced  them  at  the  sinking  fund  when 
he  was  director  of  it,  and  at  the  came  de  ser- 
vice since  he  had  induced  its  institution.  He 
had  made  use  at  that  chest  of  book-keeping  by 
double  entry,  which  consists  in  keeping  a  day- 
book of  all  the  operations  of  receipt  and  ex- 
penditure at  the  very  moment  when  they  take 
place ;  in  extracting  from  this  day.-book  the 
facts  concerning  each  particular  debtor  and 
creditor  with  whom  you  have  done  business  on 
the  same  day;  in  opening  with  each  of  them  a 
particular  account  which  places,  facing  one 
another,  what  they  owe  and  what  is  owing  to 
them ;  lastly,  in  entering  the  substance  of  all 
these  particular  accounts  in  a  general  account, 
which  is  but  a  daily  and  accurate  analysis  of 
the  transactions  of  a  trader  with  all  others, 
and  gives  him  natural  contradictors  in  all  those 
who  are  named  in  his  books,  who,  on  their  part, 
have  been  obliged  to  keep  similar  books,  and 
to  keep  them  correctly  or  suffer  for  false  entries. 
M.  Mollien,  observing  by  the  aid  of  such  ac- 
counts, the  proceedings  of  the  came  de  service  and 
the  situation  of  the  receivers  towards  it,  being 
enabled  at  any  moment  to  satisfy  himself  about 
their  punctuality  in  paying  in,  and  also  to  ascer- 
tain every  moment  what  resources  or  engage- 
ments it  had,  naturally  asked  himself  why  this 
system  of  accounts  should  not  become  that  of  the 
Treasury  itself,  its  sole  and  obligatory  system. 
The  receivers-general  at  that  time  sent  in  to 
the  general  office  of  accounts  declarations  con- 
taining a  summary  of  their  receipts  and  of 
their  payments,  at  distant  intervals  of  time, 
and  without  annexing  to  them  a  daily  journal 
of  their  operations.  Neither  did  the  sub-re- 
ceivers, who  handed  the  funds  to  them,  the 
pay-masters,  who  received  them  from  their 
hands,  in  order  to  apply  them  to  the  expenses 
of  the  state,  and  who  were  both  their  natural 
contradictors,  send  in  any  journal  of  their  ope- 
rations. All  of  them  furnished  nothing  more 
than  general  results  collected  later,  and  too 
late  to  enable  the  general  office  of  accounts,  by 
comparing  them,  to  settle  the  account  of  each. 
Thus  the  receivers-general  could  place  them- 
selves in  debit  without  the  Treasury  knowing 
it,  and,  what  is  worse,  without  being  aware  of 
it  themselves.  When,  it  is  true,  there  was  any 
one  of  them  who  collected  thirty  or  forty  mil- 
lions in  the  course  of  the  year,  it  was  easy  for 
him  to  retain  annually  two  or  three  hundred 
thousand  francs  out  of  such  a  sum,  and  by 
thus  gaining  four  or  five  years  without  settling 
his  account,  to  accumulate  three  or  four  debits, 
and  to  get  one  or  several  millions  in  arrear 
with  the  Treasury.  There  were  some  who 
owed  12,  15,  18  hundred  thousand  francs,  and 
who  employed  them  either  in  embarking  in 
hazardous  speculations,  or  in  entering  into 
foolish  expenses,  or  even,  considering  them- 
selves rich  before  they  were  so,  in  purchasing 
properties  which  involved  them  in  ruin,  be- 


cause they  were  disproportionate  to  their  i  ml 
fortune.  A  rigid  investigation  proves  that 
many  of  them  were  in  these  various  situation). 
The  receivers-general,  who  did  not  deceive  thf 
Treasury,  or  who,  in  deceiving  it,  did  not  de 
ceive  themselves,  were  those  who,  without 
saying  so,  made  use  for  their  own  benefit  of 
the  daily,  strict,  contradictory  system  of  ac- 
counts employed  by  commerce  under  the  de- 
nomination of  book-keeping  by  double  entry, 
and  which  M.  Mollien  had  recently  introduced 
both  at  the  sinking  fund  and  at  the  came  dt 
service.  This  circumstance,  being  soon  ascer- 
tained by  the  inspectors  of  the  Treasury,  was 
sufficient  to  serve  for  a  decisive  lesson  both  to 
the  minister  and  to  Napoleon  himself,  always 
informed  of  what  was  passing  in  the  adminis- 
tration. M.  Mollien.  not  venturing  to  change 
suddenly  the  system  of  accounts  of  the  Em- 
pire, nor  to  extinguish  a  light,  however  faint 
it  might  be,  till  he  had  first  caused  another  to 
be  lit  up,  conceived  the  idea  of  creating  a 
second  office  of  accounts,  by  the  side  of  the 
old  one,  and  concurrently  with  it.  He  insti- 
tuted for  himself  an  office  of  accounts,  directed 
by  an  experienced  accountant,1  placed  under 
him  book-keepers  selected  from  various  com- 
mercial houses,  and  a  number  of  young  men 
belonging  to  old  financial  families,  some  of 
them  even  sons  of  those  farmers-general  whom 
the  Revolution  had  sent  to  the  guillotine.  In 
this  office  he  had  the  accounts  with  several 
receivers  kept  by  double  entry;  these,  having 
no  intention  to  conceal  the  truth  from  the 
Treasury,  sought,  on  the  contrary,  the  best 
means  of  discovering  it.  Some  others,  who, 
without  any  ill  intention,  had  no  reasons  for 
disliking  the  new  system  of  book-keeping  but 
its  novelty  and  their  ignorance,  took  young 
men,  obtained  from  the  office  instituted  in 
Paris,  to  teach  them  how  to  make  use  of  it. 
Lastly,  those  of  whom  there  was  any  suspicion 
were  overawed.  It  took  but  a  very  short  time 
to  discover  that  many  of  the  receivers  were 
debtors,  some  from  blindness  to  their  situation, 
others  from  engaging  in  false  speculations,  or 
indulging  in  extravagant  luxury.  There  wero 
some  who  had  at  last  come  to  regard  their  de- 
bits standing  over  for  a  series  of  years,  from 
one  year  to  another,  as  a  capital  belonging  to 
them,  and  who  had  bought  estates  in  propor- 
tion to  the  fortune  which  they  fancied  they 
possessed,  but  which  was  not  theirs.  Several 
were  obliged  to  give  up  the  secret  of  their  con- 
nection with  the  wealthy  speculators  of  Paris ; 
and  thus  it  was  discovered  that  their  funds — 
that  is  to  say,  the  funds  of  the  State — had 
been  employed  in  jobbing  in  the  obligations  and 
bills  at  sight,  which  jobbing  cost  the  Treasury 
25  millions  in  expenses  of  negotiation  instead 
of  10.  The  receiver-general  of  La  Meurthe 
alone  was  constituted  debtor  to  the  Treasury 
to  the  amount  of  1,700,000  francs.  The  mys- 
tery once  unveiled,  there  was  no  need  to  hesi- 
tate longer,  and  it  became  necessary  to  change 
the  system  of  accounts.  The  thing  was  easy, 
since  Government  possessed  the  means  of  sub- 
stituting everywhere  the  new  method  for  the 
old  one.  Napoleon,  who  always  gave  force  to 
good  innovations  by  rejecting  bad  ones,  had, 
since  his  return,  closely  watched  the  course  of 

'  M.  -i*  S&int-Didier. 


360 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Aug.  1807 


this  financial  experiment;  and  he  authorized 
M.  Mollien  to  draw  up  a  decree  for  rendering 
the  new  system  obligatory  throughout  the  whole 
Empire,  from  the  1st  of  January,  1808.  The 
relations  of  each  accountable  person  with  the 
came  de  service,  accurately  described  and  ren- 
dered obligatory,  furnished  the  model  for  this 
decree.  Every  receiver-general,  or  private  in- 
dividual, every  paymaster,  every  depositary, 
in  short,  of  the  public  money,  charged  to  re- 
ceive or  to  pay  it  in,  was  thenceforward  re- 
quired to  keep  a  day-book  of  his  operations, 
and  to  send  it  every  ten  days  to  the  Treasury, 
•which,  on  comparing  these  different  journals 
•with  each  other,  has  since  been  enabled  to 
ascertain  exactly  the  incoming  and  outgoing  of 
assets,  so  as  not  to  pay,  not  to  require,  any  in- 
terest but  what  it  owes,  or  but  what  is  due  to 
it.  The  dispositions  of  this  decree  are  the 
same  as  those  practised  at  the  present  day ; 
and  they  have  rendered  the  French  system  of 
accounts  the  surest,  the  most  accurate,  and 
the  clearest  in  Europe.  They  have  permitted 
the  accounts  of  each  year  to  be  closed  ten 
months  after  the  end  of  the  year  to  which  they 
belong,  that  is  to  say,  on  the  1  st  of  the  Novem- 
ber following.  Owing  to  this  reform,  the 
agents  of  the  Treasury,  checked  the  one  by  the 
other,  and,  with  the  aid  of  the  daily  and  direct 
testimony  of  their  accounts,  flooded,  as  it  were, 
with  light,  could  not  have  either  means  or 
temptation  to  deceive,  and  were  even  secured 
from  the  danger  of  getting  into  debt  with  the 
State.  Napoleon  and  M.  Mollien,  agreeing  on 
this  point,  as  on  all  others,  were  of  opinion 
that  receivers  detected  in  a  fault  should  not  be 
punished  unless  in  case  of  evident  dishonesty; 
but  that  involuntary  inaccuracies  or  dilatori- 
ness,  the  consequence  of  old  habits,  should  be 
pardoned ;  for  the  vicious  method  had  been 
the  seducer  and  accomplice  of  faulty  receivers, 
and  was,  indeed,  more  faulty  than  they.  In 
consequence  three  receivers-general  only  were 
dismissed ;  the  others  were  brought  back  to 
better  habits,  but  not  deprived  of  their  places. 
Napoleon,  delighted  with  this  excellent  order, 
resolved  to  reward  the  minister  who  had  esta- 
blished it,  and  whom  he  had  besides  power- 
fully seconded  by  his  approbation,  and  by  the 
force  which  he  had  lent  him  against  interested 
resistances.  Not  always  approving  his  ideas 
in  regard  to  political  economy,  though  he  ap- 
proved all  his  ideas  in  regard  to  financial 
accounts,  he  had  one  day  in  the  Council  of 
State  directed  some  keen  shafts  against  inno- 
vators. M.  Mollien  conceived  that  those  shafts 
were  aimed  at  him,  and  complained  in  a  letter, 
which,  though  respectful,  betrayed  the  morti- 
fication which  he  had  felt.  Napoleon  hastened 
to  answer  him  in  terms  full  of  nobleness  and 
cordiality,  and  to  express  his  high  esteem  for 
him,  and  his  regret  that  he  had  been  misun- 
derstood. He  then  sent  him  one  of  those  high 
decorations  which  he  conferred  on  his  servants, 
and  a  considerable  sum  of  money  to  purchase 
an  estate,  where  that  minister  is  now  passing 
the  closing  years  of  a  useful  and  justly  ho- 
noured life. 

A  single  institution  was  still  wanting,  in 
order  to  leave  the  administration  of  France 
nothing  more  to  desire.  In  the  central  office 
of  accounts  had  been  collected,  as  in  a  focus 
in  which  the  rays  of  light  concentrate  them- 


selves in  order  to  diffuse  greater  lustre,  all  the 
means  of  control  and  mathematical  verifica- 
tion. But  this  office  had  only  a  purely  admi- 
nistrative authority.  Its  decisions  respecting 
accountable  persons  were  insufficient  in  certain 
cases  to  constrain  or  to  liberate  them,  and,  in 
regard  to  the  country,  they  were  of  no  ^ther 
moral  value  than  that  of  a  testimony  borne  by 
the  administrators  of  the  Treasury  concerning 
themselves  and  concerning  their  subordinates. 
There  was  yet  left  to  be  created  a  more  exalted 
jurisdiction,  that  is  to  say,  a  magistracy  set- 
tling all  accounts,  discharging  validly  the  ac- 
countable agents,  releasing  their  persons  and 
their  property  pledged  to  the  State,  affirming, 
after  an  investigation  made  out  of  the  office  of 
the  finances,  the  accuracy  of  the  accounts  de- 
livered, and  giving  to  their  annual  settlement 
the  form  and  the  solemnity  of  an  arret  of  a 
supreme  court.  Napoleon  had  often  thought 
of  this,  and,  on  his  return  from  Tilsit,  he 
realized  that  grand  idea. 

There  had  formerly  existed  in  France,  under 
the  title  of  Chambers  of  Accounts,  tribunals 
exercising  an  active  superintendence  over  the 
accountable  agents,  supplying  in  a  certain  de- 
gree the  place  of  that  which  an  ill-organized 
Treasury  could  not  then  exercise,  having  the 
powers  of  a  criminal  jurisdiction  over  them, 
charged  to  punish  acts  of  extortion,  but  liable 
also  to  be  dispossessed  of  those  powers  by  an 
arbitrary  government,  and  having  been  so 
sometimes,  when  proceeding  against  wealthy 
agents,  having  high  protectors  because  they 
had  been  in  a  high  degree  corrupters.  This 
was  the  first  model  which  needed  improving 
and  adapting  to  the  institutions,  the  manners, 
and  the  regularity  of  the  new  times.  Ever 
since  the  abolition  of  the  Chamber  of  Accounts 
in  1789,  buried  with  the  parliaments  in  one 
common  ruin,  there  had  been  only  a  commis- 
sion of  accounts,  independent  indeed  of  the 
Treasury,  but  destitute  of  character,  not  suffi- 
ciently numerous,  and  having  left  an  immense 
number  of  accounts  in  arrear.  Napoleon,  in- 
dulging his  fondness  for  unity,  and  conforming 
to  the  character  of  the  new  French  adminis- 
tration, centralized  in  all  its  parts,  resolved  to 
have  but  a  single  Court  of  Accounts,  which 
should  have  equal  rank  with  the  Council  of 
State  and  the  Court  of  Cassation,  and  should 
come  immediately  after  those  two  great  bodies. 
It  was  to  judge  directly,  individual^,  and  every 
year,  the  receivers-general,  and  the  paymas- 
ters, that  is  to  say,  the  agents  of  the  receipt 
and  of  the  expenditure.  No  criminal  proceed- 
ing against  them  was  attributed  to  it,  for  this 
would  have  been  encroaching  upon  other  juris- 
dictions, but  it  was  invested  with  authority  to 
declare  them  every  year  acquitted  towards  the 
state  for  their  annual  conduct,  and  to  liberate 
their  property,  that  is,  to  decide  questions  of 
mortgage.  They  were  at  length  charged  to 
keep  books  of  observations  respecting  the  faith- 
ful execution  of  the  laws  of  finances — obser- 
vations transmitted  every  year  to  the  head  of 
the  state  by  the  prince  arch-treasurer  of  the 
Empire.  Warm  discussion  took  place  before 
Napoleon  and  in  the  Council  of  State,  whether 
the  new  Court  of  Accounts  should  judge  or  not 
judge  the  vrdonnateurs,  that  is  to  say,  whether 
it  should  be  limited  to  certifying  that  the 
agents  of  the  receipts  had  collected  the  moneys 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


CGt 


legally  voted,  and  had  rendered  a  faithful  ac- 
count of  it ;  that  the  agents  of  the  expenditure 
had  paid  the  expenses  legally  authorized ;  or 
if  it  should  go  so  far  as  to  decide  whether  the 
ordonnateurs,  that  is  to  say,  the  ministers,  had 
administered  well  or  ill,  had,  for  instance, 
bought  well  or  ill  the  corn  destined  for  the 
Bupport  of  the  army,  the  horses  destined  to 
remount  the  cavalry ;  whether  they  had  been, 
in  short,  or  had  not  been,  intelligent,  economi- 
cal, and  skilful  dispensers  of  the  public  money. 
To  go  so  far  would  have  been  giving  to  magis- 
trates, who  ought  to  be  irremovable  that  they 
may  be  independent,  the  means,  and  with  the 
means  holding  out  the  temptation,  to  obstruct 
the  operations  of  the  government  itself.  By 
permitting  them  to  rise  from  the  judgment  of 
accounts  to  the  judgment  of  the  supreme  agents 
of  power,  the  government  would  have  abdicated 
its  authority,  in  favour  of  a  jurisdiction  irre- 
movable, and  consequently  invincible  in  its 
errors.  It  was  therefore  resolved  that  the  new 
Court  of  Accounts  should  judge  only  account- 
able agents,  never  ordonnateury,  and,  for  the 
greater  security,  it  was  settled  that  its  deci- 
sions, so  far  from  being  without  appeal,  might 
be  referred  to  the  Council  of  State,  the  sove- 
reign jurisdiction,  at  once  impartial  and  im- 
bued with  the  spirit  of  government,  besides 
irremovable,  and  easy  to  bring  back,  if  it 
could  go  out  of  the  way. 

The  organization  of  the  new  Court  still  re- 
mained to  be  settled.  It  was  proposed  to  pro- 
portion the  number  of  its  members  to  the  ex- 
tent of  its  duties.  In  the  first  place,  in  order 
that  the  investigation  which  it  was  to  under- 
take should  be  real  and  not  a  mere  assent  to 
the  papers  drawn  up  in  the  office  of  finances, 
there  was  instituted  a  first  class  of  magistrates 
called  councillors  referendary,  having  no  deli- 
berative voice,  as  numerous  as  the  multiplicity 
of  the  accounts  required,  and  charged  to  verify 
each  of  those  accounts,  having  the  accountable 
papers  before  them.  They  were  to  lay  the  re-  j 
suit  of  their  labours  before  the  high  magistra-  , 
cy  of  master-councillors,  who  alone  should 
have  deliberative  voices,  and  should  be  divided 
into  three  chambers  of  seven  members  each, 
six  councillors,  and  one  vice-president.  It  was 
settled  that,  according  to  the  importance  of  the 
questions,  the  three  chambers  were  to  unite 
into  a  single  assembly,  under  the  presidency 
of  a  first  president,  who,  with  a  procureur- 
ffenfral,  was  to  be  at  the  head  of  the  company, 
to  give  it  an  impulsion  and  direction.  This 
respectable  body,  which  has  since  rendered  j 
such  great  services  to  the  state,  was  to  rank  ' 
immediately  after  the  Court  of  Cassation,  and  | 
to  receive  the  same  appointments.  At  its 
very  outset  a  difficult  task  was  assigned  to  it, 
which  it  alone  could  perform,  that  of  settling 
all  the  accounts  in  arrear,  the  number  of 
which  amounted  to  not  fewer  than  2300,  which 
dated  back  to  the  creation  of  assignats,  and 
the  examination  of  which  the  last  commission  j 
of  accounts  had  never  been  able  to  finish.  This 
examination  was  difficult,  for  it  was  necessary 
to  distinguish  between  the  honest  accountable 
agents,  who  had  suffered  by  the  continual  fluc- 
tuations of  the  paper-money,  and  the  fraudu- 
lent agents,  who  had  profited  by  them.  It  was 
not  only  difficult  but  urgent, — urgent  for  the 
state,  which  had  tc  claim  considerable  sums, 

VOL.  II.— 46 


I  and  for  the  families  of  the  accountable  agents 
deceased  or  dismissed,  who  had  to  get  rid  of 
the  legal  mortgage  laid  upon  all  their  property. 
The  new  Court  was  invested  with  the  power 
of  arbitrating  in  regard   to   the   accounts  in 
arrear,  but  was  limited  for  the  new  accounts 
to   the   rigorous  application  of  the  laws.     It 
soon  acquitted  itself  of  this  arbitration,  with 
!  as  much  justice  as  it  afterwards  exhibited  in 
the  pure  and  simple  application  of  the  finance 
j  laws,  of  which  it  is  the  keeper,  as  the  Court 
I  of  Cassation  is  keeper  of  the  civil  and  criminal 
;  laws  of  our  country. 

This  institution,  which  was  destined  to  have 
such  useful  and  such  durable  results  for  the 
whole  administration,  had  moreover  the  se- 
i  condary  advantage  of  furnishing  honourable 
|  and  lucrative  places  for  the  most  distinguished 
j  members  of  the  Tribunate,  for  whom  Napoleon 
was  anxious  to  provide  in  a  suitable  manner ; 
for  in  his  conceptions  all  these  things  were 
strongly  and  intimately  connected.  He  com- 
posed, therefore,  the  new  Court  of  Accounts 
with  the  members  of  the  commission  of  ac- 
counts, which  had  just  been  suppressed,-  and 
with  the  members  of  the  Tribunate,  likewise 
recently  suppressed.  Messrs.  Jard-Panvilliers, 
Delpierre,  and  Brierc  de  Surgy,  the  two  former 
members  of  the  Tribunate,  the  third  a  member 
of  the  commission  cf  accounts,  were  appointed 
vice-presidents  of  the  new  Court.  The  im- 
portant post  of  president  still  remained  to  be 
filled.  This  afforded  opportunity  for  making 
amends  to  a  respectable  man  for  the  temporary 
severities  to  which  he  had  been  exposed.  This 
man  was  M.  de  Marbois,  removed  in  1806  from 
the  post  of  minister  of  the  Treasury,  for  want 
of  shrewdness  and  firmness  in  the  transactions 
with  the  United  Merchants.  Napoleon  had 
been  wrong  to  expect  those  qualities  of  him, 
and  to  punish  him  because  he  had  them  not. 
This  wrong  he  repaired  by  putting  him  into 
his  proper  place,  that  of  first  president  of  the 
Court  of  Accounts ;  for  M.  de  Marbois  was 
much  better  fitted  for  the  first  magistrate  of 
the  finance  than  its  active  and  circumspect 
administrator. 

To  the  attention  paid  to  the  system  of  the 
accounts  of  the  Empire,  Napoleon  added  a  not 
less  active  concern  for  the  great  works  of 
public  utility.  Consulting  on  this  subject  with 
M.  Cre"tet,  minister  of  the  interior,  with  Messrs. 
Regnault  and  De  Montalivet,  members  of  the 
Council  of  State,  with  the  ministers  of  finances 
and  of  the  public  Treasury,  he  took  numerous 
resolutions,  which  had  for  their  object  either 
to  give  greater  activity  to  the  works  already 
begun,  or  to  order  new  ones.  The  restoration 
of  peace,  the  supposed  approaching  diminution 
of  the  public  expenses,  the  faculty  of  recurring 
to  the  Treasury  of  the  army,  either  for  con- 
tracting loans  at  a  moderate  rate,  without 
having  recourse  to  credit,  permitted  Napoleon 
to  follow  the  inspirations  of  his  creative  genius. 
Thirteen  thousand  four  hundred  leagues  of 
high  roads,  forming  the  vast  net-work  of  the 
communications  of  the  Empire,  had  been  either 
repaired  or  kept  up  at  the  expense  of  the 
public  Treasury.  Two  monumental  routes, 
those  of  the  Simplon  and  Mont  Cenis,  had  just 
been  finished.  Napoleon  ordered  funds  to  be 
allotted  for  at  length  setting  about  that  of 
Mont  Genevre.  He  opened  the  necessary 
2H 


362 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Aug.  180* 


credits  for  trebling  the  workshops  of  the  high 
road  from  Lyons  to  the  foot  of  Mont  Cenis,  for 
doubling  those  of  the  road  from  Savona  to 
Alexandria,  destined  to  connect  Liguria  with 
Piedmont,  for  trebling  those  of  the  high  road 
from  Mayence  to  Paris,  one  of  those  to  which 
he  attached  the  greatest  importance.  He  de- 
creed, moreover,  the  opening  of  a  route  not 
less  useful  in  his  estimation,  that  from  Paris 
to  Wesel.  Four  of  the  bridges  previously  de- 
creed were  finished.  Ten  were  building,  par- 
ticularly those  of  Roanne  and  Tours  on  the 
Loire,  of  Strasburg  on  the  Rhine,  and  of 
Avignon  on  the  Rhone.  He  ordered  that  of 
Sevres  on  the  Seine ;  the  completion  of  that  of 
St.  Cloud,  partly  of  wood,  on  the  same  river; 
that  of  the  Scrivia,  between  Tortona  and  Alex- 
andria ;  lastly,  that  of  the  Gironde,  before 
Bordeaux,  which  is  become  one  of  the  grandest 
monuments  in  Europe. 

The  canals,  then  the  only  known  medium  of 
obtaining  for  land  conveyance  the  facility  and 
low  price  of  conveyance  by  sea,  had  not  ceased 
to  engage  the  attention  of  Napoleon.  Ten  great 
canals,  destined  to  unite  together  all  the  parts 
of  the  Empire,  the  Scheldt  with  the  Meuse,  the 
Meuse  with  the  Rhine,1  the  Rhine  with  the 
Saone  and  the  Rhone,'2  the  Scheldt  with  the 
Somme,  the  Somme  with  the  Oise  and  the 
Seine,3  the  Seine  with  the  Saone  and  the 
Rhone,4  the  Seine  with  the  Loire,  the  Loire 
with  the  Cher,  the  Sea  to  the  north  of  Bretagne 
with  the  Sea  to  the  south  ;  some  so  natural,  so 
ancient,  that  they  had  been  projected,  and 
even  undertaken  in  the  seventeenth  and  eight- 
eenth centuries ;  some  entirely  planned  by 
Napoleon  ;  all,  either  continued  or  commenced 
by  him,  were  in  full  progress.  That  called  the 
canal  of  the  North,  which  was  to  form  the 
communication  between  the  Scheldt  and  the 
Meuse,  the  Meuse  and  the  Rhine,  and  to 
emancipate  the  Netherlands  from  Holland, 
conceived  by  Napoleon,  possible  for  him  only, 
on  account  of  the  incorporation  of  the  countries 
traversed  by  this  canal  with  France,  was  defi- 
nitively resolved  upon  and  marked  out.  The 
works  recently  prescribed  were  begun.  The 
tunnel  of  St.  Quentin,  the  principal  difficulty 
of  the  canal  which  was  to  unite  the  Scheldt 
with  the  Somme,  the  Somme  with  the  Seine, 
was  completed,  and  promised  the  speedy  open- 
ing of  the  navigation  from  Paris  to  Antwerp. 
The  canal  of  the  Ourcq,  four-fifths  finished, 
would  soon  bring  to  Paris  the  waters  of  the 
Marne.  Until  the  waters  of  the  Beuvronne 
could  be  brought  into  the  basin  of  Villette, 
Napoleon  resolved  to  introduce  them  immedi- 
ately into  the  quarters  of  St.  Denis  and  St. 
Martin.  The  canal  of  Burgundy,  a  plan  and 
creation  of  the  eighteenth  century,  had  been 
long  relinquished.  Napoleon  had  caused  that 
part  of  it  from  Dijon  to  St.  Jean  de  Losne 
to  be  continued.  Out  of  twenty-two  locks, 
comprehended  in  this  part,  eleven,  executed 
during  his  reign,  had  just  been  finished.  The 
navigation  from  Dijon  to  the  Saone  would 
therefore  soon  be  rendered  practicable.  From 
the  Yonne  to  Tonnerre,  eighteen  locks  were 


i  Canal  of  the  North. 

«  TheAapoleon  Canal,  from  the  canal  of  the  Rhone  to 
the  Rhine. 
*  Canal  of  St  Quentin.  4  Canal  of  Burgundy. 


required,  and  these  were  in  progress.  But  the 
important  point  of  the  work  consisted  in  cross- 
ing the  heights  which  separate  the  basin  of  the 
S^eine  from  that  of  the  Saone.  The  means 
hitherto  proposed  appeared  inadequate.  Na- 
poleon ordered  this  great  line  of  navigation  to 
be  resumed,  at  first  by  surveys,  and  as  soon  as 
possible  by  operations  upon  the  soil.  After  he 
had  investigated  the  difficulties  presented  by 
the  canal  from  the  Rhone  to  the  Rhine,  the 
construction  of  which  he  had  much  at  heart, 
and  to  which  he  had  permitted  his  name  to  be 
given,  he  assigned  to  it  further  funds.  The 
canal  of  Beaucaire  was  finished.  He  had  the 
state  of  that  of  the  South,  the  everlasting  glory 
of  Riquet,  examined,  purposing  to  continue  it 
to  Bordeaux.  He  caused  that  of  Berry,  tend- 
ing to  prolong  the  navigation  of  the  Cher  from 
Montlu9on  to  the  Loire,  to  be  resumed.  He 
gave  orders  for  fresh  works  upon  that  of  La 
Rochelle,  indispensable  to  that  great  naval 
establishment,  and  on  those  of  Ille-et-Rance, 
and  of  the  Blavet,  from  Nantes  to  Brest,  des- 
tined to  cross  the  peninsula  of  Bretagne  in  all 
directions,  to  render  it  navigable  at  all  points, 
and  to  facilitate  the  transit  of  stores  to  our 
great  military  ports. 

To  this  artificial  navigation  of  canals,  he 
justly  conceived  that  there  ought  to  be  added 
the  natural  navigation  of  streams  and  rivers, 
and  that  for  this  purpose  their  courses  required 
to  be  improved.  He  ordered  surveys  to  be 
made  of  eighteen  rivers,  upon  which,  it  is  true, 
certain  works  were  already  undertaken.  Al- 
ways consistent  in  his  conceptions,  he  passed 
from  canals  and  rivers  to  ports.  He  assigned 
fresh  funds  to  that  of  Savona,  which  was  one 
of  the  terminations  of  the  Alexandria  road.  It 
is  well  known  what  wonders  were  accomplish- 
ing at  Antwerp,  where  vast  basins,  scooped  out 
as  by  enchantment,  already  contained  three- 
deckers,  which  they  had  received  from  the 
stocks  established  within  the  compass  of  that 
great  city,  and  which  they  transmitted  by  the 
Scheldt  to  Flushing.  In  arrangement  with 
Holland  for  obtaining  the  cession  of  Flushing, 
Napoleon  gave  orders  for  works  there,  for  the 
purpose  of  facilitating  the  entry  into,  the  de- 
parture from,  and  the  anchoring  in  that  port, 
and  for  placing  ships  there  out  of  the  reach  of 
the  enemy.  He  allotted  funds  for  lengthening 
the  piers  of  Dunkirk  and  Calais.  At  Cher- 
bourg, the  great  pier,  destined  to  form  a  har- 
bour, was  above  the  water,  and  had  been 
crowned  by  a  battery  called  the  Napoleon  Bat- 
tery. New  funds  were  granted  for  the  conti- 
nuation of  this  superb  undertaking,  the  work 
of  Louis  XVI.,  though  it  commemorated  one 
of  the  glories  of  the  ancient  monarchy.  Lastly, 
Napoleon  prescribed  a  new  examination  of  the 
whole  system  of  the  fortresses  of  the  Empire. 
He  resolved  to  devote  to  them  not  less  a  sum 
than  12  millions  a  year,  and  he  distributed  it 
among  them  according  to  their  importance, 
which  he  appreciated  and  fixed,  classing  them 
in  the  following  manner :  Alexandria,  Mayence, 
Wesel,  Strasburg,  Kehl,  &c. 

But  never  did  he  turn  his  attention  to  great 
works  without  thinking  of  Paris — Paris,  his 
residence,  the  centre  of  his  government,  the 
city  of  his  predilection,  the  capital  which  was 
an  epitome  of  the  greatness,  of  the  moral  pre- 
eminence, of  France  over  all  nations.  He  had 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


363 


promised  himself  before  the  conclusion  of  his 
reign  to  cover  it  with  monuments  of  art  and  of 
public  utility,  to  render  it  not  less  salubrious 
than  magnificent.  Already,  thanks  to  him, 
thirty  fountains,  instead  of  pouring  forth  water 
for  a  few  hours,  were  running  day  and  night. 
The  forwardness  of  the  canal  of  the  Ourcq  ad- 
mitted even  of  an  addition  to  this  abundance, 
and  allowed  the  water  to  be  kept  running  with- 
out intermission,  in  the  other  fountains,  old 
and  new.  At  this  moment  were  raised  by  the 
hands  of  several  thousand  labourers,  the  two 
triumphal  arches  of  the  Carrousel  and  1'Etoile, 
the  Column  in  the  Place  Vendome,  the  facade 
of  the  Legislative  Body,  the  Church  of  La  Ma- 
deleine, then  the  Temple  of  Glory,  and  the 
Pantheon.  The  Bridge  of  Austerlitz ;  thrown 
over  the  Seine,  at  the  entry  of  that  river  into 
Paris,  was  finished.  The  bridge  of  Jena,  span- 
ning the  Seine  at  its  exit,  was  in  progress,  and 
the  capital  of  the  empire  was  thus  about  to  be 
enclosed  between  two  immortal  memorials. 
Napoleon  had  enjoined  the  administration  of 
the  Bank  to  build  an  hotel  for  that  great  esta- 
blishment. He  had  decreed  the  palace  of  the 
new  Exchange,  and  directed  a  site  to  be  sought 
for  it.  The  great  Rue  Impe'riale,  resolved  upon 
in  1806,  was  soon  to  be  commenced.  For  mo- 
numents of  art  these  were  sufficient,  and  it  was 
requisite  that  he  should  direct  his  attention  to 
monuments  of  public  utility.  Napoleon  in  one 
of  his  councils,  decided  that  long  covered  gal- 
leries should  be  erected  in  the  principal  mar- 
kets to  shelter  buyers  and  sellers  from  the  in- 
clemency of  the  weather ;  that  instead  of  the 
forty  slaughter-houses,  in  which  cattle  for  the 
consumption  of  Paris  were  killed,  and  which 
were  equally  unwholesome  and  dangerous, 
there  should  be  erected  four  large  buildings  for 
the  purpose  at  the  four  principal  extremities 
of  Paris ;  that  the  cupola  of  the  Halle  aux 
file's  should  be  rebuilt :  lastly,  that  vast  maga- 
zines, capable  of  containing  several  million 
quintals  of  grain,  should  be  erected  towards 
the  arsenal,  near  the  creek  of  the  canal  of  St. 
Martin,  at  the  point  where  all  the  navigable 
routes  terminate.  He  had  bestowed  assiduous 
pains,  and  expended  considerable  sums  on  the 
supplying  of  Paris  with  provisions,  but  he 
thought  that  it  was  n,ot  sufficient  to  lay  out  20 
millions  of  francs  for  corn,  as  he  had  done  at 
a  preceding  period ;  that  it  was  necessary  to 
have  besides  a  place  in  which  it  could  be  depo- 
sited :  and  to  this  idea  are  owing  the  granaries 
(rjr?nirrt  cT abandonee)  existing  at  this  day  near 
the  Place  of  the  Bastille. 

For  all  these  works,  spread  from  the  centre 
to  the  circumference  of  the  Empire,  the  budget 
of  the  interior  rose  instantaneously  from  30 
odd  millions  to  56.  The  reserve  funds  placed 
in  the  budget  by  way  of  resource,  and  lastly 
supplementary  sums  which  one  knew  where  to 
find,  were  to  meet  these  excesses  of  the  regular 
expenses,  not  with  interested  views  of  local 
utility,  and  not  overstepping  the  bounds  of 
discretion,  notwithstanding  the  creative  ardour 
of  the  head  of  the  State.  Napoleon  was  never- 
theless desirous  to  ease  the  Treasury,  or  rather 
to  furnish  it  with  the  means  of  providing  con- 
tinually for  fresh  undertakings,  and  he  devised 
various  combinations  for  attaining  this  end. 
In  the  first  place,  the  abolition  of  the  ten  war 
centimes,  recently  granted,  appeared  to  him  an 


occasion  by  which  it  would  be  right  to  profit. 
It  would  be  sufficient  to  keep  back  a  small  part 
of  that  benefit  in  some  of  the  departments,  for 
instance  three  or  four  centimes,  to  create  con- 
siderable resources.  Napoleon  thought  that 
certain  works,  though  having  a  high  character 
of  general  utility,  such  as  the  canal  of  Bur- 
gundy, the  canal  of  Berry,  and  the  road  from 
Bordeaux  to  Lyons,  presented  at  the  same  time 
an  evident  character  of  particular  and  local 
utility ;  that  the  departments  would  cheer- 
fully make  sacrifices  to  accelerate  their  com- 
pletion ;  and  that  in  their  concurrence  there 
might  be  found  more  considerable  means  of 
execution,  along  with  greater  distributive  jus- 
tice. This  was  not  a  vain  hope,  for  several  de- 
partments had  already  voluntarily  taxed  them- 
selves, in  order  to  contribute  to  these  vast  works 
of  general  and  particular  utility.  But  these 
votes  had  the  inconvenience  of  being  tempo- 
rary, subject  to  the  deliberations  of  general 
councils,  and  on  such  a  groundwork  one  could 
scarcely  found  durable  undertakings.  Napo- 
leon therefore  resolved  to  present  a  law,  by 
virtue  of  which  the  participation  of  the  de- 
partments in  certain  works  should  be  equi- 
tably adjusted,  and  the  centimes  judged  neces- 
sary imposed  for  a  specific  number  of  years. 
Thirty-two  departments  were  in  this  predica- 
ment. The  longest  duration  of  the  centimes 
was  to  be  for  twenty-one  years,  the  shortest 
for  three,  the  mean  for  twelve ;  the  maximum 
of  the  centimes  imposed  6,  the  minimum  2f. 
Thus  the  departments  of  the  Cote-d'Or  and 
the  Yonne,  with  the  arrondissement  of  Bar, 
were  to  contribute  to  the  canal  of  Burgundy ; 
those  of  the  Allier  and  the  Cher  to  the  canal 
of  Berry ;  those  of  the  Rhone,  the  Loire,  Puy 
de  Dome,  la  Correze,  the  Dordogne,  and  the 
Gironde,  to  the  high  road  from  Bordeaux  to 
Lyons.  It  would  be  too  long  to  enumerate  the 
others.  In  general,  the  proportion  to  be  con- 
tributed by  the  state  and  the  department  was 
fixed  at  a  half  each.  This  impost  was,  after 
all,  but  a  reduction  of  the  land-tax :  and  the 
source  of  immense  advantages  to  the  localities 
on  which  it  was  laid. 

An  annual  subsidy  being  thus  insured  by  the 
law  which  imposed  the  centimes,  it  was  possible 
to  contract  loans,  because  one  had  the  means 
of  serving  their  interests.  Recourse  was  had 
to  the  usual  lender,  the  Treasury  of  the  armj7, 
which,  according  to  the  intentions  of  Napoleon, 
was  to  seek  to  procure  for  itself  solid  revenues 
by  the  advantageous  employment  of  its  capitals. 
This  Treasury  immediately  lent  the  prefect  of 
the  Seine  eight  millions  for  the  works  in  Paris. 
Other  cities,  as  well  as  several  departments, 
had  recourse  to  this  beneficent  dispensation  of 
the  wealth  acquired  by  victory.  Always  ex- 
tracting from  every  idea  whatever  of  utility  it 
comprehended,  Napoleon  thought  to  carry  the 
employment  of  this  kind  of  resource  much  fur- 
ther. Three  of  those  canals  which  we  have 
enumerated  above,  those  from  the  Scheldt  to 
the  Rhine,  from  the  Rhine  to  the  Rhone,  from 
the  Rhone  to  the  Seine,  appeared  to  him  more 
worthy  of  fixing  his  attention,  and  of  becoming 
the  object  of  his  all-powerful  activity.  Besides 
these  three  canals,  and  almost  in  their  vicinity, 
there  were  three  others,  finished,  or  nearly  so, 
and  capable  of  yielding  speedy  revenues  ;  these 
were  the  canals  of  St.  Quentin,  Orleans,  and 


3G4 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Ang.  1807. 


the  South.  Napoleon  resolved  to  finish  them 
immediately,  then  to  sell  them  to  capitalists  in 
shares  which  ought  to  bring  in  six  or  seven  per 
cent.:  making  sure  of  finding  a  purchaser  for 
all  those  which  the  public  would  not  take.  This 
purchaser,  as  it  may  easily  be  guessed,  was 
again  the  Treasury  of  the  army.  These  sums, 
said  he  to  the  minister  of  the  interior,  you  will 
employ  in  pushing  forward  the  execution  of  the 
three  canals,  the  completion  of  which  is  of  such 
importance  to  the  prosperity  of  the  Empire ; 
and  when  these  three  are  completed,  I  shall 
sell  them  to  a  purchaser,  who  will  take  them 
too ;  and  thus  shifting  from  work  to  work  a 
capital  of  three  or  four  hundred  millions  accru- 
ing from  moneys  annually  furnished  by  the 
State  and  the  departments,  we  shall  in  a  few 
years  change  the  face  of  the  country. 

His  plan  was,  after  setting  all  these  enter- 
prises in  motion,  after  getting  voted  in  a  short 
session,  besides  the  budget,  the  legislative  mea- 
sures which  he  needed  for  the  execution  of  his 
projects,  to  give  before  winter  a  few  days  to  Italy, 
wishing  to  extend  to  her  also  the  benefit  of  his 
creative  looks.  He  purposed  at  his  return  to  re- 
solve the  questions  left  undecided,  that  in  spring 
the  works  might  commence  all  over  the  Empire. 
He  therefore  ordered  the  minister  of  the  inte- 
rior to  subject  all  these  ideas  to  a  thorough 
examination,  that  they  might  be  realized  as 
speedily  as  possible.  "If  we  do  not  make 
haste,"  said  he  to  him,  "we  shall  die  before 
we  have  seen  the  navigation  opened  on  those 
three  great  canals.  Wars,  silly  people,  will 
come,  and  those  canals  will  be  left  unfinished. 
Every  thing  is  possible  in  France  at  this  moment, 
when  one  has  more  need  to  seek  the  way  to 
employ  money  than  money  itself.  .... 
I  have  funds  destined  to  reward  the  generals 
and  -the  officers  of  the  grand  army.  Those 
funds  might  as  well  be  given  them  in  canal 
shares  as  in  rentes  on  the  .State,  or  in  money. 
I  should  be  obliged  to  give  them  money,  if 
something  of  that  sort  were  not  soon  settled. 
I  have  made  the  glory  of  my  reign  consist  in 
changing  the  face  of  the  territory  of  my  Empire. 
The  execution  of  these  great  public  works  is  as 
necessary  to  the  interest  of  my  people  as  to  my 
own  satisfaction." 

Napoleon,  moreover,  was  deeply  intent  on 
the  extinction  of  beggary.  To  accomplish  its 
abolition,  he  resolved  to  create  departmental 
houses,  where  mendicants  should  be  furnished 
with  work  and  food,  and  in  which  also  they 
should  be  forcibly  confined,  when  found  beg- 
ging in  the  public  places  or  on  the  high  roads. 
He  required  that  houses  of  this  kind  should  be 
opened  shortly  in  all  the  departments.  "  I  at- 
tach," he  wrote  in  the  letter  to  the  minister  of 
the  interior  quoted  above,  "  a  great  importance 
and  a  great  idea  of  glory  to  the  suppression  of 
mendicity.  Funds  are  not  wanting,  but  every 
thing  seems  to  me  to  proceed  slowly,  and  mean- 
while the  years  are  flying  away.  We  ought  not 
to  pass  through  this  world  without  leaving 
traces  that  recommend  our  memory  to  poste- 
rity. 1  am  about  to  be  absent  for  a  month. 
Contrive  to  be  ready  on  my  return  on  all  these 
questions,  to  have  examined  them  all  in  detail, 
that  I  may  be  able,  by  a  general  decree,  to  give 
a  finishing  stroke  to  mendicity.  Before  the  15th 
of  December,  you  must  have  found  either  in  the 
reserved  fourths  or  in  the  funds  of  the  com- 


munes the  resources  necessary  for  the  mainte- 
nance of  sixty  or  a  hundred  houses  for  the  ex- 
tirpation of  mendicity ;  let  the  sites  for  them 
be  fixed  upon,  and  the  general  regulations  ma- 
tured. Don't  ask  me  again  for  three  or  four 
months  for  collecting  information.  You  have 
young  auditors,  intelligent  prefects,  clever  en- 
gineers of  the  ponts  et  chaussees — make  all  these 
run  about  and  don't  go  to  sleep  over  the  ordi- 
nary office  business.  The  winter  evenings  are 
long ;  fill  your  portfolios,  that,  during  the  even* 
ings  of  those  three  months,  we  may  be  able  to 
discuss  the  means  of  arriving  at  those  great 
results." 

In  this  extreme  ardour,  which  impelled  him 
to  hasten,  nay,  to  hurry,  the  accomplishment 
of  good,  he  paid  the  like  attention  to  the  Bank 
of  France,  which  he  purposed  to  make  one  of 
the  principal  instruments  of  the  public  pros- 
perity. He  had  required  in  1806,  that  this 
great  establishment  should  change  its  constitu- 
tion and  take  the  monarchical  form,  instead  of 
the  republican  form  which  it  before  had, — a 
result  obtained  by  giving  it  a  governor  and 
three  regents  appointed  by  the  minister  of  the 
finances.  He  desired,  moreover,  that  the  capi- 
tal of  the  Bank  should  be  proportioned  to  the 
part  which  he  destined  for  it,  and  that,  instead 
of  45,000  shares,  it  should  issue  90,000,  which 
would  raise  its  capital  from  45  to  90  millions. 
These  shares  had  not  yet  been  issued,  because 
the  Bank  was  afraid  that  it  should  not  find  em- 
ployment for  the  funds  which  they  would  pro- 
duce, especially  as  Napoleon  had  judged  it 
more  expedient  to  cause  the  service  of  the  Trea- 
sury to  be  executed  by  the  Treasury  itself,  and 
had  devoted  to  this  service  a  sum  of  84  mil- 
lions, more  than  half  of  which  was  already 
paid  in.  The  result  of  this  excellent  measure 
was,  however,  to  leave  without  employment  the 
capitals  accustomed  to  be  invested  in  obligations 
and  bills  at  sight.  Napoleon  was  delighted  at 
the  embarrassment  which  he  thus  occasioned  to 
certain  capitalists,  for,  he  said,  it  would  reduce 
them  to  the  necessity  of  seeking,  in  commerce, 
in  industry,  in  the  great  public  works,  invest- 
ments which  the  paper  of  the  Treasury  no 
longer  offered  them.  The  Bank,  which  was 
usually  engaged  in  the  discount  of  that  paper, 
and  which  could  no  longer  procure  any,  hesi- 
tated to  issue  its  45,000  new  shares.  Napoleon 
forced  it  to  issue  them,  promising  soon  to  fur- 
nish it  and  all  capitalists  with  employment  for 
their  money  by  the  multiplication  of  undertak- 
ings of  all  sorts.  In  this  figurative  language, 
he  said  to  the  Bank  of  France,  "  With  the  pro- 
pensity which  exists  in  our  country  to  central- 
ize every  thing  in  Paris,  to  centralize  their  pay- 
ments as  well  as  the  government  itself,  the 
Bank  ought  to  become  there  the  greatest  of 
commercial  agents ;  it  ought  to  be  truly  worthy 
of  its  name,  and  to  become  for  Paris  what  the 
Thames,  which  conveys  every  thing  to  London, 
is  for  London."  He  insisted,  therefore,  on  the 
issue  of  the  45,000  new  shares,  which,  for  the 
rest,  were  disposed  of  with  advantage ;  for, 
issued  at  1200  francs,  (1000  francs  representing 
the  capital  of  the  share,  200  francs  represent- 
ing old  accumulated  bonuses,)  they  were  nego- 
tiated at  1400  francs.  The  three  public  effects 
of  the  time  were  the  5  per  cent,  rentes,  the 
Bank  shares,  and  the  rescriptions  on  the  na- 
tional domains,  devised  to  liquidate  the  arrear. 


Ang.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


865 


The  5  per  cent.,  at  the  time  of  which  we  are 
treating,  (August,  1807,)  sold  at  93  francs,  the 
Bank  shares  at  1425,  the  rescriptions  at  92. 
The  rate  of  the  latter  had  become  almost  in- 
variable. 

Napoleon  required  that  the  interest  should 
be  reduced  to  5  per  cent,  at  the  Bank,  a  mea- 
sure which  it  most  cheerfully  adopted.  He  or- 
dered that  the  interest  of  securities  should  be 
reduced,  for  some  from  6  to  5,  for  the  others 
from  5  to  4.  At  last  he  carried  the  impatience 
to  do  good  so  far  as  to  desire  to  fix  the  interest 
allowed  by  the  caisse  de  service  to  capitals  at  3 
and  3£.  Having  no  need  of  money,  pouring  it 
into  that  chest  in  abundance,  he  maintained 
that  only  such  funds  ought  to  be  kept  as  could 
be  content  with  that  remuneration ;  that  all  the 
others  ought  to  be  sent  back  to  commerce ;  and 
that  thus  the  reduction  of  interest  ought  to  be 
forced  by  all  the  means  that  were  at  the  dispo- 
sal of  the  government.  But  M.  Mollien  stop- 
ped him  by  proving  to  him  that  such  a  result 
was  premature  ;  for  the  money  promised  to  the 
chest  was  not  wholly  paid  in,  and  it  was  still  in 
need  of  the  resources  by  which  it  was  usually 
supplied.  The  success  of  such  a  measure  would 
have  been  infallible  in  the  following  year,  had 
not  new  enterprises  abroad  intervened  to  divert 
the  capitalists  as  well  as  the  soldiery  of  France 
from  iheir  better,  more  useful,  and  more  sure 
employment. 

The  aspect,  if  not  alarming,  at  least  sad, 
which  the  war  had  assumed  during  the  winter 
of  1807  [1806?],  added  to  the  severity  of  the 
season  and  to  the  absence  of  the  imperial 
court,  had  slackened  for  a  moment  the  activity 
of  business,  particularly  in  Paris.  But  the 
restoration  of  continental  peace,  and  the  hope 
of  maritime  peace,  had  again  encouraged  the 
highest  flights  of  imagination,  and  in  all  parts 
people  began  to  fall  to  work  in  the  manufac- 
tories, and  in  commercial  houses  to  plan  specu- 
lations which  embraced  the  whole  extent  of 
the  Continent.  Though  the  productions  of 
Great  Britain  still  found  their  way  beyond  the 
coast  of  Europe  by  inlets  unknown  to  Napo- 
leon, they  yet  had  difficulty  to  penetrate  and 
still  greater  to  circulate ;  cotton  threads  and 
BtuffS,  which,  thanks  to  the  prohibitory  laws 
then  issued  in  France,  had  been  fabricated 
with  profit,  in  great  quantity,  and  with  a  com- 
mencement of  perfection,  superseded  the  Eng- 
lish productions  of  the  same  kind,  passed  the 
Rhine  in  the  train  of  our  armies,  and  spread 
themselves  in  Spain,  Italy,  and  Germany. 
Our  silks,  unrivalled  at  all  times,  filled  the 
markets  of  Europe,  which  caused  general  satis- 
faction at  Lyons.  Our  cloths,  which  had  the 
advantage  of  raw  material,  since  the  English 
were  shut  out  from  the  Spanish  wools,  of 
which  we  ;iad  a  superabundance,  drove  the  j 
English  woollens  out  of  all  the  fairs  of  the  j 
Continent ;  for  they  had  the  superiority  not  ; 
only  in  quality  but  in  beauty.  Besides,  it  was  ! 
not  our  productions  alone  that  gained  by  the 
exclusion  of  English  goods.  Saxony,  the  most 
industrious  of  the  German  provinces,  already 
eent  charcoal  by  the  Elbe  to  Hamburg,  cloths 
made  of  the  fine  Saxon  wools  to  markets  to 
which  they  had  never  penetrated,  and  the 
metals  of  the  Erzgebirge  to  all  quarters  where 
the  metals  of  America  were  deficient.  Our 
iron  and  that  of  Germany  also  profited  greatly  j 


by  the  exclusion  of  English  and  Swedish  iron, 
and  was  perceptibly  improved. 

Napoleon  strove  to  encourage  by  the  power 
of  fashion,  a  fickle,  fantastic  power,  which 
shares  with  the  sacred  power  of  conscience  the 
privilege  of  escaping  from  material  power,  but 
which,  nevertheless,  cheerfully  obeys  glory — 
Napoleon  strove  then  by  the  power  of  fashion 
to  gain  a  preference  for  the  use  of  articleH 
manufactured  from  materials  of  continental 
origin.  He  wished,  for  example,  that  the 
linens  and  lawn,  composed  of  flax  and  hemp, 
should  be  preferred  to  the  muslin  made  of  cot- 
ton. He  also  wished  silks  to  be  preferred  to 
plain  cloth,  which  must  occasion  a  return  to- 
wards the  luxury  of  the  ancie-n  regime,  towards 
that  time  when  men,  instead  of  dressing  in  the 
modest  stuff  called  black  cloth,  wore  stuffs  as 
rich  as  those  used  for  the  dresses  of  the  other 
sex.  And  he  encouraged  this  return  to  luxury, 
as  well  as  a  return  to  nobility,  to  titles,  to  do- 
tations, for  reasons  peculiar  to  himself,  serious 
reasons  which  always  guided  him  in  things  ap- 
parently the  most  frivolous. 

Excepting  our  maritime  branches  of  industry, 
which  he  sought  to  compensate  for  their  inac- 
tivity by  immense  naval  creations,  our  other 
industries  found,  therefore,  a  powerful  cause 
of  development  in  that  extraordinary  situation 
which  Napoleon  had  procured  for  France.  But, 
what  is  singular  enough,  the  greatest  of  me- 
chanical forces,  that  of  steam,  which,  from  its 
expansive  power,  animates  at  this  day  every 
branch  of  human  industry,  which  gives  motion 
to  so  many  machines,  which  propels  so  many 
vessels,  which  is,  with  peace,  the  principal 
cause  of  the  prosperity  of  the  inferior  classes, 
and  of  the  luxury  of  the  superior  classes — the 
force  of  steam  was  developing  itself  by  his  side, 
without  him.  Those  machines,  then  called 
fire-machines,  from  their  most  obvious  phe- 
nomenon, rudely  constructed,  consuming  an 
excessive  quantity  of  fuel,  were  employed  only 
in  coal-mines,  on  account  of  the  cheapness  of 
fuel  in  works  of  that  kind.  The  Society  for 
the  encouragement  of  industry  offered  a  prize 
as,,  a  reward  for  those  who  should  render  its 
application  more  practical  and  more  econo- 
mical ;  and,  two  thousand  leagues  from  our 
shores,  Fulton,  scarcely  listened  to  by  Na- 
poleon in  1803,  because  he  wanted,  for  cross- 
ing the  sea,  not  an  untried  but  a  tried  agent, 
was  obliged  to  go  and  make  the  experiment 
with  a  vessel  moved  by  what  was  then  called 
the  fire-machine.  He  had  performed  the  double 
trip  from  New  York  to  Albany  and  from  Al- 
bany to  New  York  in  four  days,  and  had 
scarcely  attracted  the  notice  of  the  world,  the 
face  of  which  he  was  to  change  thirty  years 
later.  This  is  not  the  first  time  that  a  great 
invention,  due  to  second-rate  but  special  geni- 
uses, has  passed  before  the  eyes  of  superior 
geniuses,  without  exciting  their  attention. 
Gunpowder,  which,  destroying  the  empire  of 
physical  strength  in  war,  contributed  so  power- 
fully to  a  revolution  in  all  the  European  man- 
ners, was  not  only  odious  to  the  heroic  Bayard, 
but  excited  the  disdain  of  Machiavel,  that  most 
profound  judge  of  human  things,  that  author, 
so  admired  by  Napoleon,  of  the  treatise  on 
war,  and  was  considered  by  him  as  an  ephe- 
meral invention  and  of  no  consequence. 

Thinking  that  a  good  legislation  is,  with 
2u2 


366 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


[Aug.  1807. 


capitals  and  markets,  the  greatest  benefit  that 
can  be  conferred  on  commerce,  Napoleon  had 
ordered  the  arch-chancellor  Cambaceres  to  get 
a  commercial  code  prepared.  This  code  had, 
in  fact,  just  been  drawn  up.  The  groundwork 
of  it  had  been  borrowed  from  the  most  cele- 
brated maritime  nations,  and  the  simple  and 
analytical  form  from  French  intelligence,  which 
shone  more  than  ever  in  this  respect  in  the  di- 
gesting of  the  laws,  because,  conceived  on  a 
vast  and  uniform  plan,  and  their  composition 
carefully  revised  in  the  Council  of  State,  they 
were  never  retouched  by  the  Legislative  Body, 
vrhich  adopted  or  rejected  them  without  amend- 
ment. This  code,  completely  prepared  at  the 
moment  of  Napoleon's  return,  was  to  be  pre- 
sented, with  the  other  measures,  of  which  we 
have  just  been  treating,  to  the  Legislative 
Body,  in  the  short  session  for  which  prepara- 
tions were  making. 

It  was  time  that  Napoleon  should  at  length 
confer  on  his  glorious  soldiers  the  rewards 
•which  he  had  promised  them,  and  which  they 
had  so  richly  deserved  during  the  last  two 
campaigns.  But  it  was  in  the  very  form  of 
these  rewards  that  he  particularly  displayed 
his  organizing  and  mighty  genius.  He  was 
sure,  in  fact,  to  take  good  care  not  to  fling  to 
them  the  spoils  of  the  vanquished,  that  they 
might  consume  them  in  an  orgie.  He  pur- 
posed, with  what  he  should  give  them,  to 
found  great  families,  which  should  surround 
the  throne,  concur  in  defending  it,  contribute 
to  the  splendour  of  French  society,  without 
injuring  public  liberty,  and,  above  all,  with- 
out incurring  any  violation  of  the  principles 
of  equality  proclaimed  by  the  French  revolu- 
tion. Experience  has  proved  that  an  aris- 
tocracy is  not  prejudicial  to  the  liberty  of  a 
country ;  for  the  English  aristocracy  has  con- 
tributed not  less  than  the  other  classes  of  the 
nation  to  the  liberty  of  Great  Britain.  Reason, 
moreover,  tells  us  that  an  aristocracy  may  be 
compatible  with  the  principle  of  equality  on 
two  conditions :  in  the  first  place,  that  the 
members  who  compose  it  should  have  no  ex- 
clusive rights,  and  should  be  subject  in  all 
things  to  the  general  law ;  secondly,  that  the 
purely  honorary  distinctions  granted  to  one 
class  should  be  accessible  to  all  the  citizens 
of  the  same  State  who  have  earned  them  by 
their  services  or  their  talents.  So  much  as 
this  was  but  reasonable  in  the  wishes  of  the 
French  revolution,  and  this  it  was  that  Na- 
poleon purposed  to  maintain  invariably.  But 
in  our  opinion,  in  modern  societies,  in  which 
envy  has  risen  against  aristocratic  institutions, 
what  a  sensible  government  had  best  do  is  to 
leave  the  laws  of  human  nature  to  act,  with- 
out in  any  way  interfering  with  them.  They 
lead  back  the  free  man  to  God,  and,  next  to 
God,  to  another  worship,  that  of  ancestors. 
Whatever  we  may  do  or  not  do,  the  great  war- 
rior, the  great  magistrate,  the  illustrious  man 
of  science,  will  bequeath  to  their  descendants 
a  consideration  which  will  cause  them  to  be 
distinguished  from  the  multitude,  and  which, 
•when  they  have  merit,  will  spare  them  the 
most  serious  of  the  difficulties  that  merit  meets 
within  this  world,  that  of  attracting  the  first 
notice  of  the  public. 

The  laws  have  no  need  to  interfere  in  order 
thut  it  should  be  thus,  for  it  is  not  written  laws, 


it  is  Nature,  that  produces  the  aristocracy  in 
all  countries  and  especially  in  republics.  Na- 
ture had  created  the  aristocracy  of  Venice  long 
before  it  thought  of  attributing  exclusive  rights 
to  itself  by  laws.  It  is  a  thing  in  which  one 
ought  not  to  intermeddle,  whatever  inclination 
one  may  have  to  do  so.  Time  makes  aristocra- 
cies everywhere :  all  that  one  has  to  do  is  to 
avoid  the  ridicule  of  making  them  one's  self, 
and  at  most  to  prevent  their  being  tempted 
hereafter  to  arrogate  to  themselves  exclusive 
privileges.  t 

If,  however,  there  was  a  sovereign  in  the 
world  who  could  escape  the  ridicule  or  the  odi- 
um sometimes  excited  by  the  establishment  of 
aristocratic  institutions,  it  was  he  who  dared 
and  could  re-establish  monarchy  on  the  morrow 
of  the  Republic,  the  difference  of  ranks  (not 
that  of  rights)  on  the  morrow  of  a  brutal  equal- 
ity ;  who,  in  his  vast  imagination,  figured  to 
himself  a  society  great  as  his  genius  and  his 
soul ;  and  who  had  immortal  names  and  trea- 
sures for  the  creating  of  mighty  families ;  who 
could  call  them  Rivoli,  Castiglione,  Montebello, 
Elchingen,  Auerstadt,  and  give  them  an  annual 
revenue  of  not  less  than  a  million.  He  was 
therefore  excusable,  for  he  would  not  violate 
the  true  principles  of  the  French  revolution, 
and  he  thought,  on  the  contrary,  to  consecrate 
them  in  a  striking  manner,  by  making,  after 
the  image  of  his  own  fortune,  a  duke,  a  prince, 
out  of  a  child  of  the  plough.  Finally,  a  last 
consideration  here  presented  itself,  to  disarm 
the  most  austere  reason,  that  was  to  procure 
for  himself  the  innocent  and  inoffensive  means 
of  exciting  and  rewarding  eminent  services.1 

Napoleon  availed  himself,  therefore,  of  the 
glory  of  Tilsit,  and  of  the  spell  with  which  he  was 
surrounded  at  this  moment,  to  accomplish  the 
plan  which  he  had  long  meditated  of  instituting 
a  nobility.  Already,  in  1806,  when  he  had  given 
crowns  to  his  brothers,  to  his  sisters,  to  his 
adopted  sou,  principalities  to  several  of  his  ser- 
vants, that  of  Ponte  Corvo  to  Marshal  Bernu- 
dotte,  that  of  Benevente  to  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
that  of  Neufchatel  to  Major-general  Berthier, 
he  had  announced  that  a  posterior  statute 
should  prescribe  the  system  of  the  succession 
for  the  families  in  favour  of  whom  there  should 
be  created  principalities,  duchies,  and  other  dis- 
tinctions destined  to  be  hereditary.  In  conse- 
quence he  enacted  by  a  senatus  consults  that  the 
titles  conferred  by  him  as  well  as  the  revenues 
attached  to  those  titles  should  be  transmitted 
hereditarily  in  a  direct  line  from  male  to  male, 
contrariwise  to  the  system  of  succession  ad- 
mitted by  the  Civil  Code.  He  further  enacted 
that  the  dignitaries  of  the  Empire  of  all  de- 
grees might  transmit  to  their  eldest  son  a  title, 
which  should  be  that  of  duke,  count,  or  baron, 
according  to  the  dignity  of  the  father,  on  con- 
dition of  having  given  proof  of  a  certain  reve- 
nue, at  least  one-third  of  which  must  remain 
attached  to  the  title  conferred  on  the  descend- 
ants. These  same  personages  had  also  the 
right  of  constituting  for  their  younger  sons 
titles  always  inferior  to  those  which  should 
have  been  granted  to  the  eldest,  and  always  on 


»  These  lilies  were  written  in  1846,  under  the  monarchy. 
I  wrote  them  because  I  believed  them  to  be  true  in  all 
times.  I  shall  not  alter  them,  therefore,  though  times  ar« 
changed. 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


3G7 


condition  of  setting  aside  out  of  their  fortune 
a  part  which  should  be  the  hereditary  accom- 
paniment of  those  titles.  Such  was  the  origin 
of  the  majorats.  'The  grand  dignitaries,  as  the 
grand-elector,  the  constable,  the  arch-chancel- 
lor, the  irch-treasurer,  were  to  have  the  title 
of  highness.  Their  eldest  sons  were  to  have  the 
title  of  dukes,  if  their  father  had  instituted  in 
their  favour  a  majorat  with  a  revenue  of  200,000 
livres.  The  ministers,  the  senators,  the  coun- 
cillors of  State,  the  presidents  of  the  Legislative 
Body,  the  archbishops,  were  authorized  to  take 
the  title  of  count  and  to  transmit  that  title  to 
their  sons  or  nephews,  on  condition  of  a  majo- 
rat with  a  revenue  of  30,000  livres.  Lastly, 
the  presidents  of  the  electoral  colleges  for  life, 
the  first  presidents  procureurs  generaux,  and 
bishops,  the  maires  of  the  thirty-seven  good 
cities  of  the  Empire,  were  authorized  to  take 
the  title  of  barons,  and  to  transmit  it  to  their 
eldest  sons  on  condition  of  a  majorat  with  a  re- 
veliue  of  15,000  livres.  The  plain  members  of 
the  Legion  of  Honour  might  call  themselves 
chevaliers,  and  transmit  that  title  on  condition 
of  a  majorat  with  a  revenue  of  3000  livres. 
Another  statute  was  to  determine  the  conditions 
to  which  these  portions  of  the  fortune  of  the 
families  thus  placed  under  an  exceptional  go- 
vernment were  to  be  subject* 

Here,  again,  it  was  the  Senate  that  received 
the  commission  to  stamp  a  legal  character  on 
this  new  imperial  creation  by  means  of  a  sena- 
ttu  consulte,  which  most  expressly  stipulated 
that  these  titles  should  not  confer  any  particu- 
lar right,  or  form  any  exception  to  the  com- 
mon law,  or  give  any  exemption  from  the 
charges  or  duties  imposed  on  other  citizens. 
There  was  nothing  exceptional  but  the  system 
of  the  substitutions  imposed  on  the  ennobled 
families,  which  acquired  their  new  greatness 
by  sacrificing  for  themselves  the  equal  sharing 
of  inheritances. 

These  dispositions  being  decreed,  Napoleon 
distributed  among  his  companions  in  arms  part 
of  the  treasures  amassed  by  his  genius.  While 
•waiting  till  he  had  decreed  to  Lannes,  Massena, 
Davout,  Berthier,  Ney,  and  others,  the  titles 
•which  he  purposed  to  borrow  from  the  great 
events  of  his  reign,  he  resolved  to  insure  their 
opulence  to  them  immediately.  He  gave  them 
estates  situated  in  Poland,  in  Germany,  in 
Italy,  with  power  to  sell  them,  and  to  invest 
the  produce  in  France,  besides  sums  in  ready 
money  to  buy  and  furnish  hotels.  This  was 
only  a  first  gift,  for  these  assignments  were 
afterwards  doubled,  trebled,  and  even  quad- 
rupled, some  of  them.  Marshal  Lannes  re- 
ceived a  revenue  of  328,000  francs,  and  a  mil- 
lion of  ready  money ;  Marshal  Davout  a  reve- 
nue of  410,000  francs,  and  300,000  francs  in 
money ;  Marshal  Massena  a  revenue  of  183,000 
francs,  and  200,000  francs  in  money,  (he  was 
afterwards  one  of  the  most  richly  endowed;) 
Major-general  Berthier  a  revenue  of  405,000 
francs,  and  500,000  francs  in  money  ;  Marshal 
Ney  a  revenue  of  229,000  francs,  and  300,000 
francs  in  money ;  Marshal  Mortier  a  revenue 
of  198,000  francs,  and  200,000  francs  in  mo- 
ney ;  Marshal  Soult  a  revenue  of  305,000 
francs,  and  300,000  francs  in  money ;  Marshal 
Augereau  a  revenue  of  172,000  francs,  and 
200,000  francs  in  money ;  Marshal  Bernadotte 
a  revenue  of  291,000  francs,  and  200,000 1 


francs  in  money.  Generals  Sebastiani,  Victor, 
Rapp,  Junot,  Bertrand,  Lemarrois,  Caulain- 
:  court,  Savary,  Mouton,  Moncey,  Friand,  St. 
Hilaire,  Oudinot,  Lauriston,  Gudin,  Marchand, 
Marmont,  Dupont,  Legrand,  Suchet,  Laribois- 
siere,  Loison,  Reille,  Nansouty,  Songy,  Chas- 
seloup,  and  others,  received,  some  a  revenue 
of  150,  others  100,  80,  50  thousand  francs,  and 
almost  all  100,000  francs  in  money.  The  civi- 
lians also  had  their  share  in  these  largesses. 
The  Arch-chancellor  Cambace"res  and  the 
Arch-treasurer  Lebrun  obtained  each  a  reve- 
nue of  200,000  francs.  Messrs.  Mollien, 
Fouche",  Decres,  Gaudin,  Daru,  obtained  each 
40  or  50  thousand.  All,  civil  and  military, 
were  only  provided  for  ad  interim  by  these  mag- 
nificent gifts,  and  were  so  in  Poland,  in  West- 
phalia, in  Hanover,  which  must  interest  them 
in  upholding  the  greatness  of  the  Empire.  Na- 
poleon had  reserved  for  himself  in  Poland 
domains  to  the  amount  of  20  millions,  in 
Hanover  of  30,  in  Westphalia  a  capital  repre- 
sented by  a  revenue  of  5  or  6  millions,  inde- 
pendently of  30  millions  in  capital,  and  of  an 
income  of  1,250,000  francs  in  Italy,  already 
reserved  in  1805.  He  had,  therefore,  where- 
withal to  enrich  the  brave  men  who  served 
him  and  to  fulfil  the  fair  promises  which  he 
had  addressed  to  several  of  them.  "  Pillage 
not,"  said  he ;  "  I  will  give  you  more  than  you 
would  take ;  and  what  I  shall  give  you, 
amassed  by  my  foresight,  will  not  cost  your 
honour  or  the  nations  we  have  conquered  any 
thing."  And  he  said  truly,  for  the  domains 
which  he  distributed  were  imperial  domains  in 
Italy,  royal  or  grand-ducal  in  Prussia,  in  Han- 
over, in  Westphalia.  But  these  domains,  won 
by  victory,  might  be  lost  by  defeat;  and,  for- 
tunately for  them,  those  who  were  so  mag- 
nificently endowed  were  mostly  to  receive  in 
France,  either  on  the  rentes  or  the  canals,  other 
assignments,  less  exposed  to  the  risk  of  events 
than  lands  situated  abroad. 

The  French  generals  were  not  the  only  par- 
ticipators in  these  largess,  for  the  Polish 
generals  Zayonsheck  and  Dombrowski,  old 
servants  of  France,  obtained  each  a  million. 

After  the  generals,  the  officers  and  soldiers 
also  received  marks  of  his  liberality.  Napoleon 
ordered  all  of  them  to  be  paid,  besides  the  pay 
in  arrear,  considerable  gratuities,  in  order  to 
procure  for  them  immediately  a  few  pleasures, 
which  they  had  well  earned.  Eighteen  millions 
were  distributed  under  this  form,  6  millions 
among  the  officers,  12  among  the  soldiers. 
The  wounded  had  a  treble  sum.  Those  who 
had  been  fortunate  enough  to  be  present. at 
the  four  great  battles  of  the  late  war,  Auster- 
litz,  Jena,  Eylau,  and  Friedland,  obtained 
twice  as  much  as  the  others.  To  these  gra- 
tuities of  the  moment  were  added  permanent 
assignments  of  500  francs  for  the  soldiers  who 
had  lost  a  limb,  and  of  1000,  2000,  4000,  5000, 
10,000,  in  favour  of  those  officers  who  had 
distinguished  themselves,  from  the  rank  of  sub- 
officer  to  that  of  colonel.  For  the  officers,  aa 
for  the  generals,  this  was  but  a  first  remunera- 
tion, followed  subsequently  by  others  moro 
considerable,  and  independent  of  the  salaries 
of  the  Legion  jf  Honour,  as  well  as  the  retir- 
ing pensions  legally  due  at  the  end  of  tho 
military  career. 

This  glorious  conqueror,  therefore,  designed 


J68 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Aug.  1807. 


that  everybody  should  participate  in  his  pros- 
perity as  in  his  glory.  As  for  himself,  simple, 
frugal,  magnificent  for  others  only,  repressing 
the  slightest  misapplication  of  the  public  mo- 
ney, unmerciful  for  any  expense  which  seemed 
to  him  unnecessary  in  his  palace  or  in  the 
State,  he  was  prodigal  only  with  noble  views, 
and  towards  all  who  had  contributed  to  the 
greatness  of  France  or  to  his  own.  The  slan- 
derers of  his  glory  and  of  ours  have  alleged 
that,  in  despoiling  the  vanquished,  in  glutting 
the  greediness  of  his  soldiers,  he  had  taken 
from  the  one  the  means  of  exalting  the  bravery 
of  the  others.  We  must  leave  such  calumnies 
to  foreigners,  or  to  parties  associated  with 
foreigners.  These  treasures  were  taken  not 
from  the  people,  but  from  emperors,  kings, 
princes,  convents,  leagued  against  France  ever 
since  1792.  As  for  the  vanquished  people, 
they  were  spared  as  much  as  the  war  allowed 
them  to  be,  much  more  than  they  had  been 
spared  in  any  times  and  in  any  country,  much 
more  than  we  have  been  ourselves.  And,  as 
for  those  heroic  soldiers,  whose  value  Napoleon 
is  said  to  have  stimulated  with  money,  they 
had  no  more  idea  that,  in  running  to  Auster- 
litz,  to  Jena,  to  Eylau,  to  Friedland,  they 
should  meet  with  Fortune  by  the  way,  than 
they  expected  it  in  running  to  Marengo,  to 
Rivoli,  and  at  an  earlier  period  to  Valmy  or 
to  Jemmapes.  After  flying  to  the  defence  of 
their  country  in  1792,  they  now  dashed  on  to 
glory,  impelled  by  the  passion  for  great  things, 
a  passion  which  the  French  revolution  had  be- 
gotten in  them,  and  which  Napoleon  had  in- 
flamed to  the  highest  degree.  If,  on  the  mor- 
row of  a  long  perseverance  in  defying  cold, 
hunger,  death,  they  found  competence,  it  was 
a  surprise  of  Fortune's  which  they  enjoyed,  as 
a  soldier  enjoys  a  little  gold  found  on  a  field 
of  battle ;  and  these  gratifications  which  had 
been  contrived  for  them,  they  were  ready  to 
leave  afresh,  to  expend  again  that  life  which 
they  considered  as  not  their  own,  and  which 
they  hastened  to  use  as  a  loan  made  to  them 
by  Napoleon,  till  he  should  demand  from  them 
the  sacrifice  of  it. 

Napoleon  took  other  measures  as  wise  as  they 
were  humane.  He  ordered,  according  to  his 
custom  in  every  interval  of  peace,  several  re- 
views of  the  army,  one  after  another,  to  with- 
draw from  the  ranks  soldiers  who  were  worn 
out  or  mutilated,  and  fit  for  no  other  service 
than  to  stimulate  the  young  soldiers  by  their 
military  stories.  He  caused  their  pension  to  be 
settled  and  their  places  in  the  ranks  to  be  filled 
up  by  conscripts,  repeating  incessantly  that  the 
Treasury  of  the  army  was  not  rich  enough  to 
pay  for  all  old  services,  neither  was  the  budget 
of  the  State  to  pay  soldiers  who  could  not  serve 
actively.  Thinking  of  civil  merits  as  well  as 
of  military  merits,  he  demanded  and  obtained 
a  modification  of  the  law  of  civil  pensions,  a 
law  which,  ever  since  1789,  had  varied  as  much 
under  the  influence  of  popular  caprice  as  re- 
wards varied  before  that  period  under  the  influ- 
ence of  royal  caprice.  At  the  time  of  the  Con- 
stituent Assembly,  the  limit  adopted  for  the 
very  highest  civil  pension  was  10,000  francs,  in 
the  time  of  the  Convention  3000,  in  the  time  of 
the  Consulate  6000.  Napoleon  wished  that 
limit  to  be  fixed  at  20,000,  proposing  to  himself 
not  to  approach,  not  to  come  up  to  it,  unless  in 


favour  of  signal  services.  It  was  the  death  of 
M.  Portalis,  leaving  a  widow  without  fortune, 
which  suggested  this  idea,  attended  with  little 
danger  to  the  finances  of  a  State,  and  useful 
for  the  development  of  talents.  He  granted  a 
pension  of  6000  francs  and  a  sum  of  24,000 
francs  to  Mademoiselle  Dillon,  sister  of  the  first 
officer  murdered  in  our  popular  disturbances. 
The  mother  of  the  empress,  Madame  de  la  Pa- 
gerie,  having  died  at  Martinique,  he  ordered 
the  negroes  and  the  negresses  who  had  served 
her  to  be  set  at  liberty,  a  dowry  to  be  given  to 
a  young  woman  who  had  nursed  her,  and  in 
short  placed  in  comfort  all  who  had  had  the 
honour  to  approach  her. 

The  Church,  as  well  as  all  the  servants  of  the 
State,  had  a  share  in  the  munificence  of  the 
conqueror.  On  the  proposal  of  Prince  Camba- 
ce"res,  who  had  acted  ad  interim  as  minister  of 
the  cultes,  during  the  interval  between  the  death 
of  M.  Portalis  and  the  appointment  of  M.  Bigot 
de  Preameneu,  he  decided  that  the  number  of 
chapels  of  ease  (succursaks)  should  be  increased 
from  24  to  30  thousand,  in  order  to  extend  the 
benefit  of  divine  service  to  all  the  communes  in 
the  Empire.  Perceiving,  moreover,  that  the 
career  of  the  priesthood  was  in  less  request 
than  formerly,  he  granted  2400  exhibitions  for 
the  small  seminaries.  He  wished  to  make 
known  to  the  Church  that  if  there  were  some 
differences  of  a  purely  temporal  nature  with  its 
head,  in  regard  to  spirituals  he  was  always 
equally  disposed  to  serve  and  to  protect  him. 
At  this  moment  he  was  engaged  with  the  exe- 
cution of  the  law  of  1806,  which  authorized  him 
to  create  a  university  out  of  the  foundation  of 
that  great  establishment.  But  this  idea  waa 
not  yet  mature  either  with  him  or  around  him. 
For  the  present  he  was  content  with  increasing 
the  number  of  the  exhibitions  in  the  lyceums. 

While  he  was  thinking  so  much  about  others, 
he  nevertheless  lent  himself  to  a  measure  which 
seemed  to  interest  his  personal  glory  alone. 
He  consented,  agreeably  to  a  wish,  excited  by 
sincere  attachment  in  some,  by  adulation  in 
others,  to  change  the  title  of  the  Civic  Code, 
and  to  call  it  the  Napoleon  Code.  Assuredly 
if  ever  title  was  merited,  it  was  this ;  for  that 
Code  was  as  much  the  work  of  Napoleon  as  the 
victory  of  Austerlitz  and  Jena.  At  Austerlitz, 
at  Jena,  he  had  had  soldiers,  who  had  lent  him 
their  arms,  as  he  had  lawyers  who  lent  him 
their  knowledge  in  the  digesting  of  that  Code ; 
but  to  the  force  of  his  will,  to  the  soundness 
of  his  judgment,  was  owing  the  completion  of 
that  great  work.  And  if  Justinian,  who,  ac- 
cording to  an  expression  in  the  exposition  of 
his  motives,  "  fought  by  his  generals,  thought 
by  his  ministers,"  had  a  right  to  give  his  name 
to  the  code  of  the  Roman  laws,  Napoleon  had 
a  greatef  right  to  give  his  to  the  code  of  the 
French  laws.  Besides,  the  memory  of  a  great 
man  protects  good  laws,  and  good  laws  protect 
the  memory  of  a  great  man.  Nothing,  there- 
fore, was  more  just  than  this  measure,  and  it 
was  conceived,  proposed,  and  cordially  adopted, 
almost  without  leaving  Napoleon  the  trouble  of 
wishing,  or  asking  for  it.  At  the  same  time, 
Napoleon  wrote  to  his-  brothers  and  to  the 
princes  under  his  influence,  to  persuade  them 
to  introduce  into  their  States  this  code  of  jus- 
tice and  civil  equality.  He  had  prescribed  ita 
adoption  throughout  all  Italy.  He  enjoined  his 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


369 


brother  Louis  to  adopt  it  in  Holland,  and  his 
brother  Jerome  to  adopt  it  in  Westphalia.  He 
invited  the  King  of  Saxony,  Grand-duke  of  War- 
saw, to  put  it  in  force  in  restored  Poland.  It 
was  already  studied  in  Germany,  and  in  spite 
of  the  repugnance  which  that  country  must 
then  have  felt  to  receive  any  thing  coming  from 
France,  all  hearts  there  were  attracted  by  the 
equity  of  a  code,  which,  besides  its  precision, 
its  clearness,  its  consistency,  had  the  advantage 
of  re-establishing  justice  in  families,  and  put- 
ting an  end  to  feudal  tyranny  in  them.  At 
Hamburg,  the  Civil  Code  had  been  called  for  by 
the  wish  of  the  population.  It  began  to  be 
acted  upon  in  Dantzig.  It  was  announced  that 
the  same  would  be  the  case  at  Bremen  and  in 
the  Hanseatic  cities.  The  prince  primate,  in 
his  principality  of  Frankfort,  the  King  of  Bava- 
ria, in  his  aggrandized  monarchy,  had  enjoined 
the  study  of  it.  in  order  to  introduce  it  into  the 
minds  of  their  subjects  before  introducing  it 
into  practice.  The  Grand-duke  of  Baden  had 
just  admitted  it  into  his  duchy.  Thus  France 
indemnified  humanity  for  the  blood  spilt  in  war, 
and  made  some  compensation  for  the  injury 
done  to  the  present  generation  by  an  immense 
benefit  insured  to  future  generations. 

All  sorts  of  glory  would  be  in  vain  dispensed 
by  Providence  to  a  nation,  if  that  nation  had 
the  keen  regret  to  conceive  that  the  glory  of 
letters,  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  was  refused 
it ;  and,  if  the  Romans  had  had  no  other  merit 
than  that  of  conquering  the  world,  of  civilizing 
after  they  had  conquered  itr  of  giving  it  im- 
mortal laws,  which,  adapted  to  our  manners, 
still  live  in  our  codes ;  if  they  had  but  this 
eminent  merit  ;  if  they  had  not  numbered 
among  their  great  men  Horace,  Virgil,  Cicero, 
Tacitus,  done  nothing  to  charm  mankind,  after 
having  done  every  thing  to  domineer  over  it, 
they  would  have  left  the  Greeks  the  honour  of 
being  its  delight,  and  they  would  occupy  in  the 
annals  of  the  human  mind  a  lower  place  than 
that  small  nation.  But  the  genius  of  govern- 
ment and  war  never  exists  without  the  genius 
of  letters,  and  of  the  arts  and  sciences,  because 
it  is  impossible  to  act  without  thinking,  and  to 
think  without  speaking,  writing,  and  painting. 

France,  which  has  shed  so  much  generous 
blood  on  all  the  battle-fields  of  Europe, — 
France  has  also  had  this  double  glory,  and 
while  she  won  the  victories  of  the  Downs  and 
of  Rocroy,  she  created  the  Cid  and  Athalie,  she 
had  Conde"  and  Bossuet  to  celebrate  Conde1.  | 
Napoleon  in  his  immense  desire  to  be  great, 
but  to  be  so  with  France  and  through  France, 
would  also  have  been  glad  that  she  should  have 
under  his  government  all  sorts  of  crowns,  those 
of  intelligence  as  well  as  those  of  power,  and 
not  renounce  the  glory  of  producing  men  of  I 
letters,  men  of  science,  painters,  as  he  pro- 
duced heroes.  But  the  will  can  do  every  thing 
among  men,  except  changing  the  times,  and 
the  times  have  a  greater  influence  over  the 
genius  of  nations  than  all  the  will  of  govern- 
ments. Charlemagne,  great  as  he  was,  smitten 
as  he  showed  himself  to  be  with  the  noblest 
studies,  could  not  fertilize  a  barbarous  age. 
St.  Louis  XIV.  while  admiring  genius  some- 
times without  comprehending  it,  sometimes 
maltreating  it,  had  only  to  allow  it  to  act  in 
order  to  have  around  him  the  finest  spectacle 
that  the  human  mind  ever  exhibited,  for  never 
VOL.  IL— 47 


did  it  produce  works  so  grand  and  so  perfect. 
Napoleon  would  have  had  the  time,  which  he 
wanted  through  his  own  fault,  which  would 
have  restored  the  French  nation  that  youth  of 
intellect  which  produces  a  Cid  and  an  Athalie ; 
and  he  would  certainly  have  refused  it  a  liberty 
which  creates  Ciceros  and  Sallusts  when  it 
exists,  Tacituses  when  it  has  ceased  to  exist. 

France,  from  1789  to  1814,  eminent  in  the 
sciences,  fancying  that  she  was  so  in  the  arts 
of  design,  even  nattered  herself  that  she  was 
eminent  in  letters.  In  these  sciences,  three 
savants,  illustrious  for  their  vast  and  noble 
works,  insured  a  durable  glory  to  the  period 
in  which  they  lived.  M.  Lagrange,  by  pushing 
the  Algebraic  sciences  beyond  their  former 
limits,  gave  a  new  power  to  abstract  calcula- 
tion. M.  de  Laplace,  applying  this  power  to 
the  universe,  did  the  only  thing  which,  after 
Galileo,  Descartes,  Kepler,  Copernicus,  and 
Newton,  was  left  to  be  accomplished ;  this  waa 
to  calculate  with  a  precision  till  then  unknown 
the  movements  of  the  celestial  bodies,  and  to 
display  in  its  sublime  totality  the  system  of  the 
world.  Lastly,  M.  Cuvier,  applying  cool  and 
patient  observation  to  the  wrecks  with  which 
our  planet  is  covered,  studying,  comparing 
together,  the  relics  of  the  animals  and  plants, 
buried  in  the  ground,  discovered  the  succession 
of  time  in  that  of  those  beings ;  and  in  creating 
the  ingenious  science  of  comparative  anatomy, 
rendered  positive  that  fine  history  of  the  earth 
which  Buffon  had  conjectured  by  an  effort  of 
genius,  and  left  conjectural  for  want  of  facts 
sufficiently  observed  at  the  period  in  which  he 
lived. 

In  the  arts  of  design  a  reaction,  estimable 
for  the  intention,  had  taken  place  against  the 
tastes  of  the  eighteenth  century.  During  that 
effeminate  and  philosophic  age,  Boucher,  the 
adored  painter  of  the  Regency,  had,  with  light 
hand,  sketched  upon  the  canvas  licentious 
courtesans,  remarkable  not  for  beauty  but  for 
a  certain  lascivious  gracefulness.  Greuze,  with 
chaster  inspirations,  had  opposed  to  them 
charming  virgins,  painted  with  a  soft  and  deli- 
cate pencil.  But  the  art,  debased  by  Boucher, 
had  not  been  raised  again  by  Greuze  to  the 
dignity  of  style,  which,  in  default  of  genius, 
Poussin  had  preserved  to  it.  It  has  been 
granted  but  once  to  a  nation  to  display  to  the 
world  the  genius  of  a  Michael  Angelo  and  a 
Raphael ;  but  all,  when  they  practise  the  arts, 
ought  to  aspire  at  least  to  correctness,  to  noble- 
ness of  design,  and  can  attain  it  by  severe 
study.  This  it  was  that  David,  the  celebrated 
painter,  accomplished.  Disgusted  with  the 
character  of  the  art,  at  the  time  of  his  youth, 
he  went  to  Rome,  was  smitten  there  by  the 
touching,  picturesque,  and  sublime  beauty  of 
the  masters  of  the  Italian  school,  and,  his 
passion  for  the  beautiful  increasing  gradually, 
he  had  raised  himt-elf  to  a  level  with  the 
Italians  of  the  fifteenth  century,  with  the 
ancients  themselves  ;  and,  instead  of  the 
courtesans  of  Boucher,  or  the  modest  young 
females  of  Greuze,  he  had  sketched  on  canvas 
antique  statues,  elegant  but  stiff,  destitute  of 
life,  even  of  colour ;  and  in  acquiring  a  better 
style  of  drawing  had  lost  that  facility  and 
brilliancy  of  pencil  which  still  distinguished 
Boucher  and  Greuze.  It  was  a  school  of  imi- 
tation, grave,  noble,  and  without  genius.  On« 


370 


HISTORY  OF   TH3 


painter,  however,  M.  Gros,  escaped  from  the 
imitation  of  antique  basso-relievos  by  painting 
battles.  Faulty  in  design,  mediocre  in  com- 
position, but  excited  by  the  spectacle  of  the 
time,  and  hurried  away  by  a  certain  natural 
passion,  he  flung  upon  the  canvas  images  which 
•will  live  probably  from  a  certain  force  of  exe- 
oution  and  a  certain  brilliancy  of  colour.  It  is 
the  style  which  insures  the  duration  of  works 
of  the  mind ;  it  is  that  which  insures  the 
duration  of  works  of  art,  because  it  is  not  the 
only  sign  of  inspiration,  but  the  loftiest,  the 
most  constant.  Another  painter,  M.  Prudhon, 
by  imitating  Correggio,  from  a  natural  taste 
for  grace,  exhibited  some  appearance  of  ori- 
ginality at  a  time  when  an  artist,  if  he  did  not 
paint  Leonidases  and  Brutuses,  was  obliged  to 
paint  the  grenadiers  of  the  imperial  guard. 
But  neither  M.  Gros  nor  M.  Prudhon,  to  whom 
the  succeeding  age  has  done  more  justice, 
excited  so  much  enthusiasm  as  David,  Girodet, 
Gerard.  France  imagined  that  she  possessed 
in  them  nearly  equals  to  the  great  masters  of 
Italy — singular  and  honourable  illusion  of  a 
nation  captivated  with  all  sorts  of  glory,  as- 
piring to  possess  them  all,  and  applauding 
even  mediocrity  in  the  hope  of  calling  forth 
genius ! 

In  literature  France  was  still  further  from 
real  superiority.  But,  an  exquisite  judge  in 
this  matter,  she  did  not  deceive  herself.  A  sort 
of  inertness,  by  no  means  usual,  had  then  seized 
the  national  genius.  In  the  seventeenth  cen- 
tury France,  arrayed  in  all  the  brilliancy  of 
youth  and  glory,  had  been  seen  excelling  in  the 
highest  degree  in  the  tragic  representation  of 
the  passions  of  man,  and  in  the  comic  repre- 
sentation of  his  oddities,  giving  lustre  to  the 
pulpit  by  a  grave,  energetic,  sublime  eloquence, 
unknown  to  the  world,  which  has  never  heard 
it,  which  will  never  hear  it,  again.  She  had 
been  seen  in  the  eighteenth  century  suddenly 
changing  her  taste,  her  genius,  her  creed,  for- 
saking art  for  polemics,  attacking  the  altar,  the 
throne,  all  the  social  institutions,  acrimonious, 
vehement,  immortal  too  in  the  literature  which 
occupies  itself  in  depicting  the  human  heart. 
She  had  thus  been  seen  varying  to  infinity  the 
productions  of  her  understanding,  never  ex- 
hausted like  that  spring  at  which  the  ancients 
represented  genius  slaking  its  thirst  and  which 
poured  forth  upon  the  world  a  perpetual  stream. 
But  nil  at  once,  after  an  immense  revolution, 
the  most  humane  in  its  object,  the  most  terrible 
in  its  means,  the  most  vast  in  its  consequences, 
the  genius  of  France,  which  had  desired,  called, 
and  produced  it,  appeared  surprised,  agitated, 
terrified  at  its  own  works,  and  as  it  were  ex- 
hausted. French  literature  subsequently  to  the 
Revolution  of  1789,  notwithstanding  the  in- 
fluence of  Napoleon,  remained  null  and  devoid 
of  inspiration.  Tragedy,  which  had  already 
declined  much,  when  Voltaire  depicted  in  his 
"Zaire"  the  conflicts  of  religion  and  love,  crept 
along,  sometimes  applying  to  Greece  sometimes 
to  England,  sometimes  to  Sophocles  sometimes 
to  Shakspeare,  for  inspirations,  for  which  it  is 
better  to  look  to  Nature,  which  never  come  when 
they  are  sought,  for  genius  truly  inspired  has 
no  need  of  extraneous  excitement.  Its  own 
plenitude  is  sufficient  for  it.  M.  Chenier  imi- 
tated, in  a  pure  and  noble  style,  the  Greek  tra- 
gedy ;  M.  Ducis,  in  an  incorrect  and  touching 


[Aug.  ISO/. 


|  style,  the  English  tragedy.  Comedy,  of  which 
M.  Picard  was  then  the  most  renowned  conti- 
nuator  in  France,  depicted  without  depth  but 
with  some  humour  undecided  characters,  the 
great  characters  having  been  drawn  for  ever 
by  Moliere  and  by  one  or  two  of  his  disciples. 
The  pulpit  having  lost  its  authority,  the  tribune 
was  mute.  There  was  no  other  eloquence  but 
that  of  M.  Regnault,  expounding,  in  a  brilliant 
and  easy  style,  the  petty  affairs  of  the  time, 
and  that  of  M.  Fontanes,  expressing  sometimes 
at  the  head  of  the  bodies  of  the  State,  and  in  a 
correct,  elegant,  and  noble  style,  grand  from 
the  greatness  of  the  events  rather  than  from 
that  of  the  historian,  the  admiration  of  France 
for  the  prodigies  of  the  imperial  reign.  His- 
tory, in  short,  wanted  liberty,  wanted  expe- 
rience, and  had  not  yet  contracted  that  taste 
for  research  by  which  it  has  since  been  dis- 
tinguished. 

French  literature  did  not  recover  a  genuine 
originality,  a  touching  eloquence,  till  M.  de 
Chateaubriand,  celebrating  the  days  of  yore, 
addressed  himself,  as  we  have  elsewhere  ob- 
served, to  that  true  melancholy  of  the  human 
heart,  which  always  regrets  the  past,  whatever 
it  may  be,  how  unworthy  soever  of  regret,  solely 
because  it  no  longer  exists.  The  age,  however, 
had  an  immortal  writer,  immortal  as  Csesar: 
this  was  the  sovereign  himself,  a  great  writer, 
because  he  was  a  great  genius,  an  inspired  ora- 
tor in  his  proclamations,  the  bard  of  his  own 
exploits  in  his  bulletins,  a  powerful  demonstra- 
tor in  a  multitude  of  notes  which  emanated 
from  him,  in  articles  inserted  in  the  Moniteur, 
in  letters  written  to  his  agents,  which  will,  no 
doubt,  appear  some  day,  and  which  will  astonish 
the  world  as  much  as  it  has  been  astonished  by 
his  actions.  High-coloured  when  he  painted, 
clear,  precise,  vehement,  imperious  when  he 
demonstrated,  he  was  always  simple  as  befitted 
the  serious  part  assigned  to  him  by  Providence, 
but  sometimes  rather  declamatory,  from  the 
remnant  of  a  habit  peculiar  to  all  the  children 
of  the  French  revolution.  Singular  destiny  of 
that  prodigious  man  to  be  the  greatest  writer 
•of  his  time,  while  he  was  its  greatest  captain, 
its  greatest  legislator,  its  greatest  administra- 
tor. The  nation  having,  on  a  day  of  fatigue, 
relinquished  to  him  the  trouble  of  willing,  or- 
dering, thinking  for  all,  had,  in  some  measure, 
by  the  same  privilege,  conceded  to  him  the  gift 
of  speaking,  of  writing,  better  than  all. 

Already  at  that  period,  in  that  restless  agi- 
tation of  an  antiquated  literature,  which  seeks 
inspirations  everywhere,  a  double  literary  ten- 
dency became  observable.  Some  were  for  going 
back  to  the  seventeenth  century  and  to  anti- 
quity, as  to  the  source  of  all  beauty ;  others 
proposed  to  solicit  from  England,  from  Ger- 
many, the  secret  of  stronger  emotions — puny 
efforts  of  the  spirit  of  imitation,  which  changes 
its  object,  without  attaining  the  originality  that 
is  refused  it!  Napoleon,  from  a  natural  taste 
for  the  purely  beautiful,  and  from  an  instinct 
of  nationality,  repulsed  these  new  attempts, 
extolled  Racine,  Bossuet,  Moliere,  and  the  an- 
cients along  with  them,  and  strove  to  make 
classic  studies  flourish  in  the  University.  At 
length,  seeking  to  act  powerfully  on  the  public 
mind,  he  devised  a  means,  in  his  opinion  the 
most  efficacious,  for  producing  good  works, 
which  was  to  give  reputation,  to  give  it  justly, 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


371 


greatly,  with  authority.  In  a  free  country, 
thousands  of  writers  engaged  in  criticism,  en- 
lightened or  ignorant,  just  or  passionate,  honest 
or  base,  discuss  the  works  of  mind,  and  then, 
after  a  vain  clamour,  are  succeeded  by  Time, 
which  decides  in  at  once  the  mildest  and  the 
surest  manner,  by  taking  no  notice  of  certain 
works,  by  continuing  to  speak  of  certain  others. 
But,  in  granting  to  literature  the  freedom  of 
discussion,  Napoleon  was  not  resolved  to  permit 
it  entire  even  for  that ;  and,  as  for  Time,  he 
was  too  impatient  to  await  its  decisions.  He 
conceived,  therefore,  the  idea  of  applying  to 
each  class  of  the  Institute  for  thoroughly  di- 
gested reports  on  the  progress  of  literature  and 
the  arts  and  sciences  since  1789,  specifying  the 
good  or  bad  tendencies,  the  distinguished  or 
indifferent  works,  and  awarding  praise  or  cen- 
«ure  with  strict  impartiality.  The  reports  were 
to  be  discussed  by  each  of  the  classes,  that  they 
might  have  the  authority  of  an  arret,  presented 
by  one  of  the  eminent  men  of  the  time,  and  read 
before  the  Emperor  in  the  Council  of  State,  thus 
judging  from  the  throne,  and  encouraging  the 
works  of  French  genius  by  this  solemn  attention. 

In  consequence,  M.  Chenier  came  to  read  be- 
fore Napoleon,  and  in  a  meeting  of  the  Council 
of  State,  a  simple,  firm,  dignified  report  on  the 
progress  of  literature  since  1789.  When  the 
reading  was  finished,  Napoleon  answered  M. 
Chenier  in  these  beautiful  words : 

"Gentlemen  deputies  of  the  second  class  of 
the  Institute,  if  the  French  language  is  become 
a  universal  language,  it  is  to  the  men  of  genius 
who  have  sat  or  who  still  sit  among  you  that 
we  are  indebted  for  this. 

"I  attach  a  value  to  the  success  of  your  la- 
bours ;  they  tend  to  enlighten  my  people,  and  are 
necessary  to  the  glory  of  my  crown.  I  have  heard 
with  satisfaction  the  report  that  you  have  just 
made  to  me.  You  may  rely  on  my  protection." 

When  governments  will  interfere  in  the  works 
of  the  human  mind,  it  is  in  this  lofty  style  that 
they  ought  to  do  so ;  and,  moreover,  to  this 
manner  of  distributing  glory  by  a  decision  of 
the  public  authority  Napoleon  added  a  munifi- 
cence, numerous  instances  of  which  we  have 
already  cited,  and  the  most  efficacious  of  all' 
encouragements,  the  approbation  of  genius.  In 
other  sittings,  he  heard  M.  Cuvier  make  a  re- 
port on  the  progress  of  the  sciences,  M.  Dacier 
on  that  of  historical  researches,  and  succes- 
sively the  representatives  of  all  the  classes  on 
the  subjects  which  concerned  them.  Desirous 
of  giving  to  the  arts  of  design  a  not  less  signal 
mark  of  attention,  he  went  himself  with  the 
Empress,  and  part  of  his  court,  to  the  studio 
of  David  the  painter,  to  inspect  the  picture  of 
the  Coronation,  and,  after  viewing  it,  to  address 
to  him  the  most  flattering  expressions. 

Such  were  the  occupations  of  Napoleon  after 
his  return  from  Tilsit ;  such  is  also  the  specta- 
cle which  France  exhibited  during  his  reign, 
either  from  the  effect  of  circumstances,  or  from 
the  personal  influence  which  he  exercised  over 
her.  Most  of  the  resolutions  which  he  had  just 
taken  could  not  dispense  with  the  concurrence 
of  the  legislative  power.  It  was  more  than  a 
year  since  it  had  met,  and  he  was  impatient  to 
assemble  it,  as  much  to  present  to  it  the  finance 
laws,  the  code  of  commerce,  the  laws  relative 
to  the  public  works,  as  to  make  a  European 
manifestation  before  the  bodies  of  the  State. 


He  had  resolved  to  open  the  session  of  the  Le- 
gislative Body  on  the  16th  of  August,  the  day 
following  the  15th,  fixed  for  the  celebration  of 
the  festival  of  St.  Napoleon.  The  15th  was  a 
real  festival  for  Paris  and  for  all  France.  The 
people  were  still  filled  with  the  joy  which  the 
peace  had  occasioned ;  for,  signed  at  Tilsit  on 
the  8th  of  July,  known  at  Paris  on  the  15th,  it 
was  scarcely  a  month  that  they  had  enjoyed  it. 
To  this  joy  for  the  continental  peace  was  added 
the  hope  of  a  maritime  peace.  The  presence 
of  Napoleon  at  Paris  had  already  exercised  its 
usual  influence.  Fresh  bustle  prevailed  every 
where.  Money  was  plentiful.  Those  on  whom 
Napoleon  had  just  conferred  wealth  were  build- 
ing elegant  hotels,  and  bespeaking  costly  fur- 
niture to  adorn  them.  Their  wives  spent  money 
in  handfuls  on  the  dealers  in  articles  of  luxury. 
It  was  announced  that  the  court  would  make  a 
long  stay  at  Fontainebleau,  whither  all  the  high 
society  of  Paris  would  be  invited,  and  where 
would  be  given  festivities  of  which  the  winter 
had  been  deprived.  In  short,  the  national  glory, 
which  deeply  touched  all  hearts,  contributed 
likewise  to  all  these  joys  by  heightening  them. 
The  evening  of  the  15th  of  August  was  as  daz- 
zling as  a  bright  day.  The  whole  population 
of  Paris  was  at  night  under  the  windows  of  the 
palace,  intoxicated  with  enthusiasm,  loudly  de- 
siring to  see  the  glorious  sovereign,  who  had 
conferred  so  many  benefits,  real  or  apparent, 
on  France,  and,  above  all,  who  had  rendered 
her  so  great.  It  must  be  acknowledged,  for  the 
honour  of  human  nature,  that  what  most  at- 
tracts it  is  glory.  Had  Napoleon  not  been  Em- 
peror and  King,  the  people  would  still  have 
desired  to  see  in  his  person  the  greatest  man 
of  modern  times.  He  showed  himself  several 
times  holding  the  Empress  by  the  hand,  scarcely 
discerned  amidst  a  brilliant  group,  but  cheered 
and  applauded  as  though  he  had  been  distinctly 
perceived.  He  wished  to  be  himself  a  closer 
witness  of  the  popular  enthusiasm,  and  went 
out  disguised,  with  his  faithful  Duroc,  to  take 
a  walk  in  the  garden  of  the  Tuileries.  By  fa- 
vour of  the  night  and  of  his  disguise,  he  could 
enjoy  the  sentiments  which  he  inspired  without 
being  known,  and  amidst  all  the  groups  he  heard 
his  name  pronounced  with  gratitude  and  love. 
He  stopped  in  the  garden  to  listen  to  a  little 
boy  who  was  shouting  with  transport  Vive 
r Empereur !  He  caught  up  the  child  in  his  arms, 
asked  why  he  shouted  in  that  manner,  and  re- 
ceived for  answer  that  his  father  and  mother 
taught  him  to  love  and  bless  the  emperor.  They 
were  Bretons,  who,  being  obliged  to  flee  from 
the  horrors  of  civil  war,  had  found  in  Paris 
peace  and  competence  in  an  humble  employ- 
ment. Napoleon  conversed  with  them,  and  they 
knew  not  till  next  day  before  how  powerful  a 
witness  they  had  poured  forth  the  simple  effu- 
sions of  their  hearts. 

On  the  following  day,  the  16th,  Napoleon  re- 
paired to  the  Legislative  Body,  surrounded  by 
his  marshals,  followed  by  an  immense  concourse 
of  people,  and  found  the  Council  of  State  and 
the  Tribunate  assembled,  with  the  member"  "f 
the  Legislative  Body.  M.  de  Talleyrand,  in 
quality  of  vice-grnnd-elector,  presented  the 
members  of  the  Legislative  Body  recently 
elected  to  be  sworn ;  and  then  the  Emperor,  in 
a  clear  and  penetrating  voice,  delivered  the  fol- 
lowing speech : — 


372 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Aug.  1807. 


"  Gentlemen  deputies  of  the  departments  to 
the  Legislative  Body,  messieurs  the  Tribunes 
and  the  members  of  my  Council  of  State,  since 
your  last  session,  new  wars,  new  triumphs,  new 
treaties  of  peace,  have  changed  the  political 
face  of  Europe. 

"  If  the  house  of  Brandenburg,  which  first 
conspired  against  our  independence,  still  reigns, 
it  is  indebted  for  this  to  the  sincere  friendship 
•with  which  the  powerful  emperor  of  the  North 
has  inspired  me. 

"  A  French  prince  will  reign  on  the  Elbe ;  he 
will  understand  how  to  reconcile  the  interests 
of  his  new  subjects  with  his  first  and  most  sa- 
cred duties. 

"  The  house  of  Saxony  has  recovered,  after 

fifty  years,  the  independence  which  it  had  lost. 

"  The  people  of  the  duchy  of  Warsaw,  and 

of  the  city  of  Dantzic,  have   recovered   their 

country  and  their  rights. 

"  All  nations  rejoice  with  one  accord  to  see 
the  mischievous  influence  which  England  exer- 
cised over  the  Continent  destroyed  for  ever. 

"  France  is  united  with  the  people  of  Ger- 
many by  the  laws  of  the  Confederation  of  the 
Rhine ;  to  those  of  Spain,  Holland,  Switzer- 
land, and  the  Italics,  by  the  laws  of  our  fede- 
rative system.  Our  new  relations  with  Russia 
are  cemented  by  the  reciprocal  esteem  of  these 
two  great  nations. 

"In  all  that  I  have  done,  I  have  had  in  view 
solely  the  prosperity  of  my  people,  more  dear 
in  my  eyes  than  my  own  glory. 

"  I  am  desirous  for  maritime  peace.  No  re- 
sentment shall  ever  influence  my  determina- 
tions. I  can  never  have  any  against  a  nation, 
the  puppet  and  victim  of  the  parties  which  tear 
it  in  pieces,  deluded  respecting  the  situation 
of  its  own  affairs  as  well  as  that  of  its  neigh- 
bours. 

"  But  whatever  be  the  issue  which  the  de- 
crees of  Providence  have  allotted  to  the  mari- 
time war,  my  people  shall  find  me  ever  the 
same,  and  I  shall  ever  find  my  people  worthy 
of  me.  Frenchmen,  your  conduct  in  these  last 
times,  when  your  Emperor  was  more  than  five 
hundred  leagues  away,  has  heightened  my  es- 
teem, and  the  opinion  which  I  had  formed  of 
your  character.  I  have  felt  proud  of  being  the 
first  among  you.  If,  during  these  ten  months 
of  absence  and  dangers,  I  have  been  present  to 
your  thoughts,  the  marks  of  attachment  which 
you  have  given  me  have  constantly  excited  my 
warmest  emotions.  All  my  anxieties,  all  that 
could  have  relation  even  to  the  preservation  of 
my  person,  touched  me  only  from  the  interest 
which  you  took  in  them,  and  for  the  importance 
of  which  they  might  be  for  your  future  desti- 
nies. You  are  a  good  and  a  great  people. 

"I  have  contemplated  various  dispositions 
f:r  simplifying  and  improving  our  institu- 
tions. 

"  The  nation  has  experienced  the  happiest 
effects  from  the  institution  of  the  Legion  of 
Honour.  I  have  created  several  imperial  titles 
to  give  new  lustre  to  the  principal  of  my  sub- 
jects, to  honour  eminent  services  by  eminent 
rewards,  and  also  to  prevent  the  revival  of 
any  feudal  title  incompatible  with  our  consti- 
tutions. 

' '  The  accounts  of  my  ministers  of  the  finances  ; 
and  of  the  public  Treasury  will  acquaint  you  | 
•with  the  proeperoui  state  of  our  finances.  My 


people  will  experience  a  considerable  relief  in 
regard  to  the  land-tax. 

"  My  minister  of  the' interior  will  inform  you 
of  the  public  works  which  have  been  com- 
menced or  finished  ;  but  what  remains  to  be 
done  is  of  far  greater  importance ;  for  I  intend 
that,  in  all  parts  of  my  Empire,  even  in  the 
smallest  hamlet,  the  prosperity  of  the  citizens 
and  the  value  of  land  shall  be  augmented  by 
the  effect  of  the  general  system  of  improvement 
which  I  have  conceived. 

"  Messieurs  the  deputies  of  the  departments, 
your  assistance  will  be  necessary  for  me  to  ar- 
rive at  this  great  result,  and  I  have  a  right  to 
rely  firmly  upon  it." 

This  speech  was  heard  with  warm  emotion, 
and  applauded  with  transport.  Napoleon  re- 
turned to  the  Tuileries,  accompanied  by  the 
same  concourse,  and  greeted  with  the  same 
shouts. 

On  the  next  and  succeeding  days  were  brought 
forward  the  various  laws  which  fixed  the  budget 
of  1807  at  720  millions  in  receipts  and  expen- 
diture, which  demanded  for  1808  mere  provi- 
sional credits,  conformably  to  the  custom  of  the 
time  ;  which,  for  this  same  year  1808,  remitted 
to  the  country  20  millions  on  the  land-tax  ; » 
which  regulated  the  concurrence  of  the  depart- 
ments in  the  great  works  of  general  utility,  in- 
stituted a  Court  of  Accounts,  and  lastly  were 
to  compose  the  commercial  code.  The  mea- 
sures concerning  the  institution  of  the  new 
titles,  the  purification  of  the  magistracy,  the 
union  of  the  Tribunate  to  the  Legislative  Body, 
were  reserved  for  the  Senate.  After  the  pre- 
sentation of  all  these  laws  came  the  report  of 
the  minister  of  the  interior  on  the  state  of  the 
Empire.  When  that  minister  had,  in  a  picture 
for  which  Napoleon  had  furnished  the  sub- 
stance and  almost  the  form,  finished  the  sketch 
of  the  flourishing  state  of  France,  of  the  pro- 
gress of  her  manufactures  and  commerce,  of 
the  impulsion  given  to  all  the  works,  of  the 
simultaneous  construction  of  canals,  roads, 
bridges,  and  public  monuments,  over  the  whole 
surface  of  the  territory,  of  the  regularity, 
order,  abundance,  prevailing  in  the  finances, 
of  the  efforts  made  to  diffuse  instruction,  to 
extend  to  every  commune  the  benefit  of  public 
worship,  in  short  of  so  many  useful  creations, 
the  course  of  which  a  war  of  giants  had  not 
interrupted,  for  which  it  had  even  procured  the 
means,  thanks  to  the  tribute  levied  from  the 
conquered  kings,  M.  de  Fontanes,  president  of 
the  Legislative  Body,  replied  in  the  following 
speech,  which  he  had  been  enabled  to  prepare 
beforehand,  for  the  sentiments  that  were  ex- 
pressed in  it  filled  all  hearts  : — 

"  Monsieur  the  minister  of  the  interior,  mes- 
sieurs the  councillors  of  State, 

"  The  picture  set  before  our  eyes  seems  to 
present  the  image  of  one  of  those  pacific  kings, 
exclusively  engaged  in  the  internal  administra- 
tion in  the  heart  of  their  dominions;  and  yet 
all  these  useful  labours,  all  these  wise  projects, 
which  are  designed  to  improve  upon  them,  were 
ordered  and  conceived  amidst  the  din  of  arms 


»  I  have  said  in  another  plnce  15 millions;  it  was  never- 
theless 20  millions;  but  the  new  centimes  imposed  for  the 
concurrence  of  the  departments  in  the  public  works  re. 
duced  these  '20  millions  to  15. 


Aug.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


378 


on  the  furthest  confines  of  conquered  Prussia, 
and  on  the  frontiers  of  threatened  Russia.  If 
it  be  true  that,  at  the  distance  of  five  hundred 
leagues  from  the  capifal,  amid  the  cares  and 
the  fatigues  of  war,  a  hero  prepared  so  many 
benefits,  how  is  he  about  to  increase  them  by 
returning  among  us !  The  public  welfare  will 
•wholly  engage  him,  and  his  glory  will  be  the 
more  touching  for  it. 

"We  are  far  from  refusing  to  heroism  that 
homage  which  in  all  times  it  obtains.  Philo- 
sophy more  than  once  insulted  military  enthu- 
siasm :  let  us  now  dare  to  avenge  it. 

"  War,  that  ancient,  and  unfortunately  ne- 
cessary disease,  which  has  ravaged  all  socie- 
ties ;  that  scourge,  the  effects  of  which  it  is  so 
easy  to  deplore,  and  so  difficult  to  extirpate  the 
cause — war  itself  is  not  without  utility  for  na- 
tions. It  imparts  new  energy  to  old  societies ; 
it  draws  together  great  nations  which  have 
long  been  enemies,  which  learn  to  esteem  each 
other  on  the  field  of  battle ;  it  stirs  and  ferti- 
lizes minds  by  extraordinary  spectacles ;  above 
all  it  instructs  present  and  future  ages,  when 
it  produces  one  of  those  rare  geniuses  formed 
to  change  every  thing. 

"But,  for  war  to  have  such  advantages,  it 
must  not  be  too  prolonged,  or  irreparable  evils 
are  the  consequence.  The  fields  and  the  work- 
shops are  depopulated,  the  schools  in  which 
minds  and  manners  are  formed  become  de- 
serted, barbarism  approaches,  and  the  genera- 
tions ravaged  in  their  flower  see  the  hopes  of 
the  human  race  perish  along  with  themselves. 

"  The  Legislative  Body  arid  the  French  na- 
tion bless  the  great  prince  who  puts  an  end  to 
war  before  it  can  subject  us  to  such  disastrous 
influences,  and  when  it  brings  us,  on  the  con- 
trary, so  many  new  means  of  strength,  wealth, 
and  population.  War,  which  exhausts  every 
thing,  has  renovated  our  finances  and  our  ar- 
mies. The  vanquished  nations  give  us  subsi- 
dies, and  France  finds  soldiers  worthy  of  her 
among  the  allied  nations. 

"  Our  eyes  have  beheld  the  most  extraordi- 
nary things.  A  few  years  have  been  sufficient 
for  renewing  the  face  of  the  world.  A  man  has 
traversed  Europe,  taking  away  and  giving  dia- 
dems. He  displaces,  he  contracts,  he  extends, 
the  boundaries  of  empires :  all  are  borne  away 
by  his  ascendency.  Well !  this  man,  covered 
with  so  much  glory,  promises  us  still  greater: 
peaceable  and  disarmed,  he  will  prove  that  this 
invin-jible  force,  which,  as  it  runs,  overturns 
thrones  and  empires,  is  beneath  that  truly  royal 
wisdom,  which  preserves  them  by  peace,  which 
enriches  them  by  agriculture  and  industry, 
adorns  them  with  master-pieces  of  art,  and 
founds  them  everlastingly  on  the  two-fold  sup- 
port of  morality  and  the  laws." 

The  labours  of  the  Legislative  Body  com- 
menced immediately,  and  were  prosecuted  with 
the  calmness  and  celerity  natural  in  discussions 
which  were  purely  formal ;  for  the  serious  in- 
vestigation of  the  proposed  laws  had  taken 
place  elsewhere,  that  is  to  say,  in  the  confer- 
ences between  the  Tribunate  and  the  Council 
of  State.  During  this  short  session,  which  kept 
him  in  Paris  and  deferred  his  departure  for 
Fontainebleau,  Napoleon  celebrated  the  mar- 
riage of  the  Princess  Catherine  of  Wurtemberg 
with  his  brother  Jerome.  This  young  princess, 
endowed  with  the  noblest  qualities,  beautiful 


and  striking  in  person,  proud  as  her  father,  but 
gentle  and  devoted  to  all  her  duties,  and  des- 
tined to  become  some  day  a  pattern  for  wives 
in  adversity,  arrived  at  the  chateau,  of  Raincy, 
near  Paris,  on  the  20th  of  August,  rather  un- 
easy about  the  situation  that  awaited  her  in  a 
court,  the  splendour  and  power  of  which  no- 
body in  Europe  denied,  but  which  was  repre- 
sented as  the  abode  of  brutal  force,  and  to 
!  which  she  was  not  to  be  accompanied  by  any 
I  of  the  servants  whom  she  had  had  around  her 
'  from  her  infancy.  Napoleon  received  her  on 
the  21st  on  the  first  step  of  the  palace  of  the 
Tuileries.  She  was  going  to  bow  to  him,  when 
he  caught  her  in  his  arms,  and  then  presented 
her  to  the  Empress,  to  his  whole  court,  and  to 
the  deputies  of  the  new  kingdom  of  Westphalia, 
convoked  to  Paris  to  be  present  at  this  union. 
On  the  following  day,  the,  young  couple  were 
civilly  married  by  the  Arch-chancellor  Camba- 
ce"res,  and  the  day  afterwards  they  received  in 
the  chapel  of  the  Tuileries  the  nuptial  benedic- 
tion of  the  prince-primate,  who,  always  alike 
attached  to  the  Emperor  from  inclination  and 
from  gratitude,  had  come  to  consecrate  in  per- 
son the  new  German  royalty,  founded  in  the 
north  of  the  Confederation,  of  which  he  was 
chancellor  and  president. 

The  festivities  held  on  occasion  of  this  mar- 
riage lasted  several  days,  and  during  this  time 
Napoleon  prepared  for  the  departure  of  the 
young  couple  for  Westphalia.  Their  kingdom, 
composed  principally  of  the  territories  of  the 
Grand-duke  of  Hesse,  dethroned  on  account  of 
his  perfidies,  was  to  have  Cassel  for  its  capital. 
It  comprehended,  besides  electoral  Hesse,  West- 
phalia and  the  provinces  separated  from  Prus- 
sia, on  the  left  of  the  Elbe.  Magdeburg  was 
its  principal  fortress.  It  had  likewise  hopes 
of  being  enriched  by  part  of  Hanover.  The 
title  of  Kingdom  of  Westphalia  was  suited  to 
its  geographical  situation,  to  its  extent,  to  its 
part  in  the  Confederation  of  the  Rhine.  It  had, 
moreover,  a  sort  of  consequence,  and  did  not 
remind  one,  as  the  title  of  Kingdom  of  Hesse 
would  have  done,  of  the  dispossession  of  a  great 
German  family.  Napoleon  had  charged  three 
councillors  of  State,  Messrs.  Simeon,  Beugnot, 
and  Jollivet,  to  go,  under  the  title  of  provisional 
regency,  and  to  commence  the  administrative 
organization  of  this  kingdom,  so  that  Prince  Je- 
rome should,  on  his  arrival,  find  a  sort  of  go- 
vernment instituted,  and,  after  his  arrival,  wise 
councillors  capable  of  guiding  his  inexperience. 
Napoleon  then  despatched  him  with  the  follow- 
ing instructions : — 

"  My  brother,  I  think  you  ought  to  go  to 
Stuttgard,  as  you  have  been  invited  thither  by 
the  King  of  Wurtemberg.  You  will  proceed 
thence  to  Cassel,  with  all  the  pomp  with  which 
the  hopes  of  your  people  will  induce  them  to 
surround  you.  You  will  convoke  the  deputies 
of  the  towns,  the  ministers  of  all  religion?,  the 
deputies  of  the  States  now  existing,  taking  care 
that  there  shall  be  half  not  noble,  half  noble ; 
and  before  this  assembly,  so  composed,  you  will 
receive  the  constitution  and  swear  to  maintain 
it,  and  immediately  afterwards  you  will  receive 
the  oath  of  those  deputies  of  the  people.  The 
three  members  of  the  regency  shall  be  charged 
with  the  delivery  of  the  country  to  you.  They 
will  form  a  privy  council,  which  shall  remain 
with  you,  so  long  as  you  have  need  of  it.  Ap- 
21 


374 


HISTORY  OF   TTIE 


[Sept.  1807. 


point  at  first  only  half  of  your  councillors  of 
State ;  that  number  will  be  sufficient  for  com- 
mencing business.  Take  care  that  the  majority 
be  composed  of  non-nobles,  but  without  letting 
any  one  perceive  this  habitual  caution  to  keep 
up  a  majority  of  the  third  estate  in  all  offices. 
I  except  from  this  some  places  at  court,  to 
which,  upon  the  same  principles,  the  highest 
names  must  be  called.  But,  in  your  ministries, 
in  your  councils,  if  possible  in  your  courts  of 
appeal,  in  your  administrations,  the  greater 
part  of  the  persons  whom  you  employ  should 
not  be  nobles.  This  conduct  will  go  to  the 
heart  of  Germany,  and  perhaps  mortify  the 
other  class.  It  is  sufficient  not  to  use  any  affec- 
tation in  this  conduct.  Take  care  never  to  en- 
ter into  discussions,  nor  to  let  it  be  understood, 
that  you  attach  such  importance  to  the  advance- 
ment of  the  third  estate.  The  avowed  principle 
is  to  select  talents  wherever  they  are  to  be  found. 
I  have  here  marked  out  for  you  the  general  prin- 
ciples of  your  conduct.  I  have  given  orders  to 
the  major-general  to  deliver  up  to  you  the  com- 
mand of  the  French  troops  which  are  in  your 
kingdom.  Remember  that  you  are  French,  and 
guard  against  their  suffering  any  wrong.  By 
degrees,  and  according  as  they  become  unne- 
cessary, you  will  send  back  the  governors  and 
the  commandants  of  arms.  My  opinion  is,  that 
you  should  not  be  in  a  hurry,  and  that  you 
should  listen  with  prudence  and  circumspection 
to  the  complaints  of  the  towns,  which  are  only 
anxious  to  rid  themselves  of  the  embarrass- 
ments occasioned  by  the  war.  Remember  that 
the  army  remained  six  months  in  Bavaria,  and 
that  those  good  people  bore  this  burden  with 
patience.  Before  the  month  of  January,  you 
ought  to  have  divided  your  kingdom  into  de- 
partments, to  have  appointed  prefects  in  them, 
and  to  have  commenced  your  administration. 
What  is  of  particular  consequence  to  me  is, 
that  you  delay  not  in  the  least  the  introduction 
of  the  Napoleon  Code.  The  constitution  esta- 
blishes it  irrevocably  on  the  1st  of  January. 
If  you  defer  putting  it  in  force,  this  would  be- 
come a  question  of  public  right,  for  if  succes- 
sions should  chance  to  open,  you  would  be  em- 
barrassed by  a  thousand  claims.  Objections 
will  not  fail  to  be  made ;  oppose  them  with  a 
firm  will.  The  members  of  the  regency,  who 
are  not  in  favour  of  what  was  done  in  France 
during  the  revolution,  will  make  remonstrances : 
give  them  for  answer  that  this  does  not  concern 
them.  But  ca-11  to  your  aid  their  intelligence 
and  experience,  from  which  you  may  derive 
great  advantage.  Above  all,  write  to  me  very 
often. 

"You  will  find  annexed  the  constitution  of 
your  kingdom.  That  constitution  contains  the 
conditions  on  which  I  renounce  all  my  rights 
of  conquest  and  my  acquired  rights  to  your 
country.  You  ought  to  follow  it  punctually. 
The  happiness  of  your  people  is  of  importance 
to  me,  not  only  for  the  influence  which  it  may 
have  upon  your  glory  and  mine,  but  also  under 
the  point  of  view  of  the  general  system  of  Eu- 
rope. Listen  not  to  those  who  tell  you  that 
your  people,  accustomed  to  servitude,  will  re- 
ceive your  benefits  unthankfully.  They  are 
more  enlightened  in  the  kingdom  of  Westphalia 
than  some  persons  would  fain  persuade  you ; 
and  your  throne  will  never  be  firmly  founded 
but  on  the  confidence  and  the  love  of  the  popu- 


lation. What  the  people  of  Germany  desire 
with  impatience  is,  that  individuals  who  are 
not  noble,  and  possess  talents,  should  have  an 
equal  right  to  your  consideration  and  to  office ; 
that  every  species  of  bondage,  and  all  interme- 
diate restrictions  between  the  sovereign  and 
the  lowest  class,  should  be  entirely  abolished. 
The  benefits  of  the  Napoleon  Code,  the  publi- 
city of  law  proceedings,  the  institution  of  juries, 
will  be  so  many  distinguishing  characteristics 
of  your  monarchy ;  and,  if  I  must  tell  you  my 
whole  mind,  I  reckon  more  upon  their  effects 
for  the  extension  and  consolidation  of  that  mo- 
narchy than  upon  the  result  of  the  greatest 
victories.  Your  people  must  enjoy  a  liberty, 
an  equality,  a  prosperity,  unknown  to  the  other 
people  of  Germany ;  and  this  liberal  govern- 
ment must  produce,  in  one  way  or  another, 
changes  the  most  salutary  to  the  system  of  the 
Confederation  and  to  the  power  of  your  mo- 
narchy. This  mode  of  governing  will  be  a 
stronger  barrier  to  separate  you  from  Prussia 
than  the  Elbe,  than  fortresses,  than  the  protec- 
tion of  France.  What  people  would  be  willing 
to  return  under  the  arbitrary  Prussian  govern- 
ment, after  it  has  tasted  the  benefits  of  a  wise 
and  liberal  administration  ?  The  people  of  Ger- 
many, those  of  France,  Italy,  Spain,  desire 
equality  and  require  liberal  ideas.  It  is  now 
several  years  that  I  have  directed  the  affairs 
of  Europe,  and  I  have  had  occasion  to  convince 
myself,  that  the  grumbling  of  the  privileged 
persons  was  contrary  to  the  general  opinion. 
Be  a  constitutional  king.  If  the  reason  and 
the  intelligence  of  your  times  were  not  suffi- 
cient, in  your  position  good  policy  would  en- 
join it." 

The  session  of  the  Legislative  Body,  though 
there  were  numerous  pr'ojets  to  be  converted 
into  laws,  could  not  last  long,  thanks,  as  we 
have  observed,  to  the  previous  conferences, 
which  rendered  public  discussion  nearly  use- 
less, and  a  matter  of  mere  form.  The  second 
half  of  the  month  of  August  and  the  first  half 
of  September  were  sufficient.  The  business 
of  this  session  being  finished,  the  senatus-con- 
sulte,  which  suppressed  the  Tribunate,  and 
transferred  its  attributes  and  its  members  to 
the  Legislative  Body,  was  brought  to  the  two 
assemblies.  It  was  accompanied  by  an  address, 
which  bestowed  due  praise  on  the  labours  and 
services  of  the  suppressed  body.  The  presi- 
dent of  that  body,  on  receiving  this  communi- 
cation, delivered  a  speech  on  his  part,  thank- 
ing the  sovereign,  who  acknowledged  the  me- 
rits of  the  members  of  the  Tribunate  and 
opened  to  them  a  new  career.  After  these 
vain  formalities,  the  session  was  closed,  and  a 
legal  character  was  imparted  to  the  last  works 
of  the  imperial  government. 

At  length,  on  the  22d  of  September,  the 
court  set  out  for  Fontainebleau,  where  it  was 
to  pass  the  autumn  amidst  festivities  and  pomp- 
ous pageantry.  Napoleon  purposed  to  exhibit 
there  a  complete  image  of  the  manners  of  the 
old  court.  Many  foreign  princes  had  been 
invited  thither,  such  as  the  prince-primate,  who 
had  come  to  Paris  on  occasion  of  the  marriage 
of  the  King  and  Queen  of  Westphalia,  the  Arch- 
duke Ferdinand,  late  sovereign  of  Tuscany  and 
of  Salzburg,  now  of  Wurzburg,  who  had  come  in 
the  hope  of  restoring  good  harmony  between 
France  and  Austria;  Prince  William,  brother 


Sept.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


375 


of  the  King  of  Prussia,  despatched  to  Paris  to 
obtain  a  mitigation  of  the  charges  imposed 
upon  his  country,  and  a  multitude  of  other 
great  personages,  French  and  foreign.  In  the 
daytime  the  company  pursued  the  sport  of 
coursing  the  deer  of  the  forest.  Napoleon 
had  prescribed  a  dress  indispensable  for  the 
chase,  and  had  imposed  the  necessity  of  wear- 
ing it  on  both  men  and  women.  He  disdained 
not  to  appear  in  it  himself,  excusing  in  his 
own  eyes  these  puerilities  by  the  opinion  that 
etiquette  in  courts,  and  particularly  in  new 
courts,  contributes  to  respect.  In  the  evening 
the  first  actors  in  Paris  came  to  perform  be- 
fore him  the  masterpieces  of  Corneille,  Racine, 
Moliere ;  for  he  admitted  to  the  honour  of  his 
presence  none  but  the  great  productions,  im- 
mortal titles  of  the  nation,  and,  as  if  to  com- 
plete this  resurrection  of  the  ancient  manners, 
he  cast  on  certain  ladies  of  the  court,  re- 
nowned for  their  beauty,  glances  which  dis- 
tressed the  Empress  Josephine,  and  caused  ob- 
servations to  be  made  respecting  him  less  serious 
than  those  of  which  he  was  usually  the  object. 
While  Napoleon,  mingling  some,  recreations 
with  a  great  deal  of  business,  awaited  at  Fon- 
tainebleau  the  resultT>f  the  negotiations  com- 
menced by  Russia  with  England,  the  stipula- 
sions  of  Tilsit  occupied  cabinets  and  produced 
in  the  world  their  natural  consequences.  Por- 
tugal, obliged  to  come  to  a  decision,  solicited 
permission  of  the  Court  of  London  to  comply 
with  the  requisitions  of  Napoleon,  at  least  in 
such  a  manner  as  to  do  the  least  possible  inju- 
ry to  British  commerce,  and  to  spare  the  Eng- 
lish, as  well  as  the  Portuguese,  the  presence 
of  a  French  army  in  Lisbon.  The  Court  of 
Spain,  anxious  in  the  highest  degree  about  the 
consequences  which  its  perfidious  conduct  last 
year  might  produce,  alarmed  at  the  thoughts 
which  omnipotence  and  leisure  might  suggest 
to  Napoleon,  despatched  to  him,  as  we  have 
seen,  in  addition  to  her  ordinary  ambassador, 
M.  de  Massaredo,  an  ambassador  extraordina- 
ry, M.  de  Frias,  besides  a  secret  envoy,  M. 
Yzquierdo.  Neither  of  the  former  had  found 
means  to  penetrate  the  frightful  mystery  of 
his  coming.  Austria,  bitterly  regretting  not 
having  acted  in  the  interval  between  the  battles 
of  Eylau  and  Friedland,  extremely  uneasy  at 
the  signs  of  intelligence  which  began  to  be 
perceived  between  the  emperors  of  France  and 
Russia,  said  to  herself  that  their  allfance,  so 
natural  when  France  was  engaged  with  Eng- 
land on  the  sea,  with  Germany  on  the  land,  and 
so  formidable  at  all  times  to  Europe,  was  per- 
haps at  this  moment  absolutely  concluded,  and 
that  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,  then  occu- 
pied by  the  Russians,  would,  in  all  probability, 
be  the  price  of  the  new  union.  If  such  were 
the  case,  it  would  crown  all  the  disasters  which 
had  overtaken  her  during  the  present  century : 
for,  despoiled  in  the  course  of  fifteen  years  of 
the  Netherlands,  of  Italy,  of  the  Tyrol,  of 
Suabia,  forced  back  behind  the  lun,  behind  the 
Styrian  and  Julian  Alps,  after  so  many  misfor- 
tunes, only  one  greater  could  befall  her,  to  see 
Russia  established  on  the  Lower  Danube,  cut- 
ting her  off  from  the  Black  Sea,  and  envelop- 
ing her  in  the  East  as  France  enveloped  her  in 
the  West.  Hence,  in  all  the  courts  where  the 
representatives  of  Austria  met  with  ours,  they 
were  seen  reetless,  suspicious,  seeking  by  all 


possible  means  to  ferret  out  the  secret  of  Tilsit, 
here  offering  to  pay  for  it  with  money,  there 
striving  to  discover  it  in  an  unguarded  moment, 
and  at  length,  on  the  refusal  of  our  diplomatists 
to  betray  it,  demanding  it  with  a  ridiculous  in- 
discretion. And  while  they  were  everywhere 
endeavouring  to  penetrate  the  projects  of  the 
new  alliance,  without  succeeding,  they  gave 
out  at  Constantinople  that  they  were  com- 
pletely discovered,  telling  the  Turks  that 
France  had  deserted,  betrayed  them,  and  given 
them  up  to  Russia ;  that  they  ought  to  turn 
their  arms  against  the  French,  continue  the 
hostilities  against  the  Russians,  and  reconcile 
themselves  with  the  English ;  who,  they  added, 
would  not  be  the  only  people  to  support  them. 
Prussia,  overwhelmed  by  her  calamity,  con- 
cerned herself  but  little  about  the  secret  con- 
ditions stipulated  at  Tilsit,  and  caring  still  less 
what  should  befall  the  balance  of  Europe  in 
the  East,  since  it  was  already  destroyed  for 
her  in  the  West,  thinking  only  of  obtaining  tho 
evacuation  of  her  territory  and  a  reduction  of 
the  war-contributions  imposed  upon  it :  for,  in 
the  exhausted  state  in  which  she  found  her- 
self, every  sum  given  to  France  was  a  resource 
withdrawn  from  her  for  reconstituting  her 
army  and  for  some  day  retrieving  her  reverses. 
In  Russia  the  spectacle  was  totally  different : 
there  the  sovereign,  who  had  sought  in  the 
French  alliance  prospects  of  greatness  suited 
to  indemnify  him  for  his  recent  mishaps,  was 
seen  making  continual  efforts  to  lead  the  court, 
the  aristocracy,  the  people,  into  his  views. 
But,  having  been  exposed  alone  at  Tilsit  to  the 
seductions  of  Napoleon,  he  could  not  persuade 
them  to  pass  so  quickly  as  himself  from  the 
horrors  of  war  to  the  enchantments  of  a  new 
alliance.  He  therefore  strove  now  to  persuade 
everybody  that,  in  terminating  by  a  reconcilia- 
tion with  France,  things  had  taken  the  best 
possible  turn ;  that  his  late  ministers,  in  em- 
broiling him  with  that  power,  had  led  him  into 
a  fatal  track,  from  which  he  had  extricated 
himself  with  equal  good  fortune  and  skill ;  that, 
in  all  this,  he  had  committed  but  one  error, 
that  of  having  believed  in  the  valour  of  the 
Prussian  army  and  in  the  integrity  of  England, 
but  he  had  soon  dispelled  this  double  illusion ; 
that  there  were  but  two  armies  in  Europe 
which  deserved  to  be  mentioned,  the  Russian 
army  and  the  French  army ;  that  it  was  use- 
less to  make  them  fight  in  order  to  serve  the 
cause  of  a  perfidious  and  selfish  power  like 
Great  Britain  ;  and  that  it  was  better  to  unite 
them  in  one  common  aim  of  peace  and  great- 
ness ;  of  peace,  if  the  cabinet  of  London  would 
at  length  desist  from  its  maritime  pretensions; 
of  greatness,  if  it  did  oblige  Europe  to  lead  the 
same  life  of  torment  and  sacrifices;  that,  in 
this  case,  every  one  must  take  care  of  himself 
and  his  own  interests ;  and  that  it  was  time 
for  Russia  to  think  of  hers.  Having  arrived 
at  this  point  of  his  explanations,  Alexander, 
not  daring  to  reveal  all  the  hopes  which  Na- 
poleon had  permitted  him  to  conceive,  nor 
above  all  to  avow  the  occult  treaty  which  they 
had  promised  themselves  to  keep  profoundly 
secret,  assumed  an  air  of  mystery  but  of  satis- 
faction, leaving  all  to  be  guessed  that  he  dur{. 
not  venture  to  tell,  though  strongly  tempted  to 
do  so,  and  speaking,  for  instance,  of  Turkey, 
declaring  openly  that  he  was  about  to  sign  an 


876 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept.  1807. 


armistice  Tilth  her,  but  should  take  care  not  to 
evacuate  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,  where 
he  should  stay  for  a  long  time,  and  that  no 
difficulty  would  be  met  with  at  Paris  on  the 
subject  of  this  prolonged  occupation. 

These  demi-confidential  intimations  had 
rather  excited  an  indiscreet  and  mischievous 
curiosity  than  gained  over  those  to  whom  they 
were  imparted  to  the  ideas  of  the  Emperor 
Alexander.  He  was,  for  the  rest,  warmly 
seconded  by  M.  de  Romanzow,  who  was  ac- 
quainted with  every  thing,  who  had  served 
Catherine,  and  inherited  her  oriental  ambition. 
The  minister,  like  the  sovereign,  repeated  that 
they  must  have  patience,  and  leave  events  to 
unfold  themselves,  and  that  they  should  soon 
have  a  satisfactory  explanation  to  give  of  the 
change  of  politics  effected  at  Tilsit. 

But  the  emperor  was  not  always  listened  to 
and  obeyed.  The  public,  ignorant  of  the 
secrets  of  the  imperial  diplomacy,  galled  by 
the  late  defeats,  exhibited  a  sorrowful  aspect, 
and  an  especial  ill-will  towards  the  French. 
The  grandees  in  particular  called  to  mind  the 
fickleness  of  Russian  politics  under  Paul,  and, 
beginning  to  believe  that  this  fickleness  would 
be  the  same  under  Alexander,  were  fearful  that 
the  intimacy  with  France  would  soon  lead  to  a 
war  with  England,  which  alarmed  them  on  ac- 
count of  their  revenues,  always  threatened 
when  British  commerce  ceased  to  purchase 
their  productions.  Hence  General  Savary,  on 
his  arrival  at  St.  Petersburg  soon  after  the 
signature  of  the  peace,  had  met  with  the  coldest 
reception,  excepting  from  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander and  two  or  three  families  composing  the 
intimate  society  of  that  prince.  The  catas- 
trophe of  Vincennes,  of  which  people  were 
reminded  by  the  appearance  of  General  Savary, 
was  assuredly  not  likely  to  reconcile  with  him 
hearts  which  politics  estranged ;  but  the  true 
cause  of  this  general  estrangement  was  in  the 
remembrance  of  recent  hostilities  and  of  great 
defeats,  without  any  event  which  could  console 
the  national  self-love.  The  emperor,  fully 
aware  of  this  situation,  endeavoured  to  render 
General  Savary's  stay  at  St.  Petersburg  endur- 
able, nay  even  agreeable  to  him,  paid  him  all 
sorts  of  attentions,  admitted  him  to  his  pre- 
sence almost  every  day ;  invited  him  frequently 
to  his  table,  and,  in  fear  of  the  reports  which 
he  might  despatch  to  Napoleon,  begged  him  to 
have  patience,  saying  that  every  thing  would 
change  when  the  late  impressions  were  effaced, 
and  when  France  should  have  done  something 
for  the  just  ambition  of  Russia.  He  knew  not 
how  far  General  Savary  might  be  initiated  in 
the  secret  of  Tilsit,  and  strove  to  discover  this, 
to  have  the  pleasure,  if  the  general  was  ac- 
quainted with  that  secret,  of  conversing  with 
him  on  the  fondest  subject  of  his  thoughts. 
The  French  envoy  was  but  partially  informed, 
and  even  had  orders  to  appear  to  know  less 
than  he  did ;  for  Napoleon  had  no  wish  that 
the  young  emperor,  incessantly  talking  over 
the  subjects  which  had  engaged  him  at  Tilsit, 
should  at  last  confirm  himself  in  his  own  de- 
sires, and  take  mere  eventualities  for  certain 
And  speedy  realities.  General  Savary  replied, 
therefore,  with  extreme  reserve  to  the  insinua- 
tions of  the  emperor,  with  warm  gratitude  for 
his  kind  attentions,  appeared  satisfied,  not  at 
all  vexed,  at  the  disagreeable  reception  given 


him  by  Russian  society,  and  full  of  confidence 
in  a  speedy  change  of  dispositions.  He  had, 
besides,  to  defend  him,  sufficient  understand- 
ing, plenty  of  assurance,  and  the  immensity 
of  the  national  glory,  which  permitted  French- 
men to  hold  their  heads  high  everywhere. 

The  example  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  and 
the  strong  expression  of  his  will,  had  opened 
to  General  Savary  some  of  the  most  important 
houses  in  St.  Petersburg,  but  most  of  the  great 
families  continued  to  exclude  him ;  for  Alex- 
ander, though  master  of  power,  was,  never- 
theless, not  master  of  high  society,  placed 
under  a  different  influence  from  his.  Having 
owed  to  a  tragic  catastrophe  the  anticipated 
possession  of  the  sceptre  of  the  czars,  this 
prince  strove  to  compensate  his  mother,  who 
had  descended  before  the  time  to  the  station 
of  dowager,  by  leaving  to  her  the  exterior  of 
supreme  power.  This  princess,  virtuous  but 
haughty,  consoled  herself  for  having  lost  with 
Paul  half  of  the  empire,  by  the  ostentatious 
display  of  imperial  splendour,  with  which  her 
son  desired  that  she  should  be  surrounded. 
As  for  himself,  he  had  no  court.  Disliking 
the  empress,  his  wife,  a  cold  and  grave  beauty, 
he  hastened  after  his  repasts  to  leave  the 
palace,  to  employ  himself  in  business  with  the 
statesmen  his  confidents,  or  to  pursue  his  plea- 
sures in  the  society  of  a  Russian  lady,  of  whom 
he  was  enamoured.  The  court  assembled  at 
his  mother's.  There  were  to  be  seen  the  cour- 
tiers fond  of  living  in  the  society  of  the  sove- 
reign, having  favours  to  obtain  or  thanks  to 
pay  for  favours  obtained.  All  came  to  solicit 
or  to  thank  the  empress-mother,  as  if  she  were 
the  sole  author  of  the  acts  of  the  imperial 
power.  Alexander  himself  made  his  appear- 
ance there  with  the  assiduity  of  a  respectful, 
submissive  son,  who  had  not  yet  inherited  the 
!  paternal  sceptre.  The  empress-mother,  who 
.  fondly  loved  that  son,  would  neither  hold  nor 
|  suffer  any  language  that  could  displease  him, 
|  but  did  not  disguise  her  own  sentiments  in 
|  manifesting  a  visible  aversion  to  the  French. 
|  She  had  therefore  received  General  Savary 
|  with  cold  politeness.  He  had  not  shown  any 
.  emotion,  but  had  adroitly  hinted  to  the  son 
j  that  none  of  these  circumstances  had  escaped 
;  him.  For  a  moment  Alexander  could  not  con- 
tain himself,  and,  apprehensive  lest,  under  this 
affected  respect  for  his  mother,  a  foreigner,  an 
aide-de-camp  of  Napoleon's,  should  not  recog- 
nise the  real  master  of  the  empire,  he  grasped 
the  general's  hand,  and  said,  "  There  is  no 
sovereign  here  but  myself;  I  respect  my  mo- 
ther, but  everybody  shall  obey,  be  assured  of 
it ;  and,  at  all  events,  whoever  needs  it,  shall 
be  reminded  of  the  nature  and  the  extent  of 
my  authority."  General  Savary,  content  with 
having  brought  the  emperor  to  such  a  confi- 
dential communication  by  piquing  his  imperial 
pride,  went  no  further,  satisfied  respecting  his 
dispositions  and  his  zeal  to  maintain  the  new 
alliance.  For  the  rest,  the  court  of  the  em- 
press-mother showed,  not  more  politeness,  for 
it  had  never  ceased  to  show  that,  but  more 
cordiality.  "Let  us  wait,"  said  the  Emperor 
Alexander  incessantly  •  to  General  Savary, 
"  and  see  what  England  will  do.  Let  us  know 
what  course  she  will  pursue  ;  I  will  then  break 
out,  and  when  I  have  declared  myself,  nobody 
shall  resist." 


Sept.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


377 


An  explanation  of  the  conduct  which  England 
intended  to  adopt  was  in  fact  awaited  with 
keen  impatience.  The  patent  treaty  of  Tilsit 
had  been  published.  Every  one  plainly  per- 
ceived that  it  did  not  tell  all,  and  that  the  new 
alliance  with  France  inferred  other  secret  sti- 
pulations. But,  at  any  rate,  according  to  the 
patent  arrangements  of  that  treaty,  and  with- 
out going  any  further,  it  was  known  that  Rus- 
sia would  act  as  mediatrix  for  France  with 
England,  and  France  as  mediatrix  of  Russia 
with  the  Porte.  The  result  of  this  double  me- 
diation was  therefore  looked  for. 

Faithful  to  his  engagements,  no  sooner  had 
the  Emperor  Alexander  arrived  at  St.  Peters- 
burgh,  than  he  addressed  a  note  to  the  British 
cabinet,  expressing  a  wish  for  the  restoration 
of  general  peace,  and  offering  his  mediation  with 
a  view  to  bring  about  a  reconciliation  between 
France  and  England.  This  note  had  been  re- 
ceived by  the  British  ambassador  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  by  the  minister  of  foreign  affairs  in 
London  with  a  coldness  which  left  but  little 
hope  of  an  accommodation.  The  new  English 
ministers,  in  fact,  disciples  of  Mr.  Pitt,  but  of 
inferior  abilities,  were  not  inclined  to  peace. 
Their  origin,  their  party  connections,  their  ac- 
cession to  the  ministry,  are  sufficient  of  them- 
selves to  explain  the  policy  which  they  adopted 
in  this  decisive  circumstance. 

It  will,  no  doubt,  be  recollected  that  when  in 
1806  [May,  1804]  Mr.  Pitt  resumed  the  direc- 
tion of  the  counsels  of  George  III.,  after  main- 
taining, jointly  with  Mr.  Fox,  a  strong  contest 
with  the  Addington  administration,  he  had  either 
the  weakness  or  the  treachery  to  resume  it  with- 
out Mr.  Fox,  on  the  one  hand,  without  his  old 
friends,  such  as  Lord  Grenville  and  Mr.  Wind- 
ham,  on  the  other.  He  had  come  back  to  of- 
fice with  men  who  had  then  but  little  political 
importance,  Mr.  Canning  and  Lord  Castlereagh. 
This  conduct  towards  his  friends,  old  or  recent, 
had  much  weakened  him  in  parliament,  and  had 
rendered  his  second  administration  by  no  means 
brilliant.  The  battle  of  Austerlitz  proved  mor- 
tal to  him.  No  sooner  was  Mr.  Pitt  dead  than 
his  feeble  colleagues,  Mr.  Canning  and  Lord 
Castlereagh,  deeming  themselves  incapable  of 
making  head  against  such  men  as  Lord  Gren- 
ville and  Mr.  Windham,  old  and  distinguished 
colleagues  deserted  by  Pitt,  and  Mr.  Fox,  his 
old  and  illustrious  rival — they  retreated  from 
before  them  in  all  haste,  and  Lord  Grenville 
and  Mr.  Windham  had  re-entered  the  adminis- 
tration along  with  Mr.  Fox.  The  wise  Mr. 
Addington,  by  the  name  of  Lord  Sidinouth,  the 
celebrated  Mr.  Grey,  by  the  name  of  Lord 
Howick,  formed  part  of  this  cabinet,  which  was 
a  double  compromise  between  persons  and 
opinion.  Mr.  Sheridan  himself  had  joined  it 
in  becoming  treasurer  of  the  navy.  The  re- 
appearance of  Mr.  Fox  in  power,  as  short  as  that 
of  Mr.  Pitt  had  been,  and  terminating  in  like 
manner  in  his  death,  had  not  lasted  long  enough, 
as  we  have  elsewhere  said,  to  bring  about  the 
restoration  of  peace.  After  the  fruitless  ne- 
gotiations of  Lord  Yarmouth  and  Lord  Lau- 
derdale  in  Paris,  Napoleon  had  taken  possession 
of  Prussia  and  Poland.  The  administration, 
•which  was  called  Fox-Grenville,  had  maintain- 
ed its  ground  after  the  death  of  Mr.  Fox,  thanks 
to  the  powerful  men  of  which  it  was  still  com- 
posed, and  of  the  system  of  compromise  which 

VOL.  II.— 48 


it  had  continued  to  follow.  At  home,  the 
Catholics  were  conciliated ;  abroad  the  war  was 
kept  up,  but  with  a  sort  of  prudence,  by  the 
grants  of  subsidies  to  the  continental  powers, 
and  by  not  risking  the  English  troops,  unless 
in  expeditions  of  demonstrated  advantage  to 
Great  Britain.  The  old  colleagues  of  Mr.  Pitt, 
blended  with  the  old  friends  of  Mr.  Fox,  no 
longer  affected  to  wage  against  France  a  war 
of  principle  but  of  interest.  They  neglected 
what  was  likely  to  call  to  mind  the  crusade 
against  the  French  revolution,  and  occupied 
themselves  exclusively  in  extending  the  con- 
quests of  England  in  all  the  seas.  Urged  by 
Prussia  and  Russia  to  send  troops  either  to 
Stralsund  or  to  Dantzig,  to  effect  a  diversion  on 
the  rear  of  Napoleon,  they  had  always  delayed, 
sometimes  upon  pretext  of  Ireland,  which  re- 
quired troops  to  guard  it,  at  others  upon  pre- 
text of  the  Boulogne  flotilla,  which  had  been 
kept  constantly  armed ;  and  they  had  mean- 
while sent  out  distant  expeditions,  projected  for 
the  sole  interest  of  England.  Thus  they  had 
taken  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  from  the  Dutch. 
From  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope  they  had  pro- 
ceeded to  the  shores  of  the  La  Plata,  and  at- 
tempted a  coup  de  main  against  Monte  Video 
and  Buenos  Ayres.  The  supineness  of  the 
Spanish  government,  and  the  cowardice  of  its 
commandants,  had  permitted  the  English  to 
penetrate  into  Buenos  Ayres,  and  to  possess 
themselves  of  that  metropolis  of  South  America. 
But  M.  Liniers,  a  Frenchman,  who,  after  the 
American  war,  had  passed  into  the  service  of 
Spain,  had  rallied  the  Spanish  troops  and  po- 

,  pulation,  and  driven  the  English  out  of  Buenos 
Ayres,  after  reducing  them  to  a  capitulation 
mortifying  for  their  glory.  At  Monte  Video, 
likewise,  after  having  entered  and  evacuated 
it,  the  English  had  been  obliged  to  withdraw 
from  the  city,  and  they  occupied  some  islands 

t  at  the  mouth  of  the  La  Plata.  The  Mediter- 
ranean also  had  become  the  theatre  of  their 
ambitious  expeditions.  They  had,  it  will  be 

;  recollected,  forced  the  Dardanelles,  without 
any  result  for  themselves,  and  effected  a  land- 
ing in  Egypt,  which  had  been  followed  by  their 

,  retreat.  By  all  these  enterprises  the  English 
had  gained  the  Cape,  the  island  of  Curaooa, 
and  the  animadversion  of  their  allies,  who  said 
that  the}'  were  deserted. 

Such  was  the  state  of  the  Grenville  ministry, 
when,  in  March,  1807,  a  question  unexpectedly 

,  arose,  which  put  the  moderate   principles  of 

!  that  administration  in  opposition  with  the  re- 
ligious principles  of  old  George  III.  Once  be- 
fore that  devout  prince  had  carried  his  infatua- 
tion against  the  Catholics  of  Ireland  to  such  a 
length  as  to  part  from  Mr.  Pitt  rather  than 
grant  a  commencement  of  emancipation.  The 
same  cause  was  destined  to  separate  the  col- 
leagues and  successors  of  Mr.  Pitt.  The  Irish 
rendered  good  service  in  the  army,  and,  at  a 
moment  when  the  contest  with  France  assumed 
a  new  character  of  implacability,  it  was  politic 
to  satisfy  those  brave  soldiers  by  permitting 
them  to  attain  the  same  rank  as  the  English 
officers,  and  thus  to  attach  the  Catholics  to 
England  by  a  first  act  of  justice.  A  bill  to  this 
effect  was  therefore  proposed  by  ministers,  and 
owing  to  the  obscurity  of  that  bill,  an  obscurity 
purposely  imparted  to  it  by  the  ministers  who 
had  drawn  it  up,  George  III.,  misapprehending 
2i2 


378 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Sept.  1807 


its  object,  consented  that  it  should  be  presented ; 
but  no  sooner  was  it  brought  in  than  the  ene- 
mies of  the  cabinet,  who  were  no  other  than 
the  secondary  personages  by  whom  Mr.  Pitt 
had  surrounded  himself  at  the  time  of  his  last 
administration,  had  by  secret  intrigues  awak- 
ened the  scruples  of  the  old  king,  and  caused 
Buch  explanations  to  be  laid  before  him  as  gave 
the  bill  an  import  which  at  first  he  had  not 
suspected.  George  III.  had  then  desired  that 
it  should  be  withdrawn.  Lord  Grenville  and 
Lord  Howick  resigned  themselves  with  diffi- 
culty to  this  humiliating  step,  declaring  that 
the  concessions  now  refused  to  the  Irish  must 
be  granted  to  them  sooner  or  later,  to  which 
George  III.  replied  by  demanding  a  promise 
that  nothing  of  the  kind  should  be  in  future 
proposed.  In  consequence  of  this  royal  requi- 
sition, Lord  Grenville,  Lord  Howick,  and  their 
colleagues,  resigned  in  March,  1807.  The  weak 
remnant  of  the  ministers  who  had  surrounded 
Mr.  Pitt  then  returned  to  office,  under  the  pre- 
sidency of  the  old  Duke  of  Portland,  a  veteran 
Whig,  who  had  no  longer  any  political  import- 
ance on  account  of  his  great  age,  and  who  was 
introduced  merely  to  give  the  cabinet  some 
appearance  of  political  coalition.  Mr.  Canning, 
Lord  Castlereagh,  Mr.  Perceval,  the  principal 
members  of  this  administration,  justly  acquired 
the  denomination  of  the  king's  creatures,  avail- 
ing themselves  of  the  royal  weakness  to  substi- 
tute themselves  for  the  most  considerable  and 
the  most  capable  men  in  England.  Violent 
discussions  in  both  Houses  of  Parliament  had 
well  nigh  left  them  in  a  minority ;  they  had 
dared  to  threaten  Parliament  with  a  dissolution, 
and  had  finished  by  dissolving  it,  strong  in  the 
support  of  George  III.  The  elections  had  taken 
place  in  June,  1807,  amidst  cries  of  "Down 
with  the  Papists !"  a  cry  which  always  finds 
many  echoes  in  England.  Seconded  by  the 
popular  fanaticism,  which  was  carried  to  such  a 
length  that  it  might  have  been  supposed  that  the 
Pope  had  actually  landed  in  Ireland,  ministers 
of  no  consideration,  champions  of  a  detestable 
cause,  had  obtained  a  considerable  majority. 
Such  were  the  men  who  at  this  moment  go- 
verned England. 

These  new  comers,  for  whom  Fortune  destined 
at  a  later  period  the  unmerited  honour  of  reap- 
ing the  fruits  of  the  efforts  of  Mr.  Pitt,  naturally 
desired  to  distinguish  themselves  from  their 
predecessors,  and  those  predecessors,  having 
Bought  to  temper  the  policy  of  Mr.  Pitt,  could 
do  no  other  than  seek  to  exaggerate  it.  They 
had  at  once  given  the  promise,  for  which  they 
were  most  bitterly  reproached,  not  to  propose 
any  measure  in  favour  of  the  Catholics ;  and  as 
to  foreign  politics,  they  affected  great  zeal  for 
the  allies  of  England,  unworthily  deserted,  they 
alleged,  by  Lord  Grenville,  Mr.  Windham,  and 
Lord  Howick. 

Without  loss  of  time  they  had  promised  ex- 
peditions to  the  Continent;  so  that,  entering 
into  the  ministry  in  March,  they  might  have 
been  able  in  April,  May,  and  June  to  afford 
useful  aid  to  the  belligerent  powers,  since 
Dantzig  had  not  surrendered  before  the  26th 
of  May;  but  they  had  done  nothing,  either 
from  incapacity  or  from  being  occupied  by 
domestic  affairs,  an  occupation  which  must  have 
been  urgent,  for  they  had  then  to  dissolve  Par- 
liament, and  to  convoke  a  new  one.  Be  this  as 


it  may,  after  they  had  assembled  a  considerable 
fleet  in  the  Downs  and  collected  at  that  point, 
numerous  troops  for  embarkation,  their  co- 
operation in  the  continental  war  was  limited  to 
the  despatch  of  an  English  division  to  Stral- 
sund.  The  news  of  the  battle  of  Friedland  and 
the  peace  of  Tilsit  had  filled  them  with  alarm 
for  their  country,  and  still  greater  for  them- 
selves ;  for,  after  reprehending  with  extreme 
severity  the  inaction  of  their  predecessors,  they 
had  rendered  themselves  liable  to  be  much  more 
justly  reproached  for  their  inertness  during 
the  three  decisive  months  of  April,  May,  and 
June,  1807.  It  was  therefore  necessary,  at 
any  rate,  to  attempt  some  enterprise  which 
should  strike  the  public  opinion,  which  should 
avert  the  reproach  of  inactivity,  which,  useful 
or  useless,  humane  or  barbarous,  should  be 
sufficiently  specious,  sufficiently  dazzling  to 
occupy  discontented  and  alarmed  minds. 

In  this  situation,  they  resolved  upon  an  en- 
terprise which  has  long  made  the  world  ring  as 
an  outrage  against  humanity,  an  enterprise  not 
only  odious,  but  very  ill-judged  in  regard  to 
British  interest.  This  enterprise  was  no  other 
than  the  famous  expedition  against  Denmark, 
projected  for  compelling  her  by  violence  to 
declare  herself  in  favour  of  England.  Paltry 
imitators  of  Mr.  Pitt,  the  English  ministers 
determined  to  inflict  on  Copenhagen  a  repeti- 
tion of  the  signal  blow  by  means  of  which  Eng- 
land had  in  1801  dissolved  the  coalition  of  the 
neutrals.  But  when  the  Addington  adminis- 
tration had  struck  Copenhagen  in  1801,  it  was 
to  break  up  a  coalition,  of  which  Denmark 
publicly  formed  a  part ;  it  was  an  act  of  war 
opposed  to  an  act  of  war ;  it  was  a  rash  opera- 
tion but  clever  in  its  temerity,  cruel  in  its  means 
but  necessary.  In  1807,  on  the  contrary,  there 
was  neither  pretext,  nor  justice,  nor  skill,  in 
attacking  Denmark.  That  State,  scrupulously 
neutral,  had  taken  extreme  care  to  maintain 
her  neutrality.  She  had,  from  an  unfortunate 
habit  of  using  greater  precaution  against  France 
than  against  England,  placed  her  whole  army 
along  Holstein,  incurring,  as  had  been  the  case 
at  Liibeck,  the  risk  of  a  collision  with  the 
French  troops  rather  than  suffer  the  line  of  her 
frontiers  to  be  violated.  Her  diplomacy  had 
acted  in  the  same  manner  as  her  army,  and 
had  always  manifested  a  jealous  susceptibility 
in  regard  to  France.  At  the  very  moment,  she 
had  not,  as  the  English  ministers  falsely  as- 
serted, just  been  engaged  in  treating  with  Rus- 
sia and  France,  and  stipulating  her  adhesion  to 
the  new  continental  coalition.  So  far  from  it, 
she  had  just  protested  once  more  her  desire  to 
maintain  her  neutrality,  though  Napoleon  had 
caused  an  intimation  to  be  made  to  her  with 
delicacy,  but  with  firmness,  that,  when  Eng- 
land shduld  have  explained  herself  respecting 
the  Russian  mediation,  Denmark  would  at 
length  be  obliged  to  come  to  a  decision,  and  to 
declare  for  or  against  the  oppressors  of  the 
seas.  If  on  this  occasion  the  English  ministers 
had  acted  judiciously,  they  would  have  left  to 
Napoleon  the  odious  part  of  compelling  Den- 
mark to  speak  out,  and  sent  a  fleet  into  the  Cat- 
tegat;  then,  in  case  of  the  approach  of  the 
French,  they  should  have  gone  to  the  assistance 
of  Copenhagen,  and,  in  assisting  that  capital, 
they  would  have  become  the  legitimate  masters 
of  the  Danish  fleet,  the  two  Belts,  and  the 


Sept.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


379 


Sound.  At  a  period  when  Europe,  already 
weary  of  suffering  by  the  quarrel  between 
France  and  England,  was  disposed  to  judge 
severely  either  of  the  two  powers  which  should 
aggravate  the  evils  of  the  war,  this  friendly 
conduct  and  assistance  afforded  to  Denmark 
would  have  been  the  only  line  of  conduct  to 
pursue.  The  contrary  conduct  gave  Denmark 
to  Napoleon,  spared  him  the  embarrassment 
of  himself  exercising  a  tyrannical  constraint, 
and  the  carrying  off  of  a  few  crazy  hulls  of  ships 
by  the  English  was  but  a  fruitless  act  of  pil- 
lage, the  more  impolitic  and  odious  since  it  was 
not  to  be  accomplished  but  by  the  abominable 
means  of  bombarding  a  population  of  women, 
children,  and  old  men. 

Supposing  that  enlightened  ministers,  placed 
in  a  simple  position,  had  then  directed  the 
politics  of  England,  the  choice  would  not  have 
been  doubtful,  and  their  conduct,  which  would 
have  consisted  in  aiding  Denmark  in  her  resist- 
ance against  Napoleon,  would  certainly  have 
prevailed.  But  Mr.  Canning,  Lord  Castlereagh, 
Perceval,  were,  with  more  or  less  of  oratorical 
talent,  sovry  politicians,  and  ministers  more 
intent  on  their  own  interest  than  on  that  of  the 
country.  They  imagined  that  the  repetition  of 
the  blow  of  1801  was  actually  necessary ;  and 
in  this  they  proved  themselves  puny  imitators 
of  Pitt's  policy,  and  every  imitator  is  a  cor- 
ruptor,  for  every  imitator  corrupts  what  he 
imitates  by  exaggerating  it. 

No  sooner  had  the  news  of  the  peace  of  Til- 
sit arrived  than  the  English  cabinet,  falsely 
pretending  to  have  obtained  from  secret  com- 
munications the  knowledge  of  a  stipulation, 
tending,  as  it  alleged,  to  subject  Denmark  to 
the  continental  coalition,  resolved  to  send  a 
powerful  expedition  to  Copenhagen  for  the  pur- 
pose of  securing  the  Danish  fleet,  upon  the 
pretext  that  to  deprive  Napoleon  of  the  mari- 
time resources  of  Denmark  was,  on  the  part 
of  England,  only  an  act  of  legitimate  defence. 
This  resolution  being  adopted,  the  English 
cabinet  immediately  issued  the  necessary  or- 
ders.' The  troops  and  the  fleet  were  all  ready 
in  the  Downs,  and  had  nothing  to  do  but  to  set 
sail.  Ever  since  the  check  before  Constanti- 
nople, the  Admiralty  had  in  its  counsels  made 
it  a  rule  that  every  naval  expedition  ought  to 
be  accompanied  by  land  forces.  Conformably 
to  this  notion,  20,000  men  had  been  assembled 
in  the  Downs  ;  these,  added  to  the  English 
troops  sent  to  Stralsund,  would  form  an  army 
of  twenty-seven  or  twenty-eight  thousand  men 
under  the  walls  of  Copenhagen.  The  proceed- 
ings were  to  be  worthy  of  the  object.  Taking 
advantage  of  the  circumstance  that  Denmark 
had  all  her  troops,  not  in  the  islands  of  Seeland 
and  Funen,  but  on  the  frontiers  of  Holstein,  it 
was  resolved  to  throw  a  naval  division  into  the 
two  Belts,  to  intercept  those  passages,  and  thus 
to  prevent  the  Danish  army  from  coming  to  the 
succour  of  Copenhagen,  then  to  land  20,000 
men  around  that  capital,  to  invest  it,  to  sum- 
mon it,  and  if  it  refused  to  surrender,  to  bom- 
bard and  even  to  destroy  it.  This  plan  of  at- 
tack, founded  on  the  default  of  preparation 
towards  the  sea,  and  on  the  assemblage  of  all 
the  Danish  forces  on  the  land  side,  was  a  com- 
plete demonstration  of  the  good  faith  of  Den- 
mark and  of  the  base  ill  faith  of  the  British 
cabinet.  Sir  Home  Popham,  deeply  compro- 


mised in  the  failure  of  the  attempt  on  Buenos 
Ayres,  and  extremely  impatient  to  retrieve  his 
reputation,  had  greatly  contributed  to  the  con- 
ception of  the  plan,  and  also  contributed 
greatly  to  its  execution. 

It  was  under  these  circumstances  that  the 
offer  of  the  Russian  mediation  and  the  propo- 
sal to  treat  for  a  reconciliation  with  France 
arrived  in  London.  There  they  were  far  too 
deeply  engaged  in  a  system  of  implacable  hos- 
tilities, too  strongly  enticed  by  the  hope  of  a 
signally  prosperous  expedition,  to  listen  to  any 
pacific  proposal.  It  was  decided,  therefore,  to 
return  an  evasive  answer,  hypocritically  calcu- 
lated, which,  without  precluding  any  ulterior 
reconciliation,  would  for  the  moment  leave  the 
ministers  at  liberty  to  prosecute  the  enterprise 
commenced.  In  consequence,  in  a  note,  which 
was  a  parody  of  the  former  language  of  Pitt, 
they  declared,  like  him,  that  they  were  quit* 
ready  for  peace,  but  that  it  had  always  been 
prevented  by  the  bad  faith  of  France,  and  that, 
not  disposed,  after  so  many  fruitless  negotia- 
tions, to  fall  into  a  new  snare,  they  requested  to 
be  informed  on  what  bases  Russia,  on  becom- 
ing mediatrix,  was  commissioned  to  treat.  It 
was  a  shuffling  answer,  but  of  which  posterior 
acts  were  soon  to  furnish  a  cruelly  negative 
interpretation. 

Admiral  Gambier,  commanding  the  English 
fleet,  and  Lieutenant-general  Cathcart,  com- 
manding the  land-forces,  set  sail  in  several  di- 
visions towards  the  end  of  July.  The  expedi- 
tion, starting  from  several  ports  in  the  Chan- 
nel, was  composed  of  25  sail  of  the  line,  40 
frigates,  and  377  transports.  It  carried  about 
20,000  men,  and  was  to  find  seven  or  eight 
thousand  returning  from  Stralsund.  The  ships 
of  war  preceded  the  fleet  of  transports,  in  or- 
der to  surround  the  island  of  Seeland,  and  to 
prevent  the  return  of  the  Danish  troops  to- 
wards Copenhagen.  This  fleet  was  on  the  1st 
of  August  in  the  Cattegat,  on  the  3d  at  the  en- 
trance of  the  Sound.  Before  proceeding  up 
the  Sound,  Admiral  Gambier  had  detached 
Commodore  Keats  with  a  division  of  frigates 
and  brigs,  and  a  few  seventy-fours,  drawing 
but  little  water,  to  secure  the  two  Belts,  and  to 
station  a  squadron  there,  with  orders  not  to 
suffer  a  single  man  to  pass  from  the  Continent 
to  the  island  of  Funen,  or  from  the  island  of 
Funen  to  that  of  Seeland.  This  precaution 
taken,  the  fleet  passed  the  Sound  without  re- 
sistance, because  Denmark  knew  nothing,  and 
Sweden  knew  every  thing.  It  came  to  an  an- 
chor in  the  road  of  Elsineur,  near  the  fortress 
of  Kronenborg,  which  continued  silent,  and  it 
despatched  an  English  agent  to  address  a  sum- 
mons to  the  Prince-royal  of  Denmark,  then 
regent  of  the  kingdom.  The  agent  chosen  was 
worthy  of  the  mission.  It  was  Mr.  Jackson, 
who  had  formerly  been  charge"  d'affaires  in 
France,  before  the  arrival  of  Lord  Whitworth 
in  Paris,  but  who  could  not  be  left  there,  on 
account  of  the  bad  spirit  which  he  manifested 
on  all  occasions.  He  did  not  meet  with  the 
prince-royal  in  Copenhagen,  and  went  in  quest 
of  him  to  Kiel,  where  the  royal  family  was  re- 
siding at  the  moment.  Being  introduced  to  the 
regent,  he  alleged  a  pretended  secret  stipula- 
tion, by  virtue  of  which  Denmark,  it  was  said, 
was  voluntarily  or  by  force  to  join  a  continental 
coalition  against  England.  As  a  reasoii  f*r 


380 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept.  1807 


acting,  he  assigned  the  necessity  in  which  the 
British  cabinet  found  itself  to  take  precautions 
lest  the  naval  forces  of  Denmark  and  the  pas- 
sage of  the  Sound  should  fall  into  the  power 
of  the  French ;  and  in  consequence  he  demand- 
ed, in  the  name  of  his  governnent,  that  the  for- 
tress of  Kronenborg,  which  commands  the 
Sound,  the  port  of  Copenhagen,  and  lastly  the 
fleet  itself,  should  be  delivered  up  to  the  Eng- 
lish army,  promising  that  the  whole  should  be 
held  in  deposit  for  the  account  of  Denmark, 
which  should  be  put  again  in  possession  of  all 
that  was  to  be  taken  from  her,  when  the  dan- 
ger should  be  over.  Mr.  Jackson  gave  an  as- 
surance that  Denmark  should  not  lose  any 
thing,  that  the  English  would  conduct  them- 
selves in  his  country  as  auxiliaries  and  friends, 
that  the  British  troops  would  pay  for  all  that 
they  should  consume. — "And  with  what,"  re- 
plied the  indignant  prince,  "would  you  pay  for 
our  lost  honour,  if  we  were  to  accede  to  this 
infamous  proposal  ?"  The  prince  continued, 
and  contrasting  with  this  perfidious  aggression 
the  upright  conduct  of  Denmark,  which  had 
taken  no  precautions  against  the  English,  which 
had  taken  all  against  the  French,  and  now  found 
that  her  confidence  was  abused  to  surprise  her. 
Mr.  Jackson  replied  to  this  just  indignation  with 
an  insolent  familiarity,  saying  that  war  was 
war,  and  that  one  must  submit  to  its  necessi- 
ties and  yield  to  the  stronger  when  one  is  the 
weaker  party.  The  prince  dismissed  the  Eng- 
lish agent  with  very  harsh  words,  declaring 
that  he  should  immediately  return  to  Copen- 
hagen to  perform  there  his  duties  of  Danish 
prince  and  citizen.  He  accordingly  repaired 
thither,  made  known  by  a  proclamation  the 
dangers  with  which  the  country  was  threat- 
ened, addressed  a  patriotic  appeal  to  the  popu- 
lation, and  prescribed  all  the  measures  which 
time  and  the  unexpected  investment  of  the 
island  of  Seeland  allowed  to  be  taken — an  in- 
vestment which  had  already  become  so  close 
that  the  prince  had  himself  found  the  greatest 
difficulty  to  cross  the  two  Belts.  Unfortunately, 
the  means  of  defence  were  far  from  correspond- 
ing with  the  wants  of  Copenhagen,  for  there 
were  scarcely  5000  troops  in  the  city,  3000  of 
the  line,  and  2000  well  organized  militia.  To 
these  were  added  a  civic  guard  of  three  or  four 
thousand  citizens  and  students.  All  the  old 
ships  were  moored,  as  in  1801,  outside  the  pas- 
pages,  so  as  to  cover  the  city  towards  the  sea 
with  floating  batteries.  The  fleet,  the  object 
of  the  predilection  and  the  pride  of  the  Danes, 
was  carefully  removed  to  the  interior  of  the 
basin;  and,  lastly,  on  the  land  side  works  were 
hastily  thrown  up,  for  it  was  known  that  the 
English  had  brought  with  them  a  great  land 
force,  and  the  heavy  artillery,  with  which  the 
Danish  arsenals  were  abundantly  provided,  was 
mounted  in  battery  in  all  quarters.  But  if 
such  means  were  sufficient  to  prevent  the  tak- 
ing of  the  city  by  assault,  they  were  far  from 
sufficient  against  the  danger  of  a  bombardment. 
It  would  have  been  requisite  to  keep  the  enemy 
at  such  a  distance  as  should  render  any  bom- 
bardment impossible,  or  to  have  had  outworks, 
which  Denmark,  relying  upon  the  insular  posi- 
tion of  her  capital,  had  never  thought  of  erect- 
ing, or  an  army  of  the  line,  which  her  good 
faith  had  induced  her  to  place  on  the  frontier 
of  her  territory.  Be  this  as  it  may,  the  prince, 


after  making  the  dispositions  adapted  to  th» 
urgency  of  circumstances,  left  a  brave  officer, 
General  Peymann,  to  command  the  city  of  Co- 
penhagen, with  orders  to  defend  himself  to  the 
last  extremity.  As  there  was  in  the  island  of 
Seeland  itself,  and  consequently  within  the 
Belts,  a  pretty  numerous  population,  capable 
of  furnishing  some  thousand  militia,  he  ordered 
General  Castenskiold  to1  assemble  this  militia 
in  all  haste,  and  to  introduce  it,  if  possible, 
into  Copenhagen,  before  the  investment  of  that 
city.  As  for  himself,  he  left  the  place  and 
hastened  in  person  to  Holstein  to  collect  the 
army  scattered  on  the  frontier,  and  lead  it  to 
the  relief  of  the  capital,  if  he  could  succeed  in 
crossing  the  Belts. 

Meanwhile  the  English  envoy,  having  re- 
turned to  the  fleet,  directed  the  English  lega- 
tion to  leave  Copenhagen,  and  gave  Admiral 
Gambier,  as  well  as  General  Cathcart,  the 
signal  for  the  fearful  execution  prepared 
against  a  city,  whose  whole  crime  consisted  in 
the  possession  of  a  fleet  which  the  English 
ministers  wanted  to  capture  in  order  to  place 
themselves  on  higher  ground  in  parliament. 
The  parleys  with  the  Danish  government,  the 
necessity  for  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  trans- 
port fleet,  which  sailed  later  than  the  ships  of 
war,  the  tarrying  for  a  favourable  wind,  had 
retarded  Admiral  Gambier's  operations  till  the 
15th  of  August.  On  the  16th  he  stood  in 
shore  at  a  point  of  the  coast  called  Webeck,  a 
few  leagues  to  the  north  of  Copenhagen,  and 
there  landed  about  20,000  men,  mostly  Ger- 
mans in  the  service  of  England.  The  division 
of  troops  from  Stralsund  was  to  land  to  the 
south  towards  Kioge.  Encouraged  by  the  pre- 
sence in  the  Belts  of  Commodore  Keats'  divi- 
sion of  light  vessels,  they  commenced  in  secu- 
rity their  criminal  enterprise.  The  English 
well  knew  that  they  should  not  be  able  even 
with  thirty  thousand  men  to  carry  by  assault  a 
place  defended  by  eight  or  nine  thousand  men, 
five  thousand  of  whom  were  regular  troops, 
and  a  population  of  very  brave  seamen.  But 
they  reckoned  upon  the  means  of  destruction 
which  they  had  at  their  disposal,  thanks  to  the 
immense  quantity  of  heavy  artillery  brought 
in  their  ships.  To  make  the  more  sure  of  suc- 
cess, they  had  even  brought  with  them  Colonel 
Congreve,  who  was  to  make  trial,  for  the  first 
time,  of  his  formidable  rockets.  In  conse- 
quence, their  operations  did  not  consist  in 
regular  works  of  approach,  but  in  the  solid 
and  well-protected  establishment  of  a  few  bat- 
teries for  red-hot  shot.  Around  Copenhagen 
there  was  a  sort  of  lake,  of  oblong  form,  which 
embraced  nearly  all  that  portion  of  enclosure 
on  the  land  side.  They  took  a  position  behind 
this  lake,  and  there  entrenched  themselves. 
Covered  in  this  manner,  on  the  side  next  to 
the  city,  against  sallies  of  the  besieged,  they 
sought  to  cover  themselves  on  the  side  next 
the  country  also  by  a  second  line  of  counter- 
vallation,  in  order  to  keep  in  awe  the  militia 
of  Seeland,  assembled  under  General  Casten- 
skiold, or  the  regular  troops  themselves,  if  any 
of  them  should  find  means  to  cross  the  Belts. 
Having  solidly  established  themselves,  they 
began  to  construct  their  batteries  for  red-hot 
shot,  and  refrained  from  making  use  of  them 
till  they  should  be  completely  armed  and  in  a 
state  for  opening  a  destructive  fire.  While 


Sept.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


381 


they  were  thus  engaged,  their  fleet  had  ap- 
proached the  side  next  the  sea,  and  brisk 
skirmishes  took  place  on  the  two  elements, 
between  the  besieged  and  the  besiegers.  A 
Danish  flotilla,  hastily  equipped,  contested 
with  the  English  flotilla,  and  with  advantage, 
the  narrow  passages  by  which  it  is  possible  to 
approach  Copenhagen  ;  while  the  troops  of  the 
line,  shut  up  in  the  city,  made  frequent  sorties 
against  General  Cathcart's  troops.  Having 
unfortunately  the  option  of  only  two  points  of 
attack,  the  two  extremities  of  the  lake  which 
separated  them  from  the  enemy,  the  Danes 
found,  when  they  attempted  sorties,  the  Eng- 
lish forces  drawn  to  those  two  points,  and  were 
not  sufficiently  numerous  to  force  the  lines  of 
the  besiegers.  They  were  obliged  every  time 
to  fall  back,  after  killing  a  few  men,  and  hav- 
ing lost  many  more  than  they  had  killed,  on 
account  of  the  disadvantage  of  position. 

The  English,  to  make  sure  of  success,  await- 
ed the  arrival  of  their  second  division,  which 
was  before  Stralsund.  The  Swedes  having,  at 
their  instigation,  resumed  hostilities,  Marshal 
Brune  proceeded  to  lay  siege  to  that  place  with 
38,000  men  and  all  the  siege  artillery,  the  use 
of  which  was  restored  to  the  French  army  by 
the  reduction  of  Dantzig,  and  by  the  cessation 
of  hostilities  before  Colberg,  Marienberg,  and 
Graudenz.  Marshal  Brune  was  accompanied 
by  General  Chasseloup,  of  the  engineers,  the 
same  who  had  contributed  so  much  to  the 
taking  of  Dantzig.  That  able  officer,  possess- 
ing this  time  all  the  means,  which  had  been 
but  successively  accumulated  before  the  fort- 
ress of  Dantzig,  purposed  to  make  the  siege  of 
Stralsund  a  model  of  precision,  vigour,  and 
promptitude.  He  had  planned  three  attacks, 
but  with  the  intention  of  rendering  only  one 
of  the  three  serious, — that  which,  directed 
towards  the  Kneiper  gate  to  the  north,  might 
carry  destruction  to  the  Swedish  fleet.  Having 
opened  the  trenches  at  all  points  at  once,  in 
spite  of  the  fire  of  the  place,  he  had  in  a  few 
days  established  and  armed  his  batteries,  and 
commenced  an  attack  so  tremendous  that  the 
hostile  general,  though  he  had  15,000  Swedes 
and  seven  or  eight  thousand  English,  either  in 
the  fortress  or  in  the  Isle  of  Riigen,  found  him- 
self compelled  to  send  a  flag  of  truce,  and  to 
surrender  Stralsund  on  the  21st  of  August. 

During  this  siege,  conducted  by  the  French 
with  a  bravery  and  skill  worthy  of  admiration, 
General  Cathcart  had  been  joined,  agreeably 
to  his  orders,  by  the  division  of  English  troops 
which  had  been  directed  to  co-operate  with  the 
Swedes.  He  had  just  disembarked  it  at  Kioge, 
and  from  that  moment  he  had  so  closely  shut 
up  the  city  of  Copenhagen  within  a  double  line 
of  countervallation  that  he  had  it  in  his  power 
to  destroy  that  unfortunate  city,  without  hav- 
ing any  thing  to  fear  from  the  effects  of  its 
despair.  Nothing  is  more  legitimate  than  a 
siege.  Nothing  is  more  barbarous  than  a 
bombardment,  when  one  of  those  imperious 
necessities  of  war  which  justify  all  things  does 
not  render  it  excusable.  And  what  necessity 
for  justifying  the  atrocious  proceeding  prepared 
by  the  English,  but  that  of  pillaging  a  fleet  and 
an  arsenal  reputed  to  be  very  rich. 

Nevertheless,  on  the  1st  of  September,  Ge- 
neral Cathcart,  having  in  battery  sixty-eight 
pieces  of  artillery,  forty-eight  of  which  were 


mortars  and  howitzers,  summoned  Copenhagen 
in  a  language  the  feigned  humanity  of  which 
could  not  deceive.  He  required  that  the  port, 
the  arsenal,  and  the  fleet,  should  be  delivered 
up  to  him,  threatening,  in  case  of  refusal,  to 
burn  the  city,  and  adding  to  his  summons 
pressing  entreaties  that  he  might  be  spared  the 
employment  of  the  means  which,  he  said,  were 
repugnant  to  his  heart.  General  Peymaun, 
having  replied  in  the  negative,  a  tremendous 
fire  of  howitzers,  bombs,  and  Congreve  rockets, 
burst  over  the  hapless  capital  of  Denmark. 
The  barbarous  authors  of  this  enterprise  had 
not  even  the  excuse  of  their  own  danger,  for 
they  were  so  covered  as  not  to  lose  a  single 
man.  After  continuing  this  cruelty  the  whole 
night  of  the  2d  of  September,  and  part  of  the 
next  day,  the  English  general  suspended  the 
fire  to  see  whether  the  place  would  surrender. 
Fires  had  broken  out  in  various  quarters ;  hun- 
dreds of  unfortunate  creatures  had  perished ; 
several  large  buildings  were  in  flames ;  the 
able  population,  employed  in  pouring  the  wa- 
ters of  the  Baltic  on  the  burning  quarters,  was 
exhausted  with  fatigue.  General  Peymann, 
with  a  heart  rent  by  this  spectacle,  maintained 
a  gloomy  silence,  waiting,  before  he  surren- 
dered, for  humanity  to  silence  honour.  Insen- 
sible to  all  these  calamities,  the  English  re- 
commenced their  fire  in  the  evening  of  the  3d, 
keeping  it  up  all  night  and  the  whole  of  the 
next  day,  excepting  a  short  interruption,  and 
persisting  in  this  barbarity  till  the  morning  of 
the  5th.  Nearly  2000  persons,  men,  women, 
children,  and  aged  people,  had  perished.  Half 
the  city  was  in  flames ;  the  fine  churches  were 
in  ruins ;  the  arsenal  was  on  fire.  General 
Peymann,  unable  to  withstand  any  longer  the 
horrible  scenes  which  he  had  before  his  eyes, 
yielded  at  length  to  the  threats  of  total  destruc- 
tion which  the  English  general  repeated,  and 
surrendered  Copenhagen  to  its  barbarous  con- 
querors. The  capitulation  was  signed  on  the 
7th.  It  gave  up  to  the  English  the  castle  of 
Kronenborg,  the  city  of  Copenhagen,  and  the 
arsenal,  with  the  faculty  of  occupying  them 
for  six  weeks,  the  time  judged  necessary  for 
equipping  the  Danish  fleet  and  carrying  it  off 
to  England.  This  fleet  was  given  up  to  Admi- 
ral Gambier,  upon  condition  that  it  should  be 
restored  at  a  peace. 

This  capitulation  being  signed,  the  English 
entered  Copenhagen  and  their  seamen  rushed 
to  the  arsenal.  No  spectacle  since  their  entry 
into  Toulon,  was  comparable  to  that  which  they 
exhibited  on  this  occasion.  Before  the  face  of 
a  population  overwhelmed  with  grief,  which 
beheld  its  habitations  ravaged,  whiph  numbered 
in  its  bosom  thousands  of  victims  dead  or  dy- 
ing, which,  besides  its  private  sorrows,  deeply 
felt  the  public  misfortunes,  for  the  loss  of  the 
Danish  navy  seemed  to  every  one  the  ruin  of 
his  own  existence — before  the  face  of  this 
afflicted  population,  coming  ashore  in  great 
numbers,  they  rushed  to  the  arsenal  with  un- 
heard-of brutality.  The  English  custom  of 
granting  to  sailors  a  great  part  of  the  value  of 
prizes,  in  adding  to  their  animosity  against  all 
European  navies  the  stimulant  of  personal 
greediness,  officers  and  men  displayed  extra- 
ordinary ardour  and  activity  to  get  afloat  every 
vessel  in  Copenhagen  that  was  in  a  state  to  put 
to  sea.  There  were  found  sixteen  sail  r.f  »h« 


382 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Sept.  1807. 


line,  and  about  a  score  of  brigs  and  frigates 
capable  of  serving,  with  the  rigging  stowed 
away  in  storehouses  kept  in  very  good  order. 
In  a  few  days  these  forty  and  odd  vessels  were 
rigged,  equipped,  and  warped  out  of  the  basins. 
The  destructive  zeal  of  the  English  sailors  did 
not  stop  at  this  robbery.  There  were  two  ships 
building — them  they  demolished.  All  the  tim- 
ber and  naval  stores  in  the  arsenal  were  car- 
ried on  board  the  Danish  squadron  or  the  Eng- 
lish squadron.  They  took  away  the  very  tools 
of  the  workmen,  and  destroyed  whatever  they 
could  not  carry  off.  Half  of  the  English  crews 
was  then  put  on  board  the  Danish  ships  to  na- 
vigate them,  and  the  entire  expedition,  the 
conquering  as  well  as  the  conquered  fleet, 
worked  through  the  passages,  taking  care  to 
receive  on  board  in  haste  the  army  which  it 
had  landed,  and  which  did  not  think  itself  safe 
in  a  city  that  it  had  drenched  with  blood,  and 
on  the  approach  of  the  French,  who  were 
coming  in  all  haste  to  avenge  such  an  atrocity. 
Passing  Webeck,  Kronenborg,  and  all  the 
points  of  the  coast,  this  immense  naval  arma- 
ment picked  up  the  English  troops,  and  then 
made  sail  for  the  coast  of  England. 

It  would  be  impossible  to  express  the  sensa- 
tion produced  in  Europe  by  the  unheard-of  act, 
which,  not  the  English  nation,  which  severely 
censured  that  act,  but  the  administration  of 
Mr.  Canning  and  Lord  Castlereagh,  had  au- 
thorized. The  indignation  was  general  among 
the  friends  of  France,  who,  at  that  time,  were 
not  numerous,  for  she  had  too  much  success  to 
have  many  friends,  as  well  as  among  her  most 
decided  enemies.  There  was  not  a  nation 
more  highly  esteemed  than  the  Danish  nation. 
Discreet,  modest,  laborious,  attentive  to  her 
own  commerce,  without  seeking  to  injure  that 
of  another,  making  a  point  of  scrupulously 
maintaining  her  neutrality  amidst  a  war  of 
bitter  animosity,  and  though  inoffensive,  yet 
capable,  as  in  1801,  of  devoting  herself  heroic- 
ally for  the  principle  of  that  neutrality  which 
formed  her  whole  policy,  she  was,  like  the 
Swiss,  like  the  Dutch,  one  of  those  nations 
which  make  up  for  numerical  weakness  by 
moral  strength,  and  know  how  to  command 
universal  respect.  The  surprise  of  which  she 
Lad  just  been  the  victim,  furnished  still  more 
striking  evidence  of  her  good  faith ;  for  she 
suffered  for  having  taken  no  precaution  against 
England,  and  for  having  taken  too  much  against 
France.  Hence  there  was  but  one  sentiment, 
but  one  cry,  throughout  all  Europe.  Before, 
it  was  said  that  nobody  could  rest  quietly  be- 
side the  redoubtable  conqueror  begotten  by 
the  French  Revolution.  Now  it  was  said  that 
England  was  quite  as  tyrannical  at  sea  as  Na- 
poleon on  land ;  that  she  was  as  perfidious  as 
he  was  violent;  and  that,  between  the  two, 
there  was  neither  security  nor  repose  for  any 
nation.  Such  was  the  language  of  our  ene- 
mies, such  the  language  of  Berlin  and  Vienna. 
But,  among  our  friends  and  among  impartial 
men,  it  was  acknowledged  that  good  reason 
for  endeavouring  to  unite  all  nations  against 
ai.  intolerable  maritime  despotism — a  despot- 
ism which,  once  established,  would  be  invin- 
cible, would  suffer  no  flag  but  the  English  flag, 
no  traffic  but  in  English  produce,  and  end  in 
fixing  at  pleasure  the  price  of  English  com- 
modities, whether  exotic  or  manufactured.  It 


was  necessary  therefore  to  join,  in  order  to 
make  head  against  England,  to  wrest  from  her 
the  sceptre  of  the  seas,  and  to  compel  her  to 
restore  to  the  world  that  peace,  of  which,  on 
her  account,  it  had  been  deprived  for  fifteen 
years. 

It  is  certain  that  there  was  nothing,  except- 
ing peace,  which  Napoleon  wished  for  more 
than  such  an  event.  He  should  not  hereafter 
have  to  resort  to  violence  with  Denmark, 
which,  on  the  contrary,  would  throw  itself  into 
his  arms,  assist  him  to  close  the  Sound,  and 
furnish  him  with  what  was  of  more  value  than 
a  few  old  ships,  with  excellent  sailors,  fit  to 
man  the  innumerable  vessels  which  France  had 
on  the  stocks.  He  could  push  the  Russian 
armies  upon  Sweden,  and  push  the  armies  of 
Spain  upon  Portugal ;  ,Jie  could  even  require 
at  Vienna  the  exclusion  of  the  English  from 
the  shores  of  the  Adriatic ;  lastly,  he  could 
demand  every  thing  at  St.  Petersburg;  for, 
after  what  had  passed  at  Copenhagen,  Alexan- 
der could  not  meet  with  any  further  resistance 
to  his  policy  in  the  opinion  of  the  Russians. 
Had  Napoleon  at  this  moment  profited  by  the 
fault  of  England,  without  committing  an  equal 
one,  he  would  have  been  in  a  unique  position ;  he 
would  have  become  as  morally  strong  through 
the  wrongs  of  his  enemy,  as  he  was  materially 
through  his  own  armies.  In  fact,  the  trouble 
of  his  system  of .  conquering  the  sea  by  land 
was  saved,  for  the  violence  done  to  the  conti- 
nental powers  to  oblige  them  to  concur  in  his 
designs  would  be  thenceforward  explained  and 
justified.  If  he  closed  the  ports  of  the  Haii- 
seatic  towns,  of  Holland,  of  France,  of  Portu- 
gal, of  Spain,  of  Italy ;  if  he  doomed  the  peo- 
ple to  shift  without  sugar  and  coffee,  and  to 
substitute  for  those  productions  of  the  tropics, 
costly  and  very  imperfect  European  imitations ; 
if  he  did  violence  to  all  tastes,  after  having 
done  violence  to  all  interests  ;  he  had  a  com- 
plete and  signal  excuse  in  the  crime  of  Copen- 
hagen. But,  we  repeat  it,  he  ought  to  have 
left  England  to  sin  alone  and  not  himself  have 
sinned  so  grievously, — a  difficult  thing,  for,  in 
a  rancorous  contest,  faults  link  themselves  to- 
gether, and  it  is  rarely  the  case  that  the  faults 
of  the  one  are  not  speedily  balanced  or  sur- 
passed by  the  faults  of  the  other. 

Napoleon  was  well  aware  of  the  advantage 
which  the  conduct  of  England  gave  him,  and 
if  he  lost  a  hope  of  accommodation,  a  hope 
which  was  but  slender  in  his  estimation,  he  all 
at  once  saw  a  concurrence  of  means,  a  union 
of  efforts,  preparing  for  him,  which  would  pro- 
mise him  a  peace,  the  conditions  of  which  would 
compensate  the  delay.  He  failed  not,  there- 
fore, to  excite  the  journals  of  France  and  all 
those  that  he  could  command  out  of  France, 
against  the  abominable  act  which  had  roused 
the  indignation  of  Europe.  From  Fontainebleau 
itself,  from  amidst  the  pleasures  of  that  resi- 
dence, his  armies,  his  fleets,  were  all  prepared 
for  a  conflict  still  more  vast  and  more  terrible 
than  that  which  for  so  many  years  had  appalled 
the  world. 

For  the  rest,  Napoleon  had  no  effort  to  make 
in  order  to  impart  to  the  opinion  of  Europe 
that  impulsion  which  it  suited  him  to  give  to 
it.  In  England  itself  the  misdeed  committed 
against  the  city  of  Copenhagen  was  censured 
with  extreme  severity.  In  that  great  and  mo- 


Sept  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


383 


ral  country  there  were,  notwithstanding  an 
unworthy  administration,  notwithstanding  a 
debased  parliament,  notwithstanding  the  pas- 
sion of  the  people  for  the  success  of  the  na- 
tional navy,  there  were  enlightened,  honest, 
impartial  men,  who  condemned  •'he  unparalleled 
act  perpetrated  against  an  inoffensive  and  dis- 
armed power.  Lord  Grenville,  Messrs.  Wind- 
ham,  Addington,  Grey,  Sheridan,  and  others, 
spoke  out  with  vehemence  against  this  odious 
act,  which,  according  to  them,  was  but  an 
iniquitous  and  mischievous  parody  of  that  of 
1801  ;  for,  in  1801,  Denmark  formed  part  of  a 
coalition  hostile  to  England,  and  the  means 
employed  for  reducing  her  were  the  most  legi- 
timate of  all, — a  naval  battle.  In  1807,  on  the 
contrary,  that  same  Denmark  was  at  peace, 
wholly  occupied  in  defending  her  neutrality 
against  France,  disarmed  in  regard  to  Eng- 
land, and  the  method  employed  to  reduce  her 
was  the  atrocious  bombardment  of  an  inoffen- 
sive population.  The  result  was,  instead  of 
dissolving  a  coalition  of  neutrals,  to  link  Den- 
mark and  France  more  closely  together,  to 
spare  the  latter  the  odium  of  a  general  con- 
straint exercised  upon  the  Continent,  to  take 
upon  itself  that  odium,  to  close  the  Sound 
against  itself;  for  the  Danes  closed  it  on  their 
side,  and  the  Swedes  were  soon  forced  to  close 
it  on  theirs.  Lastly,  to  balance  such  deplor- 
able consequences,  there  was  nothing  to  allege 
but  the  pillage  of  an  arsenal,  the  carrying 
nway  of  a  fleet  which  was  very  old,  and  only 
four  ships  of  which  were  worth  the  expense  of 
repair.  Such  were  the  animadversions  directed 
with  deserved  vehemence  against  Mr.  Canning, 
who  replied  to  them  with  an  intrepidity  in 
falsehood,  which  is  not  of  a  nature  to  honour 
his  memory,  redeemed,  it  is  true,  by  his  pos- 
terior conduct.  For  his  only  excuse,  he  re- 
peated incessantly  that  ministers  had  obtained 
the  secret  of  the  negotiations  of  Tilsit,  and  that 
this  secret  justified  the  Copenhagen  expedition. 
His  adversaries  justly  replied  by  desiring  to  be 
informed,  not  who  was  the  author  of  this  reve- 
lation, whom  the  feigned  generosity  of  the 
British  cabinet  refused  to  name,  but  of  the 
mere  substance  of  what  he  had  revealed.  Now, 
on  this  point,  the  cabinet  returned  but  very 
confused  and  perplexed  answers,  and  could  not 
furnish  any  other :  for,  if  it  was  true  that,  at 
Tilsit  (as  the  British  cabinet  knew  but  very 
vaguely)  Russia  and  France  had  promised  to 
unite  their  efforts  to  force  the  Continent  into  a 
coalition  against  England,  this  was  only  after 
an  offer  of  peace  on  moderate  conditions ;  it 
was  moreover  unknown  to  the  cabinet  of  Co- 
penhagen, which  was  not  an  accomplice  in  that 
design.  In  the  conduct  pursued  towards  Den- 
mark, there  was  then  iniquity  in  a  moral  point 
of  view,  and  silliness  in  a  political  point  of 
fiew ;  for  the  true  means  of  having  that  neu- 
tral power  on  one's  side,  of  having  her  fleet, 
her  sailors,  and  the  Sound,  would  have  been  to 
assist  her  and  to  leave  to  Napoleon  the  trouble 
of  doing  her  violence. 

In  spite,  however,  of  the  reprobation  bestowed 
by  all  honest  men  in  England  on  the  Copen- 
hagen expedition,  a  parliament  subservient  to 
the  anti-Catholic  prejudices  of  the  Crown,  and 
to  the  extravagant  policy  of  Pitt,  decided  in 
favour  of  the  ministers,  but  not  without  be- 
traying the  embarrassment  which  it  felt.  It 


adopted  in  fact  the  form  of  an  adjournment, 
declaring  that  it  would  take  the  act  into  con- 
sideration at  a  future  time,  when  the  ministers 
should  have  it  in  their  power  to  say  what  they 
could  not  divulge  at  the  moment.  But  all  idea 
of  peace  was  for  ever  abandoned.  The  British 
cabinet,  not  disguising  from  itself  the  mischiev- 
j  ous  impressions  produced  in  Europe  by  its  late 
j  violences,  endeavoured  to  recover  its  credit 
with  the  two  principal  courts  of  the  Continent, 
those  of  Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.  It  sent 
Lord  Pembroke  to  Vienna,  General  Wilson  to 
St.  Petersburg,  to  convey  some  of  those  propo- 
sals which  one  chooses  rather  to  communicate 
orally  than  in  writing.  These  proposals  were 
the  following. 

From  the  apparent  satisfaction  which  the 
Emperor  Alexander  seemed  to  have  brought 
back  from  a  war,  marked  nevertheless  by  re- 
verses ;  from  the  deini-confidential  communi- 
cations which  he  had  made,  and  which  all  led 
to  the  inference  that  great  results  would  be 
seen  to  spring  from  the  alliance  with  France ; 
from  his  persisting  to  occupy  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia ;  it  was  evident  to  men  endowed 
with  any  sagacity  that  France,  in  order  to 
[  bring  Russia  into  her  views,  had  promised  her 
I  great  advantages  in  the  East,  and  that  she  had 
singularly  flattered  her  ambition  in  regard  to 
j  that  quarter.  The  British  cabinet  decided,  there- 
|  fore,  without  hesitation,  on  the  sacrifices  which 
circumstances  appeared  to  command,  and, 
though  it  incessantly  affected  to  defend  the  in- 
tegrity of  the  Ottoman  empire,  it  conceived 
that  it  would  be  better  to  give  itself  Moldavia 
and  Wallachia  to  Russia,  than  to  leave  them 
to  be  given  her  by  Napoleon.  In  consequence, 
General  Wilson,  bold  and  clever  as  a  soldier 
and  a  diplomatist,  a  personage  at  that  time  of 
too  little  importance  for  ministers  to  be  afraid 
of  disavowing  him  in  case  of  need,  was  charged 
to  convey  to  St.  Petersburg  a  message  of  the 
most  alluring  kind  for  the  Emperor  Alexander. 
He  had  no  ostensible  powers,  but  Mr.  Canning, 
in  conversation  with  M.  d'Alopeus,  the  Russian 
minister,  assured  him  that  credit  might  be 
given  to  what  General  Wilson  should  say. 
Lord  Pembroke,  envoy  extraordinary  to  Aus- 
tria, notwithstanding  the  presence  of  Mr. 
Adair,  was  directed  to  demonstrate  to  the 
court  of  Vienna  the  necessity  for  being  on 
good  terms  with  Russia,  and  consequently  for 
making  up  its  mind  to  all  the  sacrifices  which 
this  line  of  policy  might  entail.  The  real  drift 
of  this  was  nothing  less  than  to  dispose  Aus- 
tria to  see  with  calmness  Moldavia  and  Wal- 
lachia become  the  property  of  the  Russians. 

Lord  Gower,  ambassador  in  .Russia,  and 
General  Wilson,  who  had  been  sent  to  second 
him,  strove  to  persuade  the  Russian  cabinet 
not  to  take  amiss  what  had  been  done  at  Co- 
penhagen ;  that  ministers  had  merely  endea- 
voured to  deprive  the  common  enemy  of  Europe 
of  the  means  of  doing  mischief;  that  it  ought  to 
rejoice  instead  of  being  irritated  at  it;  that 
England  relied  upon  Russia  to  bring  back 
Denmark  to  a  more  just  appreciation  of  the 
late  events ;  and  that,  as  for  the  fleet,  it  would 
subsequently  be  given  back  to  her  if  she  would 
j  join  the  good  cause ;  that,  for  the  rest,  with- 
out pretending  to  set  itself  up  for  judge  of 
the  new  line  of  policy  adopted  by  Russia,  the 
British  cabinet  was  certain  that  she  would 


884 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept.  1807. 


Boon  return  to  her  old  system,  as  the  only  good 
one;  that  it  would  not  seek  to  involve  her 
again  in  war  with  France,  at  a  moment  when 
she  had  such  need  of  rest  to  recruit  herself; 
that  it  should  even  see  with  pleasure  any  ag- 
grandizement of  her  territory  and  her  power ; 
for  there  was  but  one  mischievous  sort  of  ag- 
grandizement which  must  by  all  means  be 
prevented — the  aggrandizement  of  France  ; 
but  that  if  Russia  was  desirous  to  have  Mol- 
davia and  Wallachia,  it  would  consent  to  her 
making  the  acquisition,  provided  that  it  was 
not  in  consequenoe  of  a  partition  of  the  Turk- 
ish provinces  with  the  Emperor  Napoleon. 

The  most  compromising  of  these  words,  those 
which  one  would  not  hazard  without  the  facul- 
ty of  withdrawing  them  in  case  of  need,  were 
spoken  by  General  Wilson  to  M.  de  Romanzoff, 
who  reported  them  a  moment  afterwards  to  Ge- 
neral Savary.  The  others  were  said  by  Lord 
Gower  himself  with  an  arrogance  which  was 
not  likely  to  destroy  the  strangeness  of  their 
effect.  That  smart  way  of  explaining  the  Co- 
penhagen expedition,  that  commission  given  to 
Russia  to  justify  England  to  Denmark,  were 
one  of  the  most  offensive  of  familiarities  to  the 
Russian  cabinet.  The  Emperor  of  Russia  felt 
it  deeply,  and  insisted  that  the  overtures  of 
England  should  be  received  with  the  greatest 
haughtiness.  In  reply  to  the  proposal  for  jus- 
tifying to  Copenhagen  the  carrying  off  of  the 
Danish  fleet,  he  caused  a  formal  demand  of  a 
formal  explanation  on  that  subject  to  be  made, 
and  he  required  Lord  Gower  to  give  an  imme- 
diate and  categorical  answer  to  the  offer  of  me- 
diation which  the  Russian  cabinet  had  addressed 
to  the  British  cabinet.  Lord  Gower,  since  so 
honourably  known  by  the  name  of  Lord  Gran- 
ville,  seems  on  this  occasion  to  have  shaken  off 
his  habitual  indolence,  insisted  imperiously  on 
being  made  acquainted  with  the  secret  of  the 
negotiations  at  Tilsit,  and  declared  that  until 
England  was  informed  of  what  had  been  done 
at  that  celebrated  interview,  she  should  hold 
herself  dispensed  from  all  explanation  respect- 
ing what  she  had  done  at  Copenhagen.  As  to 
the  Russian  mediation,  Lord  Gower,  being 
pressed  to  declare  definitively  whether  he  con- 
sented to  accept  it  or  not,  replied  proudly  that 
he  did  not. 

Such  was  the  issue  of  the  explanations  with 
Lord  Gower.  As  for  the  overtures  with  which 
General  Wilson  was  charged,  M.  de  Romanzoff 
received  them  superciliously,  as  words  of  no 
importance,  and  dismissed  Wilson  himself,  with- 
out seeming  to  comprehend  what  the  latter  had 
meant  to  say.  He  had  thoroughly  understood 
him,  however,  as  we  shall  presently  see. 

M.  de  Romanzoff,  formerly  a  minister  of  Ca- 
therine's, retaining  a  reflection  of  the  glory 
of  that  princess,  heir  of  her  vast  ambition,  a 
great  personage  in  all  respects,  had  become  in 
these  circumstances  the  intimate  confidant  of 
Alexander  and  of  all  his  dreams.  Minister  of 
commerce,  he  had  just  been  appointed  minister 
for  foreign  affairs ;  and  Alexander,  seeking  an 
ambassador  who  might  be  suitable  for  Paris, 
would  not  send  him  thither,  though  he  possessed 
every  quality  for  such  a  post,  solely  that  he 
might  keep  him  about  his  person.  The  young 
sovereign  and  the  old  minister  ardently  coveted 
the  provinces  of  the  Danube.  Finland,  an  ac- 
quisition immediately  more  desirable,  because 


it  was  a  necessary,  whereas  the  provinces  of 
the  Danube  were  but  superfluities,  did  not  in- 
terest them  by  far  so  much.  Moldavia  and  Wal- 
lachia led  to  Constantinople,  and  this  was  what 
allured  them.  They  would,  therefore,  have  ac- 
cepted them,  no  matter  from  what  hand ;  and, 
in  the  impatience  of  their  desires,  they  retained 
only  so  much  judgment  as  was  requisite  to  ap- 
preciate the  donor  the  most  capable  of  giving 
speedily  and  solidly.  In  regard  to  this  point, 
Napoleon  had  all  their  preference.  From  whom, 
in  fact,  could  one  at  that  period  receive  some- 
thing, and  something  considerable,  unless  from 
Napoleon  ?  To  take  territory  in  any  part  of 
the  European  continent  without  his  assent  would 
have  entailed  war  with  him ;  and  war  with  him, 
by  whatever  number  it  had  been  waged,  had 
not  hitherto  proved  successful.  Supposing, 
even,  that  a  new  general  coalition  could  be 
formed,  such  battles  as  those  of  Austerlitz, 
Jena,  and  Friedland,  presented  no  very  cheer- 
ing prospect ;  and  at  this  time,  too,  when,  in 
the  state  of  the  French  army,  any  encounter 
with  it  must  have  the  same  consequences.  Be- 
sides, if  England,  throwing  out  slight  baits  here 
and  there,  had  shown  an  easy  disposition  in 
regard  to  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,  could 
Russia  flatter  herself  that  Austria  would  mani- 
fest the  like  disposition  ?  Had  she  not  at  St. 
Petersburg  her  ambassador,  M.  de  Meerveldz, 
who  was  every  day  inquiring  aloud,  arid  of 
everybody,  the  secret  of  the  negotiations  at 
Tilsit,  and  who  declared  that,  if  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia  were  the  price  of  the  new  alliance, 
they  must  be  prepared  to  destroy  the  last  Aus- 
trian before  they  should  obtain  the  consent  of 
the  court  of  Vienna  ?  They  must,  therefore, 
not  hope  that  a  coalition  would  be  formed  to 
insure  such  a  gift  to  Russia.  This  gift,  con- 
ferred in  spite  of  Austria,  could  come  only  from 
the  man  who,  for  fifteen  years,  had  invariably 
conquered  her,  that  is  to  say  from  Napoleon ; 
and,  the  Emperor  of  Russia  leagued  with  the 
Emperor  of  France,  not  a  creature  in  Europe 
would  dare  to  oppose  what  they  had  jointly  de- 
termined upon. 

It  was  necessary,  therefore,  to  persist  in  the 
career  commenced  at  Tilsit,  and  to  obtain  from 
Napoleon,  by  contriving  to  please  him,  the  real- 
ization of  the  hopes  to  which  he  had  so  com- 
plaisantly  lent  himself  on  the  banks  of  the  Nie- 
men.  The  value  which  he  set  on  all  that  was 
expected  from  him  it  was  easy  to  discover.  If 
the  war  continued,  he  would  attempt  fresh  en- 
terprises in  Italy,  in  Portugal,  perhaps  even  in 
Spain.  In  those  countries  there  were  Bour- 
bons, who  must  form  a  glaring,  an  intolerable 
contrast  with  his  dynasty.  He  had  said  no- 
thing on  this  subject  at  Tilsit  or  elsewhere  to  any 
creature  whatever ;  if,  nevertheless,  peace  were 
further  adjourned,  it  was  easy  to  foresee  that 
he  would  not  stop  short  in  his  activity,  that  he 
would  prosecute  in  the  West  that  work  of  reno- 
vation which  consisted  in  dethroning  the  sove- 
reigns who  were  allies  or  relations  of  the  an- 
cient house  of  Bourbon.  But  Russia  was  not 
at  all  interested  in  preventing  enterprises  of 
that  kind.  It  was  indeed  of  little  consequence 
to  Russia  whether  a  Bourbon  or  a  Bonaparte 
reigned  at  Naples,  at  Florence,  at  Milan,  at 
Madrid.  The  ideas  introduced  in  the  train  of 
the  new  dynasties  created  by  Napoleon  did  not 
yet  threaten  the  authority  of  the  czars.  As 


Sept.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


385 


for  the  influence  of  France,  Russia  would  have 
no  reason  to  regret  her  aggrandizement,  if  that 
influence  were  employed  to  facilitate  the  march 
of  the  Moscovites  towards  Constantinople.  The 
Emperor  Alexander,  therefore,  had  no  cause 
to  be  uneasy  about  what  Napoleon  might  be 
tempted  to  undertake  in  the  south  and  west  of 
Europe ;  and  if  he  winked  at  it,  he  had  every 
reason  to  hope  that  Napoleon  would  let  him  do 
what  he  pleased  in  the  East.  Napoleon  might 
condescend  more  or  less  to  the  desires  of  Alex- 
ander, permit  him  to  advance  to  the  Danube,  to 
the  foot  of  the  Balkans,  or  even  to  the  Bospho- 
rus ;  but  the  least  that  he  could  grant  was 
Wallachia  and  Moldavia.  All  that  Napoleon 
had  said  on  this  subject,  at  least  all  that  Alex- 
ander conceived  that  he  had  heard,  seemed  to 
admit  of  no  doubt.  Alexander,  ruminating 
day  and  night  over  his  recollections  of  Tilsit, 
M.  de  Romanzoff  ruminating  over  what  Alex- 
ander had  related  to  him,  had  accustomed 
themselves  to  consider  Moldavia  and  Wallachia 
as  the  smallest  of  the  gifts  which  they  might 
hope  for.  By  dint  of  reckoning  upon  this  gift, 
they  had  even  arrived  at  a  sort  of  anticipated 
satiety,  and  they  began  already  to  conceive 
new  desires.  Unluckily,  they  had  not  confined 
themselves  to  this  intimate  and  secret  enjoy- 
ment of  their  future  conquests ;  they  had 
thought  fit  to  communicate  it  to  many  confi- 
dants, to  some  in  order  to  diffuse  their  inward 
satisfaction,  to  others  to  justify  themselves  for 
the  sudden  change  in  Russian  politics.  They 
had  thus  spread  around  them  a  conviction  that 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  were  the  assured  price 
of  the  new  alliance ;  and  they  were  instigated 
to  wish  for  the  possession  of  them,  not  only  by 
the  passion  for  possessing  them,  but  also  by 
the  urgent  desire  to  escape  passing  for  dupes. 

Recent  events  served,  therefore,  only  to  con- 
firm Alexander  and  M.  de  Romanzoff  in  the 
policy  adopted  at  Tilsit.  Since  the  mediation 
turned  to  war,  they  must  derive  from  war  all 
that  Napoleon  had  promised  to  make  it  produce ; 
only,  to  bind  him  the  more  firmly,  they  must 
lend  themselves  to  what  he  should  desire.  He 
was  evidently  about  to  require  that  the  English 
and  Swedish  legation  should  be  sent  away ; 
that  the  Russian  army  should  march  for  Fin- 
land, to  oblige  Sweden  to  close  the  Sound. 
They  must  satisfy  him  on  all  these  points,  that 
he  might  consent  to  leave  the  Russian  troops  in 
Wallachia  and  Moldavia.  Singularly  enough, 
to  march  into  Finland  ought  to  have  been  the 
primary  desire  of  Russia,  as  it  was  her  primary 
interest.1  However,  so  decidedly  had  they 
taken  the  route  to  the  East,  that  marching  to 
Finland  was  an  absolute  sacrifice  on  their  part, 
which  they  made  solely  that  they  might  be  suf- 
fered to  retain  Bucharest  and  Yassy. 

The  Emperor  Alexander  then  had  in  the  de- 
partment of  foreign  affairs  an  insignificant  mi- 
nister, without  passions,  without  ideas,  a  dis- 


i  Historians  too  often  make  historical  personages  think 
and  speak  without  having  any  mean?  of  knowing  either 
their  thoughts  or  their  language.    I  do  not  allow  myself 
here  to  report  the  most  secret  thought"  and  the  most  pri- 
vate conversations  of  the  Emperor  Alexander,  solely  be- 
cause, in  order  to  do  so,  I  could  support  myself  upon  docu- 
ments of  incontestable  authority.     I  have  said  in  a  note  to 
Vol.  II.,  Book  XXVII..  that  there  Is  in  the  I/ouvre  a  series  | 
of  conversations  of  Generals  Savary  and  Caulaincourt  with  : 
the  Kmperor  Alexander  and  with  M.  de  RomanzofT,  daily  ! 
conversations,  of  such  familiarity  and  privacy  that  I  durst  ; 
tot  give  them  entire,  for  Alexander  made  the  French  en-  j 
II.— 49 


agreeable  confidant  to  talk  with  about  matters 
which  left  him  perfectly  cold :  this  was  M.  de 
Budberg.  Alexander  dismissed  him,  and  exe- 
cuted his  intention  of  confiding  the  foreign 
affairs  to  M.  de  Romanzoff  himself.  There  was 
left  in  the  cabinet  one  of  the  members  of  that 
little  occult  society,  which  had  long  governed 
the  empire — Prince  Kotschoubey.  He  was  the 
youngest  and  the  most  reserved  of  them.  But 
he  was  a  witness  of  the  past,  a  troublesome 
judge  of  the  present ;  and,  besides,  Czartoryski 
and  M.  de  Novosiltzoff,  with  whom  he  lived, 
scarcely  disguised  their  disapprobation  of  the 
new  turn  which  things  had  taken.  He  could 
not  keep  about  him  critics  so  annoying,  and  he 
was  obliged  moreover  to  give  them  a  sign  of  his 
displeasure.  The  ministry  of  the  interior  was 
therefore  withdrawn  from  M.  de  Kotschoubey, 
M.  de  Labanoff,  one  of  the  personages  who  had 
figured  at  Tilsit,  was  called  to  the  ministry  of 
war,  M.  de  Tchitchagoff  to  the  marine ;  M.  de 
Novosiltzoff  was  recommended  to  travel.  Prince 
Czartoryski,  too  particular  a  friend  of  the  sove- 
reign for  friendship  not,  to  cause  politics  to  be 
forgotten  in  regard  to  him,  perceived  that  the 
affected  silence  which  the  emperor  observed 
with  him  relative  to  the  affairs  of  the  empire 
was  redoubled.  Lastly,  for  the  embassy  to 
Paris  was  selected  the  person  who  seemed  fittest 
for  succeeding  there.  Alexander  would  have 
wished  to  send  thither,  as  we  have  just  said, 
M.  de  Romanzoff  himself,  but  he  chose  rather 
to  keep  him  about  his  person.  He  had  for  grand 
marshal  of  the  palace  a  Russian  nobleman  who 
was  devoted  to  him :  this  was  M.  de  Tolstoy, 
and  this  nobleman  had  a  brother,  General  de 
Tolstoy,  an  officer  distinguished  for  his  spirit 
and  his  services.  Alexander  thought  that  the 
latter,  from  attachment  to  his  master,  would  not 
seek  to  render  himself  disagreeable  in  France, 
as  M.  de  Markoff  had  made  it  his  business  to 
do ;  that,  from  ambition,  he  would  be  delighted 
to  attach  his  name  to  a  policy  of  aggrandize- 
ment, and  that,  from  profession,  he  would  find 
pleasure  in  a  military  court,  and  please  it  in  his 
turn,  and  follow  it  everywhere  in  its  rapid 
movements.  At  the  same  time,  the  emperor 
purposed  to  send  to  Napoleon  on  this  subject, 
and  submit  to  him  the  choice  of  General  Couni 
Tolstoy,  before  he  should  definitively  appoint 
him. 

General  Savary  had  not  ceased  to  be  sur 
rounded  at  St.  Petersburg  by  the  attentions  of 
Alexander,  and  by  the  cold  politeness  of  higb 
Russian  society.  Though  he  knew  not  at  first 
all  that  had  been  said  at  Tilsit,  and  had  learned 
it  only  from  a  later  communication  of  Napo- 
leon's, who  had  thought  fit  to  acquaint  him 
with  it  in  order  to  prevent  any  faults  of  igno- 
rance on  his  part,  he  perceived  that  Russia  was 
ready  to  do  whatever  was  wished,  in  consider- 
ation of  the  relinquishment  of  one  or  two  pro- 
vinces, not  in  the  North  but  in  the  East.  With- 

voys  acquainted  with  his  very  pleasure* :  that  these  con- 
versations, committed  to  writing  at  the  moment  when  they 
had  just  taken  place,  reported  with  minim-  3delity,  in 
question  and  answer,  and  depicted  with  striking  truth 
what  was  passing  from  day  to  day  in  the  mind  of  the  em- 
peror and  of  his  minister.  From  the  solicitations  and  the 
ill-dissembled  agitations  of  both,  it  is  impossible  not  to  dis- 
cern clearly  what  they  thought.  Other  authentic  and 
secret  documents,  as,  for  instance,  the  personal  corres- 
pondence of  Napoleon  and  Alexander,  complete  tills  col- 
lection of  proofs,  and  enable  me  to  give  as  certain  Ian  Jo- 
tails  which  I  furnish  in  this  part  of  my  narrative. 

2K 


386 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Sept.  1807. 


out  involving  Napoleon  more  than  he  was 
obliged  to  do,  without  stepping  out  of  his  part, 
he  had  sought  to  render  himself  agreeable  at 
St.  Petersburg,  and  had  succeeded  in  flattering 
•with  prudence  the  passions  of  the  sovereign. 
Hence,  no  sooner  had  the  news  of  the  events  at 
Copenhagen  been  received,  no  sooner  had  the 
warm  explanations  with  Lord  Gower  taken 
place,  than  Alexander  and  M.  de  Romanzoff 
sent  for  General  Savary,  and,  in  the  language 
befitting  each  of  them,  communicated  to  him 
the  resolutions  of  the  Russian  cabinet. 

"You  know,"  said  Alexander  to  the  general, 
in  several  very  long  conversations,  "  that  our 
efforts  for  peace  end  in  war ;  I  expected  it,  but 
I  confess  I  did  not  expect  either  the  Copenhagen 
expedition  or  the  arrogance  of  the  British  ca- 
binet. My  resolution  is  taken,  and  I  am  ready 
to  fulfil  my  engagements.  In  my  interview  with 
the  Emperor  Napoleon,  we  calculated  that,  if 
the  war  were  to  continue,  I  should  be  led  to 
declare  myself  in  December,  and  I  could  wish 
that  it  were  not  earlier,  that  I  might  not  have 
war  with  the  English  till  after  the  shutting  up 
of  the  Baltic.  No  matter — I  shall  declare  my- 
self forthwith.  Tell  your  master  that,  if  he 
desires  it,  I  will  send  back  Lord  Gower.  Cron- 
stndt  is  armed,  and,  if  the  English  are  deter- 
mined to  make  an  attack  on  it,  they  shall  see 
that  fighting  the  Russians  is  a  very  different 
affair  from  fighting  the  Turks  or  the  Spaniards. 
However,  I  shall  not  decide  upon  any  thing 
without  sending  a  courier  to  Paris,  for  we  must 
not  run  the  risk  of  thwarting  the  calculations 
of  Napoleon.  Besides,  before  a  rupture,  I 
should  like  my  fleets  to  have  all  got  back  to 
Russian  ports.  Be  this  as  it  may,  I  am  entirely 
disposed  to  follow  that  conduct  which  shall  best 
suit  your  master.  Let  him  even  send  me,  if  he 
chooses,  a  note  ready  written,  and  I  will  order 
it  to  be  delivered  to  Lord  Gower  together  with 
passports.  As  for  Sweden,  I  am  not  prepared, 
and  I  ask  for  time  to  reorganize  my  regiments, 
which  suffered  severely  in  the  late  war,  and 
which  are  some  distance  from  Finland,  and 
would  have  to  be  brought  from  the  south  to  the 
north  of  the  empire.  Besides,  on  this  theatre 
my  army  is  not  sufficient  for  me.  In  the  shoal 
waters  of  the  gulfs  of  the  North-galley,  flotillas 
are  much  used.  The  Swedes  have  a  numerous 
one :  mine  is  not  yet  equipped,  and  I  will  not 
run  the  risk  of  receiving  a  check  from  so  weak 
a  State.  Tell  your  master,  then,  that,  as  soon 
as  my  means  are  prepared,  I  will  crush  Sweden ; 
that  he  must  give  me  till  December  or  January  ; 
but,  as  for  the  English,  I  am  ready  to  declare 
myself  immediately.  I  am  even  of  opinion  that 
we  ought  not  to  stop  there,  but  require  of  Aus- 
tria her  adhesion,  voluntary  or  compulsory,  to 
a  continental  coalition.  In  this  case,  too,  I  am 
disposed  to  receive  a  note  drawn  up  in  Paris, 
to  be  sent  to  Vienna ;  for  there  is  no  demi- 
alliance,  and  in  all  things  we  must  act  in  perfect 
harmony.  I  wish  my  friendship  with  Napoleon 
to  be  complete,  and  with  this  view  I  have  chosen 
M.  de  Tolstoy.  I  have  not,  like  your  master, 
abundance  of  eminent  men  in  every  line.  M. 
de  Markoff  possesses  understanding,  but  yet 
he  only  stirred  up  discord.  I  have  preferred 
M.  de  Tolstoy  to  any  other,  because  he  belongs 
to  a  family  which  is  devoted  to  me,  because  he 
is  a  soldier,  because  he  can  ride,  and  attend  the 
emperor  to  the  chase,  to  war,  and  wherever  it 


is  fit  that  he  should.  If  he  is  not  liked,  let  mo 
know  it,  and  I  will  send  another,  so  much  have 
I  it  at  heart  to  prevent  the  slightest  cloud.  \Ve 
shall  certainly  not  be  urged  to  fight  just  yet  ; 
but  tell  Napoleon  that  I  am  weak,  changeable, 
surrounded  by  his  enemies;  that  he  must  net 
reckon  upon  me.  I  shall  be  told  that  Napoleon 
is  insatiable,  that  he  wants  all  for  himself,  no- 
thing for  others ;  that  he  is  equally  crafty  and 
violent ;  that  he  promises  me  much, that  he  will 
give  me  nothing;  that  he  spares  me  just  now, 
but  when  he  has  got  out  of  me  all  that  he  wishes, 
he  will  fall  upon  me  in  my  turn ;  and  that,  se- 
parated from  my  allies,  whom  I  shall  have  suf- 
fered to  be  destroyed,  I  must  make  up  my  mind 
to  endure  the  same  fate.  I  believe  it  not.  I 
have  seen  Napoleon ;  I  flatter  myself  that  I  have 
inspired  him  with  part  of  the  sentiments  with 
which  he  has  inspired  me ;  and  I  am  certain 
that  he  is  sincere.  But,  when  one  is  at  a  dis- 
tance, and  we  cannot  see  each  other,  jealousies 
speedily  spring  up.  On  the  first  doubt,  on  the 
first  unpleasant  impression,  let  him  write  to 
me,  or  send  me  word  through  you  or  any  other 
confidential  person  he  shall  choose,  and  all  shall 
be  explained.  For  my  part,  I  promise  him  entire 
frankness,  and  I  expect  the  like  from  him.  Oh 
that  I  could  see  him,  as  at  Tilsit,  every  day, 
every  hour !  what  talent  for  conversation !  what 
an  understanding!  what  a  genius !  what  a  gainer 
I  should  be  by  living  frequently  near  him  !  how 
many  things  he  has  taught  me  in  a  few  days  ! 
But  we  are  so  far  distant !  however,  I  hope  to 
visit  him  soon.  In  spring  I  shall  go  to  Paris, 
and  I  shall  have  occasion  to  admire  him  in  his 
Council  of  State,  amidst  his  troops,  in  every 
place,  in  short,  where  he  appears  so  great. 
But,  till  then,  we  must  endeavour  to  understand 
each  other  through  an  intermediary,  and  to 
render  the  mutual  confidence  as  complete  as 
possible.  For  my  part,  I  am  doing  all  I  can  to 
that  end,  but  I  do  not  exercise  here  that  as- 
cendency which  Napoleon  exercises  in  Paris. 
This  country,  you  perceive,  has  been  surprised 
at  the  rather  too  abrupt  change  which  has  taken 
place.  It  is  apprehensive  of  the  injuries  which 
the  English  can  inflict  on  its  commerce  ;  it  is 
angry  at  your  victories.  These  are  interests 
which  must  be  gratified,  sentiments  which  must 
be  soothed.  Send  French  merchants  hither ; 
buy  our  naval  stores  and  our  productions  :  we 
will  buy  in  return  your  Parisian  commodities ; 
the  re-establishment  of  commerce  will  put  an 
end  to  all  the  anxieties  which  the  upper  classes 
conceived  on  account  of  their  revenues.  Assist 
me,  above  all,  to  conciliate  the  whole  nation  for 
yon,  by  doing  something  for  the  just  ambition 
of  Russia.  Those  wretched  Turks,  who  are  at 
this  day  slaughtering  your  partisans,  who  are 
striking  off  the  heads  of  all  that  are  reputed  to  be 
friends  of  the  French  (this  is  what  was  actually 
taking  place  at  the  moment  in  Constantinople, 
thanks  to  the  suggestions  of  Austria  and  Eng- 
land,)— those  wretched  Turks  are  no  match 
for  me,  and  I  should  think  that,  if  they  were 
put  into  the  balance  with  me,  you  would  not 
find  them  to  equal  me  in  weight.  Your  master 
has,  no  doubt,  told  you  what  passed  at  Tilsit." 
Here  the  emperor  appeared  inquisitive  and 
restless.  He  was  impatient  to  open  himself  to 
General  Savary  on  the  subject  that  interested 
him  most,  and  at  the  same  time  fearful  of  com- 
mitting an  indiscretion  by  disclosing  himself  to 


Sepv.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


387 


one  who  was  not  acquainted  with  the  secret. 
He  had,  however,  a  new  motive  for  explaining 
himself  to  the  representative  of  Napoleon.  An 
armistice  between  the  Turks  and  the  Russians 
had  been  just  signed  in  consequence  of  the 
French  mediation — an  armistice  which  stipu- 
lated the  restitution  of  the  vessels  taken  from 
the  Turks  by  Admiral  Siniavin,  the  interdic- 
tion of  all  hostility  before  spring,  and,  lastly, 
the  evacuation  of  the  banks  of  the  Danube.  In 
reality,  there  was  but  this  last  condition  which 
affected  the  Emperor  Alexander,  but  this  he 
would  not  admit,  and  complained  in  a  general 
manner  of  the  armistice,  which  he  imputed  to 
the  unfriendly  intervention  of  the  minister  of 
France. 

He  did  not  think,  he  said  to  General  Savary, 
about  the  provinces  of  the  Danube ;  it  was 
your  emperor,  who,  on  receiving  the  news  of 
Selim's  downfall,  exclaimed  at  Tilsit:  "One 
can  do  nothing  with  those  barbarians !  Pro- 
vidence releases  me  from  restraint  in  regard 
to  them ;  let  us  settle  matters  at  their  ex- 
pense !"  I  entered  into  this  track,  continued 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  and  M.  de  Romanzoff 
with  me.  The  nation  has  followed  us,  and  it 
is  not  too  notable  an  advantage  on  that  point 
to  render  it  favourable  to  France.  Finland,  to 
•which  you  urge  me  to  march,  is  a  desert,  the 
possession  of  which  smiles  on  nobody,  which, 
besides,  must  be  taken  from  an  old  ally,  by  a 
sort  of  defection  which  wounds  the  national 
delicacy,  and  affords  pretexts  to  the  enemies 
of  the  alliance.  We  must,  therefore,  seek 
elsewhere  specious  reasons  for  our  abrupt 
change  of  conduct.  Tell  the  Emperor  Napo- 
leon all  this :  persuade  him  that  I  am  far  less 
influenced  by  the  desire  to  possess  an  addi- 
tional province,  than  by  the  desire  of  rendering 
an  alliance  from  which  I  expect  great  things 
solid  and  agreeable  to  my  nation.  Ah !  re- 
peated the  emperor,  if  I  could  but  go  to  Paris 
at  this  moment,  all  would  be  settled  in  a  few 
minutes'  conversation ;  but  I  cannot,  before  the 
month  of  March. 

On  uttering  these  last  words,  the- Emperor 
Alexander  questioned  General  Savary  with  a 
restless  inquisitiveness,  in  order  to  learn  whe- 
ther he  had  not  heard  from  Napoleon,  whether 
he  was  not  in  the  secret  of  his  plans,  of  his 
resolutions,  in  regard  to  the  East  and  the 
West. 

General  Savary  used  infinite  art  not  to  dis- 
courage the  Emperor  Alexander ;  told  him, 
and  told  him  truly,  that  he  could  not  yet  know 
what  grand  ideas  the  continuation  of  the  war 
might  suggest  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  but 
that  he  would  certainly  do  every  thing  to  sa- 
tisfy his  powerfully  ally. 

M.  de  RomanzofF  was  still  more  explicit  than 
his  sovereign,  related  to  General  Savary  the 
overtures  of  General  Wilson,  the  effect  which 
they  had  produced  on  the  Emperor  Alexander, 
and  the  eagerness  of  that  prince  to  seize  this 
occasion  of  proving  his  fidelity  to  France,  by 
accepting  from  her  hand  what  he  might  receive 
from  the  hand  of  England.  He  expressed  to 
him  more  strongly  than  ever  his  resolution  to 
declare  himself  against  England  and  Sweden  ; 
against  Austria  herself,  if  it  were  necessary  to 
bring  over  this  latter  power  to  the  politics  of 
Tilsit.  Thus  it  was  that,  in  the  language  of 
the  day,  (for  people  create  a  language  for 


every  new  circumstance,)  they  termed  the  sys- 
tem of  tolerance  which  they  had  reciprocally 
promised  one  another  for  the  enterprises  which 
they  might  be  tempted  to  engage  in,  each  for 
himself.  M.  de  Romanzoflf  added,  that  Russia 
must  obtain  an  equivalent  for  all  that  she  was 
disposed  to  permit,  were  it  only  for  the  sake 
of  rendering  the  new  alliance  popular  and 
durable.  Receiving  at  this  moment  despatches 
from  Constantinople,  which  brought  intelli- 
gence of  fresh  disturbances,  M.  de  Romauzoff 
said,  smiling,  to  General  Savary,  that  he  saw 
plainly  that  it  was  all  over  with  the  old  Otto- 
man empire,  and  that,  unless  the  Emperor 
Alexander  interfered,  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
himself  would  soon  be  obliged  to  declare  in  the 
Moniteur  that  "the  succession  of  the  sultans 
was  vacant,  and  that  the  natural  heirs  must 
come  forward." 

While  everything  was  lavished  on  General 
Savary,  solicitations,  caresses,  familiar  effu- 
sions, and  even  presents,  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander, without  saying  a  word  about  that, 
directed  orders  to  be  given  to  his  army  not  to 
evacuate  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,  upon 
pretext  that  the  armistice  could  not  be  ratified 
as  it  then  stood.  He  and  his  minister  repeated 
that  they  must  be  left  in  quiet  on  the  subject 
of  the  Turks ;  that  the  Russians  must  not  be 
required  to  abase  themselves  before  bar- 
barians ;  that  they  ought  to  turn  their  atten- 
tion as  soon  as  possible  to  a  territorial  ar- 
rangement in  the  East,  to  send  confidential 
ambassadors  to  each  other,  and  above  all  to 
send  French  purchasers  to  St.  Petersburg  to 
supply  the  place  of  English  purchasers.  Alex- 
ander specially  solicited  two  things;  in  the 
first  place,  to  be  authorized  to  send  to  France 
for  education  the  cadets  destined  to  serve  in 
the  Russian  navy,  who  were  usually  brought 
up  in  England,  where  they  contracted  a  fac- 
tious spirit ;  secondly,  liberty  to  purchase  in 
the  French  manufactories  muskets  to  supersede 
those  of  the  Russian  soldiers,  which  were  of 
bad  quality,  adding,  that  the  two  armies,  being 
now  destined  to  serve  the  same  cause,  might 
then  use  the  same  arms.  He  accompanied 
these  gracious  expressions  with  a  magnificent 
present  of  furs  for  the  Emperor  Napoleon, 
saying  that  he  would  "be  his  furrier,"  and 
repeated  that  he  expected  M.  de  Tolstoy,  whom 
he  meant  to  despatch  as  soon  as  he  should  be 
definitely  approved  at  Paris. 

On  learning  these  details,  faithfully  reported 
by  General  Savary,  Napoleon  was  at  once 
gratified  and  embarrassed,  for  he  saw  that  he 
could  dispose  at  pleasure  of  the  Emperor  Alex- 
ander and  his  principal  minister.  But  he  had 
reflected  coolly  since  Tilsit,  and  began  to  think 
that  it  was  a  serious  matter  to  allow  a  fresh 
step  to  be  taken  towards  Constantinople  by  the 
gigantic  empire  of  Peter  the  Great — an  empire 
which  for  a  century  past  had  so  rapidly  in- 
creased that  it  was  enough  to  terrify  the  world. 
General  Sebastiani,  on  his  part,  wrote  to  him 
from  Constantinople  that  the  Russians  were 
abhorred  ;  that;  if  the  Turks  had  the  slightest 
hope  of  deriving  support  from  France,  they 
would  voluntarily  throw  themselves  into  her 
arms ;  and  that,  instead  of  having  to  fight,  iu 
order  to  force  them  to  become  subjects  of 
Russia,  a  trifling  assistance  might  perhaps 
sumce  to  aid  them  to  become  subjects  of 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1807. 


France ;  that  all  the  parts  of  the  empire,  fit, 
from  their  situation,  to  become  French,  would 
give  themselves  up  to  us  spontaneously ;  that, 
in  this  case,  it  was  with  Austria,  not  with 
Russia,  that  we  ought  to  seek  to  arrange  mat- 
ters ;  that  an  understanding  with  Austria  would 
be  easier  and  more  advantageous,  whether  one 
purposed  to  partition  or  to  preserve  the  Otto- 
man empire ;  for,  if  it  were  to  be  partitioned, 
she  would  demand  less,  always  satisfied  so  that 
Russia  had  no  share  of  the  banks  of  the 
Danube ;  and  if  one  decided  to  preserve  it,  she 
would  deem  herself  so  fortunate  in  such  a  reso- 
lution, that  one  would  have  her  concurrence 
with  very  trifling  sacrifices.  These  various 
ideas,  which  had  all  their  specious  side,  had 
succeeded  and  alternately  combated  each  other 
in  the  mind  of  Napoleon,  whose  activity  never 
rested,  and  he  resolved  pot  to  be  in  too  great  a 
hurry  to  decide  what  course  to  pursue  on  so 
important  a  subject.  In  a  system  of  moderate 
ambition,  to  refuse  satisfactions  to  Russian 
ambition  would  have  been  very  wise.  But 
with  what  France  had  undertaken,  with  what 
she  was  about  further  to  undertake,  it  was 
adding  to  the  temerity  of  French  politics  to 
engage  in  new  events,  without  attaching  Russia 
completely  to  her  by  a  sacrifice  in  the  East. 

Napoleon  thought  to  satisfy  Moscovite  ambi- 
tion, not  towards  the  East,  to  which  it  was 
strongly  attracted,  but  towards  the  North, 
which  had  very  little  attraction  for  it,  and  to 
give  up  Finland  to  Russia,  upon  pretext  of 
pushing  her  against  Sweden.  Such  a  conquest 
as  Finland,  said  he  to  himself,  is  a  jine  acquisi- 
tion, and  the  Emperor  Alexander  ought  to  find 
in  it  a  first  satisfaction  for  Russian  opinion, 
which  will  give  him  time  to  wait  for  others.  In 
fact,  Finland  was  a  fine  acquisition,  consider- 
ing real  European  interests  ;  for,  if  Russia,  in 
taking  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  would  take  an 
alarming  stride  for  Europe  towards  the  Darda- 
nelles, she  would  take  a  stride  equally  alarm- 
ing towards  the  Sound,  by  possessing  herself 
of  Finland.  Unfortunately,  while  she  thus 
obtained  an  extension  to  be  regretted  for  the 
future  independence  of  Europe,  she  would  be 
receiving  a  present  in  her  estimation  almost 
worthless.  Napoleon  gave  a  great  deal  in 
reality,  very  little  in  appearance ;  and  this 
was  the  contrary  to  what  he  ought  to  have 
done  to  purchase,  at  as  cheap  a  rate  as  pos- 
sible, the  new  alliance  which  was  about  to 
become  the  foundation  of  all  his  ulterior  enter- 
prises. He  nattered  himself,  therefore,  that 
he  should  satisfy  Russia  with  Finland ;  and,  as 
for  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,  he  resolved 
to  defer  any  decision  in  regard  to  them,  with- 
out however  destroying  the  hopes  which  he  had 
need  to  keep  up. 

He,  too,  had  had  great  difficulty  to  find  an 
itmbassador  suitable  for  the  court  of  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  he  had  finally  fixed  upon  M.  de 
Oaulaincourt,  at  this  time  grand  equerry,  a 
soldier  by  profession,  reputed  to  be  upright, 
intelligent,  worthy,  but  most  unjustly  compro- 
mised in  the  affair  of  the  Duke  of  Enghien, 
(which  Napoleon  almost  regarded  as  a  recom- 
mendation for  the  embassy  to  Russia,)  but  well 
fitted  to  acquire  influence  over  the  young 
emperor,  to  follow  him  everywhere,  and  to  dis- 
guise, by  his  very  straightforwardness,  the 
somewhat  artful  tendency  of  a  mission,  the  sole 


1  aim  of  which  was  not  to  perform  all  that  he 
had  been  taught  to  hope  for.  Napoleon  in- 
;  formed  M.  de  Caulaincourt  of  what  had  passed 
at  Tilsit,  acknowledged  that,  in  striving  to 
j  satisfy  the  Emperor  Alexander,  he  had  no  in- 
tention to  make  concessions  too  dangerous  for 
Europe,  and  recommended  to  him  not  to  spare 
any  pains  for  maintaining  an  alliance  up'n 
which  must  thenceforth  rest  all  his  policy.  Le 
placed  in  his  suite  some  of  the  most  distin- 
guished young  men  of  his  court,  and  allowed 
him  the  sum  of  800,000  francs  a  year,  that  he 
might  worthily  represent  the  great  Empire. 

He  wrote  at  the  same  time  to  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  thanking  him  for  his  presents, 
offering  magnificent  ones  in  return,  (Sevres 
porcelain  of  the  greatest  beauty,)  earnestly 
soliciting  that  he  would  assist  him  in  restoring 
peace,  by  forcing  England  to  submit  to  it ; 
requesting  him  to  send  away  immediately  the 
ambassadors  of  England  and  Sweden  from  St. 
Petersburg ;  apprising  him  that  a  French  army 
was  going  to  occupy  Denmark,  in  virtue  of  a 
treaty  of  alliance  concluded  with  the  court  of 
Copenhagen,  and  urging  him  to  march  a  Rus- 
sian army  into  Sweden,  that  the  Sound  might 
thus  be  closed  on  both  coasts ;  giving  him 
afresh  his  assent  to  the  conquest  of  Finland; 
acquainting  him  with  the  measures  which  he 
was  taking  in  regard  to  England,  in  order  to 
decide  him  to  adhere  to  the  policy  of  Tilsit, 
and  also  informing  him  of  the  entry  of  nume- 
rous armies  into  the  Spanish  peninsula,  for  the 
purpose  of  closing  it  definitively  against  the 
English  ;  telling  him  finally  that  he  had  nothing 
to  do  with  the  wording  of  the  armistice  with 
the  Porte,  that  he  disapproved  of  it,  (which 
implied  a  tacit  approbation  of  the  prolonged 
occupation  of  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,) 
and  that,  in  regard  to  the  maintenance  or  the 
partition  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  that  question 
was  so  important,  so  interesting,  both  to  the 
present  and  the  future,  as  to  require  his  ma- 
ture consideration ;  that  he  could  not  discuss 
it  in  writing,  and  that  he  purposed  to  examine 
it  thoroughly  with  M.  de  Tolstoy ;  that  he 
reserved  it  for  that  ambassador ;  and  that  it 
was  even  to  wait  for  him  that  he  had  deferred 
his  departure  for  Italy,  though  he  was  in 
urgent  haste  to  repair  to  that  country.  Let  us 
unite,  said  Napoleon  to  Alexander,  and  we 
shall  accomplish  the  greatest  things  of  modern 
times!  Napoleon  moreover  sent  word  to  the 
Emperor  and  M.  de  Romanzoff  that  the  minister 
Decres  was  about  to  purchase  twenty  millions' 
worth  of  naval  stores  in  the  ports  of  Russia  ; 
that  the  French  navy  would  receive  all  the 
Russian  cadets  who  should  be  sent  to  it  for 
instruction  ;  and,  lastly,  that  fifty  thousand 
muskets,  -after  the  best  model,  were  at  the  dis- 
posal of  the  imperial  government,  which  might 
send  for  them  to  any  place  that  it  should  be 
pleased  to  point  out. 

While  he  was  writing  thus  cordially  to  the 
Emperor  Alexander,  Napoleon  recommended  to 
M.  de  Caulaincourt  not  to  talk  too  much  about 
an  approaching  interview ;  for,  in  a  new  impe- 
rial tf.te-d-teie,  he  should  be  obliged  to  come  to 
a  conclusion  respecting  Turkey,  which  he  ex- 
tremely dreaded.  At  any  rate,  Finland  granted 
immediately,  the  provinces  of  the  Danube  left 
in  prospect,  the  silence  observed  relative  to 
their  prolonged  occupation,  lastly,  many  de- 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


369 


monstrations  of  friendship,  appeared  to  Napo-  ! 
leon,  and  they  really  were,  sufficient  means  for 
living  in  harmony  for  a  longer  or  shorter  but 
limited  time. 

Napoleon,  unfortunately,  had  not  merely  re- 
garded the  outrage  of  England  against  Den- 
mark as  an  occasion  for  conciliating  the  opinion 
of  Europe ;  he  had,  on  the  contrary,  discovered 
in  it  a  pretext  for  venturing  upon  fresh  enter- 
prises ;  and  he  resolved  to  take  advantage  of 
the  prolongation  of  the  war  to  complete  all  the 
arrangements  which  he  meditated.  He  thought 
that,  in  order  the  better  to  attain  this  end,  it 
might  be  well  to  conciliate  Austria,  and  to  put 
an  end  to  that  extremely  unpleasant  state  with 
her,  arising,  independently  of  the  ordinary 
grievances  of  that  court,  from  the  recent  events 
of  the  war.  Austria  was  angry  with  herself 
for  having  armed  without  profiting  by  the  op- 
portunity for  acting,  which  offered  after  Eylau 
and  before  Friedland,  for  having  incurred  use- 
less expenses,  and  for  having  shown,  for  no 
benefit  whatever,  dispositions  of  which  Napo- 
leon could  not  be  the  dupe.  She  was  uneasy 
about  what  he  might  require  by  way  of  punish- 
ing her,  more  uneasy  still  about  what  he  might 
have  promised  Russia  on  the  Danube,  and  but 
little  cheered  by  the  language  of  England,  who 
was  incessantly  repeating  that  she  must,  on  the 
one  hand,  prepare  seriously  for  war,  and,  on 
the  other,  reconcile  Russia,  by  herself  conced- 
ing to  her  all  that  Napoleon  was  ready  to  grant 
her ;  that  is  to  say,  after  the  terrible  calami- 
ties of  the  last  fifteen  years,  she  was  to  inflict 
upon  herself  a  new  one,  more  terrible  than  all 
the  others,  namely,  that  of  seeing  Russia  on  the 
Lower  Danube. 

Napoleon,  who  had  no  difficulty  to  discern 
the  uneasiness  of  Austria,  was  solicitous  to  put 
an  end  to  it,  that  he  might  be  more  free  in  his 
actions.  He  had  received  at  Fontainebleau, 
with  perfect  courtesy,  the  Duke  of  Wiirzburg, 
brother  of  the  Emperor  Francis,  transferred, 
as  we  have  several  times  observed,  from  prin- 
cipality to  principality,  and  most  desirous  to 
bring  about  a  good  understanding  between 
Austria  and  France,  that  he  might  not  have  to 
suffer  still  more  by  their  quarrels.  Napoleon 
entered,  at  length,  and  with  the  utmost  frank- 
ness, into  explanations  with  this  prince,  com- 
pletely satisfied  him  respecting  his  intentions 
towards  the  court  of  Vienna,  from  which,  he 
said,  he  had  no  desire  to  take  any  thing,  but  to 
which,  on  the  contrary,  he  was  ready  to  give 
up  the  fortress  of  Braunau,  left  in  the  hands 
of  the  French,  ever  since  the  treachery  com- 
mitted at  the  Mouths  of  the  Cattaro.  Napoleon 
declared  that,  the  Mouths  of  the  Cattaro  hav- 
ing been  restored  to  him,  he  considered  him- 
self as  having  a  right  and  interest  in  keeping 
Braunau,  an  important  place,  which  com- 
manded the  course  of  the  Inn ;  that,  on  the 
side  of  Istria,  he  desired  nothing  more  than 
the  maintenance  of  the  military  road  previ- 
ously granted  for  the  passage  of  French  troops 
proceeding  to  Dalmatia ;  that,  at  most,  if  they 
should  consent  to  it  at  Vienna,  he  should  pro- 
pose a  rectification  of  the  frontiers  between  the 
kingdom  of  Italy  and  the  empire  of  Austria,  a 
rectification  limited  to  the  exchange  of  the 
email  Italian  territories  situated  on  the  left 
bank  of  the  Izonzo  for  the  small  Austrian  ter- 
ritories situated  on  the  right  bank,  so  as  to 


take  the  thalweg  of  that  river  for  the  boundary ; 
that,  this  done,  he  should  require  nothing  more, 
and  would  be  quite  disposed  to  respect  scrupu- 
lously the  letter  of  the  treaties.  In  regard  to 
general  policy,  Napoleon  added  that  he  joined 
Russia  in  soliciting  Austria  to  assist  him  in  re- 
storing peace,  by  closing  the  coasts  of  thf 
Adriatic  to  English  commerce ;  that  the  atro- 
cious affair  of  Copenhagen  rendered  this  a  duty 
for  all  the  powers;  that  if  Austria  pursued 
this  course,  she  would  have  the  honour  of  re- 
establishing peace,  for  England  would  not  hold 
out  against  the  strongly  expressed  unanimity 
of  the  Continent;  that,  finally,  this  union  on 
all  points  being  obtained,  the  court  of  Vienna 
would  no  doubt  renounce  useless,  expensive, 
and  annoying  armaments ;  that  Napoleon,  on 
his  part,  would  not  have  any  more  urgent  con- 
cern than  to  withdraw  his  armies,  and  to  con- 
vey them  to  the  coast  of  Lower  Italy.  As  for 
Turkey,  Napoleon  spoke  of  it  very  vaguely,  and 
manifested  no  disposition  for  any  speedy  reso- 
lution. Moreover,  he  always  gave  it  to  be  un- 
derstood that  nothing  would  be  done  in  the  East 
but  in  concert  with  Austria,  that  is  to  say,  in 
allotting  her  share  to  her,  in  case  the  Ottoman 
empire  should  cease  to  exist. 

These  explanations,  which  were  honestly 
given,  and  which  were  received  with  joy  by  the 
Duke  of  Wiir/burg — these  explanations,  trans- 
mitted to  Vienna,  imparted  a  real  relief.  Deep 
as  was  the  regret  felt  for  having  neglected  to 
seize  the  moment  when  Napoleon  was  marching 
towards  the  Niemen,  to  place  himself  between 
it  and  the  Rhine,  nothing  better  was  desired, 
now  that  the  opportunity  was  lost,  than  to  re- 
main quiet,  and  not  to  have  such  an  enemy  to 
contend  with,  when  one  was  alone  and  had  no 
other  ally  than  England,  a  not  very  helpful 
ally,  who,  when  she  had  urged  on  the  conti- 
nental powers  to  war,  and  made  them  fight, 
quietly  drew  back  to  her  island,  complaining 
of  the  bad  quality  of  the  auxiliary  troops.  To 
learn  that  it  could  recover  Braunau  without 
sustaining  any  loss  in  Istria,  to  learn,  more- 
over, that  nothing  speedy  was  preparing  in  the 
East,  would  have  afforded  real  joy  to  the  Aus- 
trian cabinet,  if,  in  the  present  state  of  things, 
it  had  been  capable  of  feeling  joy.  It  appeared 
inclined,  therefore,  to  do  all  that  Napoleon  de- 
sired, as  well  respecting  the  thalweg  of  the 
Izonzo  as  the  steps  to  be  taken  with  England, 
whose  conduct  at  Copenhagen  was  so  odious 
that,  even  at  Vienna,  there  was  no  hesitation 
to  condemn  it  strongly.  In  consequence,  powers 
were  sent  to  M.  de  Metternich,  ambassador  of 
Austria  at  Paris,  to  sign  a  convention,  embrac- 
ing all  the  objects  upon  which  concert  was  de- 
sirable and  appeared  easy  after  the  explana- 
tions exchanged  at  Fontainebleau. 

It  was  agreed  that  the  fortress  of  Braunau 
should  be  given  up  to  Austria;  that  the  thalwtg 
of  the  Izonzo  should  be  taken  for  the  frontier 
of  the  Austrian  and  Italian  possessions ;  and 
that  a  military  road  through  Istria  should  con- 
tinue open  to  French  troops  proceeding  to  Dal- 
matia. The  convention  containing  these  stipu- 
lations was  signed  at  Fontainebleau  on  the  10th 
of  October.  To  the  written  stipulations  were 
added  formal  promises  relative  to  England. 
Towards  this  old  ally  Austria  could  not  pro- 
ceed by  an  abrupt  and  firm  declaration  of  war ; 
but  she  promised  to  arrive  at  the  desired  result 
Sxl 


390 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1807. 


by  having  recourse  to  forms  which  would  dimi- 
nish in  no  respect  the  firmness  of  her  resolu- 
tions. Accordingly,  she  directed  M.  de  Stah- 
remberg,  her  ambassador  in  London,  to  com- 
plain of  the  act  perpetrated  upon  Copenhagen, 
as  an  outrage  which  must  be  deeply  felt  by  all 
the  neutral  States ;  to  require  an  answer  to  the 
offers  of  mediation  made  in  April  by  the  court 
of  Austria,  in  July  by  the  court  of  Russia,  and 
to  signify  that,  if  England  did  not  soon  reply 
to  overtures  of  peace  so  often  repeated,  reserv- 
ing a  right  afterwards  to  debate  the  conditions 
in  the  presence  of  the  mediating  powers,  Aus- 
tria should  be  compelled  to  break  off  all  con- 
nection with  her,  and  to  recall  her  ambassador. 
To  these  official  communications  was  added  the 
secret  declaration  that  Austria,  left  entirely 
alone  on  the  Continent,  was  incapable  of  mak- 
ing head  against  Russia  and  France  united ; 
that  she  was  of  course  obliged  to  give  way ; 
that,  besides,  at  this  moment,  France  was 
granting  her  tolerable  conditions ;  that  de- 
cidedly she  neither  could  nor  would  think  of 
war ;  and  that  England,  on  her  part,  ought  to 
think  of  peace,  otherwise  she  would  force  her 
best  friends  to  separate  themselves  from  her. 
It  is  true  that,  if  the  cabinet  spoke  thus,  the 
passionate  partisans  of  war  strove  to  induce  a 
belief  that  this  was  only  a  transient  resolution 
to  obtain  the  restoration  of  Braunau,  a  resolu- 
tion which  would  change  as  soon  as  Russia  had 
been  brought  back  to  a  different  policy.  Not- 
withstanding these  assertions  of  the  war-party 
at  Vienna,  the  Austrian  cabinet  in  reality  de- 
sired nothing  better  than  to  find  its  pacific  re- 
presentations listened  to  in  London,  and  had 
resolved  to  break  off  its  diplomatic  relations 
with  England,  in  case  the  latter  persisted  in 
turning  a  deaf  ear  to  any  accommodation. 

Respecting  her  armaments  Austria  gave  much 
less  sincere  assurances.  She  affirmed  that  she 
was  making  drafts  from  her.  skeletons,  and  dis- 
missing the  men  who  had  momentarily  filled 
them,  that  she  was  selling  her  magazines,  that, 
in  short,  she  was  reducing  herself  to  the  strict- 
est peace  establishment.  In  reality  she  was 
only  discharging  those  men  who  had  nearly  at- 
tained the  age  for  liberation,  and  replacing 
them  with  young  recruits,  on  whose  military 
education  she  bestowed  particular  pains,  under 
the  direction  of  the  Archduke  Charles,  who  was 
always  engaged  in  making  new  improvements 
in  the  organization  of  the  Austrian  army.  In 
fact,  she  was  selling  only  such  articles  in  the 
magazines  as  were  unfit  to  be  kept,  and  filling 
her  arsenals  with  arms  and  stores  of  all  kinds. 
In  short,  Austria,  adhering  temporarily  to  the 
views  of  Napoleon  to  spare  herself  a  war, 
wished,  nevertheless,  to  be  ready  to  revenge 
her  reverses,  if  fresh  circumstances  should  lead 
to  the  resumption  of  arms.  For  the  present 
she  desired  peace,  even  a  general  peace. 

Napoleon,  whose  plan  in  all  quarters  was  to 
carry  back  hostilities  towards  the  coasts  of  the 
Continent,  and  for  this  purpose  to  pacify  the 
interior,  had  declared  to  Prussia  that  he  would 
cheerfully  resume  the  movement  of  evacuation, 
suspended  for  a  while  in  consequence  of  delay 
ia  the  payment  of  the  contributions,  but  that 
it  was  necessary  to  settle  as  speedily  as  possi- 
lile  respecting  the  amount  of  those  contribu- 
t:->.ns  and  their  mode  of  payment.  Prussia  hav- 
ing proposed  to  send  Prince  William,  Napoleon 


intimated  that  he  would  receive  him  with  all 
possible  respect.  That  unfortunate  power  was 
so  depressed  that  it  had  declared  not  only  its 
adhesion  to  the  continental  system,  but  also  its 
readiness  to  conclude  a  formal  treaty  of  alli- 
ance, offensive  and  defensive,  with  France.  As 
for  Denmark,  she  had  signed  a  treaty  of  this 
kind,  and  stipulated  for  the  despatch  of  French 
troops  to  the  islands  of  Funen  and  Seeland,  to 
close  the  Sound,  to  cross  it  on  the  ice,  and  to 
invade  Sweden  at  the  moment  when  the  Rus- 
sians should  commence  operations  against  Fin- 
land. 

Napoleon,  being  obliged  by  circumstances  to 
continue  the  war  with  England,  and  armed 
with  all  the  means  of  the  Continent,  thought 
of  employing  them  with  all  the  energy  and 
ability  of  which  he  was  capable.  Even  before 
he  was  acquainted  with  the  result  of  the  Co- 
penhagen expedition,  and  as  soon  as  he  knew 
that  this  expedition  was  directed  towards  the 
Baltic,  he  had  ordered  Admiral  Decres  to  go 
to  Boulogne,  to  inspect  the  flotilla,  and  to  see 
if  it  could  take  on  board  the  army  which  he 
intended  to  bring  back  from  Germany,  as  soon 
as  Prussia  should  have  paid  her  contributions. 
The  departure  of  the  English  expedition,  sent 
towards  the  Sound,  was  a  unique  occasion  for 
surprising  England  when  half  disarmed.  M. 
Decres,  repairing  in  all  haste  to  Boulogne, 
Vimereux,  Ambleteuse,  Calais,  Dunkirk,  Ant- 
werp, had  unfortunately  found  the  flotilla  in  a 
state  which  rendered  it  unfit  to  receive  on  board 
a  numerous  army.  The  circular  port  formed 
at  Boulogne  was  covered  two  feet  deep  with 
sand ;  the  ports  of  Vimereux  and  Ambleteuse, 
three  feet ;  and  a  very  few  years  more  would 
suffice  to  bury  those  creations  of  the  genius 
of  Napoleon  and  of  the  perseverance  of  our 
soldiers.  Most  of  the  vessels,  hastily  built, 
and  with  green  wood,  required  extensive  re- 
pair. Out  of  the  1200  or  1300  of  these  boats, 
not  more  than  about  300  had  been  kept  in  a 
state  fit  to  serve  at  sea,  and  these  300  were  in- 
cessantly employed  in  manoeuvring  and  forming 
the  line  of  defence  from  the  Fort  de  1'Heurt  to 
the  Fort  de  la  Creche.  As  for  the  other  900 
transport  boats,  picked  up  everywhere,  and  at 
every  age,  they  were  nearly  past  service,  in 
consequence  of  having  lain  four  years  at  moor- 
ings. The  sailors,  organized  for  the  most  part 
in  battalions,  had  lost  some  of  their  qualities 
as  seamen,  but  as  landsmen  they  formed  the 
finest  troops  in  the  world.  General  Gouvion 
St.  Cyr,  who  commanded  the  camp  of  Boulogne, 
declared  that  they  were  not  surpassed  by  any 
in  the  French  army,  the  imperial  guard  in- 
cluded. Removed  back  into  ships,  and  having 
soon  become  sailors  again,  they  were  sufficient 
to  man  twelve  sail  of  the  line.  As  for  the 
Dutch  flotilla,  partly  sent  home,  partly  remain- 
ing at  Boulogne,  it  suffered  less  in  its  materiel, 
being  better  built ;  but  it  was  weary  of  its  in- 
activity, and  the  men  regretted  the  want  of 
employment  better  suited  to  their  energy  and 
their  courage.  It  was  not  possible,  therefore, 
to  send  the  flotilla  to  sea  immediately,  and  to 
put  150,000  men  on  board  of  it,  as  in  1804. 
But,  with  an  expense  of  five  or  six  millions, 
and  in  two  months'  time  by  destroying  a  fifth 
of  the  boats  and  repairing  the  others,  one 
might  embark  in  the  two  flotillas,  Dutch  and 
French,  about  90,000  men  and  three  or  four 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


391 


thousand  horses.  M.  Decres,  having  returned 
to  Paris  after  this  inspection,  Napoleon  was 
of  opinion,  like  his  minister  himself,  that  the 
sailors  of  Holland  ought  no  longer  to  be  de- 
tained for  a  service  so  uncertain  as  that  of  this 
flotilla,  always  going  and  never  gone ;  that  it 
was  difficu't  to  get  out  of  these  petty  harbours 
with  so  gresit  a  number  of  craft  at  once,  and 
that  it  would  very  soon  be  impossible  for  those 
harbours  to  contain  them ;  that  it  would  be 
better  to  divide  this  expedition,  to  send  home 
the  Dutch  sailors  with  part  of  their  materiel,  to 
keep  the  best  war-boats,  to  destroy  the  others, 
to  repair  those  that  should  be  preserved,  and 
to  fit  them  for  the  embarkation  of  60,000  men, 
then  to  put  the  Dutch  sailors  who  had  been 
sent  home  aboard  the  Texel  fleet,  the  useless 
French  sailors  aboard  the  Flushing  squadron, 
and  to  procure  in  this  manner,  besides  the  flo- 
tilla, capable  of  throwing  at  once  60,000  men 
on  the  coasts  of  England,  the  Texel  and  Flush- 
ing squadrons,  capable  of  carrying  30,000  from 
the  mouths  of  the  Meuse  to  the  mouths  of  the 
Thames,  without  reckoning  all  the  expeditions 
which  might  sail  from  Brest  and  all  the  other 
points  of  the  Continent.  This  opinion  being 
adopted,  orders  were  despatched,  and  the  Bou- 
logne flotilla,  rendered  more  manageable,  com- 
bined at  the  same  time  with  the  squadrons 
which  were  organizing  at  the  Texel,  Flushing, 
Brest,  Lorient,  Rochefort,  Cadiz,  Toulon,  Ge- 
noa, and  Tarento,  took  its  place  in  the  vast  sys- 
tem conceived  by  Napoleon — the  system  of 
camps  formed  near  the  great  fleets,  incessantly 
threatening  Great  Britain  with  a  formidable  ex- 
pedition against  her  soil  or  against  her  colo- 
nies. 

Napoleon  issued  likewise  all  the  orders  for 
the  Sicilian  expedition  and  for  the  complete 
provisioning  of  the  Ionian  Islands,  to  which 
his  whole  attention  was  at  this  moment  called 
by  the  language  held  by  the  English  agents  at 
Vienna  and  St.  Petersburg.  From  this  lan- 
guage, in  fact,  it  might  be  concluded  that  all 
imaginable  efforts  would  be  made  to  wrest  these 
islands  from  the  French.  Napoleon  prescribed 
to  his  brother  Joseph,  with  a  warmth  of  expres- 
sion raised  even  to  passion,  to  recover  Scylla 
and  Reggio,  left  in  the  possession  of  the  Eng- 
lish ever  since  the  expedition  to  St.  Euphemia ; 
to  assemble  part  of  the  regiments  composing 
the  army  of  Naples  around  Baise  and  around 
Reggio,  and  to  hold  them  in  readiness  for  em- 
barkation. He  enjoined  Prince  Eugene  to  make 
his  troops  fall  back  from  Upper  Italy  towards 
Central  Italy,  in  order  to  replace  those  which 
should  be  employed  in  maritime  expeditions. 
He  ordered  King  Joseph  and  Prince  Eugene  to 
multiply  the  supplies  of  provisions  sent  to  Cor- 
fu, Cephalonia,  and  Zante.  Lastly,  he  repeated 
more  expressly  than  ever  the  order  to  the  two 
divisions  at  Rochefort  and  Cadiz,  to  contrive  to 
get  out  of  those  ports,  and  to  proceed  to  Tou- 
lon. He  despatched  Admiral  Ganteaume  to 
take  the  command  of  the  fleet  there,  destined  to 
sweep  the  Mediterranean,  to  complete  the  con- 
quest of  the  kingdom  of  Naples  by  the  reduc- 
tion of  Sicily,  and  to  consolidate  the  French 
domination  in  the  Ionian  Islands  by  the  trans- 
port of  vast  resources  to  those  islands.  Mean- 
while the  naval  engineers  were  recommended 
to  hasten  the  building  of  the  ships  begun  on 
the  whole  coast  of  Europe. 


While  he  was  thus  engaged  with  the  mari- 
time positions  situated  in  Italy,  Napoleon  had 
urged  anew  the  expedition  to  Portugal.  Tho 
three  camps  of  St.  Lo,  Pontivy,  and  Napoleon, 
collected  under  General  Junot  at  Bayonne, 
presented  there  a  nominal  effective  of  26,000 
men,  a  real  effective  of  23,000,  2000  of  whom 
were  cavalry,  and  thirty-six  pieces  of  artillery. 
A  reinforcement  of  three  or  four  thousand 
men  was  on  the  march  to  join  it.  On  the  12th 
of  October,  the  second  day  after  the  signature 
of  the  convention  with  Austria,  Napoleon  or- 
dered General  Junot  to  cross  the  frontier  of 
Spain,  contenting  himself  with  a  mere  notice 
given  at  Madrid  of  the  passage  of  French 
troops.  He  prescribed  to  General  Junot  the 
route  of  Burgos,  Valladolid,  Salamanca,  Ciu- 
dad-Rodrigo,  Alcantara,  and  the  right  bank 
of  the  Tagus  to  Lisbon.  He  recommended  to 
him  the  most  rapid  march.  Spain  had  pro- 
mised to  join  her  forces  to  those  of  France,  in 
order  to  concur  in  the  expedition,  and  natu- 
rally to  participate  in  the  distribution  of  the 
booty.  Napoleon  had  not  only  accepted,  but 
insisted  on  the  real  despatch  of  the  Spanish 
force,  reserving  to  himself  to  fix  subsequently 
the  composition  and  the  price  when  they  should 
have  conquered  Portugal.  But,  not  reckoning 
upon  Spain  or  upon  any  troops  that  she  could 
send,  he  prepared  a  second  army  for  the  pos- 
sible case  that  Portugal  might  make  some  re- 
sistance, and  for  the  far  more  probable  case 
that  England  might  assemble  at  the  mouths 
of  the  Tagus  the  forces  returning  from  the 
Copenhagen  expedition.  Immediately  after 
his  arrival  at  Paris,  Napoleon  directed  that  the 
five  legions  of  reserve,  so  frequently  mention- 
ed, and  which  had  orders  to  replace  the  camps 
charged  with  the  defence  of  the  coasts,  should 
be  completely  organized,  instructed,  and  armed. 
He  had  required  the  five  senators  who  com- 
manded them  to  make  all  necessary  arrange- 
ments for  marching  off  two  or  three  of  the  six 
battalions  of  which  they  were  composed.  Hav- 
ing learned  that  these  two  or  three  battalions 
of  each  legion  were  ready,  he  ordered  them  to  be 
assembled  at  Bayonne,  and  formed  into  three 
divisions  under  Generals  Barbou,  Vedel,  and 
Malher ;  to  be  completed  with  two  divisions 
of  the  Parisian  guard,  which  the  return  of  that 
guard,  seasoned  in  Poland,  rendered  disposa- 
ble, with  four  Swiss  battalions,  stationed  some 
at  Rennes,  the  others  at  Boulogne  and  Mar- 
seilles, lastly,  with  the  3d  battalion  of  the  5th 
light,  in  garrison  at  Cherbourg,  and  the  1  st  of 
the  47th  of  the  line,  in  garrison  at  Grenoble. 

Here  were  twenty-one  or  twenty-two  batta- 
lions, which  were  about  to  march  from  the 
seat  of  each  legion,  that  is  to  say,  from  Ren- 
nes, Versailles,  Lille,  Metz,  and  Grenoble,  and 
to  reach  Bayonne  towards  the  end  of  Novem- 
ber. They  were  to  form  a  corps  of  twenty- 
three  or  twenty-four  thousand  men,  accompa- 
nied by  forty  pieces  of  artillery  and  some  hun- 
dred horse,  under  the  command  of  one  of  th« 
most  distinguished  generals  of  division  of  the 
time,  General  Dupont,  who  had  distinguished 
himself  at  Albeck,  Diernstein,  Hall,  and  Fried- 
land,  and  destined  by  Napoleon  to  be  soon  pro- 
moted to  marshal.  It  was  a  second  army, 
sufficient  to  support  that  of  Junot,  whatever 
importance  the  events  in  Portugal  might  ac- 
quire. It  took  the  name  of  second  corps  of 


392 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1807. 


observation  of  the  Gironde,  Junot's  army  hav- 
ing already  received  the  title  of  first  corps. 
Neither  of  these  armies  was  deficient  in  any 
thing  but  cavalry.  Napoleon  was  preparing 
for  them  a  good  and  numerous  cavalry  at  Com- 
piegne,  Chartres,  Orleans,  and  Tours.  During 
the  campaign  in  Poland,  he  had,  as  the  reader 
must  recollect,  taken  as  great  pains  to  keep  up 
the  depots  of  the  cavalry  as  those  of  the  in- 
fantry. He  had  incessantly  supplied  them  with 
men  and  horses,  and  he  could  draft  from  them 
and  employ  in  the  south  reinforcements  which 
the  peace  of  Tilsit  rendered  it  unnecessary  for 
him  to  send  to  the  north.  He  ordered  a  bri- 
gade of  1000  hussars  to  be  collected  at  Com- 
piegne,  at  Chartres  a  brigade  of  1200  chas- 
seurs, at  Orleans  a  brigade  of  1500  dragoons, 
and  a  fourth,  of  1400  cuirassiers,  at  Tours, 
which  formed  a  total  of  5000  horse,  drawn 
from  the  depots,  and  sufficiently  numerous  for 
the  mountainous  countries  in  which  the  two 
armies  of  the  Gironde  were  called  to  act. 
These  were  mere  precautions,  for  it  was  doubt- 
ful whether  so  large  a  force  would  be  required 
in  Portugal ;  but  Napoleon  had  a  great  desire 
to  draw  the  English  to  that  quarter;  and, 
though  the  soldiers  whom  he  sent  thither  were 
young,  he  thought  them  sufficient  to  be  op- 
posed to  British  troops,  and  more  than  suffi- 
cient to  beat  the  southern  armies,  of  which  at 
that  time  he  made  no  account. 

Every  thing,  therefore,  was  prepared  for 
taking  possession  of  Portugal,  independently 
of  the  assistance  promised  by  the  Spaniards. 
An  answer  had  been  received  from  the  Court 
of  Lisbon  such  as  Napoleon  had  foreseen,  and 
such  as  he  needed,  after  the  affair  of  Copen- 
hagen, to  dispense  him  from  showing  any  in- 
dulgence. The  Prince-regent  of  Portugal, 
son-in-law,  as  we  know,  of  the  King  and  Queen 
of  Spain,  was,  no  less  from  hereditary  tradi- 
tion than  from  personal  weakness,  the  devoted 
subject  of  England.  His  ministers  differed  in 
opinion,  it  is  true,  and  some  of  them  thought 
that  dependence  on  England  was  neither  the 
situation  desirable  for  Portugal,  nor  the  surest 
means  of  selling  her  wines  and  procuring  corn. 
But  others  thought  that  to  live  by  England  and 
through  England  was  a  good  thing  at  all  times, 
and  a  much  better  since  France  entered  the 
career  of  revolution,  as,  in  approaching  the 
latter,  they  ran  the  risk  of  changing  not  only 
their  industrial  system,  but  also  their  social 
system.  The  prince-regent,  apprized  by  M.  de 
Lima,  his  ambassador  at  Paris,  and  by  M.  de 
Rayneval,  charge  d'affaires  of  France  at  Lisbon, 
of  the  absolute  will  of  Napoleon,  had  concert- 
ed with  the  British  cabinet  the  conduct  to  be 
pursued,  with  the  two-fold  object  of  sparing 
himself  the  presence  of  a  French  army,  and 
causing  the  least  possible  injury  to  the  Eng- 
lish interests.  In  consequence,  he  had  come 
to  an  understanding  with  Mr.  Canning,  through 
the  medium  of  Lord  Strangford,  and  had  re- 
solved to  concede  to  France  the  apparent  ex- 
clusion of  the  British  flag,  and  even,  if  com- 
pelled, a  sham  declaration  of  war  against  Eng- 
land, but,  in  regard  to  the  merchants  of  the 
latter,  to  refuse  any  measure  against  persons 
and  property ;  for  Lisbon  and  Oporto  had  be- 
come downright  English  factories,  where  mer- 
chants, capitals,  shipping,  were  all  English. 


To  grant  the  seizure  of  persons  and  property, 
\  which  Napoleon  insisted  upon,  would  have  been 
I  ravage  and  ruin  to  those  factories.     This  an- 
;  swer  being  agreed  upon,  it  was  hoped  that,  if 
1  France  was  content  with  it,  the  commerce  of 
j  Portugal,  so  advantageous  to  British  activity, 
:  so  convenient  to  Portuguese  indolence^  would 
i  come  off  with    a  momentary  restriction,  and 
j  that  the  English  royal  navy  would  be  quit  also 
by  sailing  direct  from  Portsmouth  to  Gibraltar 
without  touching  at  Lisbon.     Still,   it  would 
not  fail,  in  case  of  need,  to  put  into  some  of 
the  least  frequented  points  of  the  coast  of  Por- 
tugal, upon  pretext  of  stress  of  weather,  for 
which  the  Court  of  Portugal  would  excuse  it, 
!  by  alleging  the  laws  of  humanity.     If  France 
would  not  accept  such  conditions,  the  Court  of 
Lisbon,  rather  than  break  with  England,  had 
made  up  its  mind  to  the  last  extremities,  not 
to  a  contest  with  French  troops,  (it  was  inca- 
pable   of  this  noble  despair,)  but  to  a  flight 
beyond  sea. 

This  race  of  Braganza,  grown  old,  like  its 
neighbour,  the  race  of  the  Spanish  Bourbons, 
sunk,  like  the  latter,  in  ignorance,  effeminacy, 
cowardice,  had  taken  an  aversion  both  to  the 
age  in  which  such  appalling  revolutions  were 
occurring,   and   to   the  very  soil   of  Europe, 
which  served  them  for  a  theatre.     It  went  so 
far  in  its  shameful  misanthropy  as  to  resolve 
to  retire  to  South  America,  the  territory  of 
which  it  shared  with  Spain.     The  flatterers  of 
its  vulgar  propensities  boasted  incessantly  of 
the  riches  of  its  Transatlantic  possessions,  aa 
people   boast  before   an   opulent   man,  whom 
they  are  encouraging  to  ruin  himself,  of  his 
patrimony,    which   he   knows   nothing   about. 
They  told  it,  that  it  was  not  worth  while  to 
contest  with  the  oppressors  of  Europe  the  pos- 
session of  that  petty  country,  Portugal,  alter- 
nately rocky  and  sandy,  while  it  had  beyond 
I  sea  a  magnificent  empire,  almost  as  extensive 
I  of  itself  as  that  dreary  Europe,  which  a  mil- 
I  lion  of  greedy  soldiers  were  fighting  for — an 
j  empire  sown  with  gold,  silver,  diamonds,  where 
j  it  would  find  peace,  without  a  single  enemy  to 
I  fear.     To  flee  from  Portugal,  to  abandon  its 
|  sterile  shores  to  the  English  and  to  the  French, 
who  might  drench  it  with  their  blood  as  much 
I  as  they  pleased,  to  leave  to  the  Portuguese 
I  people,  the  old  companion  in  arms  of  the  Bra- 
j  ganzas,  to  defend  its  independence,  if  it  were 
I  still   tenacious   of  that, — such  were    the  dis- 
|  graceful   projects   which,  from   time  to  time, 
|  allayed  the  terrors  of  the  Regent  of  Portugal 
I  and  of  his  family.     This  unworthy  weakness 
'  in  the  prince  was  combated  only  by  another 
|  weakness,  that  is,  by  the  trouble  of  taking  an 
I  important  resolution,   of  quitting   the  places 
where  he  .had  passed  a  luxurious  life,  of  equip- 
ping a  fleet,  to  convey  him  with  his  household, 
his  courtiers,  and  his  wealth ;  lastly,  of  cross- 
ing the  sea,  and  defying  one  novelty  in  fleeing 
j  from  another.     Between  these  two  weaknesses 
j  the  Court  of  Portugal  hesitated,  but  ready  to 
embark,    if  the   footfalls   of  a    French   army 
J  should  reach  its  ear.     An  official  reply  was, 
;  therefore,  given  to  M.  de  Rayneval,  that  Por- 
i  tugal  would  break  with  Great  Britain,  though 
|  she  could  scarcely  do  without  her ;  that  the 
i  former  would  even  go  so  far  as  to  declare  war 
j  against  the  latter ;  but  that  it  was  repugnant 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


383 


to  the  honour  jf  the  prince-regent  to  order 
the  English  merchants  to  be  arrested  and  their 
property  seized. 

Napoleon  was  too  sagacious  to  be  satisfied 
with  such  subterfuges.  He  clearly  perceived 
that  the  answer  had  been  concerted  in  Lon- 
don,1 that  the  exclusion  of  the  English  would 
be  but  a  sham,  and  that  his  principal  object 
would  not  be  attained.  He  knew,  moreover, 
that  the  family  of  Braganza  entertained  a  de- 
sign of  retiring  to  Brazil ;  and  he  was  not 
sorry  for  it,  for,  unfortunately,  since  the  dis- 
aster at  Copenhagen,  his  ideas  had  taken  an- 
other direction.  He  purposed,  not  to  complete 
by  the  occupation  of  Portugal  the  closing  of  the 
shores  of  the  Continent,  but  to  appropriate 
Portugal  to  himself,  to  be  disposed  of  at  his 
pleasure.  Instead  of  profiting  by  the  moral 
advantage  over  England,  given  him  by  the 
scandalous  violence  committed  by  the  latter 
against  Denmark,  he  had  resolved  to  lay  him- 
self under  no  restrictions  towards  the  friends 
and  favourers  of  the  English  policy,  and  to 
destroy  them  all  for  the  profit  of  the  Bonaparte 
family,  saying  to  himself  that,  at  the  end  of 
the  war,  there  would  be  neither  more  nor  less 
than  another  state  suppressed  in  Europe,  which 
would  add  nothing  to  the  difficulties  of  peace ; 
that  he  should  adopt,  according  to  custom,  the 
cams  presens  as  the  basis  of  the  negotiations ; 
and  that,  if  the  face  of  the  Peninsula  was 
changed,  one  would  be  obliged  to  admit  it  in 
the  state  in  which  it  should  be  found,  and  to 
introduce  it  into  the  general  treaty  in  its  new 
state.  In  consequence,  he  resolved  to  appro- 
priate Portugal  to  himself,  designing  to  come 
to  an  understanding  with  Spain,  and  even  to 
make  use  of  it  to  revolutionize  Spain,  for  she 
displeased  him — she  cramped  him — she  revolt- 
ed him  in  her  present  state  as  much  as  the 
Courts  of  Naples  and  Lisbon,  which  he  had 
already  driven,  or  which  he  was  about  to 
drive,  from  their  tottering  thrones.  Such  was 
the  commencement  of  the  greatest  faults,  of 
the  greatest  misfortunes,  of  his  reign !  My 
heart  is  wrung  in  approaching  that  sad  story, 
for  it  is  not  only  the  origin  of  the  misfortunes 
of  one  of  the  most  extraordinary,  the  most 
seducing,  of  men,  but  it  is  the  origin  of  the 
misfortunes  of  our  hapless  country,  dragged 
down  with  its  hero  into  an  appalling  abyss. 

Napoleon,  therefore,  ordered  M.  de  Rayneval 
to  leave  Lisbon,  and  passports  to  be  delivered 
to  M.  de  Lima,  recommended  to  General  Junot 
to  hasten  the  march  of  his  troops,  and  not  to 
listen  to  any  proposal  whatever,  upon  pretext 
that  he  was  not  to  enter  into  any  negotiations, 
and  that  his  only  commission  was  to  close  Lisbon 
against  the  English.  The  intention  of  Napo- 
leon, in  making  the  troops  march  without  re- 
laxation or  intermission  towards  Lisbon,  was 
to  seize  the  Portuguese  fleet,  and  to  confiscate 
all  English  property  both  at  Lisbon  and  Oporto. 
If  the  court  of  Lisbon  should  betake  itself  to 
flight,  he  determined  to  carry  off  all  the  naval 
stores  and  commercial  effects  that  he  could. 
If  it  stayed,  on  the  contrary,  and  submitted  to 
his  demands,  the  capture  of  the  Portuguese 


fleet,  and  the  booty  taken  from  the  English, 
would  compensate  him  for  not  being  able  to 
destroy  the  house  of  Braganza,  for  it  would  be 
impossible  to  treat  a  submissive  and  unarmed 
court  with  rigour. 

But  Portugal  would  remain  to  be  disposed 
of  in  case  the  house  of  Braganza  should  retire 
to  America.  To  take  possession  of  it  for 
France  was  not  admissible,  even  for  a  con- 
queror who  had  already  constituted  French 
departments  on  the  Po,  and  who  was  soon  to 
constitute  more  on  the  Tiber  and  on  the  Elbe. 
To  give  it  to  one  of  the  princes  of  the  house  of 
Bonaparte,  who  had  not  yet  received  a  crown, 
seemed  more  reasonable ;  but  it  was  adopting 
for  the  whole  Peninsula  an  arrangement  which 
would  have  a  definitive  charactei-,  and  ou  that 
head  Napoleon  designed  t)  leave  a  doubt  that 
did  not  forbid  any  ulterior  combination.  For 
some  time  past  a  fatal  idea  had  begun  to  pre- 
dominate in  his  mind.  Having  already  ex- 
pelled the  Bourbons  of  Naples  from  their 
throne,  he  frequently  said  to  himself  that  he 
should  be  obliged  some  day  to  act  in  the  same 
manner  towards  the  Bourbons  of  Spain,  who 
were  not  enterprising  enough  to  attack  him 
openly,  as  those  of  Naples  had  done,  but  who, 
at  bottom,  were  quite  as  hostile  to  him ;  who 
had  tried  to  betray  him  just  before  Jena ;  who 
would  not  fail  to  seize  yet  the  first  opportunity 
to  do  so;  who  at  last,  perhaps,  would  find  a 
fatal  one  for  him,  and  who,  if  they  betrayed 
him  not  wilfully,  would  betray  him  de  facto,  by 
suffering  the  Spanish  power  to  perish  in  their 
hands — a  power  as  necessary  to  France  as  to 
Spain  herself,  and  as  completely  annihilated  in 
1807,  as  if  it  had  never  existed.  When  Bona- 
parte thought  of  the  danger  of  having  Bour- 
bons on  his  rear — a  danger  not  very  alarming 
for  himself,  but  extremely  annoying  for  his 
successors,  who  would  not  have  his  genius,  and 
who  might,  perhaps,  find  in  the  successors  of 
Charles  IV.  qualities  which  they  no  longer  had 
themselves  ;  when  he  thought  of  all  the  mean- 
nesses, all  the  indignities,  all  the  perfidies,  of 
the  court  of  Madrid,  not  of  the  unfortunate 
Charles  IV.,  but  of  his  guilty  wife  and  her 
ignoble  favourite ;  when  he  thought  of  the  state 
of  that  power,  still  so  great  under  Charles  III., 
having  then  finances  and  a  respectable  navy, 
now  having  neither  a  dollar  nor  a  fleet,  and 
leaving  inert  resources,  which,  in  other  hands, 
would  have  already  served  by  their  union  with 
those  of  France  to  reduce  England,  he  was 
seized  with  indignation  for  the  present,  with 
fear  for  the  future  ;  he  said  to  himself,  that  he 
must  put  an  end  to  this  state  of  things,  and 
avail  himself  of  the  submission  of  'the  Conti- 
nent to  his  views — of  the  devoted  concurrence 
which  Russia  offered  to  his  policy — of  the  in- 
evitable prolongation  of  the  war  to  which  Eng- 
land doomed  Europe,  and  of  the  odium  which 
she  had  recently  excited  by  her  conduct  to- 
wards Denmark,  to  complete  the  renovation 
of  the  face  of  the  West,  to  substitute  every- 
where Bonapartes  for  Bourbons,  to  regenerate 
a  noble  and  generous  nation,  lulled  to  sleep  in 
sloth  and  ignorance,  to  restore  its  power  to  it, 

>  This  is  no  assertion  invented  for  justifying  the  con-     acknowledged  in  parliament  that  all  the  answers  of  POT- 
duct  of  Napoleon  towards  Portugal,  but  an  authentic     tugal  to  Napoleon  had  been  concerted  with  thu  British 
truth  officially   proved.    In  fact,  some  time  afterwards,     ministry.    Despatches  since  published  furnish   proof  of 
when  the  Court  of  Lisbon,  having  fled  to  Brazil,  had  no-     this  still  more  in  detail,  and  with  stronger  evidence, 
thinif  more  to  fear  from  the  French  armies,  Mr.  Canning  1 
Voi,  II.— 50 


304 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1807. 


M  procure  for  France  a  faithful,  useful  ally, 
instead  of  an  unfaithful,  useless,  and  vexatious 
ally.  Lastly,  Napoleon  said  to  himself,  that 
the  greatness  of  the  result  would  absolve  him 
from  the  violence  or  the  craft  which  it  might, 
perhaps,  be  necessary  to  employ  for  the  over- 
throw of  a  court  always  ready  to  betray  him, 
while,  in  his  incessant  expeditions,  he  moved 
to  any  distance  from  the  West,  prompt  to  pros- 
trate itself  when  he  returned,  finally  giving  a 
hundred  real  reasons,  but  no  ostensible  reason, 
for  destroying  it. 

These  thoughts  would  have  been  true,  just, 
nay,  even  realizable,  if  he  had  not  already  un- 
dertaken in  the  North  more  work  than  it  was 
possible  to  accomplish  in  several  reigns, — if  he 
had  not  already  taken  on  himself  the  task  of 
constituting  Italy,  Germany,  Poland.  Of  all 
these  works,  not  the  easiest,  but  the  most  ur- 
gent, the  most  useful  after  the  constitution  of 
Italy,  would  have  been  the  regeneration  of 
Spain.  Of  the  400,000  veteran  soldiers  em- 
ployed from  the  Rhine  to  the  Vistula,  100,000 
would  have  sufficed  for  that  purpose,  and  could 
not  have  had  a  better  employment.  But  to  add 
to  so  many  enterprises  in  the  North  a  new  enter- 
prise in  the  South,  to  attempt  it  with  troops 
scarcely  organized,  was  extremely  serious  and 
extremely  hazardous.  Napoleon  did  not  think 
so.  He  had  not  met  with  a  difficulty  which  he 
had  not  surmounted,  from  the  Rhine  to  the 
Niemen,  from  the  Ocean  to  the  Adriatic,  from 
the  Julian  Alps  to  the  Strait  of  Messina,  from 
the  Strait  of  Messina  to  the  banks  of  the  Jor- 
dan. He  had  a  profound  contempt  for  the 
southern  troops,  their  officers,  their  command- 
ers, made  little  more  account  of  the  English 
troops,  and  considered  the  Spains  as  not  more 
difficult  to  subdue  than  the  Calabrias.  They 
were  more  extensive,  it  is  true ;  which  signified 
that,  if  30,000  had  sufficed  in  the  Calabrias, 
80,000  or  100,000  would  suffice  in  Spain,  espe- 
cially when  they  should  bring  the  brave  Spa- 
nish nation,  instead  of  the  licentiousness  into 
which  it  was  plunged,  a  regeneration  for  which 
it  most  earnestly  wished.  It  was  not,  therefore, 
the  material  difficulty  which  made  Napoleon 
hesitate;  it  was  the  moral  difficulty,  it  was 
the  impossibility  of  finding,  in  the  eyes  of  the 
world,  a  plausible  pretext  for  treating  Charles 
IV.  and  his  wife  as  he  would  have  treated  Caro- 
line of  Naples  and  her  husband.  Now,  a  dy- 
nasty which,  on  his  return  from  Tilsit,  sent 
him  three  ambassadors  to  pay  him  homage ; 
which,  while  betraying  him  secretly  when  it 
could,  gave  him  its  armies,  its  fleets,  whenever 
he  asked  for  them — such  a  dynasty  furnished 
no  motive  for  dethroning  it,  which  the  public 
sentiment  of  Europe  could  accept  as  specious. 
Powerful  and  glorious  as  Napoleon  was ;  though 
to  the  victories  of  Montenotte,  of  Castiglione, 
of  Rivoli,  he  had  added  those  of  the  Pyra- 
mids, of  Marengo,  of  Ulm,  of  Austerlitz,  of 
Jena,  of  Friedland  ;  though,  to  the  Concordat, 
to  the  Civil  Code,  he  had  added  a  hundred 
measures  of  humanity  and  civilization,  it  was 
not  possible,  without  revolting  the  world,  to 
come  forward  some  day  and  say :  Charles  IV. 
is  an  imbecile  prince,  deceived  by  his  wife, 
ruled  by  a  favourite,  who  degrades  and  ruins 
Spain ;  and  I,  Napoleon,  in  virtue  of  my  genius, 
of  my  providential  mission,  I  dethrone  him, 
for  the  purpose  of  regenerating  Spain.  Such 


j  modes  of  proceeding  humanity  does  not  allow 
'  to  any  man  whatever.  It  sometimes  forgives 
them  after  the  event,  after  success,  and  then 
it  adores  in  them  the  hand  of  God,  if  benefit 
to  nations  has  resulted  from  them.  But,  till 
then,  it  regards  them  as  an  outrage  on  the 
sacred  independence  of  those  nations. 

Napoleon  could  not  then  dethrone  Charles 
IV.  for  his  imbecility,  for  his  weakness,  for 
the  adultery  of  his  wife,  for  the  debasement 
of  Spain.  He  would  have  needed  a  grievance 
that  should  have  conferred  on  him  the  right 
to  enter  his  neighbour's  dominions  and  to 
change  the  dynasty  reigning  there.  He  would 
have  wanted  a  treachery  like  that  which  the 
Queen  of  Naples  ventured  to  commit,  when, 
after  signing  a  treaty  of  neutrality,  she  at- 
tacked the  French  army  in  rear;  or  a  massa- 
cre such  as  that  at  Verona,  when  the  republic 
of  Venice  slaughtered  our  wounded  and  our 
sick,  while  the  French  army  was  marching  to 
Vienna.  But  Napoleon  had  nothing  to  allege, 
excepting  an  equivocal  proclamation,  issued 
just  before  the  battle  of  Jena,  calling  the 
Spanish  nation  to  arms — a  proclamation, 
which  he  had  affected  to  consider  as  insignifi- 
cant, which  was  accompanied,  it  is  true,  by 
secret  communications  with  England,  since 
demonstrated,  and  strongly  suspected  at  the 
time,  but  denied  by  the  court  of  Spain ;  and 
such  grievances  were  not  to  justify  that  Ro- 
man sentence  already  pronounced  against  the 
Bourbons  of  Naples — The  Bourbons  of  Spain 
have  ceased  to  reign. 

Napoleon,  however,  expected  the  intestine 
divisions  prevailing  in  the  Escurial  to  furnish 
a  pretext  for  interfering,  for  entering  as  de- 
liverer, as  peace-maker,  perhaps  as  an  offend- 
ed neighbour.  But,  if  he  had  a  general  sys- 
tematic idea  as  to  the  end  to  be  attained,  he 
had  not  fixed  either  the  day  or  the  mode  of 
acting.  He  would  even  have  accommodated 
himself  to  a  family  alliance  between  the  two 
courts  which  should  have  promised  a  complete 
regeneration  of  Spain,  and,  through  that  re- 
generation, a  sincere  and  useful  alliance  be- 
tween the  two  nations.  In  regard,  therefore, 
to  Portugal,  he  purposed  not  to  take  any 
definitive  course,  which  should  bind  him 
towards  the  court  of  Madrid.  He  could,  for 
instance,  have  given  Portugal  to  Spain,  and 
this  would  have  been  the  safest  step  to  take, 
in  exchange  for  the  Balearic  Islands,  the  Phi- 
lippines, or  some  other  distant  possession.  He 
would  thus  have  transported  the  Spanish  na- 
tion with  joy,  by  gratifying  the  most  ancient 
and  most  constant  of  its  ambitions ;  he  would 
have  enchanted  the  court  itself,  by  throwing  a 
veil  over  its  turpitudes ;  he  would  have  awaken- 
ed a  fondness  for  the  alliance  of  France,  which 
hitherto  had  appeared  only  burdensome  to  the 
Spaniards.  But  to  act  in  this  manner  would 
have  been  rewarding  cowardice  and  treachery 
equally  with  the  most  tried  and  serviceable 
!  fidelity.  It  could  scarcely  be  required  of  an 
ally  so  dissatisfied  as  Napoleon  had  reason  to 
be.  There  was  one  other  course  to  pursue, 
j  that  was  to  appropriate  to  himself,  in  exchange 
'  for  Portugal,  some  Spanish  province  bordering 
'•  on  our  frontier,  and  to  acquire  a  footing  beyond 
the  Pyrenees,  as  he  had  done  in  Italy  beyond 
the  Alps,  by  the  possession  of  Piedmont:  a 
.  detestable  policy,  fit  at  most  for  Austria, 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


395 


which  has  always  coveted  the  possession  of  the 
back  of  the  Alps,  and  whose  territories,  be- 
sides, composed  of  conquests,  ill  bound  toge- 
gether,  are  not  so  formed  by  Nature  as  to 
excite  in  her  a  fondness  for  well-defined  fron- 
tiers. To  make  himself  master  of  the  Biscayan 
provinces,  and  those  bordering  the  Ebro,  such 
as  Aragon  and  Catalonia,  would  therefore  have 
been  a  fault  against  geography,  a  sure  way  to 
wound  all  Spaniards  to  the  heart,  and  an  inef- 
ficacious method  of  placing  their  government 
under  the  dependence  of  Napoleon ;  but,  as  for 
submissive,  incapable  of  defending  itself,  this 
government  was  so,  but  skilful,  active,  attach- 
ed, in  short  all  that  could  be  wished,  it  would 
not  have  become  so  by  the  cession  of  Aragon 
or  Catalonia  to  France.  It  would  thereby  have 
been  rendered  more  contemptible,  but  not 
stronger,  more  courageous,  more  industrious. 

This  manner  of  disposing  of  Portugal  would 
have  been  the  worst  of  all,  and  the  most  dan- 
gerous. Napoleon  was  not  inclined  to  it.  He 
had,  however,  examined  it  like  all  the  others  ; 
and  at  this  very  period,  which  proves  that  he 
had  thought  of  it,  he  directed  application  to  be 
made  to  the  French  legation  at  Madrid,  for  a 
statistical  account  of  the  Biscayan  provinces, 
and  of  the  provinces  watered  by  the  Ebro  in 
its  course.  He  had  about  him  at  that  time  a 
dangerous  counsellor — dangerous,  not  because 
he  was  deficient  in  good  sense,  but  because  he 
was  deficient  in  the  love  of  truth  ;  this  was  M. 
de  Talleyrand,  who,  having  guessed  the  subject 
that  engrossed  the  secret  thoughts  of  Napoleon, 
practised  the  most  mischievous  of  seductions 
upon  him,  by  conversing  with  him  incessantly 
on  the  topics  that  engaged  his  mind.  Power 
has  not  a  more  dangerous  flatterer  than  the 
disgraced  courtier  who  is  anxious  to  recover 
its  favour.  Fouche",  the  minister,  having  lost 
in  1802  the  portfolio  of  the  police,  for  having 
disapproved  of  that  excellent  institution,  the 
Consulate  for  life,  had  exerted  himself  to  reco- 
ver his  lost  portfolio,  by  seconding  by  a  thou- 
sand intrigues  the  fatal  institution  of  the  Em- 
pire. M.  de  Talleyrand  was  playing  at  this 
moment  a  similar  part.  He  had  sorely  dis- 
pleased Napoleon  by  insisting  on  relinquishing 
the  portfolio  of  the  foreign  affairs  for  the  situa- 
tion of  grand  dignitary ;  and  he  strove  to 
please  him  again,  by  giving  him  advice,  which 
he  was  fond  of  receiving.  M.  de  Talleyrand 
was  of  the  party  at  Fontainebleau.  He  saw, 
since  the  affair  of  Copenhagen,  the  series  of 
wars  resumed  and  continued,  France  pushing 
Russia  to  the  North  and  to  the  East,  that  she 
might  herself  fall  upon  the  South  and  the  West. 
The  question  of  Portugal  became  urgent,  and, 
if  he  had  not  genius  sufficient  to  judge  what 
arrangements  were  best  adapted  to  Europe,  he 
was  well  enough  acquainted  with  human  pas- 
sions to  judge  that  Napoleon  was  full  of 
thoughts,  still  vague  but  absorbing,  relative  to 
the  Peninsula  This  discovery  made,  he  had 
endeavoured  to  lead  the  conversation  to  this 
subject,  and  he  had  seen  the  coldness  of  Napo- 
leon towards  him  disappear  all  at  once,  con- 
versation revived,  and,  if  not  confidence,  at 
least  ease  restored.  He  had  profited  by  it, 
and  had  not  ceased  to  add,  to  the  already  hide- 
ous picture  of  the  court  of  Spain,  colours  not 
needed  by  that  picture  to  offend  the  eye  of 
Napoleon.  In  regard  to  Portugal,  he  had  ap- 


peared to  be  strongly  of  opinion  that  to  de- 
scend upon  the  Ebro,  to  establish  himself 
there,  in  compensation  for  the  cession  to  Spain 
of  the  banks  of  the  Tagus,  would  be  a  position 
ad  interim  useful  and  advantageous  to  take. 
Napoleon  was  not  inclined  to  this  plan,  and 
preferred  another.  But  M.  de  Talleyrand  had, 
nevertheless,  become  his  most  intimate  confi- 
dant, after  having  been  treated  for  two  months 
with  extreme  coldness.  Napoleon,  on  his  re- 
turn from  the  chase,  or  on  leaving  the  circle 
of  the  ladies,  was  seen  regularly  in  tSte-d-lgte 
with  M.  de  Talleyrand,  talking  at  great  length, 
with  animation,  sometimes  with  a  gloomy 
though tfulness,  on  a  subject  evidently  of  im- 
portance, of  which  everybody  was  ignorant, 
and  of  which  even  none  sought  an  explanation, 
so  powerful,  so  prosperous,  so  pacific,  did  the 
Empire  appear  since  Tilsit.  Napoleon,  walk- 
ing in  the  vast  galleries  of  Fontainebleau, 
sometimes  slowly,  sometimes  with  a  speed 
proportioned  to  that  of  his  thoughts,  put  to  the 
torture  the  infirm  courtier  who  could  not  keep 
up  with  him  but  by  immolating  his  body,  as 
he  immolated  his  soul  in  flattering  the  mis- 
chievous and  deplorable  extravagance  of  genius. 
One  man  only,  deprived  of  the  confidence  which 
he  had  enjoyed,  the  Arch-chancellor  Camba- 
ce"res,  penetrated  the  subject  of  these  conversa- 
tions, durst  not  interrupt  them,  nor  oppose  his 
assiduities  to  those  of  M.  de  Talleyrand ;  for 
Napoleon,  having  become  with  time  more  im- 
perious towards  him,  without  being  less  friend- 
ly, was  less  accessible  to  the  counsels  of  his 
timid  wisdom.  A  few  words  dropped  by  the 
Arch-chancellor  Cambace"res  had  been  sufficient 
to  reveal  the  opposition  of  that  clear-sighted 
statesman  to  any  new  enterprise,  and  particu- 
larly to  any  interference  in  the  inextricable 
affairs  of  the  Peninsula,  where  corrupt  govern- 
ments reigned  over  half-savage  populations, 
where  the  difficulties  which  Joseph  had  encoun- 
tered in  the  Calabrias  would  be  found  multiplied 
tenfold.  Napoleon  had,  therefore,  perfectly 
discerned  the  opinion  of  Prince  Cambace'res, 
and,  fearing  the  disapproval  of  a  wise  man,  he, 
who  feared  not  the  world,  showed  the  same 
friendship  for  him  as  ever,  but  not  the  same 
confidence. ' 

There  had  just  appeared  at  Fontainebleau 
another  personage,  an  obscure  one,  who  was 
rarely  admitted  to  figure  in  the  presence  of 
Napoleon,  but  clever  and  crafty  as  any  secret 
agent  could  be :  this  was  M.  Yzquierdo,  the 
confidential  man  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
and  sent  to  Paris,  as  we  have  said  above,  to 
treat  seriously  about  the  affairs  which  M.  de 
Massaredo  and  M.  de  Frias  entered  upon 
merely  as  a  matter  of  form.  He  was  not  only 
charged  with  the  interests  of  Spain,  but  also 
with  the  personal  interests  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  to  whom  he  was  much  attached,  having 
been  BO  distinguished  and  appreciated  by  him 
as  to  be  intrusted  with  the  most  important 
missions.  He  did  the  best  he  could  for  the 
affairs  of  his  country  and  those  of  Emmanuel 
Godoy ;  for,  though  devoted  to  the  latter,  he 
was  a  good  Spaniard.  Endowed  with  extra- 
ordinary sagacity,  he  had  for*-»een  that  the 

«  I  report  here  the  assertion  of  Prince  Cambace'res  him- 
self, confirmed  by  the  testimony  of  eye-witnesses,  some 
formerly  ministers  of  Napoleon,  others  members  of  hi* 
court,  and  by  a  variety  of  correspondence. 


306 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[<.  ct.  1807 


critical  moment  for  Spain  was  approaching ; 
for,  on  the  one  hand,  Napoleon  became  daily 
more  disgusted  with  an  incapable  and  perfidi- 
ous ally ;  and,  on  the  other  hand,  having  suc- 
cessively touched  on  all  the  European  ques- 
tions, he  was  naturally  led  to  that  of  the 
Peninsula,  and  induced  to  turn  to  the  affairs 
of  the  South  by  the  conclusion,  apparent  at 
least,  of  those  of  the  North.  Accordingly,  this 
subtle  and  insinuating  agent  exerted  all  his 
efforts  to  be  informed  of  what  was  passing  in 
the  counsels  of  the  emperor.  He  had  found 
means  to  accomplish  his  purpose  through  the 
grand-marshal  of  the  palace,  Duroc,-  who  had 
married  a  Spanish  lady,  daughter  of  M.  d'Her- 
vaz,  formerly  at  the  head  of  the  financial  af- 
fairs of  the  court  of  Madrid,  afterwards  Marquis 
d'Almenara  and  ambassador  at  Constantinople. 
M.  Yzquierdo  had  cultivated  this  valuable  con- 
nection, and  sought,  notwithstanding  the  in- 
tegrity and  discretion  of  the  grand-marshal, 
either  to  discover  the  designs  of  Napoleon,  or 
to  get  some  useful  words  conveyed  to*  him.  He 
had  not  failed,  on  occasion  of  Portugal,  to  ap- 
pear more  frequently  at  Fontainebleau,  and  to 
endeavour  to  obtain  the  most  advantageous 
result  for  Spain  and  for  his  patron. 

The  court  of  Madrid,  though  it  felt  all  its 
desire  awakened  at  the  idea  of  an  operation 
against  Portugal,  nevertheless  saw  not  without 
vexation  the  house  of  Braganza  pushed  to- 
wards Brazil,  for  it  had  felt  great  uneasiness 
about  its  American  colonies,  ever  since  the 
United  States  had  shaken  off  the  yoke  of  i  -g- 
land.  The  establishment  of  an  independent 
European  State  in  Brazil  filled  it  with  dread  of 
a  new  commotion,  which  might  lead  Mexico, 
Peru,  and  the  provinces  of  the  La  Plata,  to 
constitute  themselves  free  States  also ;  and,  in 
the  moments  when  its  foresight  got  the  better 
of  its  greediness,  it  would  rather  have  seen 
the  Braganzas  remain  at  Lisbon  than  see  a 
chance  of  acquiring  Portugal  arising  from 
their  departure.  It  was  not  probable,  how- 
ever, that  the  Braganzas,  saved  a  first  time  in 
1802  by  Spain,  which  had  cost  the  latter  the 
island  of  Trinidad,  could  be  again  saved  in 
1807.  Spain  must  therefore  submit  to  their 
removal,  voluntary  or  compulsory,  to  Brazil. 
In  this  situation,  the  court  of  Madrid  could  not 
do  better  than  endeavour  to  acquire  Portugal. 
But  it  was  well  aware  that  it  had  not  deserved 
so  rich  a  present  from  Napoleon;  it  feared  that 
it  should  be  obliged  to  purchase  it  with  sacri- 
fices, perhaps  even  to  consent  to  its  being  di- 
vided, and,  in  this  case,  M.  Yzquierdo  had  a 
secondary  commission,  which  was  to  obtain 
one  of  the  provinces  of  Portugal  for  his  patron, 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace.  The  latter,  seeing 
from  day  to  day  a  formidable  storm  gathering 
against  him,  as  well  at  court  as  in  the  nation 
at  large,  purposed,  in  case  he  should  be  pre- 
cipitated from  the  pinnacle  of  greatness,  to 
drop,  not  into  nothing,  but  into  an  independ- 
ent and  solidly  secured  principality.  The 
queen  ardently  wished  her  favourite  so  desira- 
ble a  retreat.  The  good-natured  Charles  IV. 
thought  it  due  to  the  eminent  services  of  the 
man  who,  he  said,  had  for  twenty  years  assist- 
ed him  to  bear  the  burden  of  the  crown.  In 
consequence,  M.  Yzquierdo  had  received  from 
his  sovereigns,  as  well  as  from  the  Prince  of 
the  Peace  himself,  the  express  recommendation 


to  follow  up  this  result,  in  case  Portugal 
should  not  be  integrally  given  to  Spain.  In 
case  of  the  partition  of  Portugal,  there  was 
another  ambition  still  to  gratify,  that  of  the 
Queen  of  Etruria,  the  favourite  daughter  of  the 
King  and  Queen  of  Spain,  widow  of  the  Prince 
of  Parma,  mother  of  a  king  five  years  old,  and 
regent  of  the  kingdom  of  Etruria,  instituted 
some  years  before  by  the  First  Consul.  It  was 
much  doubted  whether  Napoleon  would  leave 
possessions  in  Italy  to  Spain  any  more  than  to 
Austria ;  and,  with  this  forecast,  part  of  Por- 
tugal was  solicited  for  the  Queen  of  Etruria. 
Portugal,  divided  then  into  two  principalities, 
vassals  of  the  crown  of  Spain,  would  become 
in  reality  a  Spanish  province.  Moreover,  the 
court  of  Madrid,  in  its  indolence,  in  its  de- 
basement, cherished  an  ambitious  desire,  which 
was  to  acquire  a  title  that  should  cover  its  pre- 
sent degradation,  and  it  wished  that  Charles  IV. 
should  be  called  King  of  the  Spains  and  Emperor 
of  the  Americas.  Thus  every  one  in  that  de- 
graded court  would  have  been  satisfied.  The  fa- 
vourite would  have  had  a  principality  wherein 
to  hide  his  turpitudes ;  the  queen  would  have 
had  the  pleasure  of  providing  for  her  favour- 
ite and  with  him  for  her  preferred  daughter; 
and  the  king  would  have  picked  up  in  passing  a 
title  for  the  amusement  of  his  imbecile  vanity. 
Such  were  the  ideas,  to  which  M.  Yzquierdo 
was  commissioned  to  obtain  assent  at  Fontaine- 
bleau. Of  all  possible  projects  the  latter  was 
the  one  which  differed  least  from  the  views  of 
Napoleon.  He  wanted  not  at  first,  as  we  have 
observed,  any  arrangement  which  could  be- 
come definitive.  He  meant  purely  and  simply 
to  give  Portugal  to  the  court  of  Madrid,  a  gift 
which  it  had  not  deserved,  and  which  would 
have  raised  it  in  the  estimation  of  the  Spa- 
niards. He  had  renounced  the  idea  lauded  by 
M.  de  Talleyrand,  of  gaining  a  footing  beyond 
the  Pyrenees  by  the  acquisition  of  the  pro- 
vinces of  the  Ebro.  Thenceforward  he  should 
prefer,  saving  some  modification,  the  plan  of 
partition  brought  by  M.  Yzquierdo,  and  which 
had  for  the  moment  the  only  advantages  to 
which  he  aspired.  In  the  first  place  Napoleon 
was  resolved  to  clear  Italy  of  all  foreign 
princes,  and,  after  turning  the  Austrians  out 
of  it,  he  purposed  to  remove  the  Spaniards 
also,  not  as  being  dangerous.  People,  there- 
fore, had  rightly  guessed  his  real  intention,  by 
supposing  that  he  would  seek  to  recover  Etru- 
ria by  means  of  an  exchange  for  a  portion  of 
Portugal.  Then,  though  filled  with  contempt 
for  the  favourite  who  was  degrading  and  ruin5 
ing  Spain,  he  resolved  to  attach  him  a  little 
longer,  that  he  might  have  him  at  his  disposal 
in  the  different  circumstances  which  he  foresaw 
or  intended  to  bring  about.  But  he  thought 
that  it  was  too  much  to  give  half  of  Portugal 
to  the  Queen  of  Etruria  as  the  price  of  Tus- 
cany, and  the  other  half  to  the  favourite  as  the 
price  of  his  subservience.  In  consequence, 
taking  little  pains  to  persuade  people,  to  whom 
he  had  only  to  signify  his  will,  he  dictated  to 
M.  de  Champagny,  on  the  morning  of  the  23d 
of  October,  a  note  containing  his  definitive  re- 
solutions.1 He  granted  to  the  Queen  of  Etru- 

i  It  is  from  this  very  note  and  the  identical  instructions 
sent  from  Madrid  to  M.  Yzquierdo,  both  preserved  in  the 
Louvre,  among  the  papers  of  Napoleon,  that  I  am  writing 
this  account. 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


397 


ria,  for  her  son,  a  State  containing  a  population 
of  800,000  souls,  situated  on  the  Douro,  and 
having  Oporto  for  its  capital,  which  was  to  be 
called  the  kingdom  of  North  Lusitania.  At 
the  other  extremity  of  Portugal,  in  the  south- 
ern part,  he  granted  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
a  State  with  a  population  of  400,000  souls, 
composed  of  the  Algarves  and  the  Alentejo, 
styled  the  principality  of  the  Algarves.  These 
two  small  States  balanced  the  population  of 
Tuscany,  at  that  time  computed  at  1,200,000 
souls.  Napoleon  was  not  sufficiently  satisfied 
with  Spain  to  give  her  more  than  he  took  from 
her.  He  reserved  the  central  part  of  Portu- 
gal, that  is  to  say,  Lisbon,  the  Tagus,  the 
Upper  Douro,  bearing  the  names  of  Portuguese 
Estramadura,  Beyra,  and  Tras-os-Montes,  and 
comprising  a  population  of  2,000,000  inhabit- 
ants, in  order  to  dispose  of  it  at  the  peace. 
This  wholly  provisional  arrangement  suited 
him  wonderfully  well,  since  it  left  every  thing 
in  suspense,  for  it  afforded  either  the  means  of 
subsequently  recovering  the  Spanish  colonies, 
by  restoring  two-thirds  of  Portugal  to  the 
house  of  Braganza,  or  to  make  what  arrange- 
ment soever  he  pleased  with  the  house  of  Spain, 
if  he  should  decide  on  suffering  it  to  reign  in 
attaching  it  to  him  by  the  bonds  of  a  marriage. 
At  any  rate,  it  was  agreed  that  the  new  Portu- 
guese principalities  should  be  constituted  into 
sovereignties,  vassals  of  the  crown  of  Spain, 
and  that  poor  King  Charles  IV.  should  be  styled, 
agreeably  to  his  desire,  King  of  the  Spaina  and 
Emperor  of  the  Americas,  and  bear,  like  Napo- 
leon, the  double  title  of  Imperial  and  Royal 
Majesty. 

Besides  these  conditions,  Napoleon  required 
that  Spain  should  unite  with  the  French  troops 
a  division  of  10,000  Spaniards  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  province  of  Oporto,  one  of  10  or  11 
thousand,  to  second  the  movement  of  the  French 
upon  Lisbon,  and  one  of  6000  to  occupy  the 
Algarves.  It  was  understood  that  General  Ju- 
not  should  command  the  French  and  allied 
troops,  unless  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  or  Charles 
IV.  should  go  to  the  army,  which  they  had  pro- 
mised not  to  do,  for  Napoleon  would  not  have 
intrusted  to  such  generals  the  life  of  a  single 
soldier  of  his.  By  disposing  of  Portugal  in 
this  manner,  he  should  recover  Etruria  imme- 
diately ;  this,  which  Napoleon  was  solicitous  to 
do,  on  account  of  his  arrangements  in  Italy, 
would  hold  out  an  alluring  bait  to  the  ambition 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  enable  him  to  defer 
every  resolution  in  regard  to  the  Peninsula,  and 
not  even  require  him  finally  to  decide  the  ques- 
tion of  the  establishment  of  the  Braganzas  in 
America. 

The  treaty  containing  this  provisional  parti- 
tion of  Portugal  was  drawn  up  conformably  to 
the  note  which  Napoleon  had  dictated  to  M.  de 
Champagny,  and  signed  by  M.  Yzquierdo  for 
Spain,  and  by  the  Grand-marshal  Duroc  for 
France.  It  was  signed  at  Fontainebleau  itself, 
on  the  27th  of  October ;  and  it  has  obtained, 
by  the  title  of  Treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  an  un- 
fortunate celebrity,  because  it  was  the  first  act 
of  the  invasion  of  the  Peninsula. 

1  A  circumstance  well  worthy  of  remark,  and  which 
•will  appear  singular,  is,  that  the  Arch-chancellor  Camba- 
cervs.  in  his  valuable  manuscript  memoirs,  relates  that 
Napoleon  adhered  to  his  purpose,  and  that  M.  de  Talley- 
rand did  not  obtain  what  he  wished.  This  is  a  mistake  of 
that  grave  personage,  for  the  correspondence  of  Napoleon 


No  sooner  were  the  signatures  given,  than 
orders  were  despatched  to  General  Junot,  whose 
troops,  having  entered  Spain  on  the  17th,  had 
already  reached  Salamanca,  purposing  to  pro- 
ceed to  the  Tagus  through  Alcantara,  and  to 
follow  the  right  bank,  while  General  Solano, 
Marquis  del  Socorro,  with  10,000  Spaniards, 
would  follow  the  left  bank.  General  Junot  had 
been  expressly  recommended  to  send  to  Paris 
all  the  Portuguese  emissaries  whom  he  should 
fall  in  with,  saying  that  he  had  no  power  to 
treat,  that  his  instructions  were  to  march  to 
Lisbon,  as  a  friend  if  he  were  not  resisted,  as  a 
conqueror  if  he  met  with  any  opposition  what- 
ever. 

M.  de  Talleyrand,  for  having  listened  to  all 
the  effusions  of  Napoleon  in  regard  to  Spain, 
obtained  what  he  desired,  that  is  to  say,  a  cer- 
tain supremacy  over  the  department  of  foreign 
affairs.  Napoleon,  irritated  at  first  to  see  him 
relinquish  the  portfolio  of  foreign  affairs  for 
the  purely  honorary  dignity  of  vice-grand-elec- 
tor, had  signified  to  him  that  he  should  no  longer 
have  any  part  in  the  diplomacy  of  the  Empire. 
But,  overcome  by  M.  de  Talleyrand's  address, 
he  decreed  that  the  vice-grand-elector  should 
succeed  in  their  functions  not  only  the  grand- 
elector,  absent  because  he  reigned  at  Naples, 
but  also  the  arch-chancellor  of  State,  because 
he  reigned  at  Milan.  The  reader  will  recollect, 
no  doubt,  that  part  of  the  duties  of  the  arch- 
chancellor  of  State  consisted  in  the  presenta- 
tion of  ambassadors,  in  the  custody  of  treaties, 
in  short,  the  honorary  part  of  the  imperial  diplo- 
macy. M.  de  Talleyrand,  therefore,  combining 
an  office  of  formality  conferred  on  him  by  de- 
cree with  the  important  duty  attributed  to  him 
by  theVonfidence  of  the  Emperor,  found  him- 
self at  once  dignitary  and  minister,  a  situation 
to  which  he  had  always  aspired,  and  which  Na- 
poleon had  declared  that  he  would  never  grant. 
The  arch-chancellor  Cambaceres  made  this  re- 
mark to  Napoleon,  who  was  slightly  embar- 
rassed, and  promised  that  the  decree  should 
not  be  signed.  But  the  Arch-chancellor  Cam- 
bace"res  was  just  then  setting  off  to  visit  his 
native  city,  Montpellier,  which  he  had  not  seen 
for  a  long  time ;  and,  no  sooner  was  he  gone 
than  the  decree  so  ardently  desired  by  M.  de 
Talleyrand  was  signed  and  published  as  an  offi- 
cial act. '  Thus,  in  this  decisive  and  fatal  mo- 
ment, prudence  withdrew  and  complaisance  re- 
mained— complaisance  more  dangerous  in  M. 
de  Talleyrand  than  in  any  other  person,  be- 
cause with  him  it  assumed  all  the  forms  of  good 
sense. 

Napoleon's  intention  was  to  set  out  for  Italy 
as  soon  as  he  had  received  M.  de  Tolstoy,  for 
he  had  not  visited  since  1805  that  country  of 
his  predilection.  He  purposed  to  carry  thither 
the  benefit  of  his  vivifying  presence,  to  embrace 
his  adopted  son  Eugene  Beauharnais  and  his 
eldest  brother  Joseph,  and  to  converse  with  Lu- 
cien  himself,  whom  he  hoped  to  prevail  upon  to 
return  into  the  bosom  of  the  imperial  family, 
perhaps  even  to  place  on  a  throne.  But,  all  at 
once,  when  on  the  point  of  setting  off.  intelli- 
gence from  Madrid  stopped  and  obliged  him  to 

and  the  Monittur  of  November  7,  1807,  No.  311,  prove  thai 
the  decree  was  signed.  Napoleon,  to  avoid,  no  doubt,  the 
embarrassment  of  an  explanation,  probably  never  spoke 
further  on  the  subject  to  the  arch-chancellor,  wh.)  "»i^ht 
believe  that  the  decree  did  not  exist. 

2L 


398 


HISTORY   Jf   THE 


[Oct.  isor. 


suspend  his  departure.'      The  accounts  from 
that  capital,  which  had  for  some  time  begun  to 
assume  a  grave  character,  were  of  the  most 
strange  and  unexpected  nature.      They  inti- 
mated that,  on  the  27th  of  October,  the  very 
day  on  which  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau  was 
signed  in  France,  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias 
had  been  arrested  at  the  Escurial,  and  consti- 
tuted a  prisoner  in  his  apartments ;  that  his 
papers  had  been  seized ;  that  among  them  had 
been  found  proofs  of  a  conspiracy  against  the 
throne ;  and  that  a  criminal  process  would  be 
commenced  against  him.     Immediately  after- 
wards, a  letter  of  the  29th,  signed  by  Charles 
IV.  himself,  informed  Napoleon  that  his  eldest 
son,  seduced  by  miscreants,  had  formed  a  dou- 
ble design  against  the  life  of  his  mother  and 
the  crown  of  his  father.     The  unfortunate  king 
added  that  such  a  design  ought  to  be  punished ; 
that  search  was  making  for  its  instigators ;  but 
that  the  prince,  the  author  of  or  accomplice  in 
such  abominable  projects,  could  not  be  permit- 
ted to  reign;  that  one  of  his  brothers,  more 
worthy  of  the  supreme  rank,  should  have  his 
place  in  the  paternal  heart  and  on  the  throne. 
To  prosecute  criminally  the  heir  to  the  crown, 
to  change  the  order  of  succession,  were  resolu- 
tions of  immense  importance,  which  could  not 
but  move  Napoleon,   already  deeply  engaged 
with  the  affairs  of  Spain,  and  forbade  his  de- 
parture.    The  appeal  made  for  his  friendship, 
almost  for  his  advice,  in  acquainting  him  with 
this  family  misfortune — a  misfortune  most  ter- 
rible if  it  were  true,  most  infamous  if  but  a 
calumny  of  an  unnatural  mother,  and  believed 
by  an  imbecile  father — obliged  him  to  inquire 
minutely  into  the  facts,  and  almost  to  inter- 
fere, in  order  to  obtain  a  command  of  dne  con- 
sequences.    Besides,  just  at  this  time  arrived 
letters  from  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  implor- 
ing the  protection  of  Napoleon  against  impla- 
cable enemies,   and  soliciting  to  become  not 
only  his  protfyt,  but  his  relation,  his  adopted 
son,  by  obtaining  the  hand  of  one  of  the  French 
princesses.2      Thus   these   unfortunate   Bour- 
bons, both  father  and  son,  themselves  called 
upon,  nay  almost  forced,  that  dread  conqueror 
to   interfere   in   their   affairs  at  the   moment 
when  he,  thoroughly  disgusted  with  their  in- 
capacity, was  too  well  disposed  to  hurl  them 
from  a  throne  on  which  they  were  not  only 
useless  but  dangerous  to  the  common  cause  of 
France  and  Spain. 

^e  should  not  have  a  just  conception  of 
these  strange  circumstances,  were  we  not  to 
turn  back  and  to  take  a  survey  of  what  had 
occurred  at  the  court  of  Spain  for  a  year  past. 
We  have  seen  elsewhere  (Vol.  I.)  a  picture 
of  that  degenerate  court,  ruled  by  an  insolent 
favourite,  who  had  contrived  to*  usurp,  in  a 
manner,  the  royal  authority,  thanks  to  the 
passion  which  he  had  excited  twenty  years 
before  in  a  queen  devoid  of  modesty.  If  there 
were  a  country  in  Europe  capable  of  exhibit- 
ing in  its  most  hideous  features,  the  spectacle 
of  the  corruption  of  courts,  it  was  assuredly 
Spain  Behind  the  Pyrenees,  between  three 


seas,  almost  cut  off  from  communication  with 
j  Europe,  sheltered  by  her  armies  and  her  ideas, 
i  amidst  an  hereditary  opulence,  which  had  its 
j  source   in   the   treasures    of  the  New  World, 
|  which  had  kept  up  the  indolence  of  the  nation 
as  well  as  that  of  its  princes ;  in  a  hot  climate, 
which  excites  the  senses  more  than  the  mind ; 
an  old  court  might  well  fall  asleep,  become 
voluptuous  and  degenerate,  between  a  clergy 
intolerant  for  heresy  but  tolerant  for  vice,  and 
a  nation  accustomed  to  consider  royalty,  what- 
ever it  might  do,  as  equally  sacred  with  the 
Deity  himself.     Towards  the  conclusion  of  the 
last  century,  a  wise,  enlightened,  and  indus- 
trious prince  and  a  minister  worthy  of  him, 
Charles  III.  and  M.  de   Florida  Blanca,   had 
endeavoured  to  stop  the  general  decline,  but 
had  only  suspended  for  a  moment  the  melan- 
choly course   of  things.     In  the  next  reign, 
Spain  had   descended  to  the  lowest  step  of 
abasement,   though  the  fine  qualities  of  the 
nation   were   only   benumbed.     King   Charles 
IV.,  always  upright,  well-intentioned,  but  in- 
capable of  any  other  exertion  than  that   of 
hunting,  regarding  it  as  a  favour  of  Heaven 
that  some  one  should  undertake  the  task  of 
reigning  for  him ;  his  wife,  always  dissolute  as 
a  Roman  princess  of  the  Lower  Empire,  always 
submissive  to  the  old  guards  du  corps,  who  had 
become  Prince  of  the  Peace,  and  reserving  her 
heart  for  him,  while  she  gave  up  her  person  to 
vulgar  gallants  of  his  choosing ;  the  Prince  of 
the  Peace,  always  vain,  light,  indolent,  igno- 
rant,  deceitful,   and  cowardly,   having   every 
vice  but  cruelty,  always  domineering  over  his 
master,  or  taking  the  trouble  to  conceive  for 
him  soft  and  capricious  resolutions,  which  suf- 
ficed to  keep  a  debased  government  going — the 
king,  the  queen,  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  had 
brought  Spain  into  a  state  difficult  to  be  de- 
scribed.    No  finances,  no  navy,  no  army,  no 
policy,  no  authority  over  colonies  ready  to  re- 
volt, no  respect  from  the  indignant  nation,  no 
relations  with  Europe,  which  disdained  a  cow- 
ardly, perfidious  court,  without  a  will  of  its 
own,  no  longer  even  a  support  in  France,  for 
Napoleon  had  been  led  by  contempt  to  believe 
that  every  thing  was  allowable  towards  a  power 
I  which  had  arrived  at  so  abject  a  condition: 
'  such  was  Spain  in  October,  1807. 

The  first  interest  of  the  Spanish  monarchy, 
ever  since,  shut  up  between  the  Pyrenees  and 
the  seas  that  surround  her,  she  has  neither 
Netherlands  nor  Italy  to  disturb  her — the  first 
interest  is  the  navy,  which  then  included  the 
administration  of  her  colonies  and  that  of  her 
|  arsenals.  Her  colonies  contained  neither  sol- 
diers, nor  muskets  to  arm  the  colonists,  in  de- 
fault of  soldiers.  Her  captains-general  were 
j  mostly  officers  so  timid  and  so  incapable  that 
the  governor  of  the  provinces  of  La  Plata  had 
given  up  Buenos  Ayres  to  the  English  without 
fighting,  and  that  a  Frenchman,  M.  de  Liniers, 
had  to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  500  men  and 
himself  undertake  to  expel  the  invaders,  which 
he  had  done  with  complete  success.  The 
Spaniards,  indignant,  had  deposed  the  cap- 


»  The  correspondence  of  Napoleon  proves  this  feet  in 
the  most  authentic  manner. 

•  The  well  known  letter,  in  which  Ferdinand  applies  to 
I^appleon  for  his  protection,  and  for  the  hand  of  a  princess 
of  bis  family,  is  dated  the  llth  of  October.  But,  for  rea- 
sons which  we  shall  state  elsewhere,  it  was  enclosed  by 


M.  de  Bcauharnaia  in  a  despatch  till  the  20th,  left  Madrid 
on  the  20th  or  21st,  could  not  arrive  in  Paris  before  the 
28th,  and  probably  reached  Fontainebleau  on  the  29th. 
It  then  took  the  courier*  seven  or  eight  days  to  travel 
from  Madrid  to  Paris. 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


399 


tain-general,  and  resolved  to  appoint  M.  Li- 
niers  in  his  place,  but  he  would  accept  only 
the  provisional  title  of  military  commandant. 
In  vain  did  the  chain  of  the  Cordilleras  pour 
forth  metals  from  its  rich  flanks ;  gold  and 
silver  dug  out  of  their  bowels  lay  useless  in 
the  cellars  of  the  captain-generalships.  There 
was  not  a  Spanish  ship  that  durst  go  to  fetch 
them.  The  governor  of  the  Philippines,  for 
example,  being  in  want  of  ammunition,  provi- 
sions, money  to  buy  them  with,  had  been 
obliged  to  apply  to  the  brave  Captain  Bou- 
rayne,  commander  of  the  French  frigate  La 
Canonnitre,  whose  gallant  fights  we  have  al- 
ready related,  to  procure  piastres  for  him. 
Captain  Bourayne  had  brought  to  the  amount 
of  12,000,000,  after  making  a  trip  from  the 
Philippines  to  Mexico  and  back,  and  thus  twice 
crossing  half  the  globe.  The  Spanish  govern- 
ment, in  order  to  have  a  little  of  this  valuable 
American  coin  at  Madrid,  was  obliged  to  sell 
considerable  sums  to  the  United  States  and  to 
Holland,  and  sometimes  even  to  England,  who, 
being  in  absolute  need  of  it  herself,  consented 
to  undertake  the  transport  of  it  to  Europe,  and 
to  give  one-half  the  amount  to  the  enemy,  on 
condition  of  keeping  the  other  half  herself. 

As  for  the  navy  itself,  its  state  was  this. 
Composed  of  76  ships  of  the  line  and  54  frigates 
under  Charles  III.,  it  had  dwindled  under 
Charles  IV.  to  33  sail  of  the  line  and  20  frigates. 
Of  those  33  ships  of  the  line,  there  were  8  to 
be  destroyed  immediately,  as  not  worth  refit- 
ting. There  were  left  25,  5  of  them  three-deck- 
ers, well  built  and  very  fine  ships,  11  of  74 
guns,  indifferent  or  bad,  9  of  54  and  64,  mostly 
old  and  on  too  small  a  scale,  since  the  adoption 
of  the  new  dimensions  in  ship-building.  The 
20  frigates  were  divided  thus :  10  equipped  or 
fit  for  equipping,  10  bad  or  requiring  repair. 
In  this  whole  navy,  there  were  but  6  sail  ready 
to  put  to  sea,  having  on  board  provisions  for 
barely  three  months,  their  crews  incomplete, 
and  their  keels  so  filthy  that  they  were  scarcely 
navigable.  These  were  the  6  sail  at  Cartha- 
gena,  armed  and  equipped  for  three  years  past, 
and  which  had  never  weighed  anchor  but  to 
Bhow  themselves  at  the  mouth  of  the  harbour, 
and  to  go  back  immediately.  There  was  not  a 
chip  capable  of  putting  to  sea  either  at  Cadiz 
or  at  Ferrol.  At  Cadiz  there  were,  it  is  true,  6 
sail  of  the  line,  armed,  but  without  provisions 
or  crews.  There  was  no  want  of  seamen  ;  but, 
having  nothing  to  pay  them  with,  the  govern- 
ment durst  not  engage  them,  and  they  were 
left  unemployed  in  the  harbours.  The  small 
number  that  had  been  raised,  instead  of  being 
on  board  the  squadron,  were  employed  in  gun- 
boats, between  Algesiras  and  Cadiz,  for  the 
protection  of  the  coasting-trade.  Thus  the 
whole  Spanish  navy  in  a  state  of  activity  was 
reduced  to  6  sail  of  the  line  armed  and  equip- 
ped at  Carthagena,  (and  these  without  a  single 
frigate,)  and  6  armed  at  Cadiz,  but  not  equip- 
ped. Of  fhe  20  frigates,  there  were  but  4 
armed  and  6  capable  of  being  armed.  The 
future  presented  a  prospect  as  dreary  as  the 
present ;  for  in  all  Spain  there  were  but  two 
ships  of  the  line  building,  and  which  had  been 
upon  the  stocks  so  long  that  they  were  looked 
upon  as  not  susceptible  of  being  finished. 

Ferrol,  Cadiz,  Carthagena,  were  destitute  of 
timber,  iron,  copper,  hemp.  Those  magnificent 


arsenals,  built  in  several  reigns,  and  w  orthy  of 
Spanish  greatness,  as  well  for  their  extent  aa 
for  their  appropriation  to  all  the  wants  of  a 
powerful  navy,  were  falling  to  ruin.  The  har- 
bours were  choked  with  mud.  The  superb  wet 
dock  of  Carthagena  was  becoming  filled  with 
sand  and  filth.  The  numerous  canals  which 
place  the  harbour  of  Cadiz  in  communication 
with  the  rich  plains  of  Andalusia,  were  encum- 
bered with  mud  and  wrecks  of  vessels.  In  one 
of  these  canals  lay  sunk  a  ship  of  the  line,  the 
St.  Gabriel,  two  frigates,  a  corvette,  three  large 
lighters,  two  transports,  and  a  great  quantity 
of  boats.  One  of  the  two  magazines  of  the 
arsenal  of  Cadiz,  destroyed  nine  years  before 
by  fire,  had  not  been  rebuilt.  The  basins, 
destined  for  dry  docks,  were  ruined  by  the 
filtering  of  the  water  into  them.  Of  the  two 
basins  at  Carthagena,  built  fifty  years  before, 
and  never  repaired,  the  one  destined  to  be  kept 
dry  had  rendered  it  necessary  to  burn  the 
timber  of  several  ships  for  the  service  of  the 
machine  employed  in  emptying  it.  The  San 
Pedro  tie  Alcantara,  which  was  under  repair  in 
it,  had,  nevertheless,  been  well  nigh  swamped 
there.  The  rope-walks  of  Cadiz  and  Cartha- 
gena were  the  finest  in  Europe,  but  there  were 
not  even  a  few  hundred-weight  of  hemp  to  em- 
ploy them.  At  the  same  time,  Seville,  Grenada, 
Valencia,  were  earnestly  soliciting  that  the  stocks 
of  hemp  left  upon  their  hands  might  be  pur- 
chased. The  beeches  and  oaks  of  Old  Castille, 
Biscay,  the  Asturias,  destined  for  Ferrol ;  the 
oaks  of  the  Sierra  de  Ronda,  destined  for  Cadiz ; 
the  noble  pines  of  Andalusia,  Murcia,  Catalonia, 
destined  for  Carthagena  and  Cadiz  ;  felled  and 
lying  on  the  ground,  were  rotting  there  for 
want  of  the  means  of  transport  to  convey  them 
to  the  stocks  where  they  were  to  be  employed. 
These  materials  were  scarce,  not  only  because 
none  were  brought,  but  because  they  were  sold. 
Upon  pretext  of  getting  rid  of  refuse  lumber, 
the  administration  of  the  port  of  Carthagena, 
in  order  to  raise  money  to  pay  certain  salaries, 
had  sold  the  most  valuable  materials,  especially 
metals.  The  board  charged  with  the  provision- 
ing of  the  squadron  at  Carthagena  could  not 
obtain  supplies,  because  it  was  18  millions  of 
reals  in  arrear  with  the  contractors.  The 
workmen  deserted,  not  from  treachery,  but 
from  sheer  want.  Out  of  5000  workmen,  there 
were  scarcely  700  left  at  Carthagena.  Some 
had  died  of  the  epidemic  disease  which  had 
desolated  the  coasts  of  Spain  some  years  be- 
fore, others  had  fled  to  Gibraltar,  and  would 
eat  the  bread  of  England  in  her  service.  Those 
at  Cadiz  found  themselves,  from  the  same 
causes,  considerably  diminished,  in  number. 
In  1807  nine  months'  pay  was  owing  them,  and 
they  were  obliged  to  hold  their  hand.  The 
sailors,  in  like  manner,  were  dispersed  in  the 
interior,  or  in  foreign  countries.  There  were 
some  of  them  to  whom  twenty-seven  months' 
pay  was  owing.  The  few  resources  that  wera 
to  be  procured,  were  expended  in  the  mainte- 
nance of  a  staff  that  would  have  been  sufficient 
for  several  great  navies.  This  establishment 
included  one  high-admiral,  two  admirals,  29 
vice-admirals,  63  officers  corresponding  in  rank 
with  rear-admiral,  80  captains  of  ships  of  the 
line,  134  captains  of  frigates,  upwards  of  12 
intendants,  6  treasurers,  11  commissaires-ordon- 
nateurs,  74  commissioners  of  the  navy,  and  all 


400 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


these  for  a  naval  power  reduced  to  33  sail  of 
the  line  and  20  frigates,  of  which  six  ships  of 
the  line  and  four  frigates  only  were  armed  and 
equipped  !  So  low  was  sunk  the  navy  of  one  of 
those  nations  of  the  globe  most  naturally  des- 
tined for  the  sea,  of  an  insular  nation  almost 
as  much  as  the  English,  having  finer  harbours 
than  theirs,  such  as  Ferrol,  Cadiz,  Carthagena  ; 
timber  which  the  English  have  not,  such  as  the 
oaks  of  Old  Castille,  Leon,  Biscay,  the  Asturias, 
and  La  Ronda ;  the  pines  of  Andalusia,  Murcia, 
Valencia,  Catalonia ;  materials  of  all  kinds,  as 
the  iron  of  the  Pyrenees,  the  copper  of  Mexico 
and  Peru,  the  hemp  of  Valencia,  Grenada,  Se- 
ville ;  lastly,  skilful  and  numerous  workmen, 
brave  sailors,  officers  capable,  like  Gravina,  of 
dying  the  death  of  heroes.     All   these   facts 
which  we  have  just  stated  were  scarcely  known 
at  Madrid.1     When  the  Spanish  administration 
was  asked  how  many  ships  there  were,  and  how 
many  either  building,  or  armed,  or  equipped, 
it  could  not  tell.     When  asked  at  what  time 
such  a  division  would  be  ready  to  weigh  anchor, 
it  was  still  more  embarrassed  for  an  answer. 
All  that  the  government  knew  was  that  the 
navy  was.  neglected.      It  knew  it,   and    even 
wished  it  to  be  so.     The  navy  appeared  to  it  a 
secondary  interest,  secondary  for  a  nation  which 
had  to  defend  the  Floridas,  Mexico,  Peru,  Co-  i 
lombia,  La  Plata,  the  Philippines !     The  en-  ' 
gaging  in  a  contest  with  England  appeared  to 
it  a  chimera — a  chimera  when  France  and  Spain 
combined  had  ports  such  as  Copenhagen,  the 
Texel,  Antwerp,  Flushing,  Cherbourg,  Brest, 
Rochfort,   Ferrol,   Lisbon,   Cadiz,  Carthagena, 
Toulon,  Genoa,  Tarento,  Venice,  and  could  not 
aend  out  120  sail  of  the  line  !    The  government, 
that  is  to  say  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  was  some- 
times base  enough  to  pour  forth  jests  upon  the 
Spanish  navy ;  he  had  sarcasms  instead  of  tears 
for  Trafalgar !     The  fact  was,  that  at  heart  he 
detested  France,   that   troublesome    ally  who 
reproached   him  incessantly  for   his  criminal 
supmeness ;  and  he  preferred  England,  because 
she  gave  him  hopes,  if  he  would  betray  the  cause 
of  the  maritime  nations,  of  the  quiet  so  con- 
genial to  his  cowardice.     Thus,  while  he  af- 
fected contempt  for  the  navy,  the  medium  for 
contending  against  England,  he  professed  great 
esteem  for  the  land-army,  the  medium  for  re- 
sisting the  counsels  of  France.     The  Prince  of 
the  Peace  was  fond  of  talking  about  his  grena- 
diers, his  dragoons,  his  hussars.     The  state  of 
that  army,  the  object  of  his  predilection,  was 
nevertheless  as  follows : 


[Oct.  1807. 


'The  Spanish  government,  in  fact,  knew  nothing,  or  as 
pood  a*  nothing,  of  the  details  we  are  giving  respecting  the 
state  of  the  navy,  and  of  those  which  we  hare^vi-n  rela- 
tive to  the  army  and  the  finance*..  Napoleon  was  Acquainted 
with  the  greater  part  of  them  by  his  agents,  who  were  very 
mmerous  and  strongly  stimulated  by  hi?  incessant  curi- 
££L  »•  «!v  KpOTta  were  not  the  on'y  sou**  of  his 
£TK^1T^feW  m°nths  later'  °e  «"tered  Spain, 
ts  relative  to  the  navy  were  entirely  known,  thanks 


The  Spanish  army  was  composed  of  about 
58,000  infantry  and  artillery,  15  or  16  thousand 
cavalry,  6000  royal  guards,  11,000  Swiss,  2000 
Irish,  and  lastly,  28,000  provincial  militia   in 
all  about  120,000  men,  capable  of  furnishing 
from  50  to  60  thousand  combatants  at  most. 
The  infantry  was  weak,  puny,   and  recruited 
in   part  out   of  the  scum  of  the   population. 
The  cavalry  was  formed  of  more  select  men ; 
only  a  very  small  part  of  it  was   mounted; 
the  fine  breed  of  Spanish  horses,  so  mettle- 
some and  so  gentle,  declining  from  day  to  day 
The  royal  guards,  Spanish  and  Walloons,  were 
the  only  portion  that  made  a  really  imposing 
appearance.    The  militia,  composed  of  peasants 
who  were  not  trained,  who  could  not  be  dis- 
placed, were  of  scarcely  any  use.     The  Swiss 
auxiliaries  were,  as  everywhere  else,  thorough 
soldiers,    faithful,    steady.      After   deducting 
therefore,  the  14,000  men  sent  to  the  north  of 
Germany,  there  were  left  no  more  than  15  or 
16  thousand  men  to  despatch  towards  Portugal 
of  the  26,000  promised  by  the  treaty  of  Fon- 
tamebleau.     The  presidios  of  Africa,  especially 
Ceuta,   that  formidable  via-d-vu  of  Gibraltar, 
the  capture  of  which  by  the  English  or  the 
Moors  would  have  rendered  the  passage  from 
the  Mediterranean  to  the  Ocean  impracticable, 
contained  neither  garrisons  nor  provisions.    At 
Ceuta,  instead  of  a  garrison  of  6000  men,  pre- 
scribed by  the  regulations  and  by  custom,  there 
were  but  3000.     At  the  famous  camp  of  St. 
Roch,  before  Gibraltar,  there  were  at  most  8 
or  9  thousand  men.     The  rest  of  the  Spanish 
army,  dispersed  in  the  provinces,  were  there 
employed  in  performing  the  duty  of  the  police, 
because  there  were  then   no   gendarmerie  in 
Spain.     The   assemblage  of  any   army  what- 
ever  would    have    been   impossible;     for   the 
14,000    sent    to     Germany    and    the     16,000 
marched   towards    Portugal,    almost    entirely 
absorbed  the  disposable  portion  of  the  regular 
troops.     For  the  rest,  the  whole  of  the  military 
force,  ill  clothed,  ill  fed,  rarely  paid,  destitute 
of  emulation,  of  military  spirit,  of  instruction, 
was  a  body  without  soul.     There,   as  in  the 
navy,  the  staff  consumed  all  the  resources.    It 
numbered  of  officers  of  the  highest  rank,  three 
captains-general,   answering   to   the   rank    of 
marshal,    87    lieutenant-generals,    127    mare- 
chaux  de  camp,  252  brigadiers,  (an  intermediate 
rank  between  that  of  marshal  de  camp  and 
that  of  colonel,)  and  an  unknown  number  of 
colonels ;  for  there  were  some  whose  titles  were 
real,  others  provisional  or  honorary,  and  be- 


very  curiou,  collect™  of  these  pape« 


Louvre  with  the  papers  of  Napoleon  that  the  authentic 
particulars  which  I  here  give  respecting  the  administrative 
affairs  of  Spain  are  derived.  .  I  have  made  a  careful  com- 
parison of  all  these  statements,  which  doeg  not  allow  me 
to  conceive  a  single  doubt  respecting  their  accuracy 
Messrs.  Munoz,  O'Farrill.  Azanza,  writing  neither  for  the 
public,  nor  for  an  assembly,  entering  into  polemics  with 
nobody,  stating  purely  and  simply  the  resources  that  could 
be  disposed  of,  were  forced  to  tell  the  truth,  which  they 
had  no  interest  to  conceal,  and  moreover  supported  by 
irrefragable  documents,  such  as  quite  recent  inspections, 
or  oflicial  registers  and  statements.  For  the  rest,  their 
statements  very  nearly  corresponded  with  what  Napoleon's 
agents  had  previously  communicated  to  him.  The  study 
of  all  these  documents  has  therefore  enabled  me  to  draw 
a  complete  picture  of  the  state  of  the  Spanish  monarchy, 
which  could  not  at  this  day  be  sketched  in  Spain-  for 
the  documents  were  transmitted  to  France  at  the  mo- 
ment of  the  invasion,  and  have  remained  there  ever 
since.  I  have  thought  this  picture  useful,  nay,  even  ne- 
cessary, for  the  understanding  of  events;  and  it  is  for  thig 
reason  that  I  have  taken  the  trouble  to  compose  it,  and 
that  I  give  my  readers  that  of  reading  it 


Oct.  1807.] 


IONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


401 


tween  both  they  were  not  reckoned  at  fewer  than 
2000.  Such  was  all  that  was  left  of  those  formi- 
dable bands,  which,  in  the  loth  and  16th  cen- 
turies, had  made  Europe  tremble.  Such,  too, 
was  all  the  service  rendered  by  the  marked 
predilection  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  for  the 
army! 

As  for  the  finances,  which,  with  the  land 
forces  and  the  naval  forces,  constitute  the  com- 
plement of  the  power  of  a  State,  they  corres- 
ponded to  the  state  of  those  forces,  and  served 
to  account  for  it.  There  were  debts  owing  to  J 
Holland,  to  the  Bank,  to  the  public,  to  the  great 
farms,  for  loans  at  fixed  and  annual  dates,  114 
millions;  in  arrears  of  pay  and  salaries  111 
millions ;  in  royal  vales  (paper  money,  50  per 
cent,  below  par)  1033  millions ;  which  formed 
a  debt  demandable  of  1258  millions,  part  due  j 
shortly,  part  immediately,  and  which  might  be  j 
called  dribbling ;  for,  110  millions  of  arrears  of 
pay  and  salaries,  32  millions  owing  to  the  great 
farms,  eight  millions  promised  by  monthly  in- 
stalments to  France  and  not  paid,  seven  millions 
of  annual  interest  due  to  Holland,  seven  millions 
of  interest  of  vales  not  provided  for,  might  well 
be  termed  dribbling  debts  for  a  government. 
The  expenses  and  the  revenues  were  composed 
as  follows:  126  millions  of  revenues,  and  159 
millions  of  expenses,  leaving,  of  course,  a  yearly 
deficit  of  33  millions,  that  is  to  say,  a  fifth  of 
the  necessities  of  the  State  unprovided  for. 
The  customs,  tobacco,  the  salt-works,  tolls,  bore 
the  principal  burdens.  Land,  thanks  to  its 
owners,  mostly  nobles  or  priests,  paid  nothing 
but  tithe  for  the  benefit  of  the  clergy.  With 
such  a  system  of  taxation,  a  revenue  of  not 
more  than  100  millions  would  have  been  ob- 
tained, if  America  had  not  furnished  a  supple- 
ment of  25  or  26  millions.  Spain  contributed 
much  more  considerable  sums,  but  great  part 
of  which  remained  in  the  hands  of  the  collect- 
ors of  the  public  revenue.  Manufactures,  long 
since  destroyed,  no  longer  produced  either  beau- 
tiful silks  or  beautiful  cloths,  notwithstanding 
the  mulberry-trees  of  Andalusia  and  the  mag- 
nificent flocks  of  the  Spanish  breed.  Some 
cottons,  manufactured  in  Catalonia,  were  rather 
a  pretext  for  smuggling  than  a  real  branch  of 
industry ;  for  then,  as  at  present,  they  served 
to  attribute  a  Spanish  origin  to  English  cottons. 
Trade  was  ruined,  for  it  was  reduced  to  a  few 
clandestine  exchanges  of  piastres,  the  export 
of  which  was  prohibited,  for  English  goods,  the 
import  of  which  was  alike  prohibited,  and  to 
the  importation  (permitted  in  this  case)  of  cer- 
tain productions  of  French  luxury.  The  supply 
of  the  colonies  and  of  the  navy,  which  alone 
had  for  a  long  time  kept  up  a  relic  of  activity 
in  the  ports  of  Spain,  had  dwindled  to  nothing 
in  consequence  of  the  war.  The  contraband 
trade  of  the  English  in  South  America,  facili- 
tated by  the  conquest  of  Trinidad,  was  sufficient 
there.  Agriculture,  behind-hand  in  its  pro- 
cesses, scarcely  capable  of  modification  accord- 
ing to  the  new  methods,  on  account  of  the  heat 
of  the  climate  and  an  absolute  want  of  water, 
ravaged  moreover  by  the  mesta,  that  is  to  say, 
by  the  annual  migration  of  seven  or  eight  mil- 
lion sheep  from  the  north  to  the  south  of  the 
Peninsula,  had  been  for  ages  in  a  stationary 
state.  Thus  the  people  were  poor,  the  middle 
class  ruined,  the  nobility  over  head  and  ears  in 
debt,  and  the  clergy  itself,  though  richly  en- 
Vot.  II.— 51 


dowed,  and  more  numerous  than  the  army  and 
navy  put  together,  distressed  also  by  the  sale 
of  a  seventh  of  its  property,  demanded  and  ob- 
tained from  the  court  of  Rome  on  account  of  the 
public  necessities.  But  amidst  this  general  po- 
verty, there  was  a  nation,  strong,  haughty, 
proud  of  its  past  greatness  as  if  that  greatness 
had  still  existed  ;  having  lost  the  habit  of  fight- 
ing, but  capable  of  the  most  courageous  self- 
devotion  ;  ignorant,  fanatic,  hating  other  na- 
tions ;  knowing,  nevertheless,  that  on  the  other 
side  of  the  Pyrenees  useful  reforms  had  taken 
place,  great  things  been  accomplished,  and  call- 
ing for,  but  at  the  same  time  dreading  the  in- 
telligence of  foreigners ;  in  short,  full  of  con- 
tradictions, of  oddities,  of  noble  and  endearing 
qualities,  and  at  the  moment,  weary  in  the  high- 
est degree  of  its  inactivity  for  a  century  past, 
deeply  grieved  at  its  humiliations,  indignant  at 
the  spectacles  which  it  had  to  witness. 

It  was  before  the  face  of  a  nation  so  nearly 
on  the  point  of  losing  its  patience  that  the  silly 
favourite,  the  ruler  of  the  indolence  of  his  so- 
vereign, of  the  vices  of  his  queen,  pursued  his 
disgraceful  course.  While  specie  was  scarce 
in  a  country  possessing  Peru  and  Mexico,  and 
the  country  had  to  shift  with  a  discredited 
paper  money,  Emmanuel  Godoy,  from  a  vague 
presentiment,  was  amassing  sums  in  gold  and 
silver,  which  the  free  command  of  all  the  re- 
sources of  the  treasury  permitted  him  to  accu- 
mulate, and  which  public  rumour  foolishly 
exaggerated,  for  it  talked  of  several  hundred 
millions  hoarded  in  his  palace.  Thus,  while 
the  nation  felt  itself  impoverished,  it  believed 
that  all  the  national  wealth  was  in  the  posses- 
sion of  Emmanuel  Godoy.  To  the  public  scandal 
of  his  adulterous  intercourse  with  the  queen 
were  added  many  other  scandals.  After  having 
married  Dona  Maria  Luisa  de  Bourbon,  Infanta 
of  Spain,  own  niece  of  Charles  III.,  cousin- 
german  of  Charles  IV.,  sister  of  the  Cardinal 
of  Bourbon,  whom  he  had  chosen  in  order  to 
draw  near  the  throne,  and  whom  he  neglected 
from  dislike  of  her  modest  virtues,  he  had 
publicly  attached  himself,  by  marriage  accord- 
ing to  some,  by  long  habit  according  to  others, 
to  a  young  lady  named  Josefa  Tudo,  by  whom 
he  had  several  children.  Desirous  of  giving 
a  certain  consecration  to  this  connection,  he  had 
obtained  for  Mademoiselle  Josefa  the  title  of 
Countess  of  Castillo  Fiel  (Chateau  Fidele),  and 
in  addition  to  this  title  a  grandeza  for  the  eldest 
of  her  children.  He  loaded  her  with  wealth, 
and  surrounded  her  with  a  sort  of  power ;  for 
it  was  to  her  house  persons  went  to  see  him 
when  they  wished  to  converse  freely  with  him ; 
thither,  too,  the  agents  of  European  diplomacy 
repaired  to  receive  their  instructions ;  it  was 
with  his  discourse  that  ambassadors  filled  their 
despatches ;  and,  while  pouring  oat  to  her  the 
cares,  the  vexations,  the  anxieties,  to  which  his 
blind  levity  exposed  him,  he  could  find,  in  the 
youth  and  beauty  of  a  sister  of  Mademoiselle 
Tudo's,  pleasures  which  crowned  the  scandals 
of  his  life.  And  all  Spain  was  acquainted  with 
this  disgraceful  licentiousness ;  the  queen  her  • 
self  was  acquainted  with  it,  and  bore  with  it 
the  king  alone  was  ignorant  of  it,  and  thanked 
Heaven  for  sending  him  a  man  who  laboured 
and  governed  for  him  ! 

The  unfortunate  Spanish  nation,  not  knowing, 
between  an  insolent  favourite,  a  |uiltv  queen. 
2L2 


402 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


rOct.  1807. 


and  an  imbecile  king,  to  vrhom  to  give  its  heart, 
had  given  it  to  the  heir  to  the  crown,  the  Prince 
of  the  Asturias,  since  Ferdinand  VII.,  who  was 
not  much  more  worthy  of  the  love  of  a  great 
people  than  his  parents.  This  prince,  then 
twenty-three  years  old,  was  left  a  widower  by 
the  Princess  of  Naples,  who  died,  it  was  re- 
ported, by  poison  administered  by  the  hand  of 
the  queen  and  the  favourite ;  which  was  false, 
but  admitted  to  be  true  by  all  Spain.  Repulsed 
by  his  mother,  who  construed  his  habitual  sad- 
ness into  a  censure,  by  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
•who  imagined  that  he  discovered  in  it  a  jealousy 
of  authority,  oppressed  by  both,  obliged  to  seek 
a  refuge  around  him,  he  had  found  it  in  his 
young  wife,  to  whom  he  had  become  fondly  at- 
tached. As  the  two  houses  of  Naples  and  Spain 
mortally  hated  each  other,  and  the  young  prin- 
cess arrived  at  the  Escurial  with  sentiments 
derived  from  her  family,  she  had  not  contri- 
buted to  reconcile  Ferdinand  with  his  parents, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  fomented  the  aversion 
which  he  entertained  for  them.  Accordingly, 
with  his  limited  faculties  of  head  and  heart, 
listening  to  every  report  conformable  to  his 
hatred,  Ferdinand  believed  that  he  had  been 
deprived  by  a  crime  of  the  woman  whom  he 
loved,  and  this  crime  he  imputed  to  his  mother 
as  well  as  to  the  adulterous  favourite  who  go- 
verned her.  It  may  be  conceived  what  passions 
must  have  fermented  in  these  vulgar,  ardent, 
idle  souls.  The  prince  was  awkward,  weak, 
and  false,  whose  whole  understanding  consisted 
in  a  certain  shrewdness,  and  whose  whole  cha- 
racter in  a  certain  obstinacy.  But  in  the  eyes 
of  an  impassioned  nation,  feeling  a  necessity  to 
love  one  of  its  masters,  and  to  hope  that  the 
future  would  be  better  than  the  present,  his 
awkwardness  passed  for  modesty,  his  unsociable 
Badness  for  the  grief  of  a  virtuous  son,  his  ob- 
Btinacy  for  firmness,  and  on  the  report  of  some 
opposition  made  to  various  acts  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  people  had  been  pleased  to  invest 
him  with  the  noblest  and  the  most  energetic 
virtues. 

In  the  course  of  1807,  a  rumour  was  sud- 
denly spread,  that  the  health  of  the  king  was 
declining,  and  that  he  was  near  his  end.  Ap- 
pearances, in  fact,  were  alarming.  This  king, 
honest  and  blind,  had  no  suspicion  of  the  infa- 
mous proceedings  which,  unknown  to  him,  dis- 
graced his  reign.  Endowed,  nevertheless,  with 
a  certain  good  sense,  he  was  well  aware  that 
there  were  misfortunes  around  him,  for,  in  spite 
of  the  pains  taken  to  deceive  him,  the  loss  of 
Trinidad,  the  disaster  of  Trafalgar,  the  paper 
money  substituted  for  specie,  could  not  wear 
the  appearance  of  prosperity  and  greatness. 
He  laid  the  blame  on  circumstances,  and  felt 
thoroughly  convinced  that,  but  for  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  things  would  have  gone  on  worse. 
In  reality  he  was  melancholy  and  ill.  It  was 
believed  that  his  death  was  at  hand.  The  na- 
tion, without  any  ill-will  to  him,  regarded  his 
death  as  the  end  of  its  humiliations :  the  Prince 
of  the  Asturias  as  the  end  of  his  slavery ;  the 
queen  and  Godoy  as  the  end  of  their  power. 
As  for  these  last,  it  was  more  than  the  end  of  a 
usurped  power — it  was  a  catastrophe ;  for  they 
supposed  that  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  would 
take  his  revenge,  and  they  measured  that  re- 
venge by  their  own  sentiments.  From  this  mo- 
live  it  was  that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  had 


attached  such  value  to  becoming  Sovereign  of 
the  Algarves. 

Various  means  were  successively  devised  by 
the  queen  and  by  the  favourite  to  secure  them 
from  the  dangers  they  anticipated. 

They  thought  at  first  of  seizing  the  Prince 
of  the  Asturias,  and  forcing  him  to  contract  a 
marriage,  which  would  place  him  under  their 
influence.  For  the  accomplishment  of  this  de 
sign,  they  cast  their  eyes  on  Dona  Maria  The- 
resa de  Bourbon,  sister  of  Dona  Maria  Luisa, 
Princess  of  the  Peace.  They  thought  that,  in 
marrying  this  infanta,  Ferdinand,  having  be- 
come brother-in-law  of  Emmanuel  Godoy,  would 
be  either  reconciled  or  controlled.  But  to  this 
plan  Ferdinand  opposed  invincible  and  even 
offensive  refusals.  I,  said  he,  become  brother- 
in-law  of  Emmanuel  Godoy  ! — never ! — that 
would  be  a  disgrace !  These  refusals,  expressed 
in  such  language,  redoubled  the  anxieties  of  the 
queen  and  the  favourite.  They  no  longer  thought 
of  fortifying  themselves  against  the  conse- 
quences of  the  king's  death,  then  supposed  to  be 
much  nearer  than  it  was  destined  to  be.  The 
Prince  of  the  Peace  was  already  generalissimo 
of  all  the  Spanish  armies.  He  resolved,  and 
the  queen  warmly  approved  this  resolution,  to 
give  himself  new  powers,  in  order  to  unite  by 
degrees  in  his  own  hands  all  the  prerogatives 
of  royalty,  and,  when  he  should  consider  him- 
self strong  enough,  to  exclude  Ferdinand  from 
the  throne.  He  intended  to  get  him  declared 
incapable  of  reigning,  the  crown  transferred  to 
a  younger  head,  to  bring  about  in  this  manner 
the  necessity  of  a  regency,  and  to  attribute  that 
regency  to  himself,  which  would  insure  to  him 
the  continuance  of  the  power  that  he  had  ex- 
ercised for  so  many  years.  This  plan  once  re- 
solved upon,  they  began  by  completing  the 
nominal  authority  of  the  prince,  for  his  real 
authority  had  long  been  as  entire  as  it  could 
be.  They  persuaded  the  king,  that,  thanks  to 
Emmanuel  Godoy,  the  army  was  in  a  flourish- 
ing state,  but  that  the  navy  was  not  in  a  like 
predicament ;  that  the  latter  needed  to  receive 
the  influence  of  that  genius  which  upheld  the 
Spanish  monarchy  ;  that  to  place  it  under  the 
direct  authority  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
would  render  its  reorganization  certain,  and 
afford  great  satisfaction  to  the  mighty  Emperor 
of  the  French,  who  complained  incessantly  of 
the  decline  of  the  Spanish  navy.  Charles  IV. 
adopted  this  proposal  with  the  joy  which  he 
always  felt  in  stripping  himself  of  his  authority 
in  favour  of  Emmanuel  Godoy ;  and  the  latter 
was  gratified  by  a  royal  decree  with  the  title 
of  grand-admiral,  a  title  which  had  bee*i  borne 
by  the  illustrious  conqueror  of  Lepanto,  Don 
John  of  Austria,  and  more  recently  by  Don 
Philip,  brother  of  Charles  III.  To  this  title, 
which  coriferred  on  Emmanuel  Godoy  the  com- 
mand of  all  the  naval  forces,  besides  the  com- 
mand of  all  the  land  forces,  which  he  already 
had,  was  added  that  of  Most  Serene  Highness. 
A  council  of  admiralty  composed  of  his  own 
creatures  was  formed  about  the  prince  for  the 
purpose  of  seconding  him,  and,  notwithstanding 
the  public  poverty,  it  was  decided  that  a  palace, 
called  the  palace  of  the  Admiralty,  should  be 
erecte  1  for  it  in  the  finest  quarter  of  Madrid. 
Thus  instead  of  any  benefit,  the  navy  beheld 
only  tne  creation  of  new  charges,  tending  solely 
to  aggravate  its  distress. 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


403 


1\  was  not  enough  to  unite  the  command  of 
all  the  forces  of  the  monarchy  in  the  hands  of 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  ;  it  was  proposed  to 
make  him  master  of  the  palace,  and,  in  some 
sort,  of  the  person  of  the  king.  It  was  insi- 
nuated about  the  latter,  that  his  unnatural  son, 
detached  from  his  parents  by  the  mischievous 
influences  of  the  house  of  Naples,  and  sur- 
rounded by  perfidious  subjects,  was  more  and 
more  to  be  feared  every  day ;  that  the  spirit 
of  disorder  peculiar  to  the  age  might  perhaps 
second  his  evil  designs,  and  therefore  it  was 
requisite  that  the  powerful  hand  of  Emmanuel 
(so  Charles  IV.  called  him  in  his  confiding 
friendship)  should  extend  over  the  royal  dwell- 
ing, to  preserve  it  from  all  danger.  In  conse- 
quence, the  prince  was  further  appointed  colo- 
nel-general of  the  king's  military  household. 
From  that  moment  he  commanded  in  the  pa- 
lace itself,  and  was  chief  of  all  the  troops  com- 
posing the  royal  guard.  No  sooner  had  he  re- 
ceived this  new  title,  which  completed  his  om- 
nipotence, than  he  hastened  to  make  reforms 
in  different  corps  of  the  guard.  Besides  two 
regiments  of  foot,  one  called  the  Spanish 
guards,  the  other  called  the  Walloon  guards, 
which  formed  an  effective  force  of  6000  men, 
there  was  a  regiment  of  cavalry,  called  the 
royal  carbineers,  and  further  a  corps  of  elite, 
called  the  life-guards,  divided  into  four  compa- 
nies, the  Spanish,  the  Flemish,  the  Italian,  and 
the  American,  commemorating  by  those  names 
all  the  ancient  dominions  of  Spain.  On  this 
corps,  the  most  enlightened  of  all,  thanks  to 
the  selection  of  the  men  of  whom  it  was  com- 
posed, and  a  good  judge  of  what  was  passing 
in  Spain,  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  could  not 
place  entire  reliance.  He  conceived  the  idea 
of  dissolving  it,  upon  the  pretext  of  putting  an 
end  to  all  denominations  which  no  longer  cor- 
responded with  the  reality  of  things,  and  to 
compose  out  of  it  two  companies  only,  desig- 
nated by  the  titles  of  first  and  second.  He 
availed  himself  of  this  occasion  to  remove  from 
it  all  those  men  whom  he  distrusted,  and  in 
particular  many  French  emigrants,  who  had 
sought  an  asylum  with  the  Bourbons  of  Spain, 
and  who,  devoted  with  body  and  soul  to  the 
good  Charles  IV.,  were  nevertheless,  from  their 
better  education,  more  capable  than  the  others 
of  appreciating  the  unworthy  administration 
which  dishonoured  the  monarchy.  Emmanuel 
Godoy,  in  excluding  them,  removed  honest 
men,  whom  he  dreaded,  and  gave  vent  to  his 
hatred  against  France,  which  every  instant  be- 
came more  violent. 

Emmanuel  Godoy  did  not  confine  himself  to 
this  measure.  He  created  his  brother  a  gran- 
dee of  Spain,  and  appointed  him  colonel  of  the 
regiment  of  Spanish  guards.  Lastly,  he  chose 
a  guard  for  himself  from  among  the  royal  car- 
bineers. All  these  precautions  taken,  he  caused 
all  the  members  of  the  council  of  Castille  whom 
he  thought  he  could  influence,  to  be  sounded 
one  after  another  for  the  purpose  of  preparing 
them  for  a  change  in  the  order  of  succession  to 
the  throne.  The  councils  of  Castille  and  of  the 
Indies  were  two  bodies  which  tempered  the  ab- 
solute authority  of  the  kings  of  Spain,  as  the 
parliaments  tempered  that  of  the  kings  of 
France.  There  was,  however,  a  difference  in 
their  attributions:  for,  besides  a  jurisdiction 
of  appeal  from  all  the  tribunals  of  the  kingdom 


which  belonged  to  them,  they  had  administra- 
tive attributions,  the  council  of  Castille  rela- 
tive to  the  internal  affairs  of  the  kingdom,  the 
council  of  the  Indies  relative  to  the  vast  affairs 
of  the  possessions  beyond  sea.  In  consequence 
of  an  uninterrupted  enjoyment  of  the  royal 
confidence  for  a  century  past,  and  the  necessity 
which  all  royalty  is  under  of  surrounding  itself 
with  a  certain  public  assent,  no  great  affair  of 
the  monarchy  was  resolved  upon  without  con- 
sulting the  opinion  of  these  two  councils.  The 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  who  had  already  intro- 
duced into  them  a  good  number  of  his  crea- 
tures, was  naturally  desirous  to  insure  their 
concurrence  in  his  criminal  designs.  But,  en- 
slaved as  they  were,  they  appeared  by  no  means 
inclined  to  countenance  a  change  in  the  succes- 
sion to  the  throne.  Secret  efforts,  however, 
to  work  upon  them  continued  to  be  made,  and 
underhand  influence  was  resorted  to  with  the 
colonels  of  the  regiments.  The  language  held 
to  both,  represented  that-the  Prince  of  the  Astu- 
rias  was  at  once  incapable  and  wicked,  and 
that  at  the  death  of  the  king  the  monarchy 
might  be  brought  into  peril  by  hands  as  mis- 
chievous as  they  were  unskilful. 

The  Prince  of  the  Peace  extended  his  in- 
trigues far  beyond  the  court  of  Spain.  Though 
he  detested  France  on  account  of  the  severe 
and  annoying  advice  which  he  received  from 
that  quarter,  he  knew  that  all  power  resided 
in  her,  and  that  the  plans  to  which  he  attached 
his  salvation  would  be  chimerical  unless  they 
had  the  support  of  Napoleon.  He  strove,  there- 
fore, to  make  sure  of  him  by  a  thousand  mean- 
nesses, especially  since  the  famous  proclama- 
tion, the  recollection  of  which  disturbed  his 
sleep.  Having  learned  that  Napoleon,  who 
liked  to  ride  Spanish  horses,  had  recently  lost 
in  the  war  one  of  those  which  the  King  of  Spain 
had  given  him,  he  had  offered  him  four,  se- 
lected from  among  the  finest  in  the  kingdom. 
Having  formed  a  false  idea  of  the  imperial 
court,  borrowed  from  the  court  of  Madrid,  he  had 
taken  it  into  his  head  that  certain  persons  were 
worth  the  trouble  of  gaining,  that  Murat  was 
the  first  military  man,  that  he  possessed  a  great 
ascendency  over  Napoleon :  him,  therefore  he 
thought  of  gaining.  With  this  motive  he  had 
commenced  a  secret  correspondence  with  him, ' 


»  There  are  in  the  Louvre  specimens  of  this  correspond- 
ence, the  communication  of  which  Napoleon  had  procured, 
either  through  Murat  himself;  or  hy  his  own  active  vigi- 
lance. These  specimens  furnish  a  singular  idea  of  the 
baseness  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace.  To  make  the  reader 
better  acquainted  with  this  personage,  his  character,  and 
his  views,  we  quote  the  following  letter,  copied  with  all 
the  faults  of  language  that  it  contains.  He  will  thus  be 
enabled  to  judge  the  better  of  the  kind  -of  education  re- 
ceived at  that  period  by  the  persons  composing  the  court 
of  Spain : — 

"  To  hit  Imperial  and  Royal  Highness  Vie  Cfrand-dutce  of 
Berg* 

"  The  letter  of  your  Imperial  Highness  dated  Venice  the 
7th  of  December,  is  the  greatest  proof  to  me  of  the  emi- 
nent character  which  constitutes  the  heart  of  a  great  prince 
like  your  Imperial  Highness.  I  have  never  doubted  the 
virtues  that  characterize  you,  and  never  has  my  soul  con- 
ceived the  base  idea  of  mistrust.  Yes,  prince.  I  have  vowed 
to  your  Highness  fidelity  in  the  friendship  with  which  you 
honour  me,  and  my  correspondence  will  last  as  long  as  my 
existence. 


*  As  we  have  not  discovered  in  this  letter  any  peculiari- 
ties of  language  worth  mentioning,  which  might  have 
rendered  an  exact  transcript  of  the  original  desirable,  we 
are  content  to  furnish  as  close  an  English  version  of  it  M 
we  are  able. — Translator. 


404 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Oct.  1807. 


reinforced  by  presents,  and  particularly  one  of 
superb  horses.  The  imprudent  Murat  on  his 
part,  deeming  it  useful  to  form  connections 
wherever  crowns  might  chance  to  become  va- 
cant, had  taken  pains  to  procure  for  himself  in 
the  Peninsula  a  friend  so  powerful  as  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace.  The  crown  of  Portugal,  which 
seemed  likely  soon  to  be  vacant,  was  not  foreign 
to  this  calculation. 

The  secret  intrigues  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace  for  changing  the  succession  to  the  throne, 
secret  as  they  were,  did  not  fail  to  transpire  at 
Madrid,  and  added  to  an  unexampled  accumu- 
lation of  titles,  they  had  roused  minds.  The 
Prince  of  the  Asturias,  equally  exasperated 
and  alarmed,  had  opened  himself  respecting 
his  situation  to  a  few  friends  on  whom  he 
thought  that  he  could  rely.  The  principal 
were  his  former  governor,  the  Duke  de  San 
Carlos,  grand-master  of  the  king's  household, 
a  very  honest  personage,  having  no  other  merit 
but  that  of  a  courtier ;  the  Duke  de  1'Infantado, 
one  of  the  hiehest  nobles  in  Spain,  a  military 
man  not  following  his  profession,  having  ambi- 
tion, little  talent,  upright  intentions,  and  en- 
joying universal  consideration;  lastly,  an  eccle- 
siastic, who  had  taught  the  prince  the  little  he 
knew,  the  canon  Escoi'quiz,  then  banished  to 
Toledo,  where  he  was  a  member  of  the  archi- 
cpiscopal  chapter,  a  clerical  bel-esprit,  a  man  ex- 
tremely conversant  in  literature,  very  little  in 
politics,  tenderly  attached  to  his  pupil  and 
fondly  loved  by  him,  afflicted  at  the  situation 
to  which  he  beheld  him  reduced,  resolved  to 
extricate  him  from  it  by  all  the  means  in  his 
power,  and,  though  very  well  intentioned,  yet 
sensible  to  the  prospect  which  opened  before 
him  of  being  some  day  the  friend,  the  director 
of  the  conscience,  of  the  King  of  Spain.  It 
was  in  the  society  of  these  personages  and  of 
a  few  ladies  of  the  court  attached  to  the  de- 
ceased Princess  of  the  Asturias,  that  Ferdinand 
poured  forth  the  bitter  sentiments  with  which 
he  was  filled.  The  canon  Escoi'quiz  being  ab- 
sent, he  was  secretly  sent  for  to  Madrid,  be- 
cause, in  the  opinion  of  Ferdinand  and  his 
little  court,  he  was  deemed  the  most  capable  of 


"  I  wan  very  sorry  to  be  obliged  to  keep  from  your  Im- 
perial Highness  a  secret  which  I  was  forced  to  do  by  the 
word  of  my  sovereign,  signed  in  a  treaty  with  his  Imperial 
and  Royal  Majesty.  My  gratitude  to  your  Imperial  High- 
ness would  have  induced  me  to  reveal  it,  if  the  Emperor 
had  not  required  it.  But  as  I  cannot  help  thinking  that 
your  Imperial  Highness  must  now  be  acquainted  with  it, 
I  cannot  but  unfold  my  sentiments  to  you.  It  is  now  that 
I  begin  to  enjoy  the  tranquillity  afforded  me  by  a  treaty 
which  places  me  under  the  protection  of  the  Emperor.  I 
could  not  want  for  any  thing  during  the  lifetime  of  my 
king,  since  his  majesty  honours  me  with  his  most  singular 
esteem ;  but  if,  unfortunately,  he  should  die,  then  my  ene- 
mies would  strive  to  disparage  my  services,  and  to  destroy 
my  reputation.  I  have  not  a  friend  in  the  world  besides 
your  Imperial  Highness,  and  though  I  am  persuaded  that 
your  power  would  have  saved  me  from  affliction,  I  never- 
theless considered  that  your  efforts  would  not  have  been 
fowerful  enough  to  avert  the  first  stroke  of  infamy.  Your 
mperial  Highness  sees,  therefore,  whether  that  wh:ch  has 
been  agreed  upon  in  the  treaty  is  not  to  me  of  inestimable 
value.  On  this  account  I  venture  to  take  the  liberty  of 
expressing  my  gratitude  to  his  Imperial  and  Royal  Ma- 
jesty in  the  letter  herewith  enclosed.  I  should  have  made 
a  point  of  acquitting  myself  earlier  of  this  respectable 
duty,  if  the  expression  of  the  treaty  itself  had  not  op- 
posed it. 

"  I  wait  with  the  utmost  impatience  for  the  explanations 
which  your  Imperial  Highness  shall  be  pleased  to  offer  me 
Immediately  after  your  arrival  in  Paris :  and  since  his  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Majesty  has  demonstrated  that  he  should 
«ee  with  pleasure  the  king  my  master  distinguish  Marshal 
Duroc  with  the  Golden  Fleece,  I  have  the  honour  to  accom- 


giving  good  advice.  As  he  possessed  mor>; 
learning  than  the  others,  understood  Virgil  and 
Cicero,  and  was  acquainted  with  the  French 
authors,  a  degree  of  science  uncommon  at  the 
court  of  Spain,  it  was  conceived  that  in  this 
labyrinth  of  horrible  intrigues  he  would  best 
direct  the  oppressed  prince.  On  the  arrival  of 
the  canon  from  Toledo,  it  was  agreed  that,  in 
the  serious  danger  which  threatened  him,  the 
prince  had  but  one  resource — to  throw  himself 
at  the  feet  of  Napoleon,  to  invoke  his  protec- 
tion, and,  to  insure  it  more  completely,  to  ask 
for  a  princess  of  the  Bonaparte  family  in  mar- 
riage. The  canon  Escoi'quiz  saw  the  advan- 
tages in  such  an  alliance :  the  first,  to  secure 
an  all-powerful  protector ;  the  second,  to  attain 
the  end  which  Napoleon  must  have  had  in  view, 
that  of  attaching  Spain  to  his  dynasty  by  close 
and  solid  ties.  This  counsel  was  listened  to, 
though  it  was  not  to  Ferdinand's  taste.  The 
young  prince,  in  fact,  fostered  at  the  bottom  of 
his  heart  some  of  the  least  commendable  of 
Spanish  passions,  and  especially  a  bitter  ha- 
tred of  foreign  nations,  .and  above  all  of  the 
French  revolution  and  its  illustrious  chief. 
These  passions,  which  were  natural  to  him, 
had  been  further  fomented  by  his  wife,  the 
Princess  of  Naples.  However,  full  of  confi- 
dence in  the  superior  understanding  of  the 
canon  Escoi'quiz,  he  adopted  his  advice  and  re- 
solved to  conform  to  it.  The  canon  had  tra- 
velled ;  and  for  France  and  for  Napoleon  he 
entertained  those  sentiments  which  every  en- 
lightened Spaniard  must  feel. 

But,  if  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  had  the  means 
of  establishing  relations  of  all  kinds  with  the 
court  of  France,  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  on 
the  contrary,  banished  to  the  Escurial,  closely 
and  continually  watched,  had  no  means  of 
transmitting  his  thoughts  and  his  wishes  to 
Napoleon.  He  and  his  friends  resolved  to 
address  themselves  to  the  ambassador  of 
France,  M.  de  Beauharnais. 

M.  de  Beauharnais,  brother  of  the  first  hus- 
band of  the  Empress  Josephine,  had  succeeded 
General  Beurnonville  at  Madrid  in  1806.  He 
was  a  man  of  moderate  understanding,  an 


pany  it  with  this  letter;  and  at  the  same  time  your  Impe- 
rial Highness  will  find  another  forwarded  herewith,  which 
the  Emperor  will  be  pleased  to  give  to  the  King  of  West- 
phalia, in  demonstration  of  the  alliance  which  exists,  in 
fact,  between  his  Catholic  Majesty  and  all  the  sovereigns 
of  the  family  of  his  Imperial  and  Royal  Majesty. 

"The  trial  of  the  criminal  seducers  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Asturias  is  prosecuted  according  to  the  dispositions  of  our 
laws,  because  the  king  has  been  pleased  to  divest  himself 
of  his  sovereign  authority,  by  which  he  could  iiave  tried 
them  alone,  and  left  the  judges  at  liberty  to  consult  his 
Majesty  upon  their  sentence.  They  have  all  incurred  the 
penalty  of  being  stripped  of  their  dignities,  and  the  two 
most  inculpated  have  deserved  capital  punishment;  but 
the  queen  has  disposed  the  will  of  the  king  to  clemency, 
and  the  punishment  of  death  will  be  commuted  into  per- 
petual imprisonment;  and  as  for  the  others,  they  are  to 
be  banished  from  the  kingdom.  Care  has  been  taken  to 
refrain  from  the  slightest  mention  of  subjects  of  his  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Majesty,  out  of  regard  for  what  he  has 
caused  to  be  signified. 

"  I  am  very  sorry  that  I  am  not  able  to  write  to  your 
Imperial  Highness  in  your  own  language,  but  I  will  not 
deprive  myself  of  the  satisfaction  of  addressing  to  you  my 
original  letter  with  this  literal  translation.  It  is  not  pos- 
sible to  transcribe  the  language  of  the  heart,  but  on  mine 
are  imprinted  the  gratitude  and  admiration,  with  which 
will  ever  have  for  your  Imperial  Highness,  with  the  high- 
est consideration, 

"  Your  invariable  servant, 

"  MANUEL. 

"San  Lorenzo,  December  20tli,  1807." 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


405 


awkward  and  parsim.-^ious  ambassador,  not 
fit  for  the  delicate  business  of  his  station,  and 
Btill  less  for  making  the  figure  which  that  sta- 
tion requires ;  endowed  nevertheless  with  some 
good  sense  and  perfect  integrity.  To  all  this 
he  added  a  very  ridiculous  pride,  arising  from 
the  sense  of  his  situation,  because  he  had,  as 
•we  have  just  observed,  the  honour  to  be  bro- 
ther-in-law of  the  consort  of  his  sovereign. 

His  gravity,  his  probity,  his  awkwardness, 
ill  accorded  with  the  trickery  and  the  levity 
of  the  favourite,  and  he  liked  the  latter  as 
little  as  he  esteemed  him.  He  transmitted  to 
Napoleon  reports  conformable  to  what  he  felt. 
Hence  he  was  considered  at  Madrid  as  an 
enemy  of  the  grand-admiral.  These  were 
favourable  circumstances  for  Ferdinand's  con- 
fidants. The  canon  Escoi'quiz  undertook  to 
call  on  M.  de  Beauharnais ;  and  he  obtained 
access  to  him  upon  the  pretext  of  presenting 

l  M.  de  Toreno  and  several  historians,  both  French  and 
Spanish,  have  alleged  that  M.  de  Beauharnais  had  received 
from  Paris,  or  had  taken  upon  himself,  the  commission  to 
enter  into  communication  with  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias, 
either  for  the  purpose  of  instilling  into  him  the  idea  of 
marrying  a  French  princess,  or  of  dividing  the  royal  family 
of  Spain,  and  thus  securing  the  means  of  sowing  dissen- 
sions in  it  of  which  advantage  was  afterwards  taken.  This 
is  a  complete  error,  as  is  proved  hy  the  official  and  the 
secret  correspondence  of  M.  de  Beauharnais.  In  this 
double  correspondence  the  ambassador  relates  how  the 
agents  of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  came  to  him,  and  from 
his  account,  perfectly  sincere,  for  he  was  incapable  of 
lying,  it  evidently  results  that  this  intercourse  originated 
with  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  and  not  with  the  French 
legation.  We  shall  presently  quote  two  papers,  which 
perfectly  clear  up  this  point.  The  first  is  a  despatch  from 
M.  de  Champagny,  in  which  that  minister,  in  reply  to  a 
letter  of  M.  de  Beauharnais,  full  of  reserve,  enjoins  him, 
in  very  sharp  language,  to  express  himself  more  clearly. 
This  first  despatch  proves  positively  that  it  was  not  Napo- 
leon who  had  the  idea  of  interfering  with  the  interior  of 
the  royal  family  of  Spain,  and  that,  on  the  contrary,  ap- 
plication was  made  to  him.  The  second  is  the  very  letter 
of  Prince  Ferdinand  to  M.  de  Beauharnais,  in  which  that 
prince  had  enclosed  the  proposal  of  marriage  addressed  to 
Napoleon.  The  proposal  of  marriage  has  been  published ; 
fcut  the  letter  in  which  it  was  enclosed  was  never  known 
or  published.  The  mere  perusal  of  this  second  paper  will 
prove  that  neither  M.  de  Beauharnais  nor  his  government 
commenced  the  intercourse  with  the  Prince  of  the  Astu- 
rias. From  the  tone  of  this  letter,  it  is  easy  to  perceive 
that  the  prince  sought  those  to  whom  he  addresses  him- 
Belf.  and  was  not  sought  by  them. 

Here  is  the  despatch  of  M.  de  Champagny  to  M.  de 
Beauharnais : — 

"Paris,  9th  September,  1807. 

"  Monsieur  1'Ambassadeur, — I  have  received  your  con- 
fidential letter,  and  lose  no  time  in  replying  to  it.  without 
admitting  an  intermediary  between  you  and  me.  All  the 
means  that  you  deem  it  proper  to  employ  in  order  to  make 
me  acquainted  either  with  the  persons  with  whom  you  are 
likely  to  have  to  treat,  or  with  the  state  of  the  affairs  which 
you  have  to  conduct,  will  appear  very  good  to  me,  if  they 
shall  tend  to  throw  upon  them  more  light,  and  in  a  surer 
manner.  You  need  not  have  any  fears  about  the  use 
which  I  shall  make  of  your  letters.  Any  communication 
through  the  offices,  (bureaux,)  whenever  it  does  take  place, 
will  always  be  without  danger :  they  deserve  the  utmost 
confidence,  and,  for  several  years  past,  they  have  been 
guardians  of  the  greatest  interests  of  the  government  and 
depositories  of  its  most  important  secrets.  Besides,  it  is 
one  of  the  first  duties  of  every  minister  to  a  foreign  court 
to  inform  his  government,  without  restriction  and  with- 
out reserve,  of  all  that  he  sees,  of  all  that  he  hears,  of  all 
that  comes  to  his  knowledge.  Placed  for  the  purpose  of 
seeing  and  hearing,  furnished  with  all  the  means  of  gain- 
ing information,  what  he  learns  does  not  belong  to  him- 
self, it  is  the  property  of  him  whose  representative  he  is. 
You  know  this  duty  better  than  any  one,  and  it  is  no 
doubt  in  order  to  fulfil  it  in  its  whole  extent  that  you  wish 
to  multiply  these  means  of  communication  with  me :  I  am 
fer  from  objecting  to  that. 

"Your  confidential  letter  contains  very  important 
things,  so  important  that  it  is  to  be  regretted  that  you 
have  not  represented  them  in  greater  detail,  and  in  parti- 
cular that  you  have  not  stated  how  they  have  come  to  you. 
Such  VKU  the  -'flection  of  the  Emperor  when  I  had  the 


him  with  a  poem  which  he  had  composed  on 
the  conquest  of  Mexico.  The  canon  proceeded 
by  degrees  to  more  intimate  communications, 
opened  himself  entirely  to  the  ambassador  of 
France,  made  him  acquainted  with  the  situation 
of  the  prince,  with  his  dangers,  with  his  wishes, 
and  with  the  desire  which  he  had  conceived 
of  obtaining  a  wife  from,  the  hand  of  Napoleon, 
being  determined  not  on  any  account  to  have 
the  one  destined  for  him  by  Emmanuel  Godoy.1 
M.  de  Beauharnais  was  much  too  new  in  the 
profession  in  which  he  was  engaged  not  to  be 
alarmed  at  so  delicate  a  position,  for  the  over- 
ture involved  his  assenting  to  a  clandestine 
intercourse  with  the  heir  to  the  crown.  He 
was  fearful  of  being  deceived  by  intriguers  and 
compromised  with  the  court  of  Spain.  He  re- 
fused at  first  to  believe  the  canon  Escoi'quiz, 
and  received  his  overtures  with  a  coolness 
capable  of  discouraging  men  less  determined 

honour  of  conversing  with  him  on  the  subject.  What  have 
been  your  relations  with  the  young  prince  of  whom  you 
speak  f  What  are  the  positive  reasons  which  you  have  for 
judging  of  him  in  a  certain  manner?  He.  implores,  you 
say,  on  his  knees,  the  protection  of  the  Emperor :  how  do  you 
knt/w  this  f  Has  he  told  you  so  himself  f  or  by  whom  has  he 
desired  that  you  should  be  told  it?  These  questions  are 
asked  you  by  the  Emperor,  and  it  is  he  who  has  made  the 
reflection  which  I  mentioned  above,  that  a  minister  ought 
to  have  no  secrets  from  his  government.  CHAMPAGNY." 

Here  follows  the  letter  of  Prince  Ferdinand  to  M.  do 
Beauharnais : — 

"  You  will  permit  me,  monsieur  1'ambassadeur,  to  ex- 
press to  you  all  my  gratitude  for  all  the  proofs  of  esteem 
and  affection  which  you  have  given  me  in  the  secret  and 
indirect  correspondence  that  we  have  had  hitherto  through  the 
person  whom  you  know,  and  who  has  all  my  confidence,  1 
owe,  in  short,  to  your  kindness,  which  I  shall  never  forget, 
the  happiness  of  being  able  to  express  directly,  and  witliout 
risk,  to  the  great  Emperor  your  master,  the  sentiments  so 
long  retained  in  my  heart.  I  avail  myself  therefore  of  this 
happy  moment  to  address  by  your  hands  to  his  Imperial  and 
Royal  Majesty  the  accompanying  letter,  and,  fearful  of  an- 
noying him  by  misplaced  prolixity,  I,  as  yet,  only  half 
express  the  esteem,  respect,  and  affection,  which  I  feel  for 
his  august  person ;  and  I  request  you,  monsieur  1'ambas- 
sadeur,  to  make  amends  for  this  in  the  letters  which  you 
will  have  the  honour  to  write  to  him. 

"  You  will  likewise  do  me  the  favour  to  add  to  his  Im- 
perial and  Royal  Majesty,  that  I  conjure  him  to  excuse 
any  faults  against  usage  and  style  which  there  may  be  in 
my  said  letter,  as  well  on  account  of  my  being  a  foreigner, 
as  in  consideration  of  the  anxiety  and  restraint  under 
which  I  am  obliged  to  write  it,  being,  as  you  know,  beset 
even  in  my  chamber  with  spies,  who  watch  me,  and  forced  to 
avail  myself  for  this  purpose  of  the  few  moments  that  lean 
steal  from  their  malicious  eyes.  As  I  fatter  myself  that  1 
shall  obtain  in  this  affair  the  protection  of  his  Imperial  and 
Knyal  Majesty,  and  that  in  consequence  the  communications 
will  become  more  necessary  and  more  frequent,  I  charge  th« 
said  person  who  has  hitherto  had  this  commission  to  take  his 
measures  in  concert  with  you  for  conducting  it  safely,  as  hr. 
has  thus  far  had  no  warrant  fur  the  said  commission  but 
the  tokens  agreed  upon  ;  being  thoroughly  assured  of  hit 
integrity,  his  discretion,  and  his  prudence,  I  (five  him  by  thit 
letter  my  full  and  absolute  powers  for  negotiating  this  affair 
till  its  conclusion,  and  I  ratify  all  that  he  shall  say  or  do 
on  this  point  in  my  name,  as  if  I  had  said  and  done  it 
myself,  which  you  will  have  the  goodness  to  communicate 
to  his  Imperial  Majesty  with  the  most  sincere  expressions 
of  my  gratitude. 

"  You  will  also  have  the  goodness  to  tell  him  that,  if  his 
Imperial  Majesty  should  happen  to  deem  it  useful,  at  what- 
ever time  it  might  be,  for  me  to  send  to  his  court  with  suitable 
secrecy  some  confidential  person,  to  give  him  more  complett 
information  concerning  my  situation  than  can  be  given  in 
writing,  or  for  any  other  purpose  that  his  wisdom  may  judge 
necessary,  his  Imperial  Majesty  has  but  to  send  you  word  to 
be  instantly  obeyed,  as  he  shall  be  in  every  thing  that  shall 
depend  on  me. 

"  I  repeat,  sir,  the  assurances  of  my  esteem  and  grati- 
tude. I  request  you  to  preserve  this  letter  as  a  testimony 
of  the  perpetuity  of  my  sentiments,  and  I  pray  God  i» 
have  you  in  his  holy  keeping. 

"  Written  and  signed  by  my  own  hand,  and  sealed  with 
my  seal. 

"  The  Escurial,  llth  of  October,  1807.        FERDISAJTP  " 


406 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Oct.  1807. 


to  make  themselves  listened  to  and  understood. 
But  the  canon  devised  a  singular  method  of 
obtaining  credit :  this  was  to  establish  an  ex- 
change of  signs  between  the  prince  and  M.  de 
Beauharnais  in  the  visits  which  the  latter 
made  to  the  Escurial  for  the  purpose  of  paying 
his  respects  to  the  court.  These  signs,  agreed 
upon  beforehand,  could  not  leave  any  doubt 
respecting  the  secret  mission  which  the  canon 
Escoiquiz  alleged  that  he  had  received  from 
Ferdinand.  In  fact,  M.  de  Beauharnais,  on 
his  first  visit  to  the  Escurial,  observed  the 
prince  attentively,  perceived  the  preconcerted 
signs,  was,  moreover,  on  his  own  part  the 
object  of  the  most  marked  attentions,  and 
could  no  longer  feel  any  uncertainty  respecting 
the  mission  of  the  canon  Escoiquiz.  When  he 
was  satisfied  on  this  point,  he  still  deferred 
listening  to  him  till  he  should  be  authorized 
by  his  court  to  enter  upon  business  of  that 
kind.  He  then  sent  to  Paris  a  mysterious 
despatch,  saying  that  an  innocent  son,  cruelly 
treated  by  his  father  and  his  mother,  solicited 
the  support  of  Napoleon,  and  desired  to  become 
his  grateful  and  devoted  protege.  Napoleon, 
angry  at  this  ridiculous  mystery,  ordered  M. 
de  Beauharnais  to  be  enjoined  to  make  him- 
self more  clear  and  intelligible.  The  latter 
obeyed,  and  related  all  that  had  passed.  He 
gave  a  detailed  account  of  it  in  a  secret  cor- 
respondence, which  exhibited  alike  his  awk- 
wardness and  his  sincerity,  and  which  neither 
was  to  be,  nor  was,  deposited  in  the  office  for 
foreign  affairs.  He  was  told  in  reply  that  he 
must  hear  every  thing,  promise  nothing  more 
than  a  friendly  interest  for  the  misfortunes  of 
the  prince,  and,  as  for  the  proposal  of  mar- 
riage, to  declare  that  the  overture  was  too 
vague  to  be  taken  into  consideration,  and  to  be 
followed  either  by  assent  or  refusal. 

Commenced  in  July,  1807,  this  intercourse 
was  continued  in  August  and  September,  with 
the  same  fear  of  committing  himself  on  the 
part  of  M.  Beauharnais,  and  the  same  desire 
to  be  accepted  on  the  part  of  Ferdinand.  That 
prince  at  length  determined  to  have  two  letters 
delivered  by  the  canon  Escoiquiz,  one  for  the 
ambassador,  the  other  for  Napoleon  himself, 
in  which  deploring  his  wretched  situation  and 
the  dangers  with  which  he  was  threatened,  he 
formally  solicited  the  protection  of  France,  and 
the  hand  of  a  princess  of  the  Bonaparte  family. 
These  two  letters,  dated  the  llth  of  October, 
were  not  despatched  till  the  20th,  in  conse- 
quence of  the  pains  taken  by  M.  de  Beau- 
harnais to  procure  a  safe  messenger,  and  did 
not  arrive  before  the  27th  or  28th,  when  other 
tidings  not  less  important,  the  subject  of  which 
we  are  about  to  state,  reached  Paris. 

While  Ferdinand  was  applying  to  Napoleon, 
not  knowing  whether  the  French  protection 
would  be  prompt  enough,  or  signified  strongly 
enough,  to  save  him,  he  had  resolved  to  take 
at  the  same  time  his  precautions  at  Madrid 
itself.  In  accord  with  his  friends,  he  con- 
ceived the  idea  of  making  an  appeal  to  his 
father,  in  order  to  open  his  eyes,  denouncing 
*he  crimes  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  the  com- 
plicity of  the  queen,  and,  if  not  her  adulterous 
connection  with  the  favourite,  at  least  her 
abject  submission  to  the  will  of  that  ruler  of 
the  royal  household ;  lastly,  beseeching  him  to 
put  an  end  to  the  scandals,  to  the  calamities 


which  desolated  Spain,  and  to  the  danger* 
which  threatened  an  unfortunate  son.  Fer 
dinand  was  to  deliver  to  the  king  a  paper  con- 
taining these  revelations,  with  a  request  that, 
after  reading,  he  would  return  it  to  him,  for  an 
indiscretion  might  endanger  his  life.  The 
minute  of  this  paper  was  in  the  handwriting 
of  the  canon  Escoiquiz.  Independently  of  this 
proceeding,  the  authors  of  the  plan  had  con- 
ceived the  further  idea,  in  case  the  king  should 
die  suddenly,  to  give  to  the  Duke  de  1'Infantado 
powers  signed  beforehand  by  Ferdinand,  by 
virtue  of  which  the  duke  should  have  the  mili- 
tary command  of  Madrid  and  New  Castille, 
that  he  might  be  enabled  to  resist  by  force  of 
arms,  if  necessary,  any  attempt  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace.  Such  were  the  means  prepared 
by  this  coterie  to  guard  against  any  design  of 
usurpation,  whether  real  or  imaginary ;  and 
assuredly  these  means  showed  neither  great 
depth  of  understanding,  nor  great  boldness  of 
character.  But,  during  these  proceedings  of 
the  prince  and  his  friends,  spies  posted  about 
them  had  observed  unusual  goings  and  comings. 
They  had  seen  Ferdinand  himself  writing  seve- 
ral times,  which  it  was  not  customary  for  him 
to  do,  and  they  had  heard  him,  in  his  exaspe- 
ration against  his  mother  and  the  favourite, 
use  expressions  of  extreme  bitterness.  The 
entry  of  the  French  troops  into  Spain,  a  sub- 
ject of  endless  conjectures,  had  also  given  oc- 
casion for  very  inconsiderate  language  on  the 
part  of  the  prince  and  his  friends.  The  latter 
already  looked  upon  themselves  as  certain  of 
the  protection  of  France,  and  liked  to  boast  of 
it :  though  they  had  long  made  it  a  crime  in 
Emmanuel  Godoy  to  seek  it,  and  to  pay  for  it 
with  a  blind  submission,  they  took  pleasure  in 
insinuating,  nay,  sometimes  in  saying  plainly, 
that  it  was  not  for  nothing  that  the  French 
armies  were  crossing  the  Pyrenees,  and  that 
the  contemptible  government  which  oppressed 
Spain  would  not  be  long  in  discovering  this ; 
which  was  unfortunately  more  true  than  they 
themselves  imagined,  and  than  they  soon  had 
occasion  to  wish. 

Among  the  persons  commissioned  to  watch 
Ferdinand,  one  (it  is  said  that  she  was  a  lady 
of  the  court)  having  either  been  intrusted  with 
the  prince's  secrets,  or  having  cast  an  indis- 
creet eye  over  his  papers,  revealed  all  to  the 
queen.  The  latter,  on  learning  these  particu- 
lars, was  seized  with  a  violent  paroxysm  of 
rage.  The  Prince  of  the  Peace  was  not  at 
that  moment  at  the  Escurial,  distant  about  a 
dozen  leagues  from  Madrid.  He  was  accus- 
tomed to  pass  a  week  alternately  at  the  Es- 
curial and  Madrid.  He  was  ill,  it  was  said, 
in  consequence  of  his  debaucheries.  He  was 
sent  for  secretly,  and  left  his  palace  by  a  pri- 
vate door,,  desiring  on  this  occasion  that  his 
presence  at  the  Escurial  should  not  be  known, 
and  to  prevent  all  idea  that  he  could  be  the 
instigator  of  the  scenes  which  were  preparing. 
The  queen,  more  exasperated  than  he,  strove 
to  persuade  the  king  that  the  circumstances  de- 
nounced proved  nothing  less  than  an  extensive 
conspiracy  against  his  throne  and  life,  insisted 
that  it  was  necessary  to  act  immediately  with- 
out fear  of  publicity  now  become  inevitable,  to 
fall  unawares  upon  the  apartments  of  the  prince, 
and  to  seize  his  papers  before  he  had  time  to 
destroy  them.  The  weak  Charles  IV.,  incapa 


Oct.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


107 


ble  of  perceiving  how  far  he  was  involving  him- 
self by  such  a  step,  consented  to  all  that  was  : 
desired  of  him,  and  that  same  evening,  the  27th  : 
of  October,  the  day  on  which  the  treaty  was 
signed  at  Fontainebleau,  permitted  his  son's 
apartments  to  be  violated  and  his  papers  seized. 
The  prince,  who,  excepting  a  little  shrewdness, 
had  neither  understanding  nor  courage,  was 
thunderstruck,  and  delivered  without  resistance 
all  that  he  had.  The  papers  which  we  have 
just  mentioned,  mixed  with  others  more  insig- 
nificant, were  carried  to  the  queen,  who  deter- 
mined to  examine  them  herself.  One  may  con- 
ceive the  rage  of  that  princess  on  reading  the 
paper  in  which  all  the  turpitudes  of  the  favour- 
ite were  denounced,  and  her  own  at  least  hinted 
at.  Imbecile  and  enslaved  as  was  the  unfortu- 
nate Charles  IV.,  this  paper  would  not  have 
been  sufficient  to  persuade  him  that  his  son 
meditated  a  crime,  and  it  might  perhaps, 
by  opening  his  eyes,  have  attained  the  end 
proposed  by  the  canon  Escoi'quiz  and  Fer- 
dinand. But,  unluckily,  there  were  other  pa- 
pers, such  as  a  cipher  destined  for  a  mysterious 
correspondence,  and  the  order  appointing  the 
Duke  de  1'Infantado  commandant  of  New  Cas- 
tille,  in  which  a  blank  had  been  left  for  the  date 
to  be  inserted  at  the  moment  of  the  king's  death. 
These  last  papers  were  sufficient  for  the  queen 
to  found  all  imaginable  suppositions  upon,  in 
order  to  deceive  the  unfortunate  Charles  IV., 
in  order  to  deceive  herself.  After  perusing 
these  papers,  unable  to  repress  her  passion, 
she  said,  perhaps  she  believed,  that  they  fur- 
nished proofs  of  a  conspiracy  tending  to  de- 
throne her  and  her  husband,  to  threaten  even 
their  lives ;  or  why  that  cipher,  if  not  to  cor- 
respond with  conspirators  ?  why  that  appoint- 
ment of  a  military  commandant  by  Ferdinand, 
who  was  not  yet  king,  if  not  to  consummate  a 
criminal  usurpation  ?  This  demonstration  laid 
before  poor  Charles  IV.,  with  no  other  proofs 
than  many  outbursts  of  rage,  filled  him  with 
affliction.  He  shed  tears  of  sorrow  over  a  son 
whom  he  still  loved,  and  whom  he  was  grieved 
to  find  so  culpable.  He  then  thanked  Heaven 
for  saving  his  life,  his  throne,  his  wife,  and  his 
friend  Emmanuel,  from  so  great  a  danger.  The 
queen,  excited  by  the  vehemence  natural  to  the 
sex,  to  take  an  initiative  in  all  this  convenient 
for  the  favourite — the  queen  declared  that  the 
case  demanded  a  prompt,  an  energetic  repres- 
sion, which  should  satisfy  the  outraged  majesty 
of  the  throne  and  secure  the  State  from  the 
repetition  of  such  plots.  It  was  therefore  re- 
solved that  the  prince  and  his  accomplices 
should  be  arrested  that  very  instant,  that  the 
ministers  and  the  prinicipal  personages  of  the 
State  should  then  be  summoned,  that  the  dis- 
covery just  made  should  be  communicated  to 
them,  with  the  royal  resolution  to  institute  a 
criminal  process  against  the  culprits.  This  was 
an  abominable  and  a  senseless  resolution,  for, 
after  such  a  clamour,  it  was  imperative  to  pro- 
secute the  prince  to  the  utmost,  to  convict  him 
of  the  crime,  were  he  innocent,  to  deprive  him 
of  his  rights  to  the  throne  and  thus  to  give  that 
throne,  suspended  on  the  brink  of  an  abyss, 
such  a  shock  as  might,  and  .actually  did,  preci- 
pitate it  into  that  abyss.  But  to  prosecute  the 
prince,  to  get  him  condemned  by  sold  judges, 
to  deprive  him  of  the  crown,  was  precisely 
what  that  infuriated  queen  aimed  at,  whatever 


the  peril  incurred  by  it.  All  that  she  wished 
for  was  accomplished.  Godoy  was  sent  back 
to  Madrid,  to  induce  a  belief  that  he  had  never 
left  it,  and  that  he  had  no  hand  in  the  tragic, 
scenes  at  the  Escurial.  The  king  went  to  Fer- 
dinand, demanded  his  sword,  and  constituted 
him  prisoner  in  his  own  apartments.  Couriers 
were  then  despatched  in  all  directions,  to  give 
orders  for  the  apprehension  of  the  alleged  ac- 
complices of  the  prince.  The  ministers  and 
the  members  of  the  councils  were  convoked, 
and,  with  consternation  in  their  countenances, 
received  the  communication  of  all  that  had  been 
decided  upon.  They  gave  their  silent  assent, 
not  from  zeal,  but  from  timidity. 

It  was  not  possible,  after  such  scandal,  to 
conceal  from  the  Spanish  nation  the  deplorable 
events  of  which  the  Escurial  had  just  been  the 
theatre.  In  enslaved  countries,  where  all  pub- 
licity is  prohibited,  important  news  circulates 
not  the  less  speedily,  nor  the  less  completely. 
It  flies  from  mouth  to  mouth,  propagated  by  an 
ardent  curiosity,  and  exaggerated  by  a  credu- 
lity that  is  not  undeceived.  The  scenes  pass- 
ing at  the  Escurial  were  already  known  to  all 
Madrid,  and  would  soon  be  known  to  all  Spain. 
Still,  to  publish  officially  the  alleged  discovery 
of  the  plot,  would  be  denouncing  the  prince  to 
the  nation  and  rendering  the  misfortunes  of 
the  throne  irreparable.  But  the  queen  and  the 
favourite  would  have  it  so.  In  consequence, 
they  required  an  act  of  publicity,  and,  in  a 
country  where  there  was  no  such  thing  but  for 
the  most  important  events,  such  as  a  birth, 
the  death  of  a  king,  a  declaration  of  war,  a 
signature  of  peace,  a  great  victory,  a  great 
defeat,  the  following  royal  decree  was  commu- 
nicated to  all  the  authorities  of  the  kingdom : 

"  God,  who  watches  over  his  creatures,  does 
not  permit  the  consummation  of  atrocious 
deeds  when  the  victims  are  innocent;  ac- 
cordingly, his  omnipotence  has  preserved  me 
from  the  most  terrible  catastrophe.  All  my 
subjects  are  perfectly  acquainted  with  my  reli- 
gious sentiments  and  the  regularity  of  my  mo- 
rals ;  all  love  me,  and  I  receive  from  all  proofs 
of  the  veneration  due  to  a  father  who  loves  his 
children.  I  was  living  in  the  persuasion  of 
this  truth,  when  an  unknown  hand  came  to  re- 
veal to  me  the  most  monstrous  and  unheard  of 
plan  framed  against  me  in  my  own  palace.  My 
own  life,  so  often  threatened,  had  become  an 
encumbrance  to  my  successor,  who,  infatu- 
ated, blinded,  and  abjuring  all  the  principles 
of  the  Christian  faith,  taught  him  through  my 
care  and  my  paternal  affection,  had  entered 
into  a  conspiracy  for  dethroning  me.  I  there- 
fore resolved  to  ascertain  myself  the  truth  of 
the  fact,  and  surprising  my  son  in  his  own 
apartments,  I  found  in  his  possession  the 
cipher  used  for  his  communications  with  the 
villains  and  the  instructions  which  he  received 
from  them.  I  summoned  the  governor  ad  in- 
terim of  the  council  to  examine  these  papers  in 
concert  with  the  other  ministers ;  they  applied 
themselves  assiduously  to  all  the  necessary 
investigations.  Every  thing  was  done,  and  the 
result  was  the  discovery  of  several  culprits ;  I 
decreed  that  they  should  be  apprehended,  and 
my  son  was  under  arrest  in  his  own  habitation. 
This  sorrow  was  wanting  to  all  those  which 
afflict  me ;  it  is  likewise  that  which  it  is  most 
important  to  make  its  author  expiate ;  and,  in  the 


408 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Nov.  1807. 


mean  time,  till  I  order  the  publication  of  the 
result  of  the  proceedings  commenced,  I  will  not 
neglect  to  manifest  to  my  subjects  my  affliction, 
which  the  proofs  of  their  loyalty  will  have  the 
effect  of  diminishing.  You  will  consider  this 
as  understood,  to  the  end  that  the  knowledge 
of  it  may  be  diffused  in  the  suitable  form. 

"San  Lorenzo,  (the  Escurial,)  30th  October,  1807. 
"To  the  Governor  ad  interim  of  the  Council." 

In  this  court,  where  one  durst  not  do  any 
thing  without  referring  to  Paris,  where  the  op- 
pressed son,  the  involuntarily  oppressing  fa- 
ther, the  favourite,  the  persecutor  of  both, 
sought  in  Napoleon  a  support  under  their  mis- 
fortune, their  silliness,  or  their  crime,  it  was 
not  possible  to  commit  such  deplorable  extra- 
vagances without  writing  to  him  on  the  sub- 
ject. In  consequence,  on  the  very  day  pre- 
vious to  the  official  act  just  quoted,  a  letter  to 
Napoleon  was  dictated  to  the  unhappy  Charles 
IV.  full  of  a  ridiculous  sorrow,  destitute  of 
dignity,  in  which  he  said  that  he  was  betrayed 
by  his  son,  and  threatened  in  his  person  and 
his  power,  and  announced  nothing  less  than  a 
determination  to  change  the  order  of  the  suc- 
cession to  the  throne.1 

Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen  above,  had  not 
received  the  letter  of  the  llth  of  October,  in 
which  Ferdinand  solicits  his  protection  and  a 
wife,  till  the  28th  of  the  same  month.  He  re- 
ceived successively,  on  the  5th,  6th,  and  7th 
of  November,  those  of  his  ambassador  and  of 
Charles  IV.,  which  informed  him  of  the  scandal 
which  the  sovereigns  of  the  Escurial  had  not 
been  afraid  to  occasion.  He  was  therefore 
obliged  in  some  measure  to  interfere  in  the 
affairs  of  Spain,  whether  he  would  or  not,  and 
iertainly  much  earlier  than  he  had  expected  or 
wished  to  do  so.  For  some  time  past,  as  we 
Vave  already  related,  he  said  to  himself,  that 
it  was  dangerous  to  leave  Bourbons  on  a  throne 
At  once  so  lofty  and  so  near  a  neighbour ;  and 
that  he  must,  besides,  relinquish  all  hope  of 
deriving  any  useful  service  from  Spain,  while  it 
should  continue  in  the  hands  of  a  degenerate 
face.  He  knew  not  what  pretext  to  use  for 
striking  the  prostrate  slaves  at  his  feet,  de- 
testing him,  well  disposed  to  betray  him,  try- 
ing sometimes  to  do  so,  then  disavowing  with 
humility  the  treacheries  in  which  they  had 
scarcely  engaged.  Neither  did  he  disguise 
from  himself  the  danger,  in  dethroning  the 
Spanish  dynasty,  of  galling  an  ardent,  un- 
tractable  nation,  desirous  of  changes,  incapa- 
ble of  effecting  them  itself,  and  ready  to  revolt 
against  the  foreign  hand  that  should  attempt 
to  effect  them  for  it.  He  delayed,  therefore, 


being  in  no  hurry,  nor  yet  decided  what  course 
to  pursue ;  witness  the  treaty  of  Fontaine- 
bleau,  which  contained  nothing  but  adjourn- 
ments. But  a  son  applying  to  him  for  a  wife 
and  his  protection,  a  father  denouncing  that 
son  to  him  as  a  criminal,  offered,  one  might 
say  forced  upon  him,  an  occasion  for  interfering 
immediately  in  the  affairs  of  Spain ;  and  still, 
full  of  doubts  and  anxieties,  desiring,  dread- 
ing what  he  was  about  to  undertake,  under- 
taking it  from  a  sort  of  fatal  impulsion,  he  gave 
hasty  orders,  signs  of  a  strongly  excited  mind. 

Hitherto  the  only  object  of  the  movements 
of  troops  prescribed  by  him  had  been  Portu- 

l.2  But  from  this  moment  the  preparations 
received  an  extent  and  an  acceleration,  which 
could  not  leave  any  uncertainty  respecting 
their  object.  He  had  composed  General  Ju- 
not's  army,  destined  to  take  possession  of  Por- 
tugal, with  the  three  camps  of  St.  Lo,  Pontivy, 
and  Napoleon ;  General  Dupont's  army  of  re- 
serve (known  by  the  name  of  second  corps  of 
the  Gironde)  with  the  first,  second,  and  third 
battalions  of  five  legions  of  reserve  and  some 
Swiss  battalions.  These  two  armies,  the  one 
already  in  Spain,  the  other  on  march  for  Bay- 
onne,  formed  an  effective  of  about  50,000  men. 
These  would  not  be  enough,  if  serious  events 
should  take  place  in  the  Peninsula ;  for  the 
second  only  of  these  armies  could  be  employed 
in  Spain.  Napoleon  hastened  its  march  to- 
ward Bayonne,  ordered  General  Dupont  to  go 
immediately  and  put  himself  at  its  head,  and 
resolved  to  compose  a  third,  which  borrowed 
its  title  from  the  specious  necessity  for  watch- 
ing the  coasts  of  the  Ocean,  deprived  of  the 
troops  which  had  been  employed  in  guarding 
them.  He  called  this  third  army  Corps  of  Ob- 
servation of  the  Coasts  of  the  Ocean,  and  gave 
the  command  of  it  to  Marshal  Moncey,  who 
had  formerly  served  in  Spain,  and  resolved 
that  it  should  be  about  84,000  strong.  In 
order  to  compose  it,  he  drafted  from  the  depots 
of  the  regiments  of  the  grand  army  stationed 
along  the  Rhine  from  Basle  to  Wesel.  These 
depots,  which  had  received  several  conscrip- 
tions, and  had  no  further  detachments  to  send 
to  the  grand  army,  were  full  of  young  soldiers, 
whose  training  had  already  commenced,  and 
with  some  of  them  was  nearly  finished.  For  a 
corps  of  observation,  whether  in  France  or  in 
Spain,  Napoleon  thought  these  young  soldiers 
quite  sufficient.  He  gave  orders,  therefore,  for 
drafting  from  the  48  depots  stationed  on  the 
Rhine,  48  provisional  battalions,  composed  of 
four  companies,  of  150  men  each,  being  600 
men  per  battalion,  making  a  total  of  28,000 
infantry.  He  ordered  four  of  these  battalions 


«  I  subjoin  the  very  text  of  that  letter. 

Letter  of  King  diaries  IV.  to  the  Emperor  Napoleon. 
•"Sir,  my  brother,  at  the  moment  when  I  was  wholly 
occ-ipied  with  the  means  of  co-operating  in  the  destruc- 
tion of  our  common  enemy,  when  I  believed  that  all  the 
plots  of  the  ci-devant  Queen  of  Naples  were  buried  with 
her  daughter,  I  see.  with  a  horror  which  makes  me  shud- 
der, that  the  spirit  of  intrigue  has  penetrated  into  the 
very  bosom  of  my  palace.  Alas !  my  heart  bleeds  in  giv- 
ing an  account  of  so  frightful  a  deed.  My  eldest  son,  heir 
§  resumptive  to  my  throne,  had  formed  a  horrible  plot  to 
ethrone  me  :  he  had  gone  to  such  an  excessive  length  as 
to  engage  in  an  attempt  against  the  life  of  his  mother. 
Such  an  atrocious  crime  ought  to  be  punished  with  the 
most  exemplary  severity  of  the  law.  The  law  which 
called  him  to  the  succession  must  be  revoked ;  one  of  his 
brothers  will  be  more  worthy  to  take  his  place  both  in 


my  heart  and  on  the  throne.  I  am  at  this  moment  in 
search  of  his-accomplices,  in  order  to  investigate  thoroughly 
this  plan  of  the  blackest  villany,  and  I  will  not  lose  a  sin- 
gle moment  in  making  your  Imperial  and  Royal  Majesty 
acquainted  with  it;  beseeching  you  to  assist  me  with  your 
understanding  and  your  counsels. 

"  Whereupon  I  pray  God,  my  good  brother,  to  have  your 
Imperial  and  Koyal  Majesty  in  his  holy  keeping. 

"  CHARLM. 

"Saint  Laurent,  29th  October,  1807." 

o  The  repeated  perusal  of  his  most  secret  corre.«pondenee 
has  proved  to  me  that,  till  the  .events  at  the  Escurial,  ha 
thought  of  Portugal  only,  and  that  after  those  events  he 
thought  solely  of  Spain.  The  dates  of  his  orders,  com- 
pared with  the  dates  of  the  news  from  Madrid,  cannot 
leave  a  doubt  concerning  their  correlation,  and  >  -ove 
that  the  one  were  the  certain  consequence  of  the  oth--'*. 


Nov.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


409 


to  be  united  and  to  form  a  regiment,  two  regi- 
ments to  form  a  brigade,  two  brigades  a  divi- 
sion, and  the  entire  corps  to  form  three  divi- 
sions, under  Generals  Musnier,  Gobert,  and 
Morlot.  The  points  where  they  were  to  be  or- 
ganized were  Metz,  Sedan,  Nancy.  These 
troops  were  to  have  the  organization  of  provi- 
sional corps,  each  battalion  being  still  depend- 
ent on  the  regiment  from  which  it  was  de- 
tached. Napoleon  gave  orders  for  attaching 
to  each  division  a  battery  of  foot  artillery,  for 
forming  at  Besanson  and  La  Fere  three  other 
batteries  of  horse  artillery,  which  would  make 
the  whole  artillery  of  the  corps  amount  to  36 
pieces.  General  Mouton  had  orders  to  proceed 
to  Metz,  Nancy,  and  Sedan,  to  superintend  the 
execution  of  these  measures.  The  four  bri- 
gades of  cavalry,  of  provisional  formation  also, 
assembled  at  Compiegne,  Chartres,  Orleans, 
and  Tours,  were  distributed  between  the  two 
corps  of  Generals  Moncey  and  Dupont.  The 
cuirassiers  and  the  chasseurs  were  attached  to 
that  of  General  Dupont,  the  dragoons  and  the 
hussars  to  that  of  Marshal  Moncey.  The  army 
of  General  Junot  being  sufficient  for  the  occu- 
pation of  Portugal,  there  would  consequently 
be  left  to  meet  events  in  Spain  the  corps  of 
General  Dupont,  entitled  Second  of  the  Gironde, 
and  the  corps  of  Marshal  Moncey,  entitled 
Corps  of  Observation  of  the  Coasts  of  the 
Ocean,  forming  between  those  two  alone  about 
60,000  men.  Lastly,  the  news  from  Madrid 
growing  worse  from  day  to  day,  Napoleon  pre- 
scribed, as  he  had  before  done,  the  establish- 
ment of  relays  of  carts  from  Metz,  Nancy,  and 
Sedan,  to  Bordeaux,  that  his  troops  might 
travel  post.  To  encourage  them  to  endure 
fatigue,  and  also  to  conceal  his  object,  he  di- 
rected the  soldiers  to  be  told  that  they  were 
going  to  the  relief  of  their  brethren  in  Portu- 
gal, threatened  by  the  landing  of  an  English 
army. 

Napoleon  made  a  retrograde  movement  of 
his  veteran  soldiers  towards  the  Rhine  coin- 
cide with  this  movement  of  his  conscripts 
towards  Spain.  All  the  countries  beyond  the 
Vistula  were  evacuated.  Marshal  Davout,  who, 
with  the  Poles,  the  Saxons,  his  third  corps, 
and  part  of  the  dragoons,  had  remained  in 
Poland,  beyond  the  Vistula,  and  formed  the 
first  command,  fell  back  between  the  Vistula 
and  the  Oder,  occupying  Thorn,  Warsaw,  and 
Posen,  his  cavalry  upon  the  Oder  itself. 
Poland,  strongly  recommended  to  Napoleon 
by  the  King  of  Saxony,  thus  obtained  a  con- 
siderable relief.  Marshal  Soult,  who  formed 
the  second  command,  received  orders  to  evacu- 
ate Old  Prussia,  and  to  fall  back  upon  Prussian 
and  Swedish  Pomerania,  his  cavalry  alone 
continuing  to  live  in  the  island  of  Nogat.  On 
the  right  of  the  Vistula  there  were  left  only 
Oudinot's  grenadiers  at  Dantzig.  The  first 
corps,  transferred  to  Marshal  Victor,  con- 
tinued to  occupy  Berlin,  with  the  heavy  ca- 
valry in  rear,  on  the  banks  of  the  Elbe.  Mar- 
shal Mortier,  with  the  fifth  and  sixth  corps 
and  two  divisions  of  dragoons,  was  left  in 
Upper  and  Lower  Silesia.  The  Prince  of 
Ponte  Corvo,  commanding  alone  the  shores 
of  the  Baltic,  since  the  reduction  of  Stralsund 
and  the  dissolution  of  the  corps  of  Marshal 
Brune,  was  to  occupy  Lubeck  with  Dupas' 
division,  Liinenburg  with  Boudet's  division, 

VOL.  II.— 52 


Hamburg  with  the  Spaniards,  Bremen  with 
the  Dutch.  All  the  surplus  cavalry  not  com- 
prehended in  these  different  commands  was 
sent  into  Hanover.  The  Bavarians,  the  Wiir- 
tembergers,  the  Baden  troops,  the  Hessians, 
and  the  Italians,  were  authorized  to  return 
home.  The  heavy  siege  artillery,  the  stores 
of  clothing,  shoes,  arms,  made  at  a  high  price 
in  Poland  and  Germany,  were  despatched  to 
Magdeburg.  The  imperial  guard,  to  the  num- 
ber of  12,000  men,  hastened  to  march  towards 
Paris. 

Napoleon,  in  prescribing  these  movements, 
had  the  twofold  intention  of  relieving  the 
north  of  Europe  from  its  burden,  and  of  bring- 
ing back  a  few  regiments  of  old  troops  to 
France.  Independently  of  the  guard  which 
would  soon  arrive,  he  ordered  the  return  of  a 
certain  portion  of  the  foot  artillery,  and  many 
skeletons  of  dragoons.  With  his  usual  dex- 
terity, he  managed  this  business  so  that  there 
should  result  from  this  change,  instead  of  a 
dissolution,  a  better  organization  of  these 
corps  cTarmee. 

The  corps  of  Lannes,  composed  of  Oudinot's 
grenadiers,  had  at  first  been  left  at  Dantzig. 
There  were  grenadiers  sufficient  for  Dantzig, 
both  as  a  defence  and  as  a  burden.  Napoleon 
pronounced  the  dissolution  of  Verdier's  divi- 
sion, composed  of  four  fine  regiments  of  in- 
fantry. Two  of  these  regiments,  the  2d  and 
12th  light,  forming  part  of  the  garrison  of 
Paris,  were  recalled  to  that  capital.  The  two 
others,  the  72d  and  the  3d  of  the  line,  were 
attached  to  St.  Hilaire's  division,  to  com- 
pensate it  for  three  regiments,  the  43d,  55th, 
and  14th  of  the  line,  which  were  taken  from  it 
because  they  had  their  depot  at  the  camp 
of  Boulogne  and  at  Sedan.  This  division 
still  comprised  five  regiments,  a  number  which 
Napoleon  would  not  exceed.  Morand's  divi- 
sion, having  six  regiments,  was  diminished 
by  the  51st.  Dupas'  division,  which,  with 
the  Saxons  and  Poles,  composed  Mortier's 
corps  at  Friedland,  now  dissolved,  formed  only 
a  temporary  assemblage,  and  bore  heavily  on 
the  city  of  Lubeck.  Napoleon  took  from  it 
the  4th  light,  which  belonged  to  the  garrison 
of  Paris,  and  the  15th  of  the  line,  which 
belonged  to  Brest.  Lastly,  the  44th  of  the 
line,  left  in  garrison  at  Dantzig  to  rest  itself 
there  after  the  disaster  of  Eylau,  being  no 
longer  necessary  in  that  city,  was  recalled. 
The  7th  of  the  line,  having  become  disposable 
by  the  evacuation  of  Braunau,  was  likewise 
recalled.  The  artillery  of  Verdier's  dissolved 
division  joined  the  corps  returning  to  France. 
In  the  North  the  arm  of  the  dragoons  was 
more  numerous  than  it  needed  'to  be.  The 
third  squadrons  of  the  1st,  3d,  5th,  9th,  10th, 
loth,  4th  regiments,  after  turning  over  all 
their  men  to  the  first  two  squadrons,  wert 
likewise  to  return  to  France. 

Thus,  without  disorganizing  his  corps,  by 
restoring  them  to  more  uniform  proportions, 
and  breaking  only  temporary  aggregations, 
Napoleon  contrived  to  create  means  for  bring- 
ing ten  fine  regiments  of  infantry,  belonging 
almost  all  either  to  Paris  or  to  the  camps  on 
the  coasts ;  which  was  an  additional  congruity, 
for  these  regiments,  being  those  which  had 
contributed  most  to  the  corps  of  Portugal  an., 
the  Gironde,  wero  thus  brought  near  to  their 
2M 


410 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Nov.  1807. 


detachments.  That  profound  art  of  disposing 
troops  is  perhaps  the  loftiest  part  of  the 
science  of  war.  It  is  necessary  for  every  go- 
vernment, even  though  pacific,  by  title  of  good 
administration.  The  grand  army  in  the  North 
was  still  about  300,000  French,  exclusive  of 
the  Poles  and  Saxons  left  in  Poland,  and 
the  Bavarians  and  Wiirtembergers,  the  Baden- 
ers,  the  Hessians,  and  the  Italians,  marching 
to  their  own  countries,  but  not  disbanded,  and 
ready  to  return  at  the  first  call.  Adding  to 
the  grand  army  the  armies  of  Upper  Italy, 
Dalmatia,  Naples,  the  Ionian  Islands,  Spain, 
and  the  interior,  Napoleon  had  then  800,000 
French  troops,  and  at  least  150,000  allied 
troops,1  a  colossal,  an  alarming  force,  if  we 
moreover  consider  that  the  greater- part  of  it 
was  composed  of  veteran  soldiers,  that  the 
conscripts  themselves  were  introduced  into  old 
skeletons,  that  all  of  them  were  commanded 
by  the  most  experienced,  the  ablest  officers 
that  war  has  ever  produced ;  and,  lastly,  that 
these  marched  under  the  orders  of  the  greatest 
captains. 

After  he  had  withdrawn  his  old  troops  from 
the  Rhine,  and  pushed  his  young  soldiers  to- 
wards the  Pyrenees,  Napoleon,  full  of  an  eager 
curiosity,  waited  impatiently  for  tidings  from 
Madrid,  which,  he  conceived,  must  follow  in 
rapid  succession,  in  consequence  of  so  flagrant 
a  step  as  the  arrest  of  the  presumptive  heir  to 
the  crown.  Having  come  to  no  fixed  resolu- 
tion, hoping  for  that  event  which  should  be 
most  conformable  to  his  wishes,  not  relying  in 
the  least  on  the  intelligence  of  M.  de  Beau- 
harnais,  though  he  had  full  reliance  on  his  in- 
tegrity, he  gave  him  no  other  instruction  than 
to  observe  all  that  passed,  and  report  it  to  Pa- 
ris with  all  possible  despatch. 

It  is  by  successive  shocks  that  great  revolu- 
tions develop  themselves,  and  always  with 
longer  intervals  between  them  than  human  im- 
patience would  wish  for.  Such  was  the  case 
at  this  time  in  Spain.  Events  did  not  follow 
one  another  so  rapidly  as  had  been  at  first  ex- 
pected. 

The  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  engaged  in  a 
scheme  in  which  there  was  assuredly  very 
little  criminality,  the  object  of  which,  after 
all,  was  only  to  open  the  eyes  of  a  deceived 
father,  and  to  prevent  usurpation — the  Prince 
of  the  Asturias,  engaged  in  this  scheme  with- 
out prudence,  without  discretion,  without  cou- 
rage— soon  proved  that  he  deserved  the  slavery 
from  which  he  had  aimed  at  releasing  himself. 
Shut  up  alone  in  his  apartments,  terrified  when 
he  thought  of  the  fate  which  the  founder  of  the 
Escurial,  Philip  II.,  had  inflicted  on  the  Infant 
Don  Carlos,  full  of  exaggerated  ideas  of  the 
cruelty  of  the  favourite,  credulous  enough  to 


i  We  tliii  k  it  right  to  quote  here  a  curious  letter  from 
Napoleon  to  Joseph,  in  which  he  shows  him.  and  in  groat 
confidence,  the  immense  extent  of  his  forces,  a  letter 
which  betrays,  along  with  his  pride  at  seeing  them  go 
great,  his  embarrassment  at  haying  to  pay  such  a  number. 

Letter  from,  the  Emperor  to  the  King  of  Naples. 

"  Fontainebleau,  21st  of  October,  1807. 
"The  urgent  necessity  there  is  for  me  to  establish  good 
order  in  the  state  of  my  military  force,  to  avoid  producing 
derangement  in  all  my  affairs,  requires  that  I  should  esta- 
blish my  army  in  Naples  on  a  definitive  footing,  and  that 
I  should  know  that  it  is  duly  kept  up. 

"  You  will  judge  what  attention  I  am  obliged  to  pay  to 
ietails  when  jou  know  that  I  have  more  than  800,000  men 


admit  that  this  favourite  and  his  mother  haa 
caused  his  wife  to  be  poisoned,  he  imagined 
that  he  was  undone,  and  thought  to  save  his 
life  by  the  basest  of  means,  by  informing 
against  his  alleged  accomplices.  This  son, 
worthy,  as  we  see,  of  those  against  whose  op- 
pression he  was  struggling,  formed  the  design 
of  throwing  himself  at  the  feet  of  his  mother 
and  confessing  every  thing  to  her — a  confes- 
sion which  could  scarcely  satisfy  her  if  he  told 
her  nothing  but  the  truth ;  but  which  would 
become  the  most  infamous  perfidy,  if,  to  please 
her,  he  charged  his  accomplices  with  supposi- 
titious crimes.  After  the  communication  to 
the  members  of  the  councils,  quoted  above,  the 
king  had  gone  to  seek  in  hunting  that  oblivion 
of  the  cares  of  government  which  he  could  not 
endure  longer  than  a  few  moments.  The  queen 
was  alone  at  the  Escurial,  still  transported 
with  anger.  Emmanuel  Godoy  remaining  ill 
at  Madrid,  where  he  pretended  to  be  much 
worse  than  he  really  was.  Ferdinand  sent  to 
beseech  his  mother  to  come  to  see  him  in  his 
apartments,  to  receive  his  confession  and  the 
assurance  of  his  repentance  and  submission. 
That  princess,  who  had  more  understanding 
than  her  son,  who  had  no  desire  for  a  recon- 
ciliation, the  probable  consequence  of  the  in- 
terview solicited  by  the  prince,  sent  to  him 
M.  de  Caballero,  minister  of  grace  and  justice, 
an  extremely  circumspect  personage,  capable 
of  assuming  all  sorts  of  parts,  but  preferring 
to  all  others  that  one  which  should  bring  him 
nearest  to  the  victorious  party.  Ferdinand 
deeply  humbled  himself  before  this  minister 
of  his  father's,  declared  what  had  passed,  con- 
fining his  account  to  the  truth,  which  was  not 
very  overwhelming :  he  maintained  that  he  had 
designed  only  to  fore-arm  himself  against  any 
attacks  upon  his  rights,  and  added,  what  was 
still  unknown,  that  he  had  written  to  Napoleon, 
to  solicit  from  him  the  hand  of  a  French  prin- 
cess. The  most  serious  thing  in  his  confession 
was  his  naming  the  Dukes  de  San  Carlos  and 
de  1'Infantado,  and  above  all  the  canon  Escoi'- 
quiz,  as  the  instigators  who  had  led  him  astray. 
The  result  of  the  declaration  was  the  immediate 
apprehension,  with  unexampled  brutality  and 
incarceration  at  the  Escurial,  of  the  personages 
whom  he  had  denounced.  The  prisoners  an- 
swered, with  a  dignity  and  firmness  which  did 
them  honour,  all  the  questions  which  were  put 
to  them,  and,  reducing  the  accusation  to  so 
much  of  it  as  was  true,  declared  that  they  had 
only  designed  to  enlighten  Charles  IV.,  de- 
ceived by  an  unworthy  favourite,  to  deliver 
the  Prince  of  Asturias  from  an  intolerable  op- 
pression, and  to  prevent,  in  case  of  the  king's 
death,  an  act  of  usurpation  foreseen  and 
dreaded  by  all  Spain.  The  firmness  of  these 


on  foot.  I  have  still  an  army  on  the  Passarge,  near  the 
Niemen;  I  have  one  at  Warsaw;  I  have  one  in  Silesia;  I 
have  one  at  Hamburg  :  I  have  one  at  Berlin :  I  have  one 
at  Boulogne ;  I  have  one  on  march  for  Portugal ;  I  have 
a  second,  which  I  am  assembling  at  Bayonne ;  I  have  one 
in  Italy;  I  have  one  in  Dalmatia,  which  I  am  at  this 
moment  reinforcing  with  six  thousand  men ;  I  have  one 
at  Naples;  I  have  garrisons  on  all  my  maritime  frontiers. 
You  may  judge,  therefore,  when  this  tide  flows  back  into 
the  interior  of  my  dominions,  and  I  shall  cease  to  find 
foreign  alleviation,  how  necessary  it  will  be  that  all  my 
expenses  should  be  rigidly  calculated. 

'•You  ought  to  hare  an  inspector  of  reviews  skilful 
enough  to  make  out  a  statement  of  what  a  regiment  ought 
to  cost  you  according  to  our  regulations." 


NOT.  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


411 


honest  men,  culpable,  no  doubt,  for  having 
engaged  in  irregular  proceedings,  but  haying 
an  extraordinary  situation  for  their  excuse, — 
their  firmness,  we  say,  threw  dishonour  on 
both  the  infamous  court  that  would  fain  have 
sacrificed  them  to  its  vengeance,  and  on  the 
pusillanimous  prince  who  repaid  their  devoted 
attachment  by  the  basest  desertion. 

The  effect,  however,  of  this  audacious  and 
foolish  proceeding  was  immense  throughout  the 
whole  Peninsula.  There  was  but  one  cry  of 
rage  and  indignation  against  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  and  against  the  queen,  who  were  bent, 
it  was  said,  on  sacrificing  a  virtuous  son,  the 
only  hope  of  the  nation.  People  were  not  ac- 
quainted with  the  bottom  of  things,  but  they 
refused  to  believe  that  absurd  imputation 
levelled  against  the  Prince  of  Asturias,  of  har- 
bouring a  design  to  dethrone  his  father ;  and 
the  popular  good  sense  discerned  that  there 
was  nothing  more  in  the  inculpatory  acts  than 
an  effort  to  undeceive  Charles  IV.,  and  some 
precautions  to  prevent  the  favourite  from 
usurping  the  supreme  authority.  At  length  the 
application  made  by  Ferdinand  to  Napoleon 
becoming  known  by  degrees,  the  scandalous 
trial  at  the  Escurial  was  attributed  to  the  anger 
which  the  court  must  have  felt  on  that  point. 
The  public  mind,  conforming  immediately  to 
what  the  adored  heir  to  the  crown  haa  done, 
approved  of  it  without  reserve.  It  was  admit- 
ted that  it  was  an  excellent  idea  to  apply  to 
that  great  man,  who  had  re-established  order 
and  religion  in  France,  who  could,  if  he  pleased, 
regenerate  Spain,  without  making  her  pass 
through  a  revolution :  it  was  above  all  a  wise 
idea  to  think  of  uniting  the  two  houses  by  the 
ties  of  blood :  for  that  union  alone  could  put 
an  end  to  the  jealousies  which  still  separated 
the  Bourbons  from  the  Bonapartes.  Ferdinand 
was  applauded  for  having  had  confidence  in 
Napoleon ;  they  felt  indebted  to  Napoleon  for 
having  inspired  him  with  it ;  and  immediately, 
with  the  fickleness,  the  ardour,  of  a  warm- 
hearted nation,  the  whole  population  of  Spain 
conceived  but  one  wish,  uttered  but  one  cry : 
that  was,  to  insist  that  the  long  columns  of 
French  troops  proceeding  towards  Lisbon 
should  turn  aside  for  a  moment  to  Madrid,  to 
deliver  a  deceived  father  and  a  persecuted  son 
from  the  monster  who  oppressed  them  both. 
This  sentiment  was  general,  unanimous,  in  all 
classes  of  the  nation :  singular  contrast  with 
the  sentiments  which  were  soon  to  burst  forth 
in  that  same  Spain,  hostile  to  France  and  to 
her  chief! 


»  M.  de  Toreno  has  alleged,  and  other  writers  have  re- 
peated, that  the  motive  which  caused  the  proceedings 
commenced  against  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  to  be  sus- 
pended, was  no  other  than  the  injunction  addressed  by 
Napoleon  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  not  to  compromise  in 
any  way  the  agents  of  the  French  government,  or  that 
government  itself.  This  is  a  mere  supposition,  contra- 
dicted by  facts  and  dates.  It  would  have  been  easy  to 
continue  these  proceeding!!  without  introducing  into  them 
the  French  ambassador,  the  communications  with  whom 
were  the  smallest  of  the  grievances,  while  the  other 
papers,  suoh  as  that  revealing  to  Charles  IV.  the  conduct 
of  the  favourite,  the  cipher,  the  eventual  appointment  of 
the  Duke  de  1'Infantado,  constituted  the  alleged  crimes  of 
the  prince  and  his  accomplices.  What  affords  a  still 
stronger  proof  of  this  is,  that  the  proceedings  against  the 
accomplices  of  the  prince  were  continued,  and  that,  the 
grievances  remaining  exactly  the  same,  the  difficulty,  had 
there  been  'any,  would  have  been  as  great  with  them  as 
with  the  prince.  But  this  invention,  I  repeat,  is  peremp- 
torily contradicted  by  the  dates.  The  begging  pardon, 


After  having  long  despised  Spain  for  having 
suffered  all  kinds  of  scandals  before  her  face, 
the  favourite  began  to  be  alarmed  on  hearing 
the  cry  of  reprobation  raised  against  him  in 
all  quarters.  Leaving  his  bed,  to  which  he 
affected  to  be  confined  by  severe  indisposition, 
he  resolved  to  show  himself  at  the  Escurial  as 
peacemaker  and  reconciler.  The  excited  pas- 
sions of  the  queen  were  more  difficult  to  repress 
than  his  own ;  and  he  had  some  trouble  to 
make  her  sensible  that  they  must  stop  short  in 
the  course  which  they  were  pursuing,  unless 
they  meant  to  provoke  a  sort  of  popular  insur- 
rection. The  signature  of  the  treaty  of  Fon- 
tainebleau  had  just  been  communicated  to  him, 
though  that  treaty  was  not  yet  to  receive  the 
consecration  of  publicity.  Emmanuel  Godoy 
was  rejoiced  that  he  had  obtained  the  quality 
of  sovereign  prince,  with  the  guarantee  of  that 
new  quality  by  France.  He  found  in  this  a 
reason  for  taking  courage,  for  avoiding  any 
violent  crisis,  for  seeking,  in  short,  gentler 
means  of  attaining  his  end.  To  dishonour  the 
Prince  of  the  Asturias  seemed  to  him  safer 
than  to  inflict  on  him  a  condemnation  which 
would  revolt  all  Spain,  and  after  which  that 
prince  would  become  the  idol  of  the  Spanish 
nation. '  A  first  step  had  been  already  taken 
in  this  course  by  the  anxiety  of  the  prince  to 
offer  his  confession,  for  which  he  was  not 
asked,  and  to  denounce  accomplices  who  were 
not  thought  of.  la  consequence,  Emmanuel 
Godoy  persuaded  the  queen,  but  not  without 
difficulty,  to  grant  a  pardon,  which  the  prince 
should  solicit  with  humility,  and  acknowledg- 
ing his  guilt.  He  went  therefore  to  Ferdinand's 
apartment,  which  had  been  converted  into  a 
prison,  and  was  received,  not  with  the  con- 
tempt which  he  ought  to  have  met  with  from  & 
prince  endowed  with  any  dignity,  but  with  the 
satisfaction  experienced  by  an  accused  person 
who  feels  that  he  is  saved.  Emmanuel  Godoy 
then  proposed  to  Ferdinand,  or  Ferdinand  to 
him,  to  write  a  letter  to  his  father  and  another 
to  his  mother,  in  which  he  should  solicit  the 
most  humiliating  pardon,  and  after  that  all 
should  be  forgotten.  Those  two  letters  were 
conceived  in  the  following  terms. 

"  November  5th,  1807. 
"  Sire  and  my  Father, 

"I  have  rendered  myself  culpable  in  offend- 
ing against  your  Majesty,  I  have  offended 
against  my  father  and  my  king.  But  I  repent 
of  it,  and  I  promise  your  Majesty  the  most 
humble  obedience.  I  ought  not  to  do  any 
thing  without  the  consent  of  your  Majesty,  but 


and  the  royal  act  which  grants  it,  are  of  the,  5th  of  Novem- 
ber. Now,  at  this  time,  the  arrest  of  the  prince  was 
scarcely  known  at  Paris,  for  the  seizure  of  his  papers  was 
on  the  27th  of  October,  his  arrest  on  the  28th,  and  the 
circulation  of  all  these  facts  at  Madrid  on  the  29th.  No 
explicit  account  then  could  have  left  Madrid  before  the 
28th  of  October.  All  the  couriers  at  that  time  took  seven 
or  eight  days  for  the  journey.  The  news  therefore  ?ouM 
not  have  reached  Paris  before  the  5th  of  November.  Had 
it  even  left  on  the  27th.  it  could  not  have  been  there  before 
the  3d,  and  assuredly  there  would  not  have  been  time  to 
order  at  Paris  on  the  3d,  an  act  which  was  consummate 
at  Madrid  on  the  5th,  which  bad  even  been  resolved  on 
there  on  the  3d  or  the  4th.  The  dates  are  conse- 
quently sufficient  to  contradict  such  a  supposition.  The 
Prince  of  the  Peace  was  induced  to  act  the  part  of  concili- 
ator solely  because  the  enterprise  of  obtaining  the  con- 
demnation of  the  heir  presumptive,  in  order  to  deprive 
him  of  his  rights  to  the  throne,  was  beyond  his  audacity 
and  the  patience  of  the  Spanish  nation. 


412 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Nov.  1807, 


I  was  taken  by  surprise.  I  have  denounced 
the  guilty  persons,  and  I  beseech  your  Majesty 
to  forgive  me,  and  to  permit  your  grateful  son 
to  kiss  your  feet." 

"  Madame  and  my  Mother, 
"I  deeply  repent  of  the  great  fault  which  I 


it  seem  that  to  allow  Charles  IV.,  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  and  the  queen,  to  continue  to 
reign,  would  be  a  solution  promising  much  du- 


ration, as  well  on  account  of  the  king's  health, 
as  that  of  the  indignation  ready  to  burst  forth. 
To  change  the  dynasty,  appeared,  therefore, 
the  simplest  course.  But  still,  in  this  case, 

have  committed  against  the  king  and  against  !  there  was  the  dangep  of  revoiting  the  opinion 
you,  my  father  and  my  mother.  I  therefore  j  of  the  Spanish  nation,  and,  above  all,  the  opi- 
implore  your  pardon  with  the  greatest  submis-  nion  of  Europe,  there  being  no  pretext  for  de- 
sion,  as  well  as  for  my  obstinacy  in  denying  throning  princes,  who,  divided  among  them- 
the  truth  to  you  the  other  night.  therefore  ;  seiveS)  were  united  only  in  calling  in  Napoleon 

as  a  friend  and  master.  Persevering  in  his 
doubts,  as  Spain  in  her  agitations,  Napoleon 
resolved  to  avail  himself  of  that  momentary 
respite  to  devote  a  few  days  to  Italy,  and  to 
regulate  several  important  affairs  that  demand- 
ed his  presence.  Besides,  he  was  to  meet  in 
Italy  his  brother  Lucien,  to  reconcile  himself 
with  him,  to  receive  from  his  hand  a  daughter, 
who  might  be  the  princess  destined  for  Spain, 
if  the  less  violent  plan  of  uniting  the  two 
houses  by  a  marriage  should  be  definitively 
adopted.  These  resolutions  taken,  he  gave 
counter-orders  to  his  armies,  not  to  stop  their 
march  towards  Spain,  but  to  slacken  the  ra- 
pidity of  that  march.  He  directed  that  the 
troops  of  the  corps  of  the  Coasts  of  the  Ocean, 
which  were  to  have  been  conveyed  post  to 
Bordeaux,  should  perform  that  march  on  foot 
and  without  any  haste.  He  enjoined  General 


beseech  your  Majesty  from  the  bottom  of  my 
heart  to  deign  to  interpose  your  mediation  with 
my  father,  that  he  will  be  pleased  to  permit  me 
his  grateful  son  to  kiss  his  Majesty's  feet." 

After  these  letters  were  signed,  a  new  pub- 
lic act  of  Charles  IV.  pronounced  the  pardon 
of  the  accused  prince,  reserving,  however, 
the  continuation  of  the  proceedings  commenced 
against  his  accomplices,  and  forbidding  the 
circulation  of  the  first  act,  in  which  he  had 
been  denounced  to  the  Spanish  nation.  But  it 
was  too  late  to  smother  so  great  a  scandal. 
The  deplorable  scenes  at  the  Escurial  were  in- 
separable from  one  another,  and  none  could 
remain  concealed.  The  first  disgraced  the 
king,  the  queen,  the  favourite ;  the  last  dis- 
graced the  Prince  of  the  Asturias. 

The  effect  on  public  opinion  was  not,  how- 
ever, what  one  would  have  supposed.  Though 


all   the    actors   in  these  scenes  had  deserved    Dupont  to  make  such  arrangements  that  the 
nearly  equal  censure,  the  father  for  his  weak-  j  second  corps  of  the  Gironde  might  enter  Spain 


ness,  the  mother  and  the  favourite  for  their 
guilty  passions,  the  son  for  his  cowardly  de- 
sertion of  his  friends,  the  Spanish  people, 
nevertheless,  resolved  not  to  find  any  fault  but 


about  the  end  of  November,  and  he  prescribed 
to  him  to  go  to  Valladolid,  without  advancing 
further  towards  Portugal.  He  despatched  from 
Paris  his  chamberlain,  M.  de  Tournon,  whose 


with  the  favourite  and  the  queen ;  neither  would    good  sense  he  appreciated,  with  orders  to  go  to 


they  regard  the  conduct  of  the  prince  as  any 
thing  more  than  i  consequence  of  the  oppres- 
sion under  whi  •  he  groaned;  his  confessions 
as  declarati  —  c.ther  supposititious  or  extorted ; 
and  continued  to  love  him  with  idolatry,  to  in- 
vest him  with  all  imaginable  virtues,  to  demand 
of  Napoleon  a  movement  of  his  mighty  arm 
towards  Spain.  All  at  once,  Napoleon  became 
the  tutelary  deity,  invoked  on  every  side  and 
by  every  voice.  It  is  the  only  moment  perhaps 
in  which  the  Spanish  people  has  ever  admired 
with  transport  a  hero  who  was  not  a  Spaniard, 
and  appealed  to  a  foreign  influence. 

At  the  same  time  that  Napoleon  was  in- 
formed of  the  accusation  preferred  against  the 
Prince  of  the  Asturias,  he  also  received  intelli- 
gence of  the  pardon  granted  to  that  prince. 


Spain,  to  observe  what  was  passing  there,  ta 
ascertain  thoroughly  whether  the  Prince  of  the 
Asturias  had  many  partisans,  whether  the  old 
court  still  retained  any,  and  with  the  further 
commission  to  carry  an  answer  to  the  various 
communications  of  Charles  IV.  In  this  an- 
swer, full  of  civility  and  generosity,  Napoleon 
recommended  to  Charles  IV.  mildness  and  in- 
dulgence towards  his  son,  denied  that  he  had 
received  any  application  from  him,  and  strove 
to  avoid  sowing  fresh  seeds  of  discord,  though 
he  had  more  interest  in  exciting  dissensions 
than  in  pacifying  Spain. 

This  done,  Napoleon,  expecting  that  he 
should  soon  have  to  turn  his  attention  again  to 
that  quarter,  left  Fontainebleau  on  the  16th  of 
November,  accompanied  by  Murat,  by  the  mi- 


He  was  as  much  surprised  at  the  one  as  at  the  nisters  of  the  marine  and  the  interior,  by 
other ;  but  he  clearly  saw  that  the  course  of  Messrs.  Sganzin  and  De  Proni,  directors  of  se- 
this  drama,  which  would  have  been  tragic  in  j  veral  important  services,  and  proceeded  to- 
another  age,  but  which  was  only  disgusting  in  wards  Milan,  to  embrace  his  beloved  son 
ours,  was  slackening,  to  be  resumed  by  and  by,  !  Prince  Eugene  de  Beauharnais.  On  leaving, 
and  to  end  subsequently  in  its  conclusion.  |  he  gave  orders  for  the  triumphal  reception  of 
Though  the  step  taken  by  the  Prince  of  the  j  the  imperial  guard,  which  would  soon  arrive 
Asturias  had  disposed  him  favourably,  he  j  in  Paris. 


knew  not  whether  it  would  be  right  to  trust 
such  a  character ;  he  knew  not  whether,  in  his 
weakness  and  in  his  passions,  there  were  not 
reasons  for  seeing  in  him  an  impotent  ally  or  a 
perfidious  enemy.  To  give  him  a  princess  of 
the  house  of  Bonaparte,  apparently  the  easiest 
solution,  was  not,  therefore  a  very  safe  course. 


He  wished  to  be  absent  from  this  solemnity, 
and,  if  possible,  that  nobody  should  even  think 
of  him.  He  wished  that  honour  should  be  done 
to  the  army,  to  the  army  alone,  by  the  festivi 
ties  given  to  the  guard  which  was  the  elite  of 
that  army.  Accordingly,  writing  to  the  minis- 
ter of  the  interior  to  prescribe  the  details  of 


Besides,  history  exhibited  but  few  encouraging  the  ceremony,  he  said  : — "In  the  emblems  and 
instances  in  regard  to  princesses  charged  to  '  inscriptions  which  shall  be  employed  in  this 
attach  Spain  to  us  by  marriages.  Neither  did  i  ceremony,  my  guard  ought  to  be  kept  in  view, 


NOT.  1807.] 


CONSULATE  AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


413 


not  myself,  and  it  ought  to  be  shown  that,  in 
honouring  the  guard,  the  whole  grand  army  is 
honoured." 

Accordingly,  on  the  25th  of  November,  the 
prefect  of  the  Seine  and  the  maires  of  Paris 
proceeded  to  the  barrier  of  La  Villette,  fol- 
lowed by  an  immense  concourse  of  people,  to 
receive  the  heroes  of  Austerlitz,  of  Jena,  of 
Friedland.  Marshal  Bessie"res  was  at  their 
head.  A  triumphal  arch  had  been  erected  at 
that  spot.  The  ensigns  stepped  out  of  the 
ranksf  lowered  the  standards,  on  which  the 
magistrates  of  the  capital  placed  crowns  of 
gold,  bearing  the  inscription,  "The  City  of  Paris 
to  the  grand  Army."  Then  the  guard,  number- 
ing twelve  thousand  veteran  soldiers,  sunburnt, 
mutilated,  some  of  them  having  already  gray 
beards,  filed  off  through  Paris,  with  an  enthu- 
siastic crowd  at  their  heels,  applauding  their 
triumph.  A  plentiful  repast,  provided  in  the 
Champs  Elys4es,  was  offered  to  these  twelve 
thousand  soldiers  by  the  city  of  Paris,  which, 
in  this  fraternal  and  national  solemnity,  repre- 
sented France,  as  well  as  the  guard  represented 


the  army.  The  weather  was  not  favourable 
towards  the  conclusion  of  the  day,  which  was 
frequently  rendered  unpleasant  by  the  rain; 
for  it  seemed  that  this  army,  which  had  no 
other  share  in  our  greatness  and  our  faults  but 
its  heroism,  was  not  lucky.  Of  the  thousand 
millions  decreed  by  the  Convention,  was  left 
nothing  but  &fSte  promised  in  1806  to  the  whole 
army  of  Austerlitz ;  of  that  fete  was  left  no- 
thing but  this  entertainment  to  the  guard, 
which  was  damped  by  the  weather  and  deprived 
of  the  presence  of  Napoleon.  But  the  glory 
of  the  French  army  might  well  dispense  with 
such  frivolous  pomp.  History  will  relate  that 
everybody  in  France  from  1789  to  1845,  ex- 
cepting the  army,  mingled  faults  with  his 
services ;  for  while  innocent  victims  were 
slaughtered  in  1793,  it  was  defending  the 
country ;  while  Napoleon  violated  the  rules  of 
prudence  in  1807  and  1808,  it  confined  itself 
to  fighting ;  and,  at  all  times,  under  all  go- 
vernments, it  knew  but  how  to  devote  itself 
and  to  die  for  the  existence  and  the  greatness 
of  France. 


414  HISTORY  OF  THE  fNoT.  1807. 

BOOK  XXIX. 

AKANJUEZ. 

Expedition  against  Portugal — Composition  of  the  Army  destined  for  that  Expedition — First  entry  of  the  French  into 
Spain — March  from  Ciudad-Rodrigo  to  Alcantara — Dreadful  hardships — General  Junot,  hastening  towards  Lisbon, 
follows  the  right  of  the  Tagus,  along  the  back  of  the  mountains  of  Beyra — Arrival  of  the  French  army  at  Abrantes, 
in  the  most  deplorable  state — -General  Junot  determines  to  march  to  Lisbon  with  the  companies  of  elite — On  learn- 
ing the  approach  of  the  French,  the  Prince-regent  of  Portugal  decides  to  sail  for  Brazil — Precipitate  embarkation  of 
the  court  and  of  the  principal  Portuguese  families — Occupation  of  Lisbon  by  General  Junot — Further  occurrences 
at  the  Escurial — State  of  the  court  of  Spain  since  the  arrest  of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  and  the  humiliating 
pardon  granted  to  him — Continuation  of  the  proceedings  against  his  accomplices — Mistrust  and  fears  which  begin 
to  seize  the  court — The  idea  of  proceeding  to  America,  after  the  example  of  the  court  of  Braganza,  occurs  to  the 
queen  and  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace — Opposition  of  Charles  IV.  to  this  scheme — Before  recurrfng  to  this  extreme 
resource,  the  Spanish  government  seeks  to  reconcile  itself  with  Napoleon,  and  renews,  in  the  king's  name,  the  ap- 
plication made  by  Ferdinand  for  a  French  princess. — To  this  application  are  added  urgent  solicitations  for  the  pub- 
lication of  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau — These  communications  cannot  reach  Napoleon  till  he  is  in  Italy — His 
arrival  at  Milan — Works  of  public  utility  ordered  in  all  the  places  through  which  he  passes — Journey  to  Venice — 
Meeting  of  princes  and  sovereigns  in  that  city — Plans  of  Napoleon  for  restoring  Venice  to  her  former  commercial 
prosperity — Trip  to  Udine,  Palma-Nova,  and  Osopo — Return  to  Milan  by  Legnago  and  Mantua — Interview  at 
Mantua  with  Lucien  Bonaparte — Residence  at  Milan — Fresh  military  orders  relative  to  Spain,  and  postponement 
of  the  answers  to  be  given  to  Charles  IV. — Political  affairs  of  the  kingdom  of  Italy — Adoption  of  Eugene  de  Beau- 
harnais,  and  the  succession  to  the  crown  of  Italy  secured  to  his  descendants — Milan  Decrees  opposed  to  the  new 
maritime  ordinances  of  England — Departure  of  Napoleon  for  Turin — Works  ordered  to  connect  Genoa  with  Pied- 
mont, Piedmont  with  France — Return  to  Paris,  on  the  1st  January,  1808 — Napoleon  is  unable  to  delay  any  longer 
his  answer  to  Charles  IV.  and  the  adoption  of  a  definitive  resolution  respecting  Spain — Three  parties  are  fornn^d — 
a  marriage,  a  partition  of  territory,  a  change  of  dynasty — Irresistible  impulsion  of  Napoleon  towards  the  change  of 
dynasty — Though  decided  as  to  the  end,  Napoleon  is  not  fixed  in  regard  to  the  means,  and  meanwhile  he  increases 
the  number  of  the  troops  which  he  has  in  the  Peninsula,  and  answers  Charles  IV.  in  an  evasive  -manner — Levy  of 
the  Conscription  of  1809 — Colossal  force  of  France  at  this  period — System  of  military  organization  suggested  to 
Napoleon  by  the  dislocation  of  his  regiments  which  have  battalions  in  Germany,  in  Italy,  in  Spain — Napoleon  is 
desirous  of  terminating  this  time  all  the  affairs  of  the  south  of  Europe — Aggravation  of  his  quarrel  with  the  Pope — 
General  Miollis  is  ordered  to  occupy  the  Roman  States — The  movement  of  the  English  troops  towards  the  Penin- 
sula, strips  Sicily,  and  furnishes  the  long  looked-for  occasion  for  an  expedition  against  that  island — Union  of 
French  squadrons  in  the  Mediterranean — Attempt  to  convey  sixteen  thousand  men  to  Sicily  and  immense  supplies 
to  Corfu — Continuation  of  occurrences  in  Spain — Conclusion  of  the  proceedings  at  the  Escurial — Charles  IV.,  on 
receiving  the  evasive  answers  of  Napoleon,  sends  him  another  letter  full  of  grief  and  uneasiness,  and  requiring  an 
explanation  relative  to  the  accumulation  of  the  French  troops  towards  the  Pyrenees — Being  pressed  with  questions, 
Napoleon  feels  the  necessity  for  coming  to  the  point — He  at  length  fixes  upon  his  means  of  execution,  and  purposes, 
by  frightening  the  court  of  Spain,  to  induce  it  to  run  away  like  the  House  of  Braganza — This  serious  enterprise 
renders  the  Russian  alliance  more  necessary  for  him  than  ever — Attitude  of  M.  de  Tolstoy  at  Paris — His  alarming 
reports  to  the  Court  of  Russia — Explanation  of  Alexander  with  M.  de  Caulaincourt — Apprised  by  the  latter  of  the 
danger  which  threatens  the  alliance,  Napoleon  writes  to  Alexander,  and  consents  to  enter  into  discussion  on  the 
partition  of  the  empire  of  the  East — Joy  of  Alexander  and  M.  de  Romanzoff — Various  plans  of  partition — First  idea 
of  an  interview  at  Erfurt — Invasion  of  Finland — Satisfaction  at  St.  Petersburg — Napoleon,  rendered  easy  respecting 
the  Russian  alliance,  makes  dispositions  for  bringing  about  a  deno&ment  in  Spain,  in  the  course  of  the  month  of 
March — Various  orders  given  between  the  20th  and  the  25th  of  February,  to  intimidate  the  Court  of  Spain,  and  to 
dispose  it  to  flight — Appointment  of  Murat  to  command  the  French  army — Ignorance  in  which  Napoleon  leaves 
him  respecting  his  political  designs — Instructions  relative  to  the  march  of  the  troops — Order  for  surprising  St. 
Sebastian,  Pampeluna,  and  Barcelona — The  plan  adopted  placing  the  Spanish  colonies  in  danger,  Napoleon  wards 
off  that  danger  by  an  extraordinary  order  despatched  to  Admiral  Rosily — Entry  of  Murat  into  Spain — His  recep- 
tion in  the  Biscayan  provinces  and  Castille — Character  of  those  provinces — Entry  into  Vittoria  and  Burgos— State 
of  the  French  Troops — Their  youth,  their  destitution,  their  diseases — Embarrassment  of  Murat;  arising  from  his 
ignorance  of  Napoleon's  political  object — Surprise  of  St.  Sebastian,  Pampeluna,  and  Barcelona — Mischievous  effect 
produced  by  the  capture  of  those  three  places — Alarm  conceived  at  Madrid  on  receiving  the  last  news  from  Paris- 
Definitive  plan  to  retire  to  America — Opposition  of  Cabellero,  the  minister,  to  this  plan — Reported  preparation  for 
the  voyage — Extraordinary  emotion  among  the  population  of  Madrid  and  Aranjuez — The  Prince  of  the  Asturias 
and  his  uncle  Don  Antonio  opposed  to  all  idea  of  retiring — The  departure  of  the  court  fixed  for  the  loth  or  16th  of 
March — The  population  of  Aranjuez  and  its  environs,  moved  by  curiosity,  indignation,  and  secret  tampering,  col- 
lects in  crowds  about  the  royal  residences,  and  exhibits  alarming  demonstrations — The  court  is  obliged  to  publish. 
on  the  16th  a  proclamation  contradicting  the  rumours  of  a  voyage — It  nevertheless  continues  its  preparations — 
Revolution  at  Aranjuez  in  the  night  between  the  17th  and  18th  of  March — The  populace  breaks  into  the  palace  of 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  utterly  destroys  it,  and  seeks  the  prince  himself  with  the  intention  of  putting  him  to  death 
— The  king  is  obliged  to  strip  Emmanuel  Godoy  of  all  his  dignities — The  search  after  the  prince  is  continued — After 
hiding  for  thirty-six  hours  under  some  rush  mats,  he  is  discovered  at  the  moment  of  leaving  his  retreat — A  few  of 
the  Life  Guards  succeed  in  rescuing  him  from  the  fury  of  the  people,  and  conduct  him  to  their  barracks,  after  re- 
ceiving several  wounds — The  Prince  of  the  Asturias  persuades  the  mob  to  disperse,  by  promising  them  that  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace  shall  be  brought  to  trial — The  king  and  queen,  alarmed  at  the  three  days'  commotion,  and 
hoping  to  save  the  lives  of  themselves  and  the  favourite  by  abdicating,  sign  their  abdication  on  the  19th  of  March 
— Character  of  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez. 


WHILE  Napoleon,  resolved  as  to  the  end  that 
he  should  pursue  in  Spain,  uncertain  as  to  the 
means,  was  travelling  to  Italy,  full  of  confidence 
in  the  immensity  of  his  power,  the  French  ar- 
mies were  advancing  into  the  Peninsula,  and 
about  to  encounter  for  the  first  time  the  hard- 
ships which  awaited  them  in  that  inhospitable 
country. 

The  army  ordered  to  enter  it  first  was  that 
of  General  Junot :  his  commission,  as  we  have 
Been,  was  to  take  possession  of  Portugal.  It 
•was  composed  of  about  26,000  men;  23,000 


from  the  depots.  It  was  distributed  into  three 
divisions,-  under  Generals  Laborde,  Loison,  and 
Travot.  It  had  for  the  principal  officer  of  the 
staff  General  Thie"bault,  and  for  commander- 
in-chief,  the  brave  Junot,  the  devoted  aide-de- 
camp of  Napoleon,  for  a  moment  ambassador 
in  Portugal,  an  intelligent  officer,  bold  to  te- 
merity, having  no  other  defect  than  a  natural 
ardour  of  disposition,  destined  to  terminate 
one  day  in  a  mental  malady.  The  army  was 
composed  of  young  soldiers  of  the  conscription 
of  1807,  levied  in  1806,  but  embodied  in  the 


present  under  arms,  and  followed  by  a  reinforce- I  old  skeletons  and  sufficiently  trained.     They 
ment  of  from  three  to  four  thousand  men  drafted  |  were  very  capable  of  behaving  well  under  fire, 


Nov.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


415 


hut  unluckily  not  seasoned  to  fatigue,  which, 
/levertheless,  was  likely  to  be  their  principal 
trial.  Napoleon,  anxious  that  they  should  enter 
Lisbon  speedily,  in  order  to  catch  there,  not 
the  royal  family  about  which  he  cared  very  lit- 
tle, but  the  Portuguese  fleet,  and  the  immense 
wealth  belonging  to  English  merchants,  had 
given  orders  to  General  Junot  to  redouble  his 
celerity,  and  not  to  spare  his  soldiers  either  fa- 
tigue or  privations,  in  order  to  arrive  in  time. 
Junot,  with  his  ardour,  was  not  the  man  to  cor- 
rect by  a  discreet  discernment  so  much  of  that 
order  as  might  prove  dangerous  in  the  country 
which  they  were  about  to  traverse. 

On  the  17th  of  October,  the  army  entered 
Spain  in  several  columns,  in  order  to  find  sub- 
sistence the  more  easily.  It  marched  upon  Val- 
ladolid,  by  Tolosa,  Vittoria,  and  Burgos.  Not- 
withstanding the  promises  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  scarcely  any  thing  had  been  provided 
upon  the  route,  and  at  night  it  was  necessary 
to  collect  in  haste  whatever  could  be  found  to 
feed  the  troops,  worn  out  with  the  fatigues  of 
the  day.  The  lodgings  were  detestable,  full 
of  vermin,  and  so  filthy  that  our  soldiers  chose 
rather  to  lie  in  the  fields  or  in  the  streets  than 
to  accept  the  wretched  shelter  that  was  offered 
them.  The  population  received  them  with  the 
curiosity  natural  to  a  lively  people,  fond  of 
sights,  and  for  which  its  inert  government  had 
procured  scarcely  any  for  a  century  past.  The 
higher  classes  behaved  well  to  our  troops ;  but 
the  lower  showed  towards  them  their  sullen 
hatred  of  foreigners.  On  the  route  to  Salaman- 
ca, several  of  our  stragglers  were  stabbed  with 
knives,  though  they  conducted  themselves  with 
the  most  cautious  discretion. 

The  army,  before  reaching  Salamanca,  where 
it  made  a  short  halt,  had  already  suffered  much 
from  fatigue,  and  left  a  certain  number  of  men 
behind.  General  Junot,  who  had  a  provident 
chief  of  the  staff,  established  at  Valladolid, 
Salamanca,  and  in  advance  of  Ciudad  Rodrigo, 
depots,  consisting  of  a  commandant,  several 
managing  clerks,  and  a  detachment,  to  collect 
the  fatigued  or  sick,  and  to  send  them  off  by 
and  by  to  the  army,  in  parties  sufficiently  nu- 
merous to  defend  themselves.  The  order  to 
march  without  intermission  having  reached  the 
army  at  Salamanca,  it  left  that  city,  on  the 
12th  of  November,  formed  into  three  divisions. 
On  its  route  from  Ciudad  Rodrigo  to  Alcantara, 
it  had  to  cross  the  chain  of  mountains  which 
separates  the  valley  of  the  Douro  from  that  of 
the  Tagus,  and  which  is  a  prolongation  of  the 
Guadarrama.  From  Salamanca,  to  Alcantara 
it  would  have  to  travel  fifty  leagues  through  a 
poor,  mountainous,  woody  country,  inhabited 
by  herdsmen  only,  who  were  accustomed  to 
drive  their  flocks  thither  twice  a  year — in  au- 
tumn, when  they  removed  from  Old  Castille  into 
Estramadura,  and  in  spring,  when  they  returned 
from  Estramadura  into  Old  Castille.  Though 
the  Spanish  authorities  had  promised  to  pre- 
pare provisions,  scarcely  any  were  found  at 
Sanmunos,  an  intermediate  point,  half-way  be- 
tween Salamanca  and  Ciudad  Rodrigo.  The 
troops  travelled  nineteen  leagues  in  two  days, 
without  any  thing  to  eat  but  a  little  goat's  flesh, 
which  they  procured  by  seizing  the  flocks  which 
they  fell  in  with  on  their  route.  At  Ciudad 
Rodrigo,  a  considerable  town  and  a  fortress  of 
great  importance,  they  found  a  governor  very 


unfavourably  disposed,  who  excused  himself 
by  alleging  the  ignorance  in  which  he  had  been 
left  of  the  passage  of  the  French  army,  and 
who  took  no  pains  to  procure  the  supplies  that 
he  had  neglected  to  provide.  Some  provisions 
were,  however,  collected,  sufficient  to  afford 
the  soldiers  half  a  ration ;  a  new  depot  was  or- 
ganized for  rallying  the  stragglers,  whose  num- 
ber increased  at  every  step,  and  tke  army  ad- 
vanced towards  the  mountains,  for  the  purpose 
of  passing  out  of  the  basin  of  the  Douro  into 
that  of  the  Tagus.  The  weather  had  all  at 
once  become  frightful,  as  is  the  case  in  these 
southern  countries,  where  Nature,  in  extremes, 
like  the  inhabitants,  passes  with  singular  vio- 
lence from  the  mildest  to  the  most  inclement 
temperature.  Rain  and  snow  succeeded  each 
other  without  intermission.  The  tracks  fol- 
lowed by  the  different  columns  were  completely 
covered,  and  not  discernible  even  under  the 
feet  of  men  and  horses.  Misled  by  half  sav- 
age guides,  who  were  themselves  frequently 
mistaken  from  having  never  passed  the  bounds 
of  their  own  village,  several  columns  lost  their 
way,  and  arrived  at  the  village  of  Pefla  Parda, 
nearly  on  the  crest  of  the  chain,  worn  out  with 
fatigue  and  hunger,  having  left  part  of  their 
men  behind  them,  on  the  way.  For  food  they 
were  obliged  to  go,  for  the  purpose  of  passing 
the  night,  to  La  Moral ej  a,  on  the  back  of  the 
mountains.  A  tremendous  tempest  overtook 
them.  In  a  moment  all  the  torrents  overflowed. 
What  with  the  howling  of  the  wind  and  the 
roaring  of  the  water,  our  inexperienced  sol- 
diers, having  had  scarcely  any  thing  to  eat  for 
several  days,  having  no  hope  of  better  quarters 
for  the  following  days,  were  seized  with  one  of 
those  sudden  demoralizations,  which  surprise 
and  depress  young  minds  not  much  accustomed 
to  the  hardships  of  the  military  life.  Night 
having  come  on,  and  the  drums,  relaxed  by  the 
rain,  giving  no  sound,  a  sort  of  confusion  took 
place  in  this  march.  The  soldiers,  ceasing  to 
distinguish  objects,  having  great  difficulty  to 
discern  one  another,  and  endeavouring  to  com- 
municate by  shouts,  made  the  mountains  ring 
with  their  wild  hooping  and  hallooing.  The 
officers  were  no  longer  heeded  or  heard ;  indis- 
cipline had  accompanied  despair,  and  the  scene 
had  become  terrific.  A  first  column,  however, 
had  arrived,  at  about  eleven  o'clock  at  night,  at 
La  Moral  ej  a;  and,  having  found  a  detachment 
which  had  already  gone  to  bed,  made  known 
the  state  in  which  it  had  left  the  rest  of  the 
army.  The  men  who  were  least  fatigued  were 
selected  and  despatched  to  the  aid  of  their  com- 
rades. Large  fires  were  kindled,  a  light  was 
placed  on  the  top  of  the  steeple,  .and  the  great 
bell  was  rung,  to  draw  the  men  who  had  lost 
their  way  towards  this  point.  To  add  to  their 
hardships,  no  more  preparations  had  been  made 
at  La  Moraleja  than  elsewhere.  No  provisions 
whatever  were  to  be  had.  The  soldiers,  in  the 
delirium  of  hunger,  respecting  nothing,  fell  to 
plundering  and  ravaging  that  unfortunate  place, 
which  thus  became  the  victim  of  the  neglect 
of  the  Spanish  government  to  fulfil  its  promises. 
There  was  not  at  the  moment  of  arrival,  one- 
fourth  of  the  men  around  the  colours.  By  de- 
grees, during  the  night,  all  who  had  not  sunk 
under  fatigue,  all  who  were  not  drowned  in  the 
torrents,  or  murdered  by  the  herdsmen  of  Ls- 
tramadura,  reached  the  devastated  quarters  of 


41C 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Nov.  1807. 


La  Moral ej a.  A  few  more  goats  sufficed,  not 
to  satisfy  the  hunger  of  the  soldiers,  but  to  pre- 
vent their  dying  of  inanition.  It  "was  impossi- 
ble to  stop  in  such  a  place,  and  next  day  the 
troops  marched  for  Alcantara,  "where  they  at 
length  reached  the  banks  of  the  Tagus  and  the 
frontier  of  Portugal. 

The  General-in-chief  Junot  had  preceded 
his  army  thither,  in  order  to  make  amends  by 
his  attentions  for  the  carelessness  of  the  Spa- 
nish government.  The  town  afforded  rather 
more  resources  than  the  wild  mountains  of 
Estramadura.  These  resources,  however,  were 
not  very  considerable,  and  they  had  been  partly 
absorbed  by  the  Spanish  troops  of  General 
Carafa,  who,  with  a  division  of  nine  or  ten 
thousand  men,  was  to  support  the  movement 
of  the  French  troops,  and  to  descend  the  left 
of  the  Tagus,  while  General  Junot  should 
descend  the  right.  A  few  bullocks  and  a  few 
sheep  were  collected,  and  distributed  among 
the  regiments  ;  bread  sufficient  to  allow  half  a 
ration  to  each  man  was  procured  ;  and  a  bait 
was  granted  to  the  army,  as  well  in  order  to 
rally  it  as  to  enable  it  to  recover  its  exhausted 
strength.  It  had  left  behind  or  lost  in  the 
forests  and  the  torrents  a  fifth  of  its  effective, 
that  is  to  say  from  four  to  five  thousand  men. 
Half  the  cavalry  was  dismounted,  many  horses 
had  died  of  hunger,  or  could  not  follow  for 
want  of  shoeing.  As  for  the  artillery,  the 
army  had  been  compelled  to  employ  oxen  to 
draw  it,  and,  that  means  soon  failing,  they 
had  not  more  than  six  pieces  at  Alcantara.  In 
respect  to  ammunition,  that  they  had  been 
obliged  to  abandon  by  the  way,  together  with 
the  rest  of  the  materiel. 

The  embarrassment  of  the  unfortunate  Gene- 
ral Junot  was  extreme.  On  the  one  hand  he 
was  stimulated  by  the  orders  of  Napoleon,  by 
the  certainty  that,  if  he  did  not  soon  reach 
Lisbon,  he  should  find  either  that  the  Portu- 
guese fleet  had  sailed  with  the  wealth  of  Portu- 
gal, or  meet  with  an  organized  resistance, 
which  he  should  have  trouble  to  overcome ;  on 
the  other  hand,  he  saw  before  him  the  backs 
of  the  mountains  of  Beyra,  sloping  towards  the 
Tagus,  consisting  of  a  multitude  of  abrupt 
spurs,  separated  from  one  another  by  frightful 
ravines,  apparently  cut  out,  as  seems  to  be 
expressed  by  the  name  of  Tailladas  given  to 
some  of  them,  entirely  destitute  of  inhabitants, 
destitute  of  every  resource,  and  rendered  still 
more  dreary  by  the  autumnal  deluges  of  rain. 
Add  to  this  that  our  soldiers?,  having  left  France 
in  haste,  and  being  unable  to  take  their  bag- 
gage along  with  them,  were  mostly  without 
shoes,  without  cartridges,  and  not  in  a  fit  state 
to  undergo  a  long  march,  or  to  conquer  a 
serious  resistance,  if  they  should  meet  with 
one,  which  was  not  impossible ;  for  the  Portu- 
guese had  still  25,000  tolerably  good  troops, 
well  disposed  to  defend  themselves,  since  the 
prospect  of  belonging  to  Spain  did  not  incline 
them  to  give  a  favourable  reception  to  the  in- 
vaders of  their  country.  Neither  was  the  con- 
currence of  the  Spaniards  to  be  depended  upon ; 
for,  instead  of  twenty  battalions,  they  had 
furnished  us  with  only  eight,  and  animated  by 
sentiments  so  adverse  to  the  French,  that  it 
had  been  found  necessary  to  send  them  to  their 
cantonments. 

\A  the  face  of  this  alternative,  either  to  allow 


events  that  might  excite  regret  to  he  consum- 
mated at  Lisbon,  or  to  encounter  fresh  fatigues 
with  exhausted  troops,  in  crossing  a  country 
more  frightful  than  that  which  he  had  just 
traversed,  General  Junot  did  not  hesitate,  and 
preferred  the  course  of  obedience  to  that  of 
prudence.  He  therefore  took  the  resolution  to 
continue  t-his  precipitate  march  by  crossing  the 
series  of  spurs  detached  from  Beyra,  which 
border  the  Tagus  from  Alcantara  to  Abrantes. 
He  picked  up  some  shoes  and  a  few  bullocks, 
availed  himself  of  a  depot  of  powder  existing 
on  the  spot,  and  of  the  paper  upon  which  were 
written  the  voluminous  records  of  the  knights 
of  Alcantara  for  making  cartridges.  He  then 
divided  his  army  into  two  parts,  one  composed 
of  the  infantry  of  the  first  and  second  divisions, 
the  other  of  the  infantry  of  the  third  division, 
of  the  cavalry,  of  the  artillery,  and  of  the 
stragglers.  He  pushed  forward  the  first,  and 
left  the  second  at  Alcantara,  with  orders  to 
rejoin  him,  as  soon  as  it  should  be  somewhat 
rallied,  recruited,  and  provided  with  means  of 
transport.  He  took  with  him  only  a  few 
mountain  guns,  which,  from  their  calibre, 
were  lighter  to  draw. 

He  resolved  to  leave  Alcantara  on  the  20th 
of  November,  and  to  cross  the  frontier  of  Por- 
tugal on  the  right  of  the  Tagus,  while  General 
Carafa  was  to  cross  it  on  the  left.  It  would, 
no  doubt,  have  been  much  better  to  pass  the 
Tagus,  to  penetrate  further  into  Estramadura, 
to  reach  Badajoz,  to  take  the  high  road  from 
Badajoz  to  Elvas,  which  the  Spaniards  gene- 
rally follow,  through  Alentejo,  a  level  province 
and  easy  to  travel  through.  But  it  would  have 
been  requisite  to  descend  the  Peninsula  as  far 
as  Badajoz,  then  to  make  a  long  circuit  to  the 
right  to  reach  Lisbon.  Napoleon  giving  orders 
at  Paris,  from  the  mere  inspection  of  the  map, 
and  preferring  the  road  that  led  most  speedily 
to  Lisbon,  had  directed  the  right  of  the  Tngus 
to  be  followed  from  Alcantara  to  Abrantes, 
while  the  Spaniards  were  to  follow  the  left.  In 
this  manner  one  not  only  made  sure  of  the 
advantage  of  celerity,  but  also  of  that  of  not 
having  subsequently  to  effect  a  passage  of  the 
Tagus  when  approaching  Lisbon.  If,  how- 
ever, Napoleon  could  have  known  that  the 
troops  would  meet  with  deluging  rains  in  Por- 
tugal, that,  through  the  negligence  of  his  allies, 
the  army  would  arrive  at  Alcantara  exhausted 
with  hunger  and  fatigue,  he  would  have  chosen 
rather  to  lose  a  few  days  than  to  prosecute  a 
march  which  was  soon  to  resemble  a  route. 
But  here  began  to  be  revealed  those  calamitous 
inconveniences  of  an  extreme  policy,  which, 
resolved  to  act  at  once  upon  the  Vistula  and 
the  Tagus,  at  Dantzig  and  at  Lisbon,  was 
obliged  to  issue  orders  from  a  great  distance, 
and  to  employ  weak  soldiers  and  inexperienced 
generals,  when  robust  soldiers  and  able  gene- 
rals were  employed  elsewhere.  There  are 
lieutenants  who  act  wrong  from  timidity,  others 
from  excess  of  zeal.  The  latter  are  the  rarest, 
and  in  general  the  most  useful,  though  fre- 
quently dangerous.  The  brave  Junot  was  one 
of  these  latter.  He  hesitated  not,  then,  to 
leave  Alcantara  on  the '  20th  of  November, 
sending  away,  as  we  have  said,  part  of  the 
Spanish  troops,  which  seemed  far  from  steady, 
and  assigning  to  the  others  the  duty  of  follow- 
ing the  left  bank  of  the  Tagus,  while  he  should 


Nov.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


417 


pursue  the  right.  Of  an  army  which  had  at 
Bayonne  an  effective  of  23,000  men  present 
under  arms,  out  of  26,000;  he  had  with  him 
but  15,000  at  most;  not  that  the  others  were 
all  dead  or  lost,  but  because  they  were  inca- 
pable of  continuing  that  hasty  march.  He 
advanced  along  the  Tagus,  by  paths  formed  on 
the  side  of  the  mountains,  compelled  inces- 
santly to  ascend  or  descend,  sometimes  rising 
to  the  very  crests  of  the  spurs  which  run  out 
from  Beyra,  sometimes  plunging  into  the  deep 
ravines  which  separate  them,  having  the  sum- 
mit of  the  mountains  on  his  right,  the  river  on 
his  left.  He  directed  his  two  divisions  of  in- 
fantry upon  Castel-Branco  by  two  different 
roads.  The  first  took  the  Idanha-Nova  road ; 
the  second  that  to  Rosmaninal.  They  were 
each  accompanied  by  some  Spanish  light 
troops.  The  weather  was  still  terrible,  the 
rain  incessant,  the  road  scarcely  passable. 
The  first  division,  commanded  by  General 
Laborde,  having  to  cross  an  overflowed  torrent, 
wider  and  deeper  than  the  others,  that  brave 
general  alighted,  walked  into  the  water  up  to 
his  waist,  and  remained  in  that  position  till  all 
his  soldiers  had  passed.  At  night,  they  had 
nothing  to  eat  but  goats'  flesh,  acorns,  and  one 
ounce  of  bread  per  man.  They  arrived  on  the 
following  day  at  Castel-Branco,  where  the  two 
divisions  joined,  in  a  state  difficult  to  be  de- 
scribed. The  first  that  arrived,  which  had 
had  fewer  difficulties  to  surmount,  went  and 
bivouacked  outside  the  town,  that  it  might 
leave  to  the  other,  which  was  still  more  fatigued 
than  itself,  the  advantage  of  lodging  in  it. 
Guards  were  posted  at  every  oven,  to  prevent 
pillage.  Thanks  to  this  precaution,  two  ounces 
of  bread  could  be  allotted  to  each  man.  They 
were  without  meat,  but  had  rice,  vegetables, 
and  wine.  The  soldiers  were  pale,  haggard, 
and  almost  all  barefoot.  To  stop  would  have 
been  to  expose  them  to  the  danger  of  dying 
from  hunger,  to  say  nothing  of  the  inconveni- 
ence of  losing  valuable  time.  They  set  off, 
therefore,  in  the  hope  of  reaching  Abrantes,  a 
wealthy  and  populous  town,  situated  beyond 
the  regions  of  the  mountains,  in  an  open  and 
fertile  country.  The  troops  marched  thither 
in  two  columns,  one,  formed  of  the  first  divi- 
sion, by  Sobreira-Formosa,  the  other  formed 
of  the  second  division,  by  Perdigao.  The  first 
had  fourteen  leagues  to  travel,  and  four  or  five 
torrents  to  cross.  They  were  so  swollen  by  the 
rain  that  they  could  not  be  passed  without 
danger.  The  soldiers  formed  a  chain  with 
their  muskets,  to  defend  themselves  against  the 
force  of  the  water.  Some,  debilitated  or  worn 
out  with  fatigue,  were  occasionally  hurried 
away  by  the  current.  The  officers,  full  of  zeal, 
with  the  intention  of  setting  the  stronger  the 
example  of  assisting  the  weaker,  took  upon 
their  shoulders  the  men  who  were  incapable 
of  passing,  and  thus  helped  them  to  cross  the 
torrents.  On  the  road  they  found  but  a  single 
village,  that  of  Sarcedas,  and  the  soldiers, 
dying  of  hunger,  plundered  it,  in  spite  of  the 
efforts  of  the  general  in  chief  to  prevent  them. 
It  was  eleven  at  night  before  they  reached 
Sobreira-Formosa,  in  a  state  of  absolute  de- 
spair. For  the  first  hour,  not  more  than  a 
sixth  of  the  men  had  joined.  They  found  some 
chestnuts,  and  a  few  cattle,  and  these  were  the 
whole  of  their  fare.  The  second  division  had, 
VOL.  II.— 63 


on  its  part,  experienced  cruel  hardships  in  its 
march  to  Perdigao. 

The  rest  of  the  route  to  Abrantes  was  not 
rendered  so  fatiguing  by  asperities  of  soil,  but 
equally  marked  by  sterility  and  destitution. 
At  length,  after  unparalleled  fatigues  and  pri- 
vations, the  troops  arrived  on  the  24th  at 
Abrantes,  to  the  number  of  four  or  five  thou- 
sand men,  wan,  wasted,  with  bleeding  feet, 
tattered  clothes,  unserviceable  muskets,  for 
the  soldiers  had  used  them  for  sticks  to  assist 
them  in  crossing  the  torrents  and  climbing  the 
mountains.  To  arrive  in  this  state  in  a  very 
populous  town  would  have  been  offering  it  a 
temptation  to  close  its  gates  against  such  as- 
sailants, and  to  defend  itself  from  them  by 
merely  leaving  them  to  die  of  hunger.  Bat, 
fortunately,  the  glorious  victories  gained  in 
all  partH  of  the  world  by  the  old  soldiers  of 
France,  protected  our  young  troops  wherever 
they  might  be.  Such  was  the  renown  of  the 
French  army  that,  at  its  approach,  but  one 
sentiment  pervaded  the  population,  that  of  sa- 
tisfying it  by  supplying  its  wants  as  speedily 
as  possible.  If  they  had  time  to  become  ac- 
quainted with  it,  they  soon  ceased  to  detest  it, 
without  ceasing  to  fear  it,  and  they  offered  it 
cheerfully  that  which  on  the  first  day  they  had 
offered  under  an  impression  of  terror. 

The  general-in-chief  had  preceded  his  army 
to  Abrantes,  in  order  to  prepare  beforehand 
that  relief  which  its  deplorable  state  demand- 
ed. The  inhabitants  complied  with  all  his 
requisitions.  They  collected  cattle,  bread  in 
abundance,  and,  for  the  first  time  since  their 
departure  from  Salamanca,  for  twelve  days, 
the  soldiers  received  complete  rations.  Excel- 
lent wine,  shoes,  clothing,  and  means  of  con- 
veyance, were  procured  for  them.  They  were 
even  enabled  to  send  off  vehicles  to  the  rear, 
to  pick  up  the  sick  and  the  fatigued  men.  The 
weather  had  not  yet  become  serene  and  dry ; 
but  they  were  in  a  fine,  level,  warm  country, 
covered  with  orange  trees,  exhaling  the  deli- 
cious perfumes  of  the  South,  presenting  a 
spectacle  of  comfort  and  wealth.  The  effect 
on  those  young  soldiers,  accessible  to  all  sen- 
sations, was  rapid,  and  they  passed  in  two 
days  from  the  most  gloomy  despair  to  a  sort 
of  joy  and  confidence.  Many  of  them  were 
still  bewildered  among  the  rocks  of  Beyra,  and 
they  came  by  degrees,  in  detached  parties,  to 
receive  in  their  turn  the  delightful  impression 
of  a  fine  country  abounding  in  resources  of 
every  kind. 

Junot  had  the  arms  repaired,  and  collecting 
the  companies  of  ilile,  formed  a  column  of  4000 
men,  capable  of  continuing  the  march  for  Lis- 
bon. Having  prevented  by  his  celerity  a  re- 
sistance which,  in  the  mountains  of  Beyra, 
might  have  become  invincible,  he  had  gained 
a  first  prize  of  his  efforts.  But  he  wanted  to 
reach  Lisbon,  so  as  to  seize  on  their  passage 
all  who  should  attempt  to  escape  from  that 
capital.  This  second  success  it  was  scarcely 
possible  to  obtain. 

At  this  moment  incredible  confusion  pre» 
vailed  at  Lisbon.  The  prince-regent,  govern^ 
ing  for  his  mother,  who  was  afflicted  with 
insanity,  had  wavered  among  a  thousand  con- 
trary resolutions.  In  concord  with  the  cabinet 
of  London,  he  had  endeavoured  to  prevail 
upon  Napoleon  to  accept  a  middle  term,  which 


418 


HISTORY    OF    THE 


consisted  in  closing  his  ports  against  the  Eng- 
lish, without  confiscating  their  property.  Na- 
poleon having  refused  this,  the  prince-regent 
had  been  again  thrown  into  great  perplexity. 
His  ministers,  divided  respecting  the  course  to 
be  pursued,  advised  some  of  them,  that  they 
should  live  as  they  had  always  lived,  that  is, 
continue  attached  to  England,  and  with  her 
aid  to  resist  Napoleon ;  others,  that  they  should 
forsake  past  errors,  enter  into  the  views  of 
France,  expel  the  English,  and  thus  spare 
themselves  a  foreign  invasion.  Others  again 
proposed  a  third  course,  to  which  we  have 
already  adverted,  that  of  retiring  to  Brazil, 
leaving  the  unfortunate  land  of  the  Braganzas 
to  the  English  and  the  French,  who  would 
soon  be  fighting  for  its  wrecks.  Amidst  these 
painful  hesitations,  the  prince-regent,  as  soon 
us  he  was  apprized  of  the  march  of  the  French 
army  upon  Valladolid,  had  acceded  to  all  the 
demands  of  Napoleon,  declared  war  against 
Great  Britain,  decreed  the  seizure  of  all  its 
property,  giving  time,  however,  to  the  Eng- 
lish merchants  to  carry  away  or  sell  the  most 
valuable  of  their  effects.  He  had,  lastly,  de- 
spatched messengers  to  meet  General  Junot, 
and  to  stop  the  French  army;  but  unluckily 
they  sought  him  on  routes  which  he  had  not 
taken.  Lord  Strangford,  the  English  ambas- 
sador, had  received  his  passports,  and  retired 
on  board  the  English  fleet,  which  had  imme- 
diately commenced  the  blockade  of  the  Tagus. 
The  unexpected  appearance  of  the  French 
army  on  the  route  from  Alcantara  to  Abrantes, 
where  none  of  the  emissaries  sent  off  could 
slacken  its  march,  struck  inexpressible  terror 
into  the  soul  of  the  regent,  a  terror  shared  by 
all  his  relations  and  councillors.  The  idea  of 
flight  then  became  uppermost  in  all  the  others. 
Lord  Strangford,  knowing  what  was  passing, 
lost  no  time  in  making  his  appearance  again  at 
Lisbon,  bringing  news  from  Paris  forwarded 
from  London,  giving  information  of  the  resolu- 
tion taken  by  Napoleon  to  dethrone  the  house 
of  Braganza.1  This  intelligence  and  his  pre- 
sence decided  definitively  the  departure  of  the 
royal  family  for  Brazil.  In  the  supposition 
that  the  government  might  be  forced  to  close 
the  Tagus  against  the  English,  all  that  was 
left  of  the  Portuguese  fleet,  that  is  to  say,  one 
ship  of  80  guns,  seven  of  74,  three  frigates, 
and  three  brigs,  had  been  armed  somehow  or 
other.  The  arrival  of  Junot  at  Abrantes, 
which  is  only  three  days'  march  from  Lisbon, 


[Nov.  1807. 


being  known  in  the  capital  on  the  27th  of  No- 
vember, the  royal  family  and  part  of  the  aris- 
tocracy were  conveyed  on  board,  together  with 
all  the  valuable  effects  that  they  could  carry 
off.  In  terrible  weather,  amidst  pelting  rain, 
the  princes,  the  princesses,  the  queen-mother, 
with  wildly  rolling  eyes  in  consequence  of  her 
mental  malady,  almost  all  the  persons  com- 
posing the  court,  many  of  the  great  families, 
men,  women,  children,  servants,  to  the  num- 
ber of  seven  or  eight  thousand,  were  seen  con- 
fusedly embarking  in  the  squadron  and  in 
about  a  score  of  large  vessels  employed  in  the 
Brazil  trade.  The  furniture  of  the  royal  pa- 
laces and  of  the  wealthy  houses  of  Lisbon,  the 
funds  in  the  public  chests,  the  money  which 
the  regent  had  for  some  time  past  taken  care 
to  amass,  that  which  the  fugitive  families  were 
able  to  procure,  all  lay  on  the  quays  of  the 
Tagus,  half-buried  in  mud,  before  the  eyes  of 
an  astounded  population,  alternately  melted 
by  so  grievous  a  spectacle,  and  irritated  at  so 
cowardly  a  flight,  which  left  it  without  govern- 
ment and  without  means  of  defence.  So  great 
was  the  precipitation  that,  on  board  some  of 
these  vessels  laden  with  wealth,  the  most  indis- 
pensable articles  of  provision  were  forgotten 
to  be  brought.  Every  thing  was  embarked  by 
the  27th ;  and  thirty-six  ships  of  war,  or  mer- 
chantmen, ranged  around  the  admiral's  ship, 
in  the  middle  of  the  Tagus,  as  broad  before 
Lisbon  as  an  arm  of  the  sea,  waited  for  a 
favourable  wind,  while  a  population  of  three 
hundred  thousand  souls,  divided  between  grief, 
anger,  curiosity,  and  terror,  sorrowfully  gazed 
at  them.  At  the  mouth  of  the  Tagus,  the  Eng- 
lish fleet  was  cruizing  to  receive  the  emigrants, 
and  to  protect  them,  if  necessary,  with  ita 
guns. 

Thus  passed  the  whole  of  the  27th,  the  wind 
not  permitting  the  expedition  to  leave  the  Tagus; 
anxiety  prevailed  in  the  Portuguese  fleet:  for, 
if  a  French  detachment  had  arrived  in  time  at 
Lisbon  and  hastened  to  the  tower  of  Belem,  the 
Tagus  would  have  been  closed. 

Meanwhile  General  Junot,  leading  in  haste 
his  unfortunate  soldiers,  arrived  breathless 
under  the  walls  of  Lisbon.  He  had  been  de- 
tained during  the  26th  and  27th  before  the  Ze- 
zera,  the  waters  of  which  had  risen  from  twelve 
to  fifteen  feet  in  a  few  hours,  and  which  falls 
into  the  Tagus  near  Punhette.  He  passed  it, 
with  some  thousand  men,  in  boats,  brought  by 
well  paid  seamen,  and  amidst  the  greatest  dan- 


<  Several  historians,  as  well  Portuguese  as  Spanish  and 
French,  have  asserted  that  Lord  Strangford  decided  the 
prince-regent,  by  producing  a  Moniteur  of  the  llth  of  No- 
vember, which  had  come  by  way  of  London,  containing 
an  imperial  decree,  similar  to  that  which  had  pronounced 
the  forfeiture  of  the  house  of  Naples,  and  declaring  that 
the  house  of  Braganza  had  ceased  to  reign.  This  assertion, 
if  not  totally  inaccurate,  is,  nevertheless,  erroneous. 
Neither  the  Afoniteur  of  the  llth  of  November,  nor  of  any 
anterior  or  posterior  date,  contains  any  decree  declaring 
that  the  House  of  Braganza  had  ceased  to  reign.  This 
form,  used  in  1806  against  the  House  of  Naples,  after  an 
unpardonable  treachery,  could  not  be  employed  against 
reigning  families,  which  had  not  furnished  Napoleon  with 
any  pretext  Jor  treating  them  in  that  manner.  Neither 
does  the  depot  of  the  minutes  at  the  secretary  of  state's 
office,  any  more  than  the  Mrmiteur,  contain  the  alleged 
decree.  But  the  Moniteur  of  the  12th  of  November  con- 
tains, under  the  head  Paris,  and  date  of  the  12th,  an  arti- 
cle relative  to  the  various  expeditions  of  the  English 
against  Copenhagen,  Alexandria,  Constantinople,  and 
Buenos-Ayres.  In  this  article,  evidently  dictated  by  Na- 
poleon, and  tending  to  show  the  consequences  to  which 


all  the  governments  that  sacrificed  themselves  to  the  Eng- 
lish policy  were  liable,  we  find  the  following  passage : — 

'•  After  these  four  expeditions,  which  so  clea  rly  demon- 
strate the  moral  and  military  decline  of  England,  wo 
shall  advert  to  the  situation  in  which  they  now  leave 
Portugal.  .The  Prince-regent  of  Portugal  loses  his 
throne ;  he  "loses  it,  influenced  by  the  intrigues  of  the 
English ;  he  loses  it  for  refusing  to  seize  the  English  mer- 
chandise at  Lisbon.  And  what  does  England,  that  so 
mighty  ally?  She  looks  on  with  indifference  at  what  is 
passing  in  Portugal.  What  will  she  do  when  Portugal  is 
taken?  Will  she  go  and  seize  Brazil?  No:  if  the  Eng- 
lish make  such  an  attempt,  the  Catholics  will  expel  them. 
The  downfall  of  the  House  of  Bragariza  will  be  a  new 
proof  that  the  ruin  of  all  who  attach  themselves  to  Eng- 
land is  inevitable." 

This  is  probably  what  is  meant  by  the  decree  declaring 
that  the  House  of  Braganza  had  ceased  to  reign  ;  and  this 
the  Manitf.ur  which,  published  at  Paris  on  the  13th,  reach- 
ing  London  n  the  15th  or  ICth,  might  through  the  Ad- 
miralty be  received  by  the  English  fleet  on  the  23d  or 
24th,  and  communicated  to  the  Prince-regent  of  Por- 
tugal. 


Nov.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


419 


gers ;  for  these  boats  were  carried  away  by  the 
current  with  great  violence  into  the  Tagus,  and 
•were  then  obliged  to  work  up  the  stream  to  get 
to  the  point  for  landing.  On  the  28th  Junot 
marched  for  Santarem,  across  the  inundation-', 
•which  covered  to  a  distance  the  banks  of  the 
Tagus,  and  in  which  the  soldiers  sometimes  tra- 
velled for  a  league  together  with  the  water  up 
to  their  knees.  On  the  29th  he  reached  Sacca- 
vem,  and  there  received  intelligence  from  Lis- 
bon. He  learned  that  the  royal  family  had  em- 
barked with  the  whole  court,  and  that  it  was 
taking  away  with  it  the  Portuguese  fleet  laden 
with  wealth.  There  was  now  no  hope  left  of 
arriving  in  time ;  but  it  was  necessary  to  pre- 
vent a  rising  which  it  would  have  been  impos- 
sible to  quell  with  a  few  thousand  exhausted 
men  and  not  a  single  piece  of  cannon.  General 
Junot  resolutely  pursued  his  course,  and  left 
Saccavem  on  the  morning  of  the  30th,  with  a 
column  of  not  more  than  1500  grenadiers  and 
with  an  escort  of  some  Portuguese  horse,  met 
with  by  the  way,  which  he  obliged  to  accompany 
him.  He  entered  Lisbon  at  eight  in  the  morn- 
ing, was  received  by  a  commission  of  the  go- 
vernment to  which  the  prince-regent  had  con- 
signed the  kingdom,  and  by  a  French  emigrant, 
M.  de  Novion,  who  was  at  the  head  of  the  po- 
lice, and  who  performed  that  duty  with  equal 
intelligence  and  energy.  General  Junot  found 
the  capital  quiet,  mortified  at  the  presence  of 
foreigners,  but  submissive,  and,  besides,  so  in- 
dignant at  the  flight  of  the  court,  as  to  feel 
little  less  embittered  against  it  than  against 
those  who  were  come  to  take  its  throne.  The 
Portuguese  fleet,  having  waited  under  sail  the 
•whole  of  the  27th  and  part  of  the  28th,  had  at 
length  crossed  in  the  evening  the  bar  of  the 
Tagus,  thanks  to  a  change  of  wind,  and  fugitive 
royalty  had  been  greeted  with  salutes  by  the 
English  fleet.  Admiral  Sidney  Smith  detached 
a  strong  squadron  to  accompany  that  royalty 
to  America,  where  it  was  about  to  commence 
with  Brazil  the  enfranchisement  of  all  the  Por- 
tuguese and  Spanish  colonies ;  for  it  was  given 
to  the  French  revolution  to  change  the  face  of 
the  New  World  as  well  as  that  of  the  Old ;  and 
those  thrones  of  the  Peninsula,  which  it  hurled 
into  the  Ocean,  were  destined  to  produce  by 
their  fall  a  reflux  that  was  felt  on  the  other  side 
of  the  Atlantic. 

General  Junot  found,  therefore,  that  part  of 
the  results  which  he  was  pursuing  with  such 
ardour  had  escaped  him.  But  a  few  old  ships, 
so  crazy  that  those  on  board  them  were  fearful 
they  might  not  reach  Brazil,  some  precious 
stones,  some  coined  metals,  and  lastly  a  family, 
the  capture  of  which  would  have  been  a  great 
embarrassment,  were  not  equivalent  to  the  ad- 
vantage of  becoming  master  of  the  most  import- 
ant positions  of  the  coast  of  Europe  without 
striking  a  blow,  and  of  having  prevented  a  re- 
sistance, which  could  not  have  been  conquered, 
had  ever  so  little  energy  been  exerted.  General 
Junot  and  his  army  had,  therefore,  won  the 
prize  of  their  perseverance.  But  it  was  requi- 
site to  establish  himself  at  Lisbon,  to  rally  the 
army,  to  give  it  rest,  to  provide  it  with  neces- 
saries, and  to  restore  to  it  the  imposing  aspect 
which  it  had  lost  during  that  memorable  march. 

Towards  the  evening  of  the  30th,  part  of  the 
first  division  arrived.  Junot  possessed  himself 
of  the  forts  and  of  the  positions  commanding 


Lisbon,  which  is  situated  on  several  hills  on  the 
shore  of  the  expansive  waters  of  the  Tagus. 
The  commission  of  the  government,  and  parti- 
cularly the  commandant  of  the  police  force, 
M.  de  Novion,  assisted  him  to  keep  order ;  in 
which  they  acted  as  good  citizens,  for  disturb- 
ance would  only  have  led  to  useless  bloodshed, 
and  perhaps  to  the  sacking  of  Lisbon.  Junot 
distributed  the  troops  in  the  manner  best  suited 
to  their  welfare  and  their  safety,  amidst  a  hos- 
tile population  of  300,000  souls.  Having  solidly 
established  the  first  detachments  that  arrived, 
he  turned  his  attention  to  rallying  the  others. 
Many  of  the  soldiers  had  been  drowned  or  mur- 
dered. These  losses,  however,  though  much  to 
be  regretted,  were  not  so  great  as  there  waa 
reason  to  fear  from  the  small  number  of  men 
who  appeared  in  the  ranks  on  the  day  that  they 
entered  Lisbon.  The  lists  subsequently  made 
proved  that  the  dead  and  missing  did  not  ex- 
ceed 1700.  There  were  left,  therefore,  21  or  22 
thousand  soldiers,  well  tried  already  by  that 
campaign,  and  followed  by  three  or  four  thou- 
sand, who,  brought  by  a  frequented  route  of  sta- 
tions (tiapes)  would  arrive  safe  and  sound  at  the 
goal  which  their  predecessors  had  not  reached 
without  great  difficulty  and  fatigue.  Most  of 
the  men  left  behind  had  collected  into  parties, 
marching  more  slowly  than  the  heads  of  co- 
lumns, but  defending  themselves  against  the 
peasantry,  and  living  upon  what  they  could  find 
in  the  woods.  The  flocks  of  goats  and  sheep 
which  they  fell  in  with  by  the  way  furnished 
their  principal  subsistence.  When  once  at 
Abrantes,  they  embarked  in  boats,  which  car- 
ried them  down  the  Tagus  to  Lisbon.  The  ar- 
tillery, which  arrived  much  later,  was  likewise 
put  on  board  boats,  and  by  this  expeditious 
mode  of  conveyance  carried  to  the  general  rally- 
ing point.  The  cavalry  arrived  without  horses. 
But  Portugal  would  soon  supply  the  army  witfc 
all  that  it  wanted.  There  was  at  Lisbon  a  mag- 
nificent arsenal,  appropriated  alike  to  the  land 
and  the  sea  service,  peopled  with  three  thou- 
sand very  skilful  workmen,  desiring  nothing 
better  than  to  continue  to  earn  their  livelihood, 
even  by  working  for  the  French.  Junot  em- 
ployed them  in  repairing  or  remaking  all  the 
materiel  of  the  army,  and  in  making  gun-car- 
riages for  the  numerous  artillery  existing  in 
Lisbon,  which  was  to  be  mounted  in  battery 
against  the  English.  Near  the  capital  was 
posted  the  Portuguese  army,  25,000  strong, 
waiting  for  its  fate  to  be  pronounced.  The 
Portuguese  soldiers,  in  general,  liked  better  to 
live  in  their  villages  than  under  their  colours. 
Junot  gave  them  furloughs,  so  that  no  more 
than  6000  were  left  in  the  ranks.-  He  took  all 
the  horses  of  the  cavalry,  and  remounted  the 
French  cavalry  with  them.  He  did  the  same 
by  the  artillery,  and,  in  a  few  days,  his  army, 
rallied,  armed,  new-clothed,  rested  from  its  fa- 
tigues, exhibited  the  finest  aspect.  There  were 
no  funds  in  the  chests  for  defraying  these  ex- 
penses. But,  till  the  payment  of  the  taxes, 
commerce,  encouraged  by  the  language  and  the 
acts  of  General  Junot,  advanced  him  five  mil- 
lions, in  order  to  supply  the  most  urgent  wants, 
and  thus  he  was  enabled  to  pay  for  all  that  th* 
army  consumed.  General  Junot  established  his 
first  division  in  Lisbon ;  the  second,  half  in 
Lisbon,  and  half  opposite  to  Abrantes ;  the 
third,  on  the  back  of  the  mountains  at  the  foot 


420 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Nov.  1807. 


of  which  Lisbon  is  seated,  from  Peniche  to 
Coimbra.  He  sent  his  cavalry,  under  General 
Kellermann,  into  the  plain  of  the  Alentejo,  to 
enforce  all  over  it  the  recognition  of  the  French 
authority.  He  placed  at  Setuval  General  Ca- 
rafa's  Spaniards,  who  had  accompanied  him. 
He  established  a  well  guarded  and  well  sup- 
plied route  of  stations  (ttapes)  through  Leiria, 
Coimbra,  Almeida,  Salamanca,  and  Bayonne. 
In  the  first  moment,  all  appeared  quiet  and 
almost  cheering.  There  was  but  one  very  em- 
barrassing difficulty  from  the  commencement, 
that  was  to  provision,  in  spite  of  the  English,  a 
capital  with  300,000  inhabitants,  accustomed 
to  receive  by  sea  corn  and  cattle  from  the  coast 
of  Africa.  General  Junot  treated  with  several 
merchants,  and  gave  commissions  on  all  sides 
for  bringing  supplies  from  the  interior.  He 
was  ably  seconded  by  Thie"bault,  chief  of  the 
staff,  and  by  M.  Hermann,  whom  Napoleon  had 
sent  to  him  to  superintend  the  Portuguese 
finances,  the  latter  was  a  man  of  the  highest 
integrity,  well  acquainted  with  the  country, 
having  long  performed  the  diplomatic  functions 
both  at  Lisbon  and  at  Madrid.  Thanks  to  the 
combined  exertions  of  these  different  agents, 
there  was  no  want  of  any  thing,  for  some  time 
at  least,  and  a  beginning  was  even  made  to 
equip  the  remnant  of  the  Portuguese  fleet.  At 
the  same  moment,  the  Spanish  General  Taranco 
occupied  the  province  of  Oporto  with  seven  or 
eight  thousand  men,  and  General  Solano  that 
of  the  Algarves  with  three  or  four  thousand. 

While  a  French  army  was  penetrating  into 
Portugal,  Napoleon,  who  had  prepared  two 
others  to  enter  the  Peninsula,  had  ordered  Ge- 
neral Dupont,  commanding  the  second  corps 
of  the  Gironde,  to  take  one  of  his  divisions  to 
Vittoria,  upon  pretext  of  assisting  General 
Junot  against  the  English.  Shortly  before  the 
march  of  this  division,  a  reinforcement  of  three 
or  four  thousand  men,  destined  to  be  incorpo- 
rated into  the  three  divisions  of  the  army  of 
Portugal,  had  already  taken  the  road  for  Sala- 
manca. Thus  the  French  became  accustomed 
to  consider  the  Spanish  boundary  as  an  abo- 
lished demarcation  and  Spain  itself  as  an  open 
road,  which  they  made  use  of,  without  even 
informing  the  sovereign  of  the  country.  Gene- 
ral Dupont's  first  division,  in  fact,  had  reached 
Vittoria  before  M.  de  Beauharnais  had  given 
notice  of  that  movement  to  the  cabinet  of  Ma- 
drid. It  was  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  who  first 
spoke  of  it  to  M.  Beauharnais,  with  a  visible 
anxiety.  At  the  same  time,  he  had  made  many 
excuses  for  the  want  of  preparations  along  the 
route  followed  by  General  Junot,  and  had  at- 
tributed that  neglect  to  important  engagements 
resulting  from  the  process  at  the  Escurial. 

Since  that  process,  and  notwithstanding  the 
pardon  granted  to  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias, 
the  agitation,  both  in  the  court  of  Spain  and 
in  the  country  in  general,  had  not  ceased  to 
increase.  The  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  whose 
abject  submission  and  whose  cowardly  betrayal 
of  his  friends  ought  to  have  disgraced  him, 
•was,  on  the  contrary,  adored  by  a  nation,  which, 
finding  in  that  degenerate  family  no  other  prince 
to  love,  was  fain  to  excuse  every  thing  in  him, 
and  imputed  whatever  was  equivocal  in  his  con- 
duct to  his  enemies,  to  their  threats,  and  to 
their  tyranny.  The  application  for  a  French 
princess,  addressed  by  Ferdinand  to  Napoleon, 


an  application  now  well  known,  had  turned  the 
eyes  of  the  nation,  as  well  as  those  of  the  prince, 
towards  the  high  protector,  who  ruled  at  this 
moment  the  destinies  of  the  world.  The  French 
troops  that  had  already  entered  the  Spanish 
territory,  those  which  were  accumulating  be- 
tween Bordeaux  and  Bayonne,  far  exceeding 
the  force  necessary  for  the  occupation  of  I  r- 
tugal,  accredited  the  opinion  that  this  pow^i-- 
ful  protector  designed  to  interfere  in  the  affairs 
of  Spain ;  and  the  whole  nation  rejoiced  in  the 
belief  that  it  would  be  in  the  way  which  ac- 
corded with  their  wishes,  that  is  to  say,  to  over- 
throw the  favourite,  confine  the  queen  in  a 
convent,  Charles  IV.  in  a  hunting-lodge,  and 
give  the  crown  to  Ferdinand  VII.,  united  to  a 
French  princess.  The  attitude  of  M.  de  Beau- 
harnais tended  only  to  favour  these  illusions. 
This  ambassador,  filled  with  aversion  for  tho 
favourite,  led  by  his  secret  intercourse  with  the 
Prince  of  the  Asturias  to  take  an  interest  in 
his  behalf,  flattering  himself  that  this  prince- 
would  marry  a  French  princess,  (Mademoiselle 
de  Tascher,)  who  was  his  relation,  abounded  in 
all  the  sentiments  of  the  Spaniards  themselves ; 
and  these,  concluding  that  the  representative  of 
France  had  orders  to  be  what  he  appeared,  con- 
ceived such  an  increasing  enthusiasm  for  Napo- 
leon, that  our  troops,  instead  of  being  a  subject 
of  alarm  to  the  most  mistrustful  people  in  the 
world,  had,  on  the  contrary,  become  a  subject 
of  hope  for  it. 

To  no  purpose  did  some  more  sagacious  minds 
say  to  themselves  that,  to  overthrow  a  favour- 
ite abhorred  by  the  Spanish  nation,  so  many 
soldiers  were  not  required  ;  that  the  nod  of  the 
omnipotent  Emperor  of  the  French  would  be 
sufficient  to  reduce  him  to  nothing ;  that  those 
troops  which  were  collecting  were,  perhaps,  the 
instruments  long  ago  prepcired,  of  a  more  im- 
portant resolution,  tending  to  exclude  the  Bour- 
bons from  all  the  thrones  of  Europe :  to  no 
purpose  some  clear-sighted  minds  made  these 
remarks ;  they  found  no  acceptance,  because 
they  were  contrary  to  the  passion  that  possessed 
all  hearts. 

Fear,  infusing  juster  apprehensions  into  the 
queen  and  her  favourite,  opened  their  eyes  to 
their  own  danger.  The  queen  and  the  favour- 
ite were  both  sensible,  and  the  queen  more 
deeply  than  her  paramour,  what  contempt  they 
must  excite  in  the  great  man  who  ruled  Europe. 
They  felt  how  far  their  weak  incapacity  was 
beneath  his  great  designs ;  and  the  veil  with 
which  he  covered  his  intentions,  added  to  their 
presentiments  the  terror  which  arises  from 
obscurity.  Though  Napoleon  had  signed  the 
treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  though,  by  this  treaty, 
he  had  recognised  Emmanuel  Godoy  sovereign 
Prince  of  the  Algarves,  they  were,  neither  of 
them,  quite  easy.  In  the  first  place,  Junot  had 
seized  into  his  own  hands  the  entire  administra- 
tion of  Portugal,  without  excepting  the  pro- 
vinces occupied  by  the  Spanish  troops.  In  the 
next,  Napoleon  had  required  that  the  treaty 
of  Fontainebleau  should  continue  to  be  kept 
secret.  Wherefore  this  secrecy,  when  Portugal 
was  in  the  power  of  the  allied  troops,  when  the 
house  of  Braganza  was  gone,  and  had,  in  some 
measure,  left  the  throne  vacant  by  its  depar- 
ture ?  To  these  questions  were  added  the  let- 
ters of  Yzquierdo,  the  agent,  who  could  not  dis- 
guise from  his  patron  the  apprehensions  with 


NOT.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


421 


which  he  began  to  be  filled.  These  apprehen- 
sions,  it  is  true,  were  not  grounded  on  any  pre- 
cise fa«  t ;  for  Napoleon  had  not  communicated 
his  determination  respecting  Spain  to  a  single 
creature — indeed,  he  could  not  communicate  it, 
for  he  was  yet  uncertain  what  he  should  do. 
But  of  that  fatal  propensity  for  everywhere 
susperseding  the  Bourbon  family  by  his  own — 
a  propensity  which  swayed  his  soul  to  such  a 
degree  as  to  make  him  unmindful  of  all  pru- 
dence, some  clear-sighted  spirits  had  a  presen- 
timent, and,  without  his  saying  a  word,  his  in- 
tention was  guessed  by  more  than  one  observer. 
The  silence  which  he  kept,  though  engaged  in 
very  apparent  preparations,  had  struck  in  par- 
ticular the  agent  Yzquierdo,  the  cleverest  of 
men  at  discovering  what  was  intended  to  be  con- 
cealed from  him ;  and  he  was  incessantly  writing 
to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  that,  though  Napo- 
leon had  set  out  for  Italy,  yet  around  his  minis- 
ters and  his  confidants  there  was  not  a  word  to 
be  picked  up ;  and  yet,  that  in  all  he  saw  there 
was  a  mystery  which  filled  him  with  uneasiness. 
Hence  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  and  the  queen 
were  extremely  agitated.  The  queen,  often  in- 
disposed, disguising  her  trouble  under  an  af- 
fected tranquillity,  her  age  under  the  most 
elegant  personal  decorations,  nevertheless  gave 
way,  in  spite  of  herself,  to  frequent  bursts  of 
anger.  She  filled  the  palace  with  her  storming, 
demanded  the  sacrifice  of  all  those  whom  she 
considered  as  her  enemies,  foolishly  insisted  on 
the  execution  of  the  canon  Escoi'quiz  and  the 
Duke  de Tlnfantado,  and  was  enraged  with  Ca- 
ballero,  the  obsequious  minister  of  justice,  who, 
trembling  all  over,  merely  opposed  to  her  de- 
sires the  difficulties  arising  from  the  ancient 
laws  of  the  kingdom,  inviolate  and  inviolable. 
She  went  so  far  as  to  declare  that  minister  a 
traitor,  sold  to  Ferdinand.  The  latter,  on  his 
part,  dissatisfied  with  this  same  minister,  called 
him  a  vile  executor  of  the  commands  of  his 
mother,  and  promised  himself  to  take  signal 
vengeance  on  him  at  a  future  time.  The  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  believing  it  to  be  for  his  interest 
even  to  pacify  the  queen,  loaded  her  with  atten- 
tions and  passed  from  an  insulting  indifference 
towards  her  to  incessant  demonstrations  of  kind- 
ness. Though  he  went  in  the  evening  to  the 
demoiselles  Tudo  to  rest  his  weary  soul,  weary 
with  intrigue  and  alarm,  he  paid  in  the  morn- 
ing to  that  exasperated  queen  all  the  attend- 
ance of  a  faithful  courtier ;  and  these  two  para- 
mours, whom,  from  their  numerous  infidelities, 
one  would  have  supposed  to  be  disgusted  with 
each  other,  were  brought  back  by  mutual  ter- 
rors and  mutual  antipathies  into  an  intimacy 
wearing  all  the  semblance  of  love.  In  public 
the  queen  manifested  redoubled  affection  for 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  and  took  delight  in  de- 
fying by  such  demonstrations  the  modesty  of 
those  who  witnessed  them  and  the  aversion  of 
her  enemies.  The  court  was  deserted :  all  re- 
spectable persons  had  forsaken  it.  When  the 
royal  family  appeared  outside  the  gardens  of 
the  Escurial,  the  people  remained  silent,  ex- 
cepting for  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  whom 
they  followed  with  their  cheers,  to  such  a  de- 
gree that  the  queen  had  obtained  a  police  ordi- 
nance by  which  all  acclamations  were  prohi- 
bited. To  such  a  length  did  she  carry  the 
extravagance  of  her  requisitions  as  to  order  a 
.  Te  Deum  to  return  thanks  to  Heaven  for  the 


miraculous  preservation  which  it  had  vouch- 
safed to  the  king,  in  thwarting  the  plots  of  th« 
Prince  of  the  Asturias.  Of  the  members  of 
the  grandeza,  all  convoked,  four  only  had 
attended,  two  Spaniards,  two  foreigners,  con- 
founded all  four  at  their  own  baseness.  At 
leaving  the  church,  the  queen  had  shown  a 
tenderness,  a  familiarity,  with  Emmanuel  Go- 
doy,  disgusting  to  the  beholders ;  while  poor 
Charles  IV.  perceived  none  of  these  infamous 
proceedings,  though,  having  a  confused  feeling 
of  the  peril  of  his  situation,  he  had  uninten- 
tionally crowned  the  scandal  by  supporting 
himself  on  the  arm  of  the  favourite,  as  on 
the  mighty  arm  from  which  he  hoped  for 
salvation.  Deplorable,  disgraceful  spectacle, 
not  only  for  the  throne,  but  for  humanity  itself, 
the  degradation  of  which,  manifested  in  so  ex- 
alted a  situation,  was  the  more  striking. 

Every  evening,  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
went,  as  we  have  said,  to  the  demoiselles  Tudo, 
to  pour  forth  the  tribulations  of  his  soul,  which, 
notwithstanding  its  levity,  was  deeply  afflicted. 
In  that  house,  to  which  the  curious  resorted  in 
quest  of  news,  great  joy  had  been  conceived 
and  expressed  at  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau ; 
a  joy  soon  embittered  by  the  order  received 
from  Paris  to  keep  that  treaty  secret,  by  the 
continual  entry  of  French  troops,  and  by  the 
letters  of  Yzquierdo,  the  agent.  As  the  pub- 
lic was  delighted  to  learn  whatever  was  unfa- 
vourable to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  his  confi- 
dants endeavoured  to  oppose  to  the  torrent  of 
bad  news  a  contrary  torrent,  referring  with 
exaggeration  to  all  the  tokens  of  favour  obtained 
from  the  Tuileries.  Thus,  in  spite  of  the  order 
to  keep  secret  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  all 
its  particulars  had  been  repeated,  and  with  the 
greatest  detail,  at  the  residence  of  the  demoi- 
selles Tudo.  It  had  been  there  related  that  the 
north  of  Portugal  had  been  given  to  the  Queen 
of  Etruria,  the  south  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
constituted  sovereign  Prince  of  the  Algarves, 
and  the  middle  reserved  to  be  subsequently 
disposed  of.  In  this  manner  the  presence  of 
the  French  armies  was  accounted  for ;  and,  as 
for  their  number,  far  superior  to  that  which 
the  mere  occupation  of  Portugal  would  have 
required,  that  was  attributed  to  the  great  pro- 
jects of  Napoleon  in  regard  to  Gibraltar.  To 
prevent  the  mischievous  effects  which  the  entry 
of  the  other  corps  speedily  expected  could  not 
fail  to  produce,  it  was  said  that  the  French 
army  would  amount  to  at  least  80,000  men,  that 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  would  command  it  in 
person,  and  that  consequently  people  need  not 
be  alarmed  on  that  subject.  As  for  the  pro- 
ceedings against  the  accomplices  of  the  Prince 
of  Asturias,  which  excited  universal  indigna- 
tion, and  which,  it  was  said,  Napoleon  would 
not  suffer  to  go  on,  the  friends  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace  alleged  that  the  court  had  intelli- 
gence from  Paris,  that  Napoleon  had  declared 
the  affair  of  the  Escurial  to  be  an  affair  foreign 
to  France,  and  that  he  highly  approved  of  the 
punishment  of  the  intriguers,  who  had  designed 
to  shake  the  throne. 

Neither  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  nor  the  wo- 
men of  such  different  rank  who  interested  them- 
selves in  his  fate,  gave  much  credit  to  this  in- 
telligence. They  were  tormented  by  fear,  which 
suggested  to  them  precautions  of  the  nature  of 
those  taken  in  the  East  against  Fortune  or 
2N 


422 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Nov.  1807. 


against  tyranny.  Thus  gold  and  precious 
stones  were  amassed  at  the  palace  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace.  Superb  dresses  were  stripped 
of  their  diamonds,  which  were  carried  to  his 
residence,  together  with  considerable  sums  in 
specie.  Everybody  might  see  at  night  laden 
mules  setting  out  from  his  habitation ;  some 
taking  the  road  for  Cadiz,  others  that  for  Fer- 
rol.  The  people,  according  to  custom,  exag- 
gerated these  circumstances,  and  exaggerated 
them  most  immoderately.  They  talked  of  five 
hundred  millions  in  specie  collected  in  his  pa- 
lace, and  then  sent  off  in  several  convoys  for 
unknown  destinations.  These  fabulous  stories, 
concurrent  with  the  flight  of  the  house  of  Bra- 
ganza,  had  led  in  all  quarters  to  the  conclusion 
that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  purposed  to  carry 
away  the  royal  family  to  Mexico,  to  prolong 
beyond  sea  a  power  which  was  expiring  in  Eu- 
rope. Propagated  with  incredible  rapidity, 
this  supposition  had  excited  the  indignation  of 
all  the  Spaniards.  The  idea  of  seeing  the  royal 
family  of  Spain  betaking  itself  to  a  cowardly 
flight,  like  the  royal  family  of  Portugal,  car- 
rying away  an  adored  prince  a  prisoner,  leav- 
ing a  vacant  kingdom  to  Napoleon,  revolted 
them  ;  and  this  fear  had  increased,  if  possible, 
the  popular  fury  excited  by  the  favourite. 
Every  week  the  rumour  that  the  riches  of  the 
crown  had  been  packed  up,  to  be  secretly  con- 
veyed to  Cadiz,  and  that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
was  about  to  conduct  the  royal  family  to  Seville, 
was  spread  anew  as  a  sinister  report,  exaspe- 
rated all  minds,  let  loose  all  tongues,  then  sub- 
sided for  a  moment,  when  found  not  to  be  con- 
firmed by  facts,  like  the  hollow  murmurs  that 
precede  the  tempest. 

And,  false  as  are  in  general  the  rumours 
•which  circulate  among  an  agitated  people, 
these  were  not  without  foundation.  Long 
before  the  flight  of  the  house  of  Braganza, 
the  project  of  that  flight  had  been  communi- 
cated to  the  court  of  Madrid,  submitted  to  its 
judgment,  and  so  far  discussed  with  it,  as  to 
be  mentioned  to  the  French  ambassador. 
Struck  with  this  example,  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  when  he  despaired  of  his  situation,  was 
fond  of  musing  upon  an  asylum  in  America, 
to  which  he  could  go  to  seek  repose,  safety, 
and  the  continuance  of  his  power.  He  had 
opened  himself  on  this  subject  to  the  queen, 
who  liked  this  scheme  much ;  and  in  order  to 
dispose  the  king  to  agree  to  it,  he  had  begun 
to  alarm  him  respecting  the  intentions  of  Na- 
poleon. After  telling  him  on  this  subject 
more  than  he  knew,  but  not  more  than  was 
really  meditated,  he  had  expatiated  at  great 
length  on  the  plan  of  flight  to  America,  as  the 
safest  and  even  the  most  profitable  course  for 
Spain.  To  withstand  the  armies  of  Napoleon 
was,  according  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
impossible.  They  might  enter  into  a  struggle, 
but  it  must  end  in  their  succumbing  to  him 
•whom  all  Europe  had  in  vain  endeavoured  to 
oppose ;  and  in  this  cuiitest  they  should  lose 
not  Spain  alone,  but  the  magnificent  empire 
of  the  Indies,  a  hundred  times  more  desirable 
than  the  European  territory  of  the  house  of 
Bourbon.  The  provinces  beyond  sea,  strongly 
agitated  already  by  the  insurrection  of  the 
English  colonies,  desiring  nothing  better  than 
to  declare  themselves  independent,  warmly 
urged  to  that  step  by  the  British  agents,  would 


I  take  advantage  of  the  war,  that  must  absorb 
all  the  forces  of  the  mother-country,  to  shake 
j  off  her  yoke ;  and  thus  they  should  see  not 
only  the  Spains,  but  Mexico,  Peru,  Colombia, 
La  Plata,  the  Philippines,  wrested  from  them. 
On  the  contrary,  by  removing  to  the  colonies, 
they  should  preserve  them  by  the  presence  of 
the  reigning  family,  whom  they  would  be  happy 
to  have  at  their  head  to  form  an  independent 
empire ;  and,  if  Napoleon,  becoming  more 
odious  to  Europe,  in  proportion  as  he  became 
more  powerful,  should  ultimately  fall,  they 
might  return  to  the  old  continent,  more  assured 
of  the  fidelity  of  the  provinces  of  America, 
which  they  should  have  bound  to  themselves 
by  stronger  ties,  and  having  meanwhile  es- 
caped by  a  mere  voyage  the  general  convul- 
sion of  all  the  States.  If,  on  the  contrary, 
the  tyrant  of  the  Old  World  should  die  on 
his  usurped  throne,  and  leave  his  consolidated 
dynasty  upon  it,  they  should  find  in  the  New 
World  a  regenerated  empire,  affording  where- 
withal to  make  them  forget  everything  that 
they  had  left  behind  in  Europe. 

These  ideas,  the  only  forcible  and  sensible 
j  ideas  that  the  favourite  had  ever  conceived,  for, 
I  if  they  renounced  all  intention  of  disputing 
;  the  possession  of  Spain  by  an  heroic  resist- 
i  ance,  the  best  thing  to  be  done  was  to  pre- 
!  serve  to  the  nation  the  two  Indies,  and  to  the 
!  reigning  family  a  throne,  how  distant  soever 
it  might  be — these  ideas  were  of  a  nature  to 
confound  Charles  IV.  To  defend  himself  by 
arms  he  most  assuredly  had  no  thoughts  of. 
To  go  from  the  Escurial  to  Cadiz,  to  embark, 
to  cross  the  sea,  to  deprive  himself  for  ever 
of  the  diversions  of  the  chase  in  the  Pardo, 
appalled  him  almost  as  much  as  a  battle.  He 
preferred  banishing  far  from  him  these  sinister 
forebodings,  and  to  throw  himself,  he  said, 
into  the  arms  of  his  magnanimous  friend,  Napo- 
leon. It  must  be  added  to  the  honour  of  this 
good  and  unfortunate  prince,  that,  notwith- 
standing his  intellectual  mediocrity,  he  appre- 
ciated whatever  was  great  in  Napoleon,  that 
he  admired  his  exploits ;  and  that,  if  he  had 
been  capable  of  any  efforts,  he  would  have 
assisted  him  to  beat  England,  for  the  interest 
of  both  countries,  which  he  comprehended 
whenever  he  chanced  to  think  about  it.  Ac- 
cordingly, he  replied  to  those  who  talked  to 
him  of  a  distant  retreat,  that  they  must  en- 
deavour to  divine  the  intentions  of  Napoleon 
and  conform  to  them,  for,  at  bottom,  they 
could  not  be  bad  ;  that  the  Prince  of  the  Astn- 
rias  had,  after  all,  not  been  so  very  ill-advised 
in  applying  for  a  princess  of  the  Bonaparte 
family  for  a  wife ;  that  it  was  a  means  of 
strengthening  the  alliance  of  the  two  countries, 
and  putting  an  end  to  the  animosity  of  the  two 
races ;  that  it  was  not  possible  for  Napoleon, 
after  giving  Ferdinand  one  of  his  adopted 
daughters,  to  harbour  an  intention  of  dethron- 
ing him.  He  was  too  great,  too  magnanimous 
a  hero,  to  commit  such  a  breach  of  faith.  It 
was,  perhaps,  the  first  time  in  his  life  that 
this  unfortunate  king,  whose  mind,  roused 
under  the  stimulus  of  circumstances,  con- 
ceived an  idea  of  his  own,  and  appeared  to 
adhere  to  it.  He  had  already  thought  of  this 
j  marriage  of  the  heir  to  the  crown  with  a  niece 
j  of  Napoleon,  and  he  had  not  to  do  violence  to 
|  himself  to  adopt  such  a  project.  He  desired, 


Nov.  1807.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE    EMPIRE. 


423 


therefore,  that  the  application  made  by  Fer- 
dinand in  an  irregular  manner  should  be  re- 
peated regularly,  in  the  name  of  the  crown 
of  Spain,  with  suitable  solemnity  and  the 
powers  necessary  for  treating.  If  Napoleon 
assented,  he  was  bound  towards  the  house  of 
Bourbon;  if  he  refused,  they  should  know 
what  to  infer  respecting  his  intentions,  and  it 
would  then  be  time  to  think  of  retiring. 

Nothing  could  be  more  disagreeable  to  the 
queen  and  the  favourite  than  such  a  marriage ; 
for  Ferdinand,  husband  of  a  French  princess, 
protected  by  Napoleon,  protector  in  his  turn 
of  the  house  of  Spain,  would  become  all- 
powerful.  The  fall  of  the  favourite  and  the 
destruction  of  the  queen's  influence  must  ensue. 
But  not  to  renew  Ferdinand's  proposal  in  the 
name  of  the  crown,  was  declaring  that  he  had 
acted  wrong  not  only  in  regard  to  the  form 
but  in  regard  to  the  main  point;  it  was  show- 
ing Napoleon  that  they  desired  not  his  alliance  ; 
it  was  depriving  themselves  of  a  sure  means 
of  sounding  his  intentions ;  and,  above  all,  de- 
priving themselves  of  arguments  indispensable 
with  Charles  IV.  for  inducing  him  to  approve 
of  the  project  of  flight  to  America.  Such  were 
the  reasons  which  reconciled  the  queen  and 
the  favourite  to  the  idea  of  applying  for  a 
princess,  that  is  to  say,  of  renewing  Ferdi- 
nand's clandestine  proposal,  in  the  name  of  the 
crown.  This  was  perhaps  the  only  occasion 
when  there  was  any  necessity  for  debating  a 
resolution  with  Charles  IV.,  the  only  occasion 
assuredly  on  which  a  resolution  of  his  became 
that  of  the  government. 

In  consequence,  a  most  affectionate  letter  was 
prepared  for  Charles  IV.  to  write,  soliciting 
Napoleon  to  unite  the  heir  to  the  crown  of  Spain 
with  a  princess  of  the  house  of  Bonaparte.  But 
this  was  not  the  only  demand.  In  a  second 
letter,  annexed  to  the  first,  the  king  sued  to 
Napoleon  for  the  immediate  execution  of  the 
treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  the  publication  of  that 
treaty,  the  entry  into  possession  of  the  sharers 
in  the  Portuguese  provinces  of  the  portion  al- 
lotted to  each.  This  suit  was  suggested  by 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  who  had  those  points 
much  at  heart,  for  he  was  impatient  to  be  pro- 
claimed a  sovereign  prince:  they  were  more- 
over for  the  well-judged  interest  of  the  house 
of  Spain,  since,  by  this  treaty,  Charles  IV. 
had  received  the  guarantee  of  his  dominions 
and  the  title  of  king  of  the  Spains  and  emperor 
of  the  Americas.  The  publication  of  the  treaty 
of  Fontainebleau  would  have  been  at  the 
moment  a  powerful  preservative  against  the 
projects,  real  or  supposed,  of  invasion. 

While  awaiting  this  publication,  there  were 
persons  who,  as  we  have  said,  had  not  hesitated 
to  commit  all  kinds  of  faults  and  to  divulge  the 
whole  treaty.  People  talked  publicly  in  the 
streets  of  Madrid,  exaggerating  even  the  asser- 
tions of  Tudo  House,  that  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace  would  soon  be  declared  King  of  Portugal, 
and  Charles  IV.  Emperor  of  the  Indies ;  that, 
in  short,  the  favour  of  Napoleon  to  Emmanuel 
Godoy  was  about  to  be  shown  in  a  signal  man- 
ner. In  the  very  brief  moments  in  which  peo- 
ple gave  credit  to  these  rumours,  they  half- 
opened  their  eyes ;  they  said  that,  no  doubt, 
Napoleon  was  preparing  to  dethrone  the  last 
of  the  Bourbons,  as  he  had  dethroned  all  the 
Others,  that  he  had  concerted  with  Godoy  to 


|  get  them  delivered  up  to  him,  and  that  he  was 
:  giving  him  Portugal,  that  Godoy,  in  return, 
|  might  give  him  Spain.  In  this  they  calumni- 
i  ated  that  personage,  whom  it  was  so  difficult 
to  calumniate ;  for,  if  it  was  true  that  he  had 
enslaved,  degraded,  ruined,  his  masters,  it  was 
not  true  that  he  had  betrayed  them  in  favour 
of  Napoleon.  Fortunately  for  the  popularity 
of  Napoleon  in  Spain,  these  reports  gained  not 
long  credit.  M.  de  Beauharnais,  who  was  left 
by  his  court  in  complete  ignorance,  affirmed 
that  be  had  no  knowledge  of  that  treaty,  and 
with  such  sincerity  that  nobody  doubted  his 
word.  The  assertions  of  the  favourite's  friends 
were,  therefore,  taken  for  one  of  their  accus- 
tomed boastings,  and  people  again  began  to 
believe  what  pleased  them,  that  is  to  say, 
that  Ferdinand  was  about  to  become  first  the 
husband  of  an  adopted  daughter  of  Napoleon, 
then  king,  and  that  the  odious  faction  which 
oppressed  and  disgraced  the  Escurial  would 
thus  be  swept  away.  And,  what  is  a  singular 
fact  in  this  gloomy  and  melancholy  history  of 
the  fall  of  the  Spanish  Bourbons,  while  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace  was  soliciting  at  Paris  the 
authorization  to  publish  the  treaty  of  Fontaine- 
bleau, M.  de  Beauharnais,  on  his  part,  was  ap- 
plying for  the  authorization  to  contradict  it. 

The  letters  of  Charles  IV.  and  the  despatches 
of  M.  de  Beauharnais  had  to  make  a  long  jour- 
ney to  reach  Napoleon,  then  in  Italy,  and  tra- 
velling from  town  to  town  with  his  usual  ra- 
pidity. In  the  state  of  the  communications  at 
that  period,  it  took  not  less  than  seven  days  to 
go  from  Madrid  to  Paris,  not  less  than  five  days 
to  go  from  Paris  to  Milan ;  and,  if  Napoleon 
was  at  that  moment  on  a  journey  either  to 
Venice  or  to  Palina  Nova,  it  was  sometimes 
fourteen  or  fifteen  days  after  the  departure  of 
despatches  from  Spain  that  they  were  received 
by  him.  The  transmission  of  answers  required 
the  same  time  ;  and  these  delays  s-iited  Napo- 
leon, who  would  fain  have  slackened  the  pace  of 
Time,  so  loth  was  he  to  take  any  resolutions 
relative  to  Spain,  divided  as  he  was  between 
the  desire  of  dethroning  the  Bourbons  every- 
where, and  apprehension  on  account  of  the 
violent  and  odious  means  which  he  should  be 
obliged  to  employ  for  its  accomplishment. 

Having  left  Paris  on  the  16th  of  November, 
Napoleon  had  arrived  at  Milan  on  the  21st, 
having  previously  visited  several  interesting 
points.  He  had  even  taken  by  suprise  his  son 
Eugene  Beauharnais,  who  had  not  had  time  to 
hasten  off  to  meet  him.  Appearing  on  the 
morning  of  his  arrival  at  the  Cathedral  of 
Milan,  to  hear  Te  Deum,  in  the  afternoon  at 
the  palace  of  Monza  to  visit  the  vice-queen,  his 
daughter,  in  the  evening  at  the  theatre  of  La 
Scala,  to  show  himself  to  the  Italians,  he  had 
conversed  in  the  intervals  with  the  functionaries 
charged  with  the  most  important  offices.  He 
spent  the  23d,  the  24th,  and  the  25th,  in  the 
despatch  of  a  great  deal  of  business  and  in  giving 
a  multitude  of  orders.  Struck,  while  traversing 
the  new  road  over  Mont-Cenis,  which  was  his 
work,  with  the  absolute  deficiency  of  accom- 
modation for  travellers,  for  want  of  population 
on  those  snow-covered  heights,  he  gave  orders 
for  the  creation  of  a  commune,  divided  into 
three  hamlets,  one  at  the  foot  of  the  ascent,  one 
at  the  summit,  and  one  on  the  descent.  The 
hamlet  situated  on  the  summit  was  to  be  the 


424 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Dec.  1807. 


chief  place  of  the  commune.  He  prescribed 
the  erection  of  a  church,  an  inn,  an  hospital, 
and  a  barrack.  He  granted  exemption  from 
taxes  for  all  the  peasants  who  should  settle  in 
the  new  commune,  and  commenced  the  popula- 
tion by  the  establishment  of  a  certain  number 
of  soldiers  in  cantonments,  charged  to  keep 
the  road  in  repair  on  ordinary  occasions, 
and,  in  case  of  accident,  to  assemble  at  the 
points  where  their  assistance  might  be  neces- 
sary. Having  fixed  the  budget  of  the  kingdom 
of  Italy,  paid  serious  attention  to  the  Italian 
army,  convoked  the  three  colleges  of  the  Pos- 
sidenti,  Dotti,  and  Commercianti  for  the  mo- 
ment of  his  return  to  Milan,  that  is  to  say  for 
the  10th  of  December,  he  set  off  for  Venice, 
taking  the  road  to  Brescia,  Verona,  and  Padua, 
greeted  on  his  passage  by  the  acclamations  of 
an  enthusiastic  people.  Ever  usefully  employed, 
even  amidst  festivities,  he  had  rectified,  in  pass- 
ing, the  drawing  of  the  fortifications  of  Peschi- 
era,  reserving  his  decision  upon  those  of  Man- 
tua till  his  return.  On  the  road,  he  had  fallen 
in  with  a  party  of  relations — the  King  and 
Queen  of  Bavaria,  whose  daughter  Eugene  had 
married;  his  sister  Elisa,  Princess  of  Lucca, 
and  soon  to  be  Gouvernante  of  Tuscany ;  and 
lastly  his  brother  Joseph,  whom  he  had  not 
seen  since  he  nominated  him  King  of  Naples, 
and  whom  he  fondly  loved,  notwithstanding 
numerous  reproaches  on  account  of  his  lax 
mode  of  governing.  At  Fusina,  a  small  port 
on  the  lagoons,  where  travellers  bound  for 
Venice  embark,  the  authorities  and  the  popu- 
lation awaited  him  in  gondolas  decorated  with 
rich  hangings,  to  conduct  him  to  the  seat  of 
the  ancient  queen  of  the  seas.  The  people  of 
Venice,  who  consoled  themselves  for  no  longer 
forming  an  independent  republic  with  the  satis- 
faction of  having  escaped  from  tyrannical  laws, 
•with  the  hope  of  soon  belonging  to  an  extensive 
kingdom  comprising  all  Italy ;  lastly,  with  the 
promise  of  vast  works  destined  to  render  its 
waters  navigable,  had  displayed  for  the  recep- 
tion of  Napoleon  all  the  luxury  of  which  they 
were  wont  to  make  a  parade  when  their  doge 
wedded  the  sea.  Innumerable  gondolas,  be- 
decked with  a  thousand  colours,  ringing  with 
the  sound  of  instruments,  escorted  the  barges, 
bringing  along  with  the  master  of  the  world, 
the  Viceroy  and  the  Vice-queen  of  Italy,  the 
King  and  Queen  of  Bavaria,  the  Princess  of 
Lucca,  the  King  of  Naples,  the  Grand-duke  of 
Berg,  the  Prince  of  Neufchatel,  and  most  of  the 
generals  of  the  old  army  of  Italy.  After  allow- 
ing the  necessary  time  for  receptions,  Napoleon 
passed  the  following  days  in  visiting  the  public 
establishments,  the  dock-yards,  the  arsenal,  the 
canals,  accompanied  everywhere  by  Messrs. 
Decres,  Proni,  and  Sganzin.  Having  finished 
the  examination  of  these  places,  he  issued  a 
decree,  containing  twelve  heads,  which  em- 
braced all  the  wants  of  regenerated  Venice. 
He  began,  in  virtue  of  this  decree,  with  re- 
establishing a  number  of  taxes,  abolished  since 
the  fall  of  the  republic,  but  justified  by  long 
experience,  little  burdensome  in  themselves, 
and  indispensable  for  defraying  the  expenses 
of  a  wholly  artificial  existence ;  for  Venice,  like 
Holland,  is  a  work  of  art  rather  than  of  Nature. 
The  means  being  insured,  he  thought  of  their 
application.  In  the  first  place,  he  organized 
an  administration  for  keeping  the  canals  in  good 


condition  and  for  deepening  the  lagoons;  he 
next  decreed  a  grand  canal,  for  conveying  ves- 
sels from  the  arsenal  to  the  passage  of  Mala- 
mocco,  a  basin  for  74-gun  ships,  hydraulic 
works,  both  on  the  Brenta,  which  brings  its 
waters  into  the  lagoons,  and  at  the  different 
outlets  by  which  they  discharge  themselves 
into  the  Adriatic.  He  instituted,  moreover,  a 
free  port,  into  which  commerce  might  bring 
merchandise  before  the  payment  of  the  duties 
of  customs.  He  provided  for  the  public  health, 
by  transferring  burials  from  churches  to  an 
island  destined  for  that  purpose.  He  attended 
to  the  pleasures  of  the  people  in  ordering  the 
Place  of  St.  Mark,  the  everlasting  object  of  the 
pride  and  the  historical  recollections  of  the 
Venetians,  to  be  repaired  and  lighted.  Lastly, 
he  insured  a  subsistence  to  seamen  by  the  re- 
establishment  of  all  the  old  charitable  institu- 
tions. After  dispensing  these  benefits  and  re- 
ceiving in  return  a  thousand  acclamations, 
Napoleon  set  off  to  visit  the  Friule,  to  inspect 
the  fortifications  of  Palma  Nova  and  Osopo, 
which  he  had  continued  to  direct  from  a  distance, 
and  which  he  considered,  with  Mantua  and 
Alexandria,  as  pledges  of  the  possession  of 
Italy.  Osopo  and  Palma  Nova  on  the  Isonzo, 
Peschiera  and  Mantua  on  the  Mincio,  Alexan- 
dria on  the  Tanaro,  were,  in  his  estimation, 
the  stages  of  an  almost  invincible  resistance 
against  the  Germans,  if  the  Italians  exerted 
any  energy  in  defending  themselves.  He  had 
come  by  Porto  Legnago  to  Mantua,  where  he 
was  to  meet  his  brother  Lucien,  to  try  to  bring 
about  a  reconciliation,  for  which  he  was 
anxiously  desirous,  but  which  he  would  grant 
only  on  certain  conditions.  M.  de  Meneval 
went  in  the  night  to  an  hotel  to  fetch  Lucien, 
and  conducted  him  to  the  palace  occupied  by 
Napoleon.  Lucien,  instead  of  throwing  himself 
into  the  arms  of  his  brother,  accosted  him  with 
a  very  excusable  loftiness  (as  he  was  the  only 
one  of  the  five  brothers  who  had  no  power)  but 
carried  perhaps  beyond  what  a  well-understood 
dignity  would  have  required.  The  interview 
was,  therefore,  unpleasant  and  stormy,  but  not 
without  useful  result.  Among  the  number  of 
the  combinations  possible  in  Spain,  Napoleon 
still  included  the  union  of  a  French  Princess 
with  Ferdinand.  In  fact,  he  had  that  moment 
received  the  letter  of  Charles  IV.  renewing  the 
proposal  for  a  marriage,  and  though  he  inclined 
to  a  more  radical  resolution,  still  he  did  not 
exclude  from  his  plans  that  kind  of  middle  term. 
He  therefore  desired  Lucien  to  give  him  a 
daughter,  the  offspring  of  a  first  marriage,  to 
be  brought  up  about  the  Empress-mother,  to 
initiate  her  thoroughly  into  his  views,  and  then 
send  her  to  Spain  to  regenerate  the  race  of  the 
Bourbons.  If  he  should  not  decide  to  intrust 
her  with'  this  part,  there  would  not  fail  to  be 
other  thrones,  more  or  less  exalted,  on  which 
he  could  place  her  by  means  of  an  alliance. 
As  for  Lucien  himself,  he  was  disposed  to  con- 
fer on  him  the  quality  of  French  Prince,  even 
to  make  him  King  of  Portugal,  which  would 
have  placed  him  near  his  daughter,  on  condi- 
tion that  he  would  annul  his  second  marriage, 
compensating  his  wife  so  repudiated  by  a  title 
and  a  handsome  annuity.  These  arrangements 
were  possible,  but  they  were  required  witu 
authority,  refused  with  irritation,  and  the  bro- 
thers parted,  agitated,  angered,  but  not  at 


Dec  1807] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


425 


variance,  since  part  of  what  Napoleon  desired 
was  complied  with  by  Lucien  Bonaparte,  a  few 
days  afterwards,  sending  his  daughter  to  Paris. 
On  the  very  next  day  Napoleon  set  off  on  his 
return  to  Milan,  where  he  arrived  on  the  15th 
of  December. 

Despatches  from  Spain  and  from  all  parts  of 
the  Empire  were  waiting  there  for  him,  and  he 
had  more  than  one  resolution  to  take.  The 
letters  of  his  agents  relative  to  the  Peninsula, 
the  letters  of  Charles  IV.  applying  for  a  French 
princess  and  for  the  publication  of  the  treaty 
of  Fontainebleau,  had  been  delivered  to  him 
while  on  his  journey.  To  resolve  such  im- 
portant questions  was  impossible  in  the  state 
of  mind  in  which  he  found  himself.  He  would 
not  yet  involve  himself  in  any  engagement,  for 
he  had  not  definitively  decided  on  any  point, 
though  he  inclined,  as  we  have  said,  to  the  re- 
solution for  dethroning  the  Bourbons.  In  con- 
sequence, he  ordered  M.  de  Champagny  to 
•write  to  Madrid,  that  he  had  received  the  let-  | 
ters  of  King  Charles  IV.,  that  he  appreciated 
their  importance,  but  that,  exclusively  ab- 
sorbed by  the  affairs  of  Italy,  where  he  had 
but  a  few  days  to  stay,  he  could  not  devote  to 
those  of  Spain  that  attention  to  which  they 
were  entitled ;  and  that,  on  his  return  to  Paris, 
he  should  give  such  answers  as  the  king's  let- 
ters deserved.  He  insisted  anew  that  the 
treaty  of  Fontainebleau  should  remain  secret 
for  some  time  longer ;  and  as  for  M.  de  Beau- 
harnais,  taking  no  heed  of  his  advice  and 
opinions,  he  addressed  to  him  insignificant 
answers,  but  formal  on  one  point,  namely,  the 
prohibition  to  show  any  preference  for  the 
parties  into  which  the  court  of  Spain  was  di- 
vided, or  to  afford  any  cause  for  inferring  to 
which  side  the  French  cabinet  leaned. 

It  was  not  true,  however,  that,  wholly  en- 
grossed by  the  affairs  of  Italy,  Napoleon  could 
not  think  of  those  of  Spain.  He  had,  on  the 
contrary,  issued  fresh  military  orders,  tending 
to  increase  his  forces  by  degrees,  both  on  this  ! 
and  on  the  other  side  of  the  Pyrenees  ;  so  that,  \ 
whatever  course  he  should  adopt,  he  might  : 
have  but  one  resolution  to  express,  when  he  i 
should  have  decided  upon  it.  All  that  he  j 
learned  of  the  state  of  Spain  contributed  to  i 
persuade  him  that  the  moment  of  a  crisis  was 
at  hand;  for  it  seemed  no  longer  possible  to 
place  the  favourite  on  a  throne,  to  instil  pa- 
tience into  Ferdinand,  and  to  repress  the  indig- 
nation of  the  Spanish  people.  He  determined, 
therefore,  to  be  ready  to  avail  himself  of  an 
occasion,  and  to  this  end  to  have  considerable 
forces  in  the  Peninsula,  without  diminishing 
either  the  grand  army  or  the  army  of  Italy, 
both  which  served  to  keep  Europe  in  alliance 
with  him  or  in  subjection.  Besides  the  army 
of  General  Junot,  necessary  for  Portugal,  he 
had  prepared,  as  we  have  seen,  two  other 
corps,  that  of  General  Dupont  and  that  of 
Marshal  Moncey,  and  these  he  deemed  insuffi- 
cient. He  considered  that  those  two  corps, 
proceeding  along  the  road  to  Burgos  and  Val- 
ladolid,  upon  pretext  of  Portugal,  enabled  by 
a  movement  to  the  left  to  march  upon  Madrid, 
would  keep  in  awe  the  capital  and  the  two 
Castilles.  But  Navarre,  Aragon,  and  Cata- 
lonia, provinces  so  important  of  themselves, 
and  likewise  for  their  spirit,  their  position, 
and  the  fortresses  which  they  contained,  ought, 

VOL.  II.— 64 


he  conceived,  to  be  occupied,  if  not  by  forces 
to  be  marched  thither  immediately,  at  least  by 
forces  which  should  be  quite  ready  to  enter 
them.  He  resolved,  therefore,  to  have  two 
divisions  prepared ;  one  which,  placed  near  St.- 
Jean-Pied-de-Port,  might,  upon  any  pretext 
whatever,  fall  upon  Pampeluna ;  the  other, 
which,  assembled  at  Perpignan,  might,  in  like 
manner,  enter  Barcelona,  and  take  possession 
of  that  city  and  also  of  the  forts  which  com- 
mand it.  Master  of  Pampeluna  and  of  the 
forts  of  Barcelona,  Napoleon  would  have  twe 
solid  bases  for  the  armies  that  were  to  advance 
upon  Madrid.  At  any  rate,  though  the  crisis 
at  the  Escurial  seemed  imminent  to  him,  he 
determined  neither  to  hasten  it,  nor  to  assume 
too  ostensibly  the  part  of  invader,  by  march- 
ing troops  elsewhere  than  on  the  Burgos,  Val- 
ladolid,  and  Salamanca  road,  which  was  the 
road  to  Portugal.  The  probable  assemblage 
of  English  troops  on  the  coasts  of  the  Penin- 
sula could  not  fail  to  furnish  subsequently 
specious  motives  for  introducing  fresh  troops 
into  the  interior  of  Spain.  Meanwhile  it  was 
sufficient  for  him  to  keep  them  assembled  on 
the  frontier.  General  Junot's  army,  composed 
of  the  old  camps  in  Bretagne,  had  left  some 
depot  battalions,  of  which  might  be  formed  a 
division  of  three  or  four  thousand  men,  quite 
sufficient  to  occupy  Pampeluna  and  to  awe 
Navarre.  These  battalions,  five  in  number, 
belonged  to  the  15th,  47th,  70th,  and  86th  of 
the  line.  One  Swiss  battalion,  cantoned  in  the 
vicinity,  afforded  the  means  of  raising  them  to 
six.  Napoleon  gave  orders  for  their  immedi- 
ate assemblage  at  St.-Jean-Pied-de-Port,  under 
the  command  of  General  Mouton,  and  for  add- 
ing to  them  a  company  of  foot-artillery.  As 
for  the  Perpignan  division,  he  sought  the  ele- 
ments for  that  in  Italy  itself.  He  there  had 
Lombard  and  Neapolitan  regiments,  fit  to  be 
employed  in  the  climate  of  Spain,  but  needing 
to  be  instructed  in  war  by  the  French.  The 
return  of  the  auxiliary  troops  to  their  country 
admitted  of  the  immediate  disposal  of  part  of 
the  Italian  regiments  stationed  nearest  to 
France.  Napoleon,  therefore,  directed  four 
Italian  battalions,  three  resident  at  Turin, 
and  one  at  Genoa,  to  march  for  Avignon.  A 
fine  Neapolitan  regiment,  which  his  brother 
Joseph  had  already  sent  him  to  gain  experi- 
ence in  war,  was  near  Grenoble.  The  same 
order  was  sent  to  it  for  Avignon.  Four  Lom- 
bard and  Neapolitan  squadrons,  six  or  seven 
hundred  strong,  with  several  companies  of 
artillery,  were  directed  to  the  same  point. 
The  French  regiment,  which  had  left  the  fort- 
ress of  Braunau,  restored  to  the .  Austrians, 
was  crossing  the  Alps  to  return  to  Italy.  Its 
route  was  prescribed  with  a  view  to  its  being 
sent  to  the  south  of  France.  Lastly,  the  five 
regiments  of  chasseurs  and  the  four  regiments 
of  cuirassiers,  transferred  in  the  preceding 
winter  from  Italy  to  Poland,  had  their  depots 
in  Piedmont,  and  these  depots  well  supplied 
with  men  and  horses,  like  all  those  of  the 
army.  Napoleon  drafted  from  them  two  more 
fine  brigades  of  cavalry,  which  formed  a  divi  - 
sion  of  1200  horse  under  General  Bessieres. 
By  joining  to  these  troops  some  French  or 
Swiss  battalions  residing  in  Provence,  it  would 
be  possible  to  form  a  corps  of  from  ten  if 
twelve  thousand  men  for  Catalonia. 
2N2 


426 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Dec.  1807. 


These  dispositions  being  prescribed  to  the 
troops  which  were  not  yet  to  cross  the  Pyre- 
nees, Napoleon  gave  orders  for  a  new  move- 
ment to  those  which  had  already  passed  them. 
He  enjoined  General  Dupont,  whose  first  divi- 
sion had  arrived  as  far  as  Vittoria,  to  set  in 
motion  the  other  two,  so  as  to  have  all  three 
united  in  the  first  days  of  January,  with  the 
appearance  of  being  on  march  for  Salamanca 
and  Ciudad  Rodrigo,  that  is  to  say  for  Lisbon, 
but  with  the  precaution  to  observe  the  bridge 
over  the  Douro  on  the  Madrid  road,  and  to  be 
ready  to  occupy  it  on  the  first  occasion.  He 
ordered  Marshal  Moncey,  with  the  corps  of  the 
Coasts  of  the  Ocean,  to  occupy  the  positions 
left  vacant  by  General  Dupont,  and  to  march 
one  of  his  divisions  towards  Vittoria.  These 
movements  could  not  much  increase  the  jea- 
lousy of  the  court  of  Spain,  because  they  would 
take  place  or  the  route  for  Lisbon.  To  render 
them  still  tiore  natural,  Napoleon  instructed 
M.  de  Beauharnais  to  communicate  to  the  Spa- 
nish ministry  the  most  alarming  intelligence 
of  an  assemblage  of  English  forces  at  Gibral- 
tar— an  assemblage  real  enough,  by  the  by, 
and  no  fiction;  for  he  had  just  learned  that 
the  British  government  had  caused  Sicily  to  be 
almost  entirely  evacuated,  and  that  it  was  pre- 
paring to  send  the  troops  which  had  returned 
from  Copenhagen  to  Portugal.  He  warmly 
urged  the  Spanish  cabinet  to  provide  for  the 
safety  of  Ceuta,  Cadiz,  the  camp  of  St.  Roch, 
the  Balearic  Islands ;  and,  while  giving  it  use- 
ful intelligence,  he  threw  an  air  of  greater  pro- 
bability over  the  pretexts  alleged  for  the  intro- 
duction of  fresh  French  troops  into  Spain. 

Napoleon  had  made  haste  to  despatch  the 
affairs  of  Italy,  that  he  might  return  to  Paris, 
whore  he  could  attend  so  much  more  closely  to 
the  object  that  incessantly  engaged  his  thoughts. 
There  was,  nevertheless,  one  question  which  he 
would  have  been  more  capable  of  resolving  at 
Paris  than  at  Milan,  because  he  would  there 
have  had  around  him  superior  intelligence, 
and  for  which,  nevertheless,  he  would  not  de- 
fer his  decision  for  a  single  day.  That  ques- 
tion related  to  the  recent  orders  in  council 
issued  by  the  British  government  respecting 
the  navigation  of  neutrals.  By  these  ordi- 
nances, England  was  about  to  plunge  deeper 
than  ever  into  the  system  of  violence  ;  and  Na- 
poleon, as  it  may  easily  be  conceived,  was  de- 
termined not  to  be  left  behind.  To  a  hard 
blow  he  made  a  point  of  replying  immediately 
by  one  still  harder.  The  reader  is  acquainted 
with  the  steps  which  had  been  previously 
taken  in  this  fatal  track.  To  the  pretension 
of  seizing  enemy's  property  even  under  a  neu- 
tral flag,  and  of  applying  the  right  of  blockade 
to  vast  extents  of  coast,  which  it  was  physically 
impossible  to  blockade,  Napoleon  had  at  first 
replied  by  the  prohibition  of  English  commerce 
on  all  the  coasts  of  the  Empire  and  of  the 
countries  under  his  influence ;  then,  his  irrita- 
tion increasing  in  proportion  to  the  violence  of 
the  Admiralty,  he  had,  by  the  famous  Berlin 
decree,  declared  the  British  islands  in  a  state 
of  blockade,  forbidden  the  traffic  in  English 
goods  in  all  countries  under  his  sway,  ordered 
*heir  seizure  and  confiscation  everywhere,  and 
given  notice  that  every  ship  which  should  have 
touched  at  any  place  in  the  three  kingdoms,  or 
at  any  of  the  English  colonies,  should  be  ex- 


cluded from  the  ports  belonging  to  France,  or 
dependent  on  her  will.  Various  supplementary 
decrees  had  imposed  upon  vessels  laden  with 
colonial  commodities  the  obligation  to  provide 
themselves  with  certificates  of  origin  delivered 
by  French  agents.  In  default  of  these  certifi- 
cates all  goods  were  liable  to  confiscation.  The 
alliance  concluded  with  Russia  and  with  Den- 
mark, the  adhesion  promised  by  Austria,  the 
insured  adhesion  of  the  two  governments  of 
the  Peninsula,  were  about  to  extend  these 
formidable  dispositions  to  the  entire  Continent. 
England  had  at  length  perceived  that  the 
system  of  interdiction,  carried  to  extremity, 
was  more  prejudicial  to  her  than  to  France, 
for  she  had  more  need  to  sell  than  the  Conti- 
nent to  buy,  that  the  colonial  productions,  the 
almost  general  monopoly  of  which  she  had  se- 
cured, for  her  ships  detained,  under  various 
pretexts,  even  the  vessels  of  the  United  States 
themselves,  remained  unsold  in  the  warehouses ; 
that  she  should  suffer,  in  point  of  importation 
as  much  as  in  point  of  exportation,  for  she 
would  not  be  able  to  obtain  certain  raw  mate- 
rials which  were  indispensable  for  her,  such  as 
the  wools  of  Spain  and  the  naval  stores  of  the 
North ;  that,  in  this  state  of  trade,  France 
would  have  much  less  reason  to  complain,  for 
she  would  furnish  the  Continent  with  the  stuffs 
which  the  English  manufactures  would  cease 
to  supply ;  that,  as  for  colonial  produce,  there 
would  reach  her,  either  by  privateers  or  by 
vessels  escaping  the  cruisers,  a  certain  quan- 
tity, for  which  she  would  be  obliged  to  pay  a 
high  price,  but  which  would  suffice  for  her 
wants ;  and  that,  after  all,  the  dearness  of 
sugar  and  coffee  would  not  be  productive  of 
such  great  inconveniences  to  France  as  the 
suppression  of  all  exchanges  would  entail  on 
England.  The  British  cabinet  had,  therefore, 
relinquished  its  system  of  exclusion,  and  de- 
vised means  for  facilitating  general  commerce, 
but,  by  obliging  it  to  pass  wholly  through 
Great  Britain,  and  making  it  moreover  her 
tributary.  In  consequence,  it  had  decided  by 
three  orders  in  council,  dated  the  llth  of  No- 
vember, 1807,  that  every  vessel  belonging  to  a 
nation  not  at  declared  war  with  Great  Britain, 
though  more  or  less  dependent  on  France, 
might  freely  enter  the  ports  of  the  United 
Kingdom  or  its  colonies,  then  go  whithersoever 
it  pleased,  provided  that  it  had  touched  in 
England  either  to  carry  thither  or  to  receive 
goods,  and  had  there  paid  duties  of  customs 
equivalent  on  an  average  to  25  per  cent.  Every 
vessel,  on  the  contrary,  which  should  not  have 
touched  in  the  ports  of  Great  Britain  and  have 
among  her  papers  certificates  of  origin  deli- 
vered by  French  agents,  was  to  be  seized  and 
declared  lawful  prize.  Accordingly  merchant- 
men, in  -as  far  at  least  as  violent  laws  can  be 
carried  into  execution  over  the  immense  ex- 
tent of  the  seas,  were  compelled  to  touch  in 
England  to  pay  the  customs,  or  to  go  thither  to 
supply  themselves  with  English  commodities 
and  merchandise.  All  commerce,  therefore, 
was  to  be  carried  on  through  the  English  ports ; 
all  merchandise  was  to  come  from  them  or  to 
pay  duty  there.  Thanks  to  these  regulations, 
the  English  had  a  sure  means  of  sending  ua 
their  colonial  productions  which  did  not  carry 
with  them,  like  cotton  stuffs,  for  instance,  the 
proof  of  their  origin.  They  called,  in  fact, 


Deo. -807.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


427 


neutral  vessels  into  the  Thames,  loaded  them 
with  sugar  and  coffee,  then  convoyed  them  to 
•within  sight  of  our  coast,  in  order  to  spare 
their  being  searched,  and  thus  introduced  them 
into  our  ports  or  those  of  Holland,  furnished 
with  false  papers,  which  enabled  them  to  pass 
for  neutrals  coming  direct  from  America. 

Napoleon,  on  receiving  at  Milan,  where  he 
then  was,  the  orders  of  the  llth  of  November, 
wrote  first  to  Paris,  to  the  minister  of  the 
finances  and  the  director  of  the  customs,  re- 
quiring a  report  on  these  orders.  But,  not  hav- 
ing patience  to  wait  for  their  answers,  he  issued 
on  the  17th  of  December  a  decree,  known  by 
the  appellation  of  the  Milan  decree,  still  more 
severe  than  the  preceding.  In  the  Berlin  de- 
cree, he  had  done  no  more  than  exclude  from 
the  ports  of  the  Empire  every  vessel  which 
should  have  touched  in  England  :  this  time  he 
went  much  further,  and  declared  every  vessel 
which  should  have  touched  in  England  or  in 
her  colonies,  and  submitted  to  an  obligation  to 
pay  a  duty  there,  denationalized,  therefore  law- 
ful prize.  By  further  regulations,  he  fixed 
heavy  penalties  for  captains  and  seamen  who 
should  make  false  declarations.  While  Napo- 
leon was  issuing  this  decree,  Messrs.  Gaudin, 
Cretet,  Defermon,  and  Collin  de  Sussy,  in  an- 
swer to  his  questions,  proposed  a  measure  tend- 
ing to  nearly  the  same  end,  but  still  more  se- 
vere :  it  was  to  forbid  all  commercial  inter- 
course with  the  French  Empire  to  such  nations 
as  should  not  themselves  have  ceased  all  com- 
merce with  England.  The  Milan  decree,  such 
as  it  was,  served  to  cut  off  more  strictly  than 
ever  the  communications  which  England  had 
purposed  to  re-open  for  her  advantage.  But 
this  advantage  was  purchased  at  the  expense 
of  a  redoubled  violence,  which  was  soon  des- 
tined to  weary  France  and  her  allies  as  much 
as  England  herself. 

Excepting  this  short  diversion,  Napoleon  be- 
stowed all  the  time  that  he  had  left  to  the  ad- 
ministration of  the  kingdom  of  Italy. 

The  three  colleges  of  the  Possidenti,  Com- 
mercianti,  and  Dotti,  met,  agreeably  to  the 
convocation  which  they  had  received,  at  Milan, 
towards  the  end  of  December,  to  listen  to  the 
communication  of  several  essential  acts.  By 
the  first  of  these  acts,  Napoleon  officially 
adopted  Prince  Eugene  Beauharnais  as  his  son. 
By  the  second,  he  fixed  the  consequence  of  this 
adoption,  by  insuring  to  Prince  Eugene  the 
succession  to  the  crown  of  Italy  and  by  restrict- 
ing his  right  of  inheritance  to  that  crown  alone, 
which  precluded  the  possibility  of  his  succeed- 
ing some  day  to  that  of  France.  After  he  had 
established  his  brothers  and  his  sisters,  it  was 
natural  that  he  should  satisfy  perhaps  the 
warmest  of  his  affections,  that  excited  in  him 
by  the  children  of  the  Empress  Josephine,  and 
particularly  Eugene  de  Beauharnais,  who  had 
served  him  with  modesty,  prudence,  and  zeal 
in  Italy.  This  prince  was  highly  esteemed  by 
the  Italians,  who  had  never  lived  under  so  mild 
and  so  enlightened  a  government,  and  who  for 
two  years  past  had  been  resting  in  the  quiet  of 
peace  from  the  horrors  of  war. 

The  crown  of  Italy  continuing  for  the  pre- 
sent united  to  that  of  France,  and  Eugene  de 
Beauharnais  being  still  only  heir  presumptive 
to  it,  with  the  title  of  viceroy,  Napoleon  re- 
solved that  he  should  be  called  Prince  of  Ve- 


nice, and  that  this  should  thenceforward  be  the 
title  borne  by  every  heir  presumptive  to  the 
crown  of  Italy.  He  created  the  title  of  Prin- 
cess of  Bologna  for  the  infant  daughter  re- 
cently produced  by  his  marriage  with  the  Prin- 
cess Augusta  of  Bavaria.  Lastly,  desirous  of 
bestowing  a  new  mark  of  favour  on  the  Duke 
de  Melzi,  formerly  vice-president  of  the  Italian 
republic,  he  created  him  Duke  of  Lodi,  a  title 
borrowed  from  one  of  the  splendid  achieve- 
ments of  our  early  campaigns.  He  then  turned 
his  attention  towards  modifying  in  some  points 
the  constitution  of  Italy — a  constitution  of  little 
importance  in  itself,  the  will  of  Napoleon  doing 
every  thing  in  Italy,  a  circumstance  not  to  be 
regretted  for  the  moment,  for,  with  the  excep- 
tion of  the  exigences  arising  from  the  general 
war,  that  will  neither  purposed  nor  accom- 
plished any  thing  but  what  was  beneficial  ther-' 
The  college  of  the  Possidenti,  the  wealthiest 
of  the  three,  voted  the  erection  at  its  expense 
of  a  monument  to  perpetuate  the  memory  of 
the  benefits  with  which  Napoleon  had  loaded 
Italy. 

These  operations  finished,  Napoleon  set  out 
for  Piedmont,  inspected  the  great  fortress  of 
Alexandria,  complimented  on  the  spot  itself 
General  Chasseloup,  intrusted  with  the  con- 
struction of  that  fortress,  then  proceeded  to 
Turin,  where  he  granted  further  advantages  to 
those  provinces  which  had  become  French, 
With  a  view  to  connect  Liguria  with  Piedmont, 
he  decreed  a  canal,  which,  discharging  itself 
into  the  sea  at  Savona,  and  crossing  the  Apen- 
nines in  their  lowest  part  to  reach  the  Bormida 
at  Carcara,  was  intended  to  join  the  Po  and  the 
Mediterranean.  He  gave  orders  for  the  im- 
provement of  the  navigation  from  Alexandria 
to  the  Po,  so  that  it  should  be  rendered  passa- 
ble for  craft  in  all  seasons.  He  caused  some 
points  on  the  high  road  from  Alexandria  to 
Savona  to  be  rectified,  and  determined  that  it 
should  be  put  into  communication  with  the 
Turin  road  by  a  branch  from  Carcara  to  Ceva. 
He  decided  upon  the  opening  of  the  high  road 
of  MontGenevre,  through  Brian9on,  Fenestrelle, 
and  Pignerol,  which,  joined  to  that  of  MontCe- 
nis,  was  to  complete  the  communications  of 
France  with  Piedmont  by  the  Cottian  Alps. 
He  decreed  also  the  construction  of  several 
bridges :  one,  of  stone,  over  the  Po  at  Turin ; 
another,  of  stone,  over  the  Doira ;  one,  of  wood, 
over  the  Sesia,  at  Verceil ;  one,  of  wood,  over 
the  Bormida,  between  Alexandria  and  Tortona  ; 
lastly,  three,  of  less  importance,  likewise  of 
wood,  over  three  streams  that  run  between  Tu- 
rin and  Verceil.  He  took  care  at  the  same 
time  to  insure  financial  means  sufficient  for 
these  extensive  works ;  for  he  was  not  one  of 
those  who  give  orders  for  new  creations,  with- 
out considering  how  the  consequent  expenses 
are  to  be  defrayed.  A  balance  owing  by  the 
purchasers  of  national  domains,  the  produce 
of  the  mortgaged  domains,  an  advance  raised 
upon  the  salt  monopoly,  were  to  provide  for 
these  useful  expenses. 

Napoleon  left  Turin,  accompanied  by  the  ac- 
clamations of  the  grateful  population,  and  ar- 
rived at  Paris  on  the  1st  of  January,  1808,  late 
in  the  day,  but  in  time  to  receive  the  homage 
of  the  court,  the  public  authorities,  and  tie 
Parisians.  His  return  to  the  capital  of  the 
Empire  was  to  be  the  signal  for  the  most  im- 


428 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Jan.  1808. 


portent  determinations  of  his  reign.      It  be 
hoved  him,  in  fact,  to  adopt  some  resolution  in 
regard  to  Spain,  for  he  could  no  longer  defe 
answering  Charles  IV.     He  was  obliged  also  t 
decide  respecting  the  court  of  Rome,  the  rela 
tions  with  which  became  every  day  more  diffi 
cult.     Napoleon  was  thus  about  to  run  agains 
the  two  oldest,  the  two  most  formidable  vestige 
of  the  ancient  system,  the  Bourbons  of  Spain 
and  the  Papacy. 

Swayed  incessantly,  ever  since  the  Continen 
was  pacified,  by  the  systematic  idea  of  placing 
Bonapartes  on  all  thrones  instead  of  Bourbons 
drawn  towards  this  object  by  family  feeling  am 
also  by  his  reforming  genius,  which  was  avers, 
to  leaving  at  his  side  degenerate  royalties 
either  useless  or  prejudicial  to  the  common 
cause,  Napoleon,  as  we  have  seen,  was  agitatec 
by  the  most  diverse  ideas  in  regard  to  Spain 
Three  courses  presented  themselves  to  his  mind 
the  first,  to  attach  Spain  to  himself  by  the  mar 
riage  of  a  French  princess  with  the  Prince  of 
the  Asturias,  and  by  the  overthrow  of  the  fa- 
vourite, without  requiring  of  the  Spaniards  anj 
thing  that  could  wound  their  pride  or  their  am 
bition ;  secondly,  to  grant  all  that  we  have  jus 
mentioned,  marriage,  overthrow  of  the  favour 
ite,  but  to  make  Spain  pay  for  it  by  sacrifices 
of  territory,  which  should  secure  to  us  the 
banks  of  the  Ebro,  the  coasts  of  Catalonia,  anc 
the  joint  possession  of  the  Spanish  colonies; 
thirdly  and  lastly,  to  resort  to  extreme  means, 
that  is  to  say,  to  dethrone  the  Bourbons,  to  im- 
pose a  new  dynasty  upon  the  Spaniards,  with- 
out demanding  of  them  any  sacrifice  of  terri- 
tory, any  commercial  advantage,  and  content- 
ing himself  with  having,  as  the  sole  result, 
closely  bound  the  destinies  of  Spain  to  those 
of  France. 

Of  these  three  courses  not  one  was  good,  (we 
shall  presently  explain  why,)  but  they  were  far 
from  being  equally  bad. 

To  grant  Ferdinand  a  French  princess,  to 
add  to  this  boon  the  overthrow  of  the  favour- 
ite, without  requiring  any  sacrifice  for  this 
double  satisfaction,  would  have  transported  the 
Spanish  nation  with  joy,  would  have  gained 
him  for  some  time  an  absolute  devotedness  on 
its  part,  and  would  have  secured  him  its  ener- 
getic support  against  any  minister  who  had  not 
kept  steadily  in  the  track  of  French  policy. 
But  gratitude  in  nations,  as  in  individuals,  is 
of  brief  duration :  Spanish  jealousy  would  soon 
have  roused  again,  when  the  memory  of  Napo- 
leon's benefits  was  effaced,  and  Ferdinand,  who 
had  all  the  defects  of  the  Spanish  character, 
without  any  of  its  good  qualities,  would  have 
become  in  a  short  time  as  inimical  to  France  as 
Emmanuel  Godoy.  His  incapacity,  his  indo- 
lence, would  have  rendered  the  counsels  of  Na- 
poleon as  annoying  to  him,  as  they  were  at  this 
moment  to  the  favourite;  after  a  few  days' 
warm  gratitude,  things  would  have  resumed 
their  old  course ;  ignorance,  carelessness,  aver- 
sion to  all  improvement,  jealousy  of  foreign 
superiority,  would  have  been,  as  in  times  past, 
*he  character  of  the  Spanish  government  in  a 
new  reign.  A  French  princess,  it  is  true,  would 
have  been  placed  near  the  throne,  to  repeat 
there  the  good  advice  proceeding  from  Paris ; 
but  it  would  have  required  a  very  rare  superi- 
ority to  withstand  such  contrary  tendencies, 
and  this  very  superiority  would  perhaps  have 


rendered  her  odious.  The  past  was  not  cheer- 
ing for  a  French  princess,  bringing  noble  and 
attractive  qualities  into  Spain.  Besides,  one 
cannot  create  at  pleasure  princesses  enriched 
with  all  the  gifts  of  Nature,  and  those  whom 
Napoleon  had  then  at  his  disposal  gave  no  in- 
dications of  the  brilliant  faculties,  which  the 
situation  would  have  rendered  as  necessary  for 
their  part  as  dangerous  for  themselves. 

The  second  plan,  that  of  requiring,  in  consi- 
deration of  the  marriage,  of  the  overthrow  of 
the  favourite,  and  of  the  cession  of  Portugal, 
large  sacrifices,  such  as  the  surrender  of  the 
provinces  of  the  Ebro,  and  the  opening  of  the 
Spanish  colonies  to  the  French,  was  merely  the 
first. plan  greatly  aggravated.     The  provinces 
of  the  Ebro  offered  an  advantage  more  appa- 
rent than  real :  for  those  provinces,  on  account 
of  their  vicinity,  disliked  the  French  more  than 
any.     They  would  not,  even  in  time,  have  con- 
tracted a  fondness  for  the   French,  any  more 
than  the  Milanese  have  contracted  a  fondness 
for  Austria.     The  Pyrenees  would  always  have 
reminded  them  that  they  were  Spanish  and  not 
French ;  and,  so  far  from  giving  us  a  soldier  or 
a  piastre,  it  would  have  cost  us  a  great  many 
men  and  a  great  deal  of  money  to  keep  them. 
The  alleged  sway  which  they  would  have  se- 
cured to  us  over  Spain,  would  be,  under  Napo- 
leon at  least,  quite   illusory.     To  start   from 
Pampeluna  or  Saragossa,  instead  of  Bayonne, 
for  the  purpose  of  marching  to  Madrid,  was 
not  so  great  a  difference  as  to  induce  a  belief 
that  Spain  would  thus  pass,  in  regard  to  us, 
from  a  state  of  independence  to  a  state  of  sub- 
mission ;  on  the  contrary,  we  should  have  ex- 
asperated the  Spaniards  by  this  dismemberment 
of  their  territory;  we  should  have  so  embit- 
tered their  joy  at  seeing  Ferdinand  married  to 
a  French  princess  and  the  favourite  overthrown, 
that   we   should   have   caused   ingratitude   to 
spring  up  on  the  very  first  day.     Lisbon  itself 
would  have  had  no  charms  in  their  eyes,  had 
they  been  obliged  to  give  Saragossa  and  Bar- 
celona for  it.     As  for  the  opening  of  the  Span- 
ish colonies  to  the  French,  this  was  a  serious 
advantage,  sufficiently  serious  to  be  desired, 
jut  easy  to  be  obtained  without  exciting  re- 
sentment, had  it  been  the  only  price  exacted 
'or  Portugal,  the  marriage,  and  the  overthrow 
of  the  favourite.     The  second  plan,  therefore, 
lad  not  the  merit  of  attaching  Spain  to  us  for 
a  single  day;  and  for  the  sake  of  some  territo- 
rial cessions  which  it  would  be  impossible  to 
•etain,  it  would  expose  us  to   the  everlasting 
latred  of  the  Spaniards. 

The  third  course,  towards  which  Napoleon 
.ppeared  to  be  urged  in  an  irresistible  manner, 
consisted  in  dethroning  the  Bourbons,  in  the 
lefinitive. approximation  of  France  and  Spain 
)y  the  establishment  of  one  and  the  same  dy- 
nasty in  both  countries,  in  regenerating  the 
atter,  in  order  to  render  it  useful  either  to 
tself  or  to  the  common  cause,  in  taking  nothing 
rom  it ;  on  the  contrary,  in  giving  to  it  every 
hing,  Portugal,  the  overthrow  of  the  favour- 
te,  internal  reforms,  in  renewing,  in  short,  the 
jolicy  of  Louis  XIV.,  which  involved  nothing 
oo  great  for  a  man  who  had  surpassed  all  known 
reatness.  Not  only  had  this  policy  of  Louis 
V.  nothing  too  great  for  Napoleon,  but  it 
as,  it  must  be  acknowledged,  the  natural  po- 
cy  of  France.  To  unite  in  one  and  the  same 


van.  1808.  J 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


429 


spirit,  in  one  and  the  same  interest,  the  whole 
of  the  West,  that  is  to  say,  France  and  the  two 
peninsulas,  Italian  and  Spanish,  to  oppose  their 
continental  power  to  the  coalition  of  the  courts 
of  the  North,  their  maritime  power  to  the  pre- 
tensions of  England,  was  assuredly  the  true, 
the  legitimate  ambition,  which  one  could  have 
wished  for  Napoleon,  that  which  would  have 
been  justified  by  the  rules  of  sound  policy,  had 
it  not  suG/ieded.  But  the  punishment  of  the 
prodigal  who  has  incurred  foolish  expenses  con- 
sists m  being  no  longer  able  to  defray  necessary 
expenses.  Napoleon,  for  having  undertaken  in 
the  North  an  immense,  an  exorbitant  task,  out 
of  the  real  interests  of  France,  such  as  to  con- 
stitute a  French  Germany,  to  the  great  dis- 
pleasure of  the  German  populations,  to  under- 
take the  restoration  of  Poland  in  spite  of  Austria 
and  Prussia,  was  about  to  feel  the  want  of  those 
forces,  which  the  execution  of  the  most  pro- 
foundly political  designs  would  have  required. 
He  was,  in  fact,  obliged  at  that  very  moment 
10  keep  three  hundred  thousand  men  between 
;he  Oder  and  the  Vistula,  to  insure  the  submis- 
aon  of  Germany  and  the  alliance  of  Russia,  one 
randred  and  twenty  thousand  men  in  Italy,  to 
leter  Austria  from  all  idea  of  recrossing  the 
Ups.  If  he  required  one  or  two  hundred  thou- 
sand more  men  to  coerce  Spain,  to  prevent  the 
entrance  of  the  English,  who  were  likely  to  find 
a  convenient  and  firm  footing  there,  for  they 
had  merely  the  Bay  of  Biscay  to  cross  in  order 
lo  reach  that  country — if  he  must  keep  these 
liiferent  armies  in  Germany,  in  Italy,  in  Spain, 
it  would  be  a  mass  of  eight  or  nine  hundred 
thousand  men  that  became  necessary,  and  there 
must  thence  result  an  extension  of  cares,  of 
efforts,  of  command,  to  which  in  the  end,  France 
and  even  his  genius  would  prove  inadequate. 

What  was  then  passing  afforded  already  a 
striking  proof  of  this,  since,  in  order  to  procure 
troops  without  weakening  the  grand  army,  with- 
out stripping  Germany  and  Italy,  Napoleon  was 
obliged  to  set  his  wits  to  work  in  a  thousand 
ways,  and  had  not  hitherto  contrived  to  find 
any  thing  but  conscripts,  commanded  by  officers 
picked  up  in  the  depots  or  dragged  from  retire- 
ment. It  was  a  first  and  strong  indication  of 
the  situation  which  Napoleon  had  created  by  the 
immoderate  multiplication  of  his  enterprises. 
Another  circumstance  served  greatly  to  aggra- 
vate this  insufficiency  of  resources.  The  sub- 
mission of  the  court  of  Spain,  though  mingled 
with  many  secret  perfidies,  though  rendered 
barren  by  the  incapacity  of  the  Spanish  admi- 
nistration, had  all  the  appearance  of  the  most 
absolute  devotedness.  Napoleon  had,  therefore, 
no  specious  grievance  to  allege  against  the  court 
of  the  Escurial ;  and  the  dictatorial  act  of  de- 
throning Charles  IV.  for  reasons  highly  politic, 
it  is  true,  but  contrary  to  simple  equity,  difficult 
to  make  the  multitude  comprehend,  and  need- 
ing, besides,  definitive  success  to  be  admitted, 
was  liable  to  excite  insurrection  in  a  proud, 
jealous  nation,  filled  with  ardent  hatred  against 
foreigners.  One  ran  the  risk,  therefore,  of  re- 
volting its  moral  feeling,  and,  to  repress  it, 
•there  would  have  needed  forces  very  different 
from  those  which  Napoleon  was  then  able  to 
collect.  It  was  not  young  conscripts,  brave  no 
doubt,  but  not  imposing  in  appearance,  that 
would  have  been  wanted :  it  was  veteran  sol- 
diers, capable  of  striking  terror  by  their  num- 


ber and  their  aspect,  and  who,  seizing  unawares 
on  all  points  at  once  of  the  affrighted  Penin- 
sula, would  prevent  any  outbreak  of  the  public 
feeling,  overawe  the  half-savage  populace  of 
Spain,  lastly,  afford  the  middle  classes  wishing 
for  a  new  order  of  things,  inclined  to  hope  for 
it  from  France,  time  to  confirm  themselves  in 
their  sentiments  and  to  diffuse  them  around, 
them.  On  these  conditions,  the  extraordinary 
act  to  which  Napoleon  was  reduced  would  have 
had  a  chance  of  succeeding;  and,  the  first 
movement  of  revolt  being  thus  prevented,  the 
Spanish  nation  would  have  learned  by  degrees 
to  acknowledge  the  benefits  which  France  was 
bringing  it.  But,  attempted  with  inferior  re- 
sources, the  plan  of  which  Napoleon  cherished 
the  idea  was  liable  to  prove  the  commencement 
of  a  series  of  disasters. 

There  was  one  more  condition  necessary  for 
the  success  of  this  enterprise,  that  was  to  keep 
up  in  all  its  intimacy  the  new  alliance  which 
Napoleon  had  concluded  at  Tilsit;  for,  if  he 
were  forced  to  recommence  either  the  campaign 
of  Austerlitz  or  that  of  Friedland  while  engaged 
in  Spain,  besides  the  difficulty  of  conqueriLg  at 
these  two  extremities  of  the  European  world, 
it  would  be  imposing  not  only  a  double  task 
upon  himself,  but  rendering  the  second  a  hun- 
dred times  more  difficult ;  for  the  Spaniards 
must  receive  extreme  encouragement  from  any 
war  that  might  break  out  in  the  North.  He 
would  then  be  obliged,  whatever  condescendence 
he  might  show  for  the  ambition  of  Alexander, 
to  take  his  own  course,  and  to  prevent  the  in- 
convenience of  the  dispersion  of  the  French 
forces,  by  purchasing  at  any  price  the  concur- 
rence of  the  great  empire  of  the  North ;  to  pay, 
in  short,  with  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  for  the 
possibility  of  dethroning  the  Bourbons  of  Spain 
with  impunity. 

Lastly,  when  all  these  conditions  were  at- 
tained there  would  still  be  a  serious  danger, 
serious  both  for  Spain  and  France — the  possi- 
ble, nay,  probable  loss  of  the  rich  Spanish 
colonies.  These  colonies,  in  fact,  had  been 
already  secretly  worked  up  by  the  spirit  of 
revolt.  The  example  of  the  United  States  had 
strongly  developed  in  them  the  disposition  for 
independence,  and  the  shameful  neglect  of  the 
mother-country,  which  left  them  without  de- 
fence, disposed  them  to  it  still  more.  There 
was  reason,  therefore,  to  apprehend  that  a  new 
dynasty,  and  that  imposed  upon  the  nation, 
would  furnish  the  colonies  with  the  pretext 
which  they  were  seeking,  to  rise,  and  that  the 
English  protection  would  furnish  them  more- 
over with  the  means  of  doing  so.  In  this  case, 
but  too  easy  to  be  foreseen,  Spain,  while  wait- 
ing till  she  had  opened  for  herself  other  sources 
of  prosperity,  would  be  ruined,  and  France 
would  have  done  nothing  more  than  enrich 
English  commerce  with  all  the  advantages 
which  the  traffic  of  the  vast  Spanish  colonies 
must  afford  it. 

Such  were  the  three  plans  between  which 
Napoleon  had  to  choose.  They  presented,  each 
of  them,  their  inconveniences  ;  for  the  first, 
which  would  have  fulfilled  all  the  wishes  of  the 
Spaniards  at  once,  by  ridding  them  of  the  fa- 
vourite, by  assuring  them  of  the  protection  of 
Napoleon  through  a  French  marriage,  by  giv- 
ing them  Lisbon  without  territorial  compensa- 
tion, would  perhaps  have  been  but  a  cheat 


430 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Jan.  1808. 


The  second,  which  would  have  required  all 
these  advantages  to  be  paid  for  by  a  cruel  sa- 
crifice of  territory,  would  have  revolted  them. 
The  third  and  last,  which  solved  the  question 
in  a  decisive  manner,  which  definitively  esta- 
blished friendship  between  France  and  Spain, 
which  regenerated  the  latter,  without  demand- 
ing any  other  sacrifice  from  her  than  that  of  a 
debased  dynasty,  might,  nevertheless,  provoke 
the  nation  to  insurrection,  and  would  then  re- 
quire such  a  disposable  force  as  Napoleon  had 
not  reserved  for  himself,  and,  as  a  last  incon- 
venience, would  bring  the  Spanish  colonies  into 
great  danger. 

Every  thing  considered,  Napoleon  could  not 
have  done  better  than  to  adopt  the  first  plan ; 
that  is  to  say,  to  deliver  Spain  from  the  favour- 
ite, to  grant  her  the  hand  of  a  French  princess, 
to  cede  Portugal  to  her,  without  requiring  the 
provinces  of  the  Ebro  in  return,  which  would 
have  raised  the  popular  joy  to  intoxication, 
and  to  demand  at  most  the  opening  of  the  colo- 
nies, perhaps  the  cession  of  the  Balearic  Islands 
or  of  the  Philippines,  from  which  Spain  derived 
no  benefit ;  serious  and  the  only  desirable  ad- 
vantages, which  she  would  have  relinquished 
to  us  without  regret,  and  without  any  change 
whatever  in  her  sentiments  towards  us.  Her 
gratitude  might  not  have  been  of  long  dura- 
tion, but  it  might  have  lasted  long  enough  for 
bringing  the  maritime  war  to  a  conclusion,  for 
obtaining,  during  the  latter  period  of  that 
war,  the  sincere  concurrence  of  the  Spaniards 
against  the  English,  for  acquiring,  even  in  their 
own  estimation,  the  right  to  demand  it,  and,  if  not 
obtained,  the  right  to  punish  their  ingratitude. 

But  this  plan,  the  only  prudent  one,  because  it 
was  the  only  one  which  added  no  new  enterprises 
to  those  with  which  the  Empire  was  already 
overburdened,  won  no  approbation,  either  from 
Napoleon,  with  whose  secret  desires  it  dis- 
agreed, or  from  M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  had  not 
the  courage  to  support  it,  though  he  began 
from  that  time  to  be  alarmed  at  the  conse- 
quences that  might  arise  from  the  policy  which 
he  had  complaisantly  flattered.  He  had  been 
seen,  with  a  view  to  regain  the  imperial  favour, 
obsequiously  entering  into  all  Napoleon's  ideas, 
making  himself  his  secret  confidant,  his  patient 
interlocutor ;  and  now,  prudence  counterba- 
lancing in  him  the  desire  to  please,  he  hesi- 
tated and  sought  in  the  second  scheme  a  mid- 
dle term,  in  which  the  courtier  and  the  states- 
man concurred.  He  seemed  to  think  that  they 
ought  not  to  enter  too  deeply  into  the  affairs  of 
the  Peninsula  ;  that  it  would  be  well  to  get  all 
they  could  from  Spain,  then  leave  her  to  her- 
self, and,  for  this  purpose,  without  pretending 
to  the  honour  of  regenerating  her,  give  her  a 
French  princess  since  she  desired  one,  rid  her 
of  the  favourite  since  she  was  tired  of  him,  and 
lastly  give  her  the  reserved  portion  of  Portu- 
gal, too  distant  from  France  to  be  kept  by  us, 
but  make  her  pay  for  it  with  Aragon,  Catalo- 

i  This  may  serve  to  explain  how  it  happens  that  M.  de 
Talleyrand,  after  flattering  more  than  any  other  the  diepo- 
Mtiou  of  Napoleon  to  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Spain, 
could  since  maintain  that  he  had  dissented  from  what 
was  done  at  this  period.  He  had  alone  encouraged  Napo- 
leon to  change  the  Mate  of  things  in  the  Peninsula,  which 
rendered  the  dethronement  of  the  Bourbons  almost  in- 
«  ritable.  This  fact  is  proved  by  authentic  documents ;  but, 
In  truth,  the  despatches  in  which-M.  de  Talleyrand  gives 
on  account  of  his  negotiations  with  M.  Yzquierdo  prove 
that  lie  preferred  a  marriage  with  Ferdinand  and  the  ae- 


nia,  the  Balearic  Islands,  the  opening  of  the 
Spanish  colonies,  and,  having  thus  obtained 
compensation  for  what  we  should  have  given, 
let  her  alone,  but  watch  her  from  the  top  of 
the  walls  of  Barcelona,  Saragossa,  and  Pam- 
peluna.1  Such  was  the  way  in  which  M.  de 
Talleyrand  strove  to  bring  back  Napoleon  from 
the  fatal  track  into  which  he  had  urged  him. 

But  the  latter,  who  judged  soundly  of  this 
plan,  because  he  disliked  it,  perceived  as  much 
danger  in  defying  as  in  adopting  the  last ;  be- 
cause it  was  as  difficult  in  his  estimation  to 
take  Saragossa,  Barcelona,  and  Pampeluna 
from  the  Spaniards  as  to  take  from  them  a 
degraded  dynasty.  He  therefore  always  turned 
away  from  it,  and  reverted  irresistibly  to  the 
idea  of  expelling  the  Bourbons  from  the  last 
throne  that  was  left  them  in  Europe,  and  said 
to  himself  that  he  must  take  advantage  of  the 
moment  when  he  was  all-powerful  on  the  Con- 
tinent, when  England  had  just  authorized  every 
thing  by  her  conduct  at  Copenhagen,  when  he 
was  young,  victorious,  obeyed,  served  by  For- 
tune, to  complete  his  system  by  a  signal  blow 
struck  at  the  Spanish  dynasty,  after  which  he, 
the  army,  France,  the  West,  would  rest  them- 
selves, dazzled  with  his  glory,  satisfied  with 
the  order  which  he  should  have  established, 
with  the  wise  reforms  which  he  should  have 
effected.  He  said  to  himself  that,  after  all, 
the  difficulty  could  not  be  much  greater  than 
that  which  had  been  encountered  in  the  king- 
dom of  Naples  ;  that,  supposing  the  Spaniards 
to  be  as  energetic  as  the  banditti  of  the  Cala- 
brias,  it  would  be  sufficient  to  triple  or  quad- 
ruple the  extent  of  the  Calabrias,  and,  instead 
of  25,000  Frenchmen,  to  imagine  100,000,  in 
order  to  form  an  idea  of  the  obstacles  to  be 
overcome ;  that  his  young  soldiers,  who  had 
everywhere  proved  themselves  the  best  troops 
in  Europe,  would  certainly  be  capable  of  con- 
quering degenerate  Spaniards,  and  that,  by 
sending  to  the  depots  one  more  conscription, 
he  should  have  the  hundred  thousand  conscripts 
and  more,  necessary  for  this  new  enterprise ; 
that  the  grand  army  should  remain  intact  be- 
tween the  Oder  and  the  Vistula,  to  overawe 
Europe ;  that  moreover,  Finland,  given  up  to 
Russia,  Moldavia  and  Wallachia  promised, 
would  insure  him  the  concurrence  of  the  Em- 
peror Alexander  in  the  accomplishment  of  his 
designs ;  that,  in  short,  what  he  purposed  to 
do  in  Spain  was  the  last  consequence  to  be 
drawn  from  his  victories,  the  definitive  esta- 
blishment of  his  family,  the  complete  consum- 
mation of  his  destinies. 

However,  in  January,  1808,  on  his  return 
from  Italy,  even  after  the  proceedings  at  the 
Escurial,  Napoleon's  resolution  was  not  irre- 
vocably taken,  and  he  sometimes  recurred  to 
the  idea  of  stopping  short  at  a  marriage,  which 
would  bind  the  two  houses  together,  when  a 
family  incident  gave  rise  to  a  sort  of  material 
impossibility  in  regard  to  this  combination. 

quisition  of  the  provinces  of  the  Ebro  to  the  decisive  mea- 
sure of  overthrowing  the  Bourbons.  It  is  by  supporting 
himself  on  this  equivocation  that  M.  de  Talleyrand  as- 
serted that  h«  had  not  approved  of  the  enterprise  against 
Spain.  He  had,  nevertheless,  pushed  on  Napoleon  to  this 
enterprise,  when  men  the  most  worthy  of  confidence,  such 
as  the  Arch-chancellor  Cambaceres,  would  have  withdrawn 
him  from  it;  and.  after  he  had  so  pushed  him,  the  pre- 
ference given  to  the  very  worst  of  the  three  possible  solu- 
tions is  not  a  valid  manner  of  redeeming  his  responsi- 
bility. 


Jan.  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


431 


Napoleon  had,  as  we  have  already  related, 
called  to  Paris  Lucien's  daughter  by  a  first 
marriage,  who  had  been  sent  to  him,  that  she 
might  not  be  made  a  victim  to  the  quarrels  of 
her  relations.  But,  unfortunately,  this  girl, 
brought  up  in  exile,  often  hearing  bitter  com- 
plaints against  the  omnipotent  family  which 
shared  among  themselves  all  the  thrones  of 
Europe,  regardless  of  a  distant  and  forgotten 
brother — this  girl  had  not  brought  with  her  to 
Paris  such  sentiments  as  it  was  desirable  that 
she  should  have  done.  Placed  about  her 
grandmother,  the  empress-mother,  she  never- 
theless met  with  a  severity  from  her,  with  a 
neglect  from  her  aunts,  which  could  not  pro- 
duce more  favourable  impressions  of  those, 
whom  she  had  been  taught  to  fear  more  than 
to  love.  Accordingly,  in  her  correspondence 
with  her  relations  in  Italy,  she  expressed  the 
disappointment  that  she  felt.  Napoleon,  in 
the  supposition  that  he  should  send  her  to 
share  the  throne  of  Spain,  desirous  of  ascer- 
taining whether  she  had  brought  with  her 
Buch  dispositions  as  accorded  with  his  policy, 
directed  that  she  should  be  closely  watched, 
and  gave  orders  that  her  correspondence  should 
be  read  at  the  post-office.  Scarcely  had  she 
arrived  in  Paris  before  letters  were  seized,  in 
which  she  made  reports  concerning  her  grand- 
mother, her  aunts,  her  uncle  Napoleon,  far 
from  favourable  to  the  imperial  family.  When 
these  letters  were  delivered  to  Napoleon,  he 
smiled  maliciously,  and  immediately  summoned 
his  mother,  his  brothers,  and -his  sisters,  to  the 
Tuileries,  and  caused  the  letters  which  had 
been  intercepted  to  be  read  in  family  meeting. 
He  was  highly  diverted  at  the  anger  excited  in 
those  present  at  this  scene,  all  of  whom  were 
treated  harshly  enough  in  this  correspond- 
ence ;  then,  passing  from  an  ironical  mirth  to 
a  cold  severity,  he  insisted  that  his  young 
niece  should  be  sent  back  within  twenty-four 
hours,  and  accordingly  on  the  following  day 
she  was  on  the  road  for  Italy.  There  was 
then  no  princess  of  the  Bonaparte  family  left 
to  be  given  to  Spain ;  for  Mademoiselle  de 
Tascher,  recently  admitted  into  the  imperial 
family,  did  not  belong  to  that  house.1  Na- 
poleon had  recently  adopted  this  young  per- 
son, niece  of  the  Empress  Josephine,  and  had 
sent  her  to  Germany,  to  be  there  married  to 
the  heir  of  the  princely  house  of  Aremberg. 
In  mixing  his  blood  with  that  of  the  Bourbons, 
he  wished  it  to  be  his  own  blood,  and  not  that 
of  his  wife,  strong  as  was  the  affection  which 
he  felt  for  her. 

Even  without  this  incident  Napoleon  would 
probably  have  preferred  the  more  decisive 
measure,  that  is  to  say,  the  dethronement  of 
the  Bourbons.  At  any  rate,  he  had  no  longer 
any  choice.  To  overthrow  them  and  to  sub- 
stitute for  them  a  member  of  his  family  was 
the  only  solution  that  was  left  him.  But  the 
pretext  to  be  alleged  for  dethroning  them, 
without  deeply  wounding  the  public  feeling  in 
Spain,  in  France,  in  Europe,  was  still  the  point 


1  The  Duchess  of  Abrantes,  in  her  Memoirs,  which  be- 
apeak  a  clover  but  not  well-informed  person,  says  that 
Prince  Lucien's  daughter  had  not  come  to  Paris,  and  that 
the  refusal  of  her  father  to  send  her  thither  had  thus  be- 
come the  cause  of  important  events ;  for  Napoleon,  obliged 
to  renounce  the  idea  of  a  union  with  the  Bourbons  of 
Spain  had  from  that  time  resolved  to  dethrone  them. 
This  assertion  is  inaccurate.  Prince  Luciea's  daughter 


that  most  embarrassed  him.  Unable  to  find  it 
in  the  abject  submission  of  the  Spanish  go- 
vernment to  his  will,  he  looked  to  events  for 
it.  The  dissensions  of  the  court,  the  scandal- 
ous passions  of  the  queen  and  the  favourite, 
the  hatred  which  they  felt  for  the  heir  to  the 
crown  and  that  which  they  excited  in  him,  the 
impatience  of  the  nation,  ready  to  break  forth 
— all  these  passions,  which  kept  increasing 
from  hour  to  hour,  might  produce  a  sudden 
explosion,  and  give  rise  to  the  desired  pretext. 
It  was  easy,  moreover,  to  perceive  that  the 
successive  introduction  of  French  troops  into 
Spain  contributed  greatly  to  increase  the  im- 
patience of  all  minds,  by  the  hopes  excited  in 
some,  the  fears  excited  in  others,  the  expecta- 
tions awakened  in  all,  and  that  it  might  per- 
haps end  in  provoking  a  catastrophe.  Besides, 
there  might  arise  from  all  these  causes  a  result 
highly  agreeable  to  Napoleon,  namely  the  flight 
of  the  royal  family  of  Spain,  in  imitation  of 
the  royal  family  of  Portugal,  going,  like  that, 
to  seek  an  asylum  in  America.  Such  a  flight 
would  have  set  Napoleon  quite  at  ease,  by  giv- 
ing up  to  him  a  vacant  throne,  which  the 
Spanish  nation,  in  its  indignation  against  the 
fugitives,  might  perhaps  itself  award  to  him. 
This  new  emigration  of  a  European  dynasty  to 
America  became,  from  that  moment,  the  solu- 
tion to  which  he  adhered,  as  the  least  odious, 
the  least  revolting,  for  the  civilized  public. 
A  sure  way  to  bring  about  this  result  was  to 
increase  the  number  of  the  French  troops  in 
Spain,  while  enveloping  his  intentions  in  more 
profound  mystery  than  ever.  This  he  failed 
not  to  do.  Being  obliged  to  answer  the  let- 
ters of  Charles  IV.,  which  solicited  of  him  the 
baud  of  a  French  princess  for  Ferdinand  and 
the  publication  of  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau, 
he  replied  to  the  first  that,  highly  honoured 
for  his  house  by  the  desire  expressed  by  the 
royal  family,  of  Spain,  he  must  nevertheless 
beg  to  be  informed,  before  entering  into  any 
explanations,  if  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias, 
recently  prosecuted  as  a  state  criminal,  had 
been  again  taken  into  favour  by  his  august 
parents ;  for  nobody,  he  said,  would  ally  him- 
self with  a  dishonoured  son.  To  the  second  he 
answered  that  affairs  were  not  yet  sufficiently 
advanced  in  Portugal  to  permit  the  adminis- 
tration to  be  parcelled  out,  and  above  all  the 
military  command  to  be  divided,  in  presence 
of  the  English,  ready  to  land ;  that  he  must 
also  beware  of  agitating  the  minds  of  the  peo- 
ple by  premature  disclosure  of  the  lot  which 
awaited  them;  that,  from  all  these  motives, 
the  publication  of  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau 
must  be  deferred  for  some  time  longer.  '  It 
was  M.  de  Vandeul,  an  employe  of  the  French 
legation,  who  had  to  deliver  these  two  so  am- 
biguous letters  without  adding  any  explana- 
tion tending  to  diminish  the  obscurity.  To 
this  redoubled  mysteriousness  Napoleon  added 
a  further  augmentation  of  his  forces. 

We  have  seen  what  pains  he  had  taken  to 
organize  the  corps  destined  for  Spain  without 

did  come  to  Paris,  but  not  stay  there  on  account  of  tha 
incident  which  I  have  just  related.  The  particulars  here 
given  were  derived  from  a  member  of  the  imperial  family, 
an  eye-witness  of  the  scene  described,  and  from  a  person- 
age who  is  a  member  of  one  of  our  assemblies  and  wai 
appointed  to  conduct  the  princess  to  Italy,  a  commission 
which  be  declined. 


432 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Jan.  1808. 


weakening  his  armies  in  Germany  and  Italy.  ' 
He  had,  in  fact,  composed  the  army  of  Portu- 
gal with   the   late   camps   in  Normandy  and 
Bretagne,  the  army  of  General  Dupont,  called 
Corps  of  the  Gironde,  with  the  three  first  bat-  | 
talions  of  the  five  legions  of  reserve  and  some  • 
Swiss  and  Parisian  battalions ;    the  army  of  j 
Marshal  Moncey,  called  Corps  of  Observation  • 
of  the  Coasts  of  the  Ocean,  with  twelve  pro- 
visional regiments  taken  from  the  depots  of  | 
the  grand  army ;  the  division  of  the  Western  j 
Pyrenees,  destined  for  Pampeluna,  with  some  j 
battalions  left  in  the  camps  in  Bretagne  and  j 
Normandy ;  lastly,  the  division  of  the  Eastern 
Pyrenees,    with   the    Italian   and    Neapolitan 
regiments,  which  had  not  served  in  Germany, 
and  which   the  return  of  the  army  of  Italy 
rendered  disposable.     These  last  two  divisions 
he  resolved  to  reinforce,  and  to  form,  more- 
over, a  general  reserve  for  all  these  corps. 

He  augmented  the  division  of  the  Western 
Pyrenees  by  adding  to  it  the  fourth  battalions 
ef  the  five  legions  of  reserve,  the  organization 
of  which  was  just  completed.  These  amounted 
to  3000  men,  who,  added  to  those  already 
marching  by  St.  Jean-Pied-de-Port  for  Pam- 
peluna, would  form  a  division  of  six  or  seven 
thousand,  sufficient  to  occupy  that  fortress  and 
to  observe  Aragon.  It  was  placed  under  the 
command  of  General  Merle,  and  General  Mou- 
ton,  who  had  been  at  first  appointed  to  that 
command,  was  commissioned  to  go  and  inspect 
the  other  corps  cTarmee.  Napoleon  augmented 
the  division  of  the  Eastern  Pyrenees,  composed 
of  Italians,  by  adding  to  it  the  provisional  bat- 
talions drawn  from  the  French  depots  situated 
between  Alexandria  and  Turin,  swarming  with 
conscripts  already  trained.  This  new  French 
division  was  to  consist  of  5000  men,  and,  added 
to  the  Italian  division  of  six  or  seven  thousand, 
commanded  by  General  Lechi,  to  form,  under 
General  Duhesme,  a  corps  quite  sufficient  for 
Catalonia. 

As  for  the  general  reserve,  Napoleon  organ- 
ized it  at  Orleans  for  the  infantry,  at  Poitiers 
for  the  cavalry.  He  had  recourse  to  the  same 
process  which  he  had  employed  for  composing 
Marshal  Moncey's  corps,  and  he  assembled  at 
Orleans  fresh  provisional  battalions,  drawn 
from  the  depots  which  had  not  yet  furnished 
detachments  for  Spain.  General  Verdier  was 
to  command  these  six  new  provisional  regi- 
ments of  infantry,  designated  by  the  numbers 
13  to  18.  Napoleon  assembled  at  Poitiers  four 
new  provisional  regiments  of  cavalry,  likewise 
drawn  from  the  depots,  consisting  of  3000 
horse  of  all  arms,  cuirassiers,  dragoons,  hus- 
sars, and  chasseurs,  under  a  general  of  cavalry 
of  distinguished  merit,  General  Lasalle.  He 
restored  to  the  camp  of  Boulogne,  to  the  gar- 
rison of  Paris,  and  to  the  camps  in  Bretagne, 
the  ten  old  regiments  brought  back  from  the 
grand  army ;  which  prepared  for  him,  in  case 
of  need,  new  reserves  of  a  superior  quality. 
Lastly,  he  despatched  secretly  for  Bordeaux 
some  detachments  of  the  imperial  guard,  in- 
fantry, cavalry,  and  artillery,  expecting  that 
he  should  be  obliged  to  go  himself  to  Spain,  to 
bring  about  the  denotement  which  he  desired.  I 
Computing  General  Dupont's  corps  at  25  thou-  j 
Band  men,  Marshal  Moncey's  at  32  thousand, 
the  division  of  the  Western  Pyrenees  at  6  or  7, 
the  corps  of  the  Eastern  Pyrenees  at  11  or  12,  ! 


the  two  reserves  of  Orleans  and  Poitiers  at  10 
thousand,  the  troops  of  the  guard  at  2  or  8 
thousand,  the  whole  force  destined  for  Spam 
may  be  set  down  at  80  and  some  odd  thousand 
men,  exclusive  of  the  army  of  Portugal,  form- 
ing a  total  amount  of  more  than  100,000  new 
soldiers  destined  for  the  Peninsula.  But  they 
were  so  young,  so  little  inured  to  fatigue,  that 
there  was  reason  to  expect  a  great  difference 
between  the  number  of  men  entered  on  the 
muster-roll  and  the  number  of  the  men  pre- 
sent under  arms.  However,  one-fourth  of  this 
effective  was  still  on  march  in  the  course  of 
January,  1808.  Napoleon,  with  a  view  to  ad- 
vance the  denotement,  prescribed  to  his  troops 
a  decided  movement  upon  Madrid.  The  high 
road  leading  to  that  capital  divaricates  oppo- 
site to  Burgos.  One  branch  passes  through 
the  Kingdom  of  Leon,  by  Valladolid  and  Se- 
govia, crosses  the  Guadarrama  towards  St. 
Ildefonso,  and  descends  by  the  Escurial  upon 
Madrid.  The  other  traverses  Old  Castillo, 
passing  through  Aranda,  crosses  the  Guadar- 
rama at  Somosiarra,  a  name  famous  in  our 
military  annals,  and  descends  by  Buitrago  and 
Chamartin  upon  Madrid.  The  two  corps  of 
Dupont  and  Moncey  being,  the  first  at  Valla- 
dolid, (in  the  route  to  Salamanca,)  the  second 
between  Vittoria  and  Burgos,  before  the  di- 
varication, had  not  yet  taken  a  single  step 
which  could  betray  the  intention  of  marching 
upon  Madrid.  Napoleon  ordered  General  Du- 
pont to  direct  one  of  his  divisions  upon  Se- 
govia, and  Marshal  Moncey  one  of  his  upon 
Aranda,  upon  pretext  of  extending  himself 
for  the  sake  of  subsistence.  From  that  mo- 
ment the  direction  upon  Madrid  would  be  un- 
masked. But  the  entry  of  the  French  troops 
into  Catalonia  and  Navarre,  which  it  was  at 
length  necessary  to  prescribe,  in  order  to 
occupy  Barcelona,  told  still  more  plainly  that 
the  real  object  of  these  movements  was  a  very 
different  one  from  Lisbon.  For  the  purpose 
of  furnishing  an  explanation  that  would  be  but 
half  credible,  Napoleon,  while  ordering  Gene- 
ral Duhesme  to  penetrate  into  Catalonia,  Ge- 
neral Merle  to  enter  Navarre,  instructed  M. 
de  Beauharnais  to  announce  the  intention  of 
a  double  movement  of  troops  upon  Cadiz,  one 
through  Catalonia,  the  other  through  Estra- 
madura  and  Andalusia.  The  French  fleet  lying 
at  Cadiz  might  be  the  motive  of  this  expedi- 
tion. If,  however,  this  alleged  object  was  in 
some  degree  doubted,  either  at  court  or  in  the 
country,  nothing  further  could  result  from  it 
than  an  increased  agitation,  which  Napoleon 
would  not  be  sorry  for,  since  he  wished  to 
bring  about,  if  not  immediately  at  least  speed- 
ily, the  flight  of  the  royal  family. 

Napoleon  found  too  great  advantage  in  keep- 
ing his  depots  continually  full,  by  means  of 
conscripts,  called  out  beforehand,  and  trained 
for  twelve  or  fifteen  months  before  they  were 
employed,  not  to  persevere  in  this  system  of 
anticipated  conscription,  especially  at  a  mo- 
ment when  he  purposed  to  form  numerous 
camps  along  the  whole  coast  of  Europe  by  the 
side  of  his  fleets.  In  consequence,  after  de- 
manding the  conscription  t>f  1808  in  the  spring 
of  1807,  he  resolved  to  demand  the  conscrip- 
tion of  1809  in  the  winter  of  1808.  This  de- 
mand furnished  him,  besides,  with  occasion  for 
a  communication  to  the  Senate,  and  for  a  spe- 


Jan.  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


433 


cious  explanation  of  the  immense  assemblage 
of  troops  collecting  at  the  foot  of  the  Pyrenees. 
The  Senate  was  therefoic  called  together  on 
the  21st  of  January,  to  hear  a  report  on  the 
negotiations  with  Portugal,  and  on  the  resolu- 
tion taken,  nay  already  executed,  of  seizing  the 
patrimony  of  the  house  of  Braganza.  This 
was  made  a  text  for  developing  the  system  of 
occupation  of  all  the  coasts  of  the  Continent, 
in  order  to  reply  to  the  maritime  blockade  by 
the  continental  blockade.  The  conscription  of 
1808,  said  M.  Regnault  de  St.  Jean  d'Angely, 
author  of  the  report  presented  to  the  Senate, 
had  been  the  signal  and  the  means  of  the  con- 
tinental peace  signed  at  Tilsit ;  the  conscription 
of  1809  would  be  the  signal  for  the  maritime 
peace.  The  latter,  unfortunately,  was  still  to 
be  signed  in  a  place  that  no  man  knew  or  could 
tell.  The  promise  to  employ  in  the  depots  alone 
the  young  conscripts  called  out  a  year  before- 
hand was  renewed  on  this  occasion,  to  weaken 
the  moral  effect  of  these  anticipated  calls.  An- 
other report  declared  the  incorporation  with  the 
Empire,  in  consequence  of  anterior  treaties,  of 
Kehl,  Cassel,  Wesel,  and  Flushing;  Kehl  and 
Cassel  as  indispensable  annexions  to  the  for- 
tresses of  Strasburg  and  Mayence  ;  Wesel  as  a 
point  of  great  importance  on  the  lower  course 
of  the  Rhine ;  lastly,  Flushing,  as  the  port  of 
a  maritime  establishment,  to  which  Antwerp 
was  the  dock-yard.  This  last  communication 
led  to  an  imperial  profession  of  faith  respect- 
ing the  disinterestedness  of  France,  which,  hav- 
ing had  in  her  hands  Austria,  Germany,  Prussia, 
Poland,  had  kept  nothing  for  herself,  and  was 
content  with  such  insignificant  acquisitions  as 
Kehl,  Cassel,  Wesel,  or  Flushing.  Napoleon 
meant  the  new  kingdom  of  Westphalia,  for  in- 
stance, to  be  considered  not  as  an  extension  of 
territory,  since  it  was  given  to  an  independent 
prince,  but  as  a  mere  extension  of  the  federa- 
tive system  of  the  French  Empire. 

Good  or  bad,  these  argumentations,  submitted 
in  brilliant  and  magniloquent  language,  for 
which  Napoleon  furnished  the  ideas  and  M. 
Regnault  the  style,  were  received,  as  usual, 
with  a  respectful  inclination  of  the  head  by  the 
senators,  and  followed  by  the  vote  of  the  con- 
scription of  1809. 

This  new  contingent  of  80,000  men  would 
raise  the  mass  of  the  French  troops  spread 
ov«r  the  banks  of  the  Vistula  and  the  Oder,  the 
shores  of  the  Baltic,  the  Alps,  thePo,  the  Adige, 
the  Isonzo,  the  coasts  of  Illyria  and  of  the  Ca- 
labrias,  lastly  on  the  Ebro  and  on  the  Tagus, 
to  nearly  900,000  men.  Adding  to  these  100,000 
allies  at  least,  here  were  more  than  a  million 
of  men,  three-fourths  of  whom  were  veteran  sol- 
diers, equal  at  least  to  the  soldiers  of  Caesar,  and 
led  by  a  man,  who,  in  point  of  military  genius, 
was  superior  to  the  Roman  captain.  What  was 
there  impossible  with  such  colossal  forces,  the 
greatest  that  mortal  ever  had  at  his  disposal,  if 
political  prudence  had  but  stepped  in  to  repress 
the  intoxication  of  victory  ?  Napoleon,  when 
enumerating  them,  felt  a  dangerous  satisfac- 
tion :  he  was  puzzled  only  how  to  pay  them,  but 
reckoned  upon  the  continuation  of  the  war  to 
enable  them  to  live  in  foreign  countries,  or  upon 
a  peace  to  permit  him  to  reduce  their  effective 
without  diminishing  their  skeletons.  Sup- 
ported by  this  prodigious  military  power,  he 
dared  to  will  any  thing,  to  attempt  any  thing, 

VOL.  II. — 55 


considering  himself,  at  that  height,  as  above  all 
the  rules  of  ordinary  morality,  empowered  to 
give  and  take  away  thrones,  like  another  Pro- 
vidence, always  justified  like  it  by  the  vastness 
of  his  designs  and  of  the  results. 

From  this  period  dates  the  origin  of  an  idea, 
with  which  Napoleon  was  ever  afterwards  pre- 
possessed on  the  subject  of  military  organiza- 
tion, which  was  not  absolutely  good  in  itself, 
but  which  for  him  alone  might  have  had  ad- 
vantages :  this  was  to  convert  the  French  regi- 
ments into  legions,  nearly  resembling  the  Roman 
legions.  The  battalion,  composed  of  seven  or 
eight  hundred  men,  and  having  for  its  measure 
the  physical  power  of  man,  who  cannot  com- 
mand directly  a  greater  number ;  the  regiment, 
composed  of  three  or  four  battalions,  and  hav- 
ing for  its  measure  the  solicitude  of  the  colonel, 
who  cannot  extend  paternal  care  to  a  greater 
number  of  individuals,  have  been,  in  modern 
times,  the  basis  of  the  military  organization. 
With  several  regiments  has  been  formed  the 
brigade,  with  several  brigades,  the  division, 
with  several  divisions  the  army.  In  general 
there  has  been  left  on  the  frontiers  a  battalion, 
called  the  depot  battalion,  in  which  it  has  been 
customary  to  collect  all  the  weakly  men,  con- 
valescents, untrained  recruits,  with  the  officers 
least  capable  of  active  service,  to  serve  at  once 
as  a  place  of  rest  and  instruction,  and  to  fur- 
nish the  war  battalions  with  a  constant  recruit. 
It  was  by  managing  this  organization  with  pro- 
found skill,  that  Napoleon  had  contrived  to  cre- 
ate those  armies,  which,  starting  from  the  Rhine, 
sometimes  from  the  Adize  or  the  Volturno,  went 
to  fight  and  to  conquer  on  the  Vistula  or  the 
Niemen.  The  constant  attention  bestowed  on 
the  depots  had  been  the  secret  cause  of  his  suc- 
cesses, as  much  as  his  genius  for  war.  Now 
his  art  was  about  to  become  complicated,  his 
solicitude  extended,  in  proportion  as  these  de- 
pots, placed  on  the  Po  and  on  the  Rhine,  hav- 
ing already  sent  detachments  to  the  armies  in 
Prussia  and  Poland,  were  required  to  send  more 
to  the  armies  in  Spain,  Portugal,  and  Illyria. 
To  follow  with  the  eye  116  French  regiments 
of  infantry,  80  of  cavalry,  from  which  have 
been  drawn  a  considerable  number  of  provi- 
sional corps,  besides  the  imperial  guard,  the 
Swiss,  the  Poles,  the  Italians,  the  Irish,  and 
the  German  and  Spanish  auxiliaries ;  to  follow 
with  the  eye  the  regiment  and  its  detachments 
in  every  country,  to  direct  its  formation,  train- 
ing, location,  so  as  to  be  assured  of  the  best 
employment  of  each,  and  to  prevent  the  disor- 
ganization which  might  arise  from  the  disloca- 
tion of  parts, — for  a  regiment  whose  depot  was 
on  the  Rhine  had  sometimes  battalions  in  Po- 
land, Germany,  Spain,  Portugal — all  this  re- 
quired a  laborious  and  singularly  wearisome 
attention,  even  for  the  most  indefatigable  of  all 
geniuses.  Napoleon,  therefore,  conceived  the 
idea  of  sixty  legions,  instead  of  a  hundred  and 
twenty  regiments,  each  composed  of  eight  war 
battalions,  commanded  by  a  martchal-de-camp. 
several  colonels  and  lieutenant-colonels,  capa- 
ble of  furnishing  war-battalions  in  Poland,  in 
Italy,  and  in  Spain,  and  having  a  single  depot, 
to  which  all  the  detachments  drawn  from  it 
should  be  sent  back.  This  was  a  departure 
from  the  principle  of  the  regiment,  a  juster 
basis,  as  we  have  observed,  since  it  has  for  its 
measure  the  physical  force  of  the  chef-de-balail- 
20 


434 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


Ion,  and  the  moral  force  of  the  colonel,  and  sub- 
stituted in  its  stead  a  new  and  completely  arbi- 
trary composition,  for  the  convenience  of  a 
unique  position,  unique  as  the  genius  and  the 
fortune  of  Napoleon ;  for  who,  excepting  him, 
could  ever  have  battalions  of  one  and  the  same 
regiment  to  send  to  Poland,  to  Italy,  to  Spain  ? 
This  conception  he  had  so  much  at  heart,  that 
he  never  afterwards  ceased  to  think  of  it  dur- 
ing his  reign,  and  even  in  exile.  However, 
upon  the  objections  of  Messrs.  Lacude  and 
Clarke,  he  contented  himself  with  a  middle  plan, 
•which,  instead  of  abandoning  the  principle  of 
the  regiment,  augmented  its  composition,  so  as 
to  diminish  the  total  number  of  the  corps.  He 
decided  by  a  decree,  which  was  not  definitively 
signed  till  the  18th  of  February,  that  all  the 
infantry  regiments  should  be  composed  of  five 
battalions,  four  for  war,  one  at  the  depot ;  each 
battalion,  of  six  companies,  one  of  grenadiers, 
one  of  voltigeurs,  and  four  of  fusileers.  The 
depot  battalion  was  fixed  at  four  companies 
only,  as  the  companies  of  the  elite  were  not  to 
be  formed  unless  in  war.  Agreeably  to  this 
decree,  each  company  consisted  of  140  men, 
and  the  whole  regiment  of  3970,  108  of  whom 
were  officers,  and  38C2  subalterns  and  privates. 
The  colonel  and  four  chefs-de-bataillon  com- 
manded the  war  battalions,  and  the  major  re- 
mained at  the  depot.  In  this  formation,  which 
already  exceeded  the  natural  proportions  of 
the  regiment,  and  which  was  induced  by  the 
situation  of  Napoleon  and  France,  a  regiment 
having  its  depot  on  the  Rhine,  for  example, 
could  have  two  war  battalions  with  the  grand 
army,  one  on  the  coast  of  Normandy,  and  one 
in  Spain.  A  regiment  having  its  depot  in  Pied- 
mont, might  have  two  of  its  war  battalions  in 
Dalmatia,  one  in  Lombardy,  and  one  in  Cata- 
lonia. In  this  manner  all  the  corps  had  a  share 
in  all  the  species  of  warfare  at  once ;  and, 
when  hostilities  ceased  in  the  North,  care  was 
taken  to  allow  all  those  who  had  just  served  in 
Poland  to  rest  themselves,  and  to  send  off  for 
Spain  all  who  had  not  been  in  the  late  cam- 
paigns, or  all  which  had  either  strength  or  the 
desire  to  make  several  successively.  But  this 
composition  of  the  regiments,  which  had  per- 
haps some  advantages  for  Napoleon  and  for  the 
Empire,  such  as  it  had  become,  is  a  singular 
proof  of  the  influence  which  an  extreme  policy 
exercised  already  on  the  military  organization. 
While  the  extension  of  his  enterprises  was  about 
to  weaken  the  armies  of  Napoleon  by  dispers- 
ing them,  it  was  about  to  weaken  also  the  regi- 
ment itself,  by  extending  it  beyond  measure, 
by  diminishing  the  energy  of  family  spirit  in 
brethern  in  arms,  too  distant  from  one  another. 
A  military  corps  is  a  whole,  which  has  its  natural 
proportions,  its  architecture,  if  one  may  be  al- 
lowed the  expression,  which  we  are  liable  to  dis- 
tort by  any  attempt  to  extend  it  too  much. 

For  the  rest,  several  dispositions  of  this  de- 
cree revealed  the  noble  and  manly  sentiments 
of  the  great  man  who  had  conceived  it.  The 
eagle  of  the  regiment,  an  object  of  the  respect, 
the  love,  the  devotedness  of  the  soldiers,  for  it 
is  their  honour,  was  always  to  be  where  the 
greatest  number  of  battalions  were,  and  to  be 
consigned  to  the  care  of  the  eagle-bearer,  who 
was  to  have  the  rank  and  pay  of  lieutenant, 
who  should  have  served  ten  years,  or  have  dis- 
tinguished himself  in  the  campaigns  of  Ulm, 


[Jan.  1808. 


Austerlitz,  Jena,  Friedland.  Beside  him  were 
to  be  placed,  with  the  title  of  second  and  third 
eagle-bearer,  with  the  rank  of  sergeant  and  the 
pay  of  sergeant-major,  two  old  soldiers,  who 
had  been  in  the  great  battles,  but  who  had  not 
been  able  to  obtain  promotion,  as  illiterate  men. 
It  was  a  worthy  mode  of  employing  and  reward- 
ing brave  fellows,  whose  intelligence  was  not 
equal  to  their  courage.  Every  thing  in  the 
State  received,  as  we  see,  the  influence  of  the 
immoderate  genius  of  Napoleon  and  the  impress 
of  his  great  soul. 

Elevated  by  the  sense  of  his  power,  conceiv- 
ing that  he  had  a  right  to  do  whatever  he 
pleased,  since  England  had  dared  to  do  every 
thing,  considering  the  continental  war  as 
finished,  and  the  prolongation  of  the  maritime 
war  as  a  useless  delay  of  the  completion  of  his 
plans,  Napoleon  resolved  to  demolish  all  the 
obstacles  that  counteracted  his  will.  While  he 
was  giving  the  orders  that  we  have  just  stated, 
for  the  purpose  of  bringing  the  Peninsula  into 
the  system  of  his  Empire,  he  issued  nearly 
similar  orders  for  bringing  the  Italian  Peninsula 
into  the  same  system,  and  for  putting  an  end, 
on  the  one  hand,  to  the  sovereignty  of  the  Pope, 
who  annoyed  him  in  the  centre  of  Italy,  on  the 
other,  to  that  of  the  Bourbons  of  Naples  who  de- 
fied him  from  the  centre  of  the  island  of  Sicily. 
We  have  seen  how  the  refusal  to  restore  the 
Legations  to  the  Holy  See,  after  the  coronation, 
then  the  conquest  of  the  kingdom  of  Naples, 
which  had  completely  reduced  the  Roman  States 
to  a  mere  enclosure  of  the  French  Empire,  had 
successively  galled  Pius  VII.,  and  converted 
his  habitual  mildness  into  a  continual  and  some- 
times violent  irritation  against  Napoleon,  to 
whom  he  was  nevertheless  attached.  The  pri- 
vation of  the  principalities  of  Benevento  and 
Ponte  Corvo,  granted  to  M.  de  Talleyrand  and 
to  Marshal  Bernadotte,  the  occupation  of  An- 
cona,  the  continual  passages  of  French  troops, 
1  had  raised  the  displeasure  and  the  exasperation 
I  of  his  Holiness  to  the  utmost.  Accordingly,  lie 
!  refused  to  comply  with  any  of  the  applications 
!  of  France,  and  rejected  them  all,  some  for 
j  specious  reasons,  others  for  reasons  which  were 
j  not  specious,  and  which  he  took  no  pains  to 
render  so.  He  had,  in  the  first  place,  refused 
j  to  annul  the  first  marriage  of  Prince  Jerome, 
consummated  without  any  formality  ;  and  could 
not  be  induced  to  do  any  thing  more  than  wink 
I  at  the  dissolution  pronounced  by  the  French 
!  ecclesiastical  authority.  He  had  refused  to 
1  acknowledge  Joseph  as  King  of  Naples,  received 
at  Rome  the  refractory  Neapolitan  cardinals,  and 
given  asylum  in  the  suburbs  of  that  capital 
to  all  the  banditti  who  murdered  the  French 
soldiers.  He  had  kept  with  him  the  consul  of 
the  dethroned  King  of  Naples,  alleging  that  this 
king,  who'  had  retired  to  Sicily,  was  at  least 
sovereign  of  that  island,  and  consequently  had 
a  right  to  keep  a  representative  at  Rome.  He 
had  not  consented  to  exclude  the  English  from 
the  Roman  States,  saying  that  he  was  an  in- 
dependent sovereign,  and  that,  as  such,  he 
could  be  at  peace  or  war  with  whomsoever  he 
pleased ;  adding  that,  in  his  quality  of  head  of 
the  Christian  Church,  his-  duty  forbade  him  to 
go  to  war  with  any  of  the  Christian  powers,  even 
though  not  Catholic.  He  delayed  the  canonical 
institution  of  the  bishops,  insisted  on  a  journey 
to  Rome  in  the  case  of  the  Italian  bishops, 


Jan.  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


435 


contested  the  extension  of  the  French  Concor-  i 
dat  to  the  Italian  provinces  which  had  become 
French,  such  as  Liguria  and  Piedmont,  and  the 
extension  of  the  Italian  Concordat  to  the  Vene-  j 
tian  provinces,  annexed  the  last  to  the  kingdom 
of  Italy.  Lastly,  he  would  not  assent  to  any 
of  the  arrangements  proposed  for  the  new  Ger- 
man Church;  and  on  every  subject,  be  it  what 
it  might,  he  objected  the  natural  difficulties 
arising  out  of  it,  and  gladly  created  such  as 
did  not  exist.  Napoleon  thus  reaped  the  re- 
ward of  his  neglect  to  satisfy  the  court  of 
Borne,  which  he  could  have  kept  in  the  best 
dispositions  by  means  of  a  few  sacrifices  of  ter- 
ritory that  would  have  been  easy  to  him ;  for, 
without  touching  the  kingdoms  of  Lombardy 
aud  Naples,  he  had  Parma,  Placentia,  Tuscany, 
for  rounding  the  dominions  of  the  Holy  See.  It 
is  true  that  his  imperious  determination  to  sub- 
ject all  Italy  to  his  system  of  warfare  against 
the  English  would  have  proved,  in  any  case,  a 
serious  difficulty.  But  assuredly  it  would  have 
been  possible  to  obtain  from  the  satisfied  Pope, 
tinder  the  form  of  a  treaty  of  alliance,  offensive 
and  defensive,  his  adhesion  to  all  the  conditions 
of  war  which  he  meant  to  impose  upon  Italy. 

Taking  no  account  of  the  motives  which  had 
alienated  his  Holiness  from  him,  Napoleon 
ordered  him  to  be  told,  "You  are  Sovereign  of 
Rome,  it  is  true,  but  comprised  in  the  French 
Empire ;  you  are  Pope,  I  am  Emperor,  such  as 
•were  the  German  emperors,  such  as  Charle- 
magne was  still  more  anciently ;  and  I  am  Char- 
lemagne for  you  by  more  than  one  title,  by 
title  of  power,  by  title  of  benefaction.  You 
will,  therefore,  obey  the  laws  of  the  federative 
system  of  the  Empire,  and  close  your  territory 
against  my  enemies."  The  manner  of  this  pre- 
tension offended  Pius  VII.  still  more  than  the 
matter.  His  eyes,  usually  so  mild,  flashed  with 
all  the  fire  of  indignation,  and  he  declared  to 
Cardinal  Fesch  that  he  recognised  no  sovereign 
above  him  upon  earth ;  that,  if  it  were  intended 
to  renew  the  tyranny  of  the  German  emperors 
of  the  middle  ages,  he  would  renew  the  resist- 
ance of  Gregory  VII. ;  and  that,  though  it  was 
alleged  that  the  spiritual  arms  had  lost  their 
force,  he  would  show  that  they  could  still  be 
powerful  against  a  sovereign  of  recent  origin, 
whom  he  had  consecrated  with  his  own  hands, 
and  who  owed  part  of  his  moral  authority  to 
that  consecration.  To  this  Napoleon  replied 
that,  in  the  19th  century,  he  feared  the  spiritual 
arms  but  little ;  that,  however,  he  would  not 
afford  any  legitimate  pretext  for  their  employ- 
ment, by  abstaining  from  touching  religious 
matters ;  that  he  should  do  no  more  than  strike 
the  temporal  sovereign ;  that  he  should  leave 
at  the  Vatican  the  respected  Bishop  of  Rome, 
the  chief  of  the  bishops  of  Christendom,  and, 
as  for  the  temporal  prince,  whose  spiritual 
sovereignty  should  have  received  no  injury,  not 
a  creature  either  in  France  or  Spain  would  in- 
terest himself  about  him. 

Cardinal  Fesch,  whose  haughty  and  meddling 
disposition  and  inferior  capacity  were  liable  to 
embroil  the  easiest  negotiations,  having  been 
superseded  by  M.  Alquier,  accustomed  succes- 
sively, at  the  courts  of  Madrid  and  Naples,  to 
treat  with  the  old  royalties,  and  disposed  to 
humour  them,  the  situation  had  nevertheless 
remained  the  same,  and  the  relations  bet'vceii 
the  two  governments  had  retained  A  1  t  uir , 


acrimony.  The  pontifical  court,  however,  re- 
solved to  send  a  cardinal  to  Paris,  to  put  an 
end  by  a  compromise  to  the  differences  which 
divided  Rome  and  the  Empire,  and  made  choice 
of  Cardinal  Litta.  Napoleon  rejected  him  as 
one  of  the  cardinals  animated  with  the  worst 
spirit.  It  then  selected  the  French  Cardinal 
de  Bayanne,  an  enlightened  and  discreet  mem- 
ber of  the  Sacred  College.  At  the  same  time, 
the  Pope,  to  prove  that  Cardinal  Consalvi  was 
not  the  instigator  of  his  resistance,  as  Napoleon 
supposed,  took  from  this  friend  the  secretary- 
ship of  state,  and  gave  it  to  an  aged  prelate, 
without  talent  and  without  energy — Cardinal 
Casoni.  They  shall  see,  he  exclaimed,  with  a 
pride,  which,  notwithstanding  his  mildness, 
would  break  forth  all  at  once  when  he  was  ir- 
ritated— they  shall  see  that  it  is  with  me,  with 
me  alone,  they  have  to  deal:  it  is  I  who  must 
be  crushed,  trampled  under  foot  by  French  sol- 
diers, if  they  are  resolved  to  do  violence  to  my 
authority. 

Napoleon,  ceasing  to  impose  upon  himself  any 
restraint,  as  we  have  said,  caused  the  provinces 
of  Urbino,  Ancona,  and  Macerata,  which  formed 
the  coast  of  the  Adriatic,  to  be  militarily  occu- 
pied by  General  Lemarois ;  and  then  the  Holy 
See,  Pope  and  cardinals,  fearing  that  these 
provinces  would  ultimately  share  the  fate  of 
the  Legations,  thought  for  a  moment  of  com- 
pounding, and  an  accommodation  took  place, 
the  conditions  of  which  were  the  following : 

The  Pope,  independent  sovereign  of  his  do- 
mains, proclaimed  such,  guarantied  such,  by 
France,  would  nevertheless  contract  an  alliance 
with  her,  and  whenever  she  may  be  at  war, 
would  exclude  her  enemies  from  the  territory 
of  the  Roman  States  : 

The  French  troops  should  occupy  Ancona, 
Civita  Vecchia,  and  Ostia,  but  be  subsisted  at 
the  expense  of  the  French  government : 

The  Pope  would  engage  to  clear  and  put  into 
good  condition,  the  muddy  harbour  of  Ancona ; 

He  would  recognise  King  Joseph,  send  away 
King  Ferdinand's  consul,  the  murderers  of  the 
French,  and  the  Neapolitan  cardinals  refusing 
the  oath,  and  renounce  his  ancient  right  of  in- 
vestiture over  the  crown  of  Naples ; 

He  would  consent  to  extend  the  Concordat  of 
Italy  and  the  Concordat  of  France  to  all  the  pro- 
vinces of  Italy  converted  into  French  provinces ; 

He  would  nominate  without  delay  the  French 
and  Italian  bishops,  and  not  require  the  latter 
to  travel  to  Rome : 

He  would  appoint  plenipotentiaries  charged 
to  conclude  a  Germanic  Concordat ; 

Lastly,  to  satisfy  Napoleon  respecting  the 
spirit  of  the  Sacred  College,  and  to  proportion 
the  influence  of  France  to  the  extension  of  her 
territory,  he  would  increase  the  number  of  the 
French  cardinals  to  one-third  of  the  total  num- 
ber of  the  cardinals. 

This  arrangement  was  nearly  completed  when 
the  Pope,  impelled  by  unlucky  suggestions,  and 
in  particular  offended  by  two  clauses,  that 
which  obliged  the  Holy  See  to  close  its  territory 
against  the  enemies  of  France,  and  that  which 
increased  the  number  of  the  French  cardinals 
— clauses,  the  first  of  which  was  inevitable  in 
the  situation  of  the  Roman  States,  and  the 
second  adapted  to  pacify  for  th<>  future-  -the 
Pope  peremptorily  refused  his  assent. 

Then,   without  listening  further  to  a  single 


430 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Jan.  1808. 


observation,  without  listening  to  the  offer  of  with- 
drawing a  first  refusal,  he  ordered  passports 
to  be  sent  to  the  Cardinal  de  Baynnne,  and 
despatched  the  necessary  orders  for  the  inva- 
sion of  the  Roman  States.  At  bottom,  he  was 
decided,  there,  as  in  Spain,  to  come  to  a  defini- 
tive solution,  that  is  to  say,  to  leave  the  Pope 
at  the  Vatican,  with  an  ample  revenue,  with  a 
purely  spiritual  authority,  and  to  deprive  him 
of  the  temporal  sovereignty  of  central  Italy. 
But,  expecting  to  have  to  do  with  the  Spaniards 
in  two  or  three  months,  that  is,  towards  Easter, 
he  had  no  wish  that  religious  causes  should  be 
added  to  political  causes  to  irritate  a  fanatical 
people.  He  formed,  therefore,  the  design  of 
occupying  for  the  moment  Rome  and  the  pro- 
vinces bordering  the  Mediterranean,  as  he  had 
already  caused  those  which  bordered  the  Adri- 
atic to  be  occupied.  Accordingly,  he  ordered 
the  general  commanding  in  Tuscany  to  assemble 
2500  men  at  Perugia,  General  Lemarois  to 
march  as  many  upon  Foligno,  General  Miollis 
to  put  himself  at  the  head  of  these  two  brigades, 
to  advance  upon  Rome,  to  pick  up  by  the  way 
a  column  of  3000  men,  ordered  by  Joseph  to 
start  from  Terracina,  and  with  these  8000 
soldiers,  to  take  possession  of  the  capital  of 
the  Christian  world.  General  Miollis  was  to 
enter,  by  fair  means  or  by  force,  the  Castle  of 
St.  Angelo,  to  take  the  command  of  the  Papal 
troops,  to  leave  the  Pope  at  the  Vatican  with 
a  guard  of  honour,  to  interfere  in  no  respect  in 
the  government,  to  say  that  he  came  to  occupy 
Rome  for  a  longer  or  shorter  time,  in  a  purely 
military  interest,  and  to  keep  off  the  enemies 
of  France  from  the  Roman  States.  He  was 
to  make  himself  master  of  the  police  alone, 
to  expel  all  the  banditti  who  made  Rome 
their  retreat,  to  send  off  the  Neapolitan  cardi- 
nals to  Naples,  and  to  have  recourse  to  the 
public  chests  for  what  was  necessary  for  the 
maintenance  of  the  French  troops. 

The  illustrious  Miollis,  an  old  soldier  of  the 
republic,  combining  with  an  inflexible  character 
a  most  cultivated  mind,  the  purest  probity, 
and  much  experience  in  treating  with  Italian 
princes,  was  better  qualified  than  any  other  for 
performing  this  rigorous  commission  and  pay- 
ing at  the  same  time  the  respect  due  to  the 
head  of  Christendom.  Napoleon  allowed  him 
a  considerable  salary,  with  orders  to  live  in 
high  style  at  Rome,  and  to  accustom  the  Ro- 
mans to  regard  the  French  general  established 
at  the  Castle  of  St.  Angelo  as  the  real  head  of 
the  government,  much  more  than  the  pontiff 
left  at  the  Vatican. 

The  invasion  of  Portugal  had  drawn  towards 
Gibraltar  the  troops  which  the  English  had  in 
Sicily,  and  those  which  they  had  brought  back 
beaten  from  Alexandria.  Not  more  than  seven 
or  eight  thousand  men  were  left  in  Sicily  to 
preserve  that  wreck  of  her  crown  for  their  un- 
fortunate victim,  Queen  Caroline.  This  was 
The  time  for  preparing  an  expedition  against 
that  island,  and  to  take  advantage  of  the  junc- 
tion of  the  French  fleets  in  the  Mediterranean 
to  convey  that  expedition.  Napoleon  had  or- 
dered Admiral  Rosily,  commanding  the  French 
fleet  at  Cadiz,  and  Admiral  Allemand,  com- 
manding the  fine  Rochefort  division,  to  weigh 
anchor  on  the  first  favourable  occasion,  and  to 
form  a  junction  with  the  Toulon  division.  At 
his  instigation,  the  same  order  had  been  given 


to  the  Spanish  division  at  Carthagena,  com 
manded  by  Admiral  Valdes,  an  order  executeo 
with  tolerable  punctuality,  since  the  Spanish 
government  showed  itself  so  submissive,  and 
he  expected  to  have  twenty  and  odd  sail  at 
Toulon  under  Admiral  Ganteaume,  if  all  these 
junctions  were  successfully  effected.  With  one 
only  of  these  junctions,  that  of  the  Rochefort 
squadron,  one  of  the  most  probable  on  account 
of  the  point  of  starting,  and  the  most  desirable 
on  account  of  the  quality  of  the  crews  and  of 
the  commander,  there  would  be  ships  sufficient 
to  transport  an  army  to  Sicily  and  to  revictual 
Corfu,  the  second  and  not  the  least  important 
object  of  the  expedition.  He  therefore  ordered 
Admiral  Ganteaume  to  collect  at  Toulon,  and 
to  take  on  board  the  division  already  assembled 
in  that  port  a  considerable  mass  of  stores  of  all 
kinds,  such  as  corn,  biscuit,  powder,  projectiles, 
gun-carriages,  tools ;  and  to  land  this  cargo  at 
Corfu,  whatever  might  be  the  success  of  the 
operations  against  Sicily.  He  directed  Joseph 
to  assemble  at  Baiae  eight  or  nine  thousand 
men,  completely  equipped,  and  at  Scylla,  oppo- 
site to  the  light-house,  seven  or  eight  thousand 
more,  with  a  great  quantity  of  feluccas  and 
craft,  capable  of  crossing  the  small  arm  of  the 
sea  which  separates  Sicily  from  Calabria.  He 
desired  that  every  thing  should  be  ready,  so 
that  Admiral  Ganteaume,  having  left  Toulon 
and  arrived  off  Baise,  might  embark  the  eight 
or  nine  thousand  men  concentrated  at  that 
point,  convey  them  in  twenty-four  hours  to  the 
north  of  the  light-house,  where  the  other  seven 
or  eight  thousand  assembled  at  Scylla  and  em- 
barked in  the  small  vessels  that  should  have 
been  procured,  would  have  arrived  on  their 
part.  With  these  15  or  16  thousand  men  the 
light-house  was  to  be  taken,  and  armed  as  well 
as  the  fort  of  Scylla,  and  these  two  points 
which  closed  the  Strait  being  gained  by  the 
French,  they  would  make  themselves  masters 
for  ever  of  the  passage.  This  result  obtained, 
not  an  English  soldier  would  dare  to  remain  in 
Sicily. 

But  this  bold  enterprise  presupposed  that  the 
orders  repeated  by  Napoleon  relative  .to  the 
two  points  which  the  English  still  possessed  on 
the  coast  of  Calabria,  Scylla  and  Reggio,  would 
have  been  carried  into  execution.  Napoleon 
had  several  times  been  angry  with  Joseph,  be- 
cause, with  an  army  of  more  than  40,000  men, 
he  suffered  the  English  still  to  possess  a  foot 
of  the  continent  of  Italy.  "  It  is  a  shame,"  he 
wrote  to  him,  "  that  the  English  can  still  resist 
us  upon  land.  I  beg  you  not  to  write  to  me  till 
this  disgrace  is  retrieved ;  and,  if  it  is  not  soon, 
I  will  send  one  of  my  generals  to  supersede  you 
in  the  command  of  my  army  in  Naples."  Joseph, 
smarting  under  these  reproaches,  had  charged 
General  Regnier  to  attack  the  two  fortified 
points  of  Scylla  and  Reggio,  which  so  grievously 
offended  the  eyes  of  Napoleon.  They  were  on 
the  point  of  being  taken — but  they  were  not 
taken.  Napoleon  was  extremely  angry.  How- 
ever, his  irritation  against  his  brother's  want 
of  energy  made  no  change  in  the  state  of  things; 
it  was  agreed  that  the  plan  of  the  expedition 
should  be  modified,  for  it  was  impossible  to  be 
master  of  the  strait,  while  the  coast  of  the  Ca- 
labrias,  which  ought  naturally  to  have  belonged 
to  the  French,  was  not  yet  in  their  possession. 
I  In  consequence  Admiral  Ganteaume  was  to 


Feb.  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


437 


proceed  first  to  Corfu,  to  land  the  vast  mass  of 
•warlike  stores  on  board  the  fleet,  then  to  return 
to  the  strait,  touch  at  Reggio,  which  would 
probably  be  taken  at  the  presumed  time  of  his 
appearance  in  these  seas,  embark  a  dozen  thou- 
sand men  there,  and  convey  them  by  the  inte- 
rior of  the  strait  to  the  south  of  the  light-house. 
The  season  was  an  additional  motive  with  Ad- 
miral Ganteaume  for  thus  acting;  for,  in  ope- 
rating by  the  interior  of  the  strait  and  to  the 
south  of  the  light-house,  he  should  be  screened 
from  the  violent  winds,  which  in  winter  blow 
from  the  north-west  and  render  the  approach 
to  the  north  coast  of  Sicily  dangerous. 

These  dispositions  being  adopted,  Admiral 
Ganteaume  held  himself  in  readiness  to  embark 
on  the  first  appearance  of  one  of  the  naval  di- 
visions expected  every  moment  from  Cartha- 
gena,  Cadiz,  or  Rochefort.  The  reader  will  re- 
collect, no  doubt,  that  on  the  very  judicious 
observations  of  Admiral  Decres,  it  had  been 
agreed  that  the  Brest  and  Lorient  divisions 
should  remain  at  sea,  and  that  those  of  Roche- 
fort  and  Cadiz  should  alone  receive  orders  to 
penetrate  into  the  Mediterranean.  Admiral 
Rosily  was  extremely  anxious  to  leave  Cadiz, 
•where  he  had  been  detained  upwards  of  two 
years.  But  it  was  more  difficult  for  him  to  get 
out  than  any  other,  on  account  of  the  Strait  of 
Gibraltar.  It  is  to  the  immensity  of  the  seas 
that  the  facility  of  escape  is  owing ;  but  in  the 
narrow  channel  of  a  strait,  within  reach  of  such 
a  post  as  Gibraltar,  it  is  impossible  to  elude  an 
enemy  and  to  give  him  the  slip.  The  sea  be- 
tween the  coast  of  Spain  and  that  of  Africa 
•was  covered  with  small  vessels  mounting  guard 
for  the  English  fleet,  which  kept  in  the  offing, 
in  order  to  entice  Admiral  Rosily  to  venture 
out.  But  no  sooner  was  he  under  weigh  than 
the  whole  naval  force  of  the  enemy  was  seen 
bearing  down  upon  him.  Rosily's  division  was 
completely  armed,  thanks  to  the  resources  of 
the  port  of  Cadiz,  abundant  for  the  French  go- 
vernment, which  paid  well,  null  for  the  Spanish 
government,  which  never  paid.  It  was  man- 
ned, moreover,  by  excellent  crews,  which  had 
been  at  sea  and  sustained  the  greatest  sea- 
fight  of  the  age,  that  of  Trafalgar.  Admiral 
Rosily,  an  old  seaman,  as  experienced  as  he 
was  brave,  would  not  have  shrunk  from  fighting 
an  English  division,  even  superior  in  force  to 
his  own ;  but,  with  six  sail  of  the  line  and  two 
or  three  frigates,  he  could  not  defy  twelve  or 
fifteen  sail  of  the  line  and  a  multitude  of  fri- 
gates without  running  the  risk  of  a  fresh  dis- 
aster. Thus,  though  he  had  received  the  order 
to  leave  Cadiz  in  September,  1807,  he  had  not 
succeeded  in  getting  out  in  February,  1808. 

Rear-admiral  Allemand,  the  boldest  naval 
officer  that  France  then  had,  especially  as  a 
navigator,  found  himself  also  closely  blockaded 
in  Rochefort,  and  the  disasters  experienced  by 
Captain  Soleil's  frigates  furnished  a  proof  of 
this.  But  once  out  of  the  Pertuis  by  a  daring 
venture,  the  ocean  expanded  before  him,  and, 
with  excellent  crews,  good  ships,  and  his  bold- 
ness at  sea,  he  had  many  chances  of  escaping 
the  English.  Several  times  he  weighed  anchor, 
and  several  times  he  beheld  the  enemy  bearing 
down  in  such  number,  that  it  would  have  been 
impossible  to  escape.  One  day,  however,  the 
17th  of  January,  1808,  favoured  by  thick  wea- 
ther, he  set  sail,  got  out  unperceived,  dashed 


into  the  Bay  of  Biscay,  and  doubled  Cape  Orte- 
gal  without  accident,  ran  along  the  whole  of 
Spain,  arrived  within  sight  of  the  projecting 
coasts  of  Europe  and  Africa,  and  in  a  dark 
night,  and  with  a  tremendous  west  wind,  he 
threw  himself  boldly  into  the  strait,  so  well 
guarded  that  Admiral  Rosily  could  not  have 
appeared  in  it  had  he  not  covered  himself  with 
English  colours.  It  has  long  been  proverbially 
said  that  Fortune  favours  the  brave ;  on  this 
occasion,  at  any  rate,  she  certainly  did ;  for,  in 
a  few  hours  Admiral  Allemand  found  himself, 
with  his  whole  division  in  the  open  Mediterra- 
nean, having  passed  Gibraltar  and  Ceuta  with- 
out being  perceived.  On  the  3d  of  February, 
i  he  appeared  in  sight  of  Toulon,  and  made  a 
signal  to  Admiral  Ganteaume  to  come  out,  that 
they  might  proceed  together  to  the  goal  marked 
for  them  by  the  Emperor.  The  joy  of  this 
brave  seaman  was  extreme,  at  having  performed 
so  successfully  such  a  dangerous  trip. 

The  Spanish  division  at  Carthagena,  much 
less  closely  watched  than  that  of  Admiral 
Rosily,  because  it  was  more  than  a  hundred 
leagues  from  the  strait,  and  at  that  time  the 
people  ceased  to  do  the  Spanish  navy  so  much 
honour  as  to  believe  it  to  be  enterprising — the 
division  at  Carthagena  had  few  difficulties  to 
conquer  in  order  to  get  out.  It  had,  therefore, 
been  able  to  weigh  anchor  and  to  sail  for  Toulon, 
agreeably  to  the  orders  of  Napoleon.  It  was 
commanded  by  Admiral  Valdes,  and  composed 
of  one  very  fine  three-decker,  one  ship  of  80, 
and  four  of  74  guns.  After  lying  immovably 
in  the  harbour  for  three  years,  their  bottoms 
were  foul ;  they  were  but  moderately  manned, 
and  had  not  on  board  provisions  for  three 
months.  Whether  the  admiral  had  received 
secret  orders  not  to  execute  his  commission,  or 
the  timidity  of  the  Spanish  sailors  had  become 
extreme,  the  squadron  had  sailed  round  the 
Balearic  Islands,  to  find  an  asylum  there  in 
case  of  need,  and,  on  the  first  appearance  of  an 
English  sail,  had  taken  refuge  there,  informing 
its  government,  which  lost  no  time  in  transmit- 
ting the  intelligence  to  Paris,  that  it  was  blocked 
up  and  knew  not  when  it  would  be  possible  to 
put  to  sea  again.  Whether  treachery  or  faint- 
heartedness, the  result  was  absolutely  the 
same  for  the  plans  of  Napoleon,  and  exhi- 
bited in  the  strongest  light  the  manner  in 
which  Spain  was  accustomed  to  perform  her 
duty  as  an  ally. 

For  the  rest,  Admiral  Ganteaume  had  orders 
to  sail  on  the  first  junction  that  should  happen 
to  increase  his  force.  The  five  ships  at  Toulon 
having,  in  fact,  been  joined  by  the  five  from 
Rochefort,  he  had  nothing  to  fear  in  the  Medi- 
terranean. -The  ships  equipped  at  Toulon  were 
far  less  efficient  than  those  which  had  arrived 
from  Rochefort ;  and  the  crews  of  those  in  par- 
ticular that  were  equipped  in  the  port  of  Genoa 
consisted  of  boys  picked  up  on  the  quays  of 
that  great  city,  the  Genoese  sailors  themselves 
having  fled  into  the  Apennine  mountains. 
Nevertheless,  as  an  excellent  spirit  prevailed 
in  the  Toulon  squadron,  a  spirit  which  was  tra- 
ditional in  that  port,  and  which  Rear-admiral 
Cosmao  strove  to  strengthen  by  his  example, 
goodwill  made  amends  for  inexperience,  and  the 
Toulon  division  was  likely  to  behave  honour- 
ably. Admiral  Ganteaume,  with  two  excellent 
lieutenants,  Rear-admirals  Allemand  and  Cos- 
2o2 


438 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[Feb.  1808 


mao,  had  two  three-deckers,  one  80-gun  ship, 
seven  seventy-fours,  two  frigates,  two  corvettes, 
two  large  flutes,  in  all  sixteen  sail.  After  taking 
time  to  divide  among  the  whole  fleet  the  im- 
mense stores  which  he  was  ordered  to  carry  to 
Corfu,  he  weighed  anchor  on  the  10th  of  Feb- 
ruary, 1808,  steering  for  the  Ionian  Islands, 
whence  he  was  to  return  to  the  Strait  of  Sicily, 
to  convey  a  French  army  to  Catanea,  when  he 
should  have  accomplished  the  first  part  of  his 
mission.  He  sailed  on  the  10th  of  February, 
and  was  out  of  sight  before  any  enemy's  ship 
made  her  appearance.  With  the  composition 
of  his  fleet,  and  in  the  state  of  the  enemy's 
forces  in  the  Mediterranean,  every  thing  be- 
spoke a  successful  result.  In  case  of  separa- 
tion, the  rendezvous  was  the  point  of  Italy  op- 
posite to  the  coast  of  Epire,  having  for  refuge 
the  Gulf  of  Tarento,  the  Mouths  of  the  Cattaro, 
and  Corfu  itself,  the  primary  object  of  the 
expedition. 

While  this  voyage,  which  was  long  and  lasted 
two  months,  was  commencing,  events  in  Spain 
were  following  their  deplorable  course.  The 
letters  of  Napoleon,  in  answer  to  the  proposal 
of  marriage  and  the  request  to  publish  the 
treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  written  on  the  10th 
of  January,  and  despatched  on  the  20th,  did 
not  reach  Madrid  till  the  27th  or  28th,  and 
were  not  delivered  before  the  1st  of  February. 
These  were  not  of  a  nature  to  cheer  the  court 
of  Spain.  To  add  to  its  unhappiness,  the  pro- 
cess at  the  Escurial  was  just  then  finished  with 
extraordinary  eclat,  and  to  the  confusion  of 
those  by  whom  it  was  set  on  foot. 

Notwithstanding  all  the  efforts  made  to  get 
the  friends  of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  de- 
clared accomplices  in  a  crime  which  had  no 
existence,  their  innocence,  supported  by  the 
public  opinion,  had  saved  them.  The  Marquis 
d'Ayerbo,  the  Count  d'Orgas,  the  Dukes  de  San 
Carlos  and  De  1'Infantado,  had  conducted  them- 
selves with  perfect  dignity.  But  the  canon 
Escoi'quiz,  in  particular,  had  displayed  an 
almost  provoking  firmness,  excited  as  he  was 
by  the  danger,  by  the  ambition  to  sustain  his 
part,  by  the  affection  of  his  royal  pupil,  by  the 
indignation  of  an  honest  man.  In  spite  of  the 
unbecoming  threats  of  the  director  of  this  pro- 
cess, Simon  de  Viegas,  one  of  the  vilest  agents 
of  the  court,  Escoi'quiz,  without  disavowing  the 
papers  on  which  the  accusation  was  founded, 
had  persisted  in  maintaining  and  demonstrat- 
ing his  innocence,  saying  that,  in  fact,  he  had 
endeavoured  in  those  papers  to  unveil  the  tur- 
pitudes and  the  crimes  of  the  favourite ;  that 
in  so  doing,  he  was  serving  the  king,  not  be- 
traying him ;  that  the  blank  order,  signed 
beforehand,  to  confer  military  powers  on  the 
Duke  de  1'Infantado  was  a  legitimate  precau- 
tion against  a  plan  of  usurpation  which  every 
body  was  acquainted  with,  and  proof  of  which 
he  engaged  to  furnish,  if  he  were  placed  in 
presence  of  Godoy,  and  permitted  to  call  wit- 
nesses who  were  all  ready  to  reveal  fearful 
truths.  The  courage  of  this  poor,  unarmed 
priest,  having  no  other  support  against  an  all- 
powerful  court  than  public  opinion,  had  dis- 
concerted the  accusers  and  excited  general 
interest :  for,  though  the  proceedings  were 
secret,  the  details  of  them  were  known  from 
day  to  day,  and  transmitted  from  mouth  to 
mouth  with  a  rapidity  which  nothing  but  the 


warmest  passion  can  account  for,  in  a  country 
without  newspapers  and  almost  without  roads. 
The  judges  beginning  to  waver,  there  had  been 
added  to  them  a  reinforcement  of  magistrates 
supposed  to  be  devoted,  for  the  purpose  of 
rendering  the  condemnation  more  certain.  The 
fiscal,  Don  Simon  de  Viegas,  had  conformed  to 
the  order  which  he  had  received,  to  require 
the  punishment  of  death  against  the  accused. 
The  court,  working  in  all  possible  ways  on  the 
judges  upon  whom  it  conceived  that  it  could 
rely,  made  application  to  them  to  pronounce 
the  condemnation  required  by  the  fiscal,  not 
for  the  purpose  of  carrying  it  into  execution, 
but  to  afford  the  king  occasion  to  exercise  his 
clemency.  It  had,  it  was  alleged,  but  one 
object  in  view;  this  was  to  render  the  royal 
authority  more  respectable  by  punishing  with 
a  sentence  of  death  the  mere  thought  of  failing 
in  duty  to  the  king,  and  to  endear  him  still 
more  to  the  people,  by  furnishing  occasion  for 
a  signal  act  of  clemency  towards  the  accused 
to  emanate  from  him.  It  was,  in  fact,  the 
design  of  the  court  to  obtain  a  sentence  of 
death,  in  order  to  prevent  its  execution.  But 
nobody  had  sufficient  confidence  in  it  to  trust 
it  with  the  lives  of  the  most  honoured  members 
of  the  Spanish  grandeza ;  and,  besides,  public 
opinion,  ready  to  break  loose  against  the  dou- 
ble-dealing judges  who  should  sacrifice  inno- 
cence, was  more  imposing  than  the  court.  One 
of  the  judges,  related  to  the  minister  of  grace 
and  justice,  Don  Eugenio  Caballero,  seized  with 
a  mortal  disease,  would  not  leave  the  world 
without  expressing  an  opinion  worthy  of  a  great 
magistrate.  He  requested  his  colleagues  com- 
posing the  extraordinary  tribunal  to  come  to 
his  house  to  deliberate  beside  his  death-bed. 
When  they  were  assembled,  Don  Eugenio  main- 
tained that  it  was  impossible  to  try  the  accom- 
plices in  a  crime,  real  or  false,  without  the 
principal  author ;  that  is  to  say,  without  the 
Prince  of  the  Asturias,  and  that,  according  to 
the  laws  of  the  kingdom,  that  prince  could  be 
summoned  and  heard  only  before  the  assembled 
Cortes ;  that,  moreover,  the  crime  was  ima- 
ginary ;  that  the  proofs  furnished  were  null  or 
destitute  of  legal  character,  for  they  were 
copies,  and  not  the  originals,  which  they  had 
before  them ;  that  the  unknown  person,  who 
had  denounced  these  facts,  ought,  according  to 
the  Spanish  laws,  to  come  forward  and  depose 
upon  the  faith  of  an  oath ;  that,  in  the  state 
of  the  proceedings,  without  the  accused  princi- 
pal, without  proofs,  without  witnesses,  with  all 
that  was  otherwise  known  concerning  the 
alleged  offence  imputed  to  a  prince,  the  object 
of  the  love  of  the  nation,  and  to  great  per- 
sonages objects  of  its  respect,  upright  judges 
ought  to  declare  themselves  incapable  of  pro- 
nouncing, and  to  beseech  the  king  to  annul  so 
scandalous  a  process. 

No  sooner  had  this  courageous  citizen  of  an 
absolute  monarchy,  in  which,  absolute  as  it 
was,  there  were  laws  and  magistrates  embued 
with  their  spirit — no  sooner  had  he  given  his 
opinion,  than  his  colleagues  adopted  that  opi- 
nion and  joined  in  it  with  a  sort  of  patriotic 
enthusiasm.  They  all  embraced  one  another 
after  this  decision,  like  men  about  to  die. 
People  believed,  in  fact,  not  Charles  IV.,  but 
the  court,  to  be  capable  of  every  thing  against 
judges  who  had  disappointed  its  calculations, 


Feb.  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


439 


and  exaggerated  its  cruelty  though  they  could 
not  exaggerate  its  baseness. 

When  this  decision  was  known,  it  transported 
the  public  with  joy,  and  filled  the  court  with 
despondence.  Poo-  Charles  IV.  was  persuaded 
that  he  ought  to  display  his  own  justice,  in 
default  of  that  of  the  magistrates,  and  a  royal 
decree  was  wrung  from  him,  in  virtue  of  which 
the  Dukes  de  San  Carlos,  and  De  1'Infantado, 
the  Marquis  d'Ayerbo,  and  the  Count  d'Orgas 
were  exiled  to  the  distance  of  sixty  leagues 
from  the  capital,  and  stripped  of  all  their  dig- 
nities and  decorations.  The  canon  Escoiquiz, 
the  most  hated  of  all,  was  treated  still  more 
severely.  He  was  deprived  of  his  ecclesiastical 
benefices,  and  doomed  to  end  his  days  in  the 
monastery  of  Tardon.  The  Cardinal  de  Bour- 
bon, Archbishop  of  Toledo,  brother  of  the 
princess  of  the  blood  married  to  Emmanuel 
Godoy,  was  moreover  required  to  make  the 
chapter  of  Toledo  pronounce  the  degradation 
of  the  canon  Escoiquiz,  a  member  of  that 
chapter.  The  cardinal  obstinately  refused  to 
comply.  On  this  occasion,  he  ventured  to  re- 
veal to  Charles  IV.  the  scandals  of  the  mo- 
narchy, and  the  melancholy  situation  of  the 
princess  his  sister,  united  to  the  favourite, 
who  had  added  to  all  his  other  crimes  that  of 
bigamy.  He  went  so  far,  it  is  said,  as  to 
insist  that  his  sister  should  be  given  up  to  him 
and  be  permitted  to  shut  herself  up  in  a  reli- 
gious retreat,  there  to  deplore  a  union  which 
brought  upon  her  disgrace  and  misery.  The 
only  answer  received  by  the  cardinal  was  an 
order  to  retire  to  his  diocese. 

The  courageous  magistrate  who  had  so  nobly 
done  his  duty,  Don  Eugenio  Caballero,  being 
dead,  his  funeral  became  a  sort  of  triumph. 
All  the  religious  congregations  disputed  the 
honour  of  burying  him  gratuitously,  and  all 
the  most  respectable  people  in  Madrid  accom- 
panied the  magistrate  who  had  so  worthily 
finished  his  career  to  his  last  home.  As  for  the 
accused,  the  public  rejoiced  to  see  their  lives 
saved,  especially  after  the  exaggerated  appre- 
hensions occasioned  by  their  trial.  No  fears 
were  entertained  for  the  consequences  of  this 
trial  to  their  reputation,  for  they  were  sur- 
rounded by  universal  esteem,  even  beyond 
their  merit;  neither  was  any  uneasiness  felt 
about  their  exile,  for  nobody  imagined  that  it 
would  last  long.  All  the  world,  in  fact,  ex- 
pected a  speedy  catastrophe,  whether  it  were 
to  proceed  from  the  public  indignation  excited 
to  the  highest  degree,  or  to  be  the  work  of  the 
French  troops,  silently  advancing  towards  the 
capital,  without  telling  what  they  came  to  do 
there.  People  still  flattered  themselves  that 
they  would  do  what  was  generally  wished, 
namely,  hurl  the  favourite  from  that  throne 
half  of  which  he  had  usurped,  and  unite  the 
Prince  of  the  Asturias  with  a  French  princess 
amid  the  thunder  of  their  guns. 

While  the  sympathies  of  an  excited  nation 
surrounded  those  who  declared  themselves 
against  the  court,  that  court  was  filled  both 
with  rage  and  terror.  It  was  an  immemorial 
custom  for  the  royal  family  to  leave,  in  Janu- 
ary, the  cold  and  bleak  residence  of  the  Escu- 
rial,  to  enjoy  the  climate  of  Aranjuez,  a  mag- 
nificent domain,  crossed  by  the  Tagus,  and 
where  spring,  as  is  the  case  in  southern  lati- 
tudes, begins  to  be  felt  in  the  month  of  March, 


sometimes  even  so  early  as  the  end  of  February. 
It  was  customary  too,  Madrid  lying  in  the  way, 
for  the  court  to  pass  a  few  days  there,  to  re- 
ceive the  homage  of  the  capital.  Expecting 
this  year  to  be  greeted  with  demonstrations  of 
aversion  alone,  the  court  passed  the  gates  of 
Madrid  without  stopping,  and  went  on  to  hide 
its  shame,  mortification,  and  alarm  at  Aran- 
juez. 

It  had,  in  fact,  not  a  single  support  to  hope 
for  in  any  quarter.  The  Spanish  people  mani- 
fested an  implacable  hatred  for  it,  and  scarcely 
made  any  difference  in  favour  of  the  king  by 
despising  instead  of  hating  him.  As  for  the 
terrible  Emperor  of  the  French,  whom  that 
court  had  alternately  flattered  and  betrayed, 
whose  favour  since  Jena,  it  hoped  to  have 
regained  by  a  year  of  meannesses,  he  covered 
himself  all  at  once  with  an  impenetrable  veil, 
and  maintained  an  alarming  silence  respecting 
his  designs.  The  French  armies,  directed  at 
first  upon  Portugal,  were  now  executing  a 
movement  upon  Madrid,  upon  pretext  of  march- 
ing towards  Cadiz  or  Gibraltar.  But  it  was  an 
unheard  of  proceeding  to  invade  in  that  man- 
ner, and  without  further  explanation,  the  ter- 
ritory of  a  great  power.  The  answer  which 
Napoleon  had  returned  to  the  proposal  of  mar- 
riage could  not  be  regarded  as  serious ;  for  ha 
wished  to  know,  he  said,  before  he  gave  a 
French  princess  to  Ferdinand,  whether  that 
prince  was  readmitted  into  the  good  graces  of 
his  parents,  and  this  question  he  asked  Charles 
IV.,  who  had  formally  acquainted  him  with 
the  arrest  of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  and 
the  pardon  which  followed  it.  The  refusal  to 
publish  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  which 
contained  the  concession  of  a  sovereignty  to 
Emmanuel  Godoy,  and  the  formal  guarantee 
of  the  dominions  belonging  to  the  crown  of 
Spain,  could  have  none  but  a  sinister  significa- 
tion. From  all  these  considerations,  despond- 
ence prevailed  at  Aranjuez,  in  the  interior  of 
royalty,  and  at  Buen  Retire,  in  the  residence 
of  the  Countess  de  Castel  Fiel,  the  favourite  of 
the  favourite.  Both  here  and  there,  they  began 
to  open  their  eyes,  and  to  discover  that,  by 
dint  of  meannesses,  they  had  inspired  Napoleon 
with  the  audacity  to  overthrow  a  degraded 
dynasty,  despised  by  all  the  Spaniards.  Every 
day  the  idea  of  imitating  the  house  of  Bra- 
ganza  and  retiring  to  America  recurred  more 
and  more  frequently  to  the  minds  of  the  leaders 
of  the  court,  and  gave  occasion  to  more  and 
more  frequent  rumours.  Emmanuel  Godoy  and 
the  queen  had  almost  definitively  decided  upon 
this  resolution,  and  they  secretly  made  their 
preparations ;  for  the  loads  of  valuable  effects 
sent  off  for  the  ports  were  more  numerous  and 
more  noticed  than  usual.  But  it  was  first  ne- 
cessary to  gain  the  sanction  of  the  king,  whose 
weakness  dreaded  a  change  of  place  almost  as 
much  as  the  horrors  of  a  war;  it  was  also 
necessary  to  decide  the  princes  of  the  blood, 
Don  Antonio,  brother  of  Charles  IV.,  Ferdinand, 
his  son  and  heir,  as  well  as  the  younger  Infants. 
The  commission  of  one  indiscretion  would  be 
sufficient  to  cause  the  whole  nation  to  rise 
against  such  a  design.  The  Prince  of  th« 
Peace,  in  order  to  cover  the  preparations  which 
were  perceived  at  Ferrol  and  Cadiz,  circulated 
a  report  that  he  was  going  in  person,  in  hia 
quality  of  grand-admiral,  to  inspect  the  ports. 


440 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


and  that  he  was  to  begin  \vith  those  of  the 
South. 

But,  before  undertaking  this  flight,  which, 
even  for  the  queen  and  Godoy,  was  but  an  ex- 
treme course,  it  would  be  proper  to  endeavour 
by  all  means  to  draw  from  Napoleon  the  secret 
of  his  intentions,  and  to  bend,  if  possible,  his 
formidable  will.  There  was  nothing,  in  fact, 
that  ought  to  have  been  attempted,  before  they 
had  themselves  decided  on  leaving  Spain,  and 
before  they  had  extorted  the  compliance  of 
Charles  IV.  In  consequence,  in  reply  to  the 
last  answer  of  Napoleon,  Charles  IV.  was  pre- 
vailed upon  to  write  another  letter,  dated  the 
6th  of  February,  eight  or  ten  days  before  the 
conclusion  of  the  process  at  the  Escurial,  with 
a  view  to  force  him  to  an  explanation,  to  touch 
his  heart,  if  it  were  possible,  to  appeal  even  to 
his  honour,  deeply  interested  in  keeping  the 
promises  that  he  had  given.  In  this  letter, 
Charles  IV.  confessed  the  alarm  which  began 
to  be  felt  at  the  approach  of  the  French  troops, 
reminded  Napoleon  of  all  that  he  had  done  to 
gratify  him,  all  the  proofs  of  attachment  that 
he  had  given  him,  the  sacrifice  of  his  navy,  the 
sending  of  his  armies  to  distant  countries,  and 
solicited  of  him,  in  return  for  so  faithful  an 
alliance,  a  frank  and  honest  declaration  of  his 
intentions ;  as  he  could  not  suppose  that  they 
were  any  other  than  what  Spain  had  deserved. 
The  poor  king  knew  not,  when  writing  in  this 
manner,  that  this  faithful  alliance  had  been 
intermingled  with  a  thousand  secret  treache- 
ries, that  the  sacrifice  of  his  navy  had  served 
only  to  cause  the  destruction  of  the  two  fleets 
at  Trafalgar,  that  the  sending  of  a  division  to 
Hamburg  had  been  of  no  other  service  than 
that  of  a  demonstration,  and  that  Spain  had 
been  an  auxiliary  useless  to  herself  and  to  her 
allies,  sometimes  even  the  occasion  of  great 
uneasiness  to  them.  Ignorant  of  these  things, 
as  of  all  others,  he  addressed  these  questions 
to  Napoleon  in  perfect  sincerity,  under  the 
dictation  of  those  who  knew,  thought,  and 
willed  for  him.  This  unfortunate  prince  could 
not  believe  that,  at  the  close  of  his  life,  having 
never  sought  to  do  an  injury,  he  could  be  re- 
duced to  the  necessity  either  of  fighting  or  of 
running  away,  convinced  as  he  was  that,  to 
reign  honourably  and  safely,  it  was  sufficient 
to  have  never  wilfully  done  harm ;  of  which  he 
was  very  sure,  for  he  had  never  done  any  thing 
but  hunt  and  look  after  his  horses  and  his 
fowling-pieces. 

This  letter,  destined  for  Napoleon,  was  fol- 
lowed by  most  pressing  letters  to  M.  Yzquierdo. 
He  was  implored  to  procure  at  any  price,  no 
matter  what  it  cost,  precise  intelligence  of  the 
intentions  of  France ;  to  endeavour  to  change 
them  by  means  of  sacrifices,  if  they  were  hos- 
tile ;  or,  if  they  were  not  to  be  changed,  to 
communicate  them  at  least,  that  one  might  be 
able  to  combat  them  or  to  avoid  their  conse- 
quences. All  the  necessary  credits  were  opened 
for  him,  in  case  there  should  be  any  means  of 
succeeding  in  such  a  commission. 

The  despatches  in  question  arrived  in  Paris 
in  the  middle  of  February.  Napoleon  had 
evaded  the  application  for  a  French  princess 
for  Ferdinand,  by  feigning  ignorance  whether 
that  prince  had  been  restored  to  favour  by  his 
parents.  Unable  to  allege  any  further  doubt 
on  this  subject,  and  directly  questioned  con- 


[Feb.  180&. 


cerning  his  intentions,  he  was  sensible  that  the 
time  for  the  denoument  had  arrived,  and  that, 
after  taking  a  fixed  resolution  to  dethrone  the 
Bourbons,  he  must  at  length  fix  upon  the 
means  of  accomplishing  it,  without  revolting 
too  violently  the  public  feeling  of  Spain,  France, 
and  Europe.  This  was  the  only  point  upon 
which  he  had  really  hesitated ;  for,  if  he  had 
for  a  moment  admitted  the  plan  of  allying  the 
two  dynasties,  by  a  marriage,  as  practicable, 
and  the  plan  of  appropriating  to  himself  a  large 
portion  of  the  Spanish  territory  as  worth  discuss- 
ing, at  bottom,  he  had  always  preferred,  as  the 
safest,  the  most  decisive,  nay,  the  most  honest 
course,  to  take  nothing  from  Spain  but  her  dy- 
nasty and  her  barbarism,  and  suffering  her  to 
keep  her  territory,  her  colonies,  and  her  inde- 
pendence. But  the  means  of  rendering  endu- 
rable this  act  of  a  conqueror,  even  in  times 
when  not  only  the  crowns  of  kings,  but  their 
heads  had  fallen — the  means  were  difficult  to 
find.  The  family  of  Braganza  had,  itself,  by 
its  flight,  suggested  a  medium  to  him,  to  which 
he  had  finally  adhered  as  we  have  seen :  this 
was  to  induce  the  court  of  Spain  to  embark  at 
Cadiz  for  the  New  World.  Nothing  would  then 
be  more  simple  than  to  present  himself  to  a 
deserted  nation,  to  declare  to  it  that,  instead 
of  a  degenerate  dynasty,  cowardly  enough  to 
abandon  its  throne  and  its  people,  he  would 
give  it  a  new,  glorious,  peaceably  reforming 
dynasty,  bringing  to  Spain  the  benefits  of  the 
French  Revolution  without  its  calamities,  a 
participation  in  the  greatness,  of  France,  with- 
out the  horrible  wars  which  France  had  had  to 
sustain.  This  solution  was  natural,  less  liable 
to  censure  than  the  other,  and  furnished  by  the 
very  cowardice  of  the  adulterated  families 
which  reigned  over  the  South  of  Europe.  It 
became,  moreover,  more  probable  from  day  to 
day ;  since  at  each  new  fit  of  terror  that  should 
seize  the  court  of  Spain,  the  report  of  a  retreat 
to  America,  echo  of  the  internal  agitations  of 
the  palace,  was  circulated  in  the  capital.  It 
would  be  sufficient  to  push  this  terror  to  the 
utmost,  to  make  the  French  troops  advance  de- 
finitively towards  Madrid,  continuing  to  ob- 
serve a  threatening  silence  respecting  their 
destination.  In  consequence  Napoleon  made 
all  arrangements  for  bringing  about  the  catas- 
trophe in  March  ;  for  if  it  should  be  necessary 
to  act  in  Spain,  spring  would  be  the  most  fa- 
vourable season  for  introducing  his  young  sol- 
diers into  that  arid  and  parched  country, 
which,  physically  as  well  as  morally,  is  the 
commencement  of  Africa.  It  was  now  the  mid- 
dle of  February.  Napoleon  had  a  month  to 
the  middle  of  March  to  make  his  last  prepara- 
tions. He  began  them,  therefore,  immediately 
after  he  had  received  the  interrogatory  letter 
of  King  Charles  IV.,  dated  the  5th  of  February ; 
in  which  that  unfortunate  prince  besought  him 
to  explain  his  intentions  in  regard  to  Spain. 

But,  before  provoking  at  Madrid  the  denod- 
ment  which  he  desired,  he  was  obliged  to  de- 
cide upon  the  course  to  be  pursued  on  a  ques- 
tion not  less  important  than  that  of  Spain,  on 
the  question  of  the  East,  for  at  the  moment  one 
was  linked  to  the  other.  If  any  thing,  in  fact, 
could  add  to  the  imprudence  of  undertaking 
new  enterprises,  when  he  had  already  such  mo- 
mentous ones  on  his  hands,  it  would  be  that  of 
engaging  in  the  affairs  of  Spain  with  Russia 


Feb.  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


441 


discontented.  Accustomed  as  Europe  was  to 
new  spectacles,  prepared  as  it  was  for  the  ap- 
proaching end  of  the  Bourbons  of  Spain,  its 
foresight  was  far  behind  the  reality;  and  the 
overthrow  of  one  of  the  most  ancient  thrones 
in  the  world  was  destined  to  excite  a  deep  emo- 
tion, to  transfer  from  the  head  of  England  to 
that  of  France  the  reprobation  called  forth  by 
the  crime  of  Copenhagen.  Though  Prussia  was 
crushed,  Austria  alternately  irritated  and  trem- 
bling, it  would  have  been  supremely  imprudent 
not  to  secure,  on  the  eve  of  an  act  of  the  great- 
est audacity,  the  certain  adhesion  of  Russia. 
It  was,  in  fact,  one  of  the  most  serious  incon- 
veniences of  the  enterprise  against  Spain,  that 
it  inevitably  entailed  sacrifices  in  the  East ; 
and  it  was,  as  we  shall  see  hereafter,  one  of  the 
most  lamentable  faults  of  the  Emperor,  in  these 
circumstances,  not  to  have  known  how  to  make 
those  sacrifices  frankly.  It  would  have  been 
otherwise  if,  having  undertaken  less  in  the 
North,  if,  having  given  up  Germany  to  satisfy 
Prussia,  he  had  not  had  to  leave  on  the  Vistula 
800,000  veteran  soldiers,  who  composed  the 
real  force  of  the  French  army.  Confining  him- 
self then  to  the  occupation  of  Italy  and  Spain, 
having  his  armies  concentrated  behind  the 
Rhine,  and  nobody  to  fear  or  to  support  be- 
yond that  frontier,  he  might  have  dispensed 
with  purchasing  by  sacrifices  the  concurrence 
of  Russia.  And  if  she  had  resolved  to  take 
advantage  of  the  occasion  to  fall  upon  the  East, 
Austria  herself,  though  inconsolable  for  the  loss 
of  Italy,  would  have  become  the  ally  of  France 
for  the  purpose  of  defending  the  Lower  Danube. 
But  Napoleon,  having  destroyed  Prussia,  created 
ephemeral  royalties  in  Germany,  and  sowed  the 
seeds  of  hatred  and  ingratitude  from  the  Rhine 
to  the  Vistula,  required  an  ally  in  the  North, 
even  though  dearly  purchased. 

General  Savary  had  been  succeeded  at  St. 
Petersburg  by  M.  de  Caulaincourt,  and  nearly 
at  the  same  time  M.  de  Tolstoy,  ambassador  of 
Russia,  had  arrived  at  Paris.  The  latter  was, 
as  we  have  said,  a  soldier,  brother  of  the  grand 
marshal  of  the  palace,  imbued  with  the  opi- 
nions of  the  Russian  aristocracy  in  regard  to 
France,  but  member  of  a  family  which  enjoyed 
the  imperial  favour,  which  placed  that  favour 
above  its  prejudices,  and  which  discovered  in 
the  conquest  of  Finland  and  of  the  Danubian 
provinces  a  sufficient  excuse  for  the  deserters 
•who  had  gone  over  from  the  English  policy  to 
the  French  policy.  "  My  brother  has  devoted 
himself,"  said  the  Grand-marshal  Tolstoy,  to 
M.  de  Caulaincourt;  "  he  has  accepted  the  em- 
bassy to  Paris,  but,  if  he  does  not  obtain  for 
Russia  something  of  consequence  he  is  ruined 
and  all  of  us  along  with  him."1  These  words 
prove  in  what  spirit  the  new  ambassador  came 
to  France.  Alexander  had  related  to  him  what 
had  passed  at  Tilsit,  in  the  way  in  which  he 
was  fond  of  calling  it  to  mind  and  understand- 
ing it,  and,  according  to  this  communication, 
much  altered  from  the  conversations  of  Napo- 
leon. M.  de  Tolstoy  had  conceived  that  all  had 
been  told,  that  the  sacrifice  of  the  empire  of 
the  East  was  made,  that  he  had  come  to  Paris 
merely  to  sign  the  partition  of  Turkey,  and  the 
acquisition,  if  not  of  Constantinople  and  the 


«  These  words  are  literally  extracted  from  the  secret 
correspondence  so  frequently  quoted  by  u*. 
VOL.  II — 56 


j  Dardanelles,  at  least  of  the  plains  of  the  Da- 
j  nube  as  far  as  the  Balkans.  Besides,  he  had 
j  visited  by  the  way  the  unfortunate  sovereigns 
!  of  Prussia,  despoiled  of  part  of  their  domi- 
nions, and  deprived  of  nearly  the  whole  of  their 
revenues  by  the  prolonged  occupation  of  the 
provinces  that  were  left  them.  M.  de  Tolstoy, 
thinking  that  if  the  conquest  of  the  provinces 
of  the  East  interested  the  glory  of  Russia,  the 
evacuation  of  the  Prussian  provinces  interested 
her  honour,  came  to  Paris  prepossessed  with 
the  two-fold  notion  of  obtaining  a  share  of  the- 
Turkish  empire  and  the  evacuation  of  Prussia. 
Add  to  all  this  that  he  was  techy,  irritable,  sus- 
picious, and  excessively  proud  of  the  glory  of 
the  Russian  armies. 

Napoleon  had  promised  to  give  him  a  favour- 
able reception,  to  make  him  fond  of  residing  at 
Paris,  that  he  might  contribute  by  his  reports 
to  the  maintenance  of  the  alliance.  But  he 
found  him  so  fiery  and  so  intractable  on  the 
double  affair  of  the  evacuation  of  Prussia  and 
the  acquisition  of  the  provinces  of  the  Danube, 
that  he  was  annoyed  at  it.  He  felt  so  strong, 
and  was  himself  so  far  from  patient,  that  he 
could  not  long  endure  the  persistance  of  M.  de 
Tolstoy.  Napoleon,  only  half  disguising  the 
vexation  that  he  felt,  told  the  new  ambassador 
that  if,  after  evacuating  the  whole  of  Old  Prus- 
sia and  part  of  Pomerania,  he  continued  to  oc- 
cupy Brandenburg  and  Silesia,  it  was  because 
Prussia  had  refused  to  pay  the  war  contribu- 
tions ;  that  he  desired  nothing  more  than  to 
withdraw  his  troops  as  soon  as  they  should  be 
paid ;  that,  for  the  rest,  if  he  tarried  in  Prus- 
sia beyond  the  intended  time,  the  Russians,  on 
their  part,  were  tarrying  without  any  avowable 
motive  in  the  provinces  of  the  Danube,  and  that 
Moldavia  and  Wallachia  were  assuredly  equi- 
valent to  Silesia.  Without  precisely  saying  so, 
Napoleon  appeared,  in  the  eyes  of  a  prejudiced 
person,  like  M.  de  Tolstoy,  to  make  the  evacua- 
tion of  Silesia  dependent  on  that  of  Moldavia 
and  Wallachia,  and  almost  to  link  the  acquisi- 
tion of  the  latter  by  the  Russians  to  the  acqui- 
sition of  the  former  by  the  French.  The  tem- 
per of  M.  de  Tolstoy  ought  to  have  given  way 
to  the  elevation  of  Napoleon,  but  the  Russian 
minister  felt  grievously  mortified ;  and,  as  we 
always  seek  the  society  that  sympathizes  most 
with  our  own  sentiments,  he  kept  company  in 
preference  with  the  infatuated  persons  of  the 
old  French  nobility,  a  far  from  numerous  class, 
who  revenged  themselves  by  their  animadver- 
sions, for  not  being  yet  admitted  into  the  impe- 
rial court.  He  held  a  language  that  was  not 
friendly,  and  had  well  nigh  quarrelled  with 
Marshal  Ney,  who  was  not  of  a  passive  dispo- 
sition, about  the  merit  of  the  Russian  and  the 
French  armies,  and  behaved  more  like  the  re- 
presentative of  an  unfriendly  court  than  of  one 
which  wished  to  be,  and  which  really  was,  at 
least  for  the  moment,  a  close  ally.  M.  de  Tal- 
leyrand, with  his  disdainful  sang-froid,  was  in- 
structed to  curb,  to  calm,  to  repress,  if  need- 
ful, the  troublesome  temper  of  M.  de  Tolstoy. 
Things  went  on  more  smoothly  at  St.  Peters- 
burg between  M.  de  Caulaincourt  and  the 
Emperor  Alexander,  but  the  latter  dissembled 
no  more  than  his  ambassador  the  mortification 
which  he  experienced.  M.  de  Caulaincourt 
was  a  grave  man,  whose  face  was  stamped 
with  the  integrity  that  dwelt  in  hie  soul,  hav- 


442 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1808. 


ing  but  one  weakness,  the  incapability  of  con- 
soling himself  for  the  part  which  he  had  acted 
in  the  affair  of  the  Duke  d'Enghien ;  which 
rendered  him  sensible,  beyond  measure,  to  the 
esteem  that  was  manifested  for  him,  and  which 
furnished  the  Emperor  Alexander  with  the 
means  of  swaying  him.  M.  de  Caulaincourt 
found  the  emperor  full  of  courtesy  and  kind- 
ness towards  him,  but  wounded  to  the  heart 
to  see  that  the  promises  made  to  him  were  not 
immediately  realized.  At  Tilsit,  Napoleon  had 
said  to  the  Emperor  Alexander  that,  if  the  war 
continued,  and  if  Russia  took  part  in  it,  she 
might  find  towards  the  Baltic  an  increase  of 
security,  towards  the  Black  Sea  an  increase 
of  greatness ;  and  he  had  talked  eventually  of 
the  distribution  to  be  made  of  the  provinces  of 
the  Turkish  empire,  without,  however,  stipu- 
lating any  thing  positive.  But  if,  on  the  one 
hand,  in  the  excitement  of  these  communica- 
tions he  had  perhaps  said  more  than  he  meant 
to  grant,  the  Emperor  Alexander  had  under- 
stood more  than  he  had  really  said  to  him ; 
and,  on  his  return  to  St.  Petersburg,  in  a  dis- 
contented company,  in  order  to  pacify  it,  he 
had  made  in  confidence  many  indiscreet  and 
exaggerated  communications.  By  degrees  a 
notion  became  current  in  the  drawing-rooms 
of  St.  Petersburg,  that  Russia,  though  van- 
quished at  Friedland,  had  brought  back  from 
Tilsit  the  gift  of  Finland,  Moldavia,  and  Wal- 
lachia.  Those  who  were  well  disposed  to- 
wards the  Emperor  Alexander,  or  at  least  who 
were  not  predetermined  to  censure  the  go- 
vernment, considered  that  this  was  a  very  fine 
price  for  several  unsuccessful  campaigns;  that 
if  Russia  owed  such  extensive  conquests  to  the 
friendship  of  France,  she  did  right  to  cultivate 
and  to  preserve  that  friendship.  Those,  on  the 
contrary,  who  still  cherished  in  their  hearts  all 
the  sentiments  excited  by  the  late  war,  or  who 
were  angry  with  the  emperor  for  his  incon- 
stancy, such  as  Messrs,  de  Czartoryski,  Novo- 
silzoff,  Strogonoff,  and  Kotschonbey,  repre- 
senting the  forsaken  policy — these  alleged  that 
the  conquest  of  Finland,  to  which  Russia  was 
urged,  was  of  no  value,  that  it  was  a  country 
of  lakes  and  marshes,  totally  destitute  of  in- 
habitants ;  that,  moreover,  this  conquest  was 
immoral,  since  it  was  gained  from  a  relation 
and  an  ally,  the  King  of  Sweden ;  that,  for  the 
rest,  it  would  be  the  only  one  that  Napoleon 
would  allow  the  Emperor  Alexander  to  make ; 
that  he  would  never  put  Moldavia  and  Wal- 
lachia  into  his  hands,  of  which  people  would 
very  soon  be  convinced;  that  the  French  al- 
liance was,  therefore,  at  once  a  desertion,  an 
inconsistency,  and  a  cheat. 

This  language,  repeated  to  the  Emperor 
Alexander,  deeply  vexed  him,  and,  seeing  by 
the  reports  of  M.  de  Tolstoy  that  it  was  likely 
to  be  some  day  verified,  he  expressed  to  M.  de 
Caulaincourt  his  extreme  mortification  on  the 
subject.  He  received  him  with  great  cordi- 
ality, manifested  for  him  an  esteem  for  which, 
as  he  perceived,  that  ambassador  was  eager, 
and  then,  coming  to  what  concerned  the  Rus- 
sian interests,  he  launched  out  into  bitter  com- 
plaints. He  had  never  meant,  he  said,  to  link 
the  fate  of  Silesia  with  that  of  Moldavia  and 
Wallachia.  He  had  stipulated  and  obtained 
from  the  friendship  of  the  Emperor  Napoleon 
the  restitution  of  part  of  the  Prussian  domi- 


nions, a  restitution  necessary,  indispensable,  tc 
the  honour  of  Russia.  He  should  have  been 
content  with  that  restitution,  and  have  retired 
to  his  own  empire,  satisfied  with  having  spared 
his  unfortunate  allies  some  of  the  consequences 
of  the  war,  if  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  desirous 
to  engage  him  in  his  system,  had  not  afforded 
him  a  glimpse  of  aggrandizements  both  to  the 
north  and  to  the  south  of  the  empire,  and  had 
not  been  the  first  to  speak  to  him  about  Mol- 
davia and  Wallachia.  Urged  to  enter  this 
track,  he  had  done  all  that  Napoleon  desired  ; 
he  had  declared  war  against  England,  in  spite 
of  the  interests  of  Russian  commerce ;  he  had 
resolved  upon  war  with  Sweden,  in  spite  of  the 
ties  of  relationship ;  and,  when  he,  and  every- 
body in  the  empire,  expected  to  receive  the 
price  of  all  this  compliance  with  a  foreign 
policy,  there  comes  all  at  once  intelligence 
from  Paris  that  he  must  renounce  the  most 
legitimate  hopes.  The  czar  could  not  recover 
from  his  surprise  or  get  the  better  of  his  vexa- 
tion. To  pretend  to  make  the  fate  of  Silesia 
dependent  on  that  of  Moldavia  and  Wallachia, 
and  to  keep  back  the  one  from  the  Prussians 
in  order  to  give  the  two  others  to  the  Russians, 
was  a  proceeding  which  rendered  it  a  duty  of 
honour  to  refuse  every  thing.  He  could  not 
pay  with  the  spoils  of  an  unfortunate  friend, 
whom  he  was  accused  of  having  too  much 
sacrificed  already,  for  acquisitions  that  he 
might  be  permitted  to  make  on  the  Danube. 
"  Those  unfortunate  Prussians"  said  Alexander, 
to  M.  de  Caulaincourt,  "  have  nothing  to  eat. 
Relieve  me  from  their  importunities,  and  I 
shall  have  nothing  else  to  trouble  me  in  my 
relations  with  France.  Besides,  what  would 
Napoleon  do  with  Silesia  ?  Would  he  keep  it 
himself?  But  in  that  case  he  would  be  my 
neighbour,  and  neighbours,  as  he  has  himself 
told  me,  are  never  friends.  Of  what  advantage 
to  him  would  be  a  province  so  distant  from  his 
empire  ?  Let  him  take  what  he  pleases  around 
him,  near  to  him,  I  shall  think  it  natural  and 
regular.  He  has  taken  Etruria ;  he  is  going,  it 
is  said,  to  take  the  Roman  States ;  and  con- 
templates one  knows  not  what  against  Spain — 
be  it  so !  Let  him  do  what  suits  him  in  the 
South,  but  leave  us  to  do,  in  like  manner, 
what  suits  us  in  the  North,  and  not  approach 
too  near  our  frontiers.  If  he  does  not  want 
Silesia  for  himself,  could  he  give  it  to  any  one 
else  equally  serviceable  to  him  with  me  ?  As- 
suredly not,  and  in  restoring  it  to  the  Prus- 
sians, which  is  the  simplest  of  solutions,  he 
must  not  in  retaliation  refuse  me  what  he  has 
promised.  He  would  then  disappoint  not  only 
my  expectations  but  those  of  the  Russian 
nation,  which  would  esteem  Finland  to  be  not 
worth  the  war  which  it  will  cost  us  with  Eng- 
land and -Sweden,  which  would  say,  'that  I 
have  been  duped  by  the  great  man  with  whom 
I  have  conversed  at  Tilsit;  that  one  cannot 
meet  him  without  danger,  either  on  the  field 
of  battle,  or  in  a  negotiation ;  and  that  it 
would  have  been  better,  without  continuing  an 
impolitic  and  dangerous  war,  to  separate  in 
peace  but  with  indifference  and  the  coldness 
which  distance  justifies.'." 

Such  had  been,  and  such  was,  every  day,  the 
language  of  the  Emperor  Alexander  to  M.  de 
Caulaincourt.  He  did  not  add  that,  if  he  had 
been  taught  to  hope  for  the  provinces  of  the 


Feb   1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


443 


Danube,  it  MIS  without  their  being  promised 
to  him,  and  that  if,  out  of  a  mere  hope,  the 
Russian  nation,  misled  by  the  rumours  of  the 
court,  had  made  a  formal  engagement,  the  fault 
was  his,  owing  to  his  indiscretion,  nay,  his 
•weakness,  since  he  had  not  been  able  to  control 
those  around  him  but  by  promising  more  thai} 
he  could  perform.  Alexander  did  not  add  this, 
but  it  was  evident  that,  if  one  were  not  to  come 
to  his  relief,  by  granting  what  he  had  impru- 
dently suffered  the  nation  to  hope  for,  he  would 
be  cruelly  hurt,  and  his  minister  Romanzoff 
also,  and  that,  if  the  sudden  change  of  policy 
effected  at  Tilsit  was  too  recent  for  one  to  ven- 
ture upon  another  equally  sudden,  there  would 
still  be  left  at  the  bottom  of  the  heart  a  deep 
wound  constantly  bleeding,  and  from  which 
fresh  wars  would  be  likely  soon  to  ensue. 

M.  de  Caulaincourt,  affirming  with  his  persua- 
sive honesty  the  good  faith  of  Napoleon,  pro- 
testing that  every  thing  would  be  cleared  up, 
attributing  to  a  misunderstanding,  to  the  jea- 
lous susceptibility  of  M.  de  Tolstoy,  the  sinister 
reports  which  had  come  from  Paris,  succeeded 
in  restoring  some  composure  to  the  mind  of  the 
Emperor  Alexander.  The  latter  at  length  be- 
gan to  find  fault  with  M.  de  Tolstoy  himself, 
with  his  awkwardness,  with  his  ill  temper,  and 
declared  before  M.  de  Caulaincourt  that  he 
would  not  fail,  if  he  again  found  M.  de  Tolstoy, 
as  he  did  formerly  M.  de  Markoff,  bent  on  em- 
broiling the  two  courts,  to  make  a  signal  exam- 
ple of  those  who  should  study  to  thwart,  instead 
of  endeavouring  to  serve  him.  The  Emperor 
Alexander  had  appeared  highly  gratified  by  the 
magnificent  presents  of  Sevres  porcelain  sent 
to  St.  Petersburg,  by  the  cession  of  fifty  thou- 
sand muskets,  and  by  the  reception  of  the  Rus- 
sian cadets  into  the  French  navy.  But  nothing 
touched  that  heart,  full  of  a  single  passion,  ex- 
cepting the  object  of  that  passion.  The  pro- 
vinces of  the  Danube  or  nothing ;  that  was  im- 
pressed upon  his  countenance  as  in  his  soul, 
deeply  smitten  with  ambition  and  renown. 

For  the  rest,  M.  de  Caulaincourt,  in  order  to 
ascertain  precisely  whether  the  nation  shared 
the  sentiments  of  its  sovereign,  sent  one  of  the 
employes  of  the  embassy  to  Moscow,  to  pick  up 
what  was  said  there.  This  employ^,  transported 
into  the  circles  of  the  old  Russian  aristocracy, 
whose  language  was  more  natural  and  more  true 
than  at  St.  Petersburg,  heard  it  repeated  that 
the  young  czar  had  very  rapidly  passed  from 
hatred  to  friendship  in  espousing  the  policy 
of  France  at  Tilsit ;  that  he  had  very  lightly 
compromised  the  interests  of  Russian  commerce 
by  declaring  war  against  Great  Britain ;  that 
Finland  was  a  very  slender  compensation  for 
such  sacrifices ;  that  Wallachia  and  Moldavia 
at  least  would  be  required  to  make  suitable 
payment  for  them ;  but  that  those  fine  provinces 
would  never  be  obtained  from  Napoleon ;  and 
that  their  young  emperor  would,  this  time, 
have  to  pay  the  penalty  of  a  new  inconsistency 
by  a  new  disappointment. 

M.  de  Caulaincourt  lost  no  time  in  transmit- 
ting these  various  particulars  to  Napoleon,  and 
declared  that  without  doubt  the  court  of  Rus- 
sia, though  deeply  mortified,  would  not  go  to 
•war,  but  that  it  was  not  to  be  relied  upon,  if 
that  were  not  granted  to  it,  which,  with  or  with- 
out reason,  it  had  flattered  itself  that  it  should 
obtain. 


General  Savary,  returning  from  St.  Peters- 
burg, corroborated  by  his  testimony  the  reports 
of  M.  de  Caulaincourt,  supported  them  by  the 
recital  of  a  multitude  of  particulars  which  he 
had  himself  collected,  and  confirmed  Napoleon 
in  the  idea  that  it  depended  on  himself  to  attach 
the  Emperor  Alexander  entirely,  to  chain  him 
to  all  his  projects,  whatever  they  might  be,  by 
means  of  a  concession  in  the  East.  Decided, 
ever  since  the  middle  of  February,  to  extin- 
guish the  Bourbons  of  Spain,  Napoleon  hesi- 
tated no  longer,  and  resolved  to  pay  on  the 
banks  of  the  Danube  for  the  new  power,  which 
he  thought  himself  on  the  point  of  acquiring 
on  the  banks  of  the  Ebro  and  the  Tagus. 

It  was  assuredly  the  best  measure  that  he 
could  adopt ;  for,  though  it  was  very  grievous 
to  have  to  lead  the  Russians  by  the  hand,  him- 
self, to  Constantinople,  or  at  least  to  bring  them 
nearer  to  that  object  of  their  everlasting  ambi- 
tion, still  it  was  necessary  to  be  consistent,  and 
to  submit  to  the  condition  of  the  enterprise  in 
which  he  was  about  to  engage.  He  was  obliged 
to  grant  one  or  two  provinces  on  the  Danube, 
in  order  to  acquire  the  right  of  dethroning  in 
Spain  one  of  the  oldest  dynasties  in  Europe,  and 
to  renew  the  policy  of  Louis  XIV.  beyond  the 
Pyrenees.  For  the  rest,  if  Napoleon  had  done  no 
more  than  give  Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  without 
Bulgaria,  to  the  Russians,  that  is  to  say,  lead 
them  to  the  banks  of  the  Danube,  taking  care 
to  stop  them  there ;  if  at  the  same  time  he  had 
procured  Bosnia,  Servia,  and  Bulgaria,  for  the 
Austrians,  for  the  purpose  of  opposing  them 
to  the  Russians,  by  placing  them  upon  the  road 
to  Constantinople,  the  mischief  would  not  have 
been  by  far  so  great.  Albania  and  the  Morea 
would  have  been  a  fine  compensation  for  France, 
and  she  would  not  have  bought  too  dearly  the 
concession  which  she  was  obliged  to  make,  in 
order  to  insure  the  Russian  alliance.  The  daily 
language  of  .the  Emperor  Alexander  and  of  M. 
de  Romanzoff  left  no  doubt  of  their  acquiescence 
in  these  conditions.  Here  then  it  was  requisite 
to  stop :  to  pay  for  the  Russian  alliance,  since 
we  had  made  it  a  necessity ;  but  not  to  push 
the  dismemberment  of  old  Europe  any  further, 
not  to  contribute  more  to  the  growth  of  the 
young  colossus,  sprung  from  the  ices  of  the  pole, 
and  enlarging  for  a  century  past  in  a  manner 
to  appal  the  world. 

Napoleon,  however,  whether  he  designed  to 
occupy  the  imagination  of  Alexander,  or  whe- 
ther, reduced  to  the  necessity  of  a  sacrifice, 
he  sought  to  envelop  it  in  an  immense  recom- 
position,  or,  lastly,  whether  he  thought  to  de- 
rive from  circumstances,  besides  the  overthrow 
of  the  dynasty  of  the  Bourbons,  the  entire  ac- 
quisition of  the  coasts  of  the  Mediterranean — 
Napoleon  conceived  that  he  ought  not  to  stop 
at  the  mere  concession  of  Moldavia  and  Walla- 
chia, which  would  have  settled  every  thing,  and 
assented  to  the  raising  of  the  immense  question 
of  the  complete  partition  of  the  Ottoman  em- 
pire. At  the  moment,  the  Turks,  secretly  ex- 
cited by  Austria,  publicly  by  England,  both 
asserting  that  France  was  about  to  sacrifice 
them  to  Russian  ambition — the  Turks  conducted 
themselves  in  the  most  odious  manner  towards 
the  French.  Not  daring  to  strike  off  their  heads, 
they  struck  off  those  of  their  partisans,  and  be- 
haved, in  short,  like  furious  barbarians,  intoxi- 
cated with  blood  and  pillage.  Napoleon,  eias- 


444 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1808. 


perated  against  them,  at  length  determined  to 
•write  a  letter  to  the  Emperor  Alexander,  in 
•which  he  announced  his  intention  of  discussing 
the  question  of  the  empire  of  the  East,  of  con- 
sidering it  under  all  its  aspects,  of  solving  it  de- 
finitively ;  in  which  he  also  expressed  a  desire 
to  admit  Austria  as  a  sharer,  and  specified  as 
an  essential  condition  of  this  partition,  what- 
ever it  might  be,  partial  or  total,  more  advan- 
tageous for  these  or  for  those,  a  gigantic  expe- 
dition to  India,  across  the  continent  of  Asia, 
executed  by  a  French,  Austrian,  and  Russian 
army.  It  was  M.  de  Caulaincourt  who  deli- 
vered Napoleon's  letter  to  the  Emperor  Alexan- 
der. The  Czar  was  already  apprized  by  a  de- 
spatch from  M.  de  Tolstoy  of  the  favourable 
change  which  had  taken  place  at  Paris,  and  he 
received  the  ambassador  of  France  with  trans- 
ports of  joy.  He  insisted  on  reading  Napoleon's 
letter  immediately,  and  m  his  presence.  He 
read  it  with  an  emotion  which  he  was  unable  to 
repress.  "  Ah,  the  great  man  !"  he  exclaimed 
every  moment — "the  great  man!  There!  he 
has  come  back  to  the  ideas  of  Tilsit!  Tell 
him,"  he  frequently  repeated  to  M.  de  Caulain- 
court, "  that  I  am  devoted  to  him  for  life ;  that 
my  empire,  my  armies,  and  all  are  at  his  dis- 
posal. When  I  ask  him  to  grant  something  to 
satisfy  the  pride  of  the  Russian  nation,  it  is 
not  out  of  ambition  that  I  speak,  it  is  for  the 
purpose  of  giving  him  that  nation  whole  and 
entire,  and  as  devoted  to  his  great  projects  as 
I  am  myself.  Your  master,"  he  added,  "pur- 
poses to  interest  Austria  in  the  dismemberment 
of  the  Turkish  empire ;  he  is  in  the  right.  It 
is  a  wise  conception :  I  cordially  join  in  it.  He 
designs  an  expedition  to  India :  I  consent  to 
that  too.  I  have  already  made  him  acquainted, 
in  our  long  conversations  at  Tilsit,  with  the  dif- 
ficulties attending  it.  He  is  accustomed  to  take 
no  account  of  obstacles ;  nevertheless,  the  cli- 
mate and  distances  here  present  such  as  sur- 
pass all  that  he  can  imagine.  But  let  him  be 
easy ;  the  preparations  on  my  part  shall  be  pro- 
portioned to  the  difficulties.  Now  we  must 
come  to  an  understanding  about  the  distribu- 
tion of  the  territories  which  we  are  going  to 
wrest  from  Turkish  barbarism.  Discuss  this 
subject  thoroughly  with  M.  de  Romanzoff. 
Nevertheless,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  all 
this  cannot  be  usefully,  definitively  discussed, 
but  in  an  interview  between  me  and  Napoleon. 
As  soon  as  our  ideas  have  arrived  at  a  com- 
mencement of  maturity  I  shall  leave  St.  Peters- 
burg, and  go  to  meet  your  Emperor  at  whatever 
distance  he  pleases.  I  should  like  to  go  as  far 
as  Paris,  but  I  cannot ;  besides,  it  is  a  meet- 
ing upon  business  that  we  want,  not  a  meeting 
for  parade  and  pleasure.  We  might  choose 
Weimar,  where  he  should  be  among  our  own 
family.  But  even  there  we  should  be  annoyed 
by  a  thousand  things.  At  Erfurt  we  should  be 
more  free,  more  tn  ourselves.  Propose  that 
place  to  your  sovereign ;  when  his  answer  ar- 
~ives  I  will  set  out  immediately,  and  I  shall 
travel  like  a  courier." 

As  he  said  these  things  and  a  thousand  others, 
which  it  were  useless  to  repeat,  the  emperor, 
overflowing  with  a  joy  which  he  could  not  re- 
press, acknowledged  that  M.  de  Caulaincourt 
was  right  some  time  before,  when  endeavouring 
to  tranquillize  him  respecting  the  intentions  of 
JJ  apoleon,  in  imputing  the  momentary  disagree- 


ment to  mere  misunderstandings.  He  again 
repeated  that  he  was  sure  it  was  M.  de  Tolstoy, 
who  had  been  awkward,  warm,  perhaps  even 
indocile,  to  the  new  policy  of  the  Russian  ca- 
binet ;  that  he  would  change  him  and  send  an- 
other who  should  be  entirely  to  the  liking  of 
Napoleon,  but  he  knew  not  where  to  find  such  a 
one ;  that  he  everywhere  met  with  refractory 
spirits;  but  he  was  determined  to  quell  them, 
whatever  severity  he  was  obliged  to  use,  and 
make  them  pursue  the  grand  system  of  Tilsit. 

M.  de  Caulaincourt  found  old  M.  de  Roman- 
zoff not  less  warm,  less  young,  in  the  expres- 
sion of  his  joy.  "  Here  we  are  then  come  back 
again  to  the  ideas  of  Tilsit,"  he  repeated  to  M. 
de  Caulaincourt.  "Those  we  comprehend,  we 
enter  into  them ;  they  are  worthy  of  the  great 
man  who  is  an  honour  to  the  age  and  to  human 
nature."  After  incredible  demonstrations  of 
satisfaction  and  of  devotedness  to  France,  M. 
de  Romanzoff  ventured  upon  that  difficult  ques- 
tion of  partition.  There  commenced  embar- 
rassment, nay  even,  we  must  say,  confusion. 
To  lay  daring  hands  on  the  extensive  countries 
which  are  of  such  importance  to  the  equilibrium 
of  the  world,  and  which  belong  not  only  to  the 
stupid  possessors,  who  keep  them  in  barbarism 
and  sterility,  but  far  more  to  Europe  itself,  so 
deeply  interested  in  their  independence — to  lay 
hands  on  these  countries,  even  in  idea,  embar- 
rassed the  greedy  Russian  minister,  who  de- 
voured them  in  his  longings,  and  the  French 
minister,  who  gave  them  up  from  necessity  to 
the  Moscovite  monster  of  ambition.  Though 
both  were  furnished  with  their  instructions,  and 
knew  what  to  think,  what  to  say,  on  the  subject 
which  brought  them  together,  neither  was  will- 
ing to  speak  the  first  word.  The  most  hungry 
was,  of  course,  the  first  to  speak,  and  he  did 
speak.  He  spoke,  in  that  interview  and  in  se- 
veral others,  with  entire  freedom,  and  with  an 
unparalleled  boldness  of  ambition. 

Two  plans  presented  themselves:  in  the  first 
place,  a  partial  partition,  which  should  leave 
to  the  Turks  that  portion  of  their  European 
territory  extending  from  the  Balkans  to  the 
Bosphorus,  consequently  the  two  straits  and 
the  city  of  Constantinople,  and  all  their  Asia- 
tic provinces ;  in  the  second  place,  a  complete 
partition,  which  should  leave  to  the  Turks 
none  of  their  European  territory,  and  take 
from  them  all  their  Asiatic  provinces  washed 
by  the  Mediterranean. 

The  first  plan  was  that  which  seemed  to  have 
occupied  the  two  emperors  at  Tilsit.  It  pre- 
sented but  few  difficulties.  France  was  to 
have  all  the  maritime  provinces,  Albania, 
which  adjoins  Dalmatia,  the  Morea,  and  Can- 
dia.  Russia  was  to  obtain  Moldavia  and  Wal- 
lachia,  which  form  the  left  of  the  Danube,  Bul- 
garia, which  forms  the  right,  and  thus  stop  at 
the  Balkans.  Austria,  to  console  herself  for 
seeing  Russia  established  at  the  mouths  of  the 
Danube,  was  to  take  Bosnia  in  full  property, 
and  Servia  as  an  appanage  for  one  of  the  arch- 
dukes. In  this  system  the  Turks  would  retain 
the  most  essential  part  of  their  European  pro- 
vinces, those  which  geography  and  the  nature 
j  of  the  population  have  hitherto  amply  insured 
:  to  them,  that  is  to  say,  the  part  to  the  south 
of  the  Balkans,  the  two  straits,  Constantino- 
ple, and  the  whole  of  the  Asiatic  empire. 
There  would  thus  be  taken  from  them  such 


Feb.  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


445 


provinces  only  as  they  could  no  longer  govern, 
Moldavia,  Wallachia,  to  which  they  had  al- 
ready been  obliged  to  concede  a  sort  of  inde- 
pendence ;  Servia,  which  was  at  that  moment 
striving  to  emancipate  itself  by  arms ;  Epire, 
which  belonged  to  Ali,  Pacha  of  Janina,  more 
than  to  the  Porte ;  lastly,  Greece,  which  al- 
ready appeared  disposed  to  defy  the  sword  of 
its  ancient  conquerors  rather  than  to  endure 
their  yoke.  The  division  of  these  provinces 
among  the  copartners  was  made  agreeably  to 
geography.  France  gained,  it  is  true,  superb 
maritime  positions.  Still,  besides  the  incon- 
venience of  herself  bringing  the  Russians  near 
to  Constantinople,  there  was  another  not  less 
serious,  namely,  that  of  giving  to  Russia  and 
Austria  that  which,  from  the  contiguity  of  ter- 
ritory, must  continue  theirs,  and  taking  for 
France  such  as  could  not  remain  hers  unless  in 
the  hypothesis  of  a  greatness  impossible  to  be 
long  maintained.  Had  we  kept  the  most  es- 
sential part  of  that  greatness,  the  Rhine  and 
the  Alps,  and  even  the  back  of  the  Alps,  that 
is  to  say,  Piedmont,  Greece  was  still  too  far 
from  us  to  be  preserved.  All  this  was,  there- 
fore, in  reality,  but  a  sorry  concession  towards 
the  East  for  the  triumph  in  the  West  of  great 
designs  no  doubt,  but  unseasonable,  extrava- 
gant, which  must  add  new  burdens  to  those 
which  already  oppressed  the  Empire. 

The  second  plan  was  a  sort  of  convulsion  of 
the  civilized  world.  The  Turkish  empire  was  to 
be  swept  away  completely  both  from  Europe 
and  from  Asia.  The  Russians,  according  to 
this  new  plan,  were  to  pass  the  Balkans  and  to 
occupy  the  southern  slope,  namely,  ancient 
Thrace  as  far  as  the  straits,  to  obtain  the  ob- 
ject of  their  desires,  Constantinople,  and  a  por- 
tion of  the  shore  of  Asia,  to  insure  to  them 
the  possession  of  the  straits.  Austria,  acquir- 
ing also  a  better  share,  and  employed  in  keep- 
ing France  and  Russia  apart,  would  obtain, 
besides  Bosnia  and  Servia,  both  in  full  pro- 
perty, Macedonia  itself  as  far  as  the  sea,  with 
the  exception  of  Salonichi.  France,  retaining 
her  former  allotment,  Albania,  Thessaly  as  far 
as  Salonichi,  the  Morea,  Candia,  would  have 
further  all  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago,  Cy- 
prus, Syria,  and  Egypt.  The  Turks,  flung 
back  to  the  extremity  of  Asia  Minor,  and  upon 
the  Euphrates,  would  be  at  liberty  to  adhere 
there  to  that  religion  of  the  Koran  which  had 
caused  them  to  lose  their  empire  in  Europe  and 
three-fourths  of  that  in  Asia. 

In  this  chimerical  division  of  the  world,  des- 
tined perhaps  to  become  some  day  a  reality, 
with  the  exception  of  what  was  then  reserved 
for  France,  there  was  one  point,  however,  on 
which  it  was  impossible  to  agree,  and  which 
was  as  strongly  contested  as  if  all  these  plans 
were  to  be  carried  into  speedy  execution.  Con- 
stantinople interested  both  the  pride  and  the 
ambition  of  the  Russians,  and,  among  nations, 
one  is  not  more  eager  than  another.  The  Rus- 
sians coveted  the  city  of  Constantinople  itself, 
as  a  symbol  of  the  empire  of  the  East:  they 
coveted  the  Bosphorus  and  the  Dardanelles,  as 
the  keys  of  the  seas.  M.  de  Caulaincourt  par- 
ticipated in  the  sentiments  of  Napoleon,  who 
recoiled  with  pride  and  horror,  when  he  was 
asked  to  give  up  Constantinople  to  the  rulers 
of  the  North,  peremptorily  refused,  and  pro- 
posed to  make  Constantinople  and  the  two 


straits  a  sort  of  neutral  State — a  kind  of  Han- 
seatic  town,  like  Hamburg  or  Bremen.  At 
length,  when  the  Russian  minister  persisted  in 
the  demand  of  the  city  of  Constantinople  in 
particular,  as  though  it  had  been  for  St.  So- 
phia alone,  M.  de  Caulaincourt  acceded,  saving 
the  pleasure  of  his  master,  but  reserving  the 
Dardanelles  for  France,  as  being  the  route  by 
land  for  Syria  and  Egypt,  which  would  have 
made  the  French  battalions  travel  the  same 
road  as  the  ancient  crusaders.  The  Russians, 
having  St.  Sophia,  would  not  relinquish  to  the 
French  the  Strait  of  the  Dardanelles,  which 
they  were  importunate  to  leave  in  the  hands 
of  the  Turks,  weak  as  they  were.  They  re- 
fused Constantinople  on  those  terms,  and  de- 
clared, what  was  indeed  true,  that  they  should 
prefer  the  first  partial  partition,  which  left  the 
south  of  the  Balkans  and  Constantinople  to  the 
Turks.  Satisfied,  in  this  case,  with  having  the 
extensive  plains  of  the  Danube  as  far  as  the 
Balkans,  they  consented  to  postpone  the  rest 
of  their  conquest,  and  chose  rather  to  see  the 
keys  of  the  seas  in  the  hands  of  the  Turks 
than  to  put  them  into  those  of  the  French. 

It  was  to  no  purpose  to  continue  the  discus- 
sion on  this  important  subject;  the  parties 
could  not  come  to  an  understanding,  and  the 
interminable  quarrel  which  arose — daring  and 
silly  anticipation  of  ages — revealed  the  true 
interest  of  Europe  against  Russia  in  the  ques- 
tion concerning  Constantinople.  The  French 
Empire  having  become,  at  this  time,  extensive 
as  Europe  itself,  was  alive  to  all  its  interests, 
and  would  not  give  up  the  strait  from  which 
the  Russians  will  some  day  threaten  the  inde- 
pendence of  the  European  continent.  It  was 
quite  enough  to  concede  Finland  to  them,  to 
afford  them  the  means  of  taking  a  step  towards 
the  Sound,  another  strait,  from  which,  at  some 
future  time,  they  will  be  not  less  threaten- 
ing. When,  indeed,  the  Russian  colossus  shall 
have  one  foot  on  the  Dardanelles  and  the  other 
on  the  Sound,  the  Old  World  will  be  enslaved, 
freedom  will  have  fled  to  America ;  chimerical 
at  this  moment  to  narrow  minds,  these  fore- 
bodings will  some  day  be  realized ;  for  Europe, 
unwisely  divided,  like  the  cities  of  Greece  be- 
fore the  kings  of  Macedonia,  will  probably 
experience  the  like  fate. 

After  long  discussion,  the  Russian  minister 
and  the  French  ambassador  had  done  no  more 
than  ripen  their  ideas,  as  they  said.  There  was 
nothing  but  a  meeting  of  the  two  sovereigns 
that  could  settle  these  mighty  differences.  It 
was  therefore  agreed  that  an  exposition  of  the 
two  plans  should  be  addressed  to  Napoleon,  with 
a  request  to  send  his  opinions,  and  an  offer  of 
an  interview  for  the  purpose  of  reconciling  them 
with  those  of  the  Emperor  Alexander.  For  this 
interview  there  was  to  be  selected  a  place  very 
near  to  France,  such  as  Erfurt  for  instance. 
But  to  write  such  things  was  repugnant  even  to 
those  who  had  dared  to  utter  them.  M.  de 
Caulaincourt,  apprized  sometimes  by  his  good 
sense  of  their  chimerical  and  alarming  nature, 
preferred  leaving  to  M.  de  Romanzoff  the  task 
of  committing  them  to  writing.  The  latter  ac- 
cepted it,  and  presented  a  note,  written  entirely 
with  his  own  hand,  which  M.  de  Caulaincourt 
was  to  despatch  immediately  to  Napoleon.  If, 
however,  he  ventured  to  write,  he  dared  not  sign 
it.  He  delivered  it  himself,  in  his  own  hand- 
2P 


446 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1808. 


writing,  but  not  signed;  and,  to  give  it  full 
authenticity,  the  Emperor  Alexander  declared 
orally  to  M.  de  Caulaincourt  that  this  note  had 
his  full  approbation,  and  was  to  be  received, 
though  without  signature,  as  the  authentic  ex- 
pression of  the  ideas  of  the  Russian  cabinet. ' 


'  We  think  it  right  to  quote  this  paper  itself;  perhaps  the 
most  curious  monument  of  those  extraordinary  times, 
copied  literally  from  the  Minute  in  the  handwriting  of  M. 
de  Romanzoff,  sent  to  Napoleon  and  now  preserved  in  the 
depot  of  the  LouTre.  We  have  had  before  us  the  original 
document,  and  we  affirm  the  strict  accuracy  of  the  follow- 
ing copy : 

"  Since  his  Majesty,  the  Emperor  of  the  French  and  the 
King  of  Italy,  Ac,  has  recently  adjudged  that,  in  order  to 
attain  a  general  peace  and  to  secure  the  tranquillity  of 
Europe,  it  would  be  expedient  to  weaken  the  Ottoman 
empire  by  the  dismemberment  of  its  provinces,  the  Em- 
peror Alexander,  faithful  to  his  engagements  and  to  his 
friendship,  is  ready  to  concur  in  it 

"  The  first  idea  which  could  not  fail  to  present  itself  to 
the  Emperor  of  all  the  Russias,  who  is  fond  of  calling  to 
mind  the  occurrences  at  Tilsit,  when  this  overture  was 
made  to  him,  was  that  the  Emperor,  his  ally,  purposed  to 
proceed  immediately  to  the  execution  of  what  the  two 
monarchs  had  agreed  upon  in  the  treaty  of  alliance  rela- 
tive to  the  Turks,  and  that  he  added  to  it  the  proposal  of 
an  expedition  to  India. 

"  It  had  been  settled  at  Tilsit  that  the  Ottoman  power 
was  to  be  driven  biick  into  Asia,  retaining  in  Europe  nc- 
thing  but  the  city  of  Constantinople  and  Romelia. 

"  There  was  drawn  at  the  same  time  this  consequence, 
that  the  Emperor  of  the  French  should  acquire  Albania, 
the  Morea,  and  the  island  of  Candia. 

"  Wallachia  and  Moldavia  were  next  allotted  to  Russia, 
giving  that  empire  the  Danube  for  its  boundary,  compre- 
hending Bessarabia,  which  is  in  fact  a  stripe  of  sea-coast, 
and  which  is  commonly  considered  as  forming  part  of 
Moldavia;  if  to  this  portion  be  added  Bulgaria,  the  em- 
peror is  ready  to  concur  in  the  expedition  to  India,  of 
which  there  had  then  been  no  question,  provided  that  this 
expedition  to  India,  as  the  Emperor  Napoleon  himself  has 
just  traced  its  route,  shall  proceed  through  Asia  Minor. 

"  The  Emperor  Alexander  applauded  himself  for  the  idea 
of  gaining  the  concurrence  of  a  corps  of  Austrian  troops  in 
the  expedition  to  India;  and,  as  the  Emperor,  his  ally, 
seemed  to  wish  that  it  should  not  be  numerous,  he  con- 
ceives that  this  concurrence  would  be  adequately  compen- 
sated by  awarding  to  Austria,  Turkish  Croatia  and  Bosnia, 
unless  the  Emperor  of  the  French  should  find  it  convenient 
to  retain  a  portion  of  them.  There  might  moreover  be  offered 
to  Austria  a  less  direct  but  very  considerable  interest,  by 
settling  the  future  condition  of  Servia,  ineontestably  one 
of  the  fine  provinces  of  the  Ottoman  empire,  in  the  follow- 
ing manner : — 

"  The  Servians  are  a  warlike  people,  and  that  quality, 
which  always  commands  esteem,  must  excite  a  wish  to 
regulate  their  lot  judiciously. 

u  The  Servians,  fraught  with  a  feeling  of  just  vengeance 
against  the  Turks,  have  boldly  shaken  off  the  yoke  of 
their  oppressors,  and  are,  it  is  said,  resolved  never  to  wear 
it  again.  In  order  to  consolidate  peace,  it  seems  necessary, 
therefore,  to  take  care  to  make  them  independent  of  the 
Turks. 


"  The  peace  of  Tilsit  determines  nothing  in  regard  to 
them.  Their  own  wish,  expressed  strongly  and  more  than 
once,  has  led  them  to  implore  the  Emperor  Alexander  to 
admit  them  into  the  number  of  his  subjects;  this  attach- 
ment to  his  person  makes  him  desirous  that  they  should 
live  happy  and  content,  without  insisting  upon  extend- 
ing his  sway;  his  Majesty  seeks  no  acquisitions  that  could 
obstruct  peace;  he  makes  with  pleasure  this  sacrifice, 
and  all  those  which  can  contribute  to  render  it  speedy  and 
solid.  He  proposes,  in  consequence,  to  erect  Servia  into  an 
independent  kingdom,  to  give  its  crown  to  one  of  the  Arch- 
dukes who  is  not  the  head  of  any  sovereign  branch,  and 
who  is  sufficiently  remote  from  the  succession  to  the  throne 
of  Austria;  and  in  this  case  it  should  be  stipulated  that 
thi»  kingdom  should  never  be  incorporated  with  the  mass 
of  the  dominion*  of  that  houne. 

fc  This  whole  supposition  of  the  dismemberment  of  the 
Turkish  provinces,  as  explained  above,  being  founded  upon 
the  engagements  at  Tilsit  has  not  appeared  to  offer  any 
difficulty  to  the  two  persons  commissioned  by  the  two 
emperors  to  discuss  together  the  means  of  attaining  the 
ends  proposed  by  their  imperial  Majesties. 

u  The  Emperor  of  Russia  is  ready  to  take  part  in  a 
treaty  between  the  three  emperors,  which  should  fix  the 
<»nditions  above  expressed;  but,  on  the  other  hand,  having 
conceived  that  the  letter  which  he  recently  rewived  from 
the  Emperor  of  the  French  seemed  to  indicate  the  resolu- 
tion of  a  much  more  extensive  dismemberment  of  the 
Ottoman  empire  than  that  which  had  been  projected  De- 


However, it  was  not  enough  to  discuss  even- 
tually plans  of  partition  of  the  Turkish  empire. 
Napoleon  conceived  that  something  more  posi- 
tive was  needed  to  satisfy  the  Russians,  some- 
thing which,  while  imposing  a  less  sacrifice  on 
him,  would  touch  them  deeply,  when  from  words 


tween  them  at  Tilsit,  that  monarch,  in  order  to  meet  the 


clared  that,  without  wanting  a  further  diminution  of  the 
strength  of  the  Ottoman  Porte,  he  would  cheerfully  concur 
in  it. 

"  He  has  laid  down  as  the  principle  of  his  interest  in 
this  greater  partition  that  his  share  of  the  increased  ac- 
quisition should  be  moderate  in  extent  or  magnitude,  and 
that  he  would  consent  that  the  share  of  his  ally  in  parti- 
cular should  be  marked  out  of  much  larger  proportion. 
His  Majesty  has  added  that  beside  this  principle  of  mo- 
deration he  placed  one  of  wisdom,  which  consisted  in  not 
finding  himself  by  this  new  plan  of  partition  worse  placed 
than  he  is  at  the  present  in  regard  to  boundaries  and  com- 
mercial relations. 

"  Setting  out  with  these  two  principles,  the  Emperor 
Alexander  would  see,  not  only  without  jealousy  but  with 
pleasure,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  acquire  and  incorporate 
with  his  dominions,  in  addition  to  what  has  been  men- 
tioned above,  all  the  islands  of  the  Archipelago,  Cyprus, 
Rhodes,  and  even  whatever  is  left  of  the  sea-ports  of  the 
Levant,  Syria,  and  Egypt. 

"  In  case  of  this  more  extensive  partition,  the  Emperor 
Alexander  would  change  his  preceding  opinion  respecting 
the  state  of  Servia ;  studying  to  form  an  honourable  and 
highly  advantageous  share  for  the  house  of  Austria,  he 
should  wish  that  Servia  should  be  incorporated  with  the 
mass  of  the  Austrian  dominions,  and  that  there  should  be 
added  to  it  Macedonia;  with  the  exception  of  that  part  of 
Macedonia  which  France  might  desire  in  order  to  fortify 
her  Albanian  frontier,  so  as  that  France  might  obtain 
Salonichi.  This  line  of  the  Austrian  frontier  might  be 
drawn  from  Scopia  to  Orphane,  and  would  make  the 
power  of  the  house  of  Austria  extend  to  the  sea. 

"  Croatia  might  belong  to  France  or  to  Austria,  as  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  pleases. 

-The  Emperor  Alexander  cannot  disguise  from  his  ally 
that,  finding  a  particular  satisfaction  in  all  that  has  been 
said  at  Tilsit  he  places,  according  to  the  advice  of  the  Em- 
peror his  friend,  those  possessions  of  the  house  of  Austria 
between  theirs,  in  order  to  avoid  the  point  of  contact,  al- 
ways so  liable  to  cool  friendship. 

'  The  sha  «  of  Russia  in  this  new  and  extensive  partition 
would  hav  added  to  that  which  was  awarded  to  her  in 
the  preceding  plan,  the  possession  of  the  city  of  Constan- 
tinople, with  a  radius  of  a  few  leagues  in  Asia,  and  in 
Europe  part  of  Romelia,  so  as  that  the  frontier  of  Russia, 
on  the  side  of  the  new  possessions  of  Austria,  setting  out 
from  Bulgaria,  should  follow  the  frontier  of  Servia  to  a 
little  beyond  Solismick  and  the  chain  of  mountains  which 
runs  from  Solismick  to  Trayanopol  inclusive,  and  then 
the  river  Moriza  to  the  sea. 

"  In  the  conversation  that  has  taken  place  respecting  this 
second  plan  of  partition,  there  has  been  this  difference  of 
opinion,  that  one  of  the  two  persons  conceived  that,  if  Russia 
were  to  possess  Constantinople,  France  ought  to  possess  the 
Dardanelles,  or,  at  least,  to  appropriate  to  herself  that 
which  was  on  the  Asiatic  side :  this  assertion  was  con  tested, 
on  the  other  part  upon  the  ground  of  the  immense  dispro- 
portion proposed  to  be  made  in  the  shares  of  this  new  and 
greater  partition,  and  that  oven  the  occupation  of  the  fort 
would  utterly  destroy  the  principle  of  the  Emperor  of 
Russia  not  to  be  worse  placed  than  he  now  is  in  regard  to 
his  geographical  and  commercial  relations. 

"  The  Emperor  Alexander,  moved  by  the  feeling  of  his 
extreme  friendship  for  the  Emperor  Napoleon,  has  de- 
clared, with  a  view  to  remove  the  difficulty ;  Istly,  that  he 
would  agree  to  a  military  road  for  France,  running  through 
the  new  possessions  of  Austria  and  Russia,  opening  to  her 
a  military  route  to  the  ports  of  Syria ;  2dly,  that,  if  the 
Emperor  Napoleon  wished  to  posses*  Smyrna  or  any  other 
point  on  the  coast  of  Natolia,  from  the  point  of  that  coast 
which  is  opposite  to  Mitylene  to  that  which  is  situated  op- 
posite to  Rhodes,  and  should  send  troops  thither  to  con- 
quer them,  the  Emperor  Alexander  is  ready  to  assist  in 
this  enterprise,  by  joining,  for  this  purpose,  a  corps  of  his 
troops  to  the  French  troops ;  3dly,  that  if  Smyrna,  or  any 
other  possession  on  the  coast  of  Natolia.  such  as  has  just  been 
pointed  out  having  come  under  the  dominion  of  France, 
should  afterwards  be  attacked  not  only  by  the  Turks,  but 
even  by  the  English,  in  hatred  of  that  treaty,  his  Majesty 
the  Emperor  of  Russia  will  in  that  case  proceed  to  the  aid 
of  his  ally  whenevor  h»  shall  be  required  to  do  so. 

"  4thly.  His  Majesty  thinks  that  the  house  of  Austria 
might,  on  the  same 


Feb.  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


447 


they  should  proceed  to  deeds — this  was  the 
conquest  of  Finland.  He  had  ordered  M.  de 
Caulaincourt  to  urge  warmly  the  expedition 
against  Sweden,  from  the  motive  that  we  have 
just  mentioned,  and  also  because  he  was  de- 
sirous to  compromise  Russia  irrevocably  in  his 
system.  Once  engaged  against  the  Swedes,  she 
could  not  fail  to  be  so  against  the  English,  and 
to  proceed,  in  regard  to  them,  from  a  mere  de- 
claration of  hostilities  to  hostilities  themselves. 
But,  singular  enough,  the  Russians  were  reluc- 
tant to  undertake  the  conquest  of  Finland,  the 
most  useful  one,  nevertheless,  of  all  those  which 
they  were  meditating,  and  it  seemed  to  be  suf- 
ficient to  have  obtained  the  authorization  for 
it,  without  being  in  haste  to  carry  it  into  exe- 
cution. It  was  with  regret  that  they  diverted 
part  of  their  forces  either  from  the  East  or 
from  the  Polish  provinces,  greatly  agitated  at 
that  moment.  Nevertheless,  continually  urged 
by  M.  de  Caulaincourt,  they  did  at  length  in- 
vade Finland  in  the  course  of  February,  at  the 
very  time  when  the  plan  of  partition  of  which 
we  have  been  treating  was  under  discussion. 

Notwithstanding  all  his  efforts,  the  Emperor 
Alexander  could  not  assemble  more  than  25,000 
men  on  the  frontier  of  Finland.  He  had  in- 
trusted the  command  of  them  to  General  Bux- 
hSvdeu,  the  same  who  had  displayed  his  inca- 
pacity at  Austerlitz,  and  who  displayed  it  still 
more  in  the  war  with  Sweden.  Excellent  troops 
had  been  given  him,  with  good  lieutenants,  es- 
pecially the  heroic  and  indefatigable  Bagration, 
who,  when  one  war  was  finished,  longed  to  begin 
another.  Napoleon  had  strongly  urged  them 
to  act  during  the  frosts,  that  they  might  be  able 
to  cross  without  difficulty  the  waters  which 
cover  Finland,  a  country  studded  with  lakes, 
forests,  granitic  rocks,  dropped  upon  this  earth 
like  aerolites.  A  brave  Swedish  officer,  Gene-  j 
ral  Klingspor,  with  15,000  regular  troops,  steady 
as  Swedish  troops  always  are,  and  four  or  five 
thousand  militia,  defended  the  country.  If  the 
Swedish  government,  less  regardless  of  all  the 
warnings  which  it  had  received,  had  taken  its 
precautions  and  directed  all  its  forces  upon 
that  point,  instead  of  threatening  the  Danes 
with  ridiculous  attempts,  it  might  have  advan- 
tageously disputed  the  possession  of  that  va- 
luable province.  But  it  had  left  there  too  few 
troops,  and  those  too  untrained,  to  oppose  any 
efficacious  resistance.  The  Russians,  on  their 
part,  attacked  upon  a  very  ill-conceived  plan, 
which  attested  the  profound  incapacity  of  their 
commander-in-chief.  Finland,  from  Wiborg  to 
Abo,  from  Abo  to  Uleaborg,  forms  a  triangle, 
two  sides  of  which  are  washed  by  the  gulfs  of 
Finland  and  Bothnia,  while  the  third  is  bordered 
by  the  Russian  frontier.  Common  sense  inti- 
mated that  it  was  requisite  to  operate  on  the 
side  of  the  triangle  bordering  the  Russian  fron- 


tier, that  is  to  say,  by  the  Savolax,  because  it 
was  the  shortest  and  the  least  defended  line 
The  Swedes,  in  fact,  occupied  the  two  sides 
which  form  the  coasts  of  the  gulf  of  Finland 
and  Bothnia:  they  were  spread  through  the 
sea-ports,  peopled  in  general  by  Swedes,  the 
ancient  colonists  of  Finland.  If,  instead  of 
traversing  the  two  maritime  sides  of  the  triangle 
for  the  purpose  of  disputing  these  with  them, 
the  Russians  had  followed  with  a  column  of 
15,000  men  the  side  which  borders  their  fron- 
tier from  Wiborg  to  Uleaborg,  sending  along 
the  coast  only  a  column  of  10,000  men,  to  oc- 
cupy as  fast  as  the  Swedes  evacuated  it,  and 
also  to  blockade  the  fortresses,  they  would  have 
arrived  before  the  Swedes  at  Uleaborg,  and 
taken  not  only  Finland,  but  General  Klingspor 
and  the  little  army  charged  with  the  defence 
of  the  country.  They  did  nothing  of  the  kind, 
advanced  along  the  coast  in  three  columns, 
commanded  by  Generals  Gortschakoff,  Toutch- 
koflf,  and  Bagration,  driving  before  them  the 
Swedes,  who  defended  themselves  as  vigorously 
as  they  were  attacked,  in  a  series  of  partial 
actions.  The  left  column,  having  arrived  at 
Sweaborg,  while  the  other  two  were  marching 
upon  Tavastehuus,  undertook  the  blockade  of 
that  great  maritime  fortress,  which  consisted 
of  several  fortified  islands,  and  which  was  de- 
fended by  old  Admiral  Cronstedt  with  7000  men. 
The  columns  of  the  centre  and  the  right  ad- 
vanced from  Tavastehuus  to  Abo,  after  travers- 
ing the  side  of  the  Finland  triangle  which 
borders  the  Gulf  of  Finland.  General  Bagra- 
tion was  left  at  Abo,  and  General  Toutchkoff 
was  afterwards  sent  along  the  side  that  borders 
the  Gulf  of  Bothnia,  running  direct  north  to 
Uleaborg.  A  weak  column  had  been  directed 
upon  the  essential  line,  that  from  Wiborg  to 
Uleaborg.  Thus  the  Russians  did  nothing  more 
than  push  the  enemy  before  them,  merely  taking 
from  them  a  few  prisoners,  and  bringing  about 
themselves  a  concentration  of  the  Swedes,  who, 
had  they  thrown  themselves  in  mass  upon  the 
true  line  of  operation,  from  Uleaborg  to  Wiborg, 
by  the  Savolax,  might  have  made  them  atone 
for  so  vicious  a  manner  of  operating.  There 
were,  nevertheless,  brilliant  petty  actions, 
which  proved  the  bravery  of  the  troops  of  the 
two  nations,  an/i  the  experience  acquired  by 
the  Russian  officers  in  their  wars  against  us, 
but  the  ignorance  of  their  staff  in  all  that  con- 
cerned the  general  conduct  of  the  operations. 
It  was  not  thus  that  French  generals,  educated 
in  the  school  of  Napoleon,  would  have  acted 
upon  such  a  theatre  of  war.  The  Russians, 
having  invaded  but  not  conquered  the  country, 
undertook  the  siege  of  the  fortresses  on  the 
coast,  among  others  that  of  Sweaborg,  which 
the  frost  could  not  but  singularly  facilitate. 
A  mouth  or  thereabout  had  sufficed  for  this 


sion  of  Salonichi,  and  proceed  to  the  aid  of  that  port  when- 
ever it  shall  be  required  of  her. 

"  Sthly.  The  Emperor  of  Russia  declares  that  he  has  no 
wish  to  acquire  the  south  coast  of  the  Black  Sea  which  is 
in  Asia,  though,  in  the  discussion,  it  was  thought  that  it 
might  be  desirable  for  him. 

"  6thly.  The  Emperor  of  Rua.sia  has  declared  that  what- 
ever mi^ht  be  the  success  of  his  troops  in  India,  he  should 
not  desire  to  possess  any  thing  there,  and  that  he  would 
cheerfully  consent  that  France  should  make  for  herself 
all  the  territorial  acquisitions  in  India  which  she  might 
think  fit;  and  that  it  should  be  likewise  at  her  option  to 
cede  any  portion  of  tho  conquests  which  she  might  make 
there  to  her  allies. 


"  If  the  two  allies  agree  together  in  a  precise  manner  that 
they  adopt  one  or  the  other  of  these  two  plans  of  partition, 
his  Majesty  the  Emperor  Alexander  will  hn.e  extreme 
pleasure  in  repairing  to  the  personal  interview  which  has 
been  proposed  to  him,  and  which  could  perhaps  take  place 
at  Erfurt.  He  conceives  that  it  would  be  advantageous  if 
the  basis  of  the  engagements  that  are  to  be  made  there,  were 
previously  fixed  with  a  sort  of  precision,  that  the  two  empe- 
rors may  have  nothing  to  add  to  the  extreme  satisfaction  of 
seeing  one  another  but  that  of  being  enabled  tc  sign  with- 
out delay  the  fate  of  this  part  of  this  globe,  and  thereby, 
as  they  purpose  to  themselves,  to  force  England  to  dcsiro 
that  peace  from  which  she  now  keeps  aloof  wilfully  out 
with  such  boasting." 


448 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1808 


military  march,  which  was  only  the  commence-  ; 
ment  of  the  war  in  Finland, — a  month  employed  j 
by  the  Russian  cabinet  in  the  discussion  of  the  j 
partition  of  the  East.  The  King  of  Sweden,  on 
learning  the  invasion  of  his  dominions,  to  re- 
venge himself  apparently  for  the  surprise  sus- 
tained from  a  brother-in-law,  ventured  upon  an 
act  which  is  hardly  customary  any  longer  even 
in  Turkey  ;  he  caused  the  Russian  ambassador, 
M.  d'Alopeus,  to  be  seized,  instead  of  merely 
Bending  him  away;  which  excited  general  in- 
dignation in  the  whole  diplomatic  body  residing 
at  Stockholm.  Alexander  replied  with  suitable 
dignity  to  this  strange  conduct ;  he  dismissed 
with  infinite  marks  of  attention  M.  de  Ste- 
dingk,  ambassador  from  Sweden  at  St.  Peters- 
burg, an  old  man  universally  respected  ;  but 
he  revenged  himself  in  a  different  and  more 
skilful  manner.  He  took  advantage  of  the  oc- 
casion to  pronounce  the  union  of  Finland  with 
the  Russian  empire.  This  conquest  was  the 
sole  result  of  the  mighty  plans  projected  at 
Tilsit :  but,  though  the  only  one,  it  was  suffi- 
cient to  justify  the  policy  followed  at  that  mo- 
ment by  the  Emperor  Alexander,  and  it  is  a 
proof  that  Russia  cannot  conquer  but  with  the 
concurrence  of  France. 

Notwithstanding  the  disdain  which  the  Rus- 
sians had  affected  for  .the  conquest  of  Finland, 
the  fact  itself,  which  seemed  to  be  consum- 
mated, though  a  great  deal  of  blood  was  yet  to  be 
spilt, — the  fact  deeply  affected  the  mind  of  the 
public  at  St.  Petersburg.  It  was  remarked  that 
having  met  with  nothing  but  defeats  in  the 
service  of  England,  Russia  had,  after  only  a 
few  months'  friendship  with  France,  acquired 
an  important  province,  but  little  cultivated  and 
thinly  peopled  it  is  true,  in  which  respects  it 
was  very  much  like  the  rest  of  the  empire,  but 
admirably  situated  as  a  land  and  sea  frontier ; 
and  people  began  to  hope  that  the  policy  of  the 
French  alliance  might  prove  as  fertile  as  the 
government  flattered  itself  that  it  would.  The 
emperor  and  his  minister  were  radiant  with  joy. 
Their  usual  critics,  Messrs,  de  Czartoryski  and 
Novosiltzoff,  were  less  disdainful  and  less  bitter 
in  their  animadversions.  The  society  in  St. 
Petersburg  itself  manifested  its  content  with 
M.  de  Caulaincourt  in  quite  new  attentions, 
addressed  not  only  to  his  person,  which  was 
surrounded  by  the  public  esteem,  but  also  to 
his  government,  with  which  it  began  to  be 
satisfied. 

The  emperor  and  M.  de  Romanzoff,  who  had 
just  received  intelligence  of  the  invasion  of 
Etruria  and  Portugal,  of  the  movements  of 
troops  towards  Rome  and  Madrid,  and  who 
could  not  doubt  that  those  movements  had  a 
very  serious  motive,  never  spoke  of  them  but 
with  singular  levity,  without  any  appearance 
of  preoccupation,  and  as  men  who  gave  up  the 
weak,  in  order  that  they  might  be  allowed  to 
oppress  in  their  turn.  But,  though  they  felt  a 
real  satisfaction,  they  were  very  urgent  with 
M.  de  Caulaiucourt  for  a  speedy  answer  to  the 
various  proposals  for  partition  and  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  place  for  an  interview  to  be  held  very 
shortly,  in  order  to  settle  matters  definitively. 
Spring  was  near  at  hand,  for  it  was  almost  the 
end  of  February,  and  they  wanted,  they  said, 
against  the  opening  of  the  navigation,  some- 
thing striking,  that  should  make  people  forget 
the  disasters  of  the  preceding  year.  The  open- 


ing of  the  navigation  in  tht1  northern  seas  is  a 
period  of  rejoicing ;  for  light  makes  its  appear- 
ance again,  warmth  returns,  commerce  brings 
its  treasures.  The  productions  of  the  North 
are  exchanged  for  those  of  civilized  Europe  or 
for  specie.  But  this  year  the  English  flag,  the 
usual  instrument  of  these  exchanges,  was  not 
to  appear,  or  if  it  did,  it  must  float  from  the 
mast-heads  of  men-of-war.  The  English  ship- 
ping, instead  of  bringing  treasures,  was  not  to 
show  any  thing  but  the  muzzles  of  its  guns. 
There  was  wanted  to  oppose  to  this  sad  spec- 
tacle some  great  national  joy,  excited  by  inte- 
rests of  a  different  kind,  the  interests  of  Rus- 
sian ambition. 

M.  de  Caulaincourt,  who  accurately  reported 
to  his  master  the  ideas  of  this  ambitious  court, 
had  communicated  every  thing  to  Napoleon 
with  his  usual  veracity.  But,  in  explaining  the 
wishes  of  Russia,  he  represented  as  certain 
that,  for  the  present,  she  was  fully  satisfied, 
and  that,  for  the  rest,  she  could  be  fed  for  some 
time  with  hopes. 

Napoleon,  successively  informed  of  this  situ- 
ation at  the  end  of  February,  and  in  the  begin- 
ning of  March,  had  clearly  foreseen  all  the 
emotions,  all  the  plans  more  or  less  chimerical, 
all  the  hopes  more  or  less  exaggerated,  that  his 
letter  would  produce  at  St.  Petersburg ;  but  he 
had  said  to  himself  that,  in  the  immediate  in- 
vasion of  Finland,  and  in  the  acceptance  of  a 
discussion  opened  for  the  partition  of  the  Turk- 
ish empire,  there  was  food  enough  for  several 
months  for  the  imagination  of  the  Russian  na- 
tion and  of  its  sovereign ;  and  that,  during  this 
interval,  he  could  prosecute  his  plans  respect- 
ing the  West.  It  is  not  true,  as  one  would  be 
disposed  to  believe  from  what  precedes,  that  he 
entirely  deceived  Russia,  and  that,  in  reality, 
he  never  intended  to  grant  her  at  any  price  A 
concession  in  the  East.  He  knew  that,  by  re- 
linquishing Moldavia  and  Wallachia,  and  even 
Moldavia  alone,  he  should  satisfy  the  czar,  and 
pay  his  debt  to  Russian  ambition,  whatever 
French  ambition  might  presume  to  do  in  the 
West.  He  had,  therefore,  this  resource,  in  all 
cases,  for  realizing  the  hopes  which  he  had  led 
the  Emperor  Alexander  to  conceive.  But  if  he 
went  further,  and  was  not  sorry  to  employ  in 
this  manner  the  lively  imagination  of  his  new 
ally,  it  was  because,  on  his  part,  his  own  ima- 
gination plunged  deeper  into  this  futurity  than 
that  of  his  contemporaries.  The  Turks,  since 
the  fall  of  Selim,  appeared  to  have  reached  the 
term  of  their  existence.  Napoleon  asked  him- 
self if  he  must  not  put  an  end  to  this  ever- 
threatening  ruin;  and,  excited  by  his  maritime 
struggle  with  the  English,  he  again  asked  him- 
self if  the  time  had  not  arrived  for  making 
himself  master  of  all  the  coasts  of  the  Medi- 
terranean, -and  for  availing  himself  of  the  mo- 
mentary attachment  with  which  he  had  inspired 
Russia,  to  direct  an  army  upon  India,  across 
the  partitioned  continent  of  Asia.  Though 
chimerical  in  the  eyes  of  a  generation  reduced, 
like  ours,  to  very  moderate  proportions,  these 
projects  must  not  be  judged  of  from  our  pre- 
sent point  of  view.  It  must  be  recollected  that 
the  man  who  conceived  such  daring  schemes 
could  at  pleasure  make  and  unmake  kings,  pro- 
nounce by  a  word  the  doom  of  the  greatest 
monarchies  in  Europe ;  and  though,  in  our  opi 
nion,  he  deceived  himself,  we  must  not  believ<8 


Feb.  1808.1 


CONSULATE   AND  THE   EMPIRE. 


that  we  accurately  measure  the  extent  of  his 
error,  in  measuring  it  according  to  our  present 
ideas ;  for,  by  judging  thus,  our  littleness  would 
deceive  itself  as  much  as  his  greatness  did. 
Having  attained  the  summit  of  omnipotence,  ! 
subject  to  a  continual  fermentation  of  ideas,  he 
conceived  that  all  these  questions  ought  to  be 
investigated  ;  and  though  he  dreaded  the  solu- 
tion as  much  as  his  ally  desired  it,  he  did  not 
deceive  him  by  bringing  them  under  discussion ; 
for,  in  the  immensity  of  his  views,  he  was  some- 
times quite  disposed  to  resolve  them. 

Be  this  as  it  may,  Napoleon,  having  pushed 
the  Emperor  Alexander  upon  Finland,  having 
given  him  the  partition  of  the  Turkish  empire 
to  discuss,  said  to  himself  that  he  had  several 
months  before  him,  and  he  decided  to  carry  at 
length  into  execution  the  plan  which  he  had 
fixed  upon  relative  to  Spain. 

We  have  already  seen  what  this  plan  was. 
It  consisted  in  progressively  increasing  the 
terror  of  the  court  of  Spain,  till  he  should  in- 
duce it  to  flee,  as  the  house  of  Braganza  had 
done.  For  this  purpose,  he  had  recourse  to 
the  most  crafty  means ;  and  on  this  occasion 
he  employed  his  genius  in  a  way  that  cannot 
be  too  deeply  regretted.  All  the  troops  were 
ready.  General  Dupont,  with  25,000  men,  was 
on  the  Valladolid  road,  one  division  upon  Se- 
govia, taking  the  direction  of  Madrid.  Mar- 
shal Moncey,  with  30,000,  was  between  Burgos 
and  Aranda,  the  direct  road  for  Madrid.  Ge- 
neral Duhesme,  with  seven  or  eight  thousand 
men,  almost  all  Italians,  was  marching  upon 
Barcelona:  5000  French  from  Piedmont  and 
Provence  were  on  march  to  join  him.  One  di- 
vision of  3000  men  was  proceeding  by  St.  Jean- 
Pied-de-Port,  for  Pampeluna.  A  second,  com- 
posed of  the  fourth  battalions  of  the  five  legions 
of  reserve,  was  gone  to  reinforce  the  first.  A 
reserve  of  infantry  was  organizing  at  Orleans, 
one  of  cavalry  at  Poitiers.  These  made  about 
80,000  men,  all  young  soldiers,  who  had  never 
seen  fire,  but  well  officered,  and  full  of  the  mi- 
litary spirit  which  at  that  period  animated  our 
armies. 

It  was  necessary  to  give  a  commander  to 
these  forces.  Napoleon  chose  a  very  indiscreet 
one  for  a  political  mission  of  such  importance, 
but  he  placed  him  in  such  a  situation  as  to  pre- 
clude the  possibility  of  any  indiscretion.  This 
commander  was  Murat,  still  discontented  at  be- 
ing only  grand-duke,  impatient  to  become  king, 
no  matter  where,  having  taken  part  in  the  wars 
in  Italy,  Austria,  Prussia,  Poland,  and  contri- 
buted to  erect  thrones  at  Naples,  Florence,  Mi- 
lan, the  Hague,  Cassel,  Warsaw,  without  gain- 
ing one  of  those  thrones  for  himself;  inconsola- 
ble above  all  for  not  having  obtained  that  of 
Poland,  and  eager  for  any  war  which  might 
offer  fresh  chances  of  reigning.  The  Penin- 
sula, where  at  this  moment  the  throne  of  Por- 
tugal was  vacant,  where  that  of  Spain  tottered, 
was  for  him  the  land  of  dreams,  as  Mexico  or 
Peru  formerly  was  for  the  Spanish  adventurers. 
Good-natured  and  generous  as  Murat  was,  if 
he  was  required  to  hasten  the  downfal  of 
Charles  IV.,  by  means  not  the  most  creditable 
or  avowable,  in  his  ardour  for  reigning  he  was 
the  man  to  undertake  the  commission.  There 
was  nothing  to  be  feared  en  his  part  but  too 
much  zeal.  However,  more  intelligent,  more 
elirewd,  than  he  has  in  general  been  deemed, 

VOL.  II.  —67 


(the  circumstances  which  arc  about  to  follow 
will  furnish  proof  of  this,)  he  was  capable,  in 
an  important  interest  of  ambition,  of  being 
even  discreet  and  reserved.  He  had,  at  all 
events,  as  we  have  seen  above,  formed  particu- 
lar relations  with  Emmanuel  Godoy,  relations, 
cultivated  by  the  latter  with  equal  eagerness, 
each  believing  that  the  other  would  assist  him 
in  the  attainment  of  the  object  of  his  wishes, 
and  both  deceiving  themselves,  for  Godoy.  was 
no  more  in  a  condition  to  give  a  king  to  the 
Spaniards  than  Murat  an  idea  to  Napoleon. 
To  send  Murat  to  Spain  was,  therefore,  in- 
viting him  to  a  feast.  But  Napoleon,  designing 
to  frighten  the  reigning  house  by  the  despatch 
of  numerous  troops  combined  with  absolute 
silence  respecting  his  intentions,  made  use  of 
his  brother-in-law  conformably  to  the  plan 
which  he  had  adopted.  He  had  had  him  by 
his  side  both  in  Italy  and  Paris,  without  utter- 
ing a  single  word  concerning  his  plans  relative 
to  Spain,  at  the  very  moment  when  he  was 
thinking  of  them  the  most.  On  the  20th  of 
February,  having  seen  him  in  the  course  of  the 
day  without  saying  a  word  to  him  about  the 
mission  which  he  destined  for  him,  he  directed 
the  minister  of  war  to  make  him  set  out  in  the 
night  for  Bayonne,  in  order  to  assume  the  com- 
mand of  the  troops  entering  Spain.  Murat 
was  to  be  there  on  the  26th,  and  to  find  there 
his  instructions.  Those  instructions  were  to 
this  effect :  to  take  the  general  command  of  the 
corps  of  the  Gironde  and  of  the  Ocean,  of  the 
division  of  the  Eastern  Pyrenees,  of  the  divi- 
sion of  the  Western  Pyrenees,  and  of  all  the 
troops  which  were  penetrating  further  into 
Spain ;  to  repair  in  the  first  days  of  March  to 
Burgos,  whither  the  detachments  of  the  impe- 
rial guard  were  to  proceed ;  to  place  his  head- 
quarters at  the  centre  of  the  corps  of  Marshal 
Moncey,  that  is  to  say,  at  Burgos  itself ;  to  ad- 
vance with  this  corps  upon  the  Madrid  road  by 
Aranda  and  Somosierra ;  to  direct  that  of  Ge- 
neral Dupont  thither  by  Segovia  and  the  Escu- 
rial ;  to  be  master  by  about  the  15th  of  March 
of  the  two  passes  of  the  Guadarrama ;  to  col- 
lect 600,000  rations  of  biscuit  already  made  at 
Bayonne,  so  that  the  troops  should  be  supplied 
for  a  fortnight,  in  case  of  a  forced  march ;  to 
await  orders  from  Paris  for  any  ulterior  move- 
ment; to  occupy  immediately  the  citadel  of 
Pampeluna,  the  forts  of  Barcelona,  the  fortress 
of  St.  Sebastian ;  to  give  the  Spanish  com- 
mandants, as  a  reason  for  this  occupation,  the 
ordinary  rule  of  war  to  secure  one's  rear,  when 
marching  forward  even  in  a  friendly  country ; 
to  keep  all  the  troops  well  together,  as  one  is 
accustomed  to  do  on  approaching  the  enemy ; 
taking  care  that  the  pay  should  never  be  in 
arrear,  so  that  the  soldiers,  having  money, 
might  not  be  tempted  to  consume  without  pay- 
ing, and,  as  there  was  reason  to  distrust  the 
Neapolitans  who  were  entering  Catalonia,  to 
order  the  first  Italian  who  should  plunder  to  be 
shot ;  not  to  seek,  not  to  accept  of  communica- 
tion with  die  court  of  Spain,  without  having  a 
formal  order ;  not  to  answer  any  letter  from 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace ;  to  say,  in  case  of  be- 
ing questioned  in  such  a  manner  as  not  to  be 
able  to  keep  silence,  that  the  French  troops 
were  entering  Spain  for  a  purpose  known  to 
Napoleon  alone,  a  purpose  certainly  advan- 
tageous to  the  cause  of  Spain  and  of  France; 
2r2 


450 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1808. 


to  pronounce  vaguely  the  words  Cadiz,  Gibral- 
tar, without  saying  any  thing  positive ;  to  inti- 
mate particularly  to  the  Biscayan  provinces, 
that  whatever  might  happen,  their  privileges 
would  be  respected ;  to  publish,  on  reaching 
Burgos,  an  order  of  the  day,  recommending  to 
the  troops  the  strictest  discipline  and  the  most 
fraternal  relations  with  the  generous  Spanish 
people,  the  friend  and  ally  of  the  French  peo- 
ple ;  never  to  mix  up  with  all  these  protesta- 
tions of  friendship  any  other  name  than  that 
of  the  Spanish  people,  and  never  to  mention 
King  Charles  IV.  or  his  government,  under  any 
form  whatever. 

Such  is  the  substance  of  the  instructions  ad- 
dressed to  Murat  on  the  20th  of  February; 
confirmed  and  developed  in  the  following  days 
in  posterior  orders.  General  Belliard  was 
placed  about  him  as  chief  of  the  staff,  General 
Grouchy  as  commander  of  his  cavalry,  General 
Lariboissiere  was  charged  with  the  direction 
of  the  artillery  of  the  army.  The  latter  was 
to  despatch  for  Bayonne,  from  all  the  depots 
of  artillery,  situated  in  the  West  and  the  South, 
considerable  stores,  particularly  tools  and  fire- 
works capable  of  blowing  up  the  gate  of  a  town 
or  of  a  strong  castle.  The  mode  of  carriage 
in  Spain  being  on  the  back  of  mules,  orders 
were  immediately  sent  off  to  Bayonne  to  pur- 
chase five  hundred  of  the  best  and  handsomest 
of  those  animals.  M.  Mollien,  minister  of  the 
public  treasury,  was  desired  to  send  several 
millions  in  specie,  two  of  them  in  gold,  to  Bay- 
onne, to  defray  all  the  expenses  of  the  army, 
and  to  pay  them  in  ready  money.  He  was, 
moreover,  to  prepare  an  equitable  tariff,  show- 
ing the  comparative  value  of  the  French  and 
Spanish  coins,  which  was  to  be  published  in 
every  town  in  Spain  through  which  the  troops 
should  pass,  in  order  to  prevent  quarrels  be- 
tween the  soldiers  and  the  inhabitants. 

To  these  instructions,  given  for  the  army 
entering  Spain,  were  added  others  for  the 
army  in  Portugal.  Napoleon  designed  that 
Spain  should  not  be  put  to  any  expense  in  an 
enterprise  which  was  about  to  cost  her  the 
reigning  dynasty.  But  he  was  not  equally 
scrupulous  in  regard  to  Portugal,  which  he  i 
was  authorized  to  treat  as  a  conquered  country 
and  the  ally  of  England.  Calculating  the 
wealth  of  that  kingdom  rather  by  that  of  the 
colonies  than  by  that  of  the  mother-country, 
he  directed  Junot  to  impose  upon  it  a  contri- 
bution of  one  hundred  millions.  He  recom- 
mended the  most  extreme  severity  for  any 
attempt  at  insurrection,  reminding  him,  as  an 
example  to  be  followed,  of  the  terrible  manner 
in  which  he  had  repressed  Cairo  in  Egypt, 
Pavia  and  Verona  in  Italy.  He  ordered  him 
to  dissolve  the  Portuguese  army,  and  to  send 
to  France  all  that  could  not  be  disbanded.  He 
expressly  enjoined  him  to  have  an  eye  on  the 
Spanish  divisions  which  had  concurred  in  the 
invasion  of  Portugal,  to  move  them  as  far  as 
he  could  from  the  frontiers  of  Spain,  to  keep 
the  bulk  of  his  forces  at  Lisbon,  and  two  small 
French  divisions  of  four  or  five  thousand  men 
each,  the  one  at  Almeida  to  awe  the  Spanish 
troops  of  General  Taranco,  who  occupied 
Oporto,  the  other  at  Badajoz,  to  march,  if 
needful,  for  Andalusia ;  to  keep  this  order 
absolutely  secret,  and,  if  he  heard  that  any 
collision  had  taken  place  between  the  Spaniards 


and  the  French,  to  circulate  among  the  Portu- 
guese that  the  cause  of  this  collision  was  no 
other  than  Portugal  itself,  the  possession  of 
which  was  demanded  by  the  Spaniards,  but 
refused  them. 

Napoleon  lastly  gave  orders  to  the  guard, 
for  he  foresaw  that  he  should  be  obliged  to  go 
himself  to  Spain,  either  to  direct  the  war,  if 
war  should  break  out  there,  or  to  direct  the 
political  affairs,  if  his  policy  should  bring 
about  a  like  termination  of  the  events  in  Spain 
to  those  in  Portugal,  by  the  flight  of  the  royal 
family.  He  had  successively  despatched  for 
Bayonne  the  Mamelukes,  the  Poles,  the  sea- 
men of  the  guard,  several  detachments  of 
chasseurs  and  horse  grenadiers,  and  a  regi- 
ment of  fusileers,  that  is  to  say,  about  3000 
men.  He  sent  the  brave  Lepic  to  command 
them,  with  orders  to  be  in  the  first  days  of 
March  at  Burgos,  the  infantry  in  Burgos  itself, 
the  cavalry  on  the  road  from  Bayonne  to 
Burgos. 

These  military  dispositions  were  not  suffi- 
cient to  fulfil  completely  the  object  which  Na- 
poleon proposed  to  himself.  While  his  troops 
were  to  advance  mysteriously  upon  Madrid, 
having  no  cheering  words  but  for  the  Spanish 
people,  and  none  whatever  for  the  reigning 
family,  he  set  his  diplomacy  to  work  in  the 
same  spirit.  M.  de  Beauharnais  applied  in- 
cessantly at  Paris  for  instructions  against  a 
catastrophe  which  appeared  imminent.  He 
solicited  in  particular  permission  to  confer 
some  demonstrations  of  interest  on  Ferdinand, 
still  convinced  that  the  favourite  must  be  over- 
thrown for  the  benefit  of  that  prince,  and  the 
fusion  of  the  two  dynasties  be  effected  by  a 
marriage.  Napoleon,  who  was  now  far  from 
entertaining  such  a  plan,  and  who  frequently 
laughed  at  the  credulity  of  M.  de  Beauharnais, 
his  awkwardness,  his  avarice,  the  importance 
which  he  was  fond  of  assuming,  and  who  left 
him  where  he  was,  because  an  honest  man 
without  talent  suited  him  better  than  another 
to  perform  the  ridiculous  part  of  an  ambassa- 
dor who  was  left  ignorant  of  every  thing,  di- 
rected that  he  should  be  enjoined  to  observe 
the  strictest  neutrality  between  the  factions 
which  divided  Spain,  to  show  no  demonstra- 
tions of  interest  for  any  of  them,  to  answer 
merely,  when  asked  concerning  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  that  he 
was  displeased,  extremely  displeased,  without 
saying  at  what ;  to  add,  if  any  thing  was  said 
to  him  concerning  the  march  of  the  French 
armies,  that  Gibraltar,  Cadiz,  probably  re- 
quired a  concentration  of  troops,  for  the  Eng- 
lish were  bringing  large  forces  towards  that 
point;  but  that  the  Spanish  cabinet  was  so 
indiscreet  that  it  could  not  be  trusted  with  the 
secret  of  a  single  military  operation. 

These  instructions  were  sufhcient  for  the 
part  which  M.  de  Beauharnais  had  to  act. 
But  Napoleon  employed  more  certain  means 
for  striking  terror  into  the  unhappy  court  of 
Spain.  M.  Yzquierdo  was  still  in  Paris,  hover- 
ing about  the  Tuileries,  sometimes  at  the 
Grand-marshal  Duroc's,  with  whom  he  had  ne- 
gotiated the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau,  some- 
times at  M.  de  Talleyrand's,  the  principal 
go-between  in  the  whole  Spanish  business. 
Seeing  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  obtain 
the  publication  of  the  treaty  of  Fontainebleau, 


Feb.  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


451 


he  had  thence  concluded  that  other  measures 
•were  contemplated  in  Paris ;  that  this  parti- 
tion of  Portugal  had  been  but  a  provisional 
arrangement  for  obtaining  the  immediate  ces- 
sion of  Tuscany ;  and  that,  no  doubt,  the  over- 
throw of  the  dynasty  itself  was  meditated. 
With  his  usual  perspicacity,  he  had  completely 
detected,  not  the  means  but  the  end  at  which 
Napoleon  was  aiming.  He  had  endeavoured, 
by  artfully  sounding  M.  de  Talleyrand,  to  dis- 
cover whether  large  concessions  of  territory 
or  of  commerce  might  not,  accompanied  by  a 
marriage,  appease  the  wrath,  real  or  feigned, 
of  the  conqueror. 

M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  was  inclined  to  an 
intermediate  plan,  had  listened  to  M.  Yzqui- 
erdo,  and  perhaps  as  much  proposed  as  adopted 
the  ideas,  of  which  this  agent  of  Emmanuel 
Godoy's  desired  to  make  essay.  These  ideas 
agreed  precisely  with  the  second  plan,  which 
we  have  already  detailed.  It  purported,  in 
fact,  to  marry  Ferdinand  to  a  French  prin- 
cess, to  take  for  France  the  provinces  of  the 
Ebro  in  exchange  for  the  part  of  Portugal  left 
disposable,  to  open  the  Spanish  colonies  to  the 
French,  to  bind  the  two  crowns  together  not 
only  by  a  marriage  but  by  a  treaty  of  alliance 
offensive  and  defensive,  which  should  render 
either  war  or  peace  common  to  both,  and 
lastly  to  give  to  Charles  IV.  the  title  of  Em- 
peror of  the  Americas.  Such  were  the  ideas 
which  M.  Yzquierdo  put  forward,  as  much  to 
sound  the  court  of  the  Tuileries  as  to  arrive  at 
a  conclusion.  All  at  once,  Napoleon  ordered 
him  to  be  treated  with  extreme  harshness,  to 
be  sent  away,  as  if  one  was  weary  of  his  ter- 
giversations, as  if  one  would  have  nothing 
more  to  do  with  a  court  so  weak,  so  incapable, 
so  insincere ;  in  short,  to  impel  him  to  set  out 
for  Madrid,  that  he  might  carry  thither  the 
terror  with  which  he  had  been  filled.  The 
Grand-marshal  Duroc  had  orders  to  write  to 
M.  Yzquierdo  that  he  would  do  well  to  return 
immediately  to  Madrid,1  to  disperse  the  thick 
clouds  which  had  arisen  between  the  two 
courts.  It  was  not  said  what  clouds ;  but  M. 
Yzquierdo  took  the  hint,  and  it  would  be  suffi- 
cient to  make  him  set  out  to  excite  in  the 
eourt  of  Spain  an  agitation,  which  would  not 
let  it  rest  anywhere,  and  which  must  lead  to  a 
definitive  resolution.  M.  Yzquierdo  left  Paris 
the  same  day. 

It  was  requisite,  at  the  same  time,  to  answer 
the  letter  of  the  oth  of  February,  in  which  the 
terrified  Charles  IV.  had  besought  Napoleon  to 
satisfy  him  respecting  his  intentions,  and  re- 
specting the  march  of  the  French  troops,  which 
at  that  moment  were  advancing  towards  Ma- 
drid. In  this  letter  Charles  IV.  had  abstained 
from  alluding  to  the  marriage  of  his  son  with 
a  niece  of  Napoleon's,  seeing  that  the  latter 
affected  to  think  no  more  of  that  proposal. 
Like  one  who  is  striving  to  pick  a  quarrel,  Na- 
poleon, instead  of  endeavouring  in  his  answer 
to  dispel  the  alarm  of  Charles  IV.,  seemed  to 
complain  that,  on  the  subject  of  the  marriage, 
there  should  be  observed  a  silence  of  which  he 
had  himself  set  the  example.  This  answer, 
dated  the  25th  of  February,  was  very  short 
and  very  dry.  He  therein  mentioned  that,  on 


I  The  letter  is  in  the  Louvre,  and  bears  date  the  24th  of 
February. 


the  18th  of  November,  King  Charles  had  asked 
him  for  a  French  princess,  that  he  answered 
on  the  10th  of  January  by  a  conditional  con- 
sent; that  on  the  5th  of  February,  King 
Charles,  writing  again  to  him,  made  no  further 
mention  of  the  marriage ;  and  he  added  that 
this  last  silence  left  him  in  doubts  which  it 
was  necessary  to  remove  in  order  to  decide 
upon  objects  of  great  importance. 

This  new  letter,  which  was  but  a  refusal  to 
relieve  the  uneasiness  of  the  unfortunate 
Charles  IV.,  and  which,  combined  with  other 
circumstances  of  the  moment,  must  have  filled 
him  with  terror,  was  brought  by  M.  de  Tour- 
non,  chamberlain  of  the  Emperor,  who  had 
been  previously  sent  to  Madrid  on  a  similar 
mission,  and  who  to  great  devotedness  united 
much  good  sense  and  love  of  truth.  He  had 
instructions  to  observe  attentively  the  progress 
and  conduct  of  the  French  troops,  the  disposi- 
tions of  the  Spanish  people  in  regard  to  them, 
to  take  particular  notice  also  of  what  was  pass- 
ing at  the  Escurial,  then  to  return  to  Burgos 
about  the  loth  of  March,  and  there  await  the 
arrival  of  Napoleon.  The  latter  had,  in  fact, 
calculated  that  his  orders,  given  between  the 
20th  and  the  25th  of  February,  would  have 
their  consequences  in  Spain  in  the  middle  of 
March,  and  that,  at  this  period,  he  ought  to 
be  in  person  at  Burgos,  to  derive  from  events, 
always  fertile  in  unforeseen  cases,  the  result 
which  he  desired. 

There  was,  therefore,  every  reason  to  be- 
lieve that  the  court  of  Spain,  already  strongly 
tempted  to  follow  the  example  of  the  house  of 
Braganza,  when  it  should  see  the  French  army 
advancing  upon  Madrid,  M.  de  Beauharnais 
saying  nothing  because  he  knew  nothing,  and 
M.  Yzquierdo  saying  much,  because  he  feared 
much,  would  no  longer  hesitate  to  set  out  for 
Cadiz.  If,  however,  in  spite  of  recommenda- 
tions given  to  the  French  troops,  to  treat  the 
Spanish  people  as  friends,  an  unforeseen  colli- 
sion should  take  place,  there  would  then  be  a 
solution  again.  He  might  consider  himself  as 
betrayed  by  allies  among  whom  he  had  come 
amicably  for  an  important  expedition  interest 
ing  the  alliance,  and  he  should  revenge  him- 
self by  deposing  the  Bourbons  of  Spain,  as  he 
had  deposed  those  of  Naples  for  a  treachery 
real  or  supposed.  Napoleon,  acting  thus  as  a 
conqueror,  who  cares  little  about  the  means, 
provided  that  he  attains  his  end,  reckoning 
upon  great  results,  such  as  the  regeneration 
of  Spain,  the  re-establishment  of  the  natural 
alliances  of  France,  to  excuse  himself  in  the 
eyes  of  posterity  for  the  dark  machination 
which  he  was  employing  towards  a  friendly 
court — Napoleon  conceived  that  he  had  at 
length  discovered  the  true  way  of  overturning 
the  Bourbons  without  resorting  to  atrocious 
violences,  which,  in  less  humane  ages  than 
ours,  conquerors  have  never  hesitated  to  com- 
mit. He  thought  that,  on  giving  a  slight  shako 
to  the  throne  of  Spain,  without  violently  hurl- 
ing Charles  IV.  from  it,  he  might  induce  that 
weak  prince,  his  guilty  wife,  and  his  cowardly 
favourite,  to  forsake  it,  in  order  to  seek  an- 
other in  America.  But  this  plan,  devised  to 
avoid  shocking  Europe  and  France  too  much, 
gave  rise  to  an  objection  which  had  caused 
Napoleon  to  hesitate  long  about  adopting  it. 
By  driving  the  reigning  house  to  retreat,  lik« 


452 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


that  of  Portugal,  to  the  New  World,  he  should 
inevitably  bring  upon  Spain  the  loss  of  her 
colonies,  as  had  been  the  case  with  Portugal. 
The  Brnganzas  in  Brazil,  the  Bourbons  in 
Mexico,  in  Peru,  on  the  banks  of  the  La  Plata, 
would  found  empires,  enemies  of  their  usurped 
mother-countries,  friends  of  England,  who 
would  find  for  a  long  time  in  the  supply  of 
these  colonies  wherewithal  to  indemnify  her- 
self for  the  closing  of  the  Continent.  No  doubt, 
on  penetrating  into  a  distant  futurity,  one 
might  discover  in  these  colonies  new  nations, 
offering  to  their  old  mother-countries  more 
means  of  exchange,  more  occasions  for  profit, 
as  was  already  exemplified  in  the  case  of  Eng- 
land and  the  United  States.  But  Spain,  Portu- 
gal, were  not  industrious  England ;  the  Ameri- 
cans of  the  South  were  not  the  Americans  of 
the  North ;  and  all  that  could  be  foreseen  for 
a  long  series  of  years  was  the  loss  of  the  Span- 
ish colonies,  and  the  working  of  them  for  the 
benefit  of  British  commerce.  To  the  flight, 
therefore,  of  Charles  IV.  to  America  were  at- 
tached, together  with  a  great  convenience  for 
thffusurpation  of  the  throne,  great  and  serious 
inconveniences  in  respect  to  the  future  lot  of 
the  Spanish  colonies.  This  must  be  a  subject 


'  I  should  very  much  astonish  both  the  public  and  con- 
temporary historians,  (who  are  usually  very  prompt  in 
making  up  their  minds  on  doubtful  questions,)  were  I  to 
describe  the  various  perplexities  I  experienced  before  I 
could  come  to  any  satisfactory  conclusion  respecting  Na- 
poleon's  real  designs  on  Spain.  As  he  ended  by  invading 
the  country  and  giving  the  sovereignty  to  his  brother 
Joseph,  it  has  been  inferred  that  he  had  all  along  projected 
the  scheme  which  he  ultimately  executed.  In  like  man- 
ner, there  are  persons  who  firmly  believe  that,  because  he 
made  himself  Emperor  of  France,  he  had  entertained  that 
project  from  the  time  when  he  commanded  the  army  of 
Italy.  The  collectors  of  recollections  have  even  gone  so 
far  as  to  look  for  the  first  traces  of  his  projects  in  the 
School  of  Brienne.  Moreau  betrayed  France  in  1813: — 
this  is  an  unquestionable  fact.  But  there  are  persons  who, 
not  content  with  dating  his  civic  delinquencies  from  the 
conspiracy  of  Georges,  and  his  misunderstanding  with  the 
First  Consul,  trace  them  back  to  the  conspiracies  of  I'iohe- 
gru;  and,  following  up  the  spirit  of  investigation,  they  go 
so  far  as  to  affirm  that  he  conceived  the  first  idea  of  be- 
traying the  French  armies  to  the  Austrians  whilst  he  was 
engaged  in  studying  the  law  at  the  School  of  Rennes. 
This  is,a  most  absurd  mode  of  judging  mankind.  It  is 
founded  on  a  misunderstanding,  not  only  of  the  indivi- 
duals themselves,  but  of  the  progress  of  the  human  mind, 
which  is  slow  and  successive,  and  much  less  frequently 
determines  events  than  is  determined  by  them.  In  1808 
Napoleon  dethroned  the  Spanish  Bourbons.  When  did  he 
determine  on  this  step,  and  by  what  means  did  he  propose 
to  effect  it?  These  are  questions  the  solution  of  which 
presents  the  utmost  difficulty,  even  to  those  who  have  the 
historical  documents  within  their  reach.  I  am  the  only 
historian  who  has  possessed  all  the  documents  relating  to 
those  facts,  thanks  to  the  facilities  afforded  by  my  political 
position ;  and  yet  I  was  for  a  considerable  time  involved 
In  great  uncertainty.  My  doubts  were  only  removed  by 
iiscoveries  which  have  been  in  part  due  to  persevering  in- 
vestigation, and  in  part  the  result  of  mere  good  fortune. 
I  will  here  subjoin  an  account  of  these  discoveries  for  the 
information  of  the  public,  and  for  the  satisfaction  of  men 
who  regard  conscientious  inquiry  on  such  points  in  the 
light  of  a  duty. 

First,  I  have  a  few  observations  to  offer  respecting  the 
documents  themselves.  Of  all  the  many  writers  who  have 
treated  of  the  events  here  in  question,  not  one  has  had 
access  to  the  real  historical  documents  referring  to  them. 
All  have  merely  written  books  from  other  books.  This  is 
evident,  on  a  perusal  of  their  works,  to  any  one  acquainted 
with  facts.  Even  Count  de  Toreno,  whose  work  on  the 
Spanish  revolution  is  remarkable  for  talent  and  what  is 
better  still,  for  sound  political  judgment,  had  not  the 
means  of  consulting  the  necessary  documents.  He  baswl 
his  work  on  the  authority  of  Spanish  and  French  publica- 
tions and  existing  traditions,  collected  in  his  own  country ; 
and  by  these  means  his  narrative  was  rendered  in  many 
respecU  highly  valuable.  Among  French  writers,  one 
only,  M.  Armand  Lefevre,  has  had  the  advantage  of  being 
Initiated  into  foreign  affairs,  and  obtaining  access  to  a  few 
authentic  documents.  But  could  he,  through  this  initia- 


[Feb.  1808 


of  grievous  affliction  to  the  Spaniards  them- 
selves, hence  discontent  and  revolt,  and  an 
injury  to  our  commerce  proportionate  to  the 
advantage  that  would  be  derived  by  the  com- 
merce of  the  enemy. 

Napoleon,  extremely  well  informed  respect- 
ing these  complicated  interests,  devised  a  new 
combination,  much  more  artful  than  any  of 
those  to  which  we  have  adverted,  and  having 
for  its  object  to  correct  the  only  inconvenience 
of  the  plan  which  he  had  definitively  adopted. 
There  was  at  Cadiz  a  fine  French  squadron, 
capable  of  commanding  the  harbour  and  the 
road.  He  resolved  to  employ  it  in  detaining 
the  Bourbons  at  the  moment  when  they  should 
attempt  to  embark,  and,  after  driving  them 
by  fear  from  Aranjuez  to  Cadiz,  stop  them  by 
force  at  Cadiz  itself,  before  they  should  have 
sailed,  under  the  escort  of  England,  for  Vera 
Cruz.  In  consequence,  he  sent  off  to  Admiral 
Rosily  a  despatch  in  cipher,  dated  the  21st  of 
February,  containing  an  express  order  to  take 
such  a  position  in  the  road  of  Cadiz  as  to  pre- 
vent the  departure  of  any  vessel,  and  to  stop 
the  fugitive  royal  family,  if  it  should  imitate 
the  folly,  so  said  the  despatch,  of  the  court  of 
Lisbon.1 


tion,  come  to  the  knowledge  of  truth?     A  single  remark 

will  suffice  to  answer  this  question.     The  correspondence 

I  of  the  foreign  office,  in  relation  to  this  Spanish  business, 

I  consists  of  a  very  few  despatches  from  M.  de  Chanip;;  rny, 

i  and  in  a  very  considerable  number  of  despatches  from  M. 

de  Beauharnais.  the  French  ambassador  at  Madrid ! 

Now,  it  happened  that  M.  de  Champagny,  who  was  a 
very  honourable  man,  and  sincerely  devoted  to  the  Em- 
peror, knew  nothing  whatever  of  the  affairs  of  Spain.  M. 
de  Beauharnais,  also  a  man  of  strict  integrity,  but  very 
incapable,  was  singled  out  as  a  fit  personage  to  play  the 
ridiculous  part  of  an  ambassador  who  was  deceived,  in 
order  that  he,  in  his  turn,  might  the  better  deceive  the 
court  to  which  he  was  accredited.  "  Say  nothing  to  Beau- 
harnais,"— "  I  have  said  nothing  to  Beauharnais,"  are 
phrases  of  continual  recurrence  in  the  correspondence 
between  Bonaparte  and  his  agents  in  Spain.  Finally,  at 
the  moment  of  the  catastrophe,  Napoleon  despatched  M. 
du  la  Koret  to  second  Murat  regarding  M.  de  Beauharnaig 
as  a  person  utterly  useless:  and  he  dismissed  the  latter  in 
disgrace,  without  even  hearing  his  defence,  which  was  a 
flagrant  ac!  of  injustice.  The  correspondence  of  the  de- 
partment of  foreign  affairs,  even  when  one  enjoys  the 
advantage  of  consulting  it,  comprises  only  a  few  very  un- 
important documents  in  relation  to  the  affairs  of  Spain. 
Where  then,  it  will  be  asked,  are  the  documents  to  be 
found?  In  the  correspondence  between  Napoleon  and  the 
agents  he  employed  at  the  time.  The  agents  in  1'uris  wore 
MM.  Talleyrand  and  Duroc — in  Madrid,  first  Murat.  and 
aft'Twards  General  Savary,  Marshal  Bessieres,  General 
Count  de  Lobau,  M.  de  Tournon,  General  Grouchy,  M.  de 
Monthyon.  (whose  reports  were  subsequently  published 
in  a  manner  different  from  that  in  which  he  wrote  them,) 
and  Admiral  Perres,  who  was  much  engaged  in  this  affair 
in  reference  to  the  Spanish  colonies.  These  were  Napo- 
leon's real  agents;  the  only  persons  who  possessed  any 
i  knowledge  of  the  affair,  and  they  were  only  partially  in- 
i  formed,  for  each  individual  knew  only  that  which  con- 
cerned himself,  and  conjectured  the  rest  as  well  as  his 
intelligence  enabled  him.  The  correspondence  of  all  these 
persons  with  Xapoleon,  and  of  Napoleon  with  them  exists. 
It  is  an  extensive  and  curious  correspondence,  preserved 
in  the  Louvre,  and  I  am  the  only  person  who  has  read  it. 
But  though  these  documents  seemed  calculated  to  clear 
up  all  obscurity,  they  did  not  satisfy  my  doubt  until  after 
I  had  examined  them  with  that  sort  of  laborious  attention 
which  it  is  necessary  to  bestow  on  certain  passages  in  the 
writings  of  the  historians  of  antiquity,  in  order  to  eluci- 
date historical  facts. 

In  general,  whenever  I  have  perused  the  correspondence 
of  Napoleon  with  his  agents.  I  have  found  it  so  clear  and 
precise  that  I  never  could  be  in  doubt  respecting  facts  and 
events;  but  after  reading  this  correspondence  relative  to 
Spain,  I  remained  for  a  length  of  time  in  the  most  embar- 
rassing perplexity.  At  first  Napoleon  must  have  wavered 
long  amidst  a  variety  of  projects ;  and,  when  at  length  hig 
determination  was  fixed,  he  did  not  make  known  his  de- 
signs. Possibly  he  might  have  disclosed  them  to  Savary 
at  the  last  moment  and  in  reference  to  one  point — the 
compulsory  journey  of  Ferdinand  to  Bayonne.  On  tho 


Feb.  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


453 


Assuredly,  if  one  were  to  judge  of  these  acts 
according  to  ordinary  morality,  which  renders 
sacred  the  property  of  another,  we  must  brand 
them  for  ever,  as  we  brand  those  of  the  crimi- 

20th  of  February  he  had  seen  Murat,  without  mentioning 
the  matter  to  him,  and  he  transmitted  to  him,  through 
the  minister  of  the  war  department,  the  order  to  depart 
for  Bayonne.  He  traced  to  him  the  march  of  the  army  on 
Madrid,  adding  not  a  single  word  relative  to  politics,  and 
forbidding  any  question  to  be  asked.  Count  Lobau  and 
M.  de  Tournon,  who  were  sent  as  observers,  were  not  put 
in  possession  of  any  secret.  At  length,  when  the  revolu- 
tion of  Aranjuez  was  accomplished,  and  Spain  was  without 
a  king,  (Charles  IV.  having  abdicated,  and  Ferdinand  VII. 
not  having  been  recognised,)  Napoleon  despatched  General 
Savary,  and  confided  to  him  a  part  of  the  plan,  that  which 
consisted  in  bringing  the  father  and  son  to  Bayonne,  either 
with  their  own  free  will  or.  by  force.  On  that  same  day, 
M.  de  Tournon  left  Paris  with  instructions  of  a  totally  dif- 
ferent nature.  These  instructions,  which  were  subse- 
quently published  at  Saint  Helena,  are  not  apocryphal, 
but  perfectly  authentic:  they  countermanded  all  that 
Murat  and  General  Savary  had  been  ordered  to  do,  and 
what  they  actually  did.  It  may  be  readily  imagined  how 
great  was  the  difficulty  of  elucidating  historical  truth  from 
amidst  this  mass  of  well-concocted  dissimulation;  and,  if 
this  task  was  difficult,  even  with  the  help  of  genuine 
documents,  it  must  be  pronounced  impossible  without 
them. 

I  will  now  explain  by  what  means  I  succeeded  in  ar- 
riving  at  the  truth.  By  comparing  one  with  another  all 
the  orders  given,  not  only  to  confidential  agents,  bat  to 
agents  who  were  mere  instruments ; — by  comparing  the 
political  with  the  military  orders,  and  not  only  with  the 
military,  but  even  with  the  financial  orders;— by  com- 
paring those  which  were  given  with  those  which  were 
executed,  and  with  some  little  hints  thrown  out  at  the 
critical  moment  when  Napoleon  found  it  necessary  to 
make  a  partial  disclosure  of  his  designs,  in  order  to  exact 
obedience; — by  these  means,  and  the  help  of  much  pa 
tience,  I  succeeded  in  unravelling  the  truth,  bu£  not  till 
after  years  of  reflection.  I  may  say  years,  for  there  is  one 
point  on  which  I  did  not  satisfy  myself  until  after  three 
years  of  attentive  examination  and  reflection. 

Having  thus  shown  the  difficulty  of  my  task,  I  will  now 
state  the  conclusions  at  which  I  have  arrived,  and  how  I 
arrived  at  them. 

That  Napoleon  had  long  and  systematically  entertained 
the  idea  of  hurling  the  Bourbons  from  every  throne  in 
Europe  admits  of  no  doubt.  But  this  idea  did  not  take 
birth  in  his  mind  until  1806,  after  the  treachery  of  the 
court  of  Naples,  and  after  the  dethronement  of  the  king, 
which  was  announced  on  the  day  succeeding  the  battle  of 
Austerlitz.  Subsequently,  the  incapacity  and  meanness 
of  the  court  of  Spain,  its  secret  treachery,  which  were  per- 
ceptible, though  not  distinctly  manifest; — finally,  the 
famous  proclamation  by  which  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  on 
the  very  eve  of  the  battle  of  Jena,  summoned  the  whole 
Spanish  nation  to  arms;  all  these  circumstances  confirmed 
Napoleon  in  the  idea  that  it  was  necessary  to  pursue  to- 
wards the  Spanish  Bourbons  the  same  course  he  had  adopt- 
ed towards  the  Bourbons  of  Naples.  But  at  what  time  was 
this  general  and  vague  idea  matured  into  a  fixed  scheme  ? 
This  is  the  first  question  And  after  the  idea  had  ripened 
into  a  fixed  scheme,  by  what  means  was  that  scheme  to  be 
executed  ?  For  the  court  of  Spain  had  not  the  courage  to 
make  that  demonstration  of  hostile  spirit  by  which  the 
Neapolitan  court  had  furnished  a  just  ground  of  offence. 
By  what  means,  then,  the  scheme  being  fairly  determined 
on,  was  it  to  be  carried  out?  This  is  the  second  question, 
and  the  most  difficult  of  solution. 

It  has  been  said  that,  Immediately  after  the  proclama- 
tion of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  Napoleon,  then  in  Berlin, 
formed  the  project  of  deposing  the  King  of  Spain.  Napo- 
leon's correspondence,  which  almost  in  every  line  reveals 
his  inmost  feelings,  bears  evidence  to  the  contrary.  After 
the  battle  of  Jena,  he  was  wholly  engrossed  by  thoughts 
of  a  great  war  in  the  north  of  Europe.  The  general  idea 
of  ultimately  getting  rid  of  the  Bourbons,  might  have  be- 
come confirmed  in  his  mind ;  but  the  project  for  its  execu- 
tion was  not  yet  even  in  embryo.  It  has  been  alleged 
that  Napoleon  was  induced  to  sign  peace  at  Tilsit  by  M. 
Talleyrand,  who  represented  the  necessity  of  bringing 
matters  to  a  close  in  the  North,  that  he  might  be  enabled 
to  direct  his  whole  attention  to  the  South,  that  is  to  say, 
to  Spain;  and  it  has  also  been  stated  that  the  question  of 
dethroning  the  Spanish  Bourbons  was  even  discussed  with 
the  Emperor  Alexander,  who  consented  to  that  step,  on 
condition  of  sacrifices  being  made  to  himself  in  the  East. 
All  this  is  untrue.  Napoleon  was  induced  to  treat  for 
peace  at.  Tilsit  only  by  a  consciousness  of  the  difficulties  of 
his  position,  which  in  1807  was  in  no  way  dissimilar  to 
what  it  wag  in  1812 ;  the  good  fortune  of  the  former  year 
being  whloly  attributable  to  the  excellence  of  the  army  at 


nal  who  has  made  free  with  what  does  not 
belong  to  him ;  and,  even  if  we  judge  of  them 
upon  different  principles,  we  cannot  avoid  in- 
flicting severe  censure  upon  them.  But  thrones 


that  period.    Spain  was  entirely  out  of  the  question.    The 
private  correspondence  of  M.  de  Caulaincourt  bears  evi- 


of  dethroning  the  King  of  Spain.  Napoleon  was  desirous 
of  concluding  the  continental  peace  at  Tilsit,  because  he 
found  that  the  Niemen  was  very  far  distant  from  the 
Rhine ;  and  he  had  one  grand  object  at  heart,  which  was 
to  constrain  England  to  conclude  a  maritime  peace  by  the 
union  of  all  the  powers  of  the  Continent  against  her. 

On  his  return  to  Paris,  in  July,  1807,  Napoleon  immedi- 
ately directed  attention  to  two  objects ;  first,  the  internal 
administration  of  the  empire,  which  had  been  neglected  for 
the  space  of  a  year;  and  secondly,  to  turn  to  the  best  ac- 
count the  results  of  the  policy  he  had  pursued  at  Tilsit. 
Thus,  whilst  the  cabinet  of  St.  Petersburg,  charged  with 
the  task  of  mediation,  was  addressing  England,  saying — 
"Choose  between  peace  and  war — peace  with  us,  or  war 
with  us !"  Napoleon  disposed  matters  so  as  to  force  the 
States  still  remaining  neutral  to  declare  themselves 
against  England,  in  the  event  of  her  determination  to 
continue  hostilities.  These  neutral  States  were  Denmark, 
4  -stria,  and  Portugal;  and  he  prepared  an  army  to  con- 
iiu  the  latter  power  to  obedience.  But  his  correspond- 
.  ...  e  and  the  nature  of  his  orders  prove  that,  as  far  as 
concerns  Portugal,  he  was  merely  desirous  of  breaking  up 
her  neutrality.  When,  in  August  and  September,  1807, 
the  only  answer  returned  by  England  to  the  question 
urgently,  pressed  by  Russia  was  the  burning  of  Copen- 
hagen, a  general  war-cry  was  raised  against  her ;  and  then 
Napoleon  determined  to  take  advantage  of  two  things,  the 
prolongation  of  the  war,  and  the  universal  indignation 
excited  against  Great  Britain ; — this  indignation  enabled 
Napoleon  to  pursue,  in  reference  to  England,  a  course 
which  he  never  would  have  ventured  upon  under  other 
circumstances. 

His  first  attempt  was  made  on  Portugal,  but,  the  secret 
understanding  of  that  power  with  England  soon  becoming 
manifest,  he  resolved  to  reduce  her  under  his  own  domi- 
nion. Not  being  able  to  do  this  in  a  direct  way,  he  deter- 
iniin"l  to  divide  the  usurped  power  between  himself  and 
Spain,  in  consideration  of  the  cession  of  Tuscany.  At  this 
time  (October,  1807)  the  question  respecting  the  whole 
Peninsula  was  visibly  raised  in  his  mind  by  the  question 
respecting  Portugal.  Words  inadvertently  dropped, — first, 
orders  hurriedly  issued,  show  the  latent  thought  that  had 
its  origin  in  the  events  of  Copenhagen.  It  was  also  at  tlie 
period  here  alluded  to  that  the  disgraceful  scenes  enacted 
in  the  Escurial  gave  birth  to  the  extravagant  idea  of 
bringing  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  to  trial,  with  the  view 
of  declaring  the  forfeiture  of  his  claims  to  the  crown,  and 
transferring  these  claims  to  some  one  else,  probably  to  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  under  the  title  of  regent.  It  would 
moreover  appear,  from  the  orders  of  Napoleon,  that  the 
vile  conduct  pursued  at  the  court  of  Spain  served  as  a 
stimulant  to  his  ambition,  for,  calculating  the  journeys 
of  couriers  according  to  the  rate  of  expedition  usual  at  the 
period,  we  find  that,  on  receipt  of  the  intelligence  of  whoi 
was  passing  in  the  Escurial,  the  military  movements  com- 
menced; for  at  first  he  had  determined  to  send  forward 
the  troops  by  forced  marches,  though  he  suspended  that 
order  on  receiving  in  Paris  intimation  of  the  royal  pardon 
accorded  to  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias. 

Led  by  the  catastrophe  at  Copenhagen,  and  the  neces- 
sity of  continuing  the  war,  to  the  thought  of  making  him- 
self master  of  Portugal,  Napoleon's  attention  was  next 
directed  to  the  general  affairs  of  the  Peninsula,  and  the 
proceedings  at  the  Escurial  very  much  disposed  him  to 
take  part  in  those  affairs  by  force.  A  delay  in  carrying 
this  wish  into  effect  was  the  consequence  of  the  pardon 
grauted  to  Ferdinand,  and  he  departed  for  Italy  iti  No- 
vember, 1807. 

From  what  passed  at  Mantua  between  Lucien  Bonaparte 
and  Napoleon,  it  is  evident  that  the  latter  thought  of  ar- 
ranging the  marriage  of  one  of  his  nieces  with  Ferdinand. 
and  that  he  was  not  quite  determined  about  the  dethrone- 
ment of  the  Bourbons.  Yet,  in  Italy  he  issued  orders  foi 
the  march  of  the  troops,  and  such  orders  as  prove  thai 
those  troops  were  not  mere  reinforcements  to  the  armj 
of  Portugal,  (as  has  been  conjectured  by  those  who  imiv 
gine  that  he  cherished  no  hostile  design  prior  to  the  revo- 
lution of  Aranjuez,)  but  troops  destined  to  decide  the  fate 
of  Spain,  for,  when  in  Italy,  he  organized  the  Duhesiup 
division,  which  was  despatched  to  invade  Calabria. 

On  his  return  to  Paris,  in  January,  1808,  his  ordctft 
were  multiplied,  and  their  rapid  sin-cession  shows,  that  his 
plan  was  becoming  matured,  »if"  thav  he  was  determined 
to  make  an  end  of  the  Spari'h  IkmrKms.  t 


454 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[Feb.  1808. 


are  a  different  thing  from  private  property. 
They  are  taken  away  or  given  by  war  or  policy, 
and  sometimes  to  the  great  advantage  of  the 
nations  which  are  thus  arbitrarily  disposed  of. 


There  were  two,  or,  it  may  be  said,  three  ways  by  which 
this  object  might  be  accomplished. 

1st.  To  give  a  French  princess  in  marriage  to  Ferdinand, 
without  requiring  any  sacrifice  on  the  part  of  Spain. 

2d.  To  give  a  French  princess  in  marriage  to  Ferdi- 
nand, and  to  demand  the  surrender  of  the  provinces  of 
the  Ebro,  and  the  opening  of  the  ports  of  the  Spanish  co- 
lonies. 

3d.  To  dethrone  the  Bourbons. 

As  to  the  first  plan,  and  in  my  opinion  the  wisest  of  the 
three,  Napoleon  seems  not  to  have  dwelt  upon  it  long,  for 
he  speedily  sent  his  niece  back  to  Italy.  This  fact  admits 
of  no  doubt,  for  it  is  attested  by  witnesses  under  whose 
observation  it  occurred.  One  of  the  Emperor's  brothers  is 
among  these  witnesses. 

With  regard  to  the  second  plan,  it  certainly  was  enter- 
tained, or  at  least  thought  of;  for  a  despatch  from  M.  Yz- 
quierdo,  received  in  Madrid  by  Ferdinand  at  the  time  of 
his  father's  abdication,  and  published  by  the  Spaniards, 
bears  evidence  that  the  plan  was  discussed  between  MM. 
Yzquierdo  and  Talleyrand.  Moreover,  there  exists  in  the 
archives  of  the  Louvre,  a  letter  from  M.  de  Talleyrand,  in 
which  he  expounds  this  same  plan  to  Napoleon,  whilst  M. 
Yzquierdo,  on  his  side,  explained  it  to  the  court  of  Spain, 
and  at  the  same  date.  Of  the  existence  of  the  project, 
there  can  consequently  be  no  doubt.  But  was  it  seriously 
entertained?  To  a  certain  extent,  I  believe  it  was,  for  M. 
de  Talleyrand,  in  his  despatch  to  the  Emperor,  thus  ex- 
presses himself: — "  My  opinion  is  that,  if  your  Majesty 
thinks  fit,  M.  Yzquierdo  might,  though  with  some  little  diffi- 
culty, be  induced  to  sign :  but  only  on  condition  of  the  troops 
being  removed  to  some  distance  from  the  king's  place  of  re- 
sidence." The  scheme  either  of  marriage,  or  no  marriage, 
but  with  the  surrenderor  the  Ebro  provinces  and  the  open- 
ing of  the  colonial  ports,  had  a  certain  degree  of  reality  in 
the  mind  of  M.  de  Talleyrand,  who  was  here  the  intimate 
confidant  of  the  Emperor.  But  was  the  plan  entertained  in 
perfect  seriousness  and  with  entire  earnestness  of  pur- 
pose, or  was  it  merely  an  eventuality  which  Napoleon  held 
in  reserve,  while  really  tending  to  a  different  object?  I 
believe  this  latter  supposition  to  be  the  correct  one.  In 
the  course  of  February  and  March,  1808,  Napoleon  dis- 
cussed the  plan  of  settling  the  pending  affairs  of  Spain, 
on  condition  of  the  surrender  of  her  Ebro  provinces,  and 
the  opening  of  her  colonial  ports,  with  or  without  a  mar- 
riage ;  but,  at  the  same  time,  and  more  seriously,  his  views 
were  directed  to  the  dethronement. 

The  following  are  the  reasons  which  determined  my 
conviction  on  this  subject: — 

1st.  The  expressions  employed  "by  M.  de  Talleyrand 
prove  that  the  project  was  only  in  part  seriously  enter- 
tained ;  for,  if  Napoleon  had  had  no  other  object  in  view, 
and  had  earnestly  designed  to  carry  out  the  scheme,  Tal- 
leyrand would  not  have  made  use  of  the  expression,  "  If 
your  Majesty  thinks  fit."  When  Napoleon  had  adetermined 
object  in  view,  his  own  language,  and  also  that  of  his 
agents,  was  imbued  with  the  spirit  of  his  resolution ;  it 
assumed  an  emphatic  and  positive  tone,  and  never  the  tone 
of  doubt. 

2d.  Had  Napoleon  desired  only  to  appropriate  to  himself 
the  provinces  of  tho  Ebro,  to  open  the  colonial  ports,  and 
to  conclude  a  marriage,  he  would  not  have  deemed  it  ne- 
cessary to  overrun  Spain  with  troops.  He  would  have  had 
no  need  to  issue  mysterious  orders  for  marching  on  Ma- 
drid by  all  the  routes  at  once.  He  had  only  to  express  his 
desire,  and  the  court  of  Spain,  after  perhaps  resisting  for 
*  while,  would  infallibly  have  yielded.  He  would,  be- 
sides, have  distinctly  told  Murat  what  he  desired,  instead 
of  leaving  him  involved  in  doubt  respecting  the  object  for 
which  the  French  army  was  destined. 

3d.  Finally,  Napoleon,  who  did  not  resolve  until  the  last 
extremity  to  make  to  Russia  the  sacrifice  of  discussing  the 
partition  of  the  Turkish  empire,  (which  was  one  step  to- 
wards the  partition  itself,)  would  not,  about  the  middle  of 
February,  the  period  of  his  definitive  orders,  have  sent  to 
Kussia  a  dangerous  lure,  by  proposing  that  she  should  ex- 
plain _her  ideas  on  so  grave  a  subject.  Nothing  short  of 
an  object  so  paramount  as  the  dethronement  of  the  Bour- 
bons could  have  determined  him  to  purchase,  at  such  a 
sacrifice,  the  concurrence  or  the  silence  of  Kussia. 

Thus,  in  February  and  March,  1808,  every  thing  tends 
to  prove  that  the  first  and  second  projects,  of  marrying 
Ferdinand  to  a  French  princess,  and  exacting  or  not  exact- 
ing territorial  and  commercial  sacrifices,  were  no  longer 
seriously  entertained,  if  they  had  ever  been  so.  The  lan- 
guage of  M.  de  Talleyrand  would  not  have  been  so  dubi- 
tory,  nor  would  Napoleon  have  invaded  Spain  with  so  much 
mystery,  or  have  made  such  great  concessions  to  Russia  for 
an  object  of  secondary  and  even  of  minor  importance,  in 
comparison  with  the  gigantic  projects  of  the  time. 

It  is  clear  that  in  February  and  March  he  had  deter- 


But  whoever  aims  at  playing  the  part  of  Pro- 
vidence should  beware  of  failing,  of  being 
either  odious  or  unfortunate  in  attempting  to 
be  great,  of  not  obtaining  the  results  that  ought 


mined  on  dethroning  the  Bourbons,  notwithstanding  al 
the  contrary  affirmations  of  those  who  maintain  that  he 
had  not  determined  on  the  step  until  he  saw  both  the  fa- 
ther and  the  son  at  Bayonne,  and  witnessed  their  intellec- 
tual incapability  and  moral  degradation. 

But,  having  ascertained  the  end  he  had  in  view,  it  is  no 
easy  matter  to  discover  the  means  he  wished  to  employ  foi 
its  attainment.  This  is  a  point  on  which  I  was  long  doubt- 
ful, and  my  doubts  were  not  cleared  up  until  after  several 
years  of  inquiry  and  reflection. 

Prior  to  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez,  that  is  to  say,  be- 
fore the  dethronement  of  the  father  by  the  son,  Napoleon 
did  not  disclose  his  intention  to  any  person  whatever. 
Not  one  of  his  ministers  was  aware  of  it,  and  Murat,  as 
has  been  seen,  was  totally  ignorant  of  the  matter. 

The  idea  has  occurred  to  me,  though  it  is  not  supported 
by  any  positive  proof,  that  Napoleon  wished  to  force  the 
Spanish  royal  family  to  depart  by  filling  them  with  alarm, 
in  the  same  manner  as  the  Braganza  family  had  been 
frightened  away.  This  idea  was  the  first  that  occurred  to 
me  in  the  course  of  my  investigation,  and  after  much 
doubt  and  perplexity  I  have  come  back  to  it. 

Whilst  reading  over  five  or  six  times  the  correspondence 
of  Napoleon,  especially  that  which  he  maintained  with 
Murat,  I  alternately  arrived  at  and  abandoned  this  con- 
viction. In  the  first  place,  I  was  forcibly  struck  with  one 
remark.  Napoleon  repeatedly  says  to  Murat,  "  Maintain 
the  most  perfect  order,  conciliate  the  populace,  avoid  any 
sort  of  collision  :"  which  was  equivalent  to  saying  that  he 
wished  the  dethronement  should  be  effected  without  vio- 
lence, in  order  to  avoid  war  with  the  Spanish  nation;  but 
he  added,  "  Seek  to  remove  tht  apprehensions  of  the  royal 
family  of  Spain  ;  address  tliem  in  courteous  terms." 

On  the  14th  of  March  he  thus  wrote  to  Murat : — "  I  have 
ordered  that  on  .the  17th  a  passage  shall  be  demanded,  by 
way  of  Madrid,  for  50,000  men,  destined  to  proceed  to  Ca- 
diz. Your  conduct  must  be  framed  according  to  the  na- 
ture of  the  answer  that  may  be  given.  Brit  endeavour  to 
be  as  encouraging  as  possible."  On  the  16th  of  March  he 
writes : — "  Continue  to  maintain  friendly  terms.  Banish 
apprehension  from  the  minds  of  the  king,  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  and  the.  queen." 

On  the  19th  he  wrote  thus: — "I  suppose  you  will  receive 
this  letter  in  Madrid,  where.  I  am  very  anxious  to  learn  that 
our  troops  entered  peacefully,  and  with  the.  consent  of  Vie, 
Icing ;  in  short,  that  all  is  proceeding  tranquilly.  I  am  mo- 
mentarily looking  for  the  arrival  of  Tournon  and  Yzquior- 
do,  so  that  I  may  know  what  to  do  for  the  arrangement  of 
affairs.  Announce  in  Madrid  that  I  have  arrived  here. 
Maintain  rigorous  discipline  among  the  troops.  Take  care 
that  they  receive  their  pay,  so  that  they  may  be  enabled 
to  scatter  money." 

On  the  25th  he  wrote  as  follows : — "  I  have  received  your 
letter  of  the  15th  of  March.  I  regret  to  learn  that"  the 
weather  has  been  so  bad ;  here,  we  have  the  finest  weather 
imaginable.  I  presume  you  have  been  in  Madrid  since 
the  day  before  yesterday.  I  have  already  intimated  that 
the  most  important  points  to  which  you  must  direct  at- 
tention, are  to  provision  your  troops,  and  let  them  rest: — 
to  maintain  the  best  understanding  with  the  king  and  tht 
court,  should  they  remain  at  Aranjuez  ;  to  give  out  that  the 
Swedish  expedition  and  the  affairs  of  the  North  detain  me 
here  for  some  days,  but  that  I  shall  speedily  arrive.  In 
short,  set  my  house  in  order  for  me.  Declare  publicly 
that  your  orders  are  to  rest  and  refresh  your  troops  in  Ma- 
drid, and  to  await  the  Emperor's  arrival ;  and  that  you  are 
certain  not  to  quit  Madrid  until  such  time  as  his  Majesty 
shall  arrive. 

"  Do  not  take  part  with  any  of  the  different  factions 
which  divide  the  country.  Behave  well  to  every  one.  and 
do  nothing  that  may  operate  prejudicially  on  the  course 
which  I  am  about  to  take.  Be  careful  always  to  keep  up 
good  supplies  of  provisions  in  the  magazines  of  Buitrago 
and  Aranda.". 

At  first  sight  there  appears  nothing  in  these  orders  which 
betrays  the  design  of  alarming  the  court  of  Spain ;  and, 
having  once  read  them,  I  relinquished  the  idea  that  Napo- 
leon's intention  was  to  frighten  the  royal  family  away. 
But  a  reperusal  of  them  convinced  me  that  he  wished  to 
lull  apprehension  only  till  he  could  effect  his  entrance  into 
Madrid,  and  to  avoid  a  collision  before  his  entrance.  For 
example,  in  the  letter  of  the  14th  of  March,  which  I  first 
quote,  I  remarked  these  words. — "  Whatever  may  be  the 
intentions  of  the  court  of  Spain,  I  wish  to  impress  upon 
you  the  paramount  importance  of.arriving  in  Madrid  with- 
out hostilities — of  encamping  the  corps  by  divisions,  to 
make  them  appear  more  numerous,  and  to  provision  and 
rest  my  troops.  Meanwhile,  my  differences  with  the  rour* 
of  Spain  will  be  adjusted.  /  hope  the  war  will  not  tab 
place  ;  that  is  a  point  I  have  greatly  at  heart.  If  I  take  a? 
these  precautions,  it  is  because  I  am  in  the  habit  of  not 


March,  ^  308.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


455 


to  serve  for  excuse.  He  ought,  in  short,  to  be 
shy  of  any  enterprise  which  he  dare  not  avow, 
and  for  which  he  is  necessitated  to  have  re- 
course to  knavery  and  lying.  Napoleon  rea- 


leaving  any  thing  to  chance.  If  war  had  broken  out,  your 
position  would  be  a  good  one,  for  you  would  have  in  your 
rear  a  force  more  than  sufficient  to  protect  you,  and  on 
your  left  think,  Duhesme's  division,  comprising  14,000 
men." 

In  his  letter  of  the  16th.  after  the  words  already  quoted, 
Tiz.,  "  Continue  to  maintain  friendly  terms.  Banish  appre- 
hension from  the  minds  of  the  king,  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
the  Prince  of  the  Asturias.  and  the  queen."  he  proceeds  to 
nay,  "the  principal  object  is  to  accomplish  tlie  arrival  in 
Madrid,  there  to  let  the  troops  rest,  and  procure  fresh  sup- 
plies of  provisions.  Say  that  I  am  coming  for  the  purpose 
of  conciliating  and  arranging  affairs." 

"Abort  all  tliinys  amid  any  act  of  hostility,  unless  yott  be 
positively  forced  to  it.  I  hope  that  all  may  be  arranged. 
It  would  be  dangerous  to  irritate  those  people. " 

The  intention  was  evident.  Napoleon  was  desirous  of 
entering  Madrid  without  a  collision,  and  he  wished  to 
inspire  ju.«t  such  an  amount  of  confidence  as  was  requisite 
for  averting  a  rupture.  But  by  carefully  comparing  one 
with  another  the  various  passages  in  his  letters,  and  look- 
Ing  into  the  whole  of  his  arrangements,  I  have  come  back 
to  the  idea  th;it  though  he  wished  to  avoid  a  collision  with 
the  populace,  he  nevertheless  wished  the  royal  family  to 
depart. 

Accordingly,  every  thing  denoted  the  intended  depar- 
ture of  the  court,  and  Napoleon  daily  received  intimation 
of  the  expected  movement  from  Madrid.  M.  Yzquierdo,  in 
conversation  with  M.  de  Talleyrand,  had  avowed  the  plan 
of  departure.  In  this  state  of  things,  Napoleon  was  fully 
aware  that  it  was  only  requisite  to  let  matters  take  their 
natural  course,  and  the  flight  would  take  place.  Nay, 
more,  the  slightest  interposition  of  his  authority  would 
have  sufficed  to  prevent  it;  for  on  the  19th  the  French 
troops  had  arrived  on  the  Guadarrama.  A  movement  of 
cavalry  on  Aranjuez  might  in  the  space  of  a  few  hours 
have  surrounded  the  court,  and  intercepted  its  flight. 
And  there  was  another  course  still  more  easy,  which  was 
to  despatch  a  force  in  the  direction  least  calculated  to  ex- 
cite alarm — that  of  Talavera;  this  force,  which  might  have 
passed  for  a  reinforcement  to  Junot.  might  have  surroundf-d 
Aranjuez.  and  have  prevented  all  possibility  of  escape.  But 
there  is  one  passage  in  Napoleon's  correspondence  more 
decisive  than  all  the  rest ;  and  it  leaves  scarcely  a  shade 
of  doubt  on  the  subject.  I  will  here  quote  it.  Murat,not 
knowing  how  to  act,  when  the  news  of  the  intended  flight 
of  the  court  was  everywhere  spread  about,  addressed  to 
Napoleon  the  following  question: — "If  the  court  should 
wish  to  depart  for  Seville,  am  I  to  allow  it?"  On  the  23d 
of  March  Napoleon  replied  as  follows : — 

"  I  may  suppose  that  you  have  arrived  in  Madrid  to-day, 
or  that  you  will  arrive  there  to-morrow.  You  must  main- 
tain strict  discipline.  Should  the  court  be  at  Aranjuez,  you 
will  let  it  remain  quietly  there,  and  you  will  manifest  friendly 
teniiments  to  the  royal  family.  Should  the  court  be  at  Se- 
vill'i  you  will  also  leave,  it  there  undisturbed.  You  will  send 
aides<le-camp  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  to  inform  him 
that  he  has  done  wrong  in  avoiding  the  French  troops, 
that  he  must  not  make  any  hostile  movement,  and  that 
the  King  of  Spain  has  nothing  to  fear  from  our  troops." 

Now,  when  it  is  recollected  that  Napoleon  caused  M. 
Yzquierdo  to  depart  from  Paris,  (there  is  extant  a  letter 
from  Duroc  containing  the  invitation  to  depart  forthwith.) 
— that  he  made  him  depart  full  of  alarm — and  that,  whilst 
he  ordered  80.000  men  to  advance  on  Madrid,  he  refused  to 
give  any  explanation, — it  is  evident  that  every  thing  was 
calculated  to  urge  on  the  departure,  which  accordingly 
took  place,  as  far  at  least  as  depended  on  the  court  of 
Spain. 

It  may  be  said,  it  is  true,  that  Napoleon  intended  to  sur- 
round and  capture  them,  and  then  to  proclaim  the  abdi- 
cation. In  the  first  place,  he  might  have  surrounded  them 
and  be  did  not ;  in  the  next  place,  to  have  done  so  would 
bave  been  an  overt  and  unjustifiable  act  of  violence.  The 
flight  to  Andalusia  answered  his  purpose  better,  for  it  left 
the  throne  vacant,  and  thus  the  whole  difficulty  was  solved. 

Having  arrived  at  this  point  in  my  investigation,  I 
should  have  been  convinced  that  Napoleon's  plan  was  to 
force  the  court  of  Spain  to  fly,  but  for  one  serious  consi- 
deration ;  and  that  one  so  weighty  that  it  caused  me  to 
hesitate  several  times  and  to  abandon  the  opinion  I  had 
conceived.  It  is  that  the  departure  or  flight  of  the  Bour- 
bons would  have  entailed  the  loss  of  the  colonies.  Now 
Spain,  without  her  colonies,  would  have  been,  as  every  one 
must  allow,  a  most  onerous  burden.  All  the  commercial 
interest  of  the  South  was  exclaiming  at  Bayonne — "Spare 
us  at  least  from  the  consequences  which  have  visited 
Portugal .'" 

Now,  to  send  the  Bourbons  to  America  was  exactly  the 
WHT  to  bring  about  those  consequences,  for  the  Bourbons 


soned  upon  what  he  was  about  to  do  as  ambi- 
tious policy  always  reasons.  That  Spanish 
nation,  he  said  to  himself,  so  proud,  so  gene- 
rous, deserved  a  better  fate  than  to  be  subjected 


would  have  raised  the  colonies  in  rebellion  against  the 
royalty  of  Joseph,  and  at  the  same  time  would  have  opened 
them  to  the  English,  a  circumstance  which  it  was  most 
desirable  to  prevent. 

This  consideration  very  much  staggered  me,  and  for  a 
considerable  time  Jpceased  to  believe  that  Napoleon  wished 
to  cause  the  flighrtf  the  Spanish  royal  family.  However, 
the  facility  for  flight  which  was  afforded  them, — the  order 
to  allow  them  to  fly,  combined  with  the  alarm  spread  from 
Paris  by  the  departure  of  M.  Yzquierdo,  were  also  fact* 
too  conclusive  to  be  disregarded.  Amidst  this  perplexity, 
one  fact  riveted  my  attention;  viz.,  that  there  was  in 
Cadiz  a  French  fleet,  in  possession  of  the  road,  and  that 
possibly  it  might  have  been  Napoleon's  intention  to  make 
use  of  it  to  arrest  the  fugitive  Bourbons,  whose  flight 
would  have  morally  ruined  them  in  the  eyes  of  the 
Spanish  nation.  After  having,  on  the  one  hand,  induced 
them  to  abandon  the  throne,  to  enable  him  to  take  posses- 
sion of  it,  he  would,  on  the  other  hand,  have  arrested 
them,  when  on  the  point  of  embarking  for  America.  Thin 
refli-ction  came  across  my  mind  like  a  ray  of  light,  for  it 
explained  and  resolved  every  obscurity.  Still  it  was  but 
a  mere  conjecture.  I  once  more  read  OVIT  the  correspon- 
dence of  M.  Decres,  and  in  it  I  discovered  the  following 
fact : — that  an  order  in  cipher  sent  to  Admiral  Rosily  could 
not  have  been  read,  because  the  key  to  the  cipher  of  the 
consulate  was  lost;  and  that  the  admiral  had  sent  to 
Paris  a  confidential  and  intelligent  officer  to  receive  the 
communications;  which  had  remained  unknown  owing  to 
the  loss  of  the  cipher.  This  circumstance  appeared  to  me 
to  be  a  remarkable  confirmation  of  my  first  conjecture. 
What  could  be  the  purport  of  this  despatch  in  cipher  f 
Could  it  be  an  order  for  the  fleet  to  quit  Cadiz  and  proceed 
to  Toulon  f  That  order  had  been  given  three  or  four  times 
in  plain  characters,  that  is  to  say,  without  employing  tho 
precaution  of  cipher.  The  despatch  must,  therefore,  have 
related  to  something  else, — something  still  more  secret- 
I  felt  quite  convinced  that  it  must  be  the  order  for  the 
arrest  of  the  fugitive  family.  I  renewed  my  search  among 
the  papers  of  the  department  for  foreign  affairs;  but 
the  despatch  was  not  to  be  found  there.  I  could  scarcely 
entertain  a  hope  of  finding  it  in  the  department  cf  the 
marine,  where  the  archives,  though  arranged  in  admirable 
order,  contain  scarcely  any  documents  of  importance. 
Nevertheless,  I  resolved  to  make  the  search,  and,  contrary 
to  my  expectation,  I  found,  in  the  historical  section,  the 
despatch  in  cipher,  and  fortunately  accompanied  by  the 
key.  It  was  written  by  M.  Decres,  and  in  the  following 
terms : — 

"  I  do  not  seek  to  discover  the  object  of  the  entrance  of 
the  French  troops  into  Spain.  The  only  point  that  con- 
cerns me  is,  that  you  and  I  have  to  answer  to  his  Majesty 
for  his  squadron.  1  recommend  you,  therefore,  to  take  a 
position  as  distant  as  possible  from  the  strong  batteries, 
and  which,  at  the  same  time,  will  defend  the  road  against 
any  attack  either  from  within  or  without.  You  have  pro- 
visions which  will  serve  you  in  case  of  need  whilst  you  are 
lying  at  anchor.  Be  cautious  not  to  betray  any  inquie- 
tude, but  stand  on  your  guard  against  any  event,  and  that 
without  show,  but  merely  as  if  it  were  the  natural  conse- 
quence of  the  orders  you  have  received  for  holding  your« 
self  in  readiness  to  depart.  Place  the  Spanish  vc^i-ls  in 
the  centre  of,  and  under  the  guns  of,  the  French  ships. 

"  Should  the  court  of  Spain,  whether  impelled  by  the  force 
of  events,  or  by  an  infatuation,  which  it  is  impossible  to  fore- 
see, renew  the  scene  that  has  been  enacted  at  Lisbon,  you 
must  oppose  its  departure.  Leave  events  to  take  their  na- 
tural course  as  far  as  you  possibly  can ;  but,  should  a  crisis 
arise,  do  not  hold  any  parley  with  the  English,  and  peem 
as  though  you  had  not  previously  entertained  any  dis- 
trust ;  but  silently  adopt  precautions  for  fhe  safety  of  the 
squadron,  and  do  all  that  is  expected  of  your  sagacity  and 
personal  merit  in  the  service  of  his  Majesty.  Feb.  21st, 
1808." 

I  naturally  experienced  very  great  satisfaction  in  hav- 
ing thus  elucidated  the  truth  ;  whilst,  at  the  same  time,  I 
felt  sincere  regret  to  find  the  truth  so  mortifying ;  but  it 
was  the  consequence  of  the  plan  of  dethroning  the  Bour- 
bons. 

From  that  moment  Napoleon's  design  was  evident  to 
me.  First,  it  is  important  to  note  the  date,  (the  21st,) 
which  corresponds  with  the  dates  of  incidents  which  com- 
prise the  whole  plan,  viz,  the  departure  of  Murat  and  th» 
instructions  given  to  him — the  composition  of  the  whole 
army — the  departure  of  M.  Yzquierdo— the  departure  of 
M.  de  Tonrnon — the  orders  to  Junot.  Secondly,  on  com- 
paring the  despatch  of  Decres  with  the  order  given  to  Mu- 
rat to  allow  the  royal  family  to  depart  if  they  wished  so  to 
do,  it  will  be  found  that  the  one  does  not  contradict  the 
other,  but  that  both  perfectly  coincide.  Napoleon  wished 


456 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


to  an  incapable  and  degraded  court ;  it  deserved 
to  be  regenerated ;  when  regenerated,  it  would 
be  capable  of  rendering  great  services  to  France 
and  to  itself,  of  assisting  to  overthrow  the 
maritime  tyranny  of  England,  of  contributing 
to  the  emancipation  of  the  commerce  of  Europe, 
of  being  called,  in  short,  to  brilliant  and  mighty 
destinies.  To  interdict  himself  from  all  this 
for  the  sake  of  an  imbecile  king,  of  a  lewd 
queen,  of  an  abject  favourite,  ^ras  more  than 
could  be  expected  of  an  impetuous  spirit,  which 
darts  upon  its  object,  like  the  eagle  upon  his 
prey,  the  moment  he  descries  it  from  the  eleva- 
tion where  he  dwells.  The  result  was  destined 
to  prove  to  what  danger  he  exposes  himself 
who  attempts  to  perform  one  of  those  parts  so 
far  above  humanity,  who  chooses  to  hold  him- 
self dispensed  from  regarding  the  lives,  the 
welfare,  of  men,  upon  pretext  of  the  aim  to- 
wards which  he  is  advancing. 

Murat  had  executed  with  perfect  submission 
the  orders  of  Napoleon,  transmitted  by  the 
minister  of  war.  Setting  out  immediately  for 
Bayonne,  he  had  arrived  in  that  town  on  the 
26th,  as  his  instructions  enjoined  him  to  do. 
His  departure  was  so  sudden,  that  he  had  with 
him  neither  staff  nor  horses  for  his  personal 
service.  He  was  accompanied  only  by  the 
aides-de-camp  who  ought  to  attend  an  officer 
of  his  rank,  marshal,  grand-duke,  and  impe- 
rial prince,  all  in  one.  He  had  despatched 
them  in  all  directions  to  ascertain  the  position 
and  state  of  the  corps,  to  put  himself  into  com- 
munication with  them,  to  assume  the  direction 
of  affairs.  The  mystery  which  Napoleon  had 
observed  in  his  instructions  hurt  his  vanity, 
but  so  clearly  did  he  perceive  their  drift,  and 
so  well  did  it  please  him,  that  he  asked  for 
nothing  more,  and  fell  to  work  in  order  to 
execute  punctually  the  commands  of  his  master. 

Bayonne  exhibited  a  spectacle  of  confusion, 
for  there  was  not  at  this  point  the  immense 
military  display  which  a  war  of  fifteen  years 
had  accumulated  on  the  frontier  of  the  Rhine 
or  of  the  Alps,  and  every  thing  there  had  to  be 
created  at  once.  Moreover,  the  troops  which 
arrived,  composed  of  conscripts  recently  or- 
ganized, were  in  want  of  necessaries,  and  of 

the  court  to  depart  from  Madrid,  that  the  throne  might 
be  left  vacant,  but  he  did  not  wish  the  royal  family  to 
quit  Cadiz,  lest  the  colonies  should  be  excited  to  insur- 
rection. 

The  great  difficulty  of  arriving  at  the  truth,  even  with 
the  help  of  the  most  authentic  documents,  may  be  easily 
conceived;  and  I  venture  to  affirm,  that  posterity  will 
never  know  more  than  I  have  here  elucidated.  Napoleon 
made  no  disclosure  on  this  subject;  Murat  has  left  behind 
him  nothing  but  his  correspondence ;  General  Savary  has 
left  inaccurate  memoirs,  (containing  statements  repeatedly 
controverted  by  his  own  correspondence ;)  M.  de  la  Foret 
himself  wrote  to  me  the  assurance  that  he  knew  nothing 
of  the  affair ;  Prince  CambaceYes,  in  his  memoirs,  declares 
that  he  has  no  information  to  give ;  Counts  de  Tournon 
and  Lobau  have  left  only  their  correspondence,  which  I 
have  perused ;  and  M.  de  Yzquierdo  has  left  only  a  few 
letters,  which  are  deposited  in  the  Louvre,  and  which  I 
have  read.  I  therefore  conclude  that  no  further  informa- 
tion on  the  subject  can  ever  come  to  light,  and  that  the 
truth  may  be  summed  up  as  follows : — 

The  idea  of  the  invasion  of  Spain  was  not  matured  into 
a  settled  plan  in  the  mind  of  Napoleon  till  after  the  treaty 
of  Tilsit,  and  not  before. 

After  the  treaty  of  Tilsit,  and  before  the  burning  of  Co- 
1«nhagen,  he  thought  only  of  closing  the  ports  of  Portu- 
gal against  Great  Britain. 

A  fter  the  events  at  Copenhagen,  the  war  being  obsti- 
nately protracted,  he  wished  to  profit  by  its  prolongation 
to  effect  a  complete  settlement  of  affairs  throughout  the 
ciuth  of  Europe. 

Ills  first  design  waa  to  share  Portugal  with  Spain ;  but 


[March,  1808. 


!  the  experience  which  might  make  amends  for 
|  it.  People  were  busy  baking  the  biscuit, 
j  making  shoes  and  great  coats,  creating  the 
means  of  transport,  of  which  they  were  totally 
destitute ;  for  it  had  been  impossible  to  pro- 
cure the  500  mules  which  Napoleon  had  ordered 
to  be  bought,  as  those  valuable  animals  were 
not  to  be  found  anywhere  but  in  Poitou.  The 
money  itself  was  behind-hand,  for  want  of  con- 
veyances. The  artillery  of  the  various  corps 
had  scarcely  joined,  and  the  retarded  materiel 
of  Junot's  army,  crossing  that  arriving  for  the 
armies  in  Spain,  increased  the  disorder.  Not- 
withstanding the  clearness,  the  precision,  the 
vigour,  which  Napoleon  infused  on  this  occa- 
sion as  formerly  into  the  despatch  of  his  orders, 
their  execution  was  affected  by  the  distance, 
by  the  precipitation,  by  the  inexperience,  of 
the  administrators,  the  most  capable  being 
employed  in  other  parts  of  Europe. 

Murat,  who  possessed  intelligence,  whom 
Napoleon,  by  his  grand  lessons  and  continual 
remonstrances,  had 'trained  to  command,  passed 
several  days  at  Bayonne  to  introduce  some 
order  there,  to  inform  himself  of  what  had  been 
executed  and  what  delayed,  that  he  might  ap- 
prize Napoleon,  and  that  the  latter  might 
apply  the  remedy.  He  then  set  out  for  Vit- 
toria.  He  crossed  the  frontier  on  the  10th  of 
March,  and  proceeded  the  same  day  to  Tolosa. 
If  ever  there  was  an  officer  who,  by  his  good 
looks,  his  martial  air,  his  open  and  quiet 
southern  manners,  suited  the  Spaniards,  it  was 
assuredly  Murat.  He  was  formed  at  once  to 
please  and  to  awe  them,  and,  among  the  French 
princes  destined  to  reign,  he  would  have  been 
incontestably  the  best  that  could  be  chosen  for 
ascending  the  throne  of  Spain.  We  shall  see 
hereafter  how  grievous  a  fault  it  was  to  prefer 
another  to  him.  The  population  of  the  Bis- 
cayan  provinces  received  him  with  great  de- 
monstrations of  joy.  These  excellent  people, 
the  handsomest,  the  most  sprightly,  the  bravest, 
and  the  most  laborious  of  those  that  inhabit 
the  Peninsula,  had  not  the  same  passions  as 
the  rest  of  the  Spaniards.  They  had  neither 
the  same  antipathy  to  foreigners,  nor  the  same 
national  prejudices.  Situated  between  the 

the  events  at  the  Escurial  suddenly  stimulated  him  with 
the  determination  of  an  armed  interference  in  the  affairs 
of  Spain. 

The  pardon  of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias  caused  him 
for  a  time  to  postpone  the  execution  of  his  designs. 

In  Italy  and  in  Paris  he  alternately  entertained  a 
variety  of  plans,  viz.,  a  marriage,  a  territorial  dismember- 
ment, with  a  partition  of  the  colonies,  and  a  dethrone- 
ment. 

He  gradually  determined,  about  the  months  of  January 
and  February,  in  favour  of  the  last-named  project — the 
dethronement. 

That  such  was  the  fact,  is  evident  from  the  mystery  of 
his  orders,  the  extraordinary  accumulation  of  troops,  the 
concession  to  Russia  of  the  partition  of  the  Ottoman  em- 
pire,— all  these  were  things  useless  and  needless  for  the 
accomplishment  of  any  secondary  project,  such  as  the 
marriage,  or  the  appropriation  of  one  or  two  provinces. 

Finally,  having  once  determined  on  the  dethronement, 
he  wished  to  bring  about,  without  collision,  the  flight  to 
Andalusia,  and  to  prevent,  by  the  arrest  of  the  royal  fa- 
mily in  the  bay  of  Cadiz,  the  consequences  which  their 
flight  might  entail  on  the  colonies. 

Such  are,  in  my  opinion,  the  real  facts,  collected  with 
rigorous  impartiality  from  historical  documents,  and  the 
only  facts  which  posterity  can  hope  to  obtain. 

There  remains  only  one  doubt,  which  may  be  created  by 
a  letter,  (first  sent  forth  to  the  world  from  St.  Helena,) 
bearing  date  the  29th  of  March,  addressed  to  Murat,  and 
censuring  his  whole  conduct.  This  letter  I  will 
and  explain  in  a  following  note. 


March,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


457 


plains  of  Gascony  and  those  of  Castille,  in  a 
mountainous  region,  speaking  a  distinct  lan- 
guage, living  by  the  illicit  traffic  which  they 
carried  on  with  France  and  Spain,  enjoying 
extensive  privileges,  of  which  they  availed 
themselves  for  continuing  that  traffic,  privi- 
leges for  which  they  were  indebted  to  the 
difficulty  of  conquering  their  mountains  and 
their  courage,  theirs  was  a  kind  of  neutral 
country,  a  Switzerland,  as  it  were,  between 
France  and  Spain.  They  were,  therefore,  but 
loosely  attached  to  the  Spanish  rule,  and  would 
not  have  been  sorry  to  belong  to  a  great  em- 
pire, which  would  have  enabled  them  to  extend 
to  a  distance  their  industrious  activity.  They 
welcomed  Murat  with  boisterous  acclamations, 
and  indicated  in  a  thousand  ways  a  wish  to 
belong  to  France.  The  French  troops  were 
cordially  received  ;  they  observed  strict  disci- 
pline, paid  for  all  they  had,  and,  by  consuming 
the  produce  of  the  country,  were  an  advantage 
to  it  rather  than  a  burden. 

Murat  was  not  less  favourably  received  at 
Vittoria,  the  capital  of  Alava,  the  third  of  the 
Biscayan  provinces,  in  which  the  Spanish  spirit 
begins  to  express  itself  more  strongly.  He  en- 
tered it  on  the  llth  in  the  carriage  of  the 
bishop,  who,  with  all  the  authorities  of  the 
country,  had  hastened  to  meet  him.  The  popu- 
lation thronged  to  the  gates  of  the  towns,  and 
gave  the  most  brilliant  reception  to  the  gene- 
ral who  had  become  a  prince,  and  was  destined 
to  be  soon  a  king.  The  French  soldiers,  though 
very  numerous  in  Spain,  more  numerous  than 
was  consistent  with  the  war  with  Portugal, 
had  not  yet  afforded  the  slightest  cause  for 
complaint.  If  people  ascribed  any  political 
intention  to  their  coming,  it  was  against  the 
court,  a  court  equally  execrated  and  despised. 
There  was  no  reason,  therefore,  for  checking 
either  the  curiosity  which  they  excited  or  the 
hopes  which  they  raised.  The  authorities,  to 
which  orders  had  been  sent  from  Madrid  to 
prepare  provisions,  in  order  to  prevent  all  dis- 
satisfaction, had  collected  them  in  tolerable 
abundance.  Murat,  having  given  notice  that 
the  consumption  of  the  army  would  be  paid 
for  by  France,  the  authorities  answered,  with 
Castilian  pride,  that  they  received  the  French 
as  allies,  as  friends,  and  that  Spanish  hospi- 
tality was  never  paid  for. 

Thus,  at  this  first  moment,  things  went  on  in 
the  best  manner.  The  illusions  were  recipro- 
cal. While  these  half-Spaniards  were  giving 
such  a  favourable  reception  to  our  troops  and 
their  illustrious  chief,  the  latter  fancied  that 
every  thing  would  be  easy  in  Spain,  that  the 
French  were  wished  for  there,  that  a  king  of 
their  nation  would  be  accepted  with  joy,  and 
•with  still  more  joy  if  that  king  were  himself. 
Struck  by  the  deep  and  universal  hatred  ex- 
cited by  the  favourite,  he  soon  discovered  that 
the  support  of  Emmanuel  Godoy  was  but  a 
feeble  stay  to  secure  for  himself  in  Spain,  and 
that  to  obtain  the  popular  favour  there,  he 
must,  on  the  contrary,  let  it  be  understood  that 
he  had  come  to  overthrow  him. 

From  Vittoria  Murat  proceeded  to  Burgos, 
which  was  to  be  the  seat  of  his  head-quarters. 
When  you  leave  Vittoria  and  pass  the  Ebro  at 
Miranda,  the  boundary  at  which  the  Spanish 
officers  of  the  customs  were  then  stationed, 
and  where  they  continued  not  long  since  to  be 

VOL.  II 58 


placed,  you  quit  the  mountainous,  diversified, 
smiling,  ever-verdant  country  of  the  Pyrenean 
Switzerland,  and  enter  real  Spain.  The  Ebro, 
which,  at  Miranda,  is  but  a  large  rivulet,  run- 
ning among  flints — the  Ebro  being  crossed, 
you  pass  the  defiles  of  Pancorbo,  a  kind  of  fis- 
sure in  a  line  of  rocks,  which  form  the  last 
ledge  of  the  Pyrenees,  and  enter  Castille. 
There  commence  prodigious  plains,  extensive 
views,  stern  and  dreary  scenes.  On  the  vast 
plateau  of  the  Castilles,  the  sun  is  serene  and 
scorching  in  summer,  the  air  foggy  and  chilly 
in  winter,  and  at  all  times  raw.  Dwellings  are 
rare ;  the  cultivation  is  uniform,  and  presents 
to  the  eye,  excepting  when  the  crops  have 
grown  up  and  are  ripening,  nothing  but  vast 
fields  of  stubble,  upon  which  subsist  the  flocks, 
absolute  masters  of  the  soil  of  Spain,  over 
which  they  travel  twice  a-year  from  north  to 
south  and  from  south  to  north,  like  birds  of 
passage.  With  this  new  aspect  of  physical 
nature  is  united,  on  entering  the  Castilles,  a 
different  aspect  of  moral  nature.  The  inha- 
bitant, handsome,  particularly  in  the  country 
— handsome,  but  less  sprightly  and  less  alert 
than  the  Biscayan  mountaineer,  tall,  well- 
made,  grave,  always  armed  with  a  gun  or  a 
dagger,  ready  to  employ  it  against  a  country- 
man, still  more  ready  against  a  foreigner,  dis- 
plays in  an  exaggerated  form  all  the  features, 
good  or  bad,  of  the  Spanish  character.  He  is 
at  once  more  ignorant,  more  savage,  more  cruel, 
more  brave,  than  the  inhabitants  of  the  towns. 
The  latter,  with  their  imperfect  instruction, 
like  half-civilized  Turks,  have  lost  with  their 
ferocity  part  of  their  energy.  The  mass  of  the 
people  in  Spain,  which  by  its  vices  and  its  vir- 
tues, preserved  the  national  independence,  ex- 
hibits a  peculiar  trait  which  distinguishes  it 
from  the  other  nations  of  Europe.  Along  with 
ardent  passions,  there  is  to  be  found  in  it  a 
sort  of  public  spirit,  owing  to  its  mode  of  life, 
to  its  aggregation  in  large  villages,  where  it 
lives  all  the  time  that  it  does  not  devote  to  the 
land,  on  which  it  bestows  but  little,  confining 
itself  to  a  single  ploughing,  then  sowing,  and 
harvest,  and  doing  nothing  afterwards.  While 
the  French,  Belgian,  English,  and  Lombard 
peasantry,  dispersed  over  the  soil,  engaged  in 
various  and  incessant  agricultural  occupations, 
are  not  induced  either  by  proximity  or  leisure 
to  attend  to  any  thing  but  their  labour,  you  find 
the  Spanish  peasant,  covered  with  a  cloak,  sup- 
ported by  a  stick,  along  with  a  party  of  his 
fellows  in  the  public  place  of  the  village,  talk- 
ing about  the  king,  the  queen,  the  events  of 
the  time,  with  an  astonishing  curiosity,  or  join- 
ing in  games,  dances,  songs,  running  to  bull- 
fights, a  sanguinary  amusement,  of  which  no 
class  of  the  nation  can  deprive  itself,  scarcely 
eyeing  the  passing  foreigner,  or  eyeing  him 
with  contemptuous  pride,  which,  on  the  slight- 
est civility,  suddenly  changes  to  unaffected 
ease  and  freedom.  The  Spaniard,  at  this  pe- 
riod was  more  than  ever  disposed  to  turn  his 
attention  with  redoubled  zeal  to  public  affairs. 
Thrust  to  the  extremity  of  the  Continent,  it 
was  more  than  a  century  since  he  had  been 
seriously  involved  in  the  affairs  of  Europe.  A 
few  sea-fights,  some  operations  in  Italy,  a  mo- 
mentary war  in  the  Pyrenees  in  1793,  had  not 
been  sufficient  to  exhaust  or  even  to  satisfy  his 
energetic  passions.  Looking  on  with  the  im- 
2Q 


458 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[March,  1808. 


patience  of  a  spectator,  -who  -would  fain  act  a 
part  in  the  great  events  of  the  age,  nobody 
could  be  better  prepared  to  take  an  immoderate 
part  in  all  things. 

Such  was  the  country,  such  the  people, 
amidst  which  we  arrived  in  March,  1808,  on 
crossing  the  Ebro.  Murat  was  again  well  re- 
ceived at  Burgos,  the  capital  of  Old  Castille, 
that  is  to  say,  with  curiosity  and  hope.  Mean- 
while, the  lower  class,  less  concerned  than  the 
citizens  about  what  the  French  were  come  to 
do  in  Spain,  seemed  more  displeased  at  seeing 
foreigners  overrun  their  country ;  and,  between 
the  petulant  hastiness  of  our  young  soldiers 
and  the  proud  gravity  of  the  lowest  class  of 
the  Spanish  people,  there  were  collisions  here 
and  there,  and  some  stabs  with  the  knife,  in- 
stantaneously revenged  by  sword-cuts.  In  this 
first  meeting  of  the  two  nations  there  was  one 
unlucky  circumstance.  There  should  have 
been  set  before  these  proud  Spaniards,  so  in- 
clined to  despise  all  who  were  not  their  coun- 
trymen, some  of  the  soldiers  of  the  grand 
army,  who  would  have  made  an  impression 
upon  them  by  their  superannuated  age,  their 
wounds,  their  gray  moustaches.  But  our  le- 
gions, composed  of  conscripts  of  1807  and 
1808,  who  had  never  seen  fire,  commanded,  as 
we  have  said,  by  officers  taken  out  of  the  de- 
pots or  drawn  from  retirement,  (this  was  the 
case  in  particular  with  the  officers  of  the  five 
legions  of  reserve,)  had  nothing  whereby  to 
gain  respect  but  the  immense  renown  of  our 
armies.  Marched  in  haste  from  the  depots, 
before  they  were  completely  clothed,  shod,  or 
armed,  they  had  not  even  the  showiness  of 
equipment  to  compensate  for  their  youthful 
looks.  They  had,  therefore,  the  two-fold  dis- 
advantage of  not  being  sufficiently  imposing 
and  of  exhibiting  the  appearance  of  a  greedy 
poverty,  which  had  come  to  eat  up  the  country 
that  it  was  invading.  Among  our  soldiers 
there  were  many  sick,  some  from  having  suf- 
fered fatigues,  for  which  they  were  not  suffi- 
ciently prepared,  others  having  caught  the  itch 
from  Spanish  beggars.  One-fifth  of  the  army 
was  infected  with  this  loathsome  disease.  It 
had  been  found  necessary,  in  order  to  secure 
the  troops  of  the  imperial  guard  from  it,  to 
make  them  bivouack  in  the  open  air.  The 
Spaniards  conceiving  that  these  were  the  sol- 
diers who  had  conquered  Europe,  said  to  them- 
selves, that  it  could  not  be  difficult  to  gain 
victories,  since  such  troops  had  sufficed,  not 
yet  knowing,  though  they  soon  learned  to  their 
cost  and  our  own,  that,  such  as  they  were,  these 
young  soldiers  were  capable  of  conquering 
them  and  stronger  than  they,  thanks  to  the 
spirit  which  animated  them,  and  to  the  military 
skill  which  superabounded  in  all  parts  of  the 
French  army.  It  was  only  the  cuirassiers, 
whose  large  stature  and  imposing  armour  dis- 
guised youth,  and  the  guard,  incomparable 
troops,  that  inspired  the  populace  of  the  Spa- 
nish towns  with  the  respect  which  they  ought 
to  have  inspired  from  the  very  first  instant. 
For  the  rest,  at  this  moment,  there  was  not 
yet  a  thought  of  resistance  ;  nothing  but  good 
was  expected  from  the  French;  and,  with 
the  exception  of  some  accidental  collisions  be- 
tween men  of  the  lowest  class  and  our  con- 
scripts, overtaken  by  the  wine  of  Spain,  or 
excited  by  the  beauty  of  the  women,  cordiality 


prevailed.  Certain  reflecting  Spaniards,  in- 
deed, said  to  themselves  that  this  extraordi- 
nary accumulation  of  troops  must  forbode  some- 
thing else  than  the  overthrow  of  the  Prince  of 
the  Peace ;  for,  in  the  then  state  of  minds,  it 
would  have  required  but  a  word  from  Napoleon 
to  hurl  him  from  power.  But  people  would 
not  believe  or  hope  for  any  thing  but  the  fall 
of  the  favourite :  they  would  not  think  of  any 
object  but  that.  Another  rumour,  moreover, 
that  of  an  expedition  against  Gibraltar,  art- 
fully circulated,  completed  the  general  illusion. 

No  sooner  had  Murat  entered  Spain  than  two 
letters  from  his  friend  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
came,  one  after  another,  to  congratulate  and 
at  the  same  time  to  question  him.  The  desire 
to  answer  him,  which,  under  any  other  circum- 
stance, would  have  been  vehement  in  the  im- 
petuous Murat,  was  easily  surmounted  by  the 
fear  of  renewing  his  relations  with  so  unpopu- 
lar a  personage,  and  by  the  still  greater  fear 
of  displeasing  Napoleon.  The  two  letters  were 
left  unanswered.  For  the  rest,  the  questions 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  were  not  the  only 
ones  to  which  Murat  was  exposed.  The  civil, 
military,  and  ecclesiastical  authorities,  which 
hastened  around  him  to  see  and  to  entertain 
him,  provoked  his  natural  indiscretion  in  a 
thousand  indirect  ways.  But  he  curbed  him- 
self, in  the  first  place,  because  he  was  not  ac- 
quainted with  Napoleon's  designs ;  and,  se- 
condly, because  the  general  object,  of  which 
he  had  a  glimpse,  was  so  important,  that  less 
intelligence  and  less  tact  than  he  possessed 
would  have  been  sufficient  to  impose  silence  on 
him.  Still  his  vexation  at  finding  himself  in 
the  midst  of  this  tumult  without  any  but  mili- 
tary instructions  was  extreme.  Accordingly, 
as  soon  as  he  had  arrived  in  Spain,  he  did  not 
fail  to  write  to  Napoleon  a  detailed  report  on 
the  state  of  the  troops,  on  their  destitution,  on 
their  diseases,  on  their  favourable  reception 
by  the  Spaniards,  on  the  unpopularity  of  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  on  the  enthusiasm  of  the 
Spaniards  for  Napoleon,  on  the  facility  of  de- 
ing  what  one  would  in  Spain,  but  also  on  the 
necessity  of  deciding  what  one  purposed  to  do, 
and  on  the  embarrassment  of  being  left  with- 
out instructions  to  meet  the  events  that  were 
preparing.  "I  conceived,  sire,"  he  wrote  to 
Napoleon — "I  conceived,  after  so  many  years' 
service  and  attachment,  that  I  had  deserved 
your  confidence,  and,  invested  above  all,  with 
the  command  of  your  troops,  that  I  ought  to 
know  to  what  ends  they  are  about  to  be  em- 
ployed. I  beseech  you,"  he  added,  "to  give 
me  instructions.  Be  they  what  they  may,  they 
shall  be  executed.  Do  you  intend  to  overthrow 
Godoy,  to  place  Ferdinand  on  the  throne  ? — 
Nothing  is  easier.  One  word  from  your  lips 
will  suffice.  Would  you  change  the  dynasty 
of  the  Bourbons,  regenerate  Spain  by  giving 
her  one  of  the  princes  of  your  house  ? — Again 
nothing  is  easier.  Your  will  shall  be  received 
as  that  of  Providence."  Brave  but  weak  ob- 
server, he  durst  not  add  a  last  assertion,  more 
true  than  any  of  those  with  which  he  filled  his 
reports,  that  he  should  have  been  the  best  re- 
ceived of  the  foreign  princes  who  could  have 
been  substituted  for  the  reigning  dynasty. 

Napoleon,  whose  intention  was  to  terrify  the 
court  by  his  silence,  and  at  the  same  time  to 
cheer  the  population  by  a  friendly  attitude,  in 


March,  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


459 


order  to  reach  Madrid  without  striking  a  blow, 
and  to  take  pacific  possession  of  a  vacant 
throne, — Napoleon  felt  a  movement  of  impa- 
tience on  reading  Murat's  letters,  full  of  home 
questions.  "  When  I  prescribed  to  you,"  said 
he,  "  to  march  militarily,  to  keep  your  divisions 
well  together,  and  at  a  distance  from  fighting, 
to  supply  them  abundantly  that  they  might  not 
commit  any  disorder,  to  avoid  all  collision,  to 
take  no  part  in  the  divisions  of  the  court  of 
Spain,  and  to  send  me  the  questions  that  might 
be  addressed  to  you,  were  not  these  instruc- 
tions ?  The  rest  does  not  concern  you,  and  if 
I  say  nothing  to  you,  it  is  because  you  ought 
to  know  nothing." 

To  this  reprimand  he  added  such  orders  as 
circumstances  required.  He  prescribed  by  a 
decree  that  the  battalions  detached  from  their 
regiments  should  be  furnished  immediately 
with  funds,  to  be  placed  to  the  account  of  the 
administration  of  the  corps ;  to  take  from  his 
guard  young  sub-officers,  sufficiently  lettered, 
having  served  in  the  campaigns  of  1806  and 
1807,  to  be  appointed  officers,  and  thus  to  sup- 
ply the  regiments  which  were  deficient  of  them; 
to  subject  immediately  all  those  who  had  the 
itch  to  proper  treatment ;  to  encamp  the  troops 
as  soon  as  the  cold  season,  which  could  not  last 
much  longer  in  Spain,  was  over ;  to  despatch 
the  brigade  composed  of  the  fourth  battalions 
of  the  legions  of  reserve  to  join  that  of  General 
Darmagnac,  already  ordered  to  occupy  Pam- 
peluna,  to  arm  it,  to  leave  1000  men  there,  then 
to  take  the  entire  division  of  the  Eastern  Py- 
renees between  Vittoria  and  Burgos,  in  order 
to  cover  the  rear  of  the  army ;  to  collect  at  the 
same  point  all  the  regiments  on  march  composed 
of  reinforcements  destined  for  the  provisional 
regiments ;  to  send  thither  besides,  and  with- 
out delay,  Verdier's  division,  (called  above  the 
Orleans  reserve,)  to  form  in  this  manner  a  con- 
siderable corps,  under  the  command  of  Marshal 
Bessieres,  which,  with  the  guard,  could  not 
amount  to  less  than  from  12, 000  to  15, 000  men, 
and  which,  in  case  of  collision,  would  secure 
the  line  of  retreat  of  the  army  against  the 
Spanish  troops  directed  to  occupy  the  North 
of  Portugal.  Napoleon  then  settled  about  the 
march  upon  Madrid.  He  ordered  Murat  to 
make  both  Marshal  Moncey's  corps  and  General 
Dupont's  pass  the  Guadarrama,  the  one  by  the 
Somosierra  road,  the  other  by  that  of  Segovia, 
on  the  19th  or  20th  of  March,  to  be  on  the  22d 
or  23d  under  the  walls  of  Madrid,  to  ask  leave 
to  rest  himself  there,  before  he  continued  his 
march  for  Cadiz  ;  to  break  open  the  gates  of 
Madrid,  if  they  should  be  closed  against  him, 
but  not  till  he  had  done  all  that  was  possible 
to  prevent  a  collision.  To  all  these  directions 
was  added,  and  that  repeatedly,  the  recom- 
mendation to  be  silent  on  the  subject  of  political 
affairs,  to  supply  all  the  wants  of  the  troops, 
that  they  might  not  take  any  thing,  and  even 
to  delay  the  movement  for  a  day  or  two,  if  the 
means  of  subsistence  and  transport  should  not 
be  sufficient. 

Murat  was,  therefore,  obliged  to  be  content 
to  learn  nothing  more,  and  set  about  punctually 
obeying  the  Emperor's  orders,  certain  that, 
after  all,  this  mystery  could  conceal  nothing  but 
what  he  desired,  that  is  to  say,  the  overthrow 
of  the  Bourbons  of  Spain,  and  the  vacating  of 
one  of  the  finest  thrones  in  the  world. 


The  occupation  of  the  fortresses,  repeatedly 
ordered  by  the  Emperor,  was  executed.  Ge- 
nerals Duhesme  and  Darmagnac,  the  one  at 
Barcelona,  the  other  at  Pampeluna,  had  at  first 
occupied  the  towns  only,  and  not  the  fortresses 
commanding  those  towns.  A  secret  order,  ema- 
nating from  Madrid,  prescribed  to  the  Spanish 
generals  to  receive  the  French  amicably,  to 
open  the  towns  to  them,  but  as  far  as  possible 
to  refuse  them  admission  into  the  citadels. 
General  Duhesme,  arriving  at  Barcelona  at  the 
head  of  about  7000  men,  mostly  Italians,  had 
been  received  with  affected  politeness  by  the 
authorities,  with  kindness  and  curiosity  by  the 
townspeople,  with  distrust  by  the  populace. 
The  incontinence  of  the  Italians  had  drawn 
upon  them  more  than  one  infliction  of  the  knife. 
The  seriousness  of  the  circumstances  having 
occasioned  the  closing  of  the  manufactories, 
there  was  a  great  number  of  unemployed  work- 
men ready  to  take  part  in  any  kind  of  disturb- 
ance. General  Duhesme,  placed  with  7000  men 
amidst  a  city  of  150,000  souls,  though  followed 
at  a  little  distance  by  5000  French,  was  in  a 
critical  position,  especially  as  he  was  not  master 
of  the  citadel  of  Barcelona  and  of  the  fort  of 
Mont-Jouy,  which  entirely  commands  the  city. 
In  consequence,  he  agreed  with  General  Lechi, 
commanding  the  Italians,  upon  a  plan  for  carry- 
ing the  fortresses,  when  a  repeated  order  to 
possess  himself  of  them  came  and  put  an  end 
to  all  his  hesitations.  One  morning,  getting  his 
troops  under  arms,  he  directed  one  part  of  them 
upon  the  citadel,  another  upon  Mont-Jouy.  At 
the  principal  gate  of  the  citadel,  a  French  post 
mounted  guard  as  well  as  a  Spanish  post.  Ad- 
vantage was  taken  of  this  circumstance  to  pe- 
netrate into  the  interior.  Owing  to  the  negli- 
gence of  the  Spanish  officers,  half  of  the  garri- 
son was  dispersed  in  the  city.  The  French, 
therefore,  found  themselves  in  far  superior  force 
within  the  citadel,  and  made  themselves  masters 
of  it  without  striking  a  blow.  At  Fort  Mont- 
Jouy  the  result  was  different.  Admission  was 
refused  by  the  officer  commanding  there,  bri- 
gadier Alvarez,  who  afterwards  energetically 
defended  Girona.  Though  part  of  his  troops 
were  absent  and  dispersed,  as  had  been  the  case 
at  the  citadel,  he  assumed  an  attitude  of  de- 
fence. General  Duhesme,  who  had  directed  the 
bulk  of  his  force  towards  this  point,  declared, 
on  his  part,  that  he  should  instantly  commence 
the  attack.  The  Captain-General  of  Catalonia, 
Count  Ezpeleta,  fearing  a  collision,  which  he 
had  been  recommended  to  avoid,  came  to  the 
determination  to  yield,  and  to  give  up  Mont- 
Jouy  to  the  French.  They  established  them- 
selves there  immediately.  Masters  of  these  two 
fortresses  which  command  Barcelona,  they  had 
nothing  more  to  fear ;  but  they  did  not  enter 
them  without  exciting  in  the  population  of  Ca- 
talonia a  painful,  and,  under  the  circumstances, 
a  very  injurious  emotion. 

At  Pampeluna,  General  Darmagnac,  a  brave 
man,  full  of  energy  and  honour,  who  would 
more  willingly  have  scaled  by  main  force  than 
stealthily  surprised  a  fortress  which  he  was 
ordered  to  occupy,  made  use  of  a  clever  expe- 
dient to  get  into  the  citadel.  He  was  lodged 
in  a  house  at  a  little  distance  from  the  principal 
gate.  He  had  a  hundred  well-armed  grenadiers 
concealed  there.  His  troops  were  accustomed 
to  go  in  the  morning  into  the  citadel  itself  to 


460 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[March,  1808. 


fetch  their  provisions.  He  sent  about  fifty 
picked  men,  who  repaired  without  arms  to  the 
gate  of  the  citadel  just  before  the  distribution, 
and  who,  pretending  to  be  waiting,  approached 
the  post  guarding  the  gate,  fell  upon  it,  and 
disarmed  it,  while  the  hundred  grenadiers,  in 
ambush  in  General  Darmagnac's  house,  running 
up  in  all  haste,  completed  the  capture.  The 
French  troops,  secretly  assembled,  came  up  at 
the  same  moment,  and  the  citadel  was  con- 
quered, but  to  the  great  displeasure  of  General 
Darmagnac,  who,  reporting  what  he  had  done 
to  the  minister  of  war,  observed :  "  These  are 
disgraceful  commissions."  At  Pampeluna,  as 
at  Barcelona,  the  emotion  was  vehement  and 
general. 

The  troops  had  less  trouble  at  St.  Sebastian. 
A  Duke  de  Crillon,  of  French  extraction,  com- 
manded there.  Murat  summoned  him  to  sur- 
render the  place.  He  flatly  refused  to  comply. 
Murat  replied  that  he  had  orders  to  occupy  it, 
not  with  hostile  views,  but,  with  mere  views 
of  military  prudence,  to  secure  the  rear  of  the 
army  ;  and  that,  if  any  resistance  were  made, 
he  should  open  his  fire  immediately.  The  Duke 
de  Crillon,  forewarned,  like  all  the  other  com- 
mandants of  fortresses,  that  a  collision  was  to 
be  avoided,  surrendered  St.  Sebastian,  on  con- 
dition that  Murat  should  restore  it  if  his  com- 
pliance was  not  approved  at  Madrid.  Murat 
assented  to  this  puerile  reserve,  and  sent  a  bat- 
talion of  French  troops  into  St.  Sebastian. 

This  sudden  occupation  of  the  fortresses, 
effected  in  the  last  days  of  February  and  the 
first  days  of  March,  produced  a  most  baneful 
impression  in  Spain.  Those  persons  of  fore- 
sight, who  had  remarked  that  to  take  posses- 
sion of  Portugal,  already  conquered  besides, 
that,  to  overthrow  a  favourite,  detested  by  the 
nation,  there  was  no  need  for  so  many  troops, 
began  to  find  their  remarks  justified  and  to 
meet  with  more  assent.  In  the  countries  in 
particular,  which  had  witnessed  these  surprises, 
accompanied  with  more  or  less  violence,  the 
people  had  well  nigh  come  to  blows  with  the 
troops.  The  middle  class,  which,  less  hostile 
to  foreigners  than  the  populace,  less  excited  by 
the  clergy,  more  disposed  to  changes,  had  taken 
pleasure  in  hoping  from  us  for  the  fall  of  the 
favourite  and  the  regeneration  of  Spain,  was 
sorely  grieved.  The  populace  manifested  a  first 
movement  of  rage,  which  the  firm  attitude  of 
our  soldiers  and  our  officers  soon  succeeded  in 
repressing.  Two  circumstances  contributed 
further  to  aggravate  these  feelings  of  disap- 
pointment among  the  middle  class,  and  jealous 
anger  among  the  populace ;  the  first  and  the 
most  grievous  was  the  contribution  of  one  hun- 
dred millions  imposed  upon  the  Portuguese ; 
the  second,  not  so  generally  known  to  the  public, 
was  the  marriage  of  Mademoiselle  de  Tascher 
to  the  Prince  of  Aremberg.  They  began  to 
complain  in  all  quarters  that  the  French  treated 
very  ill  those  from  whom  they  were  receiving 
hospitality,  and  they  asked  one  another  what 
•would  be  the  burden  of  Spain,  if  she  had  to 
pay  a  proportionate  contribution  to  that  laid 
upon  Portugal.  As  for  the  marriage  of  Ma- 
demoiselle de  Tascher,  it  greatly  affected  the 
enlightened  class,  to  which  it  was  more  parti- 
cularly known.  They  had  persuaded  them- 
selves, in  fact,  that  it  was  not  a  daughter  of 
Lucien's,  a  person  unknown  in  Spain,  but  a 


niece  of  the  empress's  recently  adopted,  and 
related  to  the  Ambassador  Beauharnais,  thai 
Napoleon  destined  for  the  Prince  of  the  Astu- 
rias.  The  marriage  of  that  young  lady  with 
the  Prince  of  Aremberg  blighted  the  hopes  of 
all  those  who  reckoned  upon  the  speedy  union 
of  a  French  princess  with  Ferdinand.  The 
dethronement  of  the  Bourbons  became  thence- 
forward the  only  intention  that  they  could  at- 
tribute to  the  Emperor.  The  middle  class,  and 
above  all  the  nobility,  might  perhaps  have  ac- 
commodated themselves  to  a  change  of  dynasty, 
which  should  have  insured  to  them  the  regenera- 
tion of  Spain,  without  making  her  pass  through 
the  cruel  ordeal  of  the  French  revolution ;  but 
the  clergy,  and  particularly  the  monks,  who 
regarded  the  French  as  dangerous  foes  to  their 
existence,  repelled  such  an  idea  with  indigna- 
tion, and  had  no  difficulty  to  act  upon  a  still 
fanatical  people,  eager  for  movement  and  tu- 
mult. The  clergy,  corresponding  from  one  end 
of  Spain  to  the  other,  by  the  dioceses  and  by 
the  convents,  had  a  powerful  means  of  commu- 
nicating to  all  parts,  with  incredible  speed,  the 
impressions  which  they  had  an  interest  in  pro- 
pagating. These  first  impressions,  however, 
were  but  a  forerunning  sign  of  the  hatred  that 
was  to  break  forth  against  us.  For  a  moment 
a  different  object  engrossed  the  minds  of  the 
Spaniards :  this  was  the  court — the  court  in 
which  an  unnatural  mother  and  an  execrated 
favourite,  governing  a  weak  king,  kept  a  young 
and  adored  prince  under  oppression.  It  was 
towards  Madrid,  towards  Aranjuez,  that  all 
eyes  were  turned,  and  to  which  the  French 
were  called  to  consummate  there  a  revolution 
universally  desired.  Certain  acts  tended,  it  is 
true,  to  excite  doubts  respecting  their  inten- 
tions; but  these  acts,  some  of  them  explained 
as  mere  military  precautions,  the  others  as 
measures  solely  applicable  to  Portugal,  quickly 
passed  out  of  the  memory  of  a  nation  occupied 
with  a  single  object;  and  people  soon  began 
again  to  think  of  the  court,  to  wish  for  its 
downfal,  and  to  demand  it  of  the  French. 

The  moment  of  the  catastrophe  was  actually 
approaching.  Napoleon  had  made  M.  Yzqui- 
erdo leave  Paris  about  the  25th  of  February  to 
carry  terror  to  the  hearts  of  the  sovereigns  of 
Spain,  and  M.  de  Tournon  to  deliver  a  new  let- 
ter, alarming  from  its  very  insignificance ;  for, 
when  he  had  been  asked  for  a  princess  for  Fer- 
dinand, he  had  evaded  the  application  by  in- 
quiring if  that  prince  was  restored  to  favour ; 
and  now,  when  marriage  was  no  longer  men- 
tioned, he  complained  that  nothing  was  said 
about  it.  These  contradictions,  with  the  sinis- 
ter explanations  furnished  by  M.  Yzquierdo's 
reports,  by  the  march  of  the  French  troops,  by 
the  silence  of  Murat,  were  soon  to  bring  about 
the  long-expected  crisis  at  Madrid. 

M.  Yzquierdo,  arriving  at  Madrid  on  the  3d 
or  4th  of  March,  was  presented  on  the  5th  at 
Aranjuez  to  the  whole  royal  family.  His  re- 
ports were  of  the  most  alarming  nature,  and 
filled  with  terror  not  only  the  royal  family  but 
the  intimate  circle  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
his  mother,  his  sisters,  and  his  mistress,  Ma- 
demoiselle Tudo.  M.  Yzquierdo,  after  explain- 
ing the  state  of  the  negotiation,  commenced 
with  M.  de  Talleyrand,  on  the  subject  of  ceding 
to  the  French  the  provinces  of  the  Ebro  and  the 
opening  of  the  Spanish  colonies — M.  Yzquierdo 


March,  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE    EMPIRE. 


4C1 


declared  that  this  negotiation,  afflicting  as  it 
might  appear,  was  itself  but  a  blind ;  that  Na- 
poleon evidently  wanted  something  else,  that 
is  to  say,  the  throne  of  Spain  for  one  of  his 
brothers. 

M.  Yzquierdo  easily  succeeded  in  convincing 
the  court  of  Aranjuez,  already  terror-stricken, 
and  in  persuading  it  that,  unless  it  adopted  a 
decisive  course,  it  was  undone.  The  arrival 
of  M.  de  Tournon,  and  the  delivery  of  the  let- 
ter of  which  he  was  the  bearer,  were  not  likely 
to  dispel  the  alarms  excited  by  M.  Yzquierdo. 
Charles  IV.,  ill,  suffering  from  rheumatism  in 
the  arm,  received  M.  de  Tournon  with  a  polite- 
ness, through  which  might  be  perceived  pro- 
found affliction ;  the  queen  and  the  favourite 
received  him  with  a  forced  smile,  that  but  ill 
concealed  their  furious  hatred.  Charles  IV. 
told  him,  in  a  tone  penetrated  with  grief,  that 
he  should  soon  write  to  his  ally  the  Emperor 
Napoleon,  and  hastened  to  put  an  end  to  a  use- 
less and  painful  interview.  From  that  moment 
the  resolution  to  leave  the  country  was  taken. 
It  was  a  cruel  sacrifice  for  Charles  IV.  to  quit 
the  three  or  four  palaces  situated  around  Ma- 
drid, among  which  he  was  accustomed  to  divide 
his  life,  going  from  one  to  another  at  every 
change  of  season,  like  those  animals  which 
change  climates  in  following  the  sun.  It  was 
to  him  a  severe  privation  to  renounce  the  chase 
in  the  Parde,  to  wait  instead  for  Napoleon,  and 
to  place  the  fate  of  the  house  of  Spain  at  the 
disposal  of  his  omnipotence.  The  good  king 
Charles  IV.  had  too  honest  a  heart,  and  too 
limited  an  understanding,  to  surmise  a  single 
one  of  Napoleon's  combinations,  and  he  was  in- 
clined to  think  that,  by  waiting  for  him  and 
placing  confidence  in  him,  all  would  be  arranged 
for  the  best.  It  is  certain  that  this  simple  self- 
surrender  of  weakness  must  have  strangely  em- 
barrassed Napoleon,  and  perhaps  produced  dif- 
ferent results.  But  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  and 
the  queen,  well  aware  that  they  had  no  favour 
to  hope  for,  that  the  interference  of  Napoleon, 
whatever  it  might  be,  would  at  least  act  against 
them,  left  no  option  to  Charles  IV.,  and  induced 
him  to  retire  to  Andalusia.  It  is  probable  that 
thoy  placed  before  his  view  nothing  more  than 
this  first  removal,  relying  upon  events  for  de- 
ciding the  definitive  retreat  to  America.  Their 
resolution  on  this  head  was  so  firm,  that  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  hurried  away  by  his  usual 
intemperance  of  language,  declared  that  he 
would  carry  off  the  king  rather  than  consent  to 
his  awaiting  the  arrival  of  the  French  at  Aran- 
juez. 

However,  that  he  might  not  deprive  himself 
of  every  resource  on  the  part  of  France,  M. 
Yzquierdo  was  obliged  to  return  immediately 
to  Paris,  to  have  recourse  to  supplications  with 
Napoleon,  to  gold  with  his  agents,  in  order  to 
avert  the  stroke  which  threatened  the  house  of 
Spain,  and  to  sign  all  the  treaties  which  might 
be  required,  how  disgraceful  soever  they  might 
be.  He  set  out  again  in  haste,  on  the  morning 
of  the  llth  of  March,  to  reach  Paris  before  a 
fatal  order  was  given.  His  distress  was  such 
that  those  who  met  him,  and  there  were  many 
going  and  coming  on  the  road,  were  forcibly 
struck  by  it. 

The  resolution  to  retire  to  Andalusia  being 
taken,  it  was  necessary  to  reconcile  to  it  many 
minds  both  at  Aranjuez  and  Madrid.  The 


Prince  of  the  Asturias,  judging  of  Napoleon's 
intentions  by  the  demonstrations  of  interest 
which  he  received  from  M.  de  Beauharnais, 
regarded  the  French  as  deliverers,  and  would 
not  submit  to  be  dragged  far  away  from  them, 
a  prisoner  to  the  queen  and  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace.  He  declared  this  loudly,  since  they  had 
talked  of  the  journey  to  Andalusia,  and  they 
talked  of  it,  in  fact,  at  the  moment  as  a  deter- 
mined resolution.  He  had  won  to  his  opinion 
his  uncle  Don  Antonio,  who  felt  as  much  aver- 
sion as  himself  for  the  queen  and  the  favourite, 
and  likewise  all  the  members  of  the  royal 
family,  excepting  the  Queen  of  Etruria,  who 
had  recently  arrived  from  Tuscany  to  take  pos- 
session of  the  north  of  Portugal.  This  prin- 
cess, dear  to  the  queen,  was  for  that  reason 
odious  to  Ferdinand,  but  nobody  cared  much 
about  her  opinion.  All  who  had  any  weight  in 
the  royal  family  were  decidedly  adverse  to  the 
plan  of  flight,  and  in  favour  of  waiting  for  the 
French.  The  queen  and  the  favourite,  giving 
themselves  no  concern  about  these  oppositions, 
were  determined  to  conquer  them,  and,  by  fair 
means  or  force,  to  take  the  whole  royal  family 
to  Seville.  But  there  were  still  other  more  for- 
midable oppositions  to  overcome.  The  council 
of  Castille,  secretly  consulted,  had  rejected  the 
idea  of  a  disgraceful  retreat,  and  replied  that 
the  French  ought  not  to  have  been  admitted 
into  Spain,  but,  after  having  so  easily  admitted 
them,  it  was  necessary  either  to  take  the  sud- 
den resolution  to  resist  them,  by  raising  the 
whole  nation  against  them,  or  to  receive  them 
with  open  arms,  appealing  to  the  good  faith  of 
these  allies,  welcomed  in  Spain  as  friends  and 
brothers.  Another  opposition,  more  unlooked- 
for  than  all  the  rest,  suddenly  burst  forth. 
The  minister  of  justice,  M.  de  Caballero,  who 
had  appeared  more  attached  than  he  was  to  the 
fortune  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  called  by 
;  his  functions  as  minister  of  justice  to  attend 
frequently  during  the  proceedings  at  the  Escu- 
rial,  had  thereby  gained  all  the  odium  of  them, 
though  without  deserving  it ;  for  he  had  main- 
tained, before  both  the  king  and  the  queen, 
that  neither  in  the  papers  which  had  been  found 
nor  in  the  facts  collected  was  there  sufficient 
evidence  for  instituting  criminal  prosecutions. 
He  had  even  on  this  account  incurred  the  anger 
of  the  queen,  who  had  called  him  a  traitor  sold 
to  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias.  The  public, 
nevertheless,  believed  him  to  be  much  more  cul- 
pable than  he  really  was.  As  for  the  journey 
to  Andalusia,  he  would  not  hear  of  it,  saying 
that  it  would  be  a  cowardly  desertion  of  the 
nation,  that  the  French  ought  not  to  have  been 
introduced  into  Spain,  but  that  now  it  was  ex- 
pedient to  wait  for  them,  that  it  was  for  those 
who  distrusted  them  to  retire,  but  that  proba- 
bly Charles  IV.,  whose  conduct  had  always 
been  honourable  towards  them,  would  perhaps 
have  no  reason  to  repent  having  waited  for 
them.  Another  minister,  M.  de  Cevallos,  who 
subsequently  would  fain  have  passed  himself 
off  for  an  antagonist  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 
though  he  was  servilely  submissive  to  him,  and 
all  whose  patriotism  consisted  in  a  stupid  hatred 
of  the  French — M.  de  Cevallos,  minister  of 
foreign  affairs,  remained  a  quiet  spectator  of 
this  conflict,  and  left  M.  de  Caballero  to  wUh- 
stand  singly  the  plan  of  flight.  The  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  regardless  of  his  opposition,  gav« 
2Q2 


462 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


all  the  orders  for  the  intended  journey  to  An- 
dalusia. Seeking  to  conceal  the  object  of  this 
journey,  he  talked  vaguely  of  a  personal  pro- 
ject for  inspecting  the  ports,  the  superintend- 
ence of  which,  since  he  was  grand-admiral, 
belonged  specially  to  him. 

The  convoys  of  money  and  movables  already 
remarked,  the  preparations  of  the  court,  and 
particularly  of  the  Tudo  family,  soon  left  no 
doubt.  It  would  be  difficult  to  form  an  idea 
of  the  indignation  of  the  Spaniards  on  learning 
that  they  were  about  to  be  abandoned  by  the 
house  of  Bourbon,  as  the  Portuguese  had  been 
by  the  house  of  Braganza.  Concerning  them- 
selves but  little  about  the  advantages  which 
such  a  resolution  might  afterwards  have  for 
the  preservation  of  the  colonies,  they  said  to 
themselves  that,  if  the  French  had  such  evil 
intentions,  the  government  was  either  silly  in 
not  having  foreseen  them,  or  criminal  in  having 
favoured  them ;  that,  at  all  events,  they  must 
be  resisted  to  the  last  extremity ;  that  all  the 
Spaniards,  having  the  king  and  the  princes  at 
their  head,  ought  to  cover  the  capital  with  their 
bodies  and  perish  rather  than  suffer  it  to  be 
entered ;  but  to  run  away  cowardly  was  au 
indignity,  a  treason ;  that,  for  the  rest,  there 
was  in  this  flight  something  besides  a  precau- 
tion of  prudence  for  the  benefit  of  the  royal 
family,  merely  a  calculation  for  prolonging  the 
usurped  power  of  the  favourite  ;  for,  if  the  in- 
tention was  to  escape  the  French,  it  was  because 
they  were  known  to  be  adverse  to  Emmanuel 
Godoy  and  favourable  to  the  Prince  of  the  As- 
turias.  This  last  idea  becoming  general  had 
restored  their  popularity  to  the  French,  and 
people  said  that,  instead  of  running  away  or 
fighting  them,  they  ought  to  go  to  meet  and 
welcome  them,  since  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
had  such  a  strong  distrust  of  their  intentions. 
The  exasperation  of  all  classes  against  the  court 
was  at  its  height.  The  nobility,  the  middle 
class,  the  common  people,  and  the  army,  all 
spoke  one  and  the  same  language  at  Madrid ; 
and  this  language  was  as  open,  as  bold,  as  im- 
moderate, as  it  is  possible  to  be  on  the  eve  of 
great  events  in  the  most  free  countries.  In  the 
army,  in  particular,  a  body  of  men  very  ill- 
treated  by  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  who  had 
overturned  its  organization,  the  life-guards, 
manifested  the  greatest  irritation,  and  resolved 
to  oppose  the  king's  departure  even  by  force. 
Among  the  officers  of  this  corps  there  were 
several  absolutely  devoted  to  the  Prince  of  the 
Asturias,  and  in  frequent  communication  with 
him,  receiving,  it  is  alleged,  suggestions  and 
orders  from  him. 

This  boisterous  opposition  had  not  shaken 
either  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  or  the  queen  in 
their  projects,  and  merely  excited  in  them  a 
desire  to  withdraw  themselves  the  sooner  from 
such  hatred  and  such  dangers,  by  retiring  first 
to  Andalusia,  afterwards,  if  they  must,  to  Ame- 
rica. The  Prince  of  the  Peace  had  given  orders 
accordingly.  He  had  made  the  troops  destined 
to  occupy  Portugal  fall  back ;  for,  on  the  eve 

»  The  domestic  resolutions  of  the  Spanish  government 
are  in  general  known  from  hearsay  only,  for  there  is  no- 
thing in  writing  on  this  subject  by  any  well-informed  man. 
The  Marquis  de  Caballero,  however,  when  subsequently 
questioned  by  M  unit,  delivered  to  him  three  very  instruc- 
tive memoirs  concerning  the  events  which  preceded  the 
disturbance  at  Aranjuez,  and  the  manuscripts  exist  in  the 
wcretary  of  state's  office.  M.  de  Caballero,  relating  the 


[March,  1808. 


of  losing  Spain,  there  was  something  else  to 
think  of  than  the  Algarves  and  North  Lusita 
nia.  General  Taranco  had  been  obliged  to 
leave  Oporto,  to  march  into  Gallicia,  and  from 
Gallicia  into  the  kingdom  of  Leon.  General 
Carafa  had  had  to  ascend  the  Tagus,  and  to 
advance  as  far  as  Talavera ;  General  Solano, 
Marquis  del  Socorro,  to  return  from  Elvas  to- 
wards Badajoz,  and  proceed  for  Seville.  As- 
suredly, the  Prince  of  the  Peace  had  no  idea 
of  entering  with  these  forces,  consisting  of  six 
or  seven  thousand  men  each,  into  a  contest  with 
the  French  army.  He  probably  destined  them 
much  more  to  cover  the  retreat  of  the  royal 
family,  than  to  organize  a  desperate  defence  in 
the  south  of  Spain.  Several  frigates  were 
eventually  prepared  in  the  port  of  Cadiz. ' 

The  Prince  of  the  Peace,  according  to  his 
custom  of  passing  a  week  alternately  at  Ma- 
drid and  with  their  majesties,  had  returned, 
on  Sunday,  the  13th  of  March,  to  Aranjuez,  a 
magnificent  royal  residence  seated  on  the  bank 
of  the  Tagus,  decorated  in  the  Italian  style, 
with  superb  gardens,  somewhat  reminding  you 
of  the  Arabic  taste.  This  residence,  as  you 
come  from  Madrid,  is  on  the  right  of  a  high 
road,  as  wide  as  the  avenue  of  the  Champs 
Elyse'es.  Opposite  to  the  palace  this  road  ex- 
pands into  a  spacious  place.  On  the  left  are 
several  fine  mansions  belonging  to  ministers 
and  to  grandees  of  the  court,  and  one  of  which 
in  particular  was  occupied  by  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace.  A  multitude  of  small  houses,  inhabited 
by  shopkeepers  and  tradesmen  whom  the  court 
and  its  numerous  establishment  draw  after 
them,  form  what  may  be  called  the  town  of 
Aranjuez. 

No  sooner  had  he  arrived  than  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace  gave  definitive  orders  for  the 
departure,  which  was  fixed  on  Tuesday  or 
Wednesday,  the  15th  or  16th  of  March.  The 
major-domo  of  the  court  had  already  caused 
the  royal  carriages  to  be  got  ready ;  and  relays 
of  horses  were  stationed  on  the  Ocana  road, 
which  leads  to  Seville.  Directions  had  been 
given  at  Madrid  to  the  Walloon  and  Spanish 
guards  and  to  the  life-guards,  who  were  not  on 
duty,  to  hold  themselves  in  readiness  to  set  out 
for  Aranjuez. 

But,  although  no  account  had  been  made  of 
the  opposition  of  certain  ministers,  it  became  at 
length  necessary  to  inform  them  of  the  defini- 
tive resolution  of  the  court,  and  to  apply  to 
them  for  the  signature  of  various  orders.  The 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  as  soon  as  he  arrived  at 
Aranjuez,  had  summoned  several  of  them  to  the 
royal  residence,  in  particular  the  Marquis  de 
Caballero,  who  had  kept  him  waiting.  The 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  somewhat  nettled,  received 
him  very  ungraciously.  The  minister,  persist- 
ing in  his  .opposition,  refused  to  concur  either 
by  his  consent  or  by  his  signature  in  the  depar- 
ture, which  was  no  longer  merely  projected  but 
resolved  upon — I  order  you  to  sign,  said  the 
prince  to  him,  in  a  movement  of  anger. — I  take 
no  orders  but  from  the  king,  replied  M.  de  Ca- 

discupsions  which  he  had  with  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  re- 
specting the  projected  departure,  details  all  that  passed  on 
this  occasion,  and  furnishes  a  great  many  facts  that  ar» 
extremely  curious.  In  particular,  he  heard  the  Prince  of 
the  Peace  assert  that  he  had  just  caused  five  frigates  to  be 
got  ready  at  Cadiz  for  conveying  the  royal  family  bey<ml 


March,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


463 


ballero.  Such  an  opposition,  from  a  man  not 
distinguished  by  boldness  of  character,  must 
have  proved  to  what  a  degree  the  authority  of 
the  favourite  was  already  shaken.  The  other 
ministers  having  come  in,  a  sharp  altercation 
took  place  among  them.  M.  de  Caballero,  urged 
to  the  highest  pitch  of  irritation,  reproached 
M.  de  Cevallos  for  his  base  complaisance  to- 
wards the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  and  had  no  sup- 
porter but  the  minister  of  the  marine.  They 
separated  without  coming  to  any  conclusion, 
and,  on  leaving  the  palace,  these  counsellors 
of  the  crown,  retaining  in  their  countenances 
and  in  their  language  the  agitation  which  they 
were  full  of,  dropped  words  which  apprized  the 
public  of  the  matter  in  hand,  and  of  the  dan- 
ger with  which  it  was  threatened. 

The  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  on  his  part,  and 
his  uncle  Don  Antonio,  had  communicated  to 
their  confidants  what  they  knew,  and  had,  in 
some  measure,  applied  for  aid  against  the  vio- 
lence that  was  preparing  for  them.  The  at- 
tached officers  whom  the  prince  numbered  in 
the  life-guards  had  spoken  to  their  men,  who 
were  disposed  to  infringe  all  the  rules  of  subor- 
dination, at  the  first  word  that  should  be  said 
to  them.  The  household,  who  knew,  from  the 
very  preparations  which  had  been  made,  how 
aear  at  hand  the  journey  was,  and  were  sorry 
to  leave  the  old  abode  in  which  they  were  ac- 
customed to  dwell,  had  forewarned  the  inhabit- 
ants of  Aranjuez.  The  latter,  grieved  to  be 
deprived  of  the  presence  of  the  court,  had  re- 
solved to  prevent  its  departure ;  and  they  had, 
by  reporting  the  design  of  flight  in  the  sur- 
rounding country,  drawn  together  the  formi- 
dable peasants  of  La  Mancha,  grievously  vexed 
also  to  see  the  court  leaving  them,  and  taking 
from  them  the  advantage  of  its  supply.  The 
affluence  to  Aranjuez  became  extreme,  and 
faces  the  most  sinister  and  the  most  strange 
began  already  to  make  their  appearance.  A 
singular  personage,  the  Count  de  Montijo,  per- 
secuted by  the  court,  having,  together  with  the 
birth  and  fortune  of  a  grandee,  the  art  and  a 
disposition  for  exciting  the  popular  masses,  was 
in  the  midst  of  this  concourse,  ready  to  give  it 
the  signal  for  insurrection.  In  consequence, 
there  were  seen  tradesmen  of  Aranjuez,  pea- 
sants of  La  Mancha,  brought  together  by  anx- 
iety, interest,  passion,  keeping  continual  watch 
about  the  palace. 

Monday,  the  14th,  the  day  after  the  alterca- 
tion between  M.  Caballero  and  the  Prince  of 
the  Peace,  was  extremely  stormy.  On  Tues- 
day, the  15th,  the  sight  of  the  last  prepara- 
tions of  the  court,  the  language  of  the  dissi- 
dent ministers,  certain  words  attributed  to  the 
Prince  of  the  Asturias,  who,  it  was  said,  asked 
for  aid  against  the  violence  of  those  who  pur- 
posed to  carry  him  off  to  Andalusia,  produced 
such  an  emotion  that  a  popular  insurrection  was 
expected  every  moment  to  break  out.  There 
was  already  the  aspect,  the  shouts  of  one ;  no- 
thing was  wanting  but  acts  of  violence. 

On  the  morning  of  the  next  day,  Wednesday, 
the  16th,  the  authors  of  the  project  of  a  jour- 
ney, seeing  that  the  departure  would  be  ren- 
dered impossible  unless  a  moment's  tranquillity 
could  be  restored  to  that  agitated  population, 
proposed  to  publish  a  proclamation,  by  which 
Charles  IV.  should  promise  not  to  leave  Aran- 
juez. Accordingly  this  proclamation  was  im- 


mediately drawn  up,  read,  and  posted  in  all  th« 
principal  streets  of  Aranjuez,  and  sent  in  the 
utmost  haste  to  Madrid. — "  My  dear  subjects," 
such  was  the  substance  of  it,  "  be  not  alarmed, 
either  at  the  arrival  of  the  troops  of  my  mag- 
nanimous ally,  the  Emperor  of  the  French, 
which  have  entered  Spain  to  repel  a  landing 
of  the  enemy  on  our  coasts,  or  at  my  alleged 
intention  of  departure.  No ;  it  is  not  true  that 
I  want  to  leave  my  beloved  people.  I  will  stay 
with  you,  live  among  you,  relying  on  your  at- 
tachment, if  I  should  need  it  against  any  enemy 
whatsoever.  Spaniards,  be  easy  then — your 
king  will  not  leave  you." 

This  proclamation  infused  into  men's  minds 
a  degree  of  security,  and  calmed  them  for  a 
moment.  The  multitude,  collected  in  front  of 
the  royal  residence,  called  for  its  sovereigns, 
who  appeared  at  the  windows  of  the  palace, 
cheering  with  all  its  might,  shouting,  "Long 
live  the  king!"  "Death  to  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace !"  "  Death  to  the  favourite  who  dis- 
honours and  betrays  his  master !"  Thus  ended 
the  16th,  amidst  a  satisfaction  which  unfortu- 
nately was  to  be  but  transient. 

On  the  following  day,  the  17th,  in  spite  of 
the  royal  promises,  the  journey  seemed  still  to 
be  resolved  upon.  The  carriages  remained 
loaded  in  the  courts  of  the  palace.  The  horses 
were  waiting  at  the  relays.  The  troops  forming 
the  garrison  of  Madrid,  composed  of  the  Wal- 
loon and  Spanish  guards,  and  of  the  company 
of  life-guards  not  on  duty,  set  out  for  Aran- 
juez. Part  of  the  populace  of  the  capital  and 
a  multitude  of  curious  persons  followed  and 
performed  the  trip,  a  distance  of  seven  or  eight 
leagues,  along  with  them.  By  the  way,  this 
train  set  up  shouts  against  the  queen  and 
against  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  and  asked  the 
officers  and  soldiers  if  they  would  let  their  sove- 
reigns be  carried  off  by  an  unworthy  usurper, 
who  meant  to  take  them  away  with  him  to 
tyrannize  over  them  the  more  safely.  The 
troops,  thus  accompanied,  reached  Aranjuez 
towards  the  close  of  the  day,  and  were  quar- 
tered upon  the  inhabitants,  which  was  not  the 
way  to  recall  them  to  military  subordination. 
A  last  circumstance  completely  convinced  the 
multitude  that  the  royal  promises  were  but  a 
deception :  this  was  that  the  demoiselles  Tudo 
themselves  had  arrived  at  Aranjuez,  and  were 
to  set  off  that  evening,  it  was  said,  for  Anda- 
lusia. 

The  concourse  about  the  king's  palace  and 
that  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  was  more  con- 
siderable than  on  the  preceding  days,  for,  with 
the  terrified  inhabitants  of  Aranjuez,  with  the 
peasants  of  La  Mancha,  were  mingled  soldiers 
without  arms,  who,  having  once  arrived  at  their 
lodgings,  came  out  again  to  join  the  mob  and 
the  curious  persons,  who  had  left  Madrid  in 
great  number.  The  life-guards,  at  least  those 
not  on  duty,  evidently  excited  by  the  friends 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  divided  into 
bands,  forming  volunteer  patroles,  sometimes 
towards  the  king's  stables,  sometimes  towards 
the  residence  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace. 

Towards  midnight  a  singular  incident,  which 
occurred  in  front  of  the  palace  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  became  the  spark  that  produced 
the  explosion.  A  lady  coming  out  of  this  pa- 
lace, under  the  arm  of  an  officer,  escorted  by 
a  few  hussars,  of  whom  the  prince  composed 


464 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[March,  1808. 


his  guard,  was  perceived  by  a  band  of  the  life-  [ 
guards  and  of  inquisitive  persons.  They  recog- 
nised, or  thought  they  recognised,  Mademoiselle 
Josepha  Tudo,  who,  according  to  them,  was 
going  to  get  into  a  carriage.  The  crowd  pressed 
around  her.  The  prince's  hussars  having  at- 
tempted to  open  a  passage,  a  gun  was  fired,  it 
is  not  known  by  whom.  A  frightful  tumult 
instantly  arose.  The  life-guards  ran  to  their 
quarters,  saddled  their  horses,  and  brandishing 
their  swords,  rushed  upon  the  prince's  hussars 
whom  they  met.  The  Walloon  and  Spanish 
guards  also  took  to  their  arms,  rather  for  the 
purpose  of  joining  the  mob  than  of  enforcing  re- 
spect for  the  royal  authority.  The  people,  no 
longer  containing  themselves,  assembled  be- 
neath the  windows  of  the  palace,  called  for  the 
king  with  loud  shouts,  insisted  on  seeing  him 
that  they  might  let  him  hear  the  expression  of 
their  good  wishes,  by  furiously  shouting,  "  Long 
live  the  king!"  "Death  to  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace !"  After  terrifying  him  by  greeting  him 
with  such  acclamations,  they  proceeded  to  the 
other  side  of  Aranjuez,  towards  the  residence 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  which  they  sur- 
rounded on  all  sides.  To  force  the  doors  and  to 
rush  in  appeared  at  first  to  this  mob  which  set 
out  in  the  career  of  revolutious,  an  outrage 
beyond  its  daring.  They  paused  for  a  moment, 
hesitating,  but  full  of  impatience,  and  devour- 
ing their  prey  with  their  eyes  before  they  seized 
it.  All  at  once  a  person,  a  messenger,  it  was 
said,  from  the  palace,  appeared  at  the  gate  of 
the  prince,  to  obtain  admittance.  It  was  re- 
fused him.  He  insisted.  The  guards  of  the 
house,  conceiving  that  they  were  attacked, 
thought  of  defending  themselves.  Amidst  this 
agitation,  a  shot  was  fired.  Hesitation  was 
then  at  an  end.  The  enraged  crowd  dashed 
against  the  gates,  broke  them  in,  penetrated 
into  the  magnificent  abode  of  the  favourite, 
ravaged  it,  flung  out  of  the  windows  pictures, 
hangings,  sumptuous  furniture,  destroyed  with- 
out pillaging,  more  furious  than  greedy,  as  is 
the  case  in  the  movements  of  every  mob,  ex- 
cited but  not  debased.  They  ran  from  apart- 
ment to  apartment,  in  quest  of  the  object  of 
the  public  hatred,  but  found  only  the  unfortu- 
nate wife  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace.  The 
populace  in  Spain,  even  the  very  lowest  of  it, 
had  at  length  become  acquainted  with  the  whole 
life  of  Emmanuel  Godoy.  They  knew  how 
many  women  he  had,  which  he  loved,  which 
he  did  not  love.  They  knew  the  wretchedness 
of  that  august  Princess  de  Bourbon,  unhappily 
united  to  a  soldier  in  the  guards,  to  throw  on 
that  soldier  the  royal  lustre  which  he  had  not. 
The  multitude,  on  perceiving  her,  fell  at  her  feet, 
conducted  her  respectfully  out  of  the  stormed 
house,  placed  her  in  a  carriage,  and  drew 
her  in  triumph  to  the  palace  of  the  sovereign. 
Having  set  her  down  in  the  abode  of  kings, 
which  she  ought  never  to  have  been  obliged  to 
leave,  the  mob,  thinking  that  they  had  not  done 
with  the  palace  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  re- 
turned thither,  searched  for  the  owner  himself 
in  every  corner  of  his  mansion,  and,  not  find- 
ing him,  revenged  themselves  by  a  frightful 
devastation.  The  whole  night  was  spent  in 
Bearching,  ravaging,  and  when  daylight  came, 
the  favourite  not  being  discovered,  it  was 
supposed  that  he  had  sought  an  asylum  else- 
where. 


It  may  be  conceived  what  must  have  been  at 
this  moment  the  terror  of  Charles  IV.  and  the 
despair  of  the  queen.  The  remembrance  of 
the  French  revolution  had  always  filled  them 
with  horror.  That  revolution  which  they  had 
so  dreaded  they  beheld  at  last  at  their  own 
door,  raising  the  same  cries,  committing  the 
same  acts,  though  excited  by  difl'erent  senti- 
ments. They  were  dismayed,  appalled,  re- 
signed to  whatever  should  befall  them.  That 
queen,  justly  odious,  felt  nevertheless  a  true 
sentiment,  which,  without  rendering  her  inte- 
resting, might,  at  least  to  a  certain  degree,  ex- 
cuse her  scandalous  life.  She  thought  not  in 
her  terror  either  of  her  family  or  of  herself, 
but  of  the  ruler  of  her  soul,  the  despicable 
Godoy.  She  inquired  of  everybody  what  had 
become  of  him ;  she  despatched  trusty  servants 
to  learn  tidings  of  him.  "  Where  is  Emma- 
nuel ?"  she  exclaimed;  "where  can  he  be?" 
and  she  hid  not  the  tears  wrung  from  her  by 
such  uneasiness.  The  king  himself,  when  his 
fear  subsided,  also  inquired  what  they  had 
done  with  poor  Emmanuel,  who,  he  said,  was 
so  attached  to  him.  As  for  the  Prince  of  the 
Asturias,  seeing  his  enemy  pulled  down,  the 
crown  ready  to  drop  from  the  head  of  hia 
father  upon  his  own,  and  not  knowing  that  he 
should  soon  fall  to  the  ground,  and  be  picked 
up  at  the  point  of  the  sword,  he  manifested  a 
mean  and  perfidious  joy,  which  was  perceived 
by  his  mother,  and  drew  from  her  the  most 
violent  reproaches. 

The  ministers  and  several  nobles  devoted  to 
the  king,  having  hurried  to  the  palace,  tumult- 
uously  advised  his  majesty  to  take  from  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace  all  his  dignities  and  em- 
ployments, as  the  only  means  of  restoring 
tranquillity  and  saving  the  life  of  the  prince 
himself.  The  king,  because  he  was  ready  for 
any  thing,  the  queen,  because  she  was  more 
anxious  to  preserve  the  life  than  the  power  of 
her  paramour,  immediately  assented ;  and  a 
decree  appeared  on  the  morning  of  the  18th 
of  March,  declaring  that  the  king  withdrew 
from  Don  Emmanuel  Godoy  his  appointments 
of  grand-admiral  and  generalissimo,  and  au- 
thorized him  to  proceed  to  what  place  soever 
he  should  be  pleased  to  choose  for  his  retreat. 

Such  was  the  end  of  this  deplorable  favour- 
ite, whose  strange  destiny  was,  in  our  times, 
a  last  vestige  of  the  vices  of  the  old  courts,  in 
contrast  with  the  manners  of  the  age ;  for, 
even  in  dissolute  courts,  they  had  come  to  re- 
spect public  opinion — deplorable  favourite  on 
other  accounts  than  those  of  scandal ;  for, 
with  the  exception  of  bloodshed,  he  had  drawn 
upon  Spain  all  evils  at  once,  shame,  disorgani- 
zation, ruin,  and,  in  the  last  instance,  popular 
insurrection.  On  learning  the  degradation  of 
Emmanuel  -Godoy,  the  people  with  whom  Aran- 
juez was  thronged,  and  who  were  composed  of 
several  populations,  not  only  of  Aranjuez,  but 
of  Madrid,  of  Toledo,  of  the  country  of  La 
Mancha,  gave  themselves  up  to  a  furious  joy, 
as  though  on  the  morrow  they  should  be  the 
happiest  people  on  earth.  In  all  quarters 
there  were  singing,  dancing,  bonfires :  they 
embraced  in  the  streets,  -congratulating  one 
another  on  this  downfal,  which  gratified  a 
still  stronger  feeling  than  that  of  interest — 
hatred  for  an  insolent  fortune  which  had  of- 
fended all  Spain.  The  news,  carried  in  two 


March,  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


465 


or  three  hours  to  Madrid,  produced  there  an 
absolute  delirium. 

As  soon  as  this  popular  movement  was 
known,  the  Ambassador  of  France,  destitute 
of  talents  but  not  of  courage,  hastened  to  the 
king,  to  cover  him  with  his  body  if  he  had 
been  in  danger.  The  disturbance  being  ended 
by  the  fall  of  the  favourite,  whose  enemy  he 
had  become  in  consequence  of  the  interest  that 
he  felt  in  behalf  of  the  Prince  of  the  Asturias, 
he  appeared  almost  triumphant  with  the  lat- 
ter. He  told  Charles  IV.  that  the  French 
troops  whose  arrival  was  near  at  hand,  (they 
were  at  that  moment  passing  the  Guadarrama, 
to  descend  upon  Madrid,)  would  be  at  his 
command  against  all  enemies  at  home  and 
abroad,  and  he  believed  that,  in  giving  this 
assurance,  he  was  fulfilling  the  instructions 
of  his  august  master,  who  would  never  suffer 
his  friendship  to  be  invoked  in  vain.  Charles 
IV.  thanked  M.  de  Beauharnais,  and  declared 
that  in  future  he  should  be  happy  to  treat  of 
business  with  the  Ambassador  of  France,  and 
without  any  intermediary.  Unfortunate  king ! 
Fate  had  not  reserved  for  him  so  heavy  a 
burden. 

The  18th  was  tranquil ;  but  the  multitude, 
once  agitated,  had  need  of  new  emotions.  It 
wanted  something  else  than  a  palace  to  de- 
stroy. It  would  have  rejoiced  to  have  the 
body  of  Emmanuel  Godoy  to  tear  in  pieces. 
Search  was  everywhere  made  for  him,  and  the 
queen  trembled  lest  she  should  hear  every 
moment  of  the  discovery  of  his  asylum  and  his 
death.  All  the  ministers  passed  the  night  at 
the  palace  near  the  two  sovereigns,  whose  eyes 
were  not  closed  for  an  instant  by  sleep. 

On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  the  popular 
agitation,  calmed  a  first  time  by  the  proclama- 
tion of  the  16th,  and  a  second  time  by  the 
deposition  of  the  favourite,  which  had  been 
decreed  on  the  18th,  had  increased,  like  a 
wave  which  alternately  rises  and  sinks.  At 
the  palace,  the  officers  of  the  guards,  finding 
all  authority  over  their  troops  slipping  out  of 
their  hands,  had  declared  that  it  was  not  in 
their  power  to  enforce  respect  for  the  royal 
authority,  if  it  should  be  attacked.  The  king 
and  the  queen,  in  deep  consternation,  had  sent 
for  their  son  Ferdinand,  to  desire  him  to  shield 
them  by  his  popularity,  and  he  had  promised 
his  good  offices,  with  the  secret  joy  of  a  con- 
queror, and  the  ease  of  a  conspirator,  sure  of 
all  the  springs  that  he  is  to  set  at  work ;  when, 
all  at  once,  a  fresh  and  violent  rumour  proved 
that  there  was  reason  to  feel  apprehensions 
for  the  day  that  was  commencing. 

The  Prince  of  the  Peace,  so  assiduously 
sought  for,  had,  nevertheless,  not  quitted  his 
residence.  At  the  moment  when  the  doors  of 
his  palace  were  forced,  he  had  taken  a  hand- 
ful of  gold  and  a  pair  of  pistols,  and  hid  him- 
self in  the  loft  under  the  roof,  by  rolling  him- 
eelf  in  a  mat,  a  sort  of  rush  carpet  used  in 
Spain.  Continuing  in  this  deplorable  situation 
during  the  whole  of  the  18th,  and  during  the 
night  between  the  18th  and  19th,  he  could 
endure  it  no  longer  than  till  the  morning  of 
the  19th,  when,  after  thirty-six  hours'  suffer- 
ing, overcome  by  thirst,  he  had  quitted  his 
asylum,  and  found  himself  face  to  face  with  a 
soldier  of  the  Walloon  guards,  who  was  on 
duty  as  sentry.  Offering  this  man  money, 

VOL.  II.— 59 


and  not  daring  to  add  to  his  offer  the  threat 
of  using  his  pistols,  all  he  gained  was  to  get 
himself  denounced,  and  he  was  instantly  de- 
livered up.  Fortunately  for  him,  the  mass  of 
the  populace  was  not  then  near  his  palace. 
Some  of  the  life-guards  coming  up  opportunely, 
placed  him  between  their  horses,  and  pro- 
ceeded as  fast  as  they  could  towards  the  quar- 
ters that  served  them  for  barracks.  They 
were  obliged  to  pass  through  all  Aranjuez, 
and  the  populace,  apprized  of  the  circum- 
stance, ran  up  in  the  twinkling  of  an  eye. 
The  prince  was  on  foot,  between  two  of  the 
guards  on  horseback,  leaning  upon  the  pom- 
mels of  their  saddles,  and  defended  by  them 
against  the  attacks  of  the  mob.  The  other 
guards,  in  front  and  rear,  did  their  best  to 
protect  him,  but  could  not  prevent  the  furious 
rabble  from  aiming  at  him  dangerous  blows 
with  stakes,  forks,  and  all  sorts  of  weapons 
snatched  up  in  haste.  With  his  feet  trampled 
by  the  horses,  with  a  large  wound  in  his  thigh, 
with  one  eye  almost  out  of  his  head,  he  arrived 
at  the  barracks  of  the  guards,  where  he  was 
thrown,  covered  with  blood,  upon  the  straw  in 
the  stables — melancholy  example  of  the  favour 
of  kings,  when  the  popular  fury  comes  to  re- 
venge itself  in  one  day  for  twenty  years'  un- 
merited omnipotence !  There  is  nothing  in 
history  more  lamentable  than  the  spectacle 
presented  at  that  moment  by  this  life-guards- 
man, returning,  after  sharing  the  royal  bed 
and  almost  the  throne,  to  the  barracks  and  to 
the  straw  on  which  he  had  lain  in  his  youth. 

The  king  and  the  queen,  on  hearing  of  this 
fresh  tumult,  sent  again  for  Ferdinand,  and 
besought  him  to  forget  his  injuries,  and  to  go 
and  rescue  the  unfortunate  Godoy.  He  pro- 
mised to  save  him,  and  accordingly  hastened 
to  the  quarters  of  the  life-guards,  which  an 
unruly  populace  threatened  to  storm,  dispersed 
it  by  the  assurance  that  the  culprit  should  be 
tried  by  the  council  of  Castille,  and  that  jus- 
tice should  be  done  upon  him  for  all  his  crimes. 
At  the  desire  of  the  heir  to  the  crown,  the  mob 
dispersed,  Ferdinand  went  to  Godoy,  whom  he 
found  bathed  in  blood,  and  told  him,  with  a 
feigned  generosity,  that  he  forgave  and  par- 
doned all  the  injuries  which  he  had  received 
from  him.  The  sight  of  an  abhorred  enemy 
restored  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  that  pre- 
sence of  mind  which  he  had  not  possessed  for 
a  moment  since  the  beginning  of  the  catas- 
trophe. "  Art  thou  king  already,"  said  he  to 
Ferdinand,  "to  grant  pardon?" — "No,"  re- 
plied the  prince,  "I  am  not;  but  I  shall  be 
soon." 

The  prince  returned  to  the  palace  to  tran- 
quillize his  parents,  who  were  left  in  a  state 
of  tribulation  difficult  to  be  described,  and 
ready,  in  order  to  save  themselves  and  their 
dear  Emmanuel,  to  make  every  possible  sacri- 
fice, even  that  of  the  throne.  "  What  would 
they  have  of  us,"  they  exclaimed,  "  to  induce 
them  to  spare  our  unfortunate  friend  ?  His 
dismissal?  We  have  pronounced  it.  His  being 
put  upon  his  trial  ?  We  are  going  to  pronounce 
it.  Would  they  have  the  crown  ?  We  will  lay 
that  down  too."  A  sort  of  aberration  of  mind 
had  seized  the  king  and  the  queen ;  they  knew 
not  what  they  said,  and  addressed  themselves 
to  every  one,  soliciting  either  support  or  ad- 
vice. With  a  view  to  make  them  easy  aboqt 


466 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[Marco,  1808. 


the  life  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  it  was  pro- 
posed to  send  him  under  a  proper  escort  to 
Grenada,  using  for  the  purpose  the  relays  with 
which  that  road  was  provided.  A  carriage 
drawn  by  six  mules  was  immedietely  brought 
in  front  of  the  barracks  of  the  life-guards,  that 
he  might  be  put  into  it  and  removed  from  so 
dangerous  a  place  of  abode  as  Aranjuez.  But 
no  sooner  were  these  preparations  perceived, 
than  the  populace,  surmising  for  what  object 
they  were  destined,  fell  upon  the  carriage, 
broke  it  in  pieces,  and  manifested  a  determi- 
nation to  prevent  any  departure. 

This  new  incident  completely  deranged  the 
heads  of  the  unfortunate  Charles  IV.  and  his 
wife.  They  both  believed  that  it  was  the 
French  revolution  recommencing  its  course  in 
Spain ;  that  it  was  not  to  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace  alone,  but  to  them  also,  that  ill-will  was 
borne ;  that  to  place  the  sceptre  in  the  hands 
of  Ferdinand  would  perhaps  be  the  best  means 
of  dispelling  this  rising  storm,  and  of  saving 
their  lives  and  that  of  their  unhappy  friend. 
This  they  said  to  all  those  who  were  around 
them,  to  M.  de  Caballero  and  M.  de  Cevallos, 
to  the  Duke  de  Castel  Franco,  commander  of 
the  troops  assembled  in  the  royal  residence,  in 
short,  to  different  persons  of  the  court;  and 
when  they  made  this  proposal,  all  present  sig- 
nified by  a  sorrowful  and  approving  silence, 
that  this  would  certainly  be  the  simplest,  the 
i/jfest,  the  most  applauded  solution,  the  solu- 
tion most  capable  of  stifling  in  its  birth  a  revo- 
lution as  appalling  as  the  commencement  of 
that  which  brought  the  head  of  Louis  XVI.  to 
the  block.  After  a  few  moments  of  these  vague 
parleys,  of  this  consultation  of  distracted  per- 
i.ons,  Charles  IV.  said  that  he  would  abdicate : 
his  ambitious  wife  replied  that  he  was  right ; 
and,  without  a  single  voice  being  raised  in 
contradiction,  his  ministers  offered  to  draw  up 
the  act  of  abdication. 

This  act  was  instantly  prepared,  and  pub- 
lished immediately,  amidst  a  joy  which  had  no 
parallel.  Charles  IV.  therein  declared  that, 
weary  of  the  fatigues  of  the  throne,  bowed  by 
the  weight  of  years  and  infirmities,  he  resigned 
to  his  son  Ferdinand  the  crown  which  he  had 
worn  for  twenty  years. 

The  news  of  this  abdication  produced  a  sort 
of  intoxication  at  Aranjuez.  The  people 
thronged  to  salute  the  young  king,  who  had  so 
long  been  the  object  of  their  wishes,  and  loaded 
him  with  a  thousand  benedictions.  The  court, 
outstripping  the  people,  had  forsaken  the  old 
sovereigns,  as  it  forsakes  their  bodies  when 
they  are  dead.  They  were  left  by  themselves, 
somewhat  less  uneasy,  but  deeply  dejected  at 


their  fall ;  and  those  who  left  them  hastened 
around  Ferdinand  to  assure  this  new  master 
that  it  was  he,  he  alone,  whom  they  had  had 
in  their  hearts  for  years  past,  when  bowing 
their  heads  before  his  mother  and  the  favour- 
ite. Ferdinand,  whom  Nature  had  formed  for 
dissimulation,  and  whom  the  unhappiness  of 
his  youth  had  further  perfected  in  that  odious 
art,  appeared  pleased  with  everybody,  and  was 
pleased  enough  with  Fortune  to  seem  so  with 
men.  He  retained  provisionally  his  father's 
ministers,  whom  he  could  not  change  imme- 
diately, and  instantly  ordered  them,  for  their 
first  commission,  to  send  for  the  Duke  de  1'In- 
fantado,  exiled  to  the  distance  of  sixty  leagues 
from  Madrid,  and  the  canon  Escoiquiz,  shut  up 
in  the  convent  of  Tardon.  He  immediately  ap- 
pointed the  Duke  de  1'Infantado  captain  of  his 
guards  and  president  of  the  council  of  Castille. 
Thus,  one  favour  extorted,  another  favour  be- 
got ;  but  this  latter  was  destined  to  last  for  a 
few  days  only.  The  formidable  Napoleon  ap- 
proached. His  troops  were  at  that  moment 
descending  from  the  heights  of  Somosierra  upon 
Buitrago,  and  were  but  one  good  march  from 
Madrid.  Ferdinand's  temporary  ministers  ad- 
vised him  to  commence  his  reign  by  advances 
towards  the  Emperor  of  the  French.  The 
Duke  del  Parque  was  sent  to  Murat,  to  irrange 
with  that  prince  respecting  the  entry  of  the 
French  into  Madrid.  The  Dukes  de  Medina- 
Cell  and  De  Frias,  and  Count  Fernan-Nunez, 
were  sent  to  Napoleon,  who  was  supposed  to  be 
on  the  way  to  Spain,  to  swear  friendship  to 
him,  and  to  renew  the  application  for  a  French 
princess.  This  done  at  the  close  of  this  very 
first  day,  Ferdinand  fell  asleep,  believing  him- 
self to  be  a  king.  He  was  destined  to  become 
such,  but  not  till  after  long  years  of  captivity, 
and  a  terrible  war. 

Thus  fell  the  last  Bourbons,  to  re-appear  well 
or  ill,  gloriously  or  scurvily,  a  few  years  later: 
they  fell  at  Paris  as  at  Aranjuez,  as  at  Naples, 
beneath  the  French  revolution  which  drove 
them  before  it,  like  the  vengeful  Furies  pursu- 
ing guilty  spirits.  At  Paris,  this  revolution 
had  struck  off  the  head  of  one  Boui-bon.  At 
Naples,  it  had  thrown  another  into  the  sea,  and 
obliged  him  to  take  refuge  in  Sicily.  At  Aran- 
juez, it  forced  the  last  to  abdicate,  in  order  to 
save  the  life  of  an  ignoble  favourite,  and  made 
use  not  of  a  people  smitten  with  liberty,  but 
of  a  people  smitten  with  royalty,  differing 
therefore  in  its  modes  of  acting,  like  the  places 
into  which  it  penetrated,  but  always  terrible 
and  regenerating,  though  fortunately  less  cruel, 
for  it  now  dethroned  without  killing  kings. 


March,  1808-1 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


467 


BOOK  XXX. 


BAYONNE. 


Disturbances  at  Madrid  on  the  news  of  the  events  at  Aranjuez — Murat  hastens  his  arrival — On  approaching  Madrid 
he  receives  a  message  from  the  Queen  of  Etruria — He  sends  M.  de  Monthyon  to  her — The  latter  finds  the  royal 
family  in  deep  affliction  and  full  of  regret  for  having  abdicated — Murat,  on  the  return  of  M.  de  Monthyon,  suggests 
to  Charles  IT.  the  idea  of  protesting  against  an  abdication  which  was  not  free,  and  defers  acknowledging  Ferdi- 
nand VII. — Entry  of  the  French  into  Madrid  on  the  23d  of  March — Secret  protest  of  Charles  IV. — Ferdinand  VIL 
hastens  to  Madrid  to  take  possession  of  the  crown — Displeasure  of  Murat  at  the  entry  of  Ferdinand — M.  de  Beau- 
harnais  advises  Ferdinand  to  go  to  meet  the  Emperor  of  the  French — Effect  of  the  news  from  Spain  on  the  resolu- 
tions of  Napoleon — New  course  adopted  by  him  on  hearing  of  the  revolution  at  Aranjuez — He  conceives  at  Paris  the 
same  plan  as  Murat  at  Madrid,  that  of  not  acknowledging  Ferdinand,  and  of  making  Charles  IV.  resign  the  crown 
to  him — Mission  of  General  Savary  to  Madrid — Return  of  M.  de  Tournon  to  Paris — Momentary  doubt  which  arises 
in  the  mind  of  Napoleon — Singular  despatch  of  the  29th,  which  contradicts  all  that  he  had  thought  and  wished — 
News  from  Madrid,  arrived  on  the  30th,  induces  Napoleon  to  return  to  his  former  projects — He  approves  of  Marat's 
conduct,  and  the  removal  of  the  whole  family  of  Spain  to  Bayonne — He  sets  out  for  Bordeaux — Murat,  with  Napo- 
leon's sanction,  assists  General  Savary  in  the  execution  of  the  arranged  plan — Ferdinand  VII,  having  brought  to- 
gether at  Madrid  his  confidants,  the  Due  de  1'Infantado  and  the  canon  Escoiquiz,  deliberates  on  the  conduct  to  be 
pursued  towards  the  French — Motives  which  induce  him  to  have  an  interview  with  Napoleon — A  meeting  with 
General  Savary  confirms  his  decision — He  resolves  on  his  departure,  and  leaves  his  uncle,  Don  Antonio,  at  the  head 
of  a  regency  at  Madrid — Sentiments  of  the  Spaniards  on  seeing  him  depart — The  aged  sovereigns,  on  hearing  that 
he  is  going  to  Napoleon,  wish  to  follow  his  example,  in  order  to  plead  their  cause  in  person — Joy  and  foolish  hopes 
of  Murat  on  seeing  the  Spanish  princes  give  themselves  up — Spirit  of  the  Spanish  people — Their  feelings  towards 
our  troops — Conduct  and  position  of  Murat  at  Madrid — Ferdinand  VII.'s  journey  from  Madrid  to  Burgos,  and  from 
Burgos  to  Vittoria — His  stay  at  Vittoria — His  motives  for  stopping  in  that  town — Savary  leaves  him,  in  order  to 
receive  fresh  instructions — Establishment  of  Napoleon  at  Bayonne — His  letter  to  Ferdinand  VII.,  and  orders  given 
concerning  him — Ferdinand  VII.  at  length  decides  on  going  to  Bayonne — His  arrival  there — His  reception  by  Napo- 
leon— First  mention  of  what  is  required  of  him — Napoleon  openly  declares  his  intention  to  take  possession  of  the 
crown  of  Spain,  and  offers  him,  in  compensation,  that  of  Etruria — Resistance  and  illusions  of  Ferdinand  VII. — • 
Napoleon,  to  put  an  end  to  the  affair,  awaits  the  arrival  of  Charles  IV,  who  insisted  on  coming  to  Bayonne — De- 
parture of  the  aged  sovereigns — Deliverance  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace — Meeting  at  Bayonne  of  all  the  Spanish 
princes — Napoleon's  reception  of  Charles  IV. — He  receives  him  as  king — Ferdinand  resumes  the  rank  of  Prince  of 
the  Asturias — Agreement  of  Napoleon  with  Charles  IV.  to  insure  him  a  retreat  in  France  on  his  giving  up  the  crown 
of  Spain — Resistance  of  Ferdinand  VII. — Napoleon  is  ready  to  finish  by  an  act  of  arbitrary  power,  when  the  events 
at  Madrid  bring  matters  to  the  desired  conclusion — Insurrection  of  the  2d  of  May  at  Madrid — Energetic  measures 
taken  by  Murat — Counter-movement  at  Bayonne — Emotion  of  Charles  IV.  on  hearing  of  the  2d  of  May — Violent 
scene  between  father,  mother,  and  son — Terror  and  resignation  of  Ferdinand  VII. — Treaty  for  the  cession  of  the 
Spanish  crown  to  Napoleon — Departure  of  Charles  IV.  for  Compiegne  and  of  Ferdinand  VII.  for  Valencay — Napo- 
leon destines  the  crown  of  Spain  for  Joseph,  and  that  of  Naples  for  Murat — Sorrow  and  rage  of  Murat  on  hearing 
Napoleon's  resolutions — He  takes  no  less  trouble  to  obtain  from  the  Spanish  authorities  an  expression  of  their  wishes 
in  favour  of  Joseph — Equivocal  declaration  of  the  Junta  and  Council  of  Castille.  expressing  a  conditional  vote  for 
Joseph — Dissatisfaction  of  Napoleon  with  Murat — Whilst  waiting  for  Joseph's  answer,  in  order  to  proclaim  the  new 
dynasty,  Napoleon  attempts  to  repair  the  violence  used  towards  Spain,  by  an  extraordinary  use  of  his  resources — 
Monetary  aid  to  Spain — Division  of  the  army,  so  as  to  defend  the  coasts  and  prevent  any  resistance — Vast  maritime 
projects — Arrival  of  Joseph  at  Bayonne — He  is  proclaimed  King  of  Spain — Junta  convoked  at  Bayonne — Its  delibe- 
rations— Spanish  Constitution — Acceptance  of  it,  and  acknowledgment  of  Joseph  by  the  Junta — Conclusion  of  affairs 
at  Bayonne,  and  departure  of  Joseph  for  Madrid,  of  Napoleon  for  Paris. 


THE  fall  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  had  al- 
ready produced  a  sort  of  ferocious  joy  among 
the  people  of  Madrid.  The  news  of  the  abdi- 
cation of  Charles  IV.,  and  of  the  accession  of 
Ferdinand  VII. ,  crowned  it.  In  the  eyes  of  the 
multitude  no  joy  is  complete  without  a  riot.  It 
was  known  that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  had 
stopped  at  Aranjuez :  an  assault  was  made  upon 
his  family  and  upon  the  persons  who  enjoyed 
his  confidence.  Their  houses  were  ravaged, 
and  their  persons  pursued  ;  but,  thanks  to  the 
courage  of  M.  de  Beauharnais,  not  one  of  them 
fell  into  the  hands  of  the  mob.  Immediately 
on  the  abdication  of  Charles  IV.,  the  latter  re- 
turned to  Madrid  in  time  to  offer  an  asylum  to 
the  family  of  Godoy.  His  mother,  the  brother 
of 'Emmanuel,  and  his  sisters,  married  to  some 
of  the  highest  nobility  in  Spain,  passed  a  fright- 
ful night  under  the  roofs  of  their  palaces.  M. 
de  Beauharnais  offered  them  an  asylum  in  the 
hotel  of  the  embassy,  where  they  would  be  pro- 
tected by  the  fear  inspired  by  the  French  arms — 
for  Murat  was  then  only  on  his  march  to  Madrid. 
The  plundering  and  burning  were  continued 
during  the  whole  of  the  20th,  which  was  Sunday, 
and  the  mob  was  not  obstructed  by  any  public 
force.  There  were  two  Swiss  regiments  at  Ma- 
drid (those  of  De  Preux  and  Reding;)  but  these 
foreign  soldiers,  still  worse  circumstanced  than 
others  in  a  case  of  popular  agitation,  did  not 
dare  to  show  themselves,  and  took  no  means  of 


stopping  the  disorder.  A  kind  of  fatigue,  the 
assembling  of  a  few  citizens  who  had  taken  up 
arms  of  their  own  accord,  and  a  proclamation 
of  Ferdinand's — who  did  not  wish  to  dishonour 
his  new  reign  by  any  gross  excesses — put  an 
end  to  their  abominable  conduct.  Madrid  was 
full  of  joy  at  seeing  the  end  of  a  hateful  reign 
and  the  commencement  of  a  new  one,  so  ardently 
desired.  In  their  satisfied  minds  scarcely  did 
there  remain  room  for  disquiet  on  learning  that 
the  French  were  approaching  the  capital.  After 
having  hoped  that  they  would  overthrow  the 
favourite,  the  Spanish  people  now  flattered 
themselves  that  they  were  about  to  recognise 
Ferdinand  VII. ;  and,  whatever  might  be  the 
case,  the  people,  elated  at  what  they  had  just 
done,  and  proud  of  having  themselves  conquered 
the  dreaded  favourite,  assumed  an  immense 
confidence  in  themselves,  and  seemed  no  longer 
to  fear  any  one.  In  the  simplicity  of  their  joy, 
they  believed  only  what  pleased  themselves,  and 
in  their  eyes  the  French  were  nothing  more 
than  auxiliaries  come  to  inaugurate  the  reign 
of  Ferdinand  VII.  With  such  a  disposition 
of  mind  our  troops  were  sure  of  being  well 
received. 

A  great  part  of  the  troops  had  already  passed 
the  Guadarrama.  On  the  20th,  the  two  first 
divisions  of  Marshal  Moncey's  corps  were  be- 
tween Cavanillas  and  Buitrago,  and  the  thinl 
at  Some-Sierra.  On  the  same  day  the  first  di 


468 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[March,  1808. 


vision  of  General  Dupont  was  at  Guadarrama, 
ready  to  descend  upon  the  Escurial ;  the  second 
of  the  same  corps  was  at  Segovia,  the  third  at 
Valladolid.  Thus,  Murat  was  in  a  condition 
to  enter  Madrid,  in  twenty-four  hours,  with  two 
divisions  of  Marshal  Moncey,  one  of  General 
Dupont,  the  whole  of  the  cavalry  and  the 
guards ;  that  is,  with  30,000  men.  But  there 
only  remained  in  that  capital  two  Swiss  regi- 
ments, completely  discouraged,  and  a  people 
without  arms.  Murat  had  consequently  no  re- 
sistance to  fear. 

He  was  deeply  troubled  by  the  disorders  in 
the  capital,  and  was  afraid  that  in  Europe  the 
French  would  be  accused  of  having  desired  to 
throw  Spain  into  utter  confusion  in  order  to 
seize  upon  it  more  easily.  He  was  also  wholly 
ignorant  whether  this  unforeseen  situation  was 
that  which  Napoleon  most  desired,  and  that 
especially,  which  would  lead  most  surely  to  a 
vacancy  on  the  throne  of  Spain.  Humanity, 
obedience,  and  ambition  caused  a  most  painful 
conflict  in  his  mind.  In  this  state  of  mind  he 
wrote  to  Napoleon  to  make  him  acquainted  with 
what  he  had  just  learned,  to  complain  anew  of 
not  having  been  admitted  into  his  secrets,  to 
express  the  pain  which  the  events  in  Madrid 
had  caused  him,  and  to  announce  to  him  that 
he  was  just  about  to  enter  that  capital,  in  order, 
at  all  costs,  to  repress  the  excesses  of  a  bar- 
barous populace.  At  the  same  time  he  put  his 
columns  in  motion,  and  advanced  to  lead  Mar- 
shal Moncey's  troops  to  San  Agostino,  and  those 
of  General  Dupont  to  the  Escurial. 

On  the  next  day,  the  21st,  being  in  person  at 
El  Molar,  he  received  a  courier  in  disguise,  who 
was  the  bearer  of  a  letter  from  the  Queen  of 
Etruria.  That  princess,  whom  he  had  known 
in  Italy,  and  to  whom  he  was  bound  by  friend- 
ship, appealed  to  his  heart  in  the  name  of  an 
august  and  deeply  unfortunate  family.  She 
informed  him  that  her  aged  parents  were 
threatened  with  the  greatest  danger,  to  guard 
against  which  they  had  recourse  to  his  generous 
protection.  She  entreated  him  to  come  himself, 
and  secretly,  to  Aranjuez,  to  witness  their  de- 
plorable situation,  and  to  devise  some  means  to 
extricate  them  from  it. 

This  deeply  afflicted  young  woman,  but  little 
versed  in  the  knowledge  of  business,  although 
she  had  more  talent  than  her  deceased  husband, 
supposed  that  a  commander-in-chief  represent- 
ing Napoleon,  and  at  the  head  of  a  French  army 
at  the  gates  of  one  of  the  largest  capitals  in 
Europe,  could  secretly  withdraw  for  a  day  or 
two  from  head-quarters,  as  he  may  have  done 
perhaps  at  Florence,  in  a  time  of  peace,  and 
when  he  was  more  occupied  with  pleasure  than 
with  war  or  negotiations.  Murat  replied,  with 
great  courtesy,  "that  he  was  fully  sensible  of 
the  misfortunes  of  the  royal  family  of  Spain, 
but  that  it  was  impossible  for  him  to  leave  his 
head  quarters  where  he  was  detained  by  impe- 
rative duties :  but  that  he  would  send  in  his 
stead  M.  de  Monthyon,  one  of  his  officers,  a 
man  thoroughly  to  be  relied  on,  to  whom  she 
might  say  freely  all  that  she  would  have  con- 
fided to  him.1 

M.  de  Monthyon  set  out  from  El  Molar  on  the 

«  I  make  no  supposition  here.  I  write  after  the  originals 
deposited  in  the  Louvre,  a  small  number  of  which,  with 
rery  considerable  alterations,  were  published  in  the  Mr* 
mteuf.  Murat's  correspondence  with  Napoleon,  tho  most 


21st,  reached  Aranjuez  on  the  22d,  and  found 
the  family  of  the  aged  sovereigns  in  the  great- 
est distress.  In  a  fit  of  fear,  Charles  IV.  and 
his  queen  had  been  led  to  divest  themselves  of 
the  supreme  authority.  The  queen,  who  was 
the  principal  author  of  all  the  determinations 
of  the  court,  had  been  led  to  this  abdication  by 
her  desire  to  save  the  life  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  and  to  release  herself  and  her  husband 
from  dangers  which  she  had  greatly  exagge- 
rated. But  when  the  first  moment  was  past, 
the  silence  and  solitude  succeeding  popular  tu- 
mult, new  dangers  threatening  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  whose  trial  had  been  ordered  by  Ferdi- 
nand VII.,  she  was  seized  with  a  double  vexa- 
tion, at  seeing  herself  fallen,  and  of  not  know- 
ing the  object  of  her  criminal  affections  to  be 
in  safety.  And  as  the  emotions  of  her  mind 
were  reproduced  immediately  in  the  mind  of 
her  feeble  husband,  she  had  filled  him  with  the 
same  regret  and  the  same  vexation.  To  increase 
the  misfortune,  it  was  just  notified  to  them  in 
the  name  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  that  it  was  neces- 
sary for  them  to  go  to  Badajoz,  at  the  extremity 
of  Estremadura,  far  from  the  protection  of  the 
French,  in  order  to  live  there  in  seclusion, 
misery  perhaps,  whilst  a  hated  son  reigned, 
avenged  himself,  and  probably  would  sacrifice 
the  unfortunate  Godoy  !  With  such  a  prospect 
in  view,  their  fall  had  become  more  cruel,  and 
the  young  Queen  of  Etruria,  whom  this  exile 
afflicted  in  proportion  to  her  age,  added  to  all 
the  vexations  of  the  royal  family  her  own  de- 
spair. Connected  with  Murat,  deriving  succour 
from  her  relation  with  him,  she  had  been  em- 
ployed to  invoke  the  protection  of  the  French 
army. 

Such  was  the  situation  in  which  M.  de  Mon- 
thyon found  this  unfortunate  family :  he  was 
surrounded,  assailed  with  prayers  and  the  most 
earnest  entreaties  by  the  aged  king,  the  aged 
queen,  and  the  young  Queen  of  Etruria ;  they 
related  to  him  the  sufferings  of  the  days  just 
past,  the  violence  to  which  they  had  been  sub- 
jected, and  that  to  which,  perhaps,  they  were 
about  to  be  subjected  again;  the  injunction  that 
had  been  received  to  set  out  for  Badajoz,  and 
above  all,  the  dangers  that  threatened  Emma- 
nuel Godoy.  They  spoke  of  the  latter  still 
more  than  of  the  royal  family  itself;  they 
earnestly  begged  for  him  the  protection  of 
France,  offering  to  refer  all  that  had  happened 
to  the  decision  of  Murat,  to  make  him  the  ar- 
biter of  the  destinies  of  Spain,  and  finally,  to 
submit  to  every  thing  which  he  should  order. 

M.  de  Monthyon  immediately  set  out  again, 
to  rejoin  Murat,  who,  during  the  22d,  had  drawn 
nearer  to  Madrid,  in  order  to  enter  the  city  on 
the  23d,  the  day  almost  indicated  beforehand 
in  the  instructions  of  Napoleon.  He  commu- 
nicated to  him  what  he  had  seen  and  heard  in 
his  interview  with  the  aged  sovereigns,  their 
bitter  regret  and  their  desire  to  submit  the  late 
events  in  Spain  to  Napoleon.  Murat,  on  hear- 
ing this  recital,  was  seized  with  a  kind  of  sud- 
den illumination.  He  was  not  in  the  secrets 
of  the  policy  of  which  he  was  the  instrument ; 
but  he  had  sometimes  supposed  that  Napoleon 
wished,  by  frightening  Charles  IV.,  to  induce 


important  of  all  which  relates  to  the  affairs  of  Spain,  h&8 
never  been  published.  Some  fragments  of  that  of  M.  do 
Monthyon  were  inserted  in  the  Ifoniteur,  but  greatly  al- 
tered. My  narrative  follows  the  autograph  originals. 


March,  1805.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


469 


him  to  flee,  and  <o  procure  for  himself  the  crown 
of  Spain  as  well  as  that  of  Portugal,  by  the 
desertion  of  their  possessors.  This  plan  being 
defeated  by  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez,  Murat 
thought  it  was  necessary  to  make  a  completely 
new  one,  to  spring  from  the  circumstances  them- 
selves. In  consequence,  he  formed  the  idea  of 
changing  the  regret  which  the  old  sovereigns 
exhibited  at  their  fall  into  a  formal  protest 
against  the  abdication  of  the  19th  ;  and,  after 
having  obtained  their  signature  to  such  a  pro- 
test, and  having  it  confided  to  his  hands,  to  re- 
fuse the  recognition  of  Ferdinand  VII. ;  this  he 
was  very  naturally  able  to  do,  for  it  was  impos- 
sible to  recognise  Ferdinand  VII.,  who  had 
come  to  the  throne  in  such  a  manner,  without 
first  having  referred  to  the  authority  of  Napo- 
leon. The  result  of  this  combination  would  be 
to  leave  Spain  without  a  sovereign ;  for  the  old 
king,  fallen  in  fact,  would  not  resume  the  throne 
by  protesting,  and  thanks  to  this  protest,  the 
royal  authority  of  Ferdinand  VII.  would  remain 
in  suspense.  Between  a  king  who  was  no  longer 
king,  who  could  no  longer  be  so,  and  a  king 
who  was  not  so  yet,  who  could  never  be  so,  if 
it  was  not  wished  that  he  should,  Spain  was 
about  to  be  without  any  other  master  than  the 
general  commanding  the  French  army.  Fortune 
thus  restored  the  means  which  she  had  taken 
away  by  preventing  the  departure  of  Charles  IV. 

Murat's  mind,  sharpened  by  ambition,  had 
just  found  out  all  that  the  genius  of  Napoleon, 
in  the  exercise  of  its  deepest  cunning,  devised 
some  days  later,  on  the  news  of  the  recent 
events.  Without  losing  a  moment,  and  with  all 
the  vivacity  of  his  desires,  be  caused  M.  de 
Monthyon  to  set  out  again  for  Aranjuez,  giving 
him  orders  immediately  to  revisit  the  royal 
family,  and,  since  they  declared  that  they  had 
been  constrained,  to  propose  to  them  to  protest 
against  the  abdication  of  the  19th,  to  protest 
secretly  if  they  dared  not  do  it  publicly,  and  to 
enclose  this  protest  in  a  letter  to  the  Emperor, 
who  would  not  fail  to  arrive  in  a  few  days  in 
Spain,  and  who  would  thus  be  constituted  ar- 
biter of  the  hateful  usurpation  committed  by 
the  son  to  the  injury  of  the  father.  Murat 
promised  to  gain  Napoleon's  favour  for  the 
cause  of  the  old  sovereigns,  and  in  the  mean 
time  to  protect  not  only  them,  but  the  unfortu- 
nate Godoy,  who  had  become  the  prisoner  of 
Ferdinand  VII. 

M.  de  Monthyon  set  out  again  for  Aranjuez, 
and  Murat  hastened  to  write  to  the  Emperor,  in 
order  to  inform  him  of  what  had  taken  place, 
and  to  submit  to  him  the  combination  which  he 
had  devised.  Having  arrived  on  the  evening 
of  the  22d  at  Chamartin,  on  the  very  heights 
which  command  Madrid,  he  prepared  to  make 
his  entry  on  the  next  day.  He  had  just  re- 
ceived the  Duke  del  Parque,  the  envoy  of  Fer- 
dinand VII.,  commissioned  to  compliment  him 
in  the  name  of  the  new  king  of  Spain,  to  offer 
him  entrance  into  Madrid,  provisions  and  quar- 
ters for  the  army,  and  an  assurance  of  the 
friendly  intentions  of  the  young  court  towards 
France.  Murat  gave  the  Duke  del  Parque  a 
very  gracious  reception,  through  which  however 
appeared  something  of  that  presumption  which 
•was  natural  to  him ;  and,  while  accepting  the 
assurances  of  which  he  was  commissioned  to 
be  the  bearer,  expressed  to  him  with  sufficient 
clearness,  that  the  Emperor  alone  could  recog- 


nise Ferdinand  VII.,  and  legalize,  in  the  name 
of  the  rights  of  nations,  the  revolutions  of 
Aranjuez.  He  declared  to  him,  that,  whilst 
awaiting  the  imperial  decision,  he  could  only 
look  upon  the  new  government  as  a  govern- 
ment de  facto,  and  give  to  Ferdinand  no  other 
title  except  that  of  Prince  of  the  Asturias. 
This  kind  of  relation  was  accepted,  since  Na- 
poleon's lieutenant  would  admit  of  none  other, 
and  every  thing  was  arranged  for  the  entry  of 
the  French  into  Madrid  on  the  next  day,  the 
23d  of  March,  1808. 

The  leaders  of  the  new  court,  though  not  very 
wise,  nevertheless  perceived  the  necessity  of 
preventing  any  collision  with  the  French  ;  for 
their  assumption  of  royalty — the  offspring  of 
a  mere  revolution  in  the  palace — might  have 
been  put  an  end  to  by  a  regiment  of  cavalry. 
In  consequence,  they  issued  orders  to  the  peo- 
ple of  Madrid  to  give  a  good  reception  to  the 
French,  and  posted  up  a  proclamation  on  the 
corners  of  all  the  streets,  in  which  Ferdinand 
VII.  appealed  to  those  feelings  of  good-will 
which  ought  to  influence  one  towards  another 
nation  so  long  and  closely  allied.  The  Spa- 
niards comprehending  this  policy  as  well  as  their 
young  king,  and  drawn,  moreover,  by  curiosity, 
were  then  perfectly  well-disposed  to  run  forth 
to  meet  Murat,  and  to  lavish  their  acclamations 
upon  him. 

On  the  morning  of  the  23d,  Murat  waited  on 
the  heights  situated  behind  Madrid,  which  are 
merely  the  last  declivities  of  the  Guadarrama, 
with  a  part  of  his  army,  which  consisted  at 
this  moment  of  the  first  two  divisions  of  Mar- 
shal Moncey,  the  cavalry  of  the  whole  corps, 
and  those  detachments  of  the  imperial  guard 
which  had  been  sent  from  Paris  to  form  Napo- 
leon's escort.  He  made  his  entry  in  the  mid- 
dle of  the  day,  at  the  head  of  a  brilliant  staff, 
and  delighted  all  the  Spaniards  by  his  noble 
mien,  and  his  trusting  and  gracious  smile.  The 
imperial  guard  made  a  singular  impression  upon 
the  Spaniards ;  and  the  cuirassiers,  by  their 
great  size,  their  accoutrements,  and  their  disci- 
pline, were  no  less  imposing.  The  infantry  of 
Marshal  Moncey,  however,  consisting  for  the 
most  part  of  boys  badly  clothed,  and  worn  out 
with  fatigue,  excited  more  pity  than  fear,  which 
was  unlucky  amongst  a  people  whose  senses  it 
was  more  necessary  to  affect  than  their  reason. 
Nevertheless  the  whole  of  this  military  specta- 
cle produced  a  certain  effect  on  the  imagination 
of  the  Spaniards ;  and  they  highly  applauded 
both  the  French  and  their  chiefs. 

By  a  piece  of  involuntary  negligence,  rather 
than  any  want  of  respect,  which  no  one  in- 
tended to  show,  the  arrangement  of  a  proper 
lodging  for  the  commander-in-chief  of  the 
French  army  had  been  omitted.  At  the  gates 
of  Madrid,  Murat  alighted  at  the  abandoned 
palace  of  Buen-Retiro,  and  occupied  the  apart- 
ments which  had  been  inhabited  by  the  demoi- 
selles Tudo  before  their  departure.  He  was 
offended  by  this  want  of  attention.  But  he 
was  immediately  offered  the  former  dwelling 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  situated  near  the 
magnificent  palace  of  the  royal  family  of  Spain 
The  authorities  civil  and  military,  the  clergy, 
and  the  diplomatic  body  came  to  visit  him.  He 
received  them  with  grace  and  dignity  almost  like 
a  sovereign — although  he  had  no  other  title  than 
that  of  commander-in-chief  of  the  French  army. 
2R 


470 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[March,  180* 


Whilst  he  was  entering  Madrid,  he  was  in- 
formed that  the  people  were  about  to  bring 
thitLer,  as  a  prisoner,  loaded  with  chains,  and 
under  the  safe  conduct  of  the  life-guards,  the 
unfortunate  Godoy,  whose  trial  they  were  eager 
to  have  the  pleasure  of  seeing  immediately  com- 
menced. Murat,  both  from  generosity  and  cal- 
culation, in  order  to  spare  the  feelings  of  the 
former  court,  now  called  to  become  the  instru- 
ment of  new  combinations,  was  resolved  not  to 
tolerate  any  act  of  cruelty  towards  the  fallen 
favourite.  Fearing  lest  the  presence  of  Godoy, 
who  was  an  object  of  such  hatred  to  the  mul- 
titude, might  provoke  a  popular  tumult,  and 
especially  at  the  moment  of  the  entrance  of  the 
French  troops,  he  sent  one  of  his  officers  with 
a  clear  and  simple  order  to  put  off  the  removal 
of  the  prisoner,  and  to  detain  him  in  a  village 
close  to  Madrid.  This  order  found  and  fixed 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  in  the  village  of  Pinto, 
•where  he  was  detained  some  days.  Murat  im- 
mediately ordered  a  detachment  of  cavalry  to 
proceed  to  Aranjuez,  in  order  to  protect  the  old 
sovereigns,  to  oppose  their  being  removed  to 
Badajoz,  and  to  give  them  courage  to  follow  his 
counsels,  by  giving  them  security.  At  the  same 
time  he  announced,  that  neither  he  nor  his  mas- 
ter would  allow  the  severities  which  were  in 
preparation  against  Emmanuel  Godoy. 

M.  de  Monthyon  had  found  the  family  of  the 
old  sovereigns  still  more  afflicted  than  on  his 
first  visit,  still  more  alarmed  for  the  fate  of  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  still  more  pained  by  the 
solitude  in  which  they  were  left,  still  more  irri- 
tated at  the  triumph  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  and, 
consequently,  still  more  disposed  to  throw  them- 
selves into  the  arms  of  France.  The  idea  of  a 
protest,  calculated  to  lead  to  the  recovery  of 
their  power,  or  to  enable  them  to  avenge  them- 
selves, and  at  the  same  time  quite  in  confor- 
mity with  facts,  could  not  be  otherwise  than 
received  with  delight.  It  was  so,  and  imme- 
diately thereupon  Charles  IV.  showed  himself 
ready  to  sign  it.  The  wording,  however,  which 
Murat  proposed,  was  not  that  which  seemed 
quite  suitable  to  the  old  sovereigns,  although 
they  were  not  difficult  to  please,  and  bad  judges, 
in  fact,  of  the  suitable  phraseology.  They 
were  afraid  that  such  a  step,  if  it  was  known, 
might  place  their  own  lives  and  that  of  the 
favourite  in  jeopardy.  They  therefore  asked 
a  few  hours,  in  order  to  consider  the  form  which 
might  appear  to  be  the  best,  engaging,  how- 
ever, to  do  as  might  be  desired,  and  to  date 
the  protest  from  the  day  which  would  most  pro- 
perly correspond  with  the  entire  freedom  of 
their  appeal  to  the  justice  of  Napoleon.  M.  dc 
Monthyon  was  sent  back  to  Murat  with  all  these 
assurances,  and  a  new  appeal  to  the  protection 
of  the  French  army. 

Murat,  certain  of  being  able  to  dispose  of 
the  old  sovereigns  according  to  his  wishes,  for 
the  success  of  plans  of  which  he  was  the  author, 
resolved  to  act  equally  upon  Ferdinand  VII., 
in  order  to  induce  him  not  yet  to  take  the  crown, 
not  to  perform  any  act  of  sovereignty  to  the 
'atest  time  he  could,  and  especially  not  to  make 
his  solemn  entry  into  Madrid.  Murat  thought, 
as  long  as  Ferdinand  VII.  should  not  be  king, 
nnd  Charles  IV.  not  being  really  so,  things 
would  go  better  in  the  sense  of  his  own  hopes. 
He  desired,  moreover,  to  obtain  another  deter- 
mination from  Ferdinand  VII.,  which  appeared 


to  him  urgent.  When  the  notion  of  a  journey 
to  Andalusia  was  in  contemplation,  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace  had  given  orders  to  the  Spanish 
troops  to  repass  the  frontiers  of  Portugal,  Ta- 
ranco's  division  to  go  to  Old  Castille,  and  So- 
lano's  to  Estramadura.  The  latter,  having 
already  reached  Talavera,  was  approaching 
Madrid,  and  might  occasion  a  collision,  which 
was  contrary  to  Murat's  views,  who  understood 
very  well  that  the  affairs  of  Spain  were  to  be 
managed  by  address,  and  not  by  force.  In 
order,  however,  to  make  the  Spanish  troops 
retrace  their  steps,  it  was  necessary  to  procure 
an  order  from  Ferdinand  himself. 

For  this  purpose,  Murat  sent  for  M.  de  Beau- 
harnais,  whom  he  very  much  distrusted,  be- 
cause he  knew  that  the  latter  was  attached  to 
Ferdinand  VII.,  and  to  whom  he  imputed  a 
greater  degree  of  finesse  than  this  honourable 
though  unskilful  ambassador  was  capable  of 
employing  in  any  political  plot.  He  persuaded 
him  to  go  immediately  to  Aranjuez,  and,  by 
using  his  influence  over  Ferdinand  VII.,  to  ob- 
tain from  him  the  decision  which  the  circum- 
stances required.  Murat  began  by  frightening 
him  with  respect  to  the  manner  in  which  he  had 
so  completely  misunderstood  the  intentions  of 
Napoleon,  by  contributing  to  prevent  the  jour- 
ney to  Andalusia  (right  or  wrong,  this  was,  in 
fact,  imputed  to  M.  de  Beauharnais.)  In  order 
to  disquiet  him  still  more,  Murat  affirmed  to 
him  what  he  really  did  not  know,  that  Napoleon 
would  have  wished  a  renewal  of  the  scenes  of 
Lisbon.  He  then  suggested  to  him,  as  a  cer- 
tain means  of  repairing  his  fault,  the  idea  of 
betaking  himself  immediately  to  Aranjuez,  in 
order  to  obtain  a  command  from  Ferdinand 
VII.  to  make  the  Spanish  troops  retrace  their 
steps,  and  not  come  to  Madrid ;  and,  moreover, 
that  he  should  leave  the  question  of  his  sove- 
reignty in  suspense,  till  Napoleon's  decision. 
M.  de  Beauharnais,  yielding  to  his  advice,  set 
out  the  same  hour  for  Aranjuez,  in  order  to  ac- 
complish, if  not  the  whole,  at  least  a  part  of 
what  Murat  desired. 

Having  reached  the  presence  of  Ferdinand, 
he  first  asked,  with  his  usual  positiveness,  for 
an  order  for  sending  back  the  Spanish  troops 
into  their  former  positions.  Ferdinand  had  not 
yet  by  his  side  his  two  chief  advisers,  the  canon 
Escoiquiz  and  the  Due  de  1'Infantado,  who  had 
been  in  exile  too  far  from  Madrid  to  have  had 
time  to  return.  He  had  retained  some  of  his 
father's  ministers,  especially  MM.  de  Cevallos 
and  De  Caballero,  and  after  having  consulted 
them,  he  caused  orders  to  be  sent  to  General 
Taranco  and  to  the  Marquis  of  Solano  in  par- 
ticular, to  return  by  Toledo  and  Talavera  to 
Badajoz.  M.  de  Beauharnais,  having  dis- 
charged the'first  part  of  his  commission,  whe- 
ther he  did  not  understand  Murat's  intentions 
with  regard  to  the  second,  or  did  not  wish  to 
conform  to  them,  applied  himself  to  persuading 
Ferdinand  that  it  was  necessary  for  him,  at  all 
costs,  to  secure  the  good-will  of  Napoleon,  and 
for  that  purpose  to  hasten  to  meet  him,  and  to 
throw  himself  into  his  arms,  asking  for  his 
friendship,  his  protection,  and  a  wife ;  that  the 
sooner  he  took  such  a  step,  the  sooner  he  would 
be  certain  of  reigning ;  that  the  best  thing  would 
be  to  set  out  immediately  from  Aranjuez  on  such 
a  journey ;  that  he  would  not  have  to  proceed 
very  far,  for  he  would  find  Napoleon  on  the 


March,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


471 


way ;  and,  finally,  that  he  ought  only  to  come 
to  Madrid  in  order  to  pass  through  it  as  quiculy 
as  possible,  to  proceed  to  Burgos  or  to  Vitto- 
ria. 

All  this  was  done  in  good  faith  on  the  part  of 
M.  de  Beauharnais,  who  entertained  no  doubt 
that  he  should  contribute  on  his  part,  as  Murat 
on  his,  to  the  invention  of  an  intrigue  to  which 
Ferdinand  would  speedily  succumb.  Ferdinand 
VII.  did  not  reject  the  advice,  but  he  deferred 
his  decision  till  the  arrival  of  his  two  confiden- 
tial advisers,  without  whom  he  did  not  wish  to 
undertake  any  thing  so  serious.  He  adopted 
as  much  of  the  advice  of  M.  de  Beauharnais 
as  suited  his  present  convenience,  that  was, 
immediately  to  quit  Aranjuez  and  to  go  to  Ma- 
drid ;  and  he  announced  his  solemn  entry  into 
the  capital  for  the  24th,  the  next  day. 

M.  de  Beauharnais,  having  returned  to  Ma- 
drid, ingenuously  related  to  Murat  all  he  had 
said  and  done.  The  latter  thought  he  perceived 
in  his  conduct  a  perfidious  calculation,  in  order 
to  lead  Ferdinand  to  enter  Madrid  immediately, 
and  to  take  possession  of  his  crown  a  little  ear- 
lier than  he  would  otherwise  have  done.  With- 
out loss  of  time  he  denounced  him  to  the  Em- 
peror as  a  secret  accomplice  of  Ferdinand  VII., 
as  an  active  agent  in  the  revolution  which  had 
hurled  the  old  king  from  his  throne,  and  as  a 
dangerous  ambassador,  who  favoured  the  cause 
of  the  new  sovereignty,  the  only  one  which  there 
was  any  reason  to  fear.  These  accusations, 
dictated  by  the  jealous  ambition  of  Murat, 
were,  however,  unfounded,  or  at  least  greatly 
exaggerated.  M.  de  Beauharnais  had  been 
from  the  first  warmly  attached  to  Ferdinand, 
because  he  appeared  to  him  the  only  person  in 
the  court  deserving  the  least  interest ;  this 
attachment  had  perhaps  become  warmer  since 
the  time  in  which  the  question  had  been  raised 
of  his  marrying  a  lady  of  the  Beauharnais 
family,  but  he  sincerely  believed  that  a  close 
union  with  Ferdinand  VII.  was  the  very  best 
solution  of  the  difficulty  for  France ;  and  by 
urging  this  prince  to  take  the  road  to  France, 
he  was  desirous  of  leading  him,  not  to  Madrid, 
but  to  the  feet  of  Napoleon,  in  order  to  insure 
that  result  which  he  thought  the  best.  Ard, 
moreover,  he  was  neither  sufficiently  active  nor 
sufficiently  able  to  have  taken  any  part  what- 
ever in  the  late  revolution,  which  he  had  only 
appeased  by  bringing  to  the  old  sovereign  at 
the  moment  of  danger  the  assistance  of  his  un- 
skilfulness  and  of  his  courage. 

Those  who  directed  the  affairs  of  the  new 
sovereignty  had  every  thing  arranged  for  the 
entry  of  Ferdinand  VII.  into  Madrid.  Although 
they  were  ignorant  of  the  designs  of  Napoleon, 
they  said  to  themselves,  that  Ferdinand's  sove- 
reignty, being  the  youngest  and  most  vigorous, 
ought  to  be  the  least  agreeable  to  the  French,  if 
they  had  any  evil  intentions  with  regard  to  the 
crown  of  Spain.  For  this  reason,  they  con- 
sidered it  as  a  pressing  matter,  that  he  should 
enter  Madrid  and  receive  from  the  people  of  the 
capital  their  acclamations,  which  would  be  a  kind 
of  national  consecration.  Murat  having  entered 
on  the  23d,  it  was  in  their  opinion  too  much  to 
be  behind  even  a  day.  Accordingly,  it  was  an- 
nounced that  the  new  court  would  remove  from  } 
Aranjuez  to  Madrid  on  the  24th,  without  any  i 
other  pageantry  except  a  few  guards  and  the 
popular  enthusiasm. 


Accordingly,  on  the  24th,  Ferdinand,  hay- 
ing set  out  early  from  Aranjuez,  alighted 
from  his  carriage  at  one  of  the  gates  of  the 
city,  that  of  Atocha,  mounted  his  horse,  and, 
surrounded  by  the  officers  of  his  court,  tra- 
versed the  beautiful  promenade  of  the  Pra- 
do,  and  entered  the  interior  of  Madrid  by 
the  wide  street  of  Alcala,  in  the  midst  of  an 
immense  multitude,  who,  after  having  long 
yearned  for  the  termination  of  the  old  reign 
and  the  commencement  of  the  new,  at  length 
saw  their  hopes  realized,  and  sought  in  some 
measure  by  the  vigour  of  their  shouts  to  drive 
away  the  thoughts  of  the  dangers  which  threat- 
ened Spain.  The  whole  population,  intoxicated 
with  joy,  were  at  the  windows  or  in  the  streets. 
The  women  scattered  flowers  from  the  tops  of 
the  houses.  The  men  threw  themselves  down 
before  the  young  king  and  spread  their  cloaks 
under  his  horse's  feet.  Others,  brandishing 
their  poniards,  swore  to  die  for  his  cause,  for 
the  danger  made  itself  confusedly  felt  in  their 
ardent  minds.  That  crafty  and  malicious 
prince,  so  little  worthy  of  being  loved,  wifc  at 
that  moment  surrounded  by  as  much  love  as 
was  shown  for  Titus  by  the  Romans,  or  by  the 
French  for  Henry  IV.  He  constituted  the  de- 
light of  Spain,  who  had  no  idea  what  was  to 
befall  him — no  doubt  at  all  of  his  future — him 
or  herself! 

Ferdinand  VII.,  having  reached  the  palace, 
there  received  the  public  authorities.  During 
the  day  the  diplomatic  body  came  to  pay  their 
respects  to  him,  as  if  he  were  an  undisputed 
king,  although  not  recognised  by  all  the  men 
of  Spain.  M.  de  Beauharnais,  kept  back  by 
Murat,  did  not  appear ;  his  absence  greatly 
alarmed  the  new  court,  and  embarrassed  the 
members  of  the  diplomatic  body  itself,  who  had 
given  way  to  their  secret  feelings  by  signifying 
so  quickly  their  adherence  to  the  sovereignty 
of  the  Bourbons.  The  ministers  of  weak  and 
dependent  courts  excused  themselves.  The 
representative  of  Russia  also  sent  his  excuse, 
but  less  humbly ;  he  alleged  diplomatic  usages, 
which  are  invariable,  and  by  virtue  of  which 
addresses  of  ceremony  are  presented  to  every 
new  king,  without  at  all  prejudging  the  ques- 
tion of  his  definitive  recognition. 

Murat  received  these  explanations  of  a  course 
of  conduct  which  displeased  him  with  ill- 
concealed  dissatisfaction,  because  he  already 
looked  upon  Ferdinand  as  a  rival  for  the  crown 
of  Spain ;  and  when  it  was  proposed  to  him  to 
go  and  pay  a  visit  to  him,  he  refused,  absolutely 
declaring  that  in  his  eyes  Charles  IV.  was  still 
King  of  Spain,  and  Ferdinand  Prince  of  the 
Asturias,  till  Napoleon  had  pronounced  his  de- 
cision on  this  melancholy  conflict.  On  the 
evening  of  the  21st,  as  we  have  said,  he  had 
written  from  El  Molar  an  account  of  all  that 
had  taken  place  to  Napoleon;  he  had  commu- 
nicated to  him  his  own  plan,  which  consisted  in 
making  Charles  IV.  protest,  and  in  net  recog- 
nising Ferdinand  VII.,  in  order  that  Spain  might 
find  herself  in  the  condition  of  being  between 
a  king  who  was  no  longer  so,  and  a  prince  who 
had  not  yet  become  one.  On  the  22d  and  23d, 
occupied  with  his  march  and  his  entry  into 
Madrid,  he  was  not  able  to  write.  On  the  24th 
he  wrote  an  accoxmt  of  what  had  taken  place 
in  the  two  days  preceding,  and,  continuing  to  b« 
inspired  by  the  events,  he  added  a  new  idea  to 


472 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[March,  1808. 


his  plan — an  idea  with  which  M.  de  Beauharnais 
had  innocently  furnished  him,  and  of  which  he 
was  about  to  make  a  treacherous  use,  that  of 
sending  Ferdinand  to  meet  Napoleon,  in  order 
that  the  latter  might  make  himself  master  of 
his  person,  and  then  do  with  him  what  he 
pleased.  There  would  then  be  no  other  person 
to  deal  with  except  Charles  IV.,  from  whom  it 
would  be  easy  to  snatch  the  sceptre,  incapable 
as  he  was  of  holding  it  in  his  weak  hands,  and 
Spain  herself  not  being  disposed  to  leave  it 
there. 

Whilst  these  events  were  occurring  in  Spain, 
Napoleon  had  been  successively  apprized  of 
them  five  or  six  days  after  their  occurrence — 
for  such  was  the  time  then  necessary  for  a  com- 
munication between  Madrid  and  Paris.  From 
the  24th  till  the  27th,  he  was  made  acquainted 
with  the  rising  at  Aranjuez,  then  with  the  over- 
throw of  the  favourite,  and  finally,  with  the 
forced  abdication  of  Charles  IV.  This  solution, 
the  most  unexpected  of  all,  although  not  the 
least  natural,  surprised  without  disconcerting 
him.  The  desired  departure  of  the  reigning 
family,  which  would  have  rendered  the  crown 
of  Spain  vacant,  not  having  been  effected,  the 
first  plan  proved  nothing  more  than  an  abortive 
combination.  Napoleon,  however,  saw  in  these 
very  events  a  new  means  of  arriving  at  his  end, 
and  that  means  was  in  complete  accordance 
with  what  the  circumstances  had  suggested  to 
Murat.  Long  before  the  letters  in  which  the 
latter  put  forward  his  ideas  had  arrived  in  Paris, 
Napoleon  had  thought  of  not  recognising  Fer- 
dinand VII.,  whose  young  sovereignty,  eagerly 
desired  by  the  Spaniards,  it  would  be  difficult 
to  destroy,  and  to  consider  Charles  IV.  still  as 
king,  whose  old  sovereignty,  worn-out  and  hate- 
ful to  the  Spaniards,  it  would  be  easy  to  over- 
turn. Besides,  under  the  form  of  arbitration 
between  the  father  and  the  son,  it  would  be 
easy  to  give  an  advantage  to  the  cause  of  the 
father,  who  would  not  fail  soon  after  to  cede 
the  crown  of  Spain  to  Napoleon,  under  the  in- 
fluence of  the  queen's  advice  and  that  of  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  who  would  wish,  above  all 
things,  to  be  avenged  on  Ferdinand  VII.  If, 
moreover,  under  pretext  of  this  arbitration, 
Ferdinand  VII.  could  be  brought  to  go  and  meet 
Napoleon,  it  would  then  be  easy  to  become 
master  of  his  person,  and  the  difficulty  would 
be  greatly  simplified,  for  he  would  have  nothing 
more  before  him  than  the  old  dethroned  sove- 
reigns, convenient  instruments  in  hands  which 
could  secure  that  repose  which  in  their  old  age 
they  required,  and  the  vengeance  for  which 
their  malicious  hearts  were  greedy.  The  sceptre 
might  be  left  for  some  time  in  their  hands,  and 
then  they  could  be  prevailed  upon  to  surrender 
it  in  return  for  a  quiet  and  opulent  retirement, 
or  even,  perhaps,  to  carry  them  off  at  the  same 

i  What  is  here  stated  is  proved  by  the  letters  of  both 
Murat  and  Napoleon,  by  their  contents  and  their  dates. 

»  It  has  been  denied  that  General  Savary  ever  received, 
or  Napoleon  ever  gave,  this  commission.  It  has  been  at- 
tempted to  show  that  the  deplorable  events  of  Bayonne 
sprang  by  chance,  from  the  concurrence  of  events ;  that 
the  royal  family  of  Spain,  father,  mother,  son,  brother,  and 
ancles,  had  all  been  drawn  by  a  sort  of  involuntary  al- 
lurement to  throw  themselves  into  the  hands  of  Napoleon, 
who,  when  he  found  them  all  united,  was  not  able  to  resist 
the  temptation  of  seizing  upon  them.  I  do  not  know  that 
Napoleon  would  be  more  excusable  even  on  this  hypothe- 
«is.  But  however  that  may  be,  the  proofs  exist,  and  leave 
no  room  for  doubt  For  myself,  who  have  no  desire  to 
tarnish  the  glory  of  Napoleon,  1  will  speak  the  truth  here, 


time,  by  taking  advantage  of  the  fear  with 
which  a  nascent  revolution  inspired  them,  and 
of  the  aversion  felt  for  them  by  a  people  dis- 
gusted with  their  vices. 

It  was  thus  Napoleon,  by  being  drawn  on  into 
this  way  of  conquering  a  foreign  throne  without 
employing  war,  proceeding  from  one  act  of  cun- 
ning to  another,  became  daily  more  guilty. 
Some  have  laid  all  this  to  the  account  of  his 
natural  perfidiousness,  and  others  to  the  im- 
prudence of  Murat,  who  had  involved  him  in  it 
against  his  own  will.  The  truth,  however,  is 
as  we  have  stated  it  here.  Both,  inspired  by 
ambition  and  guided  by  circumstances,  con- 
curred according  to  their  position  in  this  dark 
work ;  and  as  to  the  project  of  not  recognising 
the  son  and  of  using  the  instrumentality  of  the 
angry  father  against  the  rebellious  son,  it 
sprung  up  at  the  same  time,  both  in  Paris  and 
Madrid,  in  the  heads  of  Napoleon  and  Murat  on 
the  consideration  of  the  events  themselves ;  for 
the  conditions  being  such  as  they  have  been 
related,  did  not  admit  of  any  other  mode  of 
action.1 

Napoleon  instantly  summoned  the  attendanc* 
of  General  Savary,  already  employed  in  mis- 
sions of  the  greatest  magnitude,  and  who,  at 
that  time  had  just  returned  from  St.  Peters- 
burg, where,  as  has  been  seen,  he  had  given 
abundant  proofs  of  suppleness  as  well  as  of 
firmness.  Napoleon  opened  to  him  the  whole 
of  his  thoughts  respecting  Spain,  his  desire  of 
regenerating  the  country  and  of  binding  it  to 
France  by  a  change  of  dynasty ;  the  difficulties 
which  surrounded  the  enterprise,  alternately 
opposed  or  promoted  by  events ;  the  new  phase 
presented  by  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez;  and, 
finally,  the  possibility  of  conducting  it  to  the 
desired  end,  by  making  use  of  Charles  IV. 
against  Ferdinand  VII.  Napoleon  expressed  to 
General  Savary  his  intention  of  not  recognising 
the  son — of  affecting  a  religious  regard  for  the 
authority  of  the  father — of  maintaining  this 
authority  as  long  as  might  be  necessary  to  se- 
cure the.  crown,  and  of  making  him  yield  it  up 
immediately,  or  at  a  later  period,  according  to 
circumstances — to  draw  Ferdinand  VII.  away 
from  Madrid,  to  lead  him  to  Burgos  or  Ba- 
yonne— finally,  to  make  sure  of  his  person,  and 
to  obtain  from  him  the  cession  of  his  rights  by 
means  of  an  indemnity  in  Italy,  such  as  Etruria, 
for  example.  Napoleon  enjoined  Savary  to  act 
with  discretion,  to  allure  Ferdinand  to  Bayonne, 
with  the  hope  of  seeing  the  dispute  decided  in 
his  favour ;  but,  if  he  should  prove  obstinate, 
boldly  to  publish  the  protest  of  Charles  IV.,  to 
declare  that  he  alone  was  King  of  Spain,  and 
to  treat  Ferdinand  VII.  as  a  son,  and  as  a  sub- 
ject, like  a  rebel.  The  least  violent  means  were 
always  to  be  preferred.2  Napoleon  wished 
General  Savary  immediately  to  proceed  to  Ma- 


as  I  have  done  in  the  case  of  the  Due  d'Enghien,  under  the 
responsibility  which  always  rests  upon  an  historian,  of 
stating  facts  precisely  as  they  took  place.  I  have  given 
before  the  thoughts  of  Napoleon  with  respect  to  the  inva- 
sion of  Spain ;  here  I  relate  with  accuracy,  on  the  authority 
of  unquestionable  documents — the  autograph  letters  con- 
tained in  the  Louvre — the  succession  of  bis  ideas  with  re- 
spect to  the  meeting  at  Bayonne.  On  the  authority  of  this 
correspondence,  there  cannot  be  a  doubt  that  Generf  J  Sa- 
vary received  the  commission  which  I  hare  attributed  to 
him.  As  soon,  in  fact,  as  he  arrives,  he  writes  to  tlie  Em- 
peror, "  I  have  stated  your  intentions  to  }*rinre  Murat." 
Prince  Murat  replies  to  the  Emperor,  "  JVbto  that  I  knoio 
ymir  views,  every  thing  shall  be  done  according  to  your  desire." 
Then  Murat  from  day  to  day  gives  an  account  of  evcrj 


March,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


473 


drid,  to  go  and  tell  Murat  a  secret  which  had 
been  concealed  from  him  till  that  moment,  which 
he  had  indeed  obtained  a  glimpse  of,  but  which 
it  was  necessary  to  communicate  to  him  by  a 
confidential  man,  who  should  be  capable  of 
gniding  him  in  this  tortuous  course,  in  which 
the  slightest  false  step  might  prove  fatal.  Ge- 
neral Savary  immediately  set  out  in  order  to 
execute  completely  and  without  reserve  the 
wishes  of  Napoleon. 

There  took  place,  however,  in  the  mind  of 
Napoleon,  one  of  those  sudden  changes,  which 
astonish  those  who  are  unacquainted  with  the 
nature  of  the  human  mind,  and  which  men 
hasten  to  call  inconsistencies,  when  met  with 
in  the  conduct  of  men  of  less  acknowledged 
superiority  than  those  on  whose  history  I  am 
now  engaged.  Although  a  sort  of  fatal  inclina- 
tion drew  him  towards  the  usurpation  of  the 
crown  of  Spain,  he  never  concealed  from  him- 
self any  of  the  inconveniences  attached  to  this 
deplorable  undertaking.  He  anticipated  the 
blame  that  would  be  thrown  upon  him  by  public 
opinion,  the  indignation  of  the  Spaniards,  their 
obstinate  resistance,  and  the  advantage  which 
might  be  taken  of  that  resistance  by  England  ; 
he  foresaw  all  these  inconveniences  with  asto- 
nishing clearness  ;  and  yet,  blinded  not  by  the 
difficulties,  but  with  regard  to  his  immense 
power  to  conquer  them,  drawn  by  the  passion 
of  founding  a  new  order  in  Europe,  he  pro- 
ceeded towards  his  object,  troubled  however, 
from  time  to  time,  by  the  sudden  though  fleet- 
ing apparition  of  the  most  sinister  images.  An 
incident,  ill-understood  even  at  this  day,  caused 
one  of  those  accidental  changes  to  spring  up  in 
his  mind,  and  led  him  to  give  orders  the  very 
reverse  of  those  he  had  despatched  before — 
orders  which  certain  badly-informed  historians 
have  brought  forward,  as  a  proof  that,  in  the 
affairs  of  Spain  he  had  no  wish  to  do  what  was 
done,  and  that  he  had  been  more  guilty  and 
further  involved  than  he  wished  by  the  impru- 
dent ambition  of  Murat. 

Among  the  agents  of  Napoleon  travelling  in 
Spain,  there  was  one  in  whom  he  had  a  well- 
placed  confidence :  this  was  De  Tournon,  his 
chamberlain,  a  man  of  cool  mind,  little  inclined 
to  illusions,  and  sufficiently  devoted  to  his 
master  to  tell  him  the  truth.  He  was  one  of 
those  persons  whom  Napoleon  was  well  pleased 
to  send  on  any  mission  apparently  indifferent, 
such  as  that  of  delivering  a  letter  of  congratu- 
lation or  condolence ;  because,  as  he  travelled, 
he  observed  much,  observed  well,  and  reported 
faithfully  what  he  had  observed.  M.  de  Tour- 
non, during  the  last  six  months,  had  taken 
several  journeys  to  Spain  as  the  bearer  of  let- 
ters from  Napoleon  to  Charles  IV.  He  had 
formed  his  opinion  of  the  Peninsula,  and  of 
what  was  going  on  there,  with  a  sagacity  which 
events  too  well  justified.  Thus,  for  example, 
he  had  clearly  seen  that  the  old  court  was 
reaching  the  term  of  its  dominion  ;  that  a  new 
court  was  in  preparation,  already  adored  by  the 
Spaniards ;  that  it  was  necessary  to  try  to 
attach  it  to  France,  by  the  need  which  it  had 


thing  which  is  done  by  him  to  induce  the  son  to  go  to  B»- 
ycnne  ;  then  the  father,  the  brothers,  and  all  the  princes, 
referring  always  to  the  plans  of  Napoleon,  transmitted  by 
General  Savary,  and  other  agents  sent  afterwards.  Napo- 
leon's letters,  besides,  contain  his  approval  of  all  these 
act*,  at  first  in  i-o  vert  phrases,  then  in  plain  language — so 

VOL.  II.— 60 


of  French  protection;  to  be  very  careful  of 
taking  away  the  crown  of  Spain  either  by  force 
or  stratagem,  inasmuch  as  a  fanatical  people 
would  make  a  desperate  resistance,  and  tho 
advantages  which  might  be  gathered  from  such 
a  conquest  would  not  be  worth  the  efforts  ne- 
cessary to  effect  it.  M.  de  Tournon  had  very 
clearly  seen  all  this,  and  was  not  afraid  to  say 
so  in  his  numerous  journeys  in  the  presence 
both  of  Murat  and  his  officers,  all  eager  for 
bold  enterprises,  entertaining  a  profound  con- 
tempt for  the  Spaniards,  and  not  believing  foi 
a  moment  that  they  could  resist  our  arms,  be- 
fore which  the  best  soldiers  in  Europe  had 
given  way.  M.  de  Tournon,  during  his  sojouru 
in  Madrid,  having  seen  the  preludes  to  the 
revolution  of  Aranjuez,  and  the  popular  enthu- 
siasm in  favour  of  the  young  king,  still  re- 
mained convinced  that  it  would  be  folly  to  seize 
upon  Spain,  either  by  circuitous  means  or  open 
force,  and  that  it  would  be  a  hundred  times 
better  to  make  an  ally  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  who 
would  be  still  more  submissive  than  Charles 
IV.,  because  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  and  the 
old  queen  would  no  longer  be  at  his  side  to 
subject  his  submissiveness  to  the  fluctuation 
of  their  caprices  or  resentments.  'Napoleon 
had  given  orders  to  M.  de  Tournon  to  be  at 
Burgos  on  the  15th  of  March,  proposing  to 
arrive  there  himself  at  the  same  time,  and 
being  anxious  to  collect  from  the  mouth  of  a 
man  in  whom  he  could  confide,  the  details  of 
all  that  might  have  taken  place.  M.  de  Tour- 
non, on  his  way  to  Burgos,  being  obliged  to 
pass  through  the  head  quarters  of  Murat, 
neither  concealed  from  him  nor  his  officers  tho 
fear  with  which  the  enterprise  in  which  they 
were  engaged  inspired  him,  exposed  himself  to 
all  their  raillery,  (Murat  in  particular  found 
fault  with  him,)  and  went  to  Burgos  on  the 
15th,  as  he  had  been  ordered.  From  Burgos 
he  wrote  to  Napoleon,  in  order  humbly  to  en- 
treat him,  but  with  the  earnestness  of  an 
honest  man,  not  to  take  any  further  definite 
part  before  having  seen  Spain  with  his  own 
eyes,  above  all  not  to  found  his  determination 
on  the  information  forwarded  to  him  by  brave 
but  heedless  soldiers,  who  thought  of  nothing 
but  battles  and  crowns ;  that  it  would  be  found 
they  had  made  cruel  miscalculations  respecting 
Spain,  and  disregarded  what  perhaps  might 
turn  out  dreadful  evils.  He  waited  at  Burgos 
till  the  24th,  and  not  finding  Napoleon  arrive, 
he  set  out  for  Paris,  which,  with  the  greatest 
expedition,  he  could  not  reach  till  the  29th,  in 
consequence  of  the  state  of  the  roads  and  of 
the  relays  of  horses,  both  worn  out  by  the  ex- 
cessive use  at  that  time  made  of  them. 

Murat,  occupied  as  he  had  been  with  his  en- 
trance into  Madrid,  wrote  no  despatches  on 
the  22d  and  23d,  and  Napoleon  was  without 
news  on  the  28th  and  29th.  He  was  very  un- 
easy as  to  what  might  have  happened  in  Spain, 
and  in  this  state  of  extreme  anxiety  he  was 
led  for  a  moment  to  look  at  things  in  a  less 
favourable  point  of  view.  The  unexpected  ar- 
rival of  an  eye-witness  who  was  wise  and  well- 


plain  as  to  direct  Marshal  Bcssieres  to  arrest  Ferdinand 
VII.,  if  the  latter  should  refuse  to  proceed  to  Bayonne. 
Thus,  the  determination  of  Napoleon  to  cause  the  Spanish 
princes  to  be  allured  to  Bayonne  cannot  be  denied,  any 
more  than  that  the  commission  of  conducting  them  thither 
was  given  to  General  Savary. 

2  B2 


474 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


informed,  and  with  a  full  conviction  and  entire  | 
disinterestedness  contradicted  the  interested  '• 
accounts  given  by  military  men,  the  arrival  of 
such  a  witness  produced  in  Napoleon's  mind  a  j 
sudden,  and,  unhappily,  too  short  a  change  of  ; 
resolutions,  for  it  lasted  scarcely  twenty-four 
hours.  Napoleon  shared  all  the  anxieties  of  i 
M.  de  Tournon  at  the  idea  of  the  French  enter-  j 
ing  Madrid  at  the  very  moment  of  a  political  j 
revolution,  mixing  with  their  natural  forward-  '• 
ness  in  the  strife  of  the  factions  which  divided  j 
Spain,  coming  into  collision  with  the  Spaniards 
and  involving  him  in  immense  difficulties,  per- 
haps in  a  war  of  extermination  with  a  fierce 
people,  passionately  attached  to  their  independ- 
ence. He  immediately  wrote  to  Murat  that 
M.  de  Tournon  was  just  about  to  set  out,  and 
to  bring  him  new  orders;  that  he  was  proceed- 
ing too  quickly,  and  was  in  too  great  a  hurry 
to  appear  under  the  walls  of  Madrid,  (yet 
Murat  was  rather  behind  than  in  advance  of 
the  period  determined  upon  by  Napoleon  for 
his  entrance  into  the  capital ;)  that  he  was  not 
only  proceeding  too  quickly  in  directing  his 
corps  cTarmee  upon  Madrid,  but  that  he  directed 
General  Dupont  too  soon  to  go  beyond  the  Gua- 
darrama ;  that  as  soon  as  he  had  been  in- 
formed of  the  return  of  the  Spanish  troops 
under  General  Tareneo  towards  Old  Castille,  he 
ought  not  to  have  weakened  the  garrisons  of 
Segovia  and  Valladolid ;  that  it  was  necessary 
to  beware  of  mixing  himself  up  with  the 
Spaniards,  of  taking  any  part  in  their  divisions, 
and  especially  of  coming  into  collision  with 
them,  for  every  war  of  this  description  was 
ruinous ;  that  it  was  a  mistake  to  suppose  the 
Spaniards  to  be  little  to  be  feared  because  they 
were  disarmed;  that  independently  of  their 
natural  fierceness,  they  would  have  all  the 
energy  of  a  new  people,  whom  political  passions 
had  not  exhausted;  that  the  army,  though 
scarcely  amounting  to  100,000  men,  and  in- 
capable of  resisting  the  weakest  French  force, 
would  separate,  in  order  to  go  into  every  pro- 
vince, and  to  serve  as  the  kernel  for  continual 
insurrection ;  that  the  priests,  monks,  and  nobles, 
knowing  well  that  they  could  only  come  to  reform 
the  old  social  condition  of  Spain,  would  use  all 
their  influence  to  stir  up  a  fanatical  people 
against  them ;  that  England  would  not  fail  to 
take  advantage  of  the  circumstances  to  involve 
us  in  immense  difficulties,  and  create  for  us 
new  embarrassments ;  that  it  was  therefore 
necessary  to  do  nothing  hastily,  and  to  main- 
tain the  greatest  possible  reserve  between  the 
father  and  the  son ;  that  with  regard  to  the 
father,  it  was  impossible  to  suffer  him  to  reign 
longer,  because  the  government  of  the  queen 
and  the  favourite  had  become  intolerable  to  the 
Spaniards ;  that  with  respect  to  the  son,  he 
was  in  reality  an  enemy  of  France,  for  he 
shared  in  the  highest  degree  in  all  the  Spanish 
prejudices,  and  that  the  aversion  which  he 
was  supposed  to  entertain  for  his  father's  policy 
— a  policy  of  concessions  towards  France — 
constituted  some  part  of  the  popularity  which 
be  enjoyed ;  that  experience  had  proved  how 


[March,  1808. 


little  influence  marriages  exercised  in  changing 
the  policy  of  princes ;  that  Ferdinand  would 
then  before  long  be  the  declared  enemy  of  the 
French ;    that,  nevertheless,  it  was  necessary 
\  not  to  break  with  him,  for,  mean  as  he  was, 
',  our  opposition  would  make  him  a  hero;  that,  be- 
j  tween  the  impossibility  of  allowing  the  father 
I  to  reign  and  of  putting  confidence  in  the  son, 
1  it  was  necessary  not  to  be  hasty  in  choosing; 
•  above  all,  to  give  no  one  reason  to  divine  the 
i  course  we  were  likely  to  adopt,  which  was  the 
more  easily  done,  as  he  (Napoleon)  did  not  yet 
:  know  it  himself;  that  it  was  necessary  to  give 
i  hopes  of  the  possibility  of  a  kind  and  disinte- 
j  rested  arbitration,  and  that  as  to  an  interview 
!  with  Ferdinand  VII.,  that  should  not  be  thought 
of,  except  in  case  France  should  be  decidedly 
obliged  to  acknowledge  him ;  that,  in  a  word, 
prudence  advised  to  do  nothing  hastily — no- 
thing precipitately ;  that  Prince  Murat  shouM 
especially  guard  against  the  suggestions  of  his 
personal  interests ;  that  Napoleon  would  think 
for  him,  provided  he  did  not  think  for  himself; 
that  the  crown  of  Portugal  would  always  be 
at  his  disposal  to  reward  the  services  of  the 
most  faithful  of  his  lieutenants — of  him,  who, 
to  all  his  own  merits,  added  the  advantage  of 
being  his  sister's  husband. 

Such  was  the  wise  counsel  which  Napoleon, 
under  the  influence  and  by  the  instrumentality 
of  M.  de  Tournon,  was  about  to  address  to  his 
lieutenant,  when,  after  having  been  two  days 
without  news,  he  received  Murat's  letters  of  the 
24th,  in  which  the  latter  informed  him  of  his 
[  peaceable  entrance  into  Madrid,  the  excellent 
i  reception  which  had  been  given  him,  the  in- 
clination of  the  old  sovereigns  to  throw  them- 
selves into  his  arms,  their  eagerness  to  protest 
against  the  abdication  of  the  19th, — the  facility, 
in  fine,  of  rendering  the  throne  vacant  by  re- 
fusing to  recognise  Ferdinand  VII.,  and  thus 
placing  Spain  between  a  king  who  had  abdi- 
cated and  one  who  was  not  acknowledged. 
Napoleon  then  finding  all  the  means  again  in 
his  hands  in  which  he  had  ceased  to  believe  for 
a  moment,  returned  to  the  plan  suggested  to 
Murat  and  himself  by  the  revolution  of  Aran- 
juez,  and  confirmed  the  orders  which  had  been 
just  confided  to  General  Savary  before  the  ar- 
rival of  M.  de  Tournon.  In  consequence  of  this, 
Napoleon,  in  a  fresh  letter,  dated  on  the  30th, 
wrote  to  Murat  that  he  approved  of  the  whole  of 
his  conduct,  and  that  he  had  done  well  by  enter- 
ing Madrid ;  that  it  was,  however,  necessary  to 
continue  to  avoid  every  kind  of  collision,  espe- 
cially to  guard  against  any  mischief  being  done 
to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  even  to  send  him  to 
Bayonne,  if  he  could ;  carefully  to  protect  the 
old  sovereigns,  to  bring  them  from  Aranjuez  to 
the  Escurial,  where  they  would  be  in  the  midst 
of  the  French  army ;  to  beware  of  acknowledg- 
ing Ferdinand  VII.,  and  finally,  to  wait  for  the 
arrival  of  the  French  court  at  Bayonne,  whither 
it  was  about  immediately  to  proceed.  Napoleon 
caused  M.  de  Tournon  to  set  out  immediately, 
without  putting  into  his  hands  the  cautious 
letter  of  which  we  have  just  given  an  analysis,1 


» The  letter  I  have  before  mentioned  first  appeared,  if  I 
mistake  not,  in  the  Memorial  de  Sainte-Hdene ;  and  since 
then  it  ha*  been  printed  in  a  multitude  of  publications. 
To  me  it  has  been  a  subject  of  diligent  inquiry  and  ex- 
amination, with  the  view  of  ascertaining  its  authenticity, 
j  which  I  often  had  doubts.  1  will  here  explain 


the  reasons  on  which  those  doubts  were  grounded,  and 
also  the  reasons  which  definitively  led  me  to  believe  it  to 
bo  genuine.  Of  this  fact,  a  series  of  the  most  careful  com- 
parisons brought  me  to  an  entire  conviction  on  thi» 
subject. 
I  will  commence  by  quoting  the  letter  literally : — 


April,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


475 


but  without  having  been  able  to  conceal  either 
the  slight  disapprobation  which  he  had  felt 
regarding  the  conduct  of  Murat,  or  the  appre- 
hension which  the  possible  consequences  of  this 


"March  29th,  1808. 
"MONSIEUR,  GRAND  DUKE  OP  BERG, 

"  I  fear  that  you  may  be  deceiving  me  respecting  the 
situation  of  Spain,  and  that  you  may  be  deceiving  your- 
self. The  affair  of  the  19th  of  March  has  very  consider- 
ably embarrassed  the  state  of  things.  Do  not  imagine 
that  you  are  attacking  an  unarmed  nation,  and  that  your 
troops  have  only  to  show  themselves  in  order  to  reduce 
Spain  to  subjection.  The  revolution  of  the  20th  of  March 
proves  that  there  is  spirit  among  the  Spaniards.  You 
have  to  deal  with  a  people  in  the  prime  of  their  energies, 
fired  with  all  the  courage  and  all  the  enthusiasm  which 
animate  men  who  have  not  been  worn  out  by  political 
excitement. 

"The  aristocracy  and  the  clergy  are  the  masters  of 
Spain.  Should  they  become  alarmed  for  their  privileges 
and  their  existence,  they  may  raise  against  us  levies  en 
maise,  which  will  perpetuate  the  war.  I  now  have  parti- 
sans ;  but  if  I  present  myself  as  a  conqueror,  I  shall  have 
none. 

"The  Prince  of  the  Peace  is  detested,  because  he  is 
charged  with  having  delivered  Spain  over  to  France ;  this 
is  the  grievance  which  favoured  the  usurpation  of  Ferdi- 
nand. The  popular  party  is  the  weakest. 

"The  Prince  of  the  Asturias  has  none  of  the  qualifica- 
tions requisite  for  the  head  of  a  nation;  nevertheless,  for 
the  sake  of  setting  him  up  in  opposition  to  us,  he  will  be 
elevated  into  a  hero.  I  will  not  consent  to  any  violence 
being  exercised  towards  the  personages  of  that  family. 
It  never  answers  any  purpose  to  render  one's  self  odious, 
and  to  stir  up  hatred.  Spain  has  upwards  of  100,000  men 
in  arms — more  than  enough  to  carry  on  internal  war  with 
advantage  ;  and  this  force,  if  dispersed  over  various  points, 
may  serve  to  keep  the  whole  monarchy  in  a  state  of  in- 
surrectionary ferment. 

"  1  here  point  out  to  you  all  those  obstacles  which  are 
inevitable.  There  are  others  which  your  judgment  will 
enable  you  to  comprehend. 

"  England  will  not  let  slip  this  opportunity  of  multiply- 
ing our  embarrassments.  She  is  daily  forwarding  avisos 
to  the  forces  she  keeps  up  on  the  coast  of  Portugal  and  in 
the  Mediterranean,  and  she  is  enlisting  Sicilian  and  Por- 
tuguese troops. 

'•  The  royal  family  not  having  quitted  Spain  to  proceed 
to  South  America,  nothing  but  a  revolution  can  change 
the  face  of  the  country ;  and  Spain  is,  perhaps,  of  all  the 
countries  of  Europe,  that  which  is  least  prepared  for  revo- 
lution. The  persons  who  are  sensible  of  the  monstrous 
vices  of  the  government  and  of  the  anarchy  which  has 
usurped  the  place  of  legal  authority  are  in  the  minority: 
the  majority  take  advantage  of  those  vices  and  that 
anarchy. 

"  In  the  interest  of  my  empire,  I  can  effect  much  good 
to  Spain.  The  question  is,  what  are  the  best  means  of 
doing  so? 

"  Shall  I  go  to  Madrid '!  Shall  I  set  up  the  authority 
of  a  grand  Protectorate,  by  deciding  between  the  father 
and  the  son  ?  It  appears  to  mo  that  it  would  be  a  very 
difficult  matter  to  keep  Charles  IV.  on  the  throne.  His 
government  and  his  favourite  have  sunk  so  low  in  popu- 
lar estimation,  that  they  could  not  support  themselves  for 
three  months. 

"  Ferdinand  is  the  enemy  of  France,  and  for  that  reason 
he  has  been  made  king.  To  place  him  on  the  throne  will 
be  to  serve  the  factions,  which  for  the  space  of  twenty-five 
years  have  been  seeking  the  annihilation  of  France.  A 
family  alliance  would  be  but  a  feeble  bond.  Queen  Eliza- 
beth and  other  French  princesses  have  been  cruelly  put 
to  death,  when  they  could,  with  impunity,  be  made  the 
victims  of  atrocious  vengeance.  It  appears  to  me  that 
matters  ought  not  to  be  precipitated ;  and  that  it  will  be 
well  to  take  counsel  of  coming  events.  We  must  rein- 
force the  corps  on  the  frontiers  of  Portugal,  and  wait 
patiently 

"  I  do  not  approve  of  the  course  adopted  by  your  im- 
perial highness  in  so  hurriedly  taking  possession  of  Ma- 
drid. The  army  ought  to  have  been  kept  at  the  distance 
of  ten  leagues  from  the  capital.  You  had  no  satisfactory 
assurance  that  the  people  and  the  magistracy  would  will- 
ingly recognise  Ferdinand.  The  Prince  of  the  Peace  must 
have  partisans  in  the  public  departments;  besides,  the 
attachment  of  habit  which  is  cherished  towards  the  old 
king  may  produce  results.  Your  entrance  into  Madrid, 
by  exciting  the  alarm  of  the  Spaniards,  has  powerfully 
served  Ferdinand.  I  have  ordered  Savary  to  go  to  the  old 
king,  and  to  learn  how  things  are  proceeding.  He  will 
concert  with  your  imperial  highness.  I  will  hereafter 
direct  what  course  is  to  be  adopted :  in  the  mean  while,  I 
think  it  necessary  to  prescribe  to  you  the  following  lino 
of  conduct: — You  must  not  bind  me  to  any  interview  in 


Spanish  affair  excited  in  his  mind.  He  sent 
him  back  without  the  letter,  with  the  mission 
to  continue  to  observe  every  thing,  and  to  pre- 
pare apartments  for  him  at  Madrid.  Napoleon 


Spain,  with  Ferdinand,  unless  you  judge  the  position  of 
things  to  be  such  as  will  warrant  me  in  recognising  him 
as  King  of  Spain.  You  must  keep  up  an  appearance  of 
amicable  sentiments  towards  the  king,  the  queen,  and 
Prince  Godoy.  You  must  exact  for  them  and  render  to 
them  the  same  honours  as  formerly.  You  must  manage 
so  that  the  Spaniards  may  have  no  suspicion  of  the  course 
I  am  about  to  take ;  this  will  not  be  difficult,  since  1  do 
not  myself  know  what  that  course  will  be. 

"You  must  make  known  to  the  nobility  and  clergy 
that,  if  France  should  interfere  in  the  affairs  of  Spain, 
their  privileges  and  immunities  will  be  respected.  Inform 
them  that  the  Emperor  desires  the  improvement  of  the 
political  institutions  of  Spain,  that  they  may  be  raised  to 
a  level  with  the  state  of  civilization  throughout  Europe, 
and  released  from  the  control  of  favourites.  Tell  the 
magistrates,  citizens,  and  all  enlightened  persons,  that 
Spain  must  reconstruct  the  machine  of  her  government; 
that  she  must  have  laws  which  will  protect  her  citizens 
against  the  arbitrary  power  and  the  usurpations  of  feu- 
dalism ;  institutions  which  will  revive  industry,  agricul- 
ture, and  the  arts.  Portray  to  them  the  state  of  tran- 
quillity and  happiness  enjoyed  by  France,  notwithstanding 
the  wars  in  which  she  has  been  involved,  and  point  to  the 
glory  of  her  religion,  which  owes  its  re-establishment  to 
the  Concordat  I  have  signed  with  the  Pope.  Prove  to 
them  the  advantages  they  may  derive  from  a  political 
regeneration :  order  and  peace  at  home,  respect  and  power 
abroad.  Such  must  be  the  spirit  of  your  addresses  to  the 
Spanish  people,  either  in  speaking  or  writing.  Do  not 
hurry  on  any  measure.  I  can  wait  at  Bayonne,  or  I  can 
cross  the  Pyrenees,  and  fortifying  myself  in  the  direction 
of  Portugal,  I  can  continue  the  war  in  that  quarter. 

"  I  will  attend  to  your  private  interests — do  not  trouble 
yourself  about  them Portugal  will  be  at  my  dis- 
posal. Let  no  personal  project  occupy  your  thoughts  or 
guide  your  conduct;  that  would  injure  me,  and  would 
injure  you  still  more.  You  go  too  fast  in  your  instruc- 
tions of  the  14th.  The  movement  you  prescribe  for  Gene- 
ral Dupont  is  too  rapid ;  the  event  of  the  19th  of  March 
has  rendered  changes  necessary.  You  must  make  new 
arrangements;  and  you  will  receive  instructions  from  my 
minister  for  foreign  affairs.  I  desire  that  discipline  may 
be  maintained  in  the  strictest  manner : — no  pardon  even 
for  the  smallest  faults.  Let  the  inhabitants  be  treated 
with  the  greatest  consideration ;  above  all,  let  churches 
and  convents  be  respected. 

"Our  troops  must  avoid  any  sort  of  collision  either  with 
the  corps  of  the  Spanish  army  or  with  detachments.  Not 
a  cartridge  must  be  fired  on  either  side. 

"  Let  Solano  get  beyond  Radajoz,  and  keep  watch  upon 
him.  Trace  out  yourself  the  marches  of  our  army,  so  as 
to  keep  it  always  at  the  distance  of  several  leagues  from 
the  Spanish  corps.  If  war  should  be  kindled  all  is  lost. 

"  The  destinies  of  Spain  must  be  determined  by  diplo- 
macy and  negotiations.  I  recommend  you  to  avoid  ex- 
planations with  Solano,  as  well  as  with  the  other  Spanish 
governors  and  generals. 

"You  will  send  me  two  expresses  daily.  In  case  of 
events  of  urgent  importance  you  must  despatch  orderly 
officers.  Send  back  immediately  the  Chamberlain  de  Tour- 
non,  who  is  the  bearer  of  this  despatch,  and  deliver  to  him 
a  detailed  report,  Ac. 

(Signed)  *  NAPOLEON." 

Before  I  proceed  to  discuss  the  authenticity  of  this  let- 
ter. I  have  a  word  or  two  to  say  respecting  the  inferences 
which  have  been  drawn  from  it.  This  document  has  been 
regarded  as  evidence  that  Napoleon  did  not  approve  of 
any  thing  that  was  done  in  Spain — that  all  was  done, 
without  his  knowledge  and  against  his  will,  by  Murat, 
prompted  by  his  imprudence  anil  his  impatient  ambitioc. 
This  is  a  very  false  conclusion,  for,  the  day  before  and  che 
day  after  the  date  of  this  letter,  and  during  a  considerable 
interval  succeeding  it,  Napoleon  wrote  a  long  series  of 
letters,  ordering  Murat  point  by  point  to  do  every  thing 
that  was  done ;  and  when  Murat,  inspired  by  events,  took 
some  little  upon  himself,  he  received  Napoleon's  orders 
from  Paris  or  Bayonne  to  do  the  very  things  which  he 
had  actually  done.  For  example,  Murat  entered  Madrid 
on  the  23d,  but  he  had  received  formal  orders  to  enter 
one  or  two  days  earlier.  It  is,  therefore,  only  by  a  false 
induction,  that  this  document  can  be  made  to  exempt  Na- 
poleon from  the  responsibility  of  the  events  of  Spain,  and 
to  cast  that  responsibility  on  Murat. 

The  letter  could  only  be  the  offspring  of  a  moment  ol 
Indecision,  amidst  a  line  of  conduct  marked  by  the  most 
rexolute  and  undeviating  firmness.  Even  this  indecision 
is  marked  with  the  impress  of  genius,  for  it  )  .-trays  the 
most  extraordinary  and  accurate  prescience  >f  -ill  that 


476  HISTORY   OP  THE  [April,  1808. 

himself  took  his  departure  on  the  2d  of  April  |  conducted  to  Bayonne,  compulsorily  or  volun- 
for  Bordeaux,  where  he  wished  to  remain  some  j  tarily,  time  to  be  brought  or  to  repair  thither. 


days,  in  order  to  receive  further  letters  from 
Murat,  and  to  give  to  all  those  who  were  to  be 


actually  came  to  pass.  Nevertheless,  it  was  indecision, 
for,  during  a  brief  space,  Napoleon's  will  wavered,  and  he 
abandoned  one  day  that  which  he  had  desired  the  day  be- 
fore, and  which  he  again  d«sired  on  the  morrow.  He 
seemed  as  though  enlightened  by  a  supernatural  intelli- 
gence which  unfolded  the  whole  future  before  him. 

This  indecision,  which  at  the  first  glance  appears  im- 
probable, does  not  tend  in  any  way  to  the  justification  of 
Napoleon  ;  but  it  presents  an  interesting  subject  of  reflec- 
tion as  regards  the  history  of  the  human  mind.  It  na- 
turally creates  astonishment  that  one  of  the  most  firm 
and  resolute  minds  that  ever  man  possessed,  should, 
within  a  brief  interval  of  time,  survey  things  under  such 
contradictory  aspects  as  led  at  one  moment  to  determina- 
tions, alike  at  variance  with  those  formed  the  moment 
before,  and  with  those  formed  the  moment  after.  Never- 
theless, those  who  know  the  human  heart,  those  who 
have  attentively  observed  its  workings  in  great  and  try- 
ing circumstances,  are  fully  aware  how  greatly  even  the 
firmest  will  is  dependent  ou  events,  and  how  the  smallest 
circumstances  frequently  suifice  to  shake  the  highest  re- 
solves. Many  a  victory  enrolled  in  the  annals  of  immor- 
tality might  never  have  been  won,  because  the  veriest 
trifle  would  have  caused  the  battle  not  to  have  been 
fought.  Vacillation  is  in  the  ordinary  course  of  things : 
the  greatest  minds  are  liable  to  it,  and  the  firmest  minds 
vary  ere  they  resolve.  The  letter  in  question  proves  in  a 
striking  manner  how  clearly  Napoleon  could  see  the  con- 
trary side  of  the  resolutions  he  formed;  it  proves,  too,  the 
extraordinary  foresight  with  which  he  was  endowed ;  but 
at  the  same  time  it  shows  how  light  was  the  weight  of 
that  foresight  when  balanced  in  the  scale  with  his  pas- 
sions. I  lelt  as  it  were  a  certain  degree  of  philosophic 
interest  in  investigating  the  authenticity  of  this  letter, 
and  I  will  now  proceed  to  detail  the  various  views  I  took 
of  it,  before  I  definitively  arrived  at  the  conviction  that  it 
was  genuine. 

At  first  glance,  the  superior  style  of  the  letter,  both  in 
respect  to  ideas  and  language,  leaves  scarcely  a  doubt  of 
its  having  been  written  by  Napoleon.  Few,  besides  him- 
self, could  discuss  great  political  and  military  events  in 
that  masterly  manner.  Such  is  the  impression  it  pro- 
duced on  the  authors  of  all  the  works  hitherto  published 
in  relation  to  Napoleon.  But  those  writers,  knowing  lit 
tie  or  nothing  of  official  documents,  were  not,  like  myself, 
struck  by  the  manifest  discrepancies  between  the  letter 
and  certain  unquestionable  historical  facts;  accordingly, 
no  doubt  of  its  authenticity  ever  occurred  to  th«m.  For 
my  part,  however,  I  saw  such  strong  reasons  for  ques- 
tioning that  authenticity,  that  I  fear  I  shall  not  be  able 
in  the  eye  of  rigorous  criticism  to  show  that  those  doubts 
were  unfounded. 

In  the  first  place,  the  letter  stands  in  formal  contradic- 
tion to  all  that  preceded  and  all  that  followed  it.  Some 
have  assigned  to  it  the  date  of  the  27th,  others  that  of  the 
29th  of  March ;  but  the  real  date,  as  will  be  seen,  can  be 
no  other  than  the  29th.  There  exist  letters  from  Nar 
poleon,  of  dates  between  the  27th  and  the  30th,  the  pur- 
port of  which  is  totally  at  variance  with  that  now  under 
consideration.  In  the  communications  dated  between  the 
27th  and  the  30th,  he  approves  of  every  thing  done  by 
Murat;  not  only  does  he  approve,  but  he  orders  the 
entrance  into  Madrid,  and  prescribes  a  plan  for  getting 
all  the  royal  family  of  Spain  into  his  power.  The  letter 
of  the  29th  of  March  is  the  only  one,  amidst  a  lengthened 
correspondence,  which  expresses  any  disapproval  of  the 
course  pursued  by  Murat— a  course  which  was,  in  fact, 
conformable  with  his  own  directions. 

Secondly,  almost  all  Napoleon's  letters  arc  in  the  collec- 
tions in  the  Louvre;  but  this  one  is  not  there.  This  cir- 
cumstance does  not,  it  is  true,  amount  to  any  absolute 
Eroof.  for  out  of  40,000  of  the  Emperor's  letters,  one  is 
ere  aud  there  missing;  and  the  letter  in  question  may 
possibly  be  one  of  the  very  few  of  which  the  minute  has 
not  been  preserved.  These  are  so  very  few  in  number, 
that  they  do  not,  perhaps,  amount  to  100  in  the  whole 
40,000.  Another  curious  circumstance  is,  that  one  of  the 
Emperor's  letters,  from  which  the  following  is  an  extract, 
enumerates  all  the  letters  he  wrote  at  this  particular 
juncture,  and  makes  no  mention  of  the  one  of  the  29th 
of  March. 

On  his  arrival  at  Bordeaux,  he  wrote  to  Murat,  and,  ad- 
verting to  the  letters  he  had  successively  addressed  to 
him,  he  says — "  /  received  at  midnight  your  letter  of  the  3d, 
ny  which  I  perceive  that  you,  have  received  mine  of  the  ZJth 
of  March.  My  letter  of  the  30th,  and  Savary,  who  must  by 
this  time  have  arrived,  wM  make  you  better  acquainted  with 
my  intentions.  General  Reitte  will  depart  immediately  to 
join  you."  Here  not  a  word  is  said  of  the  letter  of  the 
29th.  Can  it  be  believed  that  he  would  not  hare  men- 


He left  M.  de  Talleyrand  at  Paris,  to  engage 
the  attention  and  satisfy  the  demands  of  the 


tioned  it,  had  it  been  written ;  the  more  especially  as  it 
was  a  letter  countermanding  all  that  he  had  ordered  on 
the  27th  and  the  30th  ?  He  might,  at  least,  be  expected 
to  have  alluded  to  it,  by  declaring  that  it  was  to  be  re- 
garded as  though  it  had  never  been  received. 

But  the  non-existence  of  this  minute  at  the  Louvre  ac- 
quires additional  significance  from  the  following  circum- 
stance. The  very  voluminous  correspondence  of  Murat, 
without  the  aid  of  which  it  would  never  have  been  pos- 
sible to  understand  and  narrate  the  events  of  Spain,  exists 
in  entirety  in  the  Louvre.  It  contains  exact  and  minute 
answers  to  all  the  Emperor's  letters,  even  tho,»e  of  the 
least  consequence.  It  may  be  said  that  this  correspond- 
ence comprises  question  and  answer  on  every  point;  yet 
there  is  no  letter  from  Murat  in  reply  to  this  letter — so 
important,  so  serious,  and  containing  instructions  so  much 
at  variance  with  those  previously  given.  Throughout 
this  correspondence  Murat  shows  himself  keenly  sensible 
to  the  slightest  reproaches  of  the  Emperor;  and  can  he 
be  supposed  to  have  left  unanswered  a  letter  expressive 
of  so  much  disapproval,  and  differing  so  essentially  from 
those  which  preceded  and  followed  it?  This  is  evidently 
impossible.  Should  there  still  remain  any  doubt  on  the 
question,  it  must  vanish  when  it  is  found  that  Murat,  in 
a  letter  dated  April  4th,  (eleven  o'clock  at  night,)  says — 
"  It.  de.  Tournon  arrived  this  evening,  he  will  have  found 
your  Majesty's  placs  of  residence  ready  prepared."  Murat 
does  not  add,  "  he  has  delivered  to  me  your  letters,  &c." 
It  must  be  evident  that  M.  de  Tournon  delivered  nothing; 
above  all,  nothing  so  important  as  the  letter  of  the  29th 
of  March.  I  believe  that  the  letter  never  was  delivered, 
which,  however,  is  no  proof  that  it  was  not  written,  as  I 
will  presently  show. 

The  discrepancy  between  this  letter  and  all  that  pre- 
ceded and  followed  it  its  non-existence  in  the  Louvre,  the 
mutual  silence  of  both  Napoleon  and  Murat  respecting  it, 
caused  me  at  first  to  entertain  doubts  of  its  authenticity, 
and  at  length  convinced  me  that  it  could  never  have  been 
delivered. 

I  will  now  explain  how  my  doubts  of  its  authenticity 
came  to  be  removed,  and  how  I  arrived  at  the  conviction 
of  its  having  been  written  without  having  been  delivered. 
That  it  is  from  the  pen  of  Napoleon  I  entertain  no  doubt. 
Imitators  may  succeed  in  forging  style,  but  not  in  forging 
ideas;  besides,  the  writer  must  necessarily  have  been  in 
the  very  vortex  of  events  to  have  spoken  with  so  much 
precision  of  the  departure  of  General  Savary,  of  the  com- 
mission intrusted  to  M.  de  Tournon,  and  various  other 
particulars  of  the  same  nature,  with  which  the  letter  is 
full.  There  is  one  point  which,  in  my  opinion,  completely 
establishes  its  authenticity ;  it  is  this : — '•  You  hare  been 
too  precipitate  in  your  instructions  of  the  14th  to  General 
Dupont."  Now,  it  happens  that  on  the  14th  instructions 
were  given  to  General  Dupont,  which  fairly  deserve  the 
reproach  applied  to  them  by  Napoleon,  when  considered 
from  the  point  of  view  in  which  he  saw  them  at  the  mo- 
ment. By  urging  General  Dupont  too  forward,  Murat 
left  the  rear  of  the  army  exposed  to  the  attack  of  the 
Spanish  General  Taraneo,  who  had  been  recalled  from 
Portugal  by  command  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace.  A 
person  forging  the  letter  could  not  have  been  aware  of 
this  fact,  which  could  be  known  only  to  one  who  had 
carefully  read  the  orders  of  Napoleon.  I  also  think  that 
this  fact  proven  that  the  letter  could  not  have  been  forged 
at  St.  Helena  by  Napoleon  himself,  endeavouring  in  after- 
thoughts to  justify  the  most  serious  mistake  of  his  reign. 
He  had  too  much  pride  to  resort  to  such  a  device,  for  he 
disdained  to  justify  by  falsehood  the  death  of  the  Duke 
d'Enghien;  and,  moreover,  it  is  impossible  that  he  could 
have  invented  the  circumstance  relative  to  the  orde1"  jf 
the  14th,  for  he  had  not  at  St.  Helena  the  documents  of 
the  Louvre;  and  I  have  evidence,  from  what  he  wrote  at 
St.  Helena,  that,  without  any  desire  to  deviate  from  the 
truth,  he  was  often  incorrect  in  dates  and  facts  when  he 
had  not  official  documents  to  refer  to.  The  best  ••  Me- 
moirs" are  not  free  from  similar  errors,  and  I  have  fre- 
quently detected  them  when  comparing  contemporary 
publications  with  the  correspondence  of  their  authors. 

Thus,  independently  of  its  style,  the  letter  bears  iuter- 
nal  evidence  of  its  authenticity.  But  how  are  we  to  ac- 
count for  the  contradiction  between  this  letter  and  the 
correspondence  which  preceded  and  followed  it?  and, 
above  all,  how  explain  the  silence  of  Murat,  who  does  not 
even  acknowledge  the  receipt  of  the  letter?  I  have  en- 
deavoured to  solve  these  questions  by  the  following  facts. 

I  found  in  the  Louvre  the  correspondence  of  M.  de 
Tournon.  I  there  discovered  that  he  alone,  of  all  the 
French  agents,  had  condemned  the  Spanish  enterprise, 
and  had  implored  Napoleon  to  suspend  all  decision  on  the 
subject  until  after  he  should  see  the  country  with  his  own 


April,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


477 


representatives  of  European  diplomacy,  who 
•would  require  to  be  reassured  or  satisfied  on 
the  arrival  of  every  courier  who  should  arrive 
from  Madrid.  M.  de  Tolstoy  claimed  this  care 
and  attention  more  than  any  of  the  rest.  Na- 
poleon took  with  him  the  docile  and  faithful  M. 
de  Champagny,  from  whom  he  had  no  great 
objections  to  fear,  and  even  preceded  his  house- 
hold, so  eager  was  he  to  get  nearer  to  the  thea- 
tre of  events.  Expecting  to  remain  for  a  consi- 
derable time  on  the  frontiers  of  Spain,  and  to 
receive  there  many  princes  and  princesses,  he 
gave  directions  for  the  empress  to  come  and 
join  him  there  in  a  few  days.  He  arrived  at 
Bordeaux  en  the  4th  of  April,  very  impatient  to 
receive  news  of  Murat. 

The  events  at  Madrid,  which  had  stagnated 
for  a  moment,  whilst  Murat  was  waiting  for 
orders  from  Paris,  and  Ferdinand  VII.  was 
expecting  his  two  principal  confidential  ad- 
visers, canon  Escoi'quiz  and  the  Duke  de  1'In- 
fantado,  soon  resumed  their  course.  Murat, 
even  while  yielding  to  the  impulse  of  his  usual 
boldness,  could  not  avoid  feeling  occasional 
anxiety  with  regard  to  his  conduct,  and  asking 
himself  whether  he  had  well  or  ill  compre- 
hended the  Emperor's  intentions.  He  was 
therefore  delighted  on  receiving  the  letter  of 
the  30th,  and  in  spite  of  the  momentary  blame, 
the  secret  of  which  M.  de  Tournon  had  divulged 
in  Madrid,  he  only  persevered  with  the  greater 
zeal  and  cunning  in  the  plan,  so  little  worthy 
of  his  honour,  which  he  had  invented  as  quickly 


eyes.  I  have  also  read  in  Murat's  correspondence,  that 
he  himself.  General  Grouchy,  and  others,  had  at  Somo- 
Sierra  ridiculed  the  gloomy  forebodings  of  M.  de  Tournon. 
Murat's  correspondence,  moreover,  contains  earnest  so- 
licitations that  Napoleon  will  not  form  a  decision  from 
any  thing  he  may  hear  from  M.  de  Tournon,  the  only 
person  adverse  to  Murat  and  the  officers  of  his  staff.  I 
have  another  proof  of  this  fact.  In  the  correspondence 
of  M.  de  Tournon.  it  appears  that  he  remained  at  Burgos 
until  the  evening  of  the  24th,  impatiently  waiting  for  the 
Emperor.  It  is  authentically  recorded  that  he  arrived  in 
Paris  a  few  days  afterwards.  He  could  not,  at  the  most 
speedy  rate  of  travelling,  have  arrived  before  the  29th, 
which  fixes  the  date  of  the  letter  in  question  at  the  29th, 
(at  the  very  earliest,)  since  it  is  mentioned  in  the  letter 
itself  that  M.  de  Tournon  was  to  deliver  it.  Having 
arrived  on  the  29th,  he  found  that  the  Emperor  had  re- 
ceived no  intelligence;  for)  Murat  not  having  written 
either  on  the  22d  or  23d.  Napoleon  necessarily  passed 
two  days  without  despatches  from  Spain:  and  it  must 
have  been  the  28th  and  29th,  or  possibly  the  30th.  when 
he  received  answers  to  his  communications  of  the,  22d  and 
23  I,  on  account  of  the  time  then  required  for  the  journey 
from  Madrid  to  Paris.  There  is  consequently  no  letter 
from  the  Kmperor,  bearing  date  of  the  28th  or  2Jth,  save 
the  letter  in  question.  M.  de  Tournon  found  the  Emperor 
in  the  state  of  uneasiness  naturally  created  by  the  ab- 
gence  of  intelligence  in  critical  circumstances,  (and  circum- 
stances were  then  critical  indeed,  Murat  being  at  the 
gates  of  Madrid,  and  ready  to  enter.)  Napoleon  being  ;n 
this  anxious  condition  of  mind,  is  it  not  possible  that  M. 
de  Tournon  might  have  exercised  considerable  influence 
over  him,  and  might  have  even  persuaded  him  to  write 
the  letter  here  under  consideration  ?  Napoleon  naturally 
charged  him  to  deliver  it,  it  being  in  some  measure  his 
own  work.  The  phrase,  "  M.  de  Tburrum  will  deliver  this 
letter  In  you,"  connects  it  with  M.  de  Tournon,  and  the 
personal  opinions  of  that  individual  connect  it  still  more 
closely  with  him.  In  the  next  place,  dates  concur  in  fix- 
ing the  transient  indecision  of  Napoleon  to  the  two  days 
during  which  he  received  no  news,  after  having  been  ap- 
prised of  the  movement  of  Murat  on  Madrid.  Finally, 
having  received  on  the  30th  the  letter  of  the  24th.  in 
which  Mural  informs  him  how  successfully  every  thing 
had  proceeded,  he  reverted  to  his  former  views,  approved 
every  thing,  and  probably  took  bark  the  letter  from  M. 
de  Tournon.  or  it  may  be  he  despatched  a  courier  to  desire 
him  not  to  deliver  it.  as  the  asp««t  of  affairs  was  changed. 
However  this  may  be.  it  is  certain  that  the  letter  was  not 
delivered,  for  Murat  makes  no  more  allusion  to  it  than  if 
it  had  never  been  written,  though,  from  what  he  heard 


as  his  master.  General  Savary  had  just  ar- 
rived, as  the  bearer  of  the  Emperor's  secret 
wishes,  which  were  in  such  sad  harmony  with 
those  of  Murat,  and  he  had  no  more  hesitation 
as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued.  The  plan  in- 
dicated by  events  appeared  to  Murat  to  be,  not 
to  acknowledge  Ferdinand  VII.,  to  induce  him, 
if  possible,  to  meet  the  Emperor,  if  he  resisted 
to  avail  himself  of  the  protest  of  Charles  IV., 
in  order  to  declare  the  latter  the  only  King  of 
Spain,  and  Ferdinand  VII.  a  rebellious  son 
and  usurper ;  to  rescue  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
from  the  hands  of  his  executioners,  both  from 
humanity  and  politic  calculation,  for  he  was 
about  to  become,  in  existing  circumstances,  a 
very  useful  instrument;  this  plan,  too,  was 
agreeable  to  the  commands  of  Napoleon,  who 
was  on  his  way  to  Bayonne.  Murat  and  Ge- 
neral Savary  came  to  an  understanding  as  to 
the  manner  in  which  this  difficult  plot  was  to 
be  brought  to  a  successful  issue.  They  had  a 
very  convenient  auxiliary  in  M.  de  Beauharnais ; 
and  the  more  convenient,  as  he  was  convinced, 
in  his  blind  confidence,  that  Ferdinand  VII. 
could  do  nothing  better  than  hasten  to  meet 
Napoleon,  and  to  throw  himself  into  his  arms 
or  at  his  feet  in  order  to  obtain  the  recognition 
of  his  new  title,  the  confirmation  of  all  that 
had  taken  place  at  Aranjuez,  and  the  hand  of  a 
French  princess.  M.  de  Beauharnais  daily 
advised  Ferdinand  to  adopt  this  course,  and  the 
latter,  who  was  most  eager  to  receive  permis- 
sion from  Napoleon  to  reign,  but  dared  not  yet 


from  M.  de  Tournon,  he  must  have  been  aware  of  the 
Emperor's  transient  displeasure. 

One  thing  is  certain,  viz.  that,  between  the  evening  of 
the  24th  of  March  and  the  evening  of  the  4th  of  April,  M. 
de  Tournon  went  from  Burgos  to  Paris,  and  from  Parig 
to  Madrid,  which  affords  sufficient  reason  for  believing 
that  he  did  not  stop  a  moment  on  his  journey,  and  that 
he  was  in  Paris  on  the  29th,  on  which  day  he  might  have 
caused  the  Emperor  to  vacillate  and  to  write  the  letter. 
In  this  manner  all  is  explained.  The  observation  in  the 
letter  itself  stating  that  it  is  to  be  delivered  by  M.  dc 
Tournon,  and  thereby  connecting  the  document  with  that 
individual,  enabled  me.  by  inquiring  into  bis  personal 
opinions  and  comparing  dates,  to  elucidate  the  mystery. 

Now,  it  may  be  asked,  how  did  this  letter,  which  is  not 
in  the  collection  at  the  Louvre,  gain  publicity.  Of  that  I 
know  not.  M.  de  Tournon  is  dead  ;  M.  de  Las  Cases,  who 
was  the  first  to  send  it  forth  to  the  world,  is  also  dead. 
It  is  possible  that  M.  de  Las  Cases  received  it  from  Na- 
poleon, as  evidence  that  he  was  not  wholly  in  the  dark 
respecting  the  affairs  of  Spain.  It  is  also  possible  that  It 
may  have  been  brought  to  light  through  some  unknown 
channel,  which  cannot  now  be  traced  out.  But  the  style 
in  which  it  is  written,  together  with  the  facts  to  which  it 
adverts,  prove  that  it  is  not  a  forgery.  Other  facts  equally 
authentic  prove  that  it  was  not  delivered.  The  well 
ascertained  opinions  of  M.  de  Tournon,  as  well  as  the 
circumstance  of  his  having  been  intrusted  with  it  con- 
nect it  with  him ;  dates  identify  it  with  a  period  which 
must  have  betn  to  Napoleon  one  of  great  anxiety,  and  the 
apparent  inconsistency  it  betrays  may  be  thereby  ex- 
plained. Napoleon,  in  a  moment  of  hesitation,  dictated 
the  counter-orders  contained  in  this  letter;  then,  his  con- 
fidence being  restored  by  the  intelligence  of  Murat's  suc- 
cessful entry  into  Madrid,  he  came  back  to  his  original 
plans,  and  did  not  transmit  the  letter,  which  nt  a  subse- 
quent period  was  discovered  and  made  use  of  for  the  pur- 
pose of  a  justification.  It  proves  one  thing,  which  is.  that 
Napoleon's  intelligence  always  directed  him  rightly,  whilst 
his  passions  frequently  misled  him,  and  that  it  would 
have  been  well  had  he  followed  the  dictates  of  the  former, 
without  yielding  to  the  influence  of  the  latter.  I  con- 
ceived it  to  be  important  to  verify  this  point  of  history, 
us  it  affords  a  curious  insi.cht  into  human  character;  and 
I  trust  the  candid  portion  of  the  public  will  readily  admit 
that,  for  the  elucidation  of  truth.  I  have  performed  • 
more  laborious  task  than  historians  frequent  y  deem  it 
necessary  to  undertake :  moreover,  I  have  had  the  mean* 
of  consulting  documents  which  are  still  less  frequently 
accessible  to  writers  in  general. 


478 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[April,  1808. 


take  any  steps  in  the  absence  of  his  favourites, 
promised  to  follow  the  advice  of  the  French 
ambassador  as  soon  as  he  should  have  collected 
around  him  in  Madrid  those  in  whom  he  placed 
his  confidence.     He  had  already  removed  from 
his  ministry  those  who  were  regarded  as  beinj 
the  most  devoted  to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  o 
towards  whom   he  felt   no  inclination.      The 
administration  of  the  war  department  had  been 
committed  to  M.  O'Farrell,   an  officer  of  dis 
tinction,   who   had  formerly   commanded   th< 
Spanish  troops  in  Tuscany ;  the  finances  to  M 
d'Azanza,  a  highly  respected  former  minister 
the    department  of  justice    to  Don  Sebastian 
Pinuela,  who  had  obtained  great  reputation  in 
the  administration  of  the  laws.     He  had  re- 
moved M.  de  Caballero,   who   alone,   in   late 
times,  had  made  any  opposition  to  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  but  who  was  accused  of  playing 
no  very  respectable  character  in  the  prosecu- 
tion of  the  suit  of  the  Escurial ;  and  he  had 
retained  in  the  office  of  foreign  affairs  M.  de 
Cevallos,  the  humble  servant  on  all  occasions 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  and  especially  in 
the  great  question  of  the  journey  to  Andalusia. 
Cevallos  pretended  at  this  time  to  be  the  mosl 
faithful  friend  of  the  new  court,   and  had  in 
its  eyes  a  most  excellent  title — his  detestation 
of  the  French,  whom,  however,  he  was  ready 
to  serve  as  soon  as  their  arms  were  triumphant. 
The  Duke  de  1'Infantado  having  at  length 
arrived,  Ferdinand  VII.,  as  we  have  said,  ap- 
pointed him  governor  of  the  council  of  Castille 
and  commandant  of  his  military  house.     He 
had  also  the  satisfaction  of  again  seeing  and 
embracing  his  preceptor,  whom  he  had  most 
unworthily  given  up  in  the  suit  of  the  Escurial, 
but  whom  he  loved  from  habit,  and  to  whom  he 
was  accustomed  to  open  his  heart,  which  he  did 
to  very  few.     He  wished  to  load  him  with  dig- 
nities and  to  make  him  grand  inquisitor,  which 
canon  Escoi'quiz,  with  a  feigned  disinterested- 
ness, declined,  imitating   in    this   respect   the 
conduct  of  Cardinal  de  Fleury,  and  desiring 
nothing  more  than  to  be  the  preceptor  of  his 
royal  pupil,  but  in  reality  under  this  title  as- 
piring to  be  governor  of  Spain  and  the  Indies. 
He  only  accepted  the  title  of  councillor  of  state 
and  the  cordon  of  Charles  III.,  just  as  if  to 
afford   his   king   the   pleasure  of  giving   him 
something.     It  was  with  the  help  of  these  dif- 
ferent persons,  and  by  forming  a  more  secret 
council  with  the  Duke  de  1'Infantado  and  canon 
Escoi'quiz,  in  which  the  most  important  deci- 
sions were  to  be  made,  and  those  grand  ques- 
tions to  be  solved,  on  which  his  own  fate  and 
that  of  his  monarchy  depended. 

The  questions  which  Ferdinand  had  to  re- 
Bolve  may  all  be  comprised  in  a  single  one: 
Bhould  he  go  to  meet  Napoleon,  in  order  to 
obtain  his  good-will,  an  acknowledgment  of  his 
new  title,  and  the  hand  of  a  French  princess  ? 
Or  should  he  rather  proudly  await  in  Madrid, 
surrounded  by  the  fidelity  and  enthusiasm  of 
the  nation,  what  the  French  would  dare  to  at- 
tempt against  the  dynasty  ?  Even  before 
resolving  this  grave  question,  various  acts  of 
obsequiousness  towards  Napoleon  had  been 
performed.  After  having  sent  three  grandees 
of  the  court,  Count  Fernand  NieHez,  the  Duke 
of  Medina  Celi,  and  the  Duke  of  Frias,  the 
Infant  Don  Carlos  was  despatched  to  meet  him 
-  -to  go  as  far  as  Burgos,  Vittoria,  Irun,  and, 


if  necessary,  even  to  Bayonne.  This  first  mark 
of  respect  being  shown  to  Napoleon,  it  remained 
to  know  what  concessions  must  be  made  to  in- 
sure his  favour  in  case  he  should  assume  the 
duty  of  acting  as  arbiter  between  father  and 
son.  Several  days  were  occupied  in  deliberat- 
ing on  this  difficult  subject. 

First  of  all,  it  would  have  been  necessary  to 
know  what  were   Napoleon's   intentions  with 
regard  to  Spain,  when  he  had  added  to  the 
30,000  men  sent  to  Lisbon  another  army  esti- 
mated at  not  less  than  80,000,  whose  march 
by  Bayonne  and  Perpignan,  by  Castille  and 
Catalonia,  clearly  indicated  some  very  different 
object  from  Portugal.     But  Ferdinand's  coun- 
cillors, both  those  whom  he  had  recently  intro- 
duced  into  the  ministry  and  those  who   had 
formed  a  part  of  it  in  the  time  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace,  were  absolutely  ignorant  of  the 
diplomatic  relations  with  France.     M.  de  Ce- 
vallos, the  minister  of  foreign  affairs,  had  never 
been  initiated  into  any  of  the  negotiations  car- 
ried on  in  Paris  by  M.  Yzquierdo.     The  Prince 
of  the  Peace  and   the  queen  alone  were  ac- 
quainted with   them,   and  Charles   IV.    knew 
nothing  more  than  they  thought  fit  to  tell  him. 
Besides,  these  negotiations  themselves,  as  M. 
Yzquierdo  sagaciously  asserted,  were  perhaps 
nothing  more  than  a  lure,  to  conceal  under  a 
feigned  dispute  the  secret  designs  of  Napoleon. 
Thus  Ferdinand's  councillors,  new  as  well  as 
old,  knew  nothing  of  what  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace  was    acquainted  with,  and   he  himself 
only   knew   what    M.  Yzquierdo    had    rather 
guessed  than  ascertained.     Whilst  these  deli- 
berations were  being  carried  on,  a  despatch 
from  Yzquierdo  arrived  in  Madrid,  addressed 
to  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  and  written  from 
Paris  on  the  24th,  before  any  thing  was  known 
of  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez.    In  this  despatch 
Yzquierdo  gave  the  details  of  the  pretended 
negotiation  going  on  between  the  cabinets  of 
Madrid  and  Paris.     It  appeared,  according  to 
the  language  of  this  negotiation,  that  Napoleon 
required  a  perpetual  treaty  of  alliance  between 
the  two  countries,  the  opening  of  the  Spanish 
colonies  to  the  French,  and  finally,  in  order  to 
avoid  difficulties,  the  free  passage  of  the  troops 
destined  for  the  protection  of  Portugal,  and 
the  exchange  of  that  kingdom  for  the  provinces 
on  the  Ebro  situated  at  the  foot  of  the  Pyre- 
nees, such  as  Navarre,  Arragon,  and  Catalonia. 
On  these  conditions,  Yzquierdo  informed  the 
jrince,  the  Emperor  Napoleon  would  grant  the 
King  of  Spain  the  title  of  Emperor  of  the  Ame- 
ricas,  would  acknowledge  Ferdinand  VII.  as 
icir  presumptive  to  the  crown  of  Spain,  and 
;ive  him  a  French  princess  in  marriage.     He 
lad,  as  he  said,  earnestly  contended  against 
hese  conditions,  and   especially  against  that 
which  related  to  the  cession  of  the  provinces 
on  the  Ebro,  but  without  success.     He  did  not 
add,  because  he  had  already  stated  it  person- 
ally in  his  short  journey  to  Madrid,  that  Napo- 
eon  had  a  very  different  object  in  view,  and 
aimed  at  taking  away  the  crown   itself.     In 
ther  respects,  the  contents  of  this  despatch 
were  perfectly  correct,  for  M.  de  Talleyrand, 
n  his  part,  had  made  a  similar  report  to  the 
Emperor,  offering,  if  he  desired,  to  come  to  a 
onclusion  with  the  court  of  Spain  on  these 
onditions. 
When  Ferdinand's   councillors  received  M. 


April,  i«08.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


4',  9 


Yzquierdo's  despatch,  which  was  not  intended 
for  them,  in  their  ignorance  of  men  and  busi- 
ness they  thought  themselves  thoroughly  mas- 
ters of  the  se  :ret  of  Napoleon's  policy.  They 
thought  that,  in  reality,  there  were  no  other 
questions  between  the  governments  of  France 
and  Spain  than  those  mentioned  in  the  despatch 
of  Yzquierdo,  and  that  Napoleon  had  no  idea 
whatever  of  seizing  upon  the  crown  of  Spain. 
They  reasoned  as  follows : — First,  that  Napo- 
leon would  not  dare  to  brave  the  power  of  Spain 
by  making  an  attempt  upon  the  crown ;  as  true 
Spaniards,  they  could  not  entertain  this  idea. 
That  he  had  any  desire  to  do  so,  they  thought 
still  less  admissible.  Had  he  not,  after  the 
battles  of  Austerlitz  and  Jena,  left  their  thrones 
to  the  sovereigns  of  Austria  and  Prussia  ?  He 
had  up  till  this  time  dethroned  only  the  Bour- 
bons of  Naples,  who  had  drawn  down  this 
severe  treatment  upon  themselves  by  unpar- 
donable treachery.  But  the  court  of  Spain 
had  done  nothing  to  deserve  a  similar  fate, 
since  it  had,  on  the  contrary,  lavished  all  its 
resources  in  the  service  of  France.  The  only 
questions  to  be  decided,  therefore,  according 
to  Ferdinand's  councillors,  were,  whether  they 
should  exchange  a  few  provinces  for  the  king- 
dom of  Portugal,  consent  to  open  the  Spanish 
Indies  to  the  French,  and  agree  to  an  alliance 
•which  already  existed  in  justice  and  in  fact, 
and  which,  after  all,  was  for  the  true  interest 
of  both  countries.  The  only  nice  point  was 
the  sacrifice  of  the  provinces  on  the  Ebro,  a 
sacrifice  which  the  nation  would  most  unwill- 
ingly make,  and  which  might  prove  very 
injurious  to  the  popularity  of  the  young  king. 
On  this  point,  however,  the  language  of  Yzqui- 
erdo conveyed  nothing  absolute.  It  was,  so  to 
speak,  in  exchange  for  a  military  road  to  Por- 
tugal that  the  French  cabinet  appeared  desirous 
of  obtaining  the  provinces  on  the  Ebro.  But 
if  they  preferred  supporting  the  bondage  of 
this  military  road,  then  they  might  dispense 
with  the  cession  of  the  provinces  asked,  and 
escape  with  the  inconvenient  but  temporary 
passage  of  the  French  troops ;  for  as  soon  as 
Napoleon  should  have  a  new  war  in  the  north 
(which  could  not  fail  to  happen)  he  would  be 
forced  to  evacuate  Portugal,  and  Spain  would 
be  free  from  the  presence  of  his  troops. 

Such  was  their  manner  of  interpreting  Yz- 
quierdo's despatch.  Ferdinand's  councillors 
said  to  themselves  that  the  worst  which  could 
happen  from  a  direct  negotiation  with  Napo- 
leon would  be  the  being  obliged  to  make  some 
concessions  with  regard  to  the  colonies  ;  stipu- 
late anew  an  alliance  which  had  not  ceased  to 
exist,  and  to  concede  a  military  route  to  Por- 
tugal ;  and  that,  in  return,  the  acknowledg- 
ment of  the  title  of  the  new  king  would  be  cer- 
tainly obtained.  It  was  this  last  consideration 
which  exercised  the  greatest  influence  on  the 
minds  of  those  ignorant  advisers  and  of  their 
ignorant  master,  and  which  caused  all  others 
to  be  regarded  as  of  no  importance.  Although 
it  never  entered  their  minds  that  the  recogni- 
tion of  Ferdinand  VII.  might  be  refused,  cer- 
tain symptoms  had  given  them  some  uneasiness 
on  this  subject.  The  attentions  shown  by  Mu- 
rat  to  the  old  sovereigns,  the  eagerness  to  pro- 
tect them  by  a  detachment  of  French  cavalry, 
the  declaration  that  no  act  of  violence  would 
be  allowed  against  the  Prince  of  the  Peace, 


some  proposals  which  had  come  from  Aranjuez, 
when  the  old  court  consoled  itself  by  boasting 
of  the  protection  of  its  powerful  friend  Napo- 
leon, all  these  circumstances  excited  some  ap- 
prehensions in  the  minds  of  Ferdinand  and  his 
little  court  of  some  decided  change  of  policy 
in  favour  of  Charles  IV.,  a  change  brought 
about  by  the  intervention  of  France.  Although 
M.  de  Beauharnais  had  given  them  reason  to 
hope  for  the  good-will  of  Napoleon  without  pro- 
mising it,  they  had  obtained  nothing  from  the 
ambassador  for  many  days  but  vague  words — 
the  reiterated  advice  to  throw  themselves  into 
the  arms,  of  Napoleon  in  order  to  obtain  his 
favour,  which  was,  therefore,  not  yet  acquired, 
since  it  was  necessary  to  go  so  far  to  attain  it. 
Murat,  who  stood  in  a  still  closer  and  more  di- 
rect communication  with  the  Emperor  of  the 
French,  was  still  less  favourable.  He  showed 
no  inclination  to  pay  court  to  any  except  the 
old  sovereigns,  and  only  gave  the  young  king 
the  title  of  Prince  of  the  Asturias.  From  the 
tenor  of  other  propositions  from  Aranjuez,  they 
began  to  fear  that  the  old  sovereigns  enter- 
tained the  idea  of  going  in  person  to  meet  Na- 
poleon to  inform  him  of  the  manner  in  which 
the  revolution  of  Aranjuez  had  been  effected, 
to  surprise  his  favour,  and  obtain  redress  of 
their  wrongs.  They  were  afraid  that  power 
might  thus  return  to  Charles  IV.,  and  if  not 
into  the  hands  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  at 
least  to  the  queen,  who  would  put  Ferdinand 
again  in  the  sad  situation  of  an  oppressed  son, 
the  Duke  de  1'Infantado  and  canon  Escoi'quiz 
in  strong  castles,  and  thus  be  avenged  upon 
both  for  the  few  days  of  abasement  to  which 
she  had  been  obliged  to  submit,  and,  above  all, 
for  the  fall  of  her  favourite,  for  whom  she 
would  always  continue  inconsolable. 

This  was  the  reason  which,  above  all  others, 
far  more  than  their  ignorance  of  affairs  or  than 
foreign  suggestions,  led  Ferdinand  VII.  and  his 
silly  councillors  to  adopt  the  idea  of  going  in  a 
body  to  meet  Napoleon.  The  danger  of  com- 
promising by  an  imprudent  negotiation  the  pro- 
vinces, colonial  privileges,  or  some  other  great 
interest  of  the  Spanish  monarchy,  never  even 
presented  itself  to  their  minds,  so  exclusively 
were  they  occupied  with  the  fear  that  Charles 
IV.  would  go  to  plead  for  himself,  and  perhaps 
gain  his  cause  from  Napoleon.  They  would 
have  been  a  hundred  times  better  pleased  to 
see  Napoleon  reign  in  Spain  than  to  see  the 
queen  again  in  possession  of  the  royal  author- 
ity. This  same  feeling  was  entertained  by  the 
old  sovereigns  in  their  turn ;  and,  to  the  mis- 
fortune of  Spain  and  France,  this  f.-eling  caused 
the  sceptre  of  Philip  V.  to  fall  into  the  hands 
of  the  Bonaparte  family. 

This  fear  no  sooner  took  full  possession  of 
the  minds  of  the  new  court,  than  the  question 
of  going  to  meet  Napoleon  was  decided,  and  the 
deliberations  to  which  the  journey  might  still 
give  rise,  were  the  mere  hesitations  of  feeble 
minds,  incapable  even  of  willing  resolutely 
what  they  desired  to  do.  Efforts  were  not 
wanting,  either  on  the  part  of  Murat  or  of 
General  Savary,  to  put  an  end  to  these  hesita- 
tions. Murat  availed  himself  of  M.  de  Beau 
harnais  to  repeat  daily  in  Ferdinand's  ears  the 
advice  to  set  out,  impressing  on  this  unfortu- 
nate ambassador  that  this  was  the  only  mear.g 
of  repairing  the  fault  that  he  had  committed 


480 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[April,  1808 


by  hindering  the  journey  to  Andalusia.  Murat 
had  also  seen  canon  Escoi'quiz.  The  latter,  look- 
ing upon  himself  as  necessarily  much  more 
clever  than  a  soldier  who  had  passed  his  life  on 
the  battle-field,  flattered  himself  with  being 
able  very  easily  to  penetrate  the  secret  of  the 
court  of  France  by  a  few  moments'  conversa- 
tion with  the  person  who  represented  it  at  the 
head  of  the  French  army.  Murat  saw  him, 
took  good  care  not  to  promise  beforehand  the 
recognition  of  Ferdinand  VII.,  but  declared 
many  times  that  Napoleon's  intentions  were 
altogether  friendly :  that  he  had  no  wish  to 
interfere  in  the  internal  affairs  of  Spain,  and 
that,  if  his  troops  were  at  the  gates  of  Madrid 
at  the  moment  of  the  last  revolution,  it  was  a 
pure  accident;  but  that,  Europe  being  able  to 
make  him  responsible  for  this  revolution,  he 
was  obliged  to  be  very  sure,  before  recognising 
the  new  king,  that  every  thing  had  taken  place 
legitimately  and  naturally  at  Aranjuez;  that 
no  one  was  better  able  to  give  him  complete  in- 
formation on  the  subject  than  Ferdinand  VII. ; 
and  that  the  presence  of  this  prince,  as  well  as 
the  explanations  which  he  could  give,  would  not 
fail  to  produce  a  decisive  effect  on  the  Emperor's 
mind.  Murat  thus  duped  the  poor  canon,  who 
flattered  himself  with  duping  him,  and  who 
•went  away  convinced  that  this  journey  would 
infallibly  lead  to  the  recognition  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Asturias  as  King  of  Spain. 

It  was  known  that  General  Savary  had  ar- 
rived in  Madrid,  and,  although  he  was  in  a  po- 
sition inferior  to  that  of  Murat,  he  was  re- 
garded as  being  perhaps  more  thoroughly  in- 
formed of  Napoleon's  real  thoughts  than  the 
commander-in-chief.  An  interview  with  him 
was  therefore  desired.  The  canon  Escoi'quiz 
and  the  Duke  de  1'Infantado  wished  to  converse 
with  him  themselves,  and  then  to  present  him 
to  Ferdinand  VII.  After  having  received  still 
more  explicit  assurances  from  him  than  those 
given  by  Murat,  because  General  Savary  was 
less  bound  to  reserve,  they  presented  him  to 
the  Prince  of  the  Asturias.  The  prince  ques- 
tioned General  Savary  as  to  the  utility  of  the 
journey  he  was  advised  to  undertake,  and  the 
consequences  of  an  interview  with  Napoleon. 
At  that  time  there  was  no  question  about  going 
to  Bayonne,  but  only  to  Burgos  or  Vittoria; 
for  the  Emperor,  they  were  assured,  was  on  the 
point  of  arriving,  and  the  matter  at  issue  was 
that  of  doing  him  homage,  of  anticipating  the 
meeting  of  the  old  sovereigns  with  him,  and  of 
being  the  first  to  speak  in  order  to  explain  so 
as  to  convince  him  of  the  necessity  of  the  in- 
explicable revolution  of  Aranjuez.  General 
Savary,  without  pledging  the  Emperor's  word 
— with  whose  intentions  on  matters  unknown 
when  he  had  left  Paris  he  was,  he  said,  unac- 
quainted— had  no  trouble  in  misleading  persons 
who  would  have  deceived  themselves  had  no  one 
else  deceived  them.  Affecting  to  speak  merely 
his  own  sentiments,  he  alleged  that,  when  Na- 
poleon should  have  seen  the  Spanish  prince, 
heard  from  his  own  mouth  an  account  of  the 
late  events,  and,  above  all,  become  convinced 
that  France  would  find  in  him  a  faithful  ally, 
he  would  acknowledge  him  as  King  of  Spain. 
That  took  place  on  this  occasion  which  usually 
happens  in  conversations  of  this  kind :  General 
Savary  thought  he  had  promised  nothing,  by 
giving  abundant  reason  to  hope,  and  Ferdinand 


VII.  thought  that  every  thing  he  had  been  given 
reason  to  hope  for  was  actually  promised.  The 
general  had  no  sooner  quitted  the  prince,  than 
the  resolution,  already  taken,  of  going  to  meet 
Napoleon,  was  definitively  settled.  An  incident, 
however,  was  very  near  compromising  the  result 
which  Murat  and  Savary  were  anxious  to  effect. 

The  Emperor  had  given  orders  to  rescue  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace  from  the  fury  of  the  ene- 
mies who  were  eager  for  his  death,  in  order  not 
to  suffer  the  commission  of  a  crime  before  the 
eyes,  and  in  some  measure  on  the  responsibility 
of  the  French  army  ;  and  secondly,  in  order  to 
have  in  his  hands  an  instrument,  by  whose  aid 
he  reckoned  on  being  able  to  influence  the  old 
sovereigns  according  to  his  will.  The  old 
queen,  on  her  part,  warmly  seconded  by  the 
imbecile  goodness  of  Charles  IV.,  asked,  as  a 
favour  of  more  value  in  her  eyes  than  the 
crown  or  almost  than  life  itself,  the  deliverance 
of  him  whom  she  always  called  Emmanuel, 
their  best,  their  only  friend,  who  was,  she  said, 
the  victim  of  his  too  strong  feeling  of  friend- 
ship for  the  French.  Thus,  to  save  the  favour- 
ite became  not  only  an  act  of  humanity,  but 
the  surest  means  of  filling  the  old  court  with 
gratitude  and  joy,  and  of  moulding  it  at  will. 
Murat,  with  all  the  arrogance  of  power,  de- 
manded that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  should  be 
given  up  to  him.  The  prince,  who  had  first 
been  detained  in  the  village  of  Pinto,  had  after- 
wards been  conveyed  to  Villa- Viciosa,  a  sort 
of  royal  mansion,  where  he  was  in  greater  se- 
curity. He  had  been  sent  thither  under  an 
escort  of  the  life-guards,  resolved  to  murder 
rather  than  give  him  up.  After  having  loaded 
him  with  irons,  his  trial  was  conducted  with  a 
degree  of  barbarous  ferocity,  inspired  at  once 
by  hatred,  by  a  desire  of  doing  dishonour  to 
the  old  court,  and  of  guarding,  by  the  death 
of  this  old  favourite,  against  a  reverse  of  for- 
tune. Ferdinand  VII.  and  his  councillors  lent 
themselves  to  these  indignities  as  much  on  their 
own  account  as  on  that  of  the  base  rabble  whom 
they  were  desirous  of  flattering. 

Murat  declared  to  them  that,  unless  they  de- 
livered up  the  prince  to  him,  he  would  order 
his  dragoons  to  cut  to  pieces  the  life-guards 
who  kept  him  imprisoned,  and  thus  settle  the 
difficulty  by  main  force  It  must  be  said  to  the 
honour  of  this  valiant  man,  that  on  this  occa- 
sion he  was  as  much  impelled  by  a  generous 
indignation  as  by  any  calculations  of  advantage. 
The  more  he  insisted,  the  more  the  confidential 
advisers  of  Ferdinand,  who  were  incapable  of 
comprehending  any  noble  sentiment,  saw  in  his 
persistence  a  design  of  making  use  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace  against  Ferdinand  VII.,  and  it  was 
confidently  said  that  the  idea  of  assassinating 
the  prisoner  was  for  a  moment  entertained  by 
certain  excited  minds,  it  is  not  known  which, 
amongst  the  most  influential  of  the  new  court. 

General  Savary,  more  wary  than  Murat, 
thought  he  perceived  that  the  very  warmth 
which  was  manifested  in  demanding  the  release 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  excited  a  degree  of 
distrust  injurious  to  their  principal  object, 
which  was  the  departure  of  Ferdinand  VIL, 
and  he  took  upon  himself  .to  renounce  for  the 
moment  the  surrender  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  stating  that  this  would  be  a  matter  of 
subsequent  arrangement,  like  all  the  others,  in 
the  conferences  which  were  about  to  take  place 


April,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


481 


between  the  new  King  of  Spain  and  the  Em- 
peror of  the  French. 

This  concession  having  been  made,  the  de- 
parture of  Ferdinand  was  resolved  upon.  The 
prince  wished  first  of  all  to  go  to  Aranjuez  to 
visit  his  father,  whom  he  had  left  there  desert- 
ed, nay,  almost  in  a  state  of  destitution,  since 
the  19th  of  March,  (it  was  then  the  7th  or  8th 
of  April.)  without  deigning  to  see  him  even 
once.  He  was  desirous  of  obtaining  a  letter 
from  him  to  Napoleon,  in  order  in  some  mea- 
sure to  bind  his  old  father  by  a  testimony  of 
good-will  given  in  his  favour.  Charles  IV., 
however,  received  the  visit  of  this  unnatural 
eon  very  badly ;  and  the  queen  still  worse. 
They  refused  to  give  him  any  testimonial  with 
which  he  might  arm  himself  to  establish  his 
good  conduct  in  the  events  of  Aranjuez. 

Although  somewhat  disconcerted  by  this  re- 
fusal, he  nevertheless  made  preparations  to 
set  out  on  the  10th  of  April.  He  left  behind 
him  a  regency  composed  of  his  uncle,  the 
infant  Don  Antonio,  O'Farrill,  minister  of  war, 
Azanza,  minister  of  finance,  and  Don  Sebastian 
de  Pinuela,  minister  of  justice,  with  a  commis- 
sion to  give  orders  during  his  absence  in  cases 
of  urgency,  and  to  refer  to  him  on  all  matters  not 
requiring  immediate  decision,  and  in  all  cases 
to  consult  and  advise  with  the  council  of  Cas- 
tille.  Ferdinand  took  with  him  his  two  most 
confidential  friends,  the  Duke  de  1'Infantado 
and  the  canon  Escoi'quiz,  Cevallos,  minister  of 
state,  and  two  experienced  negotiators  in 
the  persons  of  MM.  de  Musqurz  and  Labrador. 
He  was,  besides,  accompanied  by  the  Duke  of 
San  Carlos  and  the  grandees  who  constituted 
his  new  household.  Cevallos  was  charged  with 
corresponding  with  the  regency  left  behind  in 
Madrid. 

It  was,  however,  no  easy  matter  to  make  this 
resolution  acceptable  to  the  people  of  the  capi- 
tal.    Some,  from  a  feeling  of  pride  peculiarly 
Spanish,  thought  it  would  have  been  enough  to 
send  the  infant  Don  Carlos,  the  king's  brother, 
to  meet  Napoleon,  and  believed  in  all  sincerity 
that  the  sovereign  of  degenerate  Spain  was  at 
least  equal  to  the  Emperor  of  the  French,  the 
conquerer   of  the  Continent,   and   master   of 
Europe.    Others,  and  they  comprised  the  largest 
number,  began  to  see  through  the  motives  which 
had  brought  so  many  French  to  the  Peninsula, 
put  a  sinister  interpretation  on  the  refusal  to 
acknowledge  Ferdinand  VII.,  and  to  look  upon 
this  going  to  meet  Napoleon  as  the  act  of  a  j 
dupe,  for  this  was  to  put  himself  into  his  power-  ! 
ful  hands.     They  were  far  from  supposing  that ! 
Ferdinand  and  his  advisers  would  push  their  \ 
folly  so  far  as  to  go  to  Bayonne,  or  the  French  ' 
territory,  but  they  considered  that  the  nearer  [ 
they  approached   to  the  Pyrenees,   the  more  • 
they  would  place  themselves  within  the  reach  i 
of  Napoleon  and  his  armies.     There  was  an  in-  j 
expressible  commotion  in  Madrid  at  the  news 
of  this  journey,  and  a  regular  tumult  would  ; 
have  taken  place  had  not  a  proclamation  been  ! 
issued  by  Ferdinand  VII.  calculated  to  appease  ' 
their  minds,  by  saying  that  Napoleon  was  com-  ! 
ing  in  person  to  Madrid,  there  to  knit  more 
firmly  the  bonds  of  a  new  alliance,  and  to  con-  ! 
Bolidate  the  happiness  of  the  Spaniards,  and 
that  they  could  not  neglect  the  duty  of  going  ': 
to  meet  a  guest  so  illustrious  and  so  great  as  ! 
the  victor  of  Austerlitz  and  Friedland. 

VOL.  II.-- 61 


This  proclamation  prevented  the  tumult  with- 
out entirely  removing  the  suspicions  which  the 
common  sense  of  the  people  had  led  them  to 
entertain.  Ferdinand  took  his  departure  on 
the  10th  of  April,  surrounded  by  an  immense 
multitude,  who  saluted  him  with  a  melancholy 
interest,  and  with  protestations  of  unbounded 
devotedness.  Amongst  a  part  of  the  people, 
however,  it  was  easy  to  see  a  kind  of  disdain- 
ful compassion  for  the  foolish  credulity  of  the 
young  king. 

It  had  been  agreed  upon  with  Mnrat  that 
General  Savary,  for  fear  of  some  alteration  in 
Ferdinand's  mind,  or  that  of  those  who  accom- 
panied him,  should  make  the  journey  along  with 
them,  to  draw  them  on  from  Burgos  to  Vittoria, 
and  from  Vittoria  to  Bayonne,  where  it  was 
to  be  presumed  the  Emperor  had  stopped.  It 
was  agreed,  besides,  that  the  demand  for  de- 
livering up  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  should  be 
deferred  till  Ferdinand  had  crossed  the  fron- 
tiers, and  that  even  then  care  should  be  taken 
to  abstain  from  that  step,  or  any  other  calcu- 
lated to  give  offence. 

By  means  of  Generals  Savary  and  Reille, 
successively  sent  to  Madrid,  Napoleon  had  in- 
formed Murat  of  his  determination  of  getting 
possession  of  Ferdinand  VII.  by  inducing  him 
to  come  to  Bayonne ;  of  placing  Charles  IV.  * 
again  for  a  few  days  upon  the  throne ;  and  then 
availing  himself  of  this  unfortunate  prince  to 
make  him  cede  the  crown.  He  had  at  the  same  . 
time  enjoined  Murat,  if  Ferdinand  VII.  could 
not  be  prevailed  upon  to  set  out,  to  publish  the 
protest  of  Charles  IV.,  to  declare  that  he  alone 
was  king,  and  Ferdinand  VII.  nothing  more 
than  a  rebel  son.  The  facility,  however,  with 
which  Ferdinand  VII.  was  persuaded  to  go  to 
meet  Napoleon  relieved  him  from  having  re- 
course to  these  violent  means,  and  from  replac- 
ing the  sceptre  of  Spain  in  the  hands  of  Charles 
IV.  However  weak  those  hands  might  have 
been,  and  however  easy  it  might  appear  to  have 
snatched  from  them  a  sceptre  only  restored  for 
a  moment,  Murat  was,  nevertheless,  much 
better  pleased  not  to  be  obliged  to  follow  the 
long  course  which  kept  him  still  at  a  distance 
from  the  object  to  which  all  his  wishes  tended. 
He  saw,  therefore,  that  it  was  necessary  to  be 
satisfied  with  making  Ferdinand  VII.  set  out 
without  restoring  the  sceptre  to  Charles  IV. 
Ferdinand  VII.,  whom  the  Spaniards  eagerly 
desired  for  their  king,  being  once  in  the  hands 
of  Napoleon,  there  only  remained  Charles  IV., 
whom  the  Spaniards  would  not  have  on  any 
conditions,  and  he  might  even  be  prevailed 
upon  to  consent  to  go  to  Bayonne.  Then  all  the 
Bourbons,  old  and  young,  popular  and  unpo- 
pular, would  be  at  the  disposal  of  Napoleon, 
and  the  throne  of  Spain  would  be  in  truth 
vacant. 

What  Murat  had  foreseen  did  not  fail  to  come 
to  pass.  The  departure  of  Ferdinand  VII.  was 
scarcely  known  when  the  old  sovereigns  were 
also  eager  to  be  on  the  road.  It  had  been 
quite  impossible  to  inspire  them  with  a  mo- 
ment's confidence  ever  since  the  17th  of  March, 
Spain  had  become  hateful  to  them.  They  con- 
stantly spoke  of  quitting  it,  and  of  going  to 
occupy  even  an  humble  farm  in  France,  a 
country  which  their  powerful  friend  Napoleon 
had  rendered  at  once  so  calm,  so  peaceable, 
and  so  safe.  But  the  case  was  altered  alto- 
28 


482 


HISTORY  OP   THE 


[April,  1808. 


gether  when  they  learned  that  Ferdinand  VII. 
had  set  out  in  order  to  have  a  personal  inter- 
view with  Napoleon.  Although  they  had  neither 
any  great  hope  nor  a  great  ambition  of  resum- 
ing the  sceptre,  they  were  filled  with  envy  at 
the  idea  of  Ferdinand  gaining  his  cause  with 
the  arbiter  of  their  destiny — of  his  being  re- 
cognised and  settled  as  king  by  the  acknow- 
ledgment of  France — thus  becoming  their  mas- 
ter, and  that  of  the  unfortunate  Godoy,  and  of 
being  able  to  decide  their  fate  and  that  of  all 
their  creatures.  Not  being  able  to  bear  this 
idea,  they  conceived  an  ardent  desire  to  pro- 
ceed in  person  to  plead  their  cause  against 
nn  unnatural  son  in  the  presence  of  the  all- 
powerful  sovereign  who  was  approaching  the 
Pyrenees.  The  Queen  of  Etruria,  who  hated 
her  brother  Ferdinand,  and  by  whom  she  was 
hated  in  return,  had  also  to  defend  the  rights 
of  her  young  son,  now  become  King  of  North 
Lusitania.  She  was  afraid  that  his  claims  might 
be  entirely  forgotten  in  the  general  confusion  of 
every  thing  in  the  Peninsula,  and  was  desirous 
of  going  with  her  father  and  mother  to  throw 
herself  into  the  arms  of  Napoleon,  in  order  to 
obtain  from  him  justice  and  protection.  She 
therefore  contributed  to  render  the  desire  of 
her  aged  parents  more  eager,  and  to  urge  them 
J  to  take  the  road  to  Bayonne.  In  this  manner 
these  unfortunate  Bourbons  were  seized  with  a 
sort  of  emulation  to  give  themselves  up  to  this 
terrible  conqueror,  who  attracted  them  as 
snakes  are  said  to  charm  birds,  which  are 
drawn  to  them  by  an  irresistible  and  mysterious 
attraction. 

The  expression  of  this  desire  was  immediately 
communicated  to  Murat,  who  received  its  an- 
nouncement with  inexpressible  joy.  Had  he 
merely  obeyed  his  first  impulse,  he  would  have 
put  the  old  court  into  carriages  to  make  them 
set  out  immediately  after  the  young  one.  But  he 
was  afraid  of  giving  too  great  offence  by  making 
all  the  members  of  the  family  leave  at  the  same 
time,  of  provoking  reflections  in  the  mind  of 
Ferdinand  and  his  advisers,  which  might  lead 
them,  perhaps,  to  relinquish  their  journey ; 
and,  above  all,  of  adopting  such  a  course  with- 
out the  express  assent  of  the  Emperor.  He 
therefore  confined  himself  to  the  immediate 
despatch  of  this  important  news,  not  doubting 
the  answer,  and  contemplating  with  pleasure 
the  whole  of  the  princes  who  had  any  right  to 
the  crown  of  Spain  hastening  of  their  own  ac- 
cord towards  the  gulf  open  for  them  at  Bayonne. 
He  entertained  foolish  hopes,  and  persuaded 
himself  that  every  thing  was  possible  in  Spain 
to  power  mingled  with  a  little  address. 

During  this  time  Ferdinand  and  his  court 
were  proceeding  on  their  way  to  Burgos,  with 
that  slowness  usual  with  these  indolent  princes 
of  degenerate  Spain.  The  eager  homage  of  the 
population,  too,  contributed  not  a  little  to  delay 
their  progress.  Everywhere  the  people  broke 
to  pieces  the  busts  of  Emmanuel  Godoy,  and 
carried  about  in  procession  those  of  Ferdinand 
VII.  crowned  with  flowers.  The  towns  through 
which  the  prince  passed  pardoned  the  object  of 
his  journey,  which  procured  them  the  pleasure 
of  seeing  him ;  but,  deeply  impressed  with  fear 
for  his  fate,  they  swore  to  devote  themselves 
for  him  should  there  be  need.  They  gave  a 
fuller  and  more  energetic  expression  to  these 
feelings  whenever  they  could  be  remarked  by 


the  French,  as  if  they  wished  to  warn  them 
both  of  their  distrust  and  of  the  devotedness 
which  they  were  ready  to  exhibit. 

On  their  arrival  at  Burgos,  Ferdinand  VII. 
and  his  travelling  companions  experienced  a 
surprise  which  gave  rise  in  their  minds  to  the 
beginning  of  regret.  General  Savary  had 
always  said  to  them  that  the  only  thing  in 
view  was  to  go  to  meet  Napoleon ;  that  he  was 
on  his  way  to  Old  Castille,  where  they  would 
meet  him,  perhaps  even  at  Burgos.  The  ardent 
desire  of  being  the  first  to  see  him,  to  anticipate 
the  old  rulers,  had  wholly  deprived  them  of  all 
clear  sightedness,  so  that  they  failed  to  see  a 
snare  so  obvious.  But,  on  approaching  the 
Pyrenees  and  plunging  into  the  midst  of  French 
armies,  a  sort  of  shuddering  had  seized  them, 
and  they  were  almost  tempted  to  stop,  so  much 
the  more,  as  they  heard  nothing  whatever  of 
Napoleon  or  of  his  speedy  arrival.  (He  was 
then  at  Bordeaux.)  General  Savary,  who  never 
quitted  them,  presented  himself  immediately, 
gave  firmness  to  their  wavering  confidence,  as- 
sured them  they  were  at  last  going  to  meet 
Napoleon ;  that  the  further  they  advanced  to- 
wards him,  the  more  he  would  be  disposed  to 
favour  them :  and  besides,  that  they  would  be 
thus  made  certain  of  the  fate  which  awaited 
them  two  days  earlier.  It  is  a  sure  means  of 
drawing  on  agitated  minds  to  promise  them  an 
earlier  clearing  up  of  the  doubts  which  agitate 
them.  It  was  then  determined  to  proceed  to 
Vittoria,  where  they  arrived  on  the  evening  of 
the  15th  of  April. 

At  Vittoria,  Ferdinand's  hesitation  changed 
into  absolute  resistance,  and  he  refused  to  pro- 
secute his  journey  further.  Firstly,  he  had 
been  informed  that  Napoleon,  so  far  from  hav- 
ing crossed  the  frontiers,  was  still  only  at 
Bordeaux,  and  Spanish  susceptibility  was  deeply 
offended  by  having  advanced  so  far  towards  a 
meeting  when  the  other  party  had  proceeded 
so  small  a  distance.  Secondly,  as  they  ap- 
proached the  frontiers  of  France,  the  truth 
began  to  burst  upon  them.  In  Madrid,  in  the 
midst  of  hostile  factions,  eager  to  anticipate 
one  another  in  obtaining  Napoleon's  favour,  in 
the  midst  of  a  people  infatuated  respecting 
itself,  which  imagined  that  no  foreign  hand 
would  dare  to  touch  the  crown  of  Charles  V., 
it  had  been  possible  to  suppose  that  the  French 
army  had  been  sent  to  Spain  solely  with  a  view 
to  the  interests  of  the  royal  family  ;  but,  in  the 
neighbourhood  of  France,  where  every  one 
clearly  saw  the  object  of  Napoleon  ;  where  the 
French  armies,  long  assembled,  had  indiscreetly 
talked  of  what  they  supposed  to  be  the  object 
of  their  mission,  it  was  more  difficult  to  remain 
in  illusion.  Every  one  at  Bayonne  and  its 
neighbourhood  said  that  Napoleon  was  simply 
about  to  complete  his  political  system  by  plac- 
ing the  Bonaparte  family  on  the  throne  of  Spain 
instead  of  that  of  the  Bourbons.  This  conduct 
was  looked  upon  as  quite  natural  in  a  conqueror, 
who  was  the  founder  of  a  dynasty,  always  sup- 
posing that  the  enterprise  was  crowned  with 
success,  and  especially  that  in  these  changes  the 
Spanish  colonies  did  not  go  to  enlarge  the  British 
empire  beyond  the  seas.  These  ideas  had 
passed  from  the  French  Basque  provinces  into 
the  Basque  provinces  of  Spain,  and  produced 
such  a  sensation  in  the  minds  of  Ferdiiuind  VII. 
and  the  canon  Escoi'quiz,  that  a  resolution  was 


April,  1808.] 


immediately  adopted  to  stop  at  Vittoria.  The 
reason  given  was  one  of  etiquette,  which  had 
its  weight ;  for  it  was  not  a  very  dignified  step 
to  proceed  even  beyond  the  frontiers  of  Spain 
to  meet  Napoleon.  In  order  to  draw  the 
Spaniards  on  to  Vittoria,  General  Savary  had 
constantly  given  them  reason  to  hope,  and  al- 
most to  be  certain,  of  meeting  Napoleon  at  the 
next  post.  But  the  certain  news  of  his  being 
still  at  Bordeaux  no  longer  permitted  the  em- 
ployment of  such  means.  He  then  said  that, 
since  the  object  of  the  journey  was  to  see  Na- 
poleon, in  order  to  solicit  the  acknowledgment 
of  the  new  royalty,  it  was  necessary  to  put 
trifling  considerations  aside,  and  to  proceed 
towards  the  object  which  they  wished  to  attain ; 
that,  after  all,  those  who  came  to  meet  Napoleon 
Lad  need  of  him,  whilst  he  had  no  need  of  them ; 
and  therefore  it  was  natural  that  they  should 
take  that  road  which  other  business,  of  great 
importance,  had  hitherto  prevented  him  from 
pursuing;  and  that,  finally,  it  was  necessary 
to  cease  rebelling,  like  children,  against  the 
consequences  of  a  step  which  had  been  taken 
from  motives  of  peculiar  interest.  The  general, 
with  whom  a  sort  of  military  vivacity  often 
baffled  prudence,  when  he  saw  that  he  was  not 
listened  to,  suddenly  changed  his  bearing ; 
from  being  fawning  and  wily  he  became  arro- 
gant and  harsh,  and  mounting  his  horse,  said 
that  they  might  do  as  they  pleased,  but  for  his 
own  part  he  would  return  to  Bayonne  to  join 
the  Emperor,  and  that  they  might  probably  have 
to  repent  of  their  change  of  determination. 
He  left  them  frightened,  but  for  the  moment 
obstinate  in  their  resistance. 

General  Savary  immediately  set  out  for  Ba- 
yonne, where  he  arrived  on  the  14th  of  April,  a 
few  hours  before  the  Emperor,  who  did  not 
reach  that  city  till  the  evening  of  the  same  day. 
The  latter  had  remained  some  days  at  Bordeaux, 
in  order  to  give  the  Spanish  princes  time  to 
approach  the  frontiers  and  to  be  relieved  from 
the  necessity  of  going  to  meet  them,  which  he 
would  have  been  obliged  to  do  had  he  been  at 
Bayonne.  He  occupied  his  leisure  in  Bordeaux, 
as  he  usually  did,  in  informing  himself  of  every 
thing  connected  with  the  interests  of  the  coun- 
try, in  ascertaining  the  nature  and  extent  of 
the  commerce  of  that  large  city,  and  the  means 
of  keeping  up  the  relations  of  France  with  its 
colonies'.  Having  seen  with  his  own  eyes  how 
greatly  the  city  of  Bordeaux  was  suffering  from 
the  war,  he  had  given  orders  for  ft  loan  of  seve- 
ral millions  from  the  extraordinary  treasury, 
and  for  a  considerable  purchase  of  wines  on 
account  of  the  civil  list.  Having  arrived  at 
Bayonne  on  the  14th,  he  heard  with  great  satis- 
faction all  that  had  taken  place  at  Madrid  for 
the  promotion  of  his  designs,  and  adopted  suit- 
able measures  to  insure  their  definitive  excep- 
tion. 

After  having  concerted  these  measures  with 
General  Savary,  he  agreed  to  send  him  back  to 
Vittoria  as  the  bearer  of  an  answer  to  a  letter 
which  Ferdinand  had  already  addressed  to  him. 
This  answer  was  couched  in  terms  calculated 
to  draw  this  prince  to  Bayonne,  without  enter- 
ing into  any  formal  agreement  with  him.  la  it 
Napoleon  said  that  the  papers  of  Charles  IV. 
ought  to  have  convinced  him  of  his  imperial 
good-will,  (in  allusion  to  the  advice  of  indul- 
gence given  to  Charles  IV.  at  the  time  of  the 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


483 


process  at  the  Escurial ;)  that,  consequently, 
there  could  be  no  doubt  concerning  his  personal 
dispositions ;  that,  while  directing  his  troops 
to  such  points  of  the  coasts  of  Europe  as  were 
best  calculated  to  second  his  operations  against 
England,  he  had  conceived  the  design  of  going 
to  Madrid,  in  order  to  urge  his  august  friend, 
Charles  IV.,  in  passing,  to  adopt  some  indis- 
pensable reforms,  and  especially  to  dismiss  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace ;  that  he  had  often  advised 
this  dismissal,  and,  if  he  had  not  insisted  upon 
it  more,  it  was  merely  out  of  forbearance  to- 
wards his  august  weaknesses — weaknesses 
which  must  be  pardoned — for  kings,  like  other 
men,  were  only  weakness  and  error ;  that  he  had 
been  surprised  in  the  very  midst  of  these  pro- 
jects by  the  events  of  Aranjuez ;  that  he  had 
no  idea  of  constituting  himself  the  judge  of 
them,  but  that  his  armies,  being  actually  on  the 
spot,  he  did  not  wish  to  appear  in  the  eyes  of 
Europe  to  be  either  the  promoter  or  accomplice 
of  a  revolution  which  had  overturned  the  throne 
of  an  ally  and  a  friend ;  that  he  made  no  pre- 
tensions to  a  right  to  intermeddle  in  the  inter- 
nal affairs  of  Spain,  but  that,  if  it  could  be 
shown  that  the  abdication  of  Charles  IV.  had 
been  voluntary,  he  should  have  no  difficulty  in 
recognising  him — the  Prince  of  the  Asturias — 
as  lawful  sovereign  of  Spain ;  that,  for  this 
purpose,  a  conversation  of  some  hours  appeared 
desirable,  and  that  notwithstanding  the  reserve 
maintained  for  a  month  past  on  the  part  of 
France,  there  was  no  reason  to  apprehend  in 
the  Emperor  of  the  French  a  judge  prejudiced 
against  him.  This  was  followed  by  some  ad- 
vice, couched  in  the  loftiest  language,  on  the 
subject  of  the  prosecution  designed  against  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace  ;  on  the  inconvenience  that 
would  result  from  dishonouring  not  only  the 
prince,  but  the  king  and  the  queen,  from  initiat- 
ing a  jealous  and  ill-disposed  multitude  into 
the  secrets  of  state  affairs,  and  from  teaching 
them  the  habit  of  laying  hands  upon  those  who 
had  long  governed  it ;  for,  added  Napoleon,  the 
people  are  glad  to  avenge  the  homage  which  they 
render  us.  Finally,  he  showed  himself  still  dis- 
posed to  the  idea  of  a  marriage,  if  the  expla- 
nations which  were  to  be  given  at  Bayonne 
should  prove  such  as  to  satisfy  him. 

This  letter,  which  was  a  clever  mixture  of 
indulgence,  haughtiness,  and  reason,  would 
have  been  an  admirable  piece  of  eloquence,  had 
it  not  been  the  means  of  concealing  a  treache- 
rous delusion.  General  Savary  was  to  bear 
this  letter  to  Vittoria,  to  give  in  person  the 
necessary  developments  of  its  contents ;  or,  if 
necessary,  to  add  some  of  his  cunning  words, 
of  which  he  was  prodigal,  and  .which  should 
decide  Ferdinand  VII.  without  binding  the  Em- 
peror. It  was,  however,  necessary  to  make 
provision  for  the  case  of  Ferdinand  VII.  and 
his  advisers  resisting  all  these  artifices.  Should 
this  case  arise,  Napoleon  had  no  idea  of  stop- 
ping half-way.  He  decided,  therefore,  that 
force  was  to  be  employed.  In  addition  to  the 
corps  of  observation  of  the  Western  Pyrenees, 
he  had  ordered  the  reserve  of  provisional  in- 
fantry, under  General  Verdier,  to  pass  into 
Spain,  as  well  as  a  corps  of  provisional  cavalry 
under  General  Lasalle,  and  numerous  detach- 
ments of  the  mounted  imperial  guards.  These 
troops,  having  formed  a  junction  under  Marshal 
Bessieres,  were  to  occupy  Old  Castillo,  and  tu 


484 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[April,  1808. 


protect  the  rear  of  the  army.  He  sent  orders 
to  Murat,  as  well  as  to  Marshal  Bessieres,  not 
to  hesitate,  and  upon  the  mere  authority  of 
General  Savary  to  cause  the  Prince  of  the  As- 
turias  to  be  arrested — giving  publicity  at  the 
same  moment  to  the  protest  of  Charles  IV. — 
declaring  that  the  latter  alone  was  king,  and 
the  son  nothing  but  a  usurper,  who  had  set  on 
foot  the  revolutions  of  Aranjuez  in  order  to  seize 
upon  the  crown.  If  Ferdinand  VII.,  however, 
agreed  to  cross  the  frontier  and  come  to  Ba- 
yonne,  Napoleon  entirely  agreed  to  the  opinion 
of  Murat,  that  the  sceptre  should  not  be  re- 
stored to  Charles  IV.,  from  whom  it  must  soon 
be  again  taken  away,  and  that  the  aged  sove- 
reigns should  be  sent  towards  Bayonne,  since 
they  had  themselves  expressed  that  desire.  He 
continued  to  recommend  to  him,  as  soon  as  Fer- 
dinand VII.  had  crossed  the  frontier,  to  insist 
upon  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  being  delivered 
up  to  him,  willingly  or  by  force,  and  to  send 
him  to  Bayonne.  Such  were  the  arrangements 
which  were  to  complete,  in  case  of  necessity, 
by  force,  if  cunning  failed,  this  dark  scheme 
laid  against  the  crown  of  Spain. ' 

After  having  given  these  orders,  and  sent 
General  Savary  back  to  Vittoria,  Napoleon  oc- 
cupied himself  with  forming  an  establishment 
at  Bayonne,  wh;ch  might  admit  of  his  sojourn- 
ing there  for  some  months.  Independently  of 
the  Empress  Josephine,  he  expected  to  receive 
there  a  great  number  of  princes  and  princesses, 
and  for  this  reason  he  resolved  to  keep  at  his 
disposal  the  apartments  which  he  occupied  in 
the  interior  of  the  town.  This  country  is  one 
of  the  most  attractive  in  Europe — to  it,  how- 
ever, Napoleon  has  unfortunately  attached  re- 
collections much  less  pleasing  than  those  with 
which  he  filled  Egypt,  Italy,  Germany,  and  Po- 
land. In  this  country,  composed  of  beautiful 
hills,  watered  by  the  Adour,  crowned  by  the 
Pyrenees,  and  bounded  on  the  horizon  by  the 
sea,  there  was,  about  a  league  from  Bayonne, 
a  small  chateau  of  regular  architecture,  and  of 
uncertain  origin,  constructed,  as  it  is  said,  for 
one  of  those  princesses  whom  France  and  Spain 
formerly  mutually  gave  in  marriage.  This  cha- 
teau stands  in  the  midst  of  a  beautiful  garden, 
in  a  most  charming  position,  and  under  a  sun 
as  brilliant  as  that  of  Italy.  Napoleon  was 
anxious  to  get  immediate  possession  of  the 
place.  In  order  to  satisfy  the  desire,  it  was 
happily  unnecessary  to  have  recourse  either  to 
those  artifices  or  that  violence  which  were 
needed  against  the  crown  of  Spain.  Its  owner 
was  delighted  to  sell  it  him  for  100.000  francs. 
It  was  decorated  in  haste  with  such  resources 
as  the  country  offered.  The  garden  was  con- 
verted into  a  camp  for  the  troops  of  the  impe- 
rial guard.  Napoleon  established  himself  there 
on  the  17th,  and  left  the  apartments  he  occu- 
pied in  Bayonne  free,  in  order  to  accommodate 
in  them  the  royal  family  of  Spain,  all  the  mem- 
bers of  which  he  hoped  soon  to  bring  together 
there. 

General  Savary  having  set  out  in  all  haste 
for  Vittoria,  found  Ferdinand  there,  surrounded 
not  only  by  the  advisers  who  had  followed  him, 
but  by  many  other  important  individuals,  who 
had  hastened  thither  to  offer  him  their  services 
and  their  homage.  Among  the  latter,  there 

•  The  account  here  given  is  according  to  the  minutes 
of  the  orders  still  existing  in  the  Louvre. 


was  a  person  of  great  consideration ;  this  was 
Urquijo,  formerly  prime  minister,  brutally  dis- 
graced in  1802,  when  the  influence  of  the  Prince 
of  the  Peace  had  finally  become  supreme,  and 
who  then  retired  into  Biscay,  his  native  coun- 
try. Urquijo,  who  was  a  man  of  firm,  pene- 
trating, but  morose  mind,  spoke  to  Ferdinand, 
in  the  presence  of  his  other  advisers,  like  a  wise 
and  experienced  statesman.  He  told  him  and 
them  that  nothing  could  be  more  imprudent  than 
the  prince's  journey,  if  they  proceeded  beyond 
the  frontiers ;  that,  as  far  as  respect  was  con- 
cerned, every  thing  had  been  done  which  the 
greatest  and  most  illustrious  sovereign  could 
desire,  by  coming  to  receive  him  at  the  verge 
of  the  kingdom ;  that  to  go  beyond,  was  to 
prove  wanting  in  the  dignity  due  to  the  Span- 
ish crown,  and  to  commit  an  act  of  remarkable 
folly ;  that  any  one  who  had  read  with  a  ten- 
tion  the  account  of  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez, 
inserted  in  the  official  journal,  (Afoniteur,)  must 
have  seen  the  lurking  intention  to  discredit  the 
new  king,  to  dispute  his  title,  to  inspire  a  feel- 
ing of  sympathy  for  the  deposed  sovereign — 
all  which  disclosed  the  purpose  of  Napoleon  to 
be,  to  treat  the  one  as  a  usurper  and  the  other  as 
incapable  of  reigning ;  that  any  one  who  had  for 
some  time  observed  the  policy  of  Napoleon  with 
respect  to  Spain  must  have  discovered  the  plan 
of  getting  rid  of  the  house  of  Bourbon,  and  of 
making  the  Peninsula  a  part  of  the  system  of 
the  French  empire ;  that  the  indifference  affected 
towards  the  proclamation  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  accompanied  by  the  care  taken  to  dis- 
perse the  Spanish  fleets  and  armies,  by  bring- 
ing the  one  into  the  ports  of  France,  and  send- 
ing the  other  to  the  North,  revealed  even  to 
obviousness  the  project  of  taking  vengeance  on 
the  first  opportunity,  and  that  the  reunion  of 
so  many  troops  in  the  South  at  the  conclusion 
of  affairs  in  the  North  could  no  longer  leave  a 
doubt  on  such  a  subject. 

MM.  de  Musquiz  and  De  Labrador,  who  at 
the  different  courts  of  Europe  had  learned  to 
form  some  just  ideas  of  general  politics,  gave 
unequivocal  marks  of  assent  to  these  wise  ob- 
servations ;  but  no  attention  was  paid  to  their 
advice.  The  advisers  who  were  in  favour  were 
the  mediocre  and  versatile  Cevallos,  who  con- 
cealed his  duplicity  under  impetuosity,  and  had 
never  pardoned  Urquijo  for  the  wrongs  which 
he  had  formerly  done  to  this  eminent  man,  for 
he  had  been  the  subordinate  instrument  of  his 
disgrace,  and  was,  therefore,  but  little  disposed 
to  receive  his  ideas,  and  the  two  particular  con- 
fidants of  the  prince,  the  Duke  de  1'Infantado 
and  the  canon  EscoTquiz ;  both  of  them  delighted 
to  dream  of  a  happy  reign  under  their  own  be- 
nignant sway,  and  rejecting  every  thing  calcu- 
lated to  disturb  this  dream  of  their  vanity. 
Nirae  of  the  parties  were  willing  to  admit  that 
they  had  commenced  and  actively  urged  forward 
the  most  fatal  of  imprudent  steps.  They  found 
it  very  difficult  to  believe  that  they  could  be  at 
the  beginning  of  a  long  series  of  misfortunes, 
instead  of  being  at  the  commencement  of  a  long 
course  of  prosperity.  On  these  grounds  they 
rejected  the  sinister  prophecies  of  M.  de  Ur- 
quijo, as  the  views  of  a  gloomy  mind,  embittered 
by  the  disgrace  inflicted  upon  him.  "  What!" 
said  the  Duke  de  1'Infantado,  with  the  strongest 
assurance,  "  what !  is  it  likely  that  a  hero,  sur- 
rounded by  such  a  halo  of  glory,  would  conde- 


April,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


485 


scend  to  such  base  treachery?"  "You  do  not 
know  heroes,"  replied  Urquijo,  with  bitterness 
and  disdain;  "you  have  not  read  Plutarch! 
Read  him,  and  you  will  learn  that  the  greatest 
of  all  have  built  their  reputation  on  heaps  of 
dead  bodies.  The  founders  of  dynasties  espe- 
cially have  been  those  who  have  most  frequently 
built  up  their  work  in  treachery,  violence,  and 
robbery !  What  did  not  our  Charles  V.  do  in 
Germany,  Italy,  and  even  in  Spain  ?  and  I  do 
not  go  back  to  the  worst  of  your  princes !  Pos- 
terity takes  no  account  of  any  thing  but  the  re- 
sults. If  the  authors  of  so  many  guilty  deeds 
founded  great  empires,  and  rendered  nations 
powerful  and  fortunate,  it  attributes  no  blame 
to  princes  for  having  robbed,  or  for  the  armies 
which  they  sacrificed."  The  Duke  de  1'Infan- 
tado  and  the  canon  Escoi'quiz,  having  continued 
to  insist  upon  the  reprobation  to  which  Napo- 
leon would  expose  himself  by  usurping  the 
crown,  and  on  the  commotions  which  he  would 
excite  both  in  Spain  and  in  Europe,  and  the 
perpetual  war  which  he  would  draw  upon  him- 
self, Urquijo  replied,  that  Europe  had  known 
nothing  else  but  to  be  beaten  by  the  French  ; 
that  coalitions,  badly  managed  and  thwarted 
by  intestine  divisions,  had  no  chance  of  success ; 
that  only  a  single  power,  Austria,  was  still  in 
a  condition  to  fight  a  battle  ;  but  that,  even  with 
the  support  of  England,  it  would  be  crushed, 
and  be  obliged  to  pay  for  its  resistance  by  new 
losses  of  territory ;  that  Spain  might  be  able 
to  carry  on  a  war  of  partisans,  but  that  in 
reality  its  character  would  be  confined  to  serv- 
ing as  a  scene  of  action  for  the  English  and 
French ;  that  it  would  be  horribly  ravaged,  and 
that  its  colonies  would  avail  themselves  of  the 
opportunity  to  shake  off  the  yoke  of  the  mother- 
country  ;  that  if  Napoleon  knew  how  to  curb 
his  views  of  aggrandizement,  and  to  give  good 
institutions  to  the  countries  which  submitted  to 
his  system,  he  would  give  a  permanent  founda- 
tion to  himself  and  his  dynasty ;  that  the  people 
of  the  Peninsula,  bound  to  those  of  France  by 
interests  of  all  kinds,  whenever  they  came  to 
see  that  they  were  fighting  for  the  cause  of  a 
family  much  more  than  for  that  of  the  nation, 
would  end  by  attaching  themselves  to  a  govern- 
ment which  promoted  civilization ;  that,  after 
all,  the  dynasties  which  had  regenerated  Spain 
had  always  come  from  without ;  that  Napoleon 
only  needed  to  join  a  little  prudence  to  his  ge- 
nius to  make  the  Bourbons  utterly  lose  their 
cause ;  that  in  every  case  Spain  would  be  inun- 
dated with  a  deluge  of  evils,  and  certainly  lose 
its  colonies ;  that  they  should,  therefore,  avoid 
running  into  Napoleon's  nets,  and  retrace  their 
steps  as  soon  as  possible ;  that,  if  this  could  not 
be  done,  the  king  should  be.  concealed,  and 
under  a  disguise  conducted  back  to  Madrid  or 
into  the  south  of  Spain,  and  that  there,  placed 
at  the  head  of  the  nation,  he  would  have  a  bet- 
ter chance  of  treating  with  Napoleon  on  accept- 
able conditions. 

It  is  very  rare  that  a  statesman  entertains  as 
clear  a  view  of  the  future  as  Urquijo  displayed 
on  this  occasion.  His  only  answer,  however, 
was  the  disdainful  smile  of  blind  ignorance,  and 
in  his  vexation  he  set  out  immediately  without 
any  desire  to  accompany  the  king,  to  whom  he 
was  asked  to  continue  to  give  his  counsels, 
•whilst  they  absolutely  refused  to  follow  them. 
"If,"  said  he,  "you  wish  me  to  go  alone  to 


Bayonne,  to  discuss,  negotiate,  and  make  head 
against  the  common  enemy,  whilst  you  withdraw 
into  the  depths  of  the  Peninsula,  be  it  so :  but 
otherwise  I  have  no  desire,  by  accompanying 
you,  to  tarnish  my  reputation,  the  only  thing  that 
remains  to  me  under  my  disfavour,  and  in  the 
midst  of  the  misfortunes  of  our  common  country." 

Urquijo  not  having  been  listened  to,  imme- 
diately withdrew,  and  left  the  advisers  of  Fer- 
dinand to  themselves ;  they  continued  madly 
intent  on  their  plans,  but  nevertheless  somewhat 
troubled  at  the  sinister  predictions  of  a  man 
of  such  penetrating  views  and  firmness  of  mind. 
On  General  Savary's  arrival  with  Napoleon's 
letter,  they  resumed  their  confidence  in  their 
own  judgment  and  in  destiny.  This  letter,  in 
which  they  ought  to  have  seen  in  every  line  a 
concealed  and  menacing  intention,  for  the 
strange  pretension  of  becoming  judge  in  a  dis- 
pute between  father  and  son  ought  to  have  re- 
vealed to  them  the  wish  to  condemn  one  of  the 
two,  and  obviously  that  one  of  the  two  the  more 
capable  of  reigning,  so  far  from  opening  their 
eyes,  only  made  them  close  them  the  more. 
The  only  passage  that  attracted  their  attention 
was  that  in  which  Napoleon  said  that  he  needed 
to  be  informed  concerning  the  events  of  Aran- 
juez,  and  that  he  hoped,  after  a  conversation 
with  Ferdinand  VII.,  to  be  in  a  condition  to 
have  no  difficulty  in  acknowledging  him  as  king 
of  Spain.  This  vague  promise  filled  them  again 
with  all  their  illusions.  In  it  they  saw  the 
certainty  of  hearing  this  recognition  the  next 
morning  after  their  arrival  in  Bayonne,  and 
they  had  the  simplicity  to  ask  General  Savary 
if  this  was  not  the  way  in  which  Napoleon's 
letter  must  be  interpreted ;  to  which  the  gene- 
ral replied,  that  they  were  no  doubt  right  in 
so  interpreting  it,  and  that  it  could  not  well 
mean  any  thing  else.  Being  thus  reassured, 
they  resolved  to  set  out  from  Vittoria  on  th» 
morning  of  the  19th,  in  order  to  sleep  that  nighi 
at  Irun.  A  courier  was  sent  before  them  to 
announce  their  arrival  at  Bayonne.  It  ought 
to  be  added,  also,  that  the  troops  under  Gene- 
ral Verdier  had  so  completely  surrounded  them 
at  Vittoria,  that  they  would  not  have  had  it  in 
their  power  to  choose,  had  they  wished  to  act 
otherwise.  They  did  not  even  notice  this  con- 
straint, so  blind  were  they  to  their  danger. 

But  the  people  of  the  surrounding  provinces, 
who  had  been  together  to  see  Ferdinand,  did 
not  reason  on  his  situation  like  his  advisers. 
Urquijo  had  repeated  everywhere  and  to  every 
one  the  advice  which  he  had  given  at  the  court 
of  Ferdinand.  His  words  had  found  an  echo, 
and  multitudes  of  faithful  subjects  had  assem- 
bled to  oppose  the  departure  of  the  young  king. 
On  the  morning  of  the  19th,  the  day  fixed  for 
their  departure,  and  when  the  royal  carriages 
were  already  in  waiting,  there  arose  a  sudden 
commotion  among  the  people.  A  crowd  of 
armed  peasants,  who  had  lain  for  some  days  on 
the  ground,  either  before  the  gate  or  in  the  in- 
terior of  the  royal  dwelling,  manifested  an  in- 
tention of  opposing  his  journey.  One  of  them, 
armed  with  a  sickle,  cut  the  traces  and  unyoked 
the  mules,  which  were  led  back  to  the  stables. 
A  collision  would  then  have  taken  place  between 
the  French  troops  which  formed  Ferdinand's 
escort  and  the  people,  had  not  the  infantry  for- 
tunately been  ordered  to  remain  in  their  bar- 
racks, with  their  guns  loaded,  and  lighted 
2s2 


486 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


matches  ready  to  apply  to  the  cannon.  The 
cavalry  of  the  guard  alone  were  in  the  square 
where  the  carriages  were,  but  at  a  certain  dis- 
tance from  the  crowd,  with  drawn  swords,  and 
in  a  position  of  threatening  firmness.  Ferdi- 
nand's advisers,  fearing  that  a  collision  would 
injure  their  cause,  sent  the  Duke  de  Tlnfantado 
into  the  street  to  speak  to  the  people.  The 
duke,  who  was  greatly  respected,  rushed  into 
the  midst  of  the  crowd,  succeeded  in  calming 
the  people  by  appealing  to  the  respect  due  to 
the  royal  wishes,  and  assured  them  that  by 
going  to  Bayonne  they  were  certain  of  returning 
in  a  few  days,  with  the  recognition  of  Ferdinand 
as  king,  and  a  renewal  of  the  French  alliance. 
The  people  were  appeased  rather  from  respect 
than  from  conviction.  The  mules  were  put  to 
afresh,  without  any  opposition,  and  Ferdinand 
VII.,  getting  into  the  carriage,  saluted  the 
people,  who  received  him  with  acclamations 
mingled  with  cries  of  anger  and  pity.  The 
splendid  squadrons  of  the  imperial  guards, 
breaking  into  a  gallop,  immediately  surrounded 
the  royal  carriages,  as  if  to  render  homage  to 
him  whom  they  were  carrying  off  as  a  prisoner. 
Thus  took  his  departure  this  foolish  prince,  de- 
ceived by  his  own  wishes  still  more  than  by  the 
ability  of  his  adversary,  deceived  as  if  he  had 
been  the  most  simple  and  most  honourable  of 
the  princes  of  his  time,  whilst  he  was  in  fact 
one  of  the  most  hypocritical  and  least  sincere. 
The  Spanish  people  saw  him  set  out  with  vexa- 
tion and  contempt,  saying,  among  themselves, 
that,  instead  of  their  king,  they  would  soon  see 
a  stranger,  supported  by  formidable  armies. 

Ferdinand  slept  at  the  small  town  of  Irun, 
with  the  view  of  crossing  the  frontiers  the  next 
day.  On  the  morning  of  the  28th  he  in  fact 
crossed  the  Bidassoa,  and  was  very  much  sur- 
prised to  find  no  one  to  receive  him  except  the 
three  Spanish  grandees,  returned  from  their 
mission  to  Napoleon,  and  after  having  seen  him, 
bringing  nothing  but  the  gloomiest  presenti- 
ments. But  it  was  now  too  late  to  return ;  the 
bridge  of  the  Bidassoa  was  crossed,  and  there 
was  now  nothing  left  but  to  plunge  into  the 
,  gulf  which  they  had  not  had  sense  enough  to 
see  till  they  were  swallowed  up.  On  approach- 
ing Bayonne,  the  prince  met  Marshals  Duroc 
and  Bessieres  coming  to  compliment  him,  but 
only  conferring  on  him  the  title  of  Prince  of  the 
Asturias.  There  was  still  nothing  in  this  cal- 
culated to  make  them  very  uneasy,  for  Napoleon 
had  adopted,  as  the  theme  of  his  policy,  to  take 
no  notice  of  any  thing  which  had  taken  place 
at  Aranjuez  till  after  he  had  received  explana- 
tions. They  were  therefore  suffered  to  pass  a 
few  hours  longer  without  alarm. 

When  they  reached  Bayonne,  Ferdinand 
found  there  a  few  troops  under  arms,  and  a 
small  number  of  people,  for  no  one  had  been 
forewarned  of  his  coming.  He  was  conducted 
to  a  residence  very  different  from  the  magnifi- 
cent palaces  of  the  Kings  of  Spain,  but  it  was 
the  only  one  in  the  town  at  their  disposal  for 
the  purpose. 

He  had  scarcely  alighted  from  the  carriage, 
•when  Napoleon,  who  had  hastened  on  horseback 
from  the  chateau  de  Marac,  made  him  the  first 
•visit.  The  Emperor  of  the  French  embraced 
the  Spanish  prince  with  every  semblance  of  the 
greatest  courtesy,  always  addressing  him  by 
the  title  of  Prince  of  the  Asturias — which,  in 


[April,  1808. 


fact,  was  a  part  of  the  policy  he  had  proposed 
to  himself — and  quitted  him  after  a  short  inter- 
view, for  the  purpose,  as  he  said,  of  leaving 
him  to  refresh  himself,  without  having  said 
aught  that  could  give  rise  to  any  interpretation 
whatever. 

In  the  course  of  an  hour,  the  chamberlains 
waited  upon  the  prince,  to  invite  him  and  his 
suite  to  dine  at  the  chateau  de  Marac.     Ferdi- 
nand repaired  thither  towards  the  close  of  day, 
attended  by  his  small  retinue,  and  was  received 
in  the  same  manner  as  before,  that  is  to  say, 
with  refined  politeness,  but  with  extreme  re- 
serve on  every  point  relative  to  politics.    After 
dinner,  the  Emperor  entered  into  general  con- 
'•  versation  with  Ferdinand  and  his  counsellors, 
and  speedily  discovered,  beneath  the  habitu- 
ally  immovable  countenance  and  general  re- 
!  serve  of  the  young  king,  a  mediocrity  of  cha- 
j  racter  by  no  means  exempt  from  deceit ;  in 
the   conversational  powers   of  Escoiquiz,  the 
i  king's   preceptor,    he   discerned   a   cultivated 
!  mind,  which  was,  however,  unskilled  in  poli- 
tics; and  beneath  the  gravity  of  the  Duke  de 
1 1'Infantado,   an  honest  man  indeed,   but   one 
i  who  thought  more  highly  of  himself  than  he 
!  should ;  ambition,  without  talent,  constituting 
the  sum  total  of  his  merit. 

Napoleon  saw  at  a  glance  the  kind  of  men 
he  had  to  deal  with,  and  speedily  dismissed 
them  all,  under  the  pretext  that  they  must  be 
fatigued  with  their  journey;  he,  however,  de- 
tained the  canon  Escoiquiz,  by  expressing  h;< 
desire,  which  in  fact  was  tantamount  to  a  com- 
mand, to  have  some  conversation  with  him. 
He  deputed  General  Savary  to  tell  the  Prince 
of  the  Asturias  every  thing  which  he  was  him- 
self about  to  communicate  to  the  preceptor, 
with  whom  he  preferred  conversing  himself,  as 
he  considered  him  a  man  of  more  intelligence. 
His  secret  was  doubly  oppressive  to  him,  for 
he  had  not  only  kept  it  long,  but  this  secret 
was  itself  a  perfidy,  a  species  of  crime  to 
which  his  breast  was  a  stranger.  He  felt  con- 
strained to  reveal  it  to  the  least  ignorant  of 
the  counsellors  of  Ferdinand,  to  exonerate 
himself,  in  some  measure,  by  the  frankness  in 
which  he  couched  the  expos6  of  his  designs, 
and  by  the  candid  and  simple  avowal  of  mo- 
tives of  the  highest  policy  for  the  line  of  con- 
duct which  he  adopted. 

He  set  out,  therefore,  by  nattering  the  canon, 
saying  he  knew  that  he  was  a  man  of  learning, 
and  that  he  could  therefore  speak  freely  to 
him.  Without  further  preamble,  and  as  if 
compelled  at  once  to  unburden  his  heart,  Na- 
poleon declared  that  he  had  invited  the  princes 
of  Spain  to  come  to  France  for  the  purpose  of 
taking  from  them  all,  father  as  well  as  son, 
the  crown  of  their  ancestors :  that  he  had  for 
some  years  been  aware  of  the  treachery  of  the 
cour.t  of  Madrid ;  that  he  had  not  taken  any 
notice  of  it,  but  that  now,  being  quit  of  the 
affairs  of  the  North,  he  intended  to  regulate 
those  of  the  South ;  that  Spain  was  indispen- 
sable to  his  designs  against  England,  and  that 
he  was  indispensable  to  Spain  in  order  to  re- 
store her  grandeur ;  that  without  him,  she 
would  stagnate  eternally  under  a  weak  and 
degenerate  dynasty ;  that  old  Charles  IV.  was 
an  imbecile  king ;  that  his  son,  though  more 
energetic,  was  quite  below  par,  and  less  trust 
worthy — witness  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez, 


April,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


487 


the  secret  of  which  was  known  at  Paris,  with-  [ 
out  any  one's  having  been  obliged  to  go  to 
Madrid  in  order  to  learn  it ;  that  Spain,  under  j 
such  rulers,  would  never  gain  the  moral,  ad- 
ministrative, and  political  regeneration  which  ' 
was  indispensable  to  enable  her  to  regain  her 
rank  among  the  nations ;  that,  as  for  him,  Na-  ; 
poleon,  he  had  never  found  aught  among  the 
Bourbons  save  perfidy  and  hollow  friendship ;  , 
that  he  was  far  too  experienced  to  have  any  i 
faith  in  the  efficacy  of  marriages ;  that  a  high-  | 
minded  princess  was  a  treasure  not  always  at  j 
his  disposal ;  that,  even  supposing  it  were,  he  > 
doubted  whether  she  would  be  able  to  influ-  | 
ence  this  taciturn  and  vulgar  prince,  whose  I 
only  talent,  if  indeed  he  had  any,  consisted  in 
the  art  of  dissimulation ;  that  he,  Napoleon, 
everywhere  conqueror  and  founder  of  a  dy- 
nasty, was  obliged  to  trample  under  foot   a  | 
multitude  of  secondary  considerations,  in  order  j 
to  reach  his  goal,  which  was  placed  at  an  im- 
mense height ;  that  he  had  no  taste  whatever  j 
Cor  evil,  but  it  in  fact  cost  him  an  effort  to  do 
wrong,  but  that,  wherever  his  chariot  passed, 
all  must  get  out  of  the  way,  or  be  crushed  by 
the  wheels ;  that,  in  fine,  his  mind  was  made 
up ;  he  intended  to  take  the  crown  of  Spain 
from  Ferdinand  VII.,  but  he  would  soften  the 
blow  by  offering  him  an  indemnity ;  that  he 
had,  in  fiict,  already  selected  one  for  him,  well 
calculated  to  promote  his  repose ;  it  was  no 
other  than  the  beautiful  and  peaceful  Etruria 
— where  this  prince  might  go  and  reign,  secure 
from  the  revolutions  of  Europe,  where  he  would 
be  far  happier  than  in  the  midst  of  his  Span- 
iards— who  were  possessed  by  the  revolution- 
ary spirit  of  the  times,  and  could  only  be  sub- 
dued,   settled,    and   made    prosperous,    by   a 
powerful  and  energetic  prince. 

While  making  this  audacious  declaration, 
Napoleon  was  sometimes  caressing,  sometimes 
imperious,  and  reached  the  very  acme  of  the 
cynicism  of  ambition.  The  poor  canon  was 
quite  confounded.  The  honour  of  being  flat- 
tered— he,  an  humble  canon  of  Toledo — by  one 
of  the  greatest  men  of  the  age,  struggled  with 
the  indignation  that  filled  his  breast  at  hear- 
ing such  declarations.  He  was  thunderstruck 
and  stupified,  but  his  talent  for  discussion  did 
not  forsake  him,  and  he  immediately  employed 
it  with  Napoleon,  who  resolved  that  he  would 
indemnify  him  for  his  pains  by  giving  him  a 
hearing. 

The  unfortunate  preceptor  commenced  by 
justifying  the  Bourbon  family  to  the  head  of 
the  house  of  Bonaparte.  He  reminded  him 
that,  up  to  the  moment  of  the  greatest  horrors 
of  the  French  revolution,  Spain  had  not  de- 
clared war  till  after  the  death  of  Louis  XVI. ; 
that  she  had  herself  seized  the  first  opportu- 
nity of  returning  to  a  system  of  peace,  and 
from  the  system  of  peace  to  that  of  alliance 
between  the  two  States ;  that,  since  that  time, 
she  had  lavished  on  France  her  fleets,  her 
armies,  her  treasures;  that,  if  she  had  not 
rendered  better  service,  it  was  owing,  not  to 
want  of  good-will,  but  to  want  of  knowledge ; 
that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  alone  was  to 
blame,  for  that  he  was  the  sole  author  of  all 
the  ills  of  Spain  and  the  cause  of  her  weakness 
as  an  ally ;  that,  however,  this  detestable  fa- 
vourite was  for  ever  banished  from  the  throne ; 
that,  under  a  young  prince,  attached  to  Na- 


poleon, bound  to  him  by  the  ties  of  gratitude 
and  by  relationship,  and  directed  by  his  coun- 
sels, Spain  would  be  speedily  regenerated,  and 
regain  that  rank  which  she  ought  ever  to  have 
maintained  among  the  nations,  and  would, 
without  the  cost  of  any  effort  or  sacrifice, 
render  France  every  service  that  could  be  ex- 
pected from  her ;  that,  in  the  contrary  case, 
Spain  would  make  a  desperate  resistance,  she 
would  be  seconded  by  England,  and  perhaps 
by  a  part  of  Europe ;  the  colonies  would  be 
lost,  a  misfortune  equally  great  to  France  and 
to  Spain,  and  an  indelible  stain  would  tarnish 
the  glory  of  a  splendid  reign. 

"  Bad  policy  this  of  yours,  M.  le  Canon !  bad 
policy !"  replied  Napoleon,  with  a  gracious 
but  ironical  smile.  "  With  all  your  learning, 
you  will  not  fail  to  condemn  me,  if  I  suffer  the 
only  occasion  to  escape  me,  which  offers,  by 
the  submission  of  the  Continent  and  the  dis- 
tress of  England,  to  complete  the  execution  of 
my  plan.  As  for  your  Bourbons,  they  have 
always  served  me  against  the  grain,  ready  to 
betray  me  at  the  first  brush.  A  brother  would 
suit  me  better,  whatever  you  may  say.  The 
regeneration  of  Spain  is  out  of  the  question  by 
princes  of  an  old  family,  which,  in  spite  of  it- 
self, is  always  supported  by  old  abuses.  My 
resolve  is  fixed  ;  this  revolution  must  be  carried 
through.  Spain  shall  not  lose  a  single  village; 
she  shall  retain  all  her  possessions.  I  have 
already  adopted  precautions  that  she  shall  pre- 
serve her  colonies.  As  for  your  prince,  he 
shall  be  indemnified,  if  he  submits  with  a  good 
grace  to  the  force  of  events.  It  is  for  you  to 
use  your  influence  in  prevailing  upon  him  to 
accept  those  indemnities  which  I  have  in  re- 
serve for  him.  You  are  sufficiently  well  in- 
formed to  Jcnow  that,  in  doing  this,  I  only 
follow  the  laws  of  sound  policy,  which  have  their 
exigencies  and  their  unavoidable  rigours." 

In  saying  this  and  other  things  of  a  like  im- 
port, in  words  which  betrayed  regret  rather 
than  remorse  at  the  intended  spoliation,  Napo- 
leon gradually  became  mild  and  friendly,  and 
sometimes  even  extremely  familiar  in  his  man- 
ner to  the  poor  preceptor,  whose  lofty  figure 
formed  a  strange  contrast  with  his  own.  As- 
tounded at  this  firm  resolve,  Escoi'quiz,  with 
tears  in  his  eyes,  enlarged  on  the  virtues  of 
his  young  prince ;  he  endeavoured  to  exonerate 
Ferdinand  from  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez ; 
tried  to  prove  that  Charles  IV.  had  abdicated 
voluntarily ;  that  the  authority  of  Ferdinand 
VII.  was  consequently  quite  legitimate,  &c.  &c. 
To  all  this  Napoleon  replied,  with  a  smile  of 
incredulity,  that  he  knew  the  whole  story,  that 
the  revolution  of  Aranjuez  was  not  quite  such 
a  natural  event  as  the  canon  tried  to  make  him 
believe ;  that  Ferdinand  VII.  had  given  way  to 
culpable  impatience,  that  he  had  done  wrong 
in  declaring  a  succession  open  which  neverthe- 
less he  ought  not  to  enjoy,  and  that,  as  a 
punishment  for  having  sought  to  reign  too 
soon,  he  should  not  reign  at  all. 

The  canon  endeavoured  to  soften  Napoleon 
by  dilating  on  the  virtues  of  Ferdinand  VII., 
and  to  move  him  by  portraying  the  position  to  • 
which  his  unhappy  advisers  would  be  reduced 
in  the  sight  of  Spain,  of  Europe,  and  of  pos- 
terity ;  that  they  would  be  eternally  disho- 
noured for  having  given  credit  to  the  word 
of  Napoleon,  which  had  summoned  them  to 


488 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[April,  1808 


Eayonne,  by  leading  them  to  expec*  that  he 
intended  to  recognise  the  new  king;  that  they 
•would  be  accused  of  folly,  nay  of  treason, 
whereas  their  only  crime  was,  that  they  had 
believed  the  word  of  a  great  man. 

"  You  are  honourable  men,  every  one  of 
you,"  replied  Napoleon,  "and  you  especially, 
M.  le  Canon,  are  an  admirable  preceptor,  for 
the  laudable  zeal  with  which  you  defend  your 
pupil.  No,  depend  upon  it,  it  will  merely  be 
said  that  you  have  yielded  to  superior  force ; 
neither  you  nor  Spain  will  be  able  to  resist  me. 
Policy,  policy,  M.  le  Canon,  must  be  the  main- 
spring of  every  action  of  such  a  man  as  I  am. 
Go  to  your  prince,  and  induce  him  to  become 
King  of  Etruria,  if  he  wishes  to  be  king  of  any 
place,  for  you  may  positively  assure  him  that 
he  shall  no  longer  be  King  of  Spain  !" 

The  unfortunate  preceptor  of  Ferdinand  VII. 
withdrew  in  consternation ;  he  found  his  pupil 
equally  surprised  and  wretched,  in  consequence 
of  the  interview  which  he  had  just  had  with 
General  Savary.  The  latter,  without  any  pre- 
liminary form,  and  without  entering  into  any 
of  those  developments  which  Napoleon  had 
contrived  to  introduce  by  way  of  excuses,  had 
signified  to  Ferdinand  VII.  that  he  must  re- 
nounce the  crown  of  Spain,  and  accept  Etruria 
as  an  indemnity  for  the  patrimony  of  Charles 
V.  and  Philip  V. 

Great  was  the  agitation  which  prevailed  at 
this  little  court,  which  had  hitherto  been  com- 
pletely blind  to  its  fate.  All  rallied  round  the 
prince,  weeping  and  raving,  and  concluded  by 
believing  what  they  wished,  that  their  misfor- 
tunes were  not  real;  that  the  whole  was  a 
stratagem  of  Napoleon's,  for  it  was  impossible 
that  he  should  touch  a  person  so  sacred  as 
Ferdinand  VII.,  or  a  thing  so  inviolable  as  the 
crown  of  Spain.  Napoleon,  they  were  sure, 
only  wanted  gome  immense  concession  of  ter- 
ritory, or  some  important  colony,  and  there- 
fore held  out  this  terrible  menace  to  the  house 
of  Spain ;  that,  in  a  word,  it  was  a  threat,  and 
nothing  more.  They  therefore  flattered  them- 
selves that  it  was  enough  not  to  yield  to  this 
intimidation,  in  order  to  triumph,  and  they 
resolved  to  resist  and  to  reject  all  the  proposi- 
tions of  Napoleon.  M.  de  Cevallos  was  com- 
missioned to  treat  with  M.  de  Champagny  on 
the  basis  of  an  absolute  refusal. 

On  the  following  morning  M.  de  Cevallos 
repaired  to  the  chateau  de  Marac,  for  the  pur- 
pose of  having  a  conference  with  M.  de  Cham- 
pagny. This  man,  whose  low  cunning  did  not 
restrain  his  impetuous  temper,  spoke  to  M.  de 
Champagny  with  a  vehemence  which  was  not 
the  result  of  courage,  for  here  crowns  alone, 
not  individuals,  were  in  jeopardy.  He  spoke 
BO  loud  that  Napoleon  heard  him,  and,  coming 
in,  exclaimed:  "What!  you  talk  of  -fidelity  to 
the  rights  of  Ferdinand  VII. !  You,  who  ought 
faithfully  to  have  served  his  father,  whose 
minister  you  were !  You,  who  have  abandoned 
him  for  a  usurping  son,  and  have  throughout 
acted  the  part  of  a  traitor!" 

M.  de  Cevallos,  to  whom  these  words  might 
Lave  been  spoken  with  justice  by  any  one  who 
had  nothing  wherewith  to  reproach  himself, 
immediately  retired  to  his  new  master,  to  relate 
to  him  all  that  had  passed.  It  was  at  once 
considered,  by  the  advisers  of  Ferdinand,  that 


authority  nor  tact  to  defend  the  rights  of  hia 
sovereign ;  and  the  mission  was,  therefore, 
confided  to  M.  de  Labrador,  who,  in  various 
embassies  in  which  he  had  been  engaged,  had 
learned  the  art  of  negotiating  great  political 
questions  with  the  requisite  reserve.  The 
basis  of  the  negotiation  remained  unaltered, 
namely,  the  inalienable  right  of  Ferdinand  VII. 
to  the  crown  of  Spain,  or,  in  default  of  his,  that 
of  Charles  IV.,  the  only  legitimate  king,  if 
Ferdinand  VII.  were  not  so. 

Napoleon  was  rather  chagrined  at  this  re- 
sistance, but  he  hoped  that  it  would  soon  give 
way  to  necessity,  and  especially  before  Charles 
IV.  should  come  and  make  good  his  claims, 
which  were  far  better  founded  than  those  of 
Ferdinand  VII. ;  for,  although  the  idea  of  pro- 
testing against  this  abdication  had  been  sug- 
gested to  him  by  Murat,  it  was  not  less  true 
that  his  abdication  had  been  the  result  of  moral 
violence  exercised  over  his  feeble  character, 
and  that  he  was  fully  justified  in  reclaiming 
his  crown.  Hence,  in  taking  away  the  crown 
from  Ferdinand  VII.,  it  would  have  been  but 
an  act  of  justice  to  have  restored  it  to  Charles 
IV.  Napoleon,  regarding  the  presence  of 
Charles  IV.  as  indispensable  to  oppose  to  the 
pretensions  of  the  son  the  rights  of  the  father, 
which,  while  it  did  not  create  the  rights  of 
Bonaparte,  nevertheless  threw  all  these  rights 
into  a  state  of  confusion,  by  which  he  hoped  to 
profit,  urgently  pressed  Murat  to  induce  the 
aged  sovereigns  to  quit,  and  also  to  send  him 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  who  was  still  a  pri- 
soner at  Villa  Viciosa.  Napoleon  enjoined 
Murat  to  employ  force  if  needful,  not  for  the 
departure  of  the  old  court — which  had  ear- 
nestly desired  to  set  out,  and  which  nobody 
sought  to  detain — but  to  effect  the  deliverance 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  whom  the  Spaniards 
were  unwilling  to  release  at  any  price.  He 
also  recommended  that,  in  order  to  prepare  the 
mind  of  the  public,  the  junta  of  the  govern- 
ment and  the  council  of  Castille  should  be 
made  acquainted  with  the  protest  of  Charles 
IV.,  which  reduced  the  royalty  of  Ferdinand 
VII.  to  nothing,  without  re-establishing  that 
of  Charles,  and  thus  commenced  a  convenient 
sort  of  interregnum  for  the  accomplishment  of 
his  projected  usurpation.  He  endeavoured  to 
make  Murat  comprehend  that  he  must  not  wait 
for  a  majority  of  opinions  in  effecting  a  change 
which  was  not  consonant  to  the  minds  of  the 
Spaniards,  but  constrain  them  by  fear,  and 
afterwards  gain  over  men  of  judgment,  by 
demonstrating  the  good  which  a  French  royalty 
would  effect,  by  assuring  them  that  a  change 
of  dynasty  would  not  cost  Spain  one  colony  or 
even  a  single  village,  an  advantage  which 
would  result  from  no  other  arrangement ;  and 
if  this  should  fail  to  secure  their  assent,  to 
have  recourse  to  a  display  of  military  force. 

Napoleon  desired  Murat  to  be  well  on  his 
guard,  to  fortify  two  or  three  points  in  Madrid, 
such  as  the  royal  palaces,  the  Admiralty,  the 
Buen  Retiro  ;  not  to  permit  a  single  officer  to 
sleep  in  the  city,  to  insist  that  they  should  all 
be  lodged  with  their  soldiers ;  in  a  word,  so  to 
conduct  himself  as  if  he  were  on  the  eve  of  an 
insurrection  which  he  considered  inevitable ; 
for  the  Spaniards  would  probably  try  the 
mettle  of  the  French;  that,  in  this  case,  he 


uuch  a  negotiator  possessed  neither  sufficient    must  meet  them  with  energy,  BO  as  to  deprive 


April.,  1803.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


489 


them  of  every  hope  of  effectual  resistance ; 
that  he  must  not  forget  how  he  carried  on  war 
in  the  streets  of  Egypt,  in  Italy,  and  elsewhere ; 
that  he  must  not  upon  any  account  come  to  an 
engagement  within  the  city,  but  occupy  the 
heads  of  the  principal  streets  with  strong  bat- 
teries, make  the  power  of  his  guns  felt,  and 
wherever  the  crowd  should  be  bold  enough,  to 
show  itself,  openly  annihilate  it  by  the  swords 
of  the  cuirassiers.  Thus  was  Napoleon  led  from 
artifice  to  violence  by  this  usurpation  of  the 
crown  of  Spain. 

On  a  single  point  only  Murat  had  outstripped 
the  instructions  of  Napoleon :  this  was  relative 
to  the  departure  of  the  aged  sovereigns  and  the 
deliverance  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace.  He 
informed  Charles  IV.  and  his  queen,  in  reply 
to  the  expression  of  their  desires,  that  it  would 
give  the  Emperor  pleasure  to  have  them  near 
him,  and  that,  consequently,  they  had  nothing 
to  do  but  to  prepare  for  their  departure,  and 
that  he  was  about  to  demand  the  release  of  the 
Prince  of  the  Peace,  in  order  that  he  might 
travel  with  them  as  far  as  Bayonne :  intelli- 
gence doubly  welcome,  which  shed  a  gleam  of 
joy  into  hearts  that  had  been  sad  since  the 
fatal  days  of  Aranjuez. 

As  soon  as  he  had  learnt  that  Ferdinand  VII. 
had  actually  crossed  the  frontier,  Murat  felt  at 
liberty  to  throw  off  the  mask,  especially  as  the 
Spaniards,  who  were  irritated  at  the  weakness 
of  their  princes,  and  humbled  at  being  under 
their  sway,  seemed  ready  for  a  moment  to 
throw  off  their  allegiance  to  a  family  so  un- 
worthy of  the  loyalty  of  the  nation.  For  a  few 
days,  therefore,  all  went  on  smoothly ;  but,  as 
Boon  as  he  began  to  speak  of  the  deliverance 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  there  was  a  sort 
of  commotion  among  them.  The  multitude, 
greedy  of  revenge,  were  in  despair  at  seeing 
their  victim  escape  them.  The  higher  classes, 
and  among  them  were  the  men  who  were  com- 
promised in  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez,  feared 
that,  in  the  midst  of  all  these  political  changes, 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  might  some  day  regain 
power,  and  revenge  himself  upon  them  for  the 
past.  These  diverse  motives  made  them  politely 
refuse  to  set  him  at  liberty.  The  junta  of  the 
government,  composed  of  the  ministers  and  the 
Infant  Don  Antonio,  were,  more  than  any 
others,  filled  with  these  sad  apprehensions. 
They  had  from  the  very  first  offered  a  firm  re- 
sistance to  the  demands  of  Murat,  and  pre- 
tended that, -having  no  authority  to  decide  a 
question  of  such  importance,  they  must  refer 
it  to  Ferdinand  VII.  In  fact,  they  addressed 
themselves  to  him,  and  demanded  his  orders. 
Ferdinand,  greatly  embarrassed  how  he  should 
reply  to  this  message,  declared  that  this  ques- 
tion should  be  treated  and  resolved  upon  at 
Bayonne,  together  with  those  various  points 
which  were  about  to  occupy  the  two  sovereigns 
of  France  and  of  Spain. 

The  reply  of  Ferdinand  having  been  in- 
stantly transmitted  to  Murat,  he  considered  the 
question  settled  by  the  orders  of  Napoleon,  and 
demanded  that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  should 
be  instantly  released  from  prison,  in  order  that 
he  might  send  him  to  Bayonne.  He  however 
stated  that  Emmanuel  Godoy  should  be  for  ever 
exiled  from  Spain,  and  would  be  transported  to 
France,  where  his  life  would  be  the  only  boon 
granted  to  him.  Murat,  after  having  addressed 

VOL.  II.— 62 


this  communication  to  the  junta,  directed  a 
body  of  cavalry  upon  Villa  Viciosa,  with  orders 
to  carry  off  the  prisoner  either  with  consent  or 
by  force.  The  Marquis  de  Chasteler,  under 
whose  custody  he  was  placed,  deeming  it  an 
honour  to  serve  the  national  hatred,  refused  to 
give  him  up  ;  when  the  junta,  in  order  to  pre- 
vent a  collision,  sent  him  word  straightway  to 
deliver  up  the  prisoner. 

The  unfortunate  ruler  of  Spain,  who  had  till 
lately  been  surrounded  by  all  the  superfluities 
of  luxury,  surpassing  royalty  itself  in  sump- 
tuousness  as  he  had  also  surpassed  it  in  power, 
arrived  at  the  camp  of  Murat  almost  without 
clothes,  his  beard  unshaven,  and  his  body  co- 
vered with  wounds  which  were  scarcely  healed, 
and  marked  with  the  chains  which  had  galled 
him.  In  this  deplorable  state  he  for  the  first 
time  met  the  friend  whom  he  had  chosen  in  the 
bosom  of  the  imperial  court,  in  the  prospect 
of  far  other  fortune  than  what  he  realized  this 
day.  Murat,  whose  generosity  never  failed 
him,  loaded  Emmanuel  Godoy  with  kindness, 
supplied  him  with  every  thing  he  needed,  and 
sent  him  on  to  Bayonne  under  the  escort  of  one 
of  his  aides-de-camp  and  a  body  of  cavalry. 

Having  executed  this  part  of  Napoleon's 
orders,  Murat  turned  his  attention  to  the  de- 
parture of  the  old  sovereigns,  who,  in  the  midst 
of  their  misfortunes,  were  filled  with  joy  that 
their  friend  was  saved,  and  that  they  should 
soon  be  in  the  presence  of  the  all-powerful  Em- 
peror, who  would  avenge  them  of  their  enemies. 
The  preparations  for  their  journey  being  com- 
pleted— preparations  which  principally  con- 
sisted in  obtaining  possession  of  the  most  valu- 
able of  the  crown  jewels — they  desired  Murat 
to  arrange  their  departure.  They  went,  ac- 
cordingly, on  the  23d,  from  the  Escurial  to  the 
Pardo,  and  there  passed  the  night  in  the  midst 
of  the  French  troops,  where  they  saw  and  em- 
braced Murat  with  the  greatest  enthusiasm  and 
joy.  They  set  out  from  thence  for  Buitrago, 
taking  the  high  road  to  Bayonne,  and  travelled 
with  that  leisure  which  their  age  and  infirmi- 
ties demanded.  On  their  route  they  met  with 
some  marks  of  respect,  but  none  of  sympathy. 
The  presence  of  the  old  queen,  who  for  twenty 
years  had  been  an  object  of  hatred  and  con- 
tempt to  the  nation,  was  enough  to  stifle  every 
display  of  affection. 

Murat  was  now  almost  sole  master  of  Spain, 
and  might  have  fancied  himself  a  king.  He 
proceeded,  by  order  of  Napoleon,  to  communi- 
cate to  the  junta  the  protest  of  Charles  IV., 
drawn  up  in  a  great  measure  under  his  own 
dictation,  and  to  demand  by  the  proclamation 
of  that  document  the  suppression  .of  the  name 
of  Ferdinand  VII.  in  the  acts  of  the  govern- 
ment. The  junta,  greatly  embarrassed,  wished 
to  make  the  council  of  Castille  share  the  re- 
sponsibility by  consulting  it.  The  council,  how- 
ever, returned  the  document,  and  refused  to 
give  an  opinion.  Murat  then  settled  the  ques- 
tion by  a  word,  and  it  was  agreed  that  the  acts 
of  the  government  should  be  published  in  the 
name  of  the  king,  without  specifying  what  king. 
Thus  the  throne  of  Spain  had  suddenly  become 
vacant,  and  the  Spaniards,  with  profound  grief, 
began  to  take  cognisance  of  their  true  position. 
Sometimes  indignant  at  the  folly  and  weaknesa 
of  their  princes,  who  suffered  themselves  to  be 
deceived  and  plunged  into  an  abyss  from  which 


490 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[April,  1808. 


they  could  not  possibly  extricate  themselves, 
and  then,  overwhelmed  with  pity  for  their  fate, 
they  turned  their  fury  against  those  foreigners 
who  had  insinuated  themselves  into  their  terri- 
tory by  stratagem  and  violence.  Those  of  en- 
lightened minds,  now  clearly  seeing  why  the 
French  had  invaded  Spain,  fluctuated  between 
their  hatred  to  the  foreigners  and  their  desire 
to  see  Spain  reorganized  as  France  had  been  by 
the  hand  of  Napoleon. 

Attracted,  in  company  with  their  wives,  to 
the  fetes  given  by  Murat,  they  were  sometimes 
entrapped  and  half  seduced,  but  never  entirely 
conquered.  The  populace,  on  the  contrary, 
never  gave  in  to  this  species  of  seduction  under 
any  form.  Sometimes  the  appearance  of  the 
national  guard  and  of  our  cavalry  would  call 
forth  their  enthusiasm,  and  they  even  admired 
Murat ;  but  our  infantry,  composed  chiefly  of 
young  men,  scarcely  trained,  suffering  from  the 
itch,  and  completing  their  military  instruction 
under  their  own  eyes,  did  not  inspire  them  with 
any  respect  whatever,  and  they  were  even 
buoyed  up  with  the  confident  expectation  that 
they  would  be  our  victors.  The  lazy  peasants 
of  the  environs  had  rushed  to  Madrid  with  their 
muskets  and  their  cutlasses,  and  were  in  the 
habit  of  defying  us  with  their  looks  before  com- 
bating us  with  their  arms.  Some  of  them,  ex- 
cited by  fanatical  monks,  committed  the  most 
horrible  assassinations.  One  of  their  number 
killed  two  of  our  soldiers  and  wounded  a  third 
with  his  sword,  under  the  inspiration,  as  he 
said,  of  the  Blessed  Virgin.  The  priest  of 
Caramanchel,  a  village  at  the  very  gates  of 
Madrid,  assassinated  one  of  our  officers.  Mu- 
rat made  a  memorable  example  of  the  authors 
of  these  crimes,  but  he  could  not  thereby  ap- 
pease the  hatred  which  now  began  to  manifest 
itself.  The  minds  of  men  were  excited  to  such 
a  pitch,  that  on  one  occasion  a  horse  having 
run  away  on  the  grand  promenade  of  the  Prado, 
everybody  took  to  flight  under  the  idea  that  a 
combat  was  about  to  commence  between  the 
French  and  the  Spaniards. 

Murat  always  contrived  to  deceive  himself 
m  regard  to  the  disposition  of  the  Spaniards, 
but,  stimulated  by  the  reiterated  advice  of  Na- 
poleon, he  adopted  some  precautionary  mea- 
sures. He  lodged  the  guard  and  the  cuiras- 
siers within  the  city,  but  placed  the  rest  of 
the  troops  upon  the  heights  which  commanded 
Madrid.  To  the  three  divisions  of  Marshal 
Moncey  he  added  the  first  division  of  General 
Dupont,  and  thus  occupied  Madrid  with  the 
guard,  the  whole  of  the  cavalry,  and  four  di- 
visions of  infantry.  The  second  division  of 
General  Dupont  was  stationed  at  the  Escurial, 
and  the  third  at  Segovia.  The  troops  were 
lodged  under  tents  around  the  whole  of  Ma- 
drid. Though  there  was  some  difficulty  in  fur- 
nishing them  with  provisions,  on  account  of  the 
insufficiency  of  conveyance,  they  had  never- 
theless an  abundant  supply.  The  remedies 
which  were  applied  to  our  young  soldiers  for 
the  disease  under  which  they  were  suffering, 
had  almost  restored  them  to  health.  They 
were  now  exercised  daily,  and  began  to  ac- 
quire that  strength  which  it  would  have  been 
desirable  for  them  to  have  had  from  the  time 
they  entered  Spain.  Murat  had  placed  over 
them  officers  selected  from  among  the  subal- 
terns of  the  guards,  and,  in  fact,  took  infinite 


!  pains  in  the  organization  of  an  army  which  he 
regarded  as  the  support  of  his  future  crown. 
The  division  under  General  Dupont  especially 
was  extremely  fine.  Unhappily,  however,  this 
should  have  been  displayed,  we  repeat  it,  in 
its  maturity  to  the  Spaniards,  and  not  have 
grown  up  under  their  eyes. 

Murat,  consecrating  himself  to  a  work  in 
which  he  delighted,  sometimes  even  applauded 
by  the  Spanish  populace,  who  were  dazzled  by 
his  presence  and  by  the  splendid  squadrons  of 
the  imperial  guard,  master  of  the  junta,  which, 
balanced  between  two  absent  monarchs,  un- 
certain which  to  obey,  yielded  to  present  au- 
thority— Murat  thought  himself  already  King 
of  Spain.  His  aides-de-camp,  in  their  turn, 
dreamt  that  they  were  grandees  of  the  new 
court,  flattered  him  more  and  more ;  while  he, 
re-echoing  these  flatteries  to  Paris,  wrote  to 
Napoleon — "I  am  master  here  in  your  name; 
give  the  word,  and  Spain  will  do  all  you  de- 
sire ;  she  will  give  the  crown  to  whichever  of 
the  French  princes  you  may  be  pleased  to 
designate."  Napoleon  merely  replied  to  these 
idle  assurances  by  reiterating  his  order  to 
fortify  the  principal  palace  of  Madrid,  and  to 
keep  the  officers  lodged  with  their  troops ; 
measures  which  Murat  executed  rather  as  an 
act  of  obedience  than  from  a  conviction  of 
their  utility. 

The  Prince  of  the  Peace  performed  the  jour- 
ney to  Bayonne  with  the  utmost  speed,  so  as 
not  to  give  the  populace  time  to  create  a  mob 
on  his  road,  and  arrived  at  his  destination  long 
before  his  old  sovereigns.  Napoleon  was  ex- 
tremely impatient  to  see  this  former  ruler  of 
the  Spanish  monarchy,  and,  above  all,  to  make 
use  of  him.  After  a  few  moments'  conversa- 
tion, he  saw  that  the  favourite  was  as  inferior 
in  talent  as  he  had  been  described ;  remark- 
able only  for  some  physical  advantages  which 
had  endeared  him  to  the  Queen  of  Spain,  and 
a  certain  shrewdness,  combined  with  much  ex- 
perience in  state  affairs,  but  calumniated  by 
those  who  had  depicted  him  as  a  monster. 
Napoleon,  however,  in  pity  for  his  misfortunes, 
refrained  from  manifesting  the  disdain  which 
such  a  head  of  the  empire  inspired  him  with, 
and  he  hastened  to  set  his  mind  at  ease  re- 
specting his  future  destiny,  and  that  of  his  old 
masters,  which  he  promised  to  render  secure, 
peaceable,  and  opulent,  and  worthy  of  the 
ancient  possessors  of  Spain  and  the  Indies. 

To  these  promises  Napoleon  added  another, 
not  less  soothing,  that  of  promptly  and  cruelly 
avenging  them  on  Ferdinand  VII.,  by  making 
him  descend  from  the  throne ;  and  he  called 
upon  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  to  second  him  in 
these  projects  with  the  queen  and  Charles  IV. 
This  he  readily  promised  to  do,  and  this  pro- 
mise it  would  be  easy  to  keep,  because  both 
the  father  and  mother  were  so  irritated  against 
their  son,  that  they  would  rather  have  seen  a 
stranger,  nay,  an  enemy,  on  the  throne  of 
their  ancestors  than  Ferdinand  VII. 

The  arrival  of  Charles  IV.  and  the  queen 
was  announced  for  the  30th  of  April.  It  was 
the  policy  of  Napoleon  that  the  old  sovereigns 
should  be  received  with  royal  honours,  and 
every  thing  was  arranged  for  their  reception  as 
if  they  were  still  in  the  enjoyment  of  their 
power,  and  as  if  the  revolution  of  Aranjuez  had 
never  taken  place.  He  ordered  the  troops  to 


April,  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


491 


be  drawn  up  under  arms,  sent  his  court  to 
meet  them,  commanded  the  cannon  of  the  forts 
to  be  fired,  the  flags  to  be  hoisted  in  the  vessels 
in  the  waters  of  the  Adour,  and  prepared  to 
put  the  crowning  honour  upon  his  plans  by  his 
own  presence.  At  mid-day  they  made  their 
entry  into  Bayonne,  amid  the  firing  of  guns 
and  the  ringing  of  bells.  They  were  received 
at  the  gates  of  the  city  by  the  civil  and  military 
authorities,  were  met  on  their  road  by  the  two 
princes,  Ferdinand  VII.  and  the  Infant  Don 
Carlos,  who  welcomed  them  with  visible  though 
repressed  indignation,  alighted  at  the  govern- 
ment palace  which  was  placed  at  their  disposal, 
and  for  an  instant  might  perhaps  have  pleased 
themselves  with  the  fond  delusion  that  they 
were  still  in  possession  of  the  supreme  power  ; 
but  this  was  the  last  and  vain  shadow  with 
which  Napoleon  amused  their  old  age  before 
he  precipitated  them  all,  father  as  well  as 
children,  into  that  abyss  into  which  he  desired 
to  plunge  all  the  Bourbons. 

A  moment  afterwards,  Napoleon  himself 
arrived,  at  full  gallop,  accompanied  by  his 
lieutenants,  in  order  to  pay  his  all-potent 
homage  to  the  aged  pair,  the  victims  of  his 
ambitious  calculation.  He  was  scarcely  in  the 
presence  of  Charles  IV.,  whom  he  had  never 
before  seen,  when  he  opened  his  arms,  and  the 
unfortunate  descendant  of  Louis  XIV.  flung 
himself  into  them,  weeping,  as  he  would  have 
done  to  a  friend  from  whom  he  hoped  to  receive 
consolation  in  his  misfortune. 

The  queen  exerted  all  the  art  of  a  woman  of 
the  court  to  please,  especially  with  the  Empress 
Josephine,  who  had  arrived  a  few  days  before 
at  Bayonne,  and  had  hastened  to  greet  the 
sovereigns  of  Spain.  After  a  short  interview, 
Napoleon  quitted  Charles  IV.,  surrounded  by 
the  Spaniards  who  had  assembled  at  Bayonne, 
and  by  the  French  officers  and  chamberlains 
•who  were  appointed  to  constitute  his  suite  of 
honour.  According  to  the  desires  of  Napoleon, 
•who  wished  none  of  the  usages  of  the  court  of 
Spain  to  be  neglected  on  this  occasion,  there 
was  a  general  kissing  of  hands.  Each  of  the 
Spaniards  present  approached,  and,  kneeling 
down,  kissed  the  hand  of  the  aged  king  and 
of  the  queen  his  consort.  Ferdinand,  taking 
his  rank  as  son  and  Prince  of  the  Asturias, 
went  in  his  turn  to  kneel  before  his  august  pa- 
rents, but  their  countenances  plainly  indicated 
the  sentiments  which  filled  their  breasts. 

As  soon  as  this  ceremony  was  over,  the  king 
nnd  queen,  who  were  much  fatigued,  rose  to 
retire.  Ferdinand  VII.  and  his  brother  being 
about  to  follow  them  into  their  apartment, 
Charles  IV.,  unable  any  longer  to  contain  him- 
self, stopped  his  eldest  son,  exclaiming,  "  Un- 
happy man !  hast  thou  not  sufficiently  disho- 
noured my  white  hair ;  at  least  have  respect  to 
my  repose ;"  and  thus  the  king  refused  to  see 
him  except  in  public.  Ferdinand  VII.,  reduced 
in  a  few  hours  by  this  single  etiquette  to  the 
quality  of  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  felt  that  he 
was  lost:  he  was  punished,  and  Charles  IV. 
avenged.  But  Charles  was  soon  obliged  to  re- 
sign into  the  hands  of  Napoleon  the  price  at 
which  that  vengeance  had  been  attained. 

The  aged  sovereigns  desired  with  the  utmost 
impatience  to  embrace  their  friend,  their  be- 
loved Emmanuel,  whom  they  had  not  seen  since 
the  fatal  night  of  the  17th  of  March.  They 


threw  themselves  into  his  arms,  and  Napoleon, 
who  wished  to  give  them  time  to  unbosom  them- 
selves and  enjoy  unrestrained  intercourse,  de- 
ferred till  the  following  day  the  reception  which 
he  had  prepared  for  them  at  Marac,  and  left 
them  at  liberty  the  whole  day  to  converse  freely 
of  their  situation  and  their  future  lot. 

The  Prince  of  the  Peace  promptly  informed 
them  of  the  subject  that  was  mooted  at  Ba- 
yonne. This  neither  astonished  nor  afflicted 
them,  for  they  had  no  longer  any  pretensions 
to  reign,  and  they  had  the  satisfaction  of  learn- 
ing that  Napoleon,  in  avenging  them  of  Ferdi- 
nand VII.,  designed  to  give  them  in  France  a 
secure  and  magnificent  retreat,  revenues  equal 
to  those  of  the  wealthiest  reigning  princes  of 
Europe,  and  all  this  for  the  loss  of  a  power  of 
which  they  had  long  foreseen  the  approaching 
termination.  It  was  therefore  by  no  means 
difficult  to  make  them  fall  in  with  the  projects 
of  Napoleon,  to  which  they  were  in  fact  re- 
signed, even  while  they  were  yet  in  ignorance 
of  the  indemnification  which  he  had  in  reserve 
for  them. 

On  the  following  day  Napoleon  invited  them 
to  dine  at  the  chateau  de  Marac,  where  he  pro- 
posed entertaining  them  daily  with  every  mark 
of  distinction.  Charles  IV.  and  his  consort 
went  thither  in  the  imperial  carriages,  so  dif- 
ferent from  the  antique  vehicles  of  the  court 
of  Spain,  which  were  built  on  the  same  model 
as  those  of  Louis  XIV.  Charles  had  the  great- 
est difficulty  to  get  into  and  alight  from  the 
carriage,  and  manifested  in  the  minutest  points 
how  utterly  he  was  a  stranger  to  the  usages 
and  ideas  of  the  present  age. 

When  he  had  arrived  at  the  chateau  de  Ma- 
rac, Napoleon  hastened  to  the  coach-door  to 
receive  him,  and  the  aged  monarch  leaned  on 
his  arm  as  he  put  his  foot  to  the  ground.  "  Sup- 
port yourself  upon  me,"  said  Napoleon;  "I 
have  strength  enough  for  us  both."  "  I  depend 
most  surely  on  it,"  replied  the  old  king,  and 
testified  his  sincere  gratitude  to  the  Emperor, 
happy  at  finding  in  France,  repose,  security, 
and  opulence  for  the  remainder  of  his  days. 

Napoleon  had  forgotten  to  insert  the  name 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  in  the  list  of  the 
persons  invited.  Charles  IV.,  not  seeing  him, 
cried  out  with  a  vivacity  which  embarrassed  all 
the  attendants,  "Where  is  Emmanuel?"  The 
Emperor  desired  that  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
might  be  sought  for,  and  this  friend,  without 
whom  he  could  no  longer  exist,  was  brought  to 
Charles  IV. 

While  Napoleon  thus  strove  to  soften  the  lot 
of  this  aged,  dethroned,  childish  king,  the  Em- 
press Josephine  watched  with  her  accustomed 
grace  over  the  Queen  of  Spain,  and  procured 
her  those  fertile  amusements  which  were  within 
her  reach,  by  offering  her  all  the  newest  and 
most  exquisite  personal  ornaments  of  Paris. 
But  the  wife  of  Charles  IV.  was  more  difficult 
to  console  than  her  husband,  owing  to  her 
understanding  and  her  ambition.  Neverthe- 
less, she  could  fully  reckon  on  two  consolations 
— the  safety  of  Emmanuel  Godoy  and  the  de- 
thronement of  Ferdinand. 

Napoleon  having  loaded  his  august  and  un- 
happy guests  with  favours,  was  impatient  to 
arrive  at  a  conclusion,  and  set  to  work  the 
various  instruments  which  he  had  at  his  dispo- 
sal. By  his  desire,  Charles  IV.  addressed  a 


492 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[April,  1808. 


letter  to  Ferdinand,  reminding  him  of  his  cul- 
pable conduct  in  the  scenes  at  Aranjuez,  his 
imprudent  ambition,  his  inability  to  reign  over 
a  country  which  through  his  delinquency  was 
abandoned  to  revolutionary  agitation,  and  re- 
quiring him  to  resign  the  crown.  This  demand 
clearly  revealed  to  the  councillors  of  the  duped 
Ferdinand  how  the  negotiations  were  to  be 
carried  on  after  the  arrival  of  the  old  court. 
It  was  evident  that  the  crown  was  demanded 
from  the  son  in  order  that  it  might  rest  for  a 
certain  number  of  days,  or  perhaps  hours,  on 
the  head  of  his  father,  and  then  pass  from  his 
aged  head  to  that  of  a  prince  of  the  Bonaparte 
family. 

The  advisers  of  the  young  king  replied  to 
this  demand  by  a  very  clever  letter,  in  which 
Ferdinand  VII.,  speaking  to  his  father  as  a 
submissive  and  respectful  son,  declared  him- 
self ready  to  restore  the  crown,  although  he 
had  received  it  in  consequence  of  a  voluntary 
abdication,  subject,  however,  to  two  conditions : 
the  first,  that  Charles  IV.  would  reign  himself; 
the  second,  that  the  restoration  should  take 
place  publicly  at  Madrid,  in  presence  of  the 
Spanish  nation.  Without  these  two  conditions, 
Ferdinand  formally  refused  to  restore  the  crown 
to  his  father ;  because,  if  the  latter  would  not 
reign,  Ferdinand  considered  himself  as  the  only 
legitimate  king,  in  accordance  with  the  laws  of 
the  Spanish  monarchy ;  and  if  the  retrocession 
took  place  elsewhere  than  at  Madrid,  in  the 
very  bosom  of  the  assembled  nation,  it  would 
be  neither  free,  dignified,  nor  secure. 

This  reply  was  able  and  suitable.  But 
Charles  IV.  was  desired  to  reply  to  it,  to  en- 
large on  the  irregularity  of  the  abdication,  on 
the  violence  by  which  it  had  been  brought  about, 
on  the  incapability  of  Ferdinand  to  govern 
Spain,  just  awoke  out  of  a  long  sleep  and  ready 
to  plunge  headlong  into  revolutions,  and  on  the 
necessity  of  confiding  to  Napoleon  the  charge 
of  securing  the  happiness  of  the  people  of  the 
Peninsula.  The  letter  concluded  by  an  indi- 
cation of  menacing  measures  if  this  obstinacy 
were  persevered  in.  To  this  reply  the  young 
court  opposed  a  counter-reply,  similar  to  the 
first  reply  of  Ferdinand  VII. 

The  negotiation  did  not  make  any  progress, 
for  the  interchange  of  this  idle  correspondence 
had  occupied  from  the  1st  to  the  4th  of  May. 
Napoleon  began  to  manifest  the  most  lively  im- 
patience, and  resolved  to  declare  Ferdinand 
VII.  a  rebel,  and  to  restore  the  crown  to  Charles 
IV.,  who  should  then  transmit  it  to  him,  after 
a  delay  more  or  less  brief.  By  the  intervention 
of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace,  he,  in  the  first  place, 
caused  an  act  to  be  drawn  up,  by  which  Charles 
IV.  declared  himself  the  sole  legitimate  king 
of  the  Spanish  dominions,  but  that,  being  him- 
self incapable  of  exercising  his  authority,  he 
appointed  the  Grand-duke  of  Berg  his  lieute- 
nant, confided  to  him  his  royal  powers,  and  espe- 
cially the  command  of  the  troops.  Napoleon 
regarded  this  transition  as  necessary  in  pass- 
ing the  royalty  from  the  Bourbons  to  the  Bona- 
partes.  He  hurried  the  despatch  of  this  decree 
with  the  reiterated  order  given  a  few  days  be- 
fore, that  all  the  Spanish  princes  still  remaining 
In  Madrid  should  quit  it  immediately;  the 
Youngest  of  the  infants,  Don  Francisco  de  Pau- 
la, Don  Antonio,  uncle  of  Ferdinand,  and  pre- 
sident of  the  junta,  and  the  Queen  of  Etruria, 


who  had  been  prevented  by  indisposition  from 
accompanying  her  parents.  After  having  taken 
these  measures,  he  prepared  to  put  an  end  to 
the  scenes  of  Bayonne  by  a  solution  which  he 
himself  intended  to  propose,  when  the  events 
of  Madrid  facilitated  the  denouement  which  he 
desired  by  enabling  him  to  dispense  with  the 
employment  of  force. 

While  Napoleon  corresponded  with  Madrid, 
Ferdinand  VII.,  on  his  side,  neglected  nothing 
to  transmit  thither  intelligence  which  was  cal- 
culated to  enlist  the  national  interest  in  his 
favour,  and  above  all  counteract  the  bad  effect 
which  his  indiscreet  conduct  had  produced. 
He  was  not  ignorant  that  the  Spaniards  felt  as 
much  pity,  and  almost  as  much  dislike,  to  his 
person  as  to  that  of  his  aged  father,  for  having 
fallen  into  the  snare  laid  by  Napoleon.  He 
therefore,  by  means  of  couriers,  who  set  out 
from  Bayonne  in  disguise,  and  traversed  the 
mountains  of  Aragon  to  gain  Madrid,  spread 
abroad  such  intelligence  as  he  deemed  most 
likely  to  reinstate  him  in  the  public  opinion. 
He  made  known  that  they  wished  to  treat  him 
with  treachery  and  violence  at  Bayonne,  in 
order  to  wrench  from  him  the  sacrifice  of  his 
rights,  but  that  he  resisted,  and  would  resist 
every  menace,  and  that  his  people  should  hear 
of  his  death  rather  than  of  his  submission  to 
the  wishes  of  the  foreigner.  He  depicted  him- 
self as  the  most  noble,  the  most  interesting  of 
victims,  so  as  to  enlist  every  generous  heart  in 
his  favour. 

These  couriers,  in  order  to  avoid  the  direct 
route,  which  was  covered  with  French  troops, 
lost  a  day  or  two  in  reaching  Madrid,  but  they 
all  arrived  there  safely,  and  the  news  which  they 
carried,  and  which  was  rapidly  spread,  regained 
Ferdinand  VII.  the  good  feeling  which  had  for 
a  moment  been  alienated.  The  universally  cre- 
dited report  that  Ferdinand  VII.  was  the  object 
of  brutal  violence  at  Bayonne,  and  that  he  op- 
posed it  by  heroic  resistance,  regained  him  the 
favour  of  the  populace  of  the  capital,  numeri- 
cally strengthened,  as  we  have  already  said,  by 
the  idle  peasants  from  the  environs. 

Unable  to  have  recourse  to  the  press,  which 
was  closely  watched  by  the  agents  of  Murat, 
manuscript  bulletins  were  employed,  and  these 
bulletins,  reproduced  in  profusion,  and  circu- 
lated with  incredible  rapidity,  excited  the  pas- 
sions of  the  people  to  the  hightest  pitch. 

The  junta  of  the  government,  profoundly  dis- 
sembling its  secret  sentiments,  affected  great 
deference  for  the  desires  of  Murat,  but  devoted, 
as  was  natural,  to  Ferdinand  VII.,  it  was,  in 
fact,  the  agent  of  the  communications  with 
Bayonne,  and  of  the  publications  which  resulted 
from  it.  It  despatched  emissaries  to  Ferdinand, 
to  ascertain  whether  he  wished  it  to  withdraw 
itself  from  the  French, — whether  it  should  in 
some  place  proclaim  the  legitimate  sovereign, 
provoke  a  rising  of  the  nation,  and  declare 
war  against  the  usurper.  While  waiting  for  a 
reply  to  these  propositions,  the  junta,  after  in- 
terminable delays,  yielded  to  the  demands  of 
Murat,  which  were  calculated  to  serve  the  de- 
signs of  Napoleon. 

Among  these  demands,  one  had  caused  much 
perplexity  in  the  junta ;  it  was  that  which  re- 
quired that  all  the  members  of  the  royal  family 
still  in  Madrid  should  be  sent  to  Bayonne.  On 
the  one  hand,  the  old  Queen  of  Spain  desired 


May,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


493 


that  the  young  Infant  Don  Francisco,  who  had 
been  left  behind  in  consequence  of  the  state  of 
his  health,  should  be  sent  to  her ;  on  the  other 
hand,  the  Queen  of  Etruria,  who  had  remained 
at  Madrid  from  a  similar  cause,  was  herself 
urgent  to  go,  terrified  at  the  state  of  agitation 
which  was  daily  increasing  among  the  Spa- 
niards. Murat,  who  had  been  commissioned 
by  the  Emperor  to  make  all  the  members  of 
the  royal  family  repair  to  Bayonne,  imperiously 
demanded  this  twofold  departure.  With  re- 
gard to  the  Queen  of  Etruria  there  could  be  no 
difficulty  whatever,  because  she  was  an  inde- 
pendent princess,  and  was  anxious  to  depart ; 
but  with  regard  to  the  young  Infant  Don  Fran- 
cisco, who,  on  account  of  his  age,  was  placed 
under  royal  authority,  he  was  actually  depend- 
ent on  the  junta  of  the  government,  which 
exercised  that  authority  in  the  absence  of  the 
king. 

The  junta  easily  divined  the  motives  of  these 
successive  departures,  and  assembled,  during 
the  night  between  the  30th  of  April  and  the  1st 
of  May,  to  deliberate  on  the  demand  of  Murat. 
The  numbers  were  augmented  by  the  adjunc- 
tion of  the  divers  presidents  of  the  councils  of 
Castille  and  the  Indies,  and  several  members 
of  those  councils.  The  sitting  was  extremely 
agitated.  Some  of  the  members  demanded  that 
a  positive  refusal  should  be  given  to  a  proposi- 
tion, the  evident  object  of  which  was  to  remove 
the  last  representatives  of  the  royal  family; 
and  that,  rather  than  yield,  open  resistance 
should  be  resorted  to. 

The  minister  of  war,  M.  O'Farrill,  exposed 
the  state  of  the  army,  the  corps  of  which  were 
disorganized  and  dispersed,  some  in  the  North, 
some  in  Portugal,  and  some  on  the  coasts, 
which  did  not  leave  in  Madrid  at  this  present 
moment  a  combined  force  of  more  than  3000 
military.  Men  of  more  ardent  temperaments 
proposed  that  the  populace  should  be  supplied 
with  knives  and  fowling-pieces,  and  the  nation 
eeek  its  safety  in  one  grand  act  of  popular 
desperation.  The  majority  were  of  opinion  that 
Murat  should  be  answered  by  a  dissembled  re- 
fusal, and  every  thing  avoided  that  might  pro- 
voke a  collision. 

Besides  the  junta,  a  party  of  patriots,  dis- 
contented at  what  they  called  its  weakness,  de- 
sired that  the  departure  of  the  infants  should 
be  prevented  by  every  possible  means,  and  in- 
fused their  passions  into  the  people;  though 
certainly  there  was  not  much  necessity  for  ex- 
citing them. 

The  1st  of  May,  which  fell  on  a  Sunday,  at-  , 
tracted  an  immense  concourse  of  country  peo-  i 
pie  into  the  city;  and  wild,  energetic  figures, 
mingled  amid  the  numerous  groups  which  took 
their  stations  in  the  different  squares  of  Ma- 
drid At  the  Puerto  del  Sol,  a  large  square 
situated  in  the  centre  of  the  city,  from  which 
issue  the  principal  streets,  such  as  that  of 
Mayor,  Alcala,  Montera,  and  Las  Carretas,  a 
dense  and  menacing  crowd  was  assembled. 
Murat  sent  thither  a  few  hundred  dragoons, 
whose  very  appearance  dispersed  the  multitude, 
and  compelled  them  to  remain  tranquil. 

Murat,  to  whom  the  junta  had  communicated 
its  refusal  in  very  mild  terms,  replied  that  he 
should  take  no  notice  whatever  of  it,  and  that, 
on  the  following  morning,  the  2d  of  May,  he 
should  make  the  Queen  of  Etruria  and  the  In- 


fant Don  Francisco  set  out ;  a  declaration  to 
which  the  junta  did  not  give  any  reply. 

The  next  morning,  at  eight  o'clock,  the  court 
carriages  accordingly  drew  up  before  the  pa- 
lace to  receive  the  royal  personages.  The 
Queen  of  Etruria  displayed  great  readiness  to 
depart;  but  the  Infant  Don  Francisco  burst 
into  tears,  so  at  least  it  was  reported,  at  the 
gates  of  the  palace.  These  details  passed  from 
mouth  to  mouth  in  the  ranks  of  the  assembled 
throng,  and  produced  a  lively  agitation.  Sud- 
denly an  aide-de-camp  of  Murat's  arrived, 
having  been  sent  by  him  to  pay  his  respects  to 
the  queen  at  the  moment  of  her  departure. 
At  the  sight  of  the  French  uniform,  the  popu- 
lace raised  a  shout,  pelted  the  aide-de-camp 
with  stones,  and  were  preparing  to  murder  him, 
when  a  dozen  grenadiers  of  the  imperial  guard, 
who  were  on  duty  at  the  palace  occupied  by 
Murat,  whence  the  tumult  could  be  seen,  rushed 
into  the  thick  of  the  crowd,  bayonet  in  hand, 
and  rescued  the  aide-de-camp,  who  was  on  the 
very  point  of  being  massacred.  Some  dis- 
charges of  musketry  which  were  fired  in  this 
conflict  were  the  signal  for  a  general  rising, 
and  a  universal  firing  was  heard  on  all  sides. 
A  furious  populace,  composed  chiefly  of  the 
peasants  who  had  come  from  the  environs, 
threw  themselves  upon  the  French  officers  who 
were  dispersed  in  the  various  houses  of  Madrid 
in  spite  of  the  recommendations  of  Napoleon, 
and  upon  the  detached  soldiers  who  came  by 
squadrons  to  receive  their  rations.  Several 
were  slaughtered  with  horrible  ferocity,  while 
others  were  indebted  for  their  lives  to  the  hu- 
manity of  the  citizens,  who  concealed  them  in 
their  houses. 

Murat  mounted  his  horse  at  the  first  alarm, 
and  issued  his  orders  with  the  resolve  of  a 
general  who  is  accustomed  to  all  the  chances 
of  war.  He  ordered  the  troops  of  the  camp  to 
fall  back  and  enter  Madrid  by  all  the  gates  at 
the  same  moment.  The  most  distant,  those 
under  General  Grouchy,  stationed  near  Buen 
Retiro,  were  to  enter  by  the  main  streets  of 
San  Geronimo  and  Alcala,  and  march  towards 
the  Puerto  del  Sol ;  while  Colonel  Frederichs, 
setting  out  with  the  fusiliers  who  were  keeping 
guard  at  the  palace  situated  at  the  opposite  ex- 
tremity, were  to  go  by  Mayor-street,  to  meet 
General  Grouchy,  towards  the  Puerto  del  Sol, 
which  was  the  centre  of  the  movement.  Gene- 
ral Lefranc,  who  was  stationed  at  the  convent 
of  St.  Bernard,  was  to  march  thither  concen- 
trically by  the  gate  of  Fuencarral.  At  the  same 
instant  the  cuirassiers  and  the  cavalry,  arriv- 
ing by  the  road  of  Caravanchel,  received  orders 
to  advance  by  the  gate  of  Toledo. 

Murat,  at  the  head  of  the  cavalry  of  th« 
guard,  was  in  the  rear  of  the  palace  at  the  foot 
of  the  height  of  St.  Vincent,  near  the  gate  by 
which  those  troops  that  were  on  duty  at  the 
royal  palace  del  Campo  were  to  enter.  Thus, 
placed  just  without  the  populous  quarters,  and 
in  a  commanding  position,  he  could  readilj 
repair  wherever  his  presence  might  be  re- 
quired. 

The  action  commenced  in  the  square  of  th« 
palace,  whither  Murat  had  directed  a  battalion 
of  the  infantry  of  the  guard,  preceded  by  a 
battery.  A  shower  of  musketry,  followed  by 
a  volley  of  grape-shot,  very  speedily  cleared 
the  square.  The  people  fled  with  such  preoi- 
2  T 


494 


HISTORY   OF    THE 


[May,  1808. 


pitation,  that,  as  is  generally  the  case  in  occur- 
rences of  this  kind,  the  number  of  victims  was 
comparatively  small. 

Colonel  Frederichs  marched  with  his  fusiliers 
by  the  streets  Plateria  and  Mayor  towards  the 
Puerto  del  Sol,  whither  the  troops  of  General 
Grouchy  were  also  marching  by  the  streets 
Alcala  and  St.  Geronimo.  Our  soldiers,  young 
and  old,  advanced  with  that  steadiness  for 
which  they  were  indebted  to  experienced  and 
warlike  leaders.  The  populace,  backed  by  the 
peasants,  who  were  braver  than  themselves, 
could  not  hold  out ;  but,  stopping  at  the  corner 
of  the  cross  streets,  fired  upon  our  soldiers, 
and  then  disappeared  into  the  houses,  in  order 
to  fire  from  the  windows.  They  were  pursued 
by  our  soldiers,  despatched  with  the  bayonet, 
and  the  fanatics  found  with  arms  in  their  hands 
were  thrown  from  the  windows. 

The  two  French  columns,  marching  to  meet 
one  another,  had  enclosed  in  the  centre,  that  is 
to  say,  in  the  Puerta  del  Sol,  the  infuriated 
mob,  Avhich  by  its  denseness  formed  an  obsta- 
cle, and  had  not  even  the  liberty  of  flight.  The 
most  obstinate  among  the  crowd  fired  upon  our 
troops.  Several  squadrons  of  the  chasseurs, 
and  the  Mamelukes  of  the  guard,  rushed,  sabre 
in  hand,  amid  this  mass  of  people,  and  com- 
pelled them  to  disperse  by  every  outlet  that 
was  still  left  open.  The  Mamelukes  especially 
used  their  curved  sabres  with  great  dexterity, 
cutting  off  the  heads  of  several  with  a  stroke, 
and  thus  spread  a  panic,  the  remembrance  of 
which  left  a  lasting  impression  upon  the  people 
of  Madrid.  The  crowd,  repelled  on  every  side, 
had  no  other  resource  than  to  take  refuge  in 
the  houses,  and  to  fire  from  the  windows.  The 
troops  of  General  Grouchy  had  many  a  mur- 
derous execution  to  perform  in  the  street  of  St. 
Geronimo,  especially  in  the  hotel  of  the  Duke 
de  Hijar,  whence  a  deadly  fire  had  issued. 

The  troops  under  General  Lefranc  sustained 
a  very  obstinate  combat  at  the  arsenal,  where 
a  part  of  the  garrison  of  Madrid  had  been  shut 
up  with  orders  not  to  fight.  The  insurgents, 
having  repaired  thither,  fired  upon  our  troops, 
and  the  corps  of  Spanish  artillery  was  then 
compelled,  in  spite  of  itself,  to  enter  into  the 
combat.  The  storming  of  a  strong  edifice, 
while  exposed  to  the  fire  of  the  enemy,  who 
sent  a  brisk  shower  of  musketry  upon  us  from 
every  part,  cost  us  several  men.  But  our  sol- 
diers led  the  assault  with  energy,  dislodged  the 
defenders,  and  made  them  pay  dear  for  this  en- 
gagement. The  arsenal  was  carried  before  the 
people  had  time  to  take  possession  of  the  arms 
and  ammunition. 

Two  or  three  hours  sufficed  to  suppress  this 
sedition,  and  after  the  taking  of  the  arsenal 
only  a  few  isolated  shots  were  heard  here  and 
there.  Murat  had  constituted  a  court-martial 
at  the  post-office,  which  ordered  the  immediate 
execution  of  all  the  peasants  who  were  seized 
with  arms  in  their  hands.  Some  of  these,  by 
way  of  example,  were  shot  on  the  spot,  upon 
the  Prado  itself;  while  others,  who  endea- 
Toured  to  fly  to  the  environs,  were  pursued  by 
the  cuirassiers,  and  cut  down  by  their  sabres. 
Tflc  troops  of  the  camp  who  arrived  at  this  in- 
stant found  no  occasion  to  use  their  arms. 
Every  thing  was  quieted  by  the  terror  of  prompt 
repression,  and  by  the  presence  of  the  minis- 
ters, O'Farrill  and  Azanza,  who,  accompanied 


by  General  Harispe,  chief  of  Murat's  staff,  put 
a  stop  to  this  combat  wherever  there  was  yet 
any  trace  of  it.  They  demanded,  and  their 
request  was  granted  without  difficulty,  that  at 
immediate  stop  should  be  put  to  the  executions 
which  had  been  ordered  by  the  court-martia- 
established  at  the  post-office. 

This  fatal  morning,  which  was  afterwards  to 
be  most  fearfully  re-echoed  throughout  Spain, 
had  the  immediate  effect  of  restraining  the  po- 
pulace of  Madrid,  by  taking  from  them  every 
illusion  of  their  strength,  and  teaching  them 
that  our  young  soldiers,  led  on  by  experienced 
officers,  were  as  invincible  to  the  ferocious 
peasants  of  Spain,  as  they  were  at  Essling  and 
Wagram  to  the  most  disciplined  soldiers  of  Eu- 
rope. 

The  Infant  Don  Antonia,  who  at  the  noctur- 
nal session  of  the  junta  had  not  been  one  of  the 
fomentors  of  the  revolt,  but  had  even  appeared 
annoyed  at  the  braggings  of  the  partisans  of 
the  insurrectionary  movement,  said  to  Murat 
in  the  evening,  like  a  man  who  was  able  to 
breathe  after  a  long  fatigue,  "  At  length  they 
will  cease  to  reiterate  that  peasants  armed 
with  knives  will  be  able  to  rout  the  regular 
troops." 

The  impression,  in  fact,  upon  the  people  of 
Madrid,  was  profound,  and  in  their  excitement 
they  stated  and  believed  that  several  thousand 
of  their  fellow-citizens  had  been  killed  or 
wounded.  However,  there  were  not  many  after 
all,  for  the  insurgents  scarcely  lost  400  men, 
and  the  French  about  100  at  the  most.  But 
terror,  as  usual,  magnified  these  numbers,  and 
gave  a  moral  importance  to  this  morning  very 
superior  to  its  material  importance. 

From  this  moment  Murat  could  act  as  he 
pleased.  On  the  following  morning  he  sent  off 
not  only  the  infant  Don  Francisco,  but  the 
Queen  of  Etruria,  her  son,  and  the  aged  Infant 
Don  Antonio  himself,  who  was  imbued  with  all 
the  sentiments  of  the  insurgents  save  their 
energy,  and  who  asked  for  nothing  better  than 
to  go  to  Bayonne  and  find  there,  what  all  the 
other  princes  of  Spain  expected  to  find,  repose 
with  certain  losses.  The  Infant  Don  Antonio 
readily  consented  to  set  out  immediately,  and 
abandoned  the  presidency  of  the  junta  of  the 
government  without  even  informing  that  body 
of  his  intentions. 

Murat  had  now  received  the  decree  of  Charles 
IV.,  which  conferred  on  him  the  lieutenancy- 
general  of  the  kingdom.  He  summoned  the 
junta,  made  them  accept  him  as  president  in 
the  room  of  Don  Antonio,  and  was  from  this 
moment  invested  with  all  the  powers  of  royalty. 
He  took  up  his  abode  in  the  palace,  where  he 
occupied  the  apartments  of  the  Prince  of  the 
Asturias,"  and,  resuming,  in  his  correspondence 
with  Napoleon,  his  habitual  language,  he  wrote 
that  the  entire  force  of  resistance  on  the  part 
of  the  Spaniards  was  exhausted  on  the  morn- 
ing of  the  2d  of  May ;  that  it  was  only  needful 
to  designate  the  king  destined  for  Spain,  and 
that  this  king  would  reign  without  obstacle.  In 
more  letters  than  one  he  had  already  stated, 
as  a  fact,  which  he  cited  without  comment, 
that  the  Spaniards,  impatent  to  be  relieved 
from  their  long  and  painful  anxieties,  frequently 
cried  out,  "  Let  us  run  to  the  Grand-duke  de 
Berg  and  proclaim  him  king."  There  was, 
however,  some  truth  in  these  vain  allusions ; 


May,  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


495 


if  they  were  to  have  a  French  king,  Murat,  by 
his  military  renown,  his  courtly  bearing,  his 
southern  bravadoes,  his  presence  at  Madrid, 
would  have  been  the  most  readily  accepted  by 
the  Spanish  nation. 

The  news  from  Madrid  arrived  at  Bayonne 
on  the  5th  of  May,  at  four  o'clock  in  the  after- 
noon. When  he  received  it,  Napoleon  saw  at  a 
glance  that  it  was  the  very  means  of  producing 
that  shock  which  he  needed  for  terminating 
this  lengthened  species  of  negotiation  with  the 
Spanish  princes.  He  immediately  went  to 
Charles  IV.,  with  the  despatch  of  Murat  in  his 
hand,  and  displayed  much  more  irritation  than 
he  really  felt  at  these  Sicilian  vespers  which 
had  been  attempted  in  the  streets  of  Madrid. 
He  loved  his  soldiers,  but  he  who  could  sacri- 
fice 10,000  or  20,000  in  one  morning  was  not 
the  man  to  regret  the  loss  of  a  paltry  100  for 
so  great  an  achievement  as  the  conquest  of  the 
throne  of  Spain.  However,  he  pretended  to  be 
extremely  angry  in  the  presence  of  these  aged 
sovereigns,  who  were  terrified  to  see  the  vio- 
lence of  the  man  upon  whom  they  were  depend- 
ent. The  infants,  with  Ferdinand  VII.  at 
their  head,  were  immediately  summoned.  As 
soon  as  they  entered  the  apartment  of  their 
parents,  they  were  apostrophized  by  their 
father  and  mother  with  extreme  violence.  "  See 
what  you  have  done,  sir!"  exclaimed  Charles 
IV.  "The  blood  of  my  subjects  has  flowed, 
and  the  blood  of  the  soldiers  of  my  friend,  my 
ally,  the  great  Napoleon,  has  also  been  shed. 
See  to  what  ravages  you  would  expose  Spain 
if  we  had  had  to  deal  with  a  less  generous  con- 
queror! Look  at  the  consequences  of  all  that 
you  and  your  friends  have  done,  in  order  that 
you  might  enjoy  some  few  days  too  soon  that 
crown  which  I  was  in  as  much  haste  as  you 
were  to  place  upon  your  head.  It  is  you  who 
have  unchained  the  people,  and  there  is  no 
longer  a  master  over  them  to-day.  Restore, 
restore  that  crown  which  is  too  weighty  for 
you,  and  give  it  to  him  who  alone  is  capable  of 
bearing  it." 

While  uttering  these  words,  the  aged  king, 
who  was  condemned  to  act  this  afflicting  comedy, 
kept  brandishing  a  long  gold-headed  cane,  upon 
which,  in  consequence  of  his  infirmities,  he 
generally  leaned,  and  it  was  evident  to  all  pre- 
sent that  he  menaced  his  son  with  it. 

The  father  had  scarcely  finished,  when  the 
aged  queen,  with  a  violence  which  was  certainly 
not  feigned,  flew  upon  Ferdinand,  loaded  him 
with  abuse,  reproached  him  with  being  a 
wicked  son,  with  having  wished  to  dethrone  his 
father,  with  having  desired  to  murder  his 
mother,  with  being  false,  prefidious,  heartless, 
without  bowels  of  compassion,  &c.  &c. 

While  listening  to  all  these  apostrophes, 
Ferdinand  VII.  stood  immovable,  his  eyes 
riveted  on  the  floor  with  a  sort  of  stupified  in- 
sensibility. He  said  nothing,  he  manifested 
nothing,  but  he  suffered  every  thing.  Several 
times  his  mother  called  upon  him  to  answer, 
went  up  to  him,  menaced  him  with  her  hand, 
and  exclaimed,  "Yes,  I  see  very  well  you  are 
just  as  you  always  were.  Whenever  your  father 
and  I  wished  to  give  you  any  exhortations  which 
were  for  your  own  interest,  you  held  your 
tongue,  and  only  replied  to  our  counsels  by 
silence  and  hatred.  Speak  to  your  father,  sir, 
to  your  mother,  to  our  friend,  our  protector, 


the  great  Napoleon."  But  the  prince,  quite 
insensible,  was  perfectly  silent,  merely  affirm- 
ing, in  a  quiet  way,  that  he  had  nothing  what- 
ever to  do  with  the  disturbances  of  the  2d  of  May. 

Napoleon,  greatly  embarrassed,  nay,  almost 
confused  at  a  scene  like  this,  although  it  fur- 
thered the  solution  he  desired,  said  to  Ferdi- 
nand, in  a  cold  but  imperious  tone,  that  if  he 
had  not  resigned  the  crown  to  his  father  that 
same  evening,  he  should  be  treated  as  a  rebel- 
lious son,  the  author  or  accomplice  of  a  con- 
spiracy which,  on  the  days  of  the  17th,  18th, 
and  19th  of  March,  had  ended  in  depriving  the 
legitimate  sovereign  of  his  crown.  He  then 
retired  to  Marac  to  wait  for  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  for  the  purpose  of  concluding  with  him 
a  definitive  arrangement,  under  the  present 
impression  of  the  events  at  Madrid. 

"  What  a  mother !  what  a  son !"  cried  Napo- 
leon, as  he  returned  to  Marac,  addressing  those 
around  him.  "  The  Prince  of  the  Peace  is 
certainly  a  very  inferior  sort  of  person,  that  is 
true  enough ;  but,  after  all,  he  is  perhaps  the 
least  incompetent  of  this  degenerate  court. 
He  proposed  to  them  the  only  reasonable  idea 
— an  idea  which  might  have  led  to  great  result* 
had  it  been  carried  out  with  courage  and  re- 
solution :  it  was  this,  to  go  and  found  a  Spanislr 
empire  in  America,  there  to  save  both  thi 
dynasty  and  the  finest  part  of  the  patrimony 
of  Charles  V.  But  they  could  do  nothing  that 
was  noble  or  great.  The  old  people  by  theii 
want  of  energy,  the  son  by  his  perfidy,  haw 
ruined  this  design,  and  now  behold  them  ac^ 
tually  denouncing  each  other  to  the  very  power 
upon  which  they  are  dependent."  Napoleon 
spoke  long,  grandly,  and  with  rare  eloquence, 
on  the  vast  subject  of  America,  of  Spain,  of  the 
translation  of  the  Bourbons  into  the  Indian 
empire.  After  having  judged  others,  he  pro- 
ceeded to  judge  himself,  for  he  added  these 
words:  "What  I  am  doing  now  is  not  good  in 
a  certain  point  of  view ;  I  know  that  well 
enough ;  but  policy  demands  that  I  should  not 
leave  in  my  rear,  and  that  too  so  near  Paris,  a 
dynasty  inimical  to  mine." 

That  evening  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  went 
to  Marac,  and  the  results  which  Napoleon  ob- 
tained by  means  so  deeply  to  be  regretted,  was 
defined  in  the  following  treaty,  which  was  signed 
by  the  Prince  of  the  Peace  himself  and  by  the 
Grand-marshal  Duroc : — 

"Charles  IV.,  recognising  the  impossibility 
that  he  and  his  family  should  secure  the  peace 
of  Spain,  resigns  the  crown,  of  which  he  declares 
himself  the  sole  legitimate  possessor,  to  Napo- 
leon, that  he  may  dispose  of  it  as  ft  shall  seem 
good  to  him.  He  resigns  it  to  him  on  the 
following  conditions: — 

"  I.  The  integity  of  the  soil  of  Spain  and  of 
its  colonies,  no  portion  whatsoever  of  which 
shall  be  severed. 

"II.  The  preservation  of  the  Catholic  faith 
as  the  dominant  religion,  to  the  exclusion  of 
every  other. 

"III.  That  Charles  IV.  shall,  for  his  life, 
have  the  chateau  and  forests  of  Compiegne  and 
the  chateau  of  Chambord  in  perpetuity,  together 
with  a  civil  list  of  30,000,000  reals  (9,500,000 
francs,)  to  be  paid  by  the  treasury  of  France. 

"  IV.  A  proportionable  revenue  for  all  the 
princes  of  the  royal  family." 

Ferdinand  VII.  had  returned  home ;  his  eye* 


496 


HISTORY   OF   THE 


[May,  1808 


were  at  length  opened  to  his  actual  situation, 
and  the  firm  resolve  of  Napoleon  not  only  to 
intimidate  but  to  dethrone  him.  His  counsel- 
lors also  were  undeceived ;  among  them,  one 
only,  the  canon  Escoi'quiz,  though  he  was  not 
the  least  honest,  nevertheless  gave  his  young 
master  the  most  undignified  counsel ;  namely, 
to  accept  the  crown  of  Etruria,  in  order  that 
Ferdinand  might  remain  king  of  some  place, 
and  he,  Escoi'quiz,  the  director  of  some  king,  it 
mattered  not  of  what  realm. 

The  other  counsellors,  with  more  reason, 
conceived  that  this  would  be  tantamount  to  a 
declaration  to  Spain  that  it  need  not  take  any 
further  steps  with  regard  to  Ferdinand,  since 
he  accepted  a  foreign  crown  as  an  indemnifica- 
tion for  that  which  had  been  snatched  from  him. 
They  conceived  that,  to  accept  nothing  save  an 
alimentary  pension,  would  be  an  indication  to 
Spain  that  he  had  been  dealt  with  treacher- 
ously, that  he  protested  against  this  treachery ; 
that,  in  fine,  he  always  thought  of  Spain,  and 
consequently  she  ought  always  to  think  of  him. 

Ferdinand  VII.,  however,  signed  a  treaty  in 
his  turn,  by  which  Napoleon  secured  to  him 
the  chateau  of  Navarre,  with  a  net  revenue  of 
1,000,000  francs,  besides  400,000  francs  for 
each  of  the  infants,  on  condition  of  their  com- 
mon renunciation  of  the  crown  of  Spain. 

A  couple  of  chateaux  and  10,000,000  francs 
a-year  were  the  price  that  was  to  be  paid  to  the 
father  and  the  children  for  this  magnificent 
crown  of  Spain ;  a  very  moderate,  nay,  a  very 
mean  price ;  but  to  this  was  to  be  added  a 
fearful  complement  then  unknown — six  years' 
hateful  war,  the  death  of  hundreds  of  thousands 
of  soldiers,  the  lamentable  division  of  the  forces 
of  the  Empire,  and  an  indelible  stain  upon  the 
glory  of  the  conqueror. 

Napoleon,  who,  blinded  by  power,  did  not 
foresee  the  consequences  of  this  fatal  step, 
hastened  to  execute  the  conditions.  Success 
restored  his  natural  generosity.  He  gave 
orders  that  every  possible  attention  should  be 
shown  to  a  family  which  had  just  fallen  beneath 
the  strokes  of  his  policy,  as  so  many  others  had 
fallen  beneath  the  strokes  of  his  sword.  He 
charged  the  Prince  Cambace"res  to  receive  the 
aged  sovereigns ;  and,  while  the  necessary  ar- 
rangements were  completing  at  Compiegne,  he 
wished  them  to  have  a  first  essay  of  French 
hospitality  at  Fontainebleau,  a  place  which  was 
more  calculated  than  any  other  to  afford  plea- 
sure to  Charles  IV.  He  assigned  to  them  the 
company  of  the  aged  and  mild  arch-chancellor 
as  more  congenial  to  their  humour.  This  was 
the  first  intimation  of  the  affair  of  Spain  which 
Napoleon  gave  to  this  grave  personage,  for  he 
dared  no  longer  speak  to  him  of  projects  which 
could  not  bear  the  scrutiny  of  a  politician  who 
was  as  wise  as  he  was  devoted. 

As  for  the  young  prince,  he  assigned  to  him 
the  chateau  of  Valen9ay  as  a  residence  until 
that  of  Navarre  should  be  completed,  and  as  a 
companion  he  gave  a  man  as  subtle  as  he  was 
dissipated,  the  Prince  de  Talleyrand,  who  had 
lately  become  proprietor  of  this  same  cha- 
teau of  Valen9ay  by  an  act  of  imperial  munifi- 
cence. Napoleon  wrote  to  him  the  following 
letter,  for  Napoleon  executed  with  the  refine- 
ment of  the  manners  of  the  nineteenth  century 
a  policy  which  was  worthy  of  the  knavery  of 
the  fifteenth  :— 


"  To  the  Prince  de  Benevent. 

"Bayonne,  May  9th,  1808. 

"  The  Prince  of  the  Asturias,  the  Infant  Don 
Antonio  his  uncle,  and  the  Infant  Don  Carlos 
his  brother,  will  set  out  from  this  place  on  Wed- 
nesday next,  rest  on  Friday  and  Saturday  at 
Bordeaux,  and  on  the  following  Wednesday  reach 
Valen9ay.  Be  there  on  Monday  evening.  My 
chamberlain  De  Tournon  will  proceed  thither 
by  post,  in  order  to  prepare  every  thing  for 
their  reception.  Take  care  that  there  be  plenty 
of  table  and  bed  linen,  and  that  the  kitchen  be 
well  supplied.  There  will  be  about  ten  or 
twelve  persons  in  their  train,  and  double  the 
number  of  servants.  I  have  given  orders  to 
the  general  who  acts  as  chief  inspector  of  the 
gendarmerie  at  Paris  to  go  thither  and  organize 
the  service  of  surveillance. 

"I  desire  that  the  princes  be  received  with- 
out external  pomp,  but  heartily  and  with  sym- 
pathy, and  that  you  do  every  thing  in  your 
power  to  amuse  them.  If  you  have  a  theatre 
at  Valen9ay,  and  can  engage  some  comedians 
to  come,  it  will  not  be  a  bad  plan.  You  had 
better  bring  Madame  de  Talleyrand  thither, 
with  four  or  five  other  ladies.  If  the  Prince 
of  the  Asturias  should  fall  in  love  with  some 
pretty  woman  it  would  not  be  amiss,  especially 
if  we  were  sure  of  her.  It  is  a  matter  of  great 
importance  to  me  that  the  Prince  of  the  Astu- 
rias should  not  take  any  false  step.  I  desire, 
therefore,  that  he  be  amused  and  occupied. 
Stern  policy  would  demand  that  I  should  shut 
him  up  in  Bitche,  or  some  other  fortress ;  but, 
as  he  has  thrown  himself  into  my  arms,  and 
has  promised  to  do  nothing  without  my  orders, 
and  that  every  thing  shall  go  on  in  Spain  as  I 
desire,  I  have  adopted  the  plan  of  sending  him 
to  a  country-seat,  surrounding  him  with  plea- 
sure and  surveillance.  This  will  probably  last 
throughout  the  month  of  May  and  a  part  of 
June,  when  the  affairs  of  Spain  may  have  taken 
a  turn,  and  I  shall  then  know  what  part  to  act. 

"With  regard  to  yourself,  your  mission  is 
extremely  honourable.  To  receive  under  your 
roof  three  illustrious  personages,  in  order  to 
amuse  them,  is  quite  in  keeping  with  the  cha- 
racter of  the  nation,  and  also  with  your  rank." 

Charles  IV.  quitted  the  frontier  of  Spain 
with  a  broken  heart,  for  he  bade  adieu  to  his 
native  land,  to  his  throne,  and  to  those  habits 
which  had  always  constituted  his  pleasure,  so 
far  at  least  as  he  was  capable  of  enjoyment. 
The  popular  agitation,  however,  of  which  he 
had  seen  the  first  indications,  had  so  greatly 
troubled  him,  and  the  intestine  divisions  of  his 
family  had  so  overwhelmed  him  with  grief,  that 
he  fondly  consoled  himself  for  his  fall  with  the 
prospects  "of  finding  in  France  security,  rest, 
an  opulent  retreat,  religious  exercises,  and  the 
fine  hunting  grounds  of  Compiegne.  His  aged 
consort,  disconsolate  at  the  loss  of  her  throne, 
had  also  more  than  one  indemnification:  re- 
venge, the  secured  presence  of  the  Prince  of 
the  Peace,  and  ample  revenues. 

Ferdinand  VII.,  who  had  passed  from  stupid 
blindness  to  positive  terror,  was  full  of  regrets  : 
and  few  will  conjecture  the  subject  of  these 
regrets.  He  regretted  having  sent  to  the  junta 
of  the  government,  in  reply  to  its  interroga- 
tions, the  secret  order  to  convoke  the  Cortes, 
to  excite  the  nation  to  rise,  and  to  make  open 


May,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


497 


•war  upon  the  French.  He  dreaded  lest  the 
execution  of  this  order  should  irritate  Napo- 
leon, and  place  in  jeopardy  his  own  person,  his 
allowance,  and  the  estate  of  Navarre.  He 
therefore  sent^a  fresh  messenger,  and  recom- 
mended the  junta  to  act  with  extreme  prudence, 
counselling  that  it  should  do  nothing  that  might 
alienate  the  French.  Not  content  with  this 
precautionary  measure,  he  had  scarcely  set 
out  for  Valer^ay  when  he  wrote  to  Napoleon, 
to  ask  for  one  of  his  nieces  in  marriage ;  and 
not  forgetting  his  preceptor,  Escoiquiz,  he  re- 
quested for  him  the  confirmation  of  two  royal 
favours  which  he  had  conferred  on  him  on  suc- 
ceeding his  father,  which  favours  consisted  in 
the  grand  cordon  of  Charles  III.,  and  the  ap- 
pointment of  councillor  of  state !  It  is  evident 
that  the  victims  of  Napoleon's  ambition  might 
charge  themselves  with  having  annihilated  all 
remorse  in  him,  and  all  interest  in  the  public. 

Napoleon,  master  of  the  crown  of  Spain, 
hastened  to  dispose  of  it.  This  crown,  the 
most  illustrious  next  to  that  of  France  of  all 
the  crowns  which  he  had  had  at  his  command, 
seemed  to  him  to  belong  of  right  to  his  brother 
Joseph,  now  king  of  the  peaceful  and  consider- 
able kingdom  of  Naples.  Napoleon  was  led  to 
this  choice  by  affection  in  the  first  instance, 
for  he  preferred  Joseph  to  his  other  brothers ; 
secondly,  by  a  certain  respect  for  hierarchy, 
because  Joseph  was  the  eldest ;  and  lastly,  by 
confidence,  for  he  had  more  in  him  than  in  any 
of  his  other  brothers.  He  considered  Jerome 
devoted  to  him,  but  too  young ;  Louis  honest, 
but  so  soured  by  illness,  domestic  troubles,  and 
pride,  that  he  deemed  him  capable  of  taking 
the  most  vexatious  steps.  With  regard  to 
Joseph,  while  he  reproached  him  for  an  excess 
of  vanity  and  weakness,  he  nevertheless  judged 
him  a  sensible  man,  mild,  and  very  much 
attached  to  his  person ;  and  he  resolved  that 
te  him  alone  he  would  confide  that  important 
kingdom  which  lay  so  near  France.  This 
choice  was  by  no  means  the  least  fault  which 
Napoleon  committed  in  this  fatal  affair  of 
Spain.  Joseph  could  not  possibly  be  at  Madrid 
before  the  expiration  of  two  months,  and  these 
two  months  would  suffice  to  decide  upon  the 
submission  or  insurrection  of  Spain.  He  was 
weak,  inactive,  not  much  of  a  soldier,  and 
quite  incapable  of  commanding  the  Spaniards 
or  inspiring  them  with  respect. 

Murat,  on  the  other  hand,  was  actually  at 
Madrid ;  he  was  liked  by  the  Spaniards,  and, 
by  the  promptness  of  his  resolutions,  was  the 
very  man  to  stifle  an  insurrection  at  its  birth  ; 
from  being  accustomed  to  command  the  army 
in  the  absence  of  Napoleon,  he  knew  how  to 
make  the  French  generals  obey  him :  to  Murat, 
therefore,  ought  to  have  been  confided  the 
charge  of  restraining  and  gaining  the  Spaniards. 
But  Napoleon  had  confidence  in  none  but  his 
brothers ;  he  saw  in  Murat  merely  a  simple 
ally ;  he  was  afraid  of  his  levity  and  the  ambi- 
tion of  his  wife,  although  she  was  his  own 
sister,  and  he  determined  to  give  him  only  the 
kingdom  of  Naples. 

He  accordingly  wrote  to  Joseph  as  follows : — 

"King  Charles,  by  a  treaty  which  I  have 
just  concluded  with  him,  has  ceded  to  me  all 
his  rights  to  the  crown  of  Spain.  *  *  *  This 
crown  I  have  destined  for  you.  The  kingdom 
of  Naples  cannot  be  compared  with  Spain; 

VOL.  II.— 63 


there  are  eleven  millions  of  inhabitants,  a 
revenue  of  above  150  millions,  and  the  posses- 
sion of  America.  Besides  this,  it  i s  the  crown 
which  will  place  you  at  Madrid,  three  days' 
journey  from  France,  and  which  entirely  de- 
fends one  of  its  frontiers.  At  Madrid  you  are 
actually  in  France ;  Naples  is  at  the  other  end 
of  the  world. 

"  I  desire  therefore  that,  immediately  on  tho 
receipt  of  this  letter,  you  will  commit  the 
regency  to  whomsoever  you  please,  and  the 
command  of  the  troops  to  Marshal  Jourdan, 
and  that  you  set  out  for  Bayonne  by  the 
shortest  route  possible,  Turin,  Mont  Cenis,  and 
Lyons.  *  *  *  Keep  the  secret  from  everybody ; 
as  it  is,  it  will  only  be  suspected  too  readily. 
*  *  *  &c.  &c." 

Such  was  the  simple  and  expeditious  man- 
ner in  which  crowns  were  then  disposed  of,  nay, 
even  the  crown  of  Charles  V.  and  of  Philip  II. 

Napoleon  wrote  to  Murat  to  inform  him  of 
what  had  passed  at  Bayonne,  announced  that 
he  had  made  choice  of  Joseph  to  reign  in  Spain, 
the  consequent  vacancy  of  the  kingdom  of 
Naples,  which,  added  to  the  vacancy  of  the 
kingdom  of  Portugal,  (for  the  treaty  of  Fon- 
tainebleau  vanished  with  Charles  IV.,)  left  an 
option  between  two  vacant  thrones.  Napoleon, 
in  the  same  despatch,  offered  Murat  the  choice 
of  whichever  of  the  two  he  preferred,  leading 
him,  however,  to  prefer  that  of  Naples,  because, 
by  the  maritime  projects  which  he  meditated, 
before  securing  Sicily  to  him,  this  kingdom 
would,  as  formerly,  comprise  about  six  millions 
of  inhabitants.  He  enjoined  him,  meanwhile, 
to  make  himself  master  of  Madrid  with  all 
authority,  to  make  sure  of  it  with  the  greatest 
vigour,  to  inform  the  junta  of  the  government, 
the  councils  of  Castillo  and  the  Indies,  of  the 
renunciation  of  Charles  IV.  and  Ferdinand  VII., 
and  to  compel  these  divers  bodies  to  ask  for 
Joseph  Bonaparte  as  King  of  Spain. 

It  would  be  difficult  to  form  any  idea  of  the 
surprise  and  grief  of  Murat  in  learning  the 
choice,  however  natural,  which  Napoleon  had 
just  decreed.  The  command  of  the  French 
armies  in  the  Peninsula,  so  speedily  converted 
into  the  lieutenancy-general  of  a  kingdom,  had 
appeared  to  him  a  certain  presage  of  his  eleva- 
tion to  the  throne  of  Spain.  The  overthrow  of 
all  his  hopes  was  a  blow  that  profoundly  shook, 
not  his  mind  only,  but  even  his  strong  constitu- 
tion, the  proof  of  which  was  speedily  visible. 
The  fair  crown  of  Naples,  with  which  Napoleon 
sought  to  dazzle  his  eyes,  was  far  from  in- 
demnifying him,  and  appeared  to  him  nothing 
better  than  a  painful  disgrace.  He  neverthe- 
less refrained — so  great  was  his  submission  to 
his  all-powerful  brother-in-law — from  testify- 
ing to  him  any  discontent ;  but  in  his  reply  he 
maintained  a  silence  upon  this  subject  which 
plainly  proved  what  he  felt,  and  clearly  showed 
M.  de  la  Foret,  who  had  made  himself  master 
of  his  confidence,  the  painful  sentiments  that 
filled  his  breast.  M.  de  la  Foret,  formerly 
minister  at  Berlin,  had  been  sent  to  him  in 
place  of  M.  de  Beauharnais,  punished  by  an 
unmerited  recall  for  blunders  which  he  had 
committed,  and  which  were  inevitable  in  the 
situation  in  which  he  was  placed,  even  if  he 
had  been  more  skilful. 

Murat  had,  however,  still  one  chance  ; 
namely,  that  Joseph  would  not  accept  the 


498 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[May,  1808. 


crown  of  Spain,  or  that  the  very  difficulties  of 
its  transmission  to  a  prince  removed  to  a  dis- 
tance from  Madrid,  and  who  had  not  in  his 
hands  the  reins  of  the  Spanish  government, 
might  induce  Napoleon  to  change  his  mind. 
He  therefore  tried  to  conquer  his  painful  emo- 
tion, conceived  a  sort  of  hope,  and  laboured 
sincerely  to  execute  the  orders  he  had  received. 
The  junta  of  the  government,  no  longer  under 
the  presidency  of  Don  Antonio,  and  enlarged, 
as  we  have  seen,  by  several  members  of  the 
councils  of  Castillo  and  the  Indies,  was  natu- 
rally attached  to  Ferdinand  VII.,  for  the  men 
who  composed  it  were  Spaniards  at  heart ;  but 
they  were  irresolute,  and  knew  not  what  part 
to  take  to  promote  the  interests  of  their  country. 
As  Spaniards,  it  cost  them  much  to  renounce 
the  ancient  dynasty,  which  for  a  century  had 
reigned  over  Spain,  and  was  as  completely 
identified  with  the  country  as  if  it  had  descend- 
ed directly  from  Ferdinand  and  Isabella.  This 
attachment  on  their  part  was  strengthened  by 
the  energetic  passions  of  the  people,  who,  ex- 
cited by  hatred  to  foreigners,  by  their  aversion 
to  the  favourite  Godoy,  saw  in  Ferdinand  VII. 
the  victim  of  both,  and  were  everywhere  dis- 
posed to  insurrection.  But  they  were  restrained 
by  the  apprehensions  entertained  by  all  men  of 
discernment,  that,  if  opposition  were  made  to 
the  French,  they  should  see  Spain  turned  into 
a  field  of  battle  for  the  armies  of  Europe ;  a 
fanatic  and  barbarian  populace  entering  the 
lists,  to  the  detriment  of  all  men  of  honour; 
and,  lastly,  the  colonies  shaking  off  the  yoke 
of  Spain,  or  perhaps  opening  their  arms  to  the 
English.  Such  was  the  conflict  of  ideas  which 
made  the  junta  hesitate,  and  agitated  the  breast 
of  every  Spaniard  who  understood  and  che- 
rished the  interests  of  his  country. 

Where  the  mind  is  uncertain  the  conduct 
will  be  so  also.  The  junta,  and  with  it  the 
enlightened  classes,  acted  therefore  amid  these 
grave  occurrences  an  indecisive  and  equivocal 
part.  In  receiving  the  renunciations  of  Charles 
IV.  and  Ferdinand  VII.,  and  the  declarations 
by  which  these  princes  released  the  Spaniards 
from  their  oath  of  allegiance,  the  members  of 
the  junta,  though  firmly  persuaded  that  these 
renunciations  had  been  extorted  by  force,  felt 
disposed  to  bow  before  a  superior  destiny.  The 
recent  recommendations  of  Ferdinand  VII., 
which  engaged  them  to  abstain  from  every  act 
of  imprudence,  gave  the  finishing  stroke  to 
confirm  them  in  this  resolution.  They  were, 
however,  for  a  moment  in  painful  uncertainty, 
when  the  reply  to  the  former  questions  of  the 
junta,  inquiring  whether  they  should  assemble 
in  any  other  place  than  Madrid,  convoke  the 
Cortes,  and  make  national  war  upon  the  French, 
reached  them  by  a  secret  messenger,  who  had 
lost  much  time  in  traversing  the  Castilles.  The 
first  reply  to  these  questions  had  been  in  the 
affirmative,  as  will  be  remembered,  and  was 
dated  on  the  morning  of  the  5th  of  May,  shortly 
before  that  eventful  scene  took  place  at  the 
residence  of  the  aged  monarch  Charles  IV. 
which  had  decided  the  renunciations. 

After  mature  reflection,  the  members  of  the 
junta,  considering  that  what  had  since  passed 
between  the  father  and  the  son  had  completely 
changed  the  face  of  things,  induced  Ferdinand 
VII.  to  resign  his  royalty,  and  himself  to 
Aounsol  them  to  act  with  prudence,  conceived 


that  they  could  take  no  account  of  orders  which 
were  annulled  by  posterior  resolutions.  It 
therefore  testified  its  perfect  resignation  to 
Murat,  its  readiness  to  obey  his  commands, 
and  to  recognise  the  king  whom  Napoleon 
should  give  them.  Those  especially  who,  from 
conviction  or  interest,  adopted  the  idea  of  a 
change  of  dynasty — the  Marquis  de  Caballero 
for  example — were  disposed  to  serve  the  new 
sovereign  with  great  energy,  especially  if 
Murat,  with  whom  they  were  acquainted,  wag 
to  be  invested  with  that  dignity. 

Murat,  however,  had  more  to  demand  from 
them  than  passive  concurrence.  He  had  orders 
to  elicit  from  the  junta  and  the  councils  of  Cas- 
tille  and  the  Indies  the  formal  demand  of  Joseph 
Bonaparte  as  King  of  Spain.  This  was  too 
much  for  the  weakness  of  some  and  the  inte- 
rested calculations  of  others.  To  drop  the  rights 
of  the  house  of  Bourbon,  without  taking  upon 
themselves  the  responsibility  of  a  change  of 
dynasty,  was  all  that  could  have  been  expected 
from  them.  To  compromise  themselves  for  a 
new  prince,  on  condition  of  doing  so  before  his 
face,  and  thus  to  acquire  all  his  favour,  might 
have  suited  ambitious  minds  ;  but  it  was  not  in 
accordance  with  their  feelings  to  compromise 
themselves  for  an  absent  prince,  who  was  un- 
known, and  was  not  even  witness  of  the  ardour 
manifested  in  his  service. 

Murat,  therefore,  found  their  courage  com- 
pletely cooled  when  he  proposed  to  the  junta 
that  it  should  concert  with  the  councils-of  Cas- 
tille  and  the  Indies  to  call  Joseph  Bonaparte  to 
the  throne  of  Spain.  Some  did  not  conceal 
their  apprehensions,  others  their  want  of  zeal 
for  the  interests  of  an  absent  king.  In  all  this 
there  was  much  to  flatter  the  secret  inclina- 
tions of  Murat,  for  it  was  evident  that  the  ini- 
tiative of  the  Spanish  authorities  would  have 
been  far  more  easily  obtained,  if  he  himself 
had  been  proposed,  both  because  he  pleased, 
and  because  he  was  upon  the  spot.  He  did  not, 
however,  on  this  account,  insist  the  less  ur- 
gently and  energetically  with  the  Spanish  au- 
thorities, in  order  to  extort  from  them  what  he 
had  been  commissioned  to  obtain. 

The  councils  of  Castille  and  of  the  Indies, 
which  in  some  respects  answered,  as  we  have 
already  said,  to  the  former  French  parliaments, 
had  always  sought  occasion  to  extend  their 
power ;  now,  however,  far  from  seeking  to  extend 
it,  they  availed  themselves  of  its  circumscribed 
limits,  and  exclaimed  against  the  pretension 
which  was  suggested  to  them  of  trenching  upon 
the  rights  of  the  throne,  and  of  deciding  whether 
one  dynasty  had  deserved  to  descend  from  it  and 
another  to  mount  it.  However,  after  numerous 
and  active  negotiations,  in  which  the  Marquis 
de  Caballero  was  the  negotiator,  the  councils 
of  Castille  and  the  Indies  agreed  upon  a  decla- 
ration, to  the  effect  that,  in  case  Charles  IV. 
and  Ferdinand  VII.  should  have  definitively  re- 
nounced their  rights  to  the  crown,  the  sove- 
reign whom  they  considered  most  capable  of 
promoting  the  happiness  of  Spain  was  the 
Prince  Joseph  Bonaparte,  who  reigned  with  so 
much  wisdom  in  a  part  of  the  ancient  Spanish 
patrimony  in  the  kingdom  of  Naples.  Thus 
the  councils  did  not  take  upon  themselves  to 
pronounce  on  the  rights  of  Charles  IV.  and 
Ferdinand  VII.,  but  confined  themselves,  in 
case  of  a  well  recognised  vacancy  of  the  throne, 


May,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE  EMPIRE. 


490 


lf>  signify  a  preference,  which,  after  all, 
amounted  to  no  more  than  a  mark  of  high  con- 
sideration for  one  of  the  most  esteemed  princes 
of  the  family  of  Bonaparte. 

Murat  transmitted  this  result  to  Napoleon, 
•without  concealing  from  him  the  trouble  it  had 
cost  him  to  obtain  it,  and  the  extreme  difficul- 
ties which  an  absent  candidate  would  meet 
•with.  It  was  easy  to  perceive  that  he  expressed 
a  sort  of  satisfaction  in  seeing  objections  started 
against  the  candidateship  of  Prince  Joseph 
•which  might  revive  his  own.  Napoleon,  who 
was  not  in  the  habit  of  sparing  him,  refrained 
nevertheless  from  irritating  him  at  a  moment 
when  he  stood  in  need  of  his  zeal,  and  contented 
himself  with  addressing  to  M.  de  la  Foret  the 
most  violent  and  unjust  reprimands,  saying  that 
he  had  placed  him  near  the  person  of  Prince 
Murat  in  order  that  he  might  give  him  wise  and 
good  counsels,  not  flatter  his  inclinations ;  that 
the  indecision  which  was  met  with  at  Madrid 
proceeded  only  from  the  weakness  of  action 
displayed  before  the  Spanish  authorities ;  that 
the  Grand-duke  of  Berg  was  lulling  himself 
with  the  hope  of  reigning  over  Spain,  and  that 
his  conduct  evidenced  this ;  that  this  was  a  vain 
delusion,  which  must  be  crushed,  for  no  one  in 
Spain  would  ever  think  of  having  him  for  king ; 
that  it  would  never  be  forgotten  that  he  was 
the  author  of  the  whole  plot  which  had  effected 
the  dispossession  of  the  fallen  family,  and  the 
general  who  had  commanded  the  slaughter  of 
the  2d  of  May;  that  a  prince  who  was  a 
stranger  to  all  these  acts,  to  whom  no  recollec- 
tions of  intrigue  or  rigour  were  attached,  would 
be  far  better  received ;  and  that  the  reward  of 
the  services  rendered  by  Prince  Murat  would 
be  the  kingdom  of  Naples,  destined  to  become  ' 
vacant  by  the  very  success  of  what  had  been 
done  at  Madrid. 

This  reprimand,  which  was  addressed  to  M.  j 
tie  la  Foret  in  order  that  it  might  come  to  the 
ears  of  Murat,  was  a  melancholy  reward  to  the 
latter  for  his  complaisance  in  seconding  an 
odious  machination :  a  melancholy  reward,  we 
say,  but  a  well-merited  reward,  for  thus  should 
all  those  be  treated  who  lend  their  aid  to  guilty 
designs. 

After  having  manifested  his  discontent  to 
Murat  in  this  indirect  way,  Napoleon  consi- 
dered that,  while  waiting  for  the  definitive  pro- 
clamation of  the  new  dynasty,  it  would  be  well 
to  employ  the  few  weeks  that  must  elapse  in 
preparing  the  administrative  reorganization  of 
Spain.  He  wished  to  exonerate  himself  in  the 
eyes  of  the  statesmen  of  every  country  for  the 
act  which  he  had  just  committed  by  a  marvel- 
lous use  of  the  resources  of  Spain ;  and  no  man 
— for  it  is  impossible  to  deny  this — was  more 
capable  than  he  was  of  redeeming,  by  his  man- 
ner of  reigning,  the  crime  which  he  had  com- 
mitted in  order  to  reign.  The  projects  which 
he  formed,  and  which  Spain  baffled  by  fanatic 
and  generous  resistance,  were  the  most  com- 
prehensive, the  best  combined,  which  he  had 
ever  conceived  in  his  life. 

He  commenced,  in  the  first  instance,  by  de- 
siring that  all  the  documents  made  use  of  by 
the  Spanish  administration  relative  to  the 
finances,  the  army,  and  the  navy,  should  be 
Bent  to  him  at  Bayonne.  Very  few  were  found, 
for,  as  we  have  said  elsewhere,  the  finances 
vere  a  state  secret  of  the  minister  of  finances, 


a  creature  of  the  Prince  of  the  Peace.  The 
distribution  of  the  army  and  the  navy,  their 
condition,  their  resources,  their  wants,  de- 
pended upon  local  circumstances,  which  were 
scarcely  known  to  the  central  administration 
at  Madrid.  When  Murat  applied,  in  the  name 
of  the  Emperor,  for  a  statement  of  the  navy, 
a  printed  annual  was  presented  to  him ;  but 
Napoleon  was  not  the  man  to  be  contented  with 
documents  such  as  these.  To  M.  O'Farrill,  the 
minister  of  war,  and  M.  Azanza,  the  minister 
of  finance,  the  principal  persons  of  the  junta, 
he  sent  marks  of  esteem,  and  even  flattering 
intimations  which  might  lead  them  to  expect 
some  great  favour  under  the  new  reign,  and 
requested  of  them  an  immediate  thorough  in- 
vestigation of  every  part  of  the  service.  He 
ordered  that  engineers  should  forthwith  be 
despatched  to  every  port,  and  officers  to  all  the 
principal  military  stations,  to  obtain  accurate 
and  positive  documents  on  every  subject. 

The  Spaniards  were  not  accustomed  to  such 
activity  or  rigorous  precision,  but  they  were  at 
last  roused  by  this  all-powerful  energy,  of 
which  Murat  gave  a  fresh  instance  on  the  arri- 
val of  every  courier,  and  they  sent  to  Napoleon 
a  tabular  statement  of  the  monarchy,  a  table 
which  we  have  already  made  known.  It  was 
singular  that  Napoleon,  in  demanding  these  do- 
cuments, said  to  Murat,  "  I  shall  want  them, 
in  the  first  instance,  for  the  measures  which  I 
shall  order ;  and  I  shall  want  them  afterwards 
in  order  that  posterity  may  learn  in  the  sequel 
in  what  state  I  find  the  Spanish  monarchy." 
Thus  he  was  himself  conscious  that,  in  order 
to  justify  himself,  he  should  be  compelled  to 
demonstrate  the  state  in  which  he  found  Spain, 
and  the  state  in  which  he  hoped  to  leave  her. 
But  avenging  Providence  granted  him  only  half 
this  justification. 

The  first  and  most  urgent  need  of  Spain  was 
want  of  money.  Murat  had  not  wherewith  to 
furnish  the  pay  of  the  troops,  or  to  send  the 
indispensable  funds  to  the  ports  for  sending  a 
few  vessels  to  sea.  Ferdinand  VII.,  on  his  ac- 
cession to  the  throne,  had  found  means  to  dis- 
pose of  sums  in  cash  which  belonged  either  to 
the  consolidated  fund  or  to  the  Prince  of  the 
Peace,  and  which  had  been  seized  the  moment 
the  old  court  had  set  out  for  Andalusia.  He 
had  employed  them  in  making  several  large 
presents,  and — what  was  of  more  importance — 
in  paying  to  the  annuitants  of  the  State  a  sum 
of  money  of  which  they  stood  in  great  need, 
and  for  which  they  had  been  waiting  for  some 
months.  This  done,  there  was  nothing  left. 
Murat,  exhausted,  and  reduced  to  the  necessity 
of  paying  his  own  personal  expenses  out  of  the 
chest  of  the  French  army,  had  informed  Napo- 
leon of  the  desperate  state  of  the  finances,  and 
demanded  immediate  pecuniary  aid,  relying  on 
the  wealth  which  victory  had  placed  in  the 
hands  of  Napoleon.  But  Napoleon,  fearful  of 
dissipating  a  treasure  which  he  had  destined 
as  a  recompense  for  his  army  in  case  of  conti- 
nued prosperity,  or  as  a  fund  for  creating  grand 
resources  of  defence  in  case  of  reverses,  at 
first  replied  that  he  had  no  money — an  answer 
which  he  always  gave  when  he  was  applied  to 
— at  all  events,  when  not  required  for  worka 
of  beneficence. 

Speedily  sensible  that  Spain  was  actually 
more  denuded  than  he  had  supposed,  Napoleon 


HISTORY  OF  THE 


[May,  1808- 


reconsidered  his  refusal,  and  decided  upon  suc- 
couring her — his  first  punishment  for  desiring 
to  be  master  of  her.  Nevertheless,  he  would 
not  suffer  his  hand  to  be  seen  even  while  con- 
ferring a  benefit,  for  he  knew  that  there  would 
be  no  haste  to  repay  if  only  himself  were  known 
to  be  the  debtor.  He  therefore  pretended  to 
obtain  a  loan  to  Spain  of  100  millions  of  reals, 
25  millions  of  francs,  from  the  Bank  of  France, 
upon  the  crown  jewels  of  Spain,  which  Charles 
IV.  was,  according  to  his  engagements,  to  have 
left  at  Madrid.  But  the  principal  of  these 
jewels  could  not  be  found,  for  they  had  been 
carried  off  by  the  old  queen.  Napoleon,  how- 
ever, concluded  this  financial  operation  upon 
reasonable  conditions,  which  he  obtained  the 
more  easily  from  the  Bank  as  it  only  lent  its 
name  to  the  treasurer  of  the  army.  It  was 
secretly  stipulated  with  the  governor  of  the 
Bank  that  Napoleon  should  furnish  the  funds 
and  run  all  the  chances  of  the  loan,  but  that 
the  Bank  should  act  with  all  the  precaution 
and  circumspection  of  a  creditor  acting  on  his 
own  account.  In  order  that  no  time  might  be 
lost,  Napoleon  instantly  threw  into  the  treasury 
of  Spain  several  millions  of  the  specie  which 
he  had  accumulated  at  Bayonne ;  thus,  by  his 
energetic  foresight,  abridging  the  delays  which 
are  ordinarily  attached  to  all  transactions  of 
this  nature. 

With  these  first  succours,  far  more  efficacious 
from  being  in  specie  and  not  in  royal  Vales, 
(paper-money  issued  by  the  Prince  of  the  Peace 
at  a  loss  of  50  per  cent.,)  he  gave  a  large  sum 
to  the  public  functionaries  and  to  the  army, 
but  he  reserved  the  greater  part  of  his  store 
of  cash  for  the  service  of  the  ports,  which 
more  than  any  other  he  was  anxious  to  re- 
animate. Although  he  did  not  foresee  a  gene- 
ral insurrection  in  Spain,  especially  after  all 
that  Murat  continued  to  write  him,  Napoleon 
was  especially  distrustful  of  the  army.  He 
commanded  that  it  should  receive  a  distribu- 
tion, which,  had  it  been  executed  in  time,  might 
have  averted  many  evils.  He  was  at  first  very 
anxious  that  the  troops  of  General  Solano 
should  be  sent  from  Madrid  and  marched  to 
Andalusia.  He  subsequently  renewed  this 
order,  but  prescribed  that  a  portion  of  them 
should  be  sent  to  the  camp  of  St.  Roch,  before 
Gibraltar,  another  to  Portugal,  for  the  purpose 
of  employing  them  on  the  coast,  where  they 
would  be  useful  rather  than  dangerous  in  face 
of  the  English.  He  commanded  that  the  1st 
division  of  General  Dupont  should  instantly  be 
sent  from  the  Escurial  to  Toledo,  and  from  To- 
ledo to  Cordova  and  Cadiz,  to  protect  the  fleet 
of  Admiral  Rosily,  which  had  become  the  ob- 
ject of  his  greatest  care  since  the  change  of 
the  dynasty  was  known.  He  at  the  same  time 
enjoined  that  the  2d  division  of  General  Dupont 
should  go  to  Toledo,  and  there  be  ready  to 
support  the  1st,  and  the  3d  to  the  Escurial, 
in  order  that  it  might  be  at  hand  to  aid  the  two 
others. 

He  made  divers  other  dispositions  for  the 
purpose  of  reinforcing  General  Dupont.  He 
added  to  his  first  division  a  strong  artillery, 
2000  dragoons,  and  four  Swiss  regiments,  serv- 
ing in  Spain.  He  announced  to  the  latter  that 
ie  would  take  them  into  his  pay,  and  grant 
them  exactly  the  same  conditions  as  those 
which  they  enjoyed  in  Spain,  not  doubting  that 


they  would  be  far  prouder  to  serve  Napoleon 
than  Ferdinand  VII. ;  but  he  added,  in  writing 
to  Murat,  that  if  these  Swiss  troops  were  in  a 
current  of  French  opinion  they  would  conduct 
themselves  well,  but  ill  if  they  were  in  a  current 
of  Spanish  opinion.  He  consequently  ordered 
that  the  two  regiments  of  Preux  and  of  Red- 
ing, which  had  formed  part  of  the  garrison  of 
Madrid,  should  assemble  at  Talavera,  in  order 
to  be  placed  on  the  route  of  General  Dupont, 
who  should  take  them  up  in  passing.  He  com- 
manded that  the  two  Swiss  regiments  which 
were  at  Carthagena  and  Malaga  should  as- 
semble at  Grenada,  whence  they  should  join 
General  Dupont  in  Andalusia.  Among  other 
things,  he  prescribed  to  General  Junot  to  march 
the  Spanish  troops  to  the  Portuguese  frontiers, 
and  to  remove  the  French  troops  from  thence, 
taking  two  divisions  of  the  latter,  the  one  to- 
wards Upper  Castille  to  Almeida,  the  other 
towards  Andalusia  to  Elvas. 

There  General  Dupont  was  to  control  the 
Andalusians  with  10,000  French  of  his  1st  di- 
vision, 4000  or  5000  of  the  division  sent  by 
General  Junot,  and  5000  Swiss.  The  Spaniards 
assembled  in  the  camp  of  St.  Roch  were  to  join 
him,  and  in  common  to  protect  the  interest  of 
the  new  order  of  things  against  the  English 
and  the  discontented  Spaniards.  The  fleet  of 
Admiral  Rosily  had  therefore  nothing  more  to 
fear. 

Napoleon  next  ordered  that  a  large  portion 
of  the  Spanish  troops  stationed  in  the  South 
should  be  sent  to  the  Balearic  Isles,  to  Ceuta, 
and  all  the  other  presidencies  of  Africa,  in 
order  that  these  important  points  should  be 
well  secured  against  every  attack  of  the  English, 
and  also  that  as  few  Spanish  troops  as  possible 
should  at  this  moment  remain  on  the  continent 
of  Spain.  He  made  one  division  go  north- 
wards, that  is  to  say,  towards  Ferrol,  for  an 
expedition  to  the  colonies — the  importance  and 
object  of  which  will  afterwards  be  seen.  Lastly, 
he  desired  Murat  to  dispose  of  a  certain  num- 
ber of  those  who  were  stationed  in  the  environa 
of  Madrid,  on  the  route  of  the  Pyrenees,  to 
prepare  them  gradually  to  pass  into  France, 
under  the  pretext  that  they  were  to  go  and 
share  the  glory  of  the  Romana  division  in  an 
expedition  for  Scania  against  the  English  and 
the  Swedes. 

A  similar  disposition  was  prescribed  for  the 
life-guard,  which  had  displayed  such  hatred  to 
the  Prince  of  the  Peace  and  so  much  devotion 
to  Ferdinand  VII.,  and  who  for  this  reason 
were  greatly  suspected.  A  northern  campaign, 
side  by  side  with  the  French  army,  was  the 
bait  held  out  to  them  in  making  them  choose 
between  this  glorious  mission  and  their  dis- 
bandment. 

It  is  impossible  duly  to  conceive  a  more  able 
distribution  ;  for  the  Spanish  troops,  dispersed 
on  the  frontiers  of  the  Peninsula,  in  Africa,  in 
America,  and  in  the  north  of  Europe,  more- 
over, placed  everywhere  under  the  surveillance 
of  the  French  army,  could  no  longer  be  an 
object  of  apprehension.  Unhappily,  however, 
the  unanimous  effort  of  a  great  nation  speedily 
defeated  the  most  profound  combinations  of 
genius. 

Let  us  now  come  to  the  dispositions  relative 
to  the  navy.  The  first  care  of  Napoleon,  in 
the  very  first  moment,  was  to  secure  the  Spa- 


May,  1808  ] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


501 


nish  colonies  from  the  dangers  of  an  insurrec- 
tion, by  this  means  gaining  the  hearts  of  the 
Spaniards  in  securing  the  interest  which  most 
nearly  touched  them,  and  exalting  their  ima- 
ginations by  finally  realizing  those  vast  mari- 
time projects  which  he  meditated  since  the 
days  of  Tilsit,  but  for  the  carrying  out  of  which 
he  had  hitherto,  in  the  first  instance,  wanted 
time,  and,  in  the  second,  the  free  co-operation 
of  Spain. 

Napoleon  commenced  by  commanding  multi- 
plied communication,  as  well  with  the  French 
colonies  as  with  those  of  Spain.  To  this  end 
he  sent  off  from  France,  from  Portugal,  and 
Spain,  small  vessels  bearing  proclamations 
filled  with  the  most  seductive  promises,  with 
papers  emanating  from  all  the  commercial 
companies  confirming  these  proclamations,  with 
commissioners  charged  to  spread  them  abroad ; 
lastly,  with  warlike  stores  and  provisions,  of 
which  the  recent  events  in  Buenos  Ayres  had 
revealed  the  urgent  need.  All  the  colonies  had, 
in  fact,  manifested  the  greatest  zeal  to  defend 
the  domination  of  Spain,  and  their  want  of 
arms  alone  had  prevented  this  zeal  from  being 
efficacious.  Napoleon,  who  not  only  ordered 
every  thing,  but  himself  carried  those  orders 
into  execution  wherever  he  might  himself  be, 
had  already  discovered  at  Bayonne,  a  port 
from  which  there  was  at  that  time  a  good  deal 
of  intercourse  with  the  Spanish  colonies,  the 
means  of  communicating  with  America.  He 
had  there  found  out  a  vessel  very  small,  very 
neatly  rigged,  very  inexpensive  to  build,  almost 
imperceptible  at  sea  on  account  of  her  small 
sails,  and  able  to  escape  all  the  enemy's  cruisers. 
He  despatched  one  which  was  already  complete, 
immediately  caused  six  others  to  be  put  upon 
the  stocks  under  the  name  of  mouches,  [flies,] 
in  order  to  send  them  to  Spanish  America 
laden  with  arms  and  communications  for  the 
authorities.  One  month  sufficed  to  build  them ; 
he  was  therefore  sure  that  he  should  very  soon 
have  an  adequate  number  ready  to  send  out. 

He  had  ascertained,  by  observations  made  at 
Cadiz,  that  this  port  was  the  best  for  distant 
expeditions,  because  vessels  steering  for  the 
coast  of  Africa,  and  running  down  it  as  far  as 
the  latitude  of  the  trade-winds,  were  not  obliged 
to  double  any  of  the  Spanish  capes,  where  they 
generally  encountered  the  enemy's  cruisers. 
He  desired  that  from  this  port  a  multitude  of 
little  vessels  should  be  immediately  despatched, 
carrying,  like  the  others,  a  number  of  procla- 
mations and  warlike  stores. 

Having  provided  for  frequent  communication 
with  the  colonies,  he  turned  his  attention  to 
sending  considerable  forces  thither.  He  com- 
manded that  armaments  should  be  equipped  at 
Ferrol,  Cadiz,  and  Carthagena.  A  part  of  the 
loan  granted  to  Spain  was  to  be  employed  in 
this  object,  and  to  obtain  the  double  result  of 
gladdening  the  eyes  of  the  Spaniards  by  the 
sight  of  great  maritime  activity,  and  of  pre- 
paring expeditions  capable  of  saving  the  colo- 
nial possessions.  There  were  at  Ferrol  two 
ships  of  the  line  and  two  frigates  ready  for  sea. 
He  commanded  that  two  other  vessels  should 
be  immediately  refitted  ;  these  six  ships  should 
be  manned,  freighted  with  arms  and  ammuni- 
tion, and  kept  in  readiness  to  receive  from 
3000  to  4000  soldiers,  who  were  at  that  moment 
on  their  way  to  Ferrol.  This  expedition  was 


destined  for  Rio  de  la  Plata,  and,  as  a  few 
hundred  men  under  the  command  of  a  French 
officer,  M.  de  Linidrs,  had  sufficed  to  expel  the 
English  from  Buenos  Ayres,  and  a  hundred 
French  at  Caraccas  to  defeat  the  attempt  of 
the  insurgent  Miranda,  there  was  every  reason 
to  hope  that  the  sending  of  such  a  succour 
would  suffice  to  secure  the  vast  possessions  of 
South  America  from  every  hostile  attempt. 

At  Cadiz  there  had  long  been  six  sail  of  the 
line  equipped.  Napoleon  commanded  that  they 
should  be  furnished  with  whatever  they  might 
require  in  regard  to  crews  and  provisions  ;  that 
to  these  should  be  added  five  other  vessels, 
which  the  resources  of  this  port,  if  there  were 
a  supply  of  money,  would  be  adequate  to  refit, 
to  arm,  and  to  equip.  There  were  already  at 
Cadiz  five  French  ships  of  the  line  and  several 
French  frigates,  under  Admiral  Rosily,  the 
glorious  remains,  as  we  have  before  said,  of 
the  disaster  of  Trafalgar,  and  as  well  organized 
as  the  best  of  the  English  ships.  Napoleon 
wished  to  reinforce  this  division  by  two  other 
vessels,  by  means  of  a  very  ingenious  combina- 
tion, which  was  highly  advantageous  to  Spain. 
He  sent  from  the  funds  of  the  French  treasury 
the  necessary  advance  for  the  construction  of 
two  new  ships,  which  were  to  be  put  on  the 
stocks  at  Carthagena,  a  port  where  ship-build- 
ing was  continually  going  on,  while  in  that  of 
Cadiz  the  timber  was  reserved  for  repairing 
the  armed  fleet.  In  return  for  this  advance, 
Spain  was  to  lend  France  the  Santa  Anna  and 
the  San  Carlos,  two  magnificent  three-deckers, 
which  were  to  be  returned  after  the  completion 
of  the  two  vessels  at  Carthagena. 

Napoleon  prescribed  to  the  battalion  of  the 
marines  of  the  guard,  from  600  to  700  strong, 
which  had  followed  the  detachments  of  the 
guards  in  Spain,  to  repair  to  General  Dupont 
at  Cadiz.  Besides  these  600  or  700  excellent 
seamen,  Admiral  Rosily  might  be  able,  without 
weakening  his  own  squadron,  to  take  from  it 
300  or  400  men,  whom  General  Dupont  should 
replace  by  giving  conscripts  from  his  battalions, 
and  by  these  means  it  would  be  perfectly  easy 
to  man  the  two  vessels  borrowed  from  the 
arsenal  at  Cadiz.  Thus,  therefore,  there  would 
be  immediately  at  Cadiz  seven  French  sail  of 
the  line,  five  or  six  Spanish,  making  in  all 
twelve  or  thirteen,  and,  with  the  five  Spanish 
the  equipment  of  which  had  been  commenced, 
a  total  of  eighteen,  to  be  employed,  as  will 
soon  be  seen,  in  the  execution  of  the  grandest 
designs. 

At  Carthagena,  the  construction  of  two  new 
French  vessels  for  the  account  of  France  was 
about  to  reanimate  the  works  and  to  re-as- 
semble the  dispersed  workmen.  From  this 
port  a  squadron  of  six  vessels  had  sailed  for 
Toulon.  There  were  left  two  others  capable 
of  keeping  the  sea,  and  these  Napoleon  com- 
manded to  be  immediately  armed,  and  to  be 
joined  by  several  frigates.  He  enjoined  the 
fleet  of  Carthagena,  which  had  taken  refuge  at 
Mahon,  to  repair  to  Toulon  or  to  return  to  Car- 
j  thagena,  where,  with  the  two  vessels  which 
were  about  to  be  manned,  it  would  form  a  divi- 
j  sion  of  eight  vessels.  "  Take  to  yourself  the 
I  glory,"  wrote  Napoleon  to  Murat,  "of  having, 
during  your  short  administration,  reanimated 
the  Spani«h  navy :  it  is  the  best  means  of  at- 
taching the  Spaniards  to  us,  and  of  assigning 


602 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


[May,  1808 


an  honourable  motive  for  our  presence  among 
them." 

It  is  easy  to  see  that  these  preparations, 
which  were  calculated  -to  reawaken  activity  in 
all  the  ports  of  Spain,  would  act  in  concert 
with  the  naval  forces  already  created  through- 
out the  whole  extent  of  the  French  empire. 
We  have  before  said  that  the  project  of  Napo- 
leon  was  to  station  in  all  the  ports  of  Europe, 
from  the  Sound  to  Cadiz,  from  Cadiz  to  Toulon, 
from  Toulon  to  Corfu  and  Venice,  fleets  com- 
pletely equipped,  and  at  the  side  of  these  fleets 
camps,  which  the  return  of  the  grand  army 
would  enable  him  to  compose  of  the  finest 
troops,  for  the  purpose  of  ruining  and  dis- 
heartening England  by  the  already  impending 
possibility  of  an  immense  expedition  to  every 
part  of  the  globe — for  Sicily,  Egypt,  Algiers, 
the  Indies,  Ireland,  nay,  England  herself.  In 
this  way  Napoleon  showed  whither  his  projects 
tended,  and  what  they  would  become  by  the 
union  of  Spain  and  France  under  the  same 
authority. 

The  expedition  of  Corfu,  destined  principally 
for  Sicily,  had  many  storms  to  encounter,  but 
had  been  master  of  the  Mediterranean  for  two 
months,  from  the  10th  of  February  to  the  10th 
of  May.  Admiral  Ganteaume,  who,  as  we 
have  stated,  left  Toulon  on  the  10th  of  February 
with  the  two  divisions  of  Toulon  and  Rochefort, 
consisting  of  ten  sail  of  the  line,  two  frigates, 
two  corvettes,  and  one  flute,  encountered  a 
fearful  tempest  on  the  night  of  the  llth.  This 
squadron  once  dispersed  could  not  rally.  With 
his  three-decker,  Le  Commerce  de  Paris,  and  the 
division  of  Rochefort,  he  had  kept  out  at  sea, 
doubled  Sicily,  and  arrived  in  sight  of  Corfu, 
which  he  entered  on  the  23d. 

Rear-admiral  Cosmao,  on  his  part,  with  four 
ships  of  the  line,  two  frigates,  two  flutes,  had 
long  battled  with  the  seas  of  Sicily,  in  order  to 
rejoin  the  admiral ;  had  afterwards  gained  Cape 
Santa  Maria,  the  rendezvous  which  had  been 
assigned  at  the  extremity  of  the  Otranto  terri- 
tory, and,  instead  of  entering  Corfu,  where  he 
would  have  found  the  rest  of  the  fleet,  had  re- 
turned to  the  gulf,  to  Tarento,  on  the  false 
report  of  the  approach  of  the  English  squadron. 

Admiral  Ganteaume,  who  sailed  from  Corfu 
on  the  25th  of  February  to  join  the  division  of 
Cosmao,  was  tossed  about  by  a  frightful  tem- 
pest for  nineteen  days,  and  at  length  fell  in  with 
his  lieutenant  on  the  13th  of  March :  thus  collect- 
ing his  ten  ships  of  the  line,  his  two  frigates,  his 
two  corvettes,  and  one  of  his  two  flutes,  he  took 
them  back  to  Corfu.  He  had  there  landed  a 
considerable  quantity  of  provisions  and  stores, 
and  increased  the  garrison  to  6000  men.  He  was 
preparing  to  enter  the  strait  of  Messina,  to 
effect  the  passage  of  the  French  troops  into 
Sicily,  when  he  received  intelligence  from 
Joseph  that  the  English  Admiral  Strachan  was 
at  Palermo  with  seventeen  vessels ;  he  was 
therefore  obliged  to  return  to  Toulon,  leaving 
at  Corfu  his  newly-equipped  frigates,  and  tak- 
ing with  him  the  Pomone  and  the  Pauline,  which 
had  exhausted  their  stores  and  worn  out  their 
rigging  by  their  prolonged  sojourn  in  that 
island.  He  encountered  the  equinoctial  gales, 
and  did  not  make  Toulon  till  the  10th  of  April. 

This  expedition  of  two  months,  though  greatly 
impeded  by  weather,  nevertheless  gave  Napo- 
leon extreme  satisfaction,  and  he  ordered  that 


j  the  most  pompous  eulogiums  should  be  lavished 
upon  the  admirals  and  officers  in  all  the  public 
journals  throughout  the  empire.  He  arrive'! 
at  the  conclusion  that,  with  a  little  more  dar- 
ing and  more  practice,  his  admirals  would  be 
able  to  attempt  great  things.  He  accordingly 
commanded  that  Admiral  Ganteaume's  ten  ships 
should  be  instantly  repaired,  provided  with  ex- 
cellent crews  and  two  good  officers — Rear-ad- 
mirals Cosmao  and  Allemand ;  to  put  to  sea 
the  Austerlitz,  the  Breslau,  and  the  Donauwerth, 
and  that  there  should  be  added  to  them  two 
Russian  vessels  which  had  taken  refuge  at 
Toulon,  for  which  step  he  had  obtained  the 
concurrence  of  the  Russian  government  He 
decreed  a  new  levy  of  seamen  on  the  coas»t  of 
Provence,  Liguria,  Tuscany,  and  Corsica,  with 
an  addition  of  conscripts  for  manning  the 
three  new  vessels,  the  Austerlitz,  the  Breslau, 
and  the  Donauwerth.  He  ordered  that  several 
frigates  and  old  ships  should  be  equipped  as 
flutes,  so  that  he  might  be  able  to  embark  2000 
men  and  800  horses.  The  arrival  of  the  Spa- 
nish division  from  Carthagena,  if  it  came  fronr 
the  Balearic  islands  to  Toulon,  would  thereb; 
augment  by  a  third  or  even  a  fourth  the  meant 
of  transport. 

We  have  spoken  of  the  preparation  com- 
manded at  Carthagena  and  at  Cadiz.  General 
Junot  had  found  at  Lisbon  two  vessels  ready 
for  sea,  and  one  on  the  stocks  on  the  eve  of 
being  launched.  Napoleon  had  sent  to  him 
several  officers  and  some  sailors,  and  had  de- 
sired him  to  enrol  the  Danish,  Spanish,  and 
Portuguese  sailors  who  might  be  found  unem- 
ployed at  Lisbon,  to  man  the  three  Portuguese 
vessels. 

At  Rochefort,  Napoleon  had  supplied  the 
place  of  Allemand's  division  by  three  ships  of 
the  line  already  under  sail,  and  a  fourth  just 
launched.  At  Lorient,  he  had  a  division  con- 
sisting of  three  new  ships  of  the  line,  besides 
Le  Veteran,  which  was  about  to  return  thither, 
with  several  frigates  and  store-ships.  He 
ordered  preparations  to  be  made  at  the  last- 
mentioned  port  for  the  embarkment  of  4000  or 
5000  men.  At  Brest,  there  still  remained 
seven  ships  of  the  old  fleet  in  good  condition ; 
to  these  were  to  be  added  several  frigates  and 
other  ships  armed  en  flute,  that  is  to  say,  having 
only  one  tier  of  guns,  so  that  a  very  few  of 
them  would  be  capable  of  embarking  12,000 
men.  Admiral  Villaumez  was  to  command  this 
squadron. 

Finally,  there  were  already  at  Flushing  eight 

new  ships  of  the  line,  just  come  down  from 

Antwerp ;  besides  about  a  dozen  others  in  the 

course  of  construction,  several  of  which  were 

ready  for -launching.     Napoleon  ordered  that 

a  portion  of  the  crews  should  be  detached  from 

the  ships  forming  this  flotilla  at  Boulogne  and 

I  organized  into  marine  battalions,  serving  alter- 

j  nately  by  land  and  by  sea,  and  made  capable 

of  manning  ships  of  war.     The  flotilla,  reduced 

j  to  such  limits  as  the  roads  of  Boulogne  could 

easily  contain,  was  still  sufficiently  considerable 

to  transport  80,000  men  in  two  or  three  trips 

|  across  the  Channel.     In  the  harbour  of  Texel, 

j  King  Louis  had  eight  ships  of  war  ready  foi 

j  sea,  and  several  detachments  of  Dutch  troops. 

Napoleon  had  thus  forty-two  French  ships 

j  of  war,  equipped  and  manned ;  twenty  Spanish 

\  ships  already  equipped  or  nearly  so ;  ten  Dutch, 


May,  1808.] 


CONSULATE   AND   THE   EMPIRE. 


603 


and  eleven  Russian  ships,  in  the  various  ports 
of  France  ;  twelve  Russian  vessels  in  the  Adri- 
atic, together  with  one  or  two  belonging  to 
Denmark.  In  addition  to  all  these,  he  hoped 
to  be  able  to  build  thirty-five  more  ships  by 
the  close  of  the  year ;  namely,  twelve  at  Flush- 
ing, one  at  Brest,  five  at  Lorient,  five  at  Roche- 
fort,  one  at  Bordeaux,  one  at  Lisbon,  four  at 
Toulon,  one  at  Genoa,  one  at  Spezzia,  and  three 
or  four  at  Venice.  These  thirty-five  ships  were 
already  two-thirds  finished.  He  calculated 
that  the  completion  of  all  these  naval  construc- 
tions would  put  him  in  possession  of  131  ships 
of  the  line ;  and  his  design  was  to  station  7000 
men  at  the  Texel,  25,000  at  Antwerp,  80,000 
at  Boulogne,  50,000  at  Brest,  10,000  between 
Lorient  and  Rochefort,  6000  Spaniards  at  Fer- 
rol,  20,000  French  round  Lisbon,  30,000  round 
Cadiz,  20,000  round  Carthagena,  25,000  at 
Toulon,  15,000  at  Reggio,  and  15,000  at  Tarento. 
With  131  ships  of  the  line,  and  about  300,000 
men  always  ready  to  embark  at  one  point  or 
another,  it  would  be  easy  to  keep  the  English 
in  continual  alarm. 

Whilst  this  vast  development  of  force  was 
accomplishing,  Napoleon  calculated  that  the 
English  would  have  ten  ships  of  war  in  the 
Baltic,  keeping  watch  over  the  Russians  and 
the  operations  in  Holland ;  eight  to  observe  the 
fleet  assembled  at  the  Texel  and  at  the  outlets 
of  the  Meuse  ;  twenty-four  to  oppose  the  eight 
or  ten  at  Flushing,  the  seven  at  Brest,  the  four 
at  Lorient,  and  the  three  at  Rochefort ;  four  to 
hold  in  check  the  expedition  at  Ferrol,  twelve 
to  oppose  the  armament  at  Lisbon,  twenty  to 
make  head  against  the  armament  at  Cadiz,  and 
twenty-two  or  twenty-four  against  the  arma- 
ment at  Toulon.  For  all  this,  102  ships  were 
required,  to  say  nothing  of  the  naval  forces 
necessary  to  be  kept  up  on  the  coasts  of  Ame- 
rica, India,  and  other  parts  of  the  world.  It 
must  inevitably  have  been  ruinous  to  Great 
Britain  to  condemn  her  to  a  continuance  of  these 
efforts  for  the  space  of  two  or  three  years. 

But  Napoleon  was  not  disposed  to  confine 
himself  to  empty  threats,  whatever  degree  of 
alarm  or  expense  it  might  occasion  to  England. 
He  determined  to  direct  his  immense  prepara- 
tions to  two  immediate  results ;  viz.,  an  expe- 
dition to  India,  and  one  to  Egypt.  This  two- 
fold scheme  engrossed  his  whole  attention 
whenever  it  was  diverted  from  the  straits  of 
Calais.  He  had  given  orders  for  adding  to  the 
divisions  of  ships  armed  for  war  a  certain  num- 
ber of  transports,  consisting  of  old  frigates  and 
other  vessels  armed  en  flute,  and  capable  of 
conveying  numerous  forces  and  great  quantities 
of  provisions,  without  the  inconvenience  of 
numerous  vessels.  By  this  means  he  could 
embark  12,000  men  at  Brest,  4000  or  5000  at 
Lorient,  5000  at  Rochefort,  all  with  supplies 
of  provisions  for  six  months.  At  Toulon  there 
were  arrangements  for  embarking  20,000  men, 
with  provisions  for  three  years.  At  Cadiz  he 
had  given  orders  for  similar  preparations  for 
20,000  men,  but  with  reference  to  a  more  remote 
period. 

Profiting  by  the  perplexity  of  England,  when 
thus  menaced  on  all  points  at  once,  it  was  de- 
termined that  the  Lorient  expedition  should  be 
the  first  to  sail,  conveying  4000  or  5000  men  to 
the  Isle  of  France.  This  augmentation  of 
troops,  ammunition,  and  naval  force  would 


render  the  Isle  of  France  a  formidable  post  to 
the  trade  of  India.  The  Brest  expedition  was 
to  be  the  next  in  the  order  of  departure.  In 
the  event  of  its  also  reaching  the  Isle  of  France, 
General  Decaen,  with  a  force  of  between  16,000 
and  17,000  troops,  and  a  powerful  squadron, 
would  be  enabled  to  overthrow,  or  at  least  to 
shake,  the  British  empire  in  India.  After  the 
lapse  of  a  little  time,  Admiral  Ganteaume,  with 
20,000  men,  was  to  proceed  either  to  Sicily  or 
Egypt,  whilst  the  fleet  at  Cadiz  would  follow  in 
the  one  or  the  other  direction.  The  least  im- 
portant result  that  might  be  expected  from 
these  combined  movements,  would  be  the  con- 
veyance of  supplies  to  our  colonies  in  the 
ocean,  and  the  conquest  of  an  important  point 
in  the  Mediterranean ;  whilst  in  both  those 
quarters  the  English  navy  would  find  so  much 
occupation  that  any  attempt  against  the  Spa- 
nish colonies  would  be  out  of  the  question. 

Whilst  Napoleon  was  warmly  discussing  these 
plans,  alternately  with  the  minister  Decres  and 
with  the  admirals  charged  with  the  several 
commands,  he  directed  the  arrangements  of  the 
whole  project,  and  verified  the  details  by  the 
opinions  of  practical  men.  In  his  intervals  of 
leisure,  he  mounted  his  horse,  and  rode  along 
the  sea-shore,  visiting  the  mouth  of  the  Adour, 
and  collecting,  by  his  own  personal  observation, 
much  information  relative  to  naval  affairs. 
During  his  visit  to  the  Landes,  he  had  seen 
numbers  of  fine  firs  and  oaks  felled,  and  lying 
on  the  ground  rotting,  for  want  of  the  means 
of  transport.  On  beholding  this  waste  of  use- 
ful resources,  he  determined  to  conquer  nature 
by  the  force  of  art.  "  My  heart  bleeds,"  he  said, 
in  a  letter  addressed  to  M.  Decres,  "to  see  all 
this  valuable  wood  perishing  uselessly."  He 
forthwith  gave  orders  for  transporting  a  por- 
tion of  the  timber  by  water  down  the  Adour  to 
Mont-de-Marsan ;  from  thence  it  was  to  be 
drawn  by  teams  of  oxen  to  Langon,  and  after- 
wards to  be  floated  by  the  Garonne  to  Bordeaux 
and  Rochelle.  But  this  mode  of  conveyance 
being  very  expensive,  he  continued  building 
ships  at  Bayonne,  in  order  to  use  the  timber 
remaining  in  that  part  of  the  country.  The  bar 
which  obstructs  the  river  was  the  only  obstacle 
that  opposed  these  works.  There  being  only 
fourteen  feet  water  at  high  tide,  the  depth  was 
insufficient  to  float  a  74-gun  ship,  which  Napo- 
leon wished  to  construct  in  that  port.  He  de- 
vised works  for  throwing  back  the  bar  some 
hundred  fathoms,  which  would  have  procured 
a  depth  of  twenty  or  thirty  feet  of  water ;  for, 
at  a  little  distance  out,  the  sea  becomes  ex- 
tremely deep,  and  the  bar  sunk  in  proportion. 
He  sent  for  engineers  from  Holland  to  discuss 
and  arrange  the  plan  of  the  works.  He  next 
entertained  various  schemes  for  furnishing  the 
colonies  with  recruits  and  supplies  of  corn, 
which  they  wanted,  and  for  bringing  home  to  the 
mother-country  the  sugar  and  coffee  which  they 
could  not  use.  He  proposed  to  give  the  owners 
of  merchant-vessels  a  certain  sum  per  ton  for 
the  transport  of  troops  and  stores ;  but  this 
proposition  was  met  by  demands  so  exor- 
bitant, that  he  determined  on  sending  out  sloops 
and  frigates  to  convey  the  troops  and  corn,  and 
to  bring  back  the  colonial  produce  at  the  charge 
of  the  state.  "  Extraordinary  circumstances,'' 
he  used  to  observe,  "  demand  extraordinary 
measures.  To  remain  inactive,  and  to  do 


504 


HISTORY  OF   THE 


nothing  would  be  the  -worst  thing  possible,  for 
our  colonists  would  perish  of  hunger  whilst  sur- 
rounded by  their  barrels  of  sugar  and  coffee,  and 
we  should  be  in  want  of  those  valuable  articles, 
with  our  warehouses  stored  with  unsold  corn 
and  salted  provisions." 

About  this  time  there  arrived  in  Bayonne  a 
certain  number  of  Spaniards,  men  of  high  re- 
spectability, who  had  been  selected,  by  order  of 
Napoleon,  from  the  different  provinces  of  Spain, 
for  the  purpose  of  forming  a  junta.  They  had 
readily  responded  to  his  summons ; — some,  be- 
cause they  felt  convinced  that,  for  the  welfare 
of  Spain,  to  save  her  from  a  destructive  war, 
to  preserve  her  colonies,  and  insure  her  regene- 
ration, it  was  necessary  to  support  the  Napo- 
leon dynasty ;  others,  because  they  were  at- 
tracted by  interest  and  curiosity,  or  by  the 
sympathy  which  an  extraordinary  man  never 
fails  to  inspire  Meanwhile,  the  insurrectional 
movement,  commenced  in  Madrid  on  the  2d  of 
May,  had  simultaneously  spread  into  several 
of  the  provinces.  In  Andalusia  it  was  favoured 
by  the  distance  of  the  French  troops ;  in  Ara- 
gon  by  the  national  spirit  prevailing  in  that 
frontier  province ;  in  the  Asturias  by  the  old 
feeling  of  independence  peculiar  to  that  inac- 
cessible region.  There  the  sentiments  of  the 
intelligent  class  of  the  people  were  subdued  by 
those  of  the  populace  who  were  less  alive  to 
political  considerations  than  offended  at  the 
deposition  of  a  national  dynasty.  In  those  pro- 
vinces the  attempt  to  nominate  deputies  for  the 
junta  would  have  been  abortive,  and  therefore 
the  government  at  Madrid  took  upon  itself  the 
task  of  nominating  them.  Some  of  the  deputies, 
though  commissioned  to  proceed  to  Bayonne, 
were  afraid  to  go,  for  the  idea  began  to  be 
generally  spread  abroad  that  those  who  went 
thither  would  never  return.  A  sort  of  popular 
and  superstitious  terror  pervaded  the  public 
mind.  The  troops  destined  for  the  Pyrenees, 
and  especially  the  life-guards,  refused  to  march 
— a  circumstance  the  more  unfortunate,  as  it 
served  to  strengthen  the  insurrectionary  feel- 
ing. Napoleon,  warned  by  Murat  of  this  dis- 
position of  the  public  mind,  sent  away,  for  a 
few  days,  MM.  de  Frias,  de  Medina-Celi,  and 
some  other  persons  of  note,  for  the  purpose  of 
showing  that  it  was  possible  for  persons  to  leave 
Bayonne  after  having  been  there. 

The  end  of  May  was  now  approaching,  and 
the  warmth  of  public  feeling  in  Spain  was  vi- 
sibly declining.  This  change  was  especially 
assignable  to  the  delay  in  proclaiming  the  new 
king.  Murat  urgently  insisted  that  matters 
should  be  brought  to  a  crisis ;  first,  for  deter- 
mining a  question  which  had  incessantly  occu- 
pied his  mind ;  and  next,  for  checking  the  in- 
creasing indifference  felt  towards  him  by  the 
Spaniards.  Napoleon,  who  clearly  perceived 
the  personal  motives  of  his  brother-in-law,  and 
who  could  not  hasten  the  arrival  of  the  answer 
he  expected  from  Naples,  wrote  in  a  very  angry 
tone  to  Murat.  The  latter,  agitated  by  a  thou- 
sand fears  and  hopes,  which  he  alternately  con- 
ceived and  abandoned,  and  tormented  by  the 
anjust  reproaches  of  Napoleon,  fell  ill  of  a 
fever,  caused  not  less  by  anxiety  of  mind  than 
by  the  effect  of  the  climate.  This  circumstance, 
which  placed  his  life  in  jeopardy,  served  to 
convince  the  ignorant  class  of  the  people  that 
Napoleon's  lieutenant  had  been  struck  by  the 


[June,  1808. 


avenging  hand  of  Providence.  This  popular 
superstition,  together  with  the  sudden  suspen- 
sion of  the  authority  of  the  lieutenant-general, 
were  not  a  little  unfortunate  in  the  then  exist- 
ing circumstances. 

At  the  commencement  of  June,  after  a  delay 
of  three  weeks,  Napoleon  received  intimation 
of  the  arrival  of  Joseph,  and  his  acceptance 
of  the  proposal  made  to  him : — the  delay  of 
both  the  answer  and  the  arrival  having  been 
the  unavoidable  consequence  of  distance.  Na- 
poleon determined  on  at  once  proclaiming  his 
brother  King  of  Spain,  so  that  he  might  pre- 
sent himself  with  that  title  in  Bayonne,  and 
there  receive  the  homage  of  the  junta.  He 
issued  a  decree,  in  which,  resting  upon  the  de- 
clarations of  the  council  of  Castille,  he  pro- 
claimed Joseph  Bonaparte  king  of  Spain  and 
the  Indies,  guarantying  to  the  new  sovereign 
the  integrity  of  his  dominions  in  Europe,  Africa, 
America,  and  Asia.  On  the  7th  of  June,  Na- 
poleon set  out  to  meet  Joseph  on  the  road  to 
Pau :  he  overwhelmed  him  with  demonstrations 
of  regard,  which,  though  dictated  by  policy, 
were  not  the  less  sincere  ;  for  he  loved  his  bro- 
ther, and  wished  to  give  him  credit  in  the  eyes 
of  the  junta.  Joseph,  though  transported  with 
joy  by  the  high  position  in  which  he  found  him- 
self, was  nevertheless  dismayed  by  the  difficul- 
ties he  beheld  in  perspective,  difficulties  of 
which  the  insurrection  in  Calabria  already  af- 
forded a  distinct  prognostic.  Like  all  persons 
suddenly  raised  to  greatness,  he  was  less  happy 
than  jealous  envy  supposed.  He  received  with 
a  certain  degree  of  alarm  the  sovereignty  of 
Spain,  which  Murat  had  so  ardently  longed 
for ;  and  his  perplexed  thoughts  turned  with 
regret  to  the  fair  kingdom  of  Naples,  which 
was  insufficient  to  satisfy  the  ambition  of  Mu- 
rat. This  strange  state  of  things  arose  out  of 
one  of  the  many  singular  positions  presented 
by  the  Bonaparte  family,  who,  after  being  at 
one  moment  elevated  by  a  great  man  to  the  re- 
gion of  marvels,  descended  again  to  the  region 
of  reality ;  falling  from  the  height  of  the  loftiest 
thrones  of  the  earth. 

As  soon  as  Joseph  arrived,  Napoleon  pre- 
sented to  him  those  Spaniards  of  high  rank  and 
importance  whom  he  had  successively  invited 
to  Bayonne,  either  to  be  members  of  the  junta, 
or  because  they  were  men  of  consideration 
whom  he  wished  to  know,  and  who,  flattered  by 
such  a  mark  of  attention,  readily  obeyed  his 
summons.  Joseph's  countenance  possessed  some 
traces  of  the  classic  beauty  which  marked  that 
of  Napoleon ;  he  had  not,  it  is  true,  the  per- 
fect regularity  of  features,  or  that  grandeur 
of  expression  which  imparted  to  the  conqueror 
of  Rivoli  aad  Austerlitz  a  resemblance  to  Caesar 
or  Alexander.  But  Joseph,  on  the  other  hand, 
possessed  extreme  amiability  of  manners,  and 
a  certain  grace,  combined  with  some  slight 
share  of  borrowed  dignity.  The  brothers  of 
Napoleon  had,  in  their  intercourse  with  him, 
contracted  the  facility  of  conversing  on  mili- 
tary affairs,  on  diplomacy  and  government ; 
and  on  all  those  subjects  they  possessed  such 
an  amount  of  general  information  as  was  re- 
quisite to  make  them  feel  at  ease  in  the  extra- 
ordinary positions  to  which  the  author  of  their 
fortunes  had  raised  them ;  moreover,  they  were 
not  wanting  in  natural  intelligence.  The  Spa- 
nish grandees,  who  were  ignorant,  and  vain  of 


July,  1808.] 


CONSULATE  AND  THE  EMPIRE. 


605 


their  own  greatness,  had  already  been  fasci- 
nated by  the  presence  of  Napoleon ;  and  Joseph, 
by  bis  amiable  manners,  and  a  display  of  the 
stock  of  information  he  had  acquired  in  Naples, 
succeeded  in  pleasing  and  inspiring  them  with 
confidence  in  his  capacity.  Servility  is  conta- 
gious ;  and  the  Spaniards  who  were  gathered 
round  the  new  king  began  to  laud  his  virtues, 
and  even  to  put  faith  in  his  high  qualities. 
The  Dukes  de  San  Carlos,  De  1'Infantado,  Del 
Parque,  De  Frias,  De  Hijar,  and  De  Castel 
Franco ;  the  Counts  de  Fernan-Nufiez,  De  Or- 
gaz,  and  even  the  famous  CevalloSj  with  all  his 
hostility  to  the  French,  were  already  persuaded 
that  the  interests  of  Spain  demanded  submis- 
sion to  the  new  dynasty ;  a  fact  which  certainly 
admitted  of  no  doubt.  O'Famll  and  De  Azanzn, 
the  ministers  of  war  and  of  finance,  who  had 
been  invited  to  Bayonne,  were  led  to  the  same 
conviction  ;  which  was,  however,  on  their  part, 
much  more  natural,  for,  not  being  courtiers, 
but  mere  men  of  business,  they  were  not  influ- 
enced by  private  or  personal  feelings,  and  had 
no  political  object  but  to  secure  the  greatest 
degree  of  benefit  to  their  country.  In  the 
minds  of  such  men  there  could  exist  no  doubt 
of  the  advantage  of  superseding  the  old  dynasty 
by  the  new  one.  Moreover,  their  introduction 
to  Napoleon  had  filled  them  with  admiration, 
and  made  them  almost  forget  his  conduct  to- 
wards the  dethroned  family.  They  readily 
pledged  themselves  to  serve  the  new  king. 
Whilst  awaiting  the  arrival  of  Joseph,  Napo- 
leon, in  conjunction  with  the  Spaniards  pre- 
sent in  Bayonne,  had  drawn  up  the  plan  of  a 
constitution  adapted  at  once  to  the  age  and  to 
the  manners  of  Spain.  It  was  determined  that 
the  junta  should  assemble  in  the  ancient  epis- 
copal palace  of  Bayonne,  which  was  arranged 
for  the  purpose  ;  that  there  the  king  should  be 
recognised  and  the  constitution  discussed,  so 
as  to  give  the  appearance  of  a  free  and  volun- 
tary adoption.  The  whole  plan  was  carried 
into  effect  with  military  promptitude  and  pre- 
cision. Joseph  had  arrived  on  the  7th  of  June. 
On  the  15th  the  junta  was  convoked,  the  pre- 
sident being  SeSor  de  Azanza,  minister  of 
finance  under  Ferdinand  VII.,  now  destined  to 
fill  the  same  post  under  Joseph  Bonaparte,  and 
well  worthy  to  fill  it  under  any  enlightened  sove- 
reign. Senor  de  Urquijo  discharged  the  du- 
ties of  secretary.  After  a  few  formal  speeches, 
(all  adverting  to  th«  advantage  of  receiving 
from  the  hand  of  Napoleon  a  member  of  that 
miraculous  dynasty,  which  had  been  sent  on 
earth  for  the  regeneration  of  thrones,  and  an- 
nouncing that  that  member  was  Joseph  Bona- 
parte,) the  imperial  decree  proclaiming  Joseph 
king  of  Spam  and  of  the  Indies  was  read. 
The  junta  then  waited  on  the  new  king  to  offer 
the  homage  of  the  Spanish  nation ;  of  which, 
unluckily,  they  represented  the  intelligence  but 
not  the  passions.  After  taking  leave  of  Joseph, 
the  junta  visited  Napoleon,  and  returned  thanks 
to  the  powerful  benefactor,  to  whom,  they  be- 
lieved, they  owed  a  bright  and  prosperous  future. 
Several  succeeding  days  were  occupied  in 
discussing  the  plan  of  the  constitution ;  some 
changes  were  suggested  and  taken  into  consi- 
deration. It  was  framed  on  the  model  of  the 
French  constitution,  with  some  modifications 
adapted  to  the  manners  of  the  Spaniards ;  and 
it  contained  the  following  provisions : — 
Vou  IL— 64 


An  hereditary  monarchy,  transmissible  in  th« 
male  line,  in  the  order  of  primogeniture,  re- 
versible from  the  branch  of  Joseph,  to  those 
of  Louis  and  Jerome.  Any  union  of  the  crown 
of  Spain  with  the  crown  of  France  was  ex- 
pressly interdicted,  and  thus  the  independence 
of  Spain  was  secured. 

A  senate  composed  of  twenty-four  members, 
like  that  of  France,  was  intrusted  with  the  de- 
fence of  the  constitution,  and  also  empowered 
to  protect  the  liberty  of  the  press  and  personal 
liberty ;  a  commission  being  appointed  to  make 
known  cases  in  which  either  freedom  of  the 
press  or  of  persons  should  be  violated. 

An  assembly  of  the  Cortes,  comprising,  tin- 
der the  name  of  the  Bench  of  Clergy,  twenty- 
five  bishops,  chosen  by  the  king;  under  the 
name  of  Bench  of  NobiUty,  twenty-five  grandees 
of  Spain,  also  chosen  by  the  king ;  sixty-two 
deputies  from  the  provinces  of  Spain  and  the 
Indies ;  thirty  deputies  from  the  principal  cities ; 
fifteen  eminent  merchants ;  fifteen  literary  and 
scientific  men,  the  latter  representing  the  uni- 
versities and  academies ;  all  to  be  elected  by 
those  whom  they  were  to  represent.  The  as- 
sembly, which  was  to  be  convoked  at  least 
every  three  years,  was  to  discuss  the  laws,  and 
to  fix  the  revenue  and  expenditure  for  three 
years  to  come. 

A  permanent  magistracy,  dispensing  justice 
according  to  the  forms  of  modern  legislature, 
under  the  supreme  jurisdiction  of  a  high  court, 
which  was  to  be  no  other  than  the  Council  of 
Castille,  under  the  title  of  Court  of  Cassation. 
Finally,  a  Council  of  State,  for  the  supreme 
regulation  of  the  government,  on  the  model  of 
that  of  France. 

Such  was  the  constitution  of  Bayonne,  which 
was  certainly  alike  adapted  to  the  manners  of 
Spain,  and  to  the  state  of  her  political  advance- 
ment. It  made  no  mention  of  the  inquisition, 
the  clergy,  or  the  privileges  of  the  nobility; 
for  it  had  been  drawn  up  with  a  desire  not  to 
give  umbrage  to  any  class  of  the  people.  To 
the  legislature  was  consigned  the  task  of  sub- 
sequently deducing  consequences  from  the  prin- 
ciples laid  down  in  this  act,  which  contained 
the  germ  of  the  regeneration  of  Spain. 

The  discussions  on  the  constitution  being 
ended,  a  royal  sitting  was  held  on  the  7th  of 
July,  in  the  episcopal  palace.  Joseph,  seated 
on  the  throne,  read  a  speech  expressive  of  the 
sentiments  of  devotion  with  which  he  was  about 
to  assume  the  government  of  Spain ;  then  lay- 
ing his  hand  on  the  Gospel,  he  took  the  oath 
of  allegiance  to  the  new  constitution.  At  the 
close  of  these  proceedings,  which  elicited  loud 
and  enthusiastic  acclamations,  the  assembly 
adjourned  to  Marac,  to  compliment  the  man 
whose  will  ruled  the  events  of  the  time. 

It  was  urgent  that  Joseph  should  forthwith 
take  possession  of  his  kingdom.      It  was  said 
that  the  Spaniards,  irritated  at  sight  of  the 
blood  shed  on  the  2d  of  May  in  Madrid,  and 
indignant  at  the  artifice  which  had  enticed  the 
Bourbon  family  to  Bayonne,  were  already  show 
ing  symptoms  of  discontent ;  that  an  insurrec 
tionary  feeling  prevailed  in  Andalusia,  in  Ara 
gon,  and  in  the  Asturias,  and  that  the  route 
by  which  the  king  had  to  travel  was  scarcely 
safe.     Nevertheless,  it  was  indispensable  that 
Joseph  should  go  to  relieve  Murat,  now  ill,  and 
in  a  delirium  of  impatience  to  quit  a  countrjr 


506 


CONSULATE   AND    THE    EMPIRE. 


[July,  180P. 


which  had  become  hateful  to  him,  and  in  which 
he  could  not  remain  without  peril  to  his  life. 

Napoleon,  beginning  to  perceive  the  real  state 
of  things,  and  unwilling  to  send  his  brother 
into  a  foreign  country  in  a  way  which  would 
not  command  respect,  prepared  new  military 
forces  for  his  escort.  The  reserves  of  infantry 
formed  at  Orleans,  and  the  reserves  of  cavalry 
assembled  at  Poitiers,  had  already  entered 
Spain  under  the  command  of  Generals  Verdier 
and  Lasalle,  and  they  formed  a  corps  cTarmSe, 
which  occupied  the  centre  of  Castille.  Some 
old  regiments,  drafted  from  the  grand  army, 
were  sent  to  the  coast  camps,  and,  from  the 
forces  previously  occupying  those  camps,  four 
fine  regiments  were  selected, — viz.,  the  13th  of 
the  line,  and  the  2d,  4th,  and  12th  light  infan- 
try. To  these  were  added  some  Polish  lancers, 
and  a  superb  regiment  of  cavalry,  raised  by 
Murat  in  the  territory  of  Berg ;  and,  out  of  all 
these  various  corps,  Napoleon  composed  a  divi- 
sion of  veteran  troops,  amidst  which  Joseph 
was  to  advance  on  Madrid  by  short  stages, 
thereby  affording  the  troops  the  indulgence  of 
slow  marches,  and  giving  the  Spaniards  ample 
opportunities  of  seeing  their  ne-w  king.  The 
junta  and  the  grandees  of  Spain  followed  in 
the  suite  of  the  king,  all  proceeding  by  short 
and  slow  journeys. 

Joseph  departed  on  the  9th  of  July,  escorted 
by  veteran  troops,  and  preceded  and  followed 
by  upwards  of  a  hundred  carriages,  filled  with 
the  members  of  the  junta.  Napoleon  conducted 
his  brother  to  the  frontier  of  France,  where  he 
affectionately  took  leave  of  him.  He  recom- 
mended him  to  be  of  good  heart,  whilst  he 
hinted  only  partially  what  his  keen  intelligence 
enabled  him  to  foresee.  The  irresolute  spirit 
of  Joseph  would  have  sunk  under  the  disclo- 
sures which  his  brother  could  have  made ;  and 
yet  Napoleon's  keen  glance,  though  it  enabled 


him  to  see  the  impending  future,  did  not  dis- 
cern one  half  of  the  evils  which  were  destined 
to  result  from  the  great  fault  committed  at 
Bayonne. 

Such  were  the  measures  to  which  Napoleon 
was  prompted  by  his  deference  to  a  systematic 
idea,  rather  than  by  feelings  of  family  affec- 
tion, for  he  had  the  means  of  establishing  all 
his  relations  in  high  positions,  without  usurp- 
ing the  crown  of  Spain,  and  dethroning  the 
last  of  the  Bourbons  reigning  in  Europe.  By 
reason  of  the  weakness  of  the  Spanish  Bour- 
bons, he  could  not  resort  to  force,  for  it  would 
have  been  ridiculous  to  declare  war  against 
Charles  IV.  He  therefore  had  recourse  to 
stratagem,  and  he  forced  them  to  fly  by  arous- 
ing their  fears.  The  indignation  of  Spain  hav- 
ing arrested  the  unfortunate  Bourbons  in  their 
flight,  Napoleon  took  advantage  of  their  family 
discord  and  enticed  them  to  Bayonne  by  the 
hope  of  obtaining  justice,  which  justice  he  dis- 
pensed in  the  manner  of  the  judge  in  the  fable, 
who  gave  an  oyster-shell  to  each  dissentient 
party.  He  was  led  on  from  stratagem  to  dis- 
honesty, and  thereby  affixed  to  his  name  one 
of  the  two  great  stains  which  tarnish  his  glory. 
To  have  escaped  from  this  stigma,  he  must 
have  effected  the  good  which  he  intended  to 
render  to  Spain ;  and,  by  Spain,  he  must  have 
secured  the  advantages  he  contemplated  for 
France.  Providence  did  not  reserve  for  him 
the  opportunity  of  absolving  himself  from  an 
act  of  perfidy  unworthy  of  his  character. 

But  why  anticipate  the  justice  which  time 
never  fails  to  award.  In  the  events  which  re- 
main to  be  narrated,  stern  justice  will  be  seen 
arising  out  of  the  events  themselves,  and  show- 
ing, by  its  punishment,  that  men  of  high  genius, 
no  more  than  those  of  ordinary  capacity,  can 
hope  for  dispensation  for  any  departure  from 
rectitude  and  common  sense. 


END  OF  VOL.   II. 


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